Southern Political Science Association

The Antifederalists, the First Congress, and the First Parties Author(s): John H. Aldrich and Ruth W. Grant Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 55, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 295-326 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2132267 Accessed: 20-08-2014 14:05 UTC

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This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions TheAnti,federalists, the First Congress, andthe First Parties

John H. Aldrich Ruth W. Grant Duke University

It is regularlyargued that the ratificationof the federalConstitution and the formationof the Fed- eralist and JeffersonianRepublican parties marked points of significantdiscontinuity between politics before the new Constitutionand thereafter.In this paper, we argue that there was significantcontinu- ity in politics in this period. In particular,we argue that the antifederalistrepresentatives in the First Congresshelped create such continuity in both debate and voting. Issues that arose in the First Con- gress were regularlytied to constitutionalquestions, sometimes explicitly so, as in passageof the constitutionalamendments and in the question of executive removalpowers. At other times, notably in debate and action over Hamilton'sfiscal plan, the constitutionalissues formed the basis for interpret- ing the particularpolicies at hand. We argue that the antifederalistsforged such links in debate, help- ing to establish the grounds for the opposition of Madison and his supportersto Hamiltoniangoals. Moreover,their votes made up a substantialproportion of that opposition, and they served as part of the coalitionthat eventuallyformed the JeffersonianRepublican party. We also arguethat the formation of new institutionslike political partiesneeds to be understoodnot only in terms of the interestsand politicalgoals of their creators,but also in terms of the ideas and principlesthat motivatedtheir actions.

INTRODUCTION

I never submittedthe whole system of my opinions to the creed of any partyof men whatever in religion,in philosophy,in politics, or in anythingelse where I was capableof thinkingfor my- self. Such addictionis the last degradationof a free and moralagent. If I could not go to heaven but with a party,I would not go there at all ... ThomasJefferson to FrancisHopkinson, March 13, 1789

Were partieshere divided merelyby a greedinessfor office, as in England,to take a part with eitherwould be unworthyof a reasonableor moralman. But wherethe principleof differenceis as substantial,and as stronglypronounced as betweenthe republicansand monocratsof our country, I hold it as honorableto takea firmand decidedpart, and as immoralto pursuea middleline, as between the partiesof honestmen and rogues,into which everycountry is divided. Jeffersonto WilliamB. Giles, Dec. 31, 1795

Most studies of the First Congress have been motivated by the desire to explain the rapid and unanticipated development of the first national political

Some of the data analyzed here were made availablethrough the InterUniversityConsortium for Political and Social Research.Support was also generouslymade availablethrough a grant from the

THEJoURNAL OF POLITICS,Vol. 55, No. 2, May 1993, Pp. 295-326 C 1993 by the Universityof Texas Press

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parties.While this is certainlyan importantquestion, focusing on party development has distortedthe picture of the politics of the immediatepostratification period and has led to a seriousmisunderstanding of the continuitiesbetween the politics of the 1780s and those of the 1790s. The distortioncan be attributedin part to a concentrationon institutionaldevelopment that excludes politicalideology. One aim of this paperis to demonstratethat an explanationcentered on the relationbetween ideology and institutionsis more complete than those offeredby alternative approaches. The centralargument of this paperis that there were significantcontinuities in national politics between the controversiessurrounding ratification and those of the first few Congresses,and indeed that the rise of nationalparties cannot be ex- plainedwithout takingthis continuityinto account.Evidence of continuityis to be found particularlyin the debatesof the First Congresswhere antifederalistrepre- sentativesplayed an importantrole, not only in the early discussionsof constitutional issues left unresolved by ratification,but also in shaping the response to AlexanderHamilton's fiscal plan. Hamilton'sopponents saw his plan in the light of an understandingof republicanismthat had been articulatedby the antifederalists during the ratificationcampaign.' The plan was interpretedas an attempt to create a partisanfinancial elite, which would subvert the new and fragilerepublic in the directionof aristocracyand monarchy.Antifederalists had warnedthat the governmentunder the new Constitutionwould have this tendency. The central question of the ratificationdebate was whether republicangovernment could be viableon a nationalscale. This "regimequestion" remained open in the 1790s, although its focus shifted from the merits of the Constitutionitself to which of the potentialtendencies within the Constitution'sframework would prove dominant. Antifederalistrepresentatives played a central role in their roll-call voting behavior as well as in the expression of their political beliefs. While their votes were generallycast on the losing side, the minority was typicallyquite large, and anti- federalistsprovided much of that opposition.In mattersof fiscal policy, they often joined with James Madison and his allies and, thus, played a major role in the transitionthat led to the eventualcreation of the Republicanparty. This view contrastssharply with the dominant view that ratificationdefeated the antifederalistsonce and for all and opened a new chapterin Americannational politics. There were echoes of the old debates in the First Congress, to be sure, but these were mainly confined, in this view, to the "housewarming"tasks that were needed to get the nation underway.Even the final form of the Bill of

Duke University ResearchCouncil. We would like to thankHoward Lubert and Phil Paolinofor their assistance,and CalvinJillson, WilliamH. Riker, and Rick K. Wilson for their commentson an earlier draft.None of these institutionsor individualsare responsiblefor the contents of this paper.We retain responsibilityfor all remainingerrors. 'For the view that the antifederalistsand the JeffersonianRepublicans were both adherentsof a "country" or classicalrepublican "persuasion," and thus that there was significantideological similarity between them see Banning(1978). Additionalevidence to supportthis view can be found in McCoy (1980).

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Rights was less the productof continuingantifederalist influence than the result of clever maneuveringsby JamesMadison to minimizethe extent of compromisewith them. As ratificationmarked one point of major discontinuity, the introduction of Hamilton's fiscal plan in the First Congress marked a second. In this view, Hamilton's plan set events in motion that culminatedin the creationof the first modern politicalparties, dividing the heretoforeallies in ratification,Hamilton on one side and Madisonand Jefferson on the other. Indeed, most studies of the First Congress are in fact studies of the origins of "modern"political parties, wholly new inventions that ran strongly against prevailingmores, and even morals, and markedat least as great a discontinuityin democraticpolitics as the Constitution itself did. Many accounts of the new parties cite the difficultiesin the First and Second Congressesin grapplingwith Hamilton'splan as.leadingto the slow reali- zation that some form of extralegislativeorganizing was useful, if not necessary. In effect, a new era of Americanpolitics, unrelatedto the ratificationperiod, was initiated with Hamilton's plan; controversyspread to a wider public and in new directionswith disputes over relationswith Englandand France;and the process culminatedin genuine partisanshipin presidentialpolitics, leadingmen to place a high priority on the electoral success of parties as such (see Chambers 1963; Charles 1956; Cunningham1957; Formisano 1981, 1983; Goodman 1964, 1967).2 Those who have analyzed voting patterns come to much the same conclusions. Voting was effectively unstructuredin the First Congress, with voting blocs developing only gradually.These blocs were initially mostly sectional in character, and only later did "partisan"cleavages develop. Thus, analysts conclude that there was no continuitybetween politicaldivisions over ratificationand those divisions that were later expressedin congressionalvoting alignmentsassociated with fiscaland foreignpolicy issues.3 This conventional interpretation,however, leaves important questions unan- swered. While we agree that fiscal, foreign, and other policy debates did lead to party formation,we question whether these issues were new. National fiscal policