Economics 280C Spring 2005 Reading List Updated: 1/4/05
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Exchange Rate Policies
Exchange Rate Policies Charles Engel Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research Senior Fellow, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas July 28, 2009 Email: [email protected]. Address: Department of Economics, 1180 Observatory Drive, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706-1393, USA. This note was prepared as background for the wrap-up conferences of the BIS Asian research programme, The International Financial Crisis and Policy Challenges in Asia and the Pacific, in Shanghai, 6-8 August 2009. I acknowledge support for my research from the Duisenberg Fellowship at the European Central Bank, and from the National Science Foundation under grant #MSN121092. A debate has continued over many years on the desirable degree of foreign exchange rate flexibility. One side of the debate has sometimes made the case that the exchange rate should be freely determined by market forces, independently of any foreign exchange intervention or targeting by central bank monetary policy. This argument takes the stance that the market can best determine the appropriate level of the exchange rate. From the standpoint of modern macroeconomics, particularly from the view of New Keynesian economics, that stance is potentially self-contradictory. Markets are able to achieve efficient, welfare-maximizing outcomes when they operate without distortions – that is, when markets are competitive and prices adjust instantly to reflect underlying costs. But in such a world, the nominal exchange rate regime is of no consequence in determining the real allocation of resources. The real exchange rate (the consumer price level in one country compared to the level in another country, expressed in a common currency) and the terms of trade (the price of a country’s imports relative to its exports) could adjust freely to efficient levels under a floating nominal exchange rate regime, a managed float or even a fixed exchange rate regime if goods markets were perfectly efficient. -
Christian Hellwig
CHRISTIAN HELLWIG Professeur Associé d’Economie, Université Toulouse 1, Capitole Toulouse School of Economics, Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 Allées de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse Email: [email protected] Telephone: +33 (0) 5 61 12 85 93 EDUCATION Ph.D. in Economics, London School of Economics, November 2002 M.Sc. in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, with distinction, London School of Economics, July 1999 B.A. in Economics, University of Lausanne, July 1998 Visiting Student, Oberlin College, August 1994 – June 1995 CURRENT ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS Professeur Associé, Université de Toulouse 1 Capitole, September 2010 – present Member, Toulouse School of Economics, September 2010 – present Member, Institut d’Economie Industrielle, September 2010 – present Research Affiliate, Centre for Economic Policy Research, July 2007 – present ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE Associate Professor (with tenure), Department of Economics, UCLA, July 2007 – present (on leave 2010-11) Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, UCLA, July 2002 – June 2007 Visiting Research Fellowship, Fondazione Ente ‘Luigi Einaudi’, Rome, June 2007, September 2008 Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Columbia University, September – December 2006 Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, September – December 2004 Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, March 2004 Visiting Scholar and Instructor, Department of Economics, MIT, September 2000 – June 2002 Research Assistant, Financial Markets Group, LSE, September 1999 – July 2000 PUBLICATIONS IN REFEREED JOURNALS Setting the Right Prices for the Wrong Reasons, with Venky Venkateswaran, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 56 (S), p. S57-S77 (October 2009) Bubbles and Self-enforcing Debt, with Guido Lorenzoni, Econometrica, vol. 77 (4), p. 1137-1164 (July 2009) Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition, with Laura Veldkamp, Review of Economic Studies, vol. -
The Real Exchange Rate, Real Interest Rates, and the Risk Premium
IHS Economics Series Working Paper 265 April 2011 The Real Exchange Rate, Real Interest Rates, and the Risk Premium Charles Engel Impressum Author(s): Charles Engel Title: The Real Exchange Rate, Real Interest Rates, and the Risk Premium ISSN: Unspecified 2011 Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) Josefstädter Straße 39, A-1080 Wien E-Mail: offi [email protected] Web: ww w .ihs.ac. a t All IHS Working Papers are available online: http://irihs. ihs. ac.at/view/ihs_series/ This paper is available for download without charge at: https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/2050/ 265 Reihe Ökonomie Economics Series The Real Exchange Rate, Real Interest Rates, and the Risk Premium Charles Engel 265 Reihe Ökonomie Economics Series The Real Exchange Rate, Real Interest Rates, and the Risk Premium Charles Engel April 2011 Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna Contact: Charles Engel Department of Economics University of Wisconsin 1180 Observatory Drive Madison, WI 53706-1393 email: [email protected] Founded in 1963 by two prominent Austrians living in exile – the sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the economist Oskar Morgenstern – with the financial support from the Ford Foundation, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education and the City of Vienna, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) is the first institution for postgraduate education and research in economics and the social sciences in Austria. The Economics Series presents research done at the Department of Economics and Finance and aims to share “work in progress” in a timely way before formal publication. -
![International Macroeconomics Prospectus[1]](https://docslib.b-cdn.net/cover/2652/international-macroeconomics-prospectus-1-472652.webp)
International Macroeconomics Prospectus[1]
International Macroeconomics Prospectus Professor: Ethan Kaplan Spring, 2006 This course will focus on the main area of research in international macroeconomics and international finance: the determination of the exchange rate and the determination of the current account. The exchange rate will be studied in both regular modes and crisis modes under fixed, floating and currency band models. The current account will be studied in both regular as well as crisis modes, incorporating both determinants of levels as well as sustainability issues. The course will begin with a 2-period and then an infinite horizon real-side model of current account determination. Current account determination will then be revisited in the presence of uncertainty. Uncertainty leaves open the possibility of default (Obstfeld-Rogoff, Chapters 1, 2, and 5). The course will then continue with models of sovereign default (Bulow-Rogoff, 1989). Recent theoretical as well as empirical work will be considered. The course will then turn towards the nominal side of the economy, looking at exchange rate determination. The first topic on exchange rate determination will be PPP models. We will discuss empirical work on whether or not there is convergence to PPP in the long and short run. Then, we will look at Dornbusch’s sticky-price model of exchange rate determination (Dornbusch, 1976). Krugman´s currency band model (Krugman, 1991) will also be considered. The course will then consider more recent new open economy macroeconomic models of exchange rate determination, starting with Obsteld-Rogoff (1994). Included in the new open economy macro discussion will be recent work on the impact of net asset holdings in exchange rate and current account determination. -
Economics 280C Spring 2009 Reading List Updated: 1/16/09
Economics 280C Spring 2009 Reading List Updated: 1/16/09 Maurice Obstfeld Classes will be held Tuesdays 10:00 A.M. -12:00 P.M. in 639 Evans Hall. Textbooks The main required text for the course is: Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, Foundations of International Macroeconomics (MIT Press, 1996). An additional book you may wish to obtain (available in paperback) is: Nelson C. Mark, International Macroeconomics and Finance: Theory and Econometric Methods (Blackwell Publishers, 2001) Topics and Additional Readings Note: Many pre-early 2000s works are available at JSTOR. Elsevier journals are available online. Many recent working papers or pre-publication versions of published works are at http://www.nber.org. 1. Traditional Macro Models and Monetary Policy Baxter, Marianne, and Alan C. Stockman, "Business Cycles and the Exchange Rate Regime: Some International Evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics 23 (May 1989): 377-400. Dornbusch, Rudiger, "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy 84 (December 1976): 1161-76. Engel, Charles, and Kenneth D. West, "Taylor Rules and the Deutschmark-Dollar Real Exchange Rate," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 38 (August 2006): 1175-94. Engel, Charles, Nelson C. Mark, and Kenneth D. West, "Exchange Rate Models Are Not as Bad as You Think," NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2007, forthcoming. http://www.nber.org/books_in_progress/macro22/engel-et-al8-2-07.pdf Flood, Robert P., and Mark P. Taylor, "Exchange Rate Economics: What's Wrong with the Conventional Macro Approach?" in The Microstructure of Foreign 1 Exchange Markets, edited by Jeffrey A. Frankel, Giampaolo Galli, and Alberto Giovannini (University of Chicago Press, 1996). -
Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity, and Volatility
Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity, and Volatility By GEORGE-MARIOS ANGELETOS AND IVA´ N WERNING* Crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored. We study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information. The asset price aggre- gates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal. In contrast to the case with exogenous information, our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information: multiplicity is ensured with small noise. In addition, we show that: (a) multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself; (b) less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique; and (c) similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another’s actions, highlighting the importance of endogenous infor- mation more generally. (JEL D53, D82, D83) It’s a love-hate relationship—economists are outcomes, but often lack obvious comparable at once fascinated and uncomfortable with mul- changes in fundamentals. Many attribute an im- tiple equilibria. On the one hand, crises can be portant role to more or less arbitrary shifts in described as times of high nonfundamental vol- “market sentiments” or “animal spirits,” and atility: they involve large and abrupt changes in models with multiple equilibria formalize these ideas.1 On the other hand, these models can also be viewed as incomplete theories, which should * Angeletos: Department of Economics, Massachusetts ultimately be extended along some dimension Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142, and National Bureau of Economic Research to resolve the indeterminacy. -
Michael B. Devereux, Charles Engel
Expectations and Exchange Rate Policy Michael B. Devereux Charles Engel UBC Wisconsin November 25, 2005 Preliminary Draft Abstract Both empirical evidence and theoretical discussion has long emphasized the impact of `news’ on exchange rates. In most exchange rate models, the exchange rate acts as an asset price, and as such responds to news about future returns on assets. But the exchange rate also plays a role in determining the relative price of non-durable goods. In this paper we argue that these two roles may conflict with one another when nominal goods prices are sticky. If news about future asset returns causes movements in current exchange rates, then when nominal prices are slow to adjust, this may cause changes in current relative goods prices that have no efficiency rationale. In this sense, anticipations of future shocks to fundamentals can cause current exchange rate misalignments. We outline a series of models in which an optimal policy eliminates news shocks on exchange rates. Much of analysis of open economy macroeconomics in the past 30 years has been built on the foundation that exchange rates are asset prices and that some goods prices adjust more slowly than asset prices. If this is true, it means that exchange rates wear two hats: They are asset prices that determine the relative price of two monies, but they also are important in determining the relative prices of goods in international markets in the short run. For example, if export prices are sticky in the exporting currency, then nominal exchange rate movements directly change the terms of trade. -
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities
ISSUES IN MACROECONOMIC POLICY DESIGN Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities By GEORGE-MARIOS ANGELETOS AND ALESSANDRO PAVAN* Economies with production externalities, de- spect to public information, which increases the mand spillovers, incomplete financial markets, volatility generated by common noise in market and Keynesian frictions are only a few exam- expectations. Moreover, when information is ples of those in which macroeconomic comple- heterogeneous, an increase in the precision of mentarities play a prominent role. Within this public information may have the perverse effect class of economies, how does the precision of of increasing aggregate volatility, by increasing publicly provided and privately collected infor- the sensitivity of economic activity to common mation affect equilibrium allocations and social noise. On the contrary, an increase in the pre- welfare? And what is the optimal transparency cision of private information necessarily re- in the information conveyed, for example, by duces aggregate volatility. Nevertheless, we economic statistics, policy announcements, or show that, as long as there is no value to lotter- news in the media? To answer these questions, ies, welfare unambiguously increases with an we consider a simple real economy where the increase in either the relative or the absolute individual return to investment is increasing in precision of public information. Hence, policies the aggregate level of investment and where that either disseminate more precise informa- market participants have heterogenous expecta- tion about economic fundamentals or reduce the tions about the underlying economic fundamen- heterogeneous interpretation of economic statis- tals (the exogenous productivity). We interpret tics and policy measures necessarily boost wel- an increase in the transparency of public infor- fare. -
Effects of Us Quantitative Easing on Emerging Market Economies
ADBI Working Paper Series EFFECTS OF US QUANTITATIVE EASING ON EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES Saroj Bhattarai, Arpita Chatterjee, and Woong Yong Park No. 803 January 2018 Asian Development Bank Institute Saroj Bhattarai is assistant professor of economics, University of Texas, US. Arpita Chatterjee is senior lecturer at the School of Economics, University of New South Wales. Woong Yong Park is assistant professor at Seoul National University. The views expressed in this paper are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of ADBI, ADB, its Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. ADBI does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts no responsibility for any consequences of their use. Terminology used may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms. Working papers are subject to formal revision and correction before they are finalized and considered published. The Working Paper series is a continuation of the formerly named Discussion Paper series; the numbering of the papers continued without interruption or change. ADBI’s working papers reflect initial ideas on a topic and are posted online for discussion. ADBI encourages readers to post their comments on the main page for each working paper (given in the citation below). Some working papers may develop into other forms of publication. ADB recognizes “China” as the People’s Republic of China; “Hong Kong” as Hong Kong, China; and “Korea” as the Republic of Korea. Suggested citation: Bhattarai, S., A. Chatterjee, and W.Y. Park. 2018. Effects of US Quantitative Easing on Emerging Market Economies. -
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps
Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps George-Marios Angeletos Massachusetts Institute of Technology and National Bureau of Economic Research Christian Hellwig University of California, Los Angeles Alessandro Pavan Northwestern University This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric in- formation has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria. The policy maker is thus trapped into a We are grateful to the editor, Nancy Stokey, and two anonymous referees for suggestions that greatly helped us improve the paper. For comments we thank Daron Acemoglu, Andy Atkeson, Philippe Bacchetta, Gadi Barlevy, Marco Bassetto, Olivier Blanchard, Ricardo Caballero, V. V. Chari, Eddie Dekel, Glenn Ellison, Paul Heidhues, Patrick Kehoe, Robert Lucas Jr., Narayana Kocherlakota, Kiminori Matsuyama, Stephen Morris, Bala`zs Szentes, Jean Tirole, Muhamet Yildiz, Iva´n Werning, and seminar participants at Athens University of Economics and Business, Berkeley, Carnegie-Mellon, Harvard, Iowa, Lausanne, London School of Economics, Mannheim, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Northwestern, Stanford, Stony Brook, Toulouse, University of California at Los Angeles, University of Pennsylvania, the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Cleveland, and Minneapolis, the 2002 annual meeting of the Society for Economic Dynamics, the 2002 Universita´PompeuFabra workshop on coordination games, the 2003 Centre for Economic Policy Research Euro- pean Summer Symposium in International Macroeconomics, and the 2003 workshop of the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics. We also thank Emily Gallagher for excellent editing assistance. -
A REEXAMINATION Charles Engel Working Paper 14829
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES CURRENCY MISALIGNMENTS AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY: A REEXAMINATION Charles Engel Working Paper 14829 http://www.nber.org/papers/w14829 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 April 2009 I am indebted very much to Gianluca Benigno, Mick Devereux, Jon Faust, Lars Svensson and Mike Woodford for comments and suggestions at various stages of this work. I thank Chris Kent for detailed comments on an earlier draft. I acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation through grant no. 0451671. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2009 by Charles Engel. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Currency Misalignments and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Reexamination Charles Engel NBER Working Paper No. 14829 April 2009 JEL No. E52,F41 ABSTRACT This paper examines optimal monetary policy in an open-economy two-country model with sticky prices. We show that currency misalignments are inefficient and lower world welfare. We find that optimal policy must target not only inflation and the output gap, but also the currency misalignment. However the interest rate reaction function that supports this targeting rule may involve only the CPI inflation rate. -
Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities
ISSUES IN MACROECONOMIC POLICY DESIGN Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities By GEORGE-MARIOS ANGELETOS AND ALESSANDRO PAVAN* Economies with production externalities, de- spect to public information, which increases the mand spillovers, incomplete financial markets, volatility generated by common noise in market and Keynesian frictions are only a few exam- expectations. Moreover, when information is ples of those in which macroeconomic comple- heterogeneous, an increase in the precision of mentarities play a prominent role. Within this public information may have the perverse effect class of economies, how does the precision of of increasing aggregate volatility, by increasing publicly provided and privately collected infor- the sensitivity of economic activity to common mation affect equilibrium allocations and social noise. On the contrary, an increase in the pre- welfare? And what is the optimal transparency cision of private information necessarily re- in the information conveyed, for example, by duces aggregate volatility. Nevertheless, we economic statistics, policy announcements, or show that, as long as there is no value to lotter- news in the media? To answer these questions, ies, welfare unambiguously increases with an we consider a simple real economy where the increase in either the relative or the absolute individual return to investment is increasing in precision of public information. Hence, policies the aggregate level of investment and where that either disseminate more precise informa- market participants have heterogenous expecta- tion about economic fundamentals or reduce the tions about the underlying economic fundamen- heterogeneous interpretation of economic statis- tals (the exogenous productivity). We interpret tics and policy measures necessarily boost wel- an increase in the transparency of public infor- fare.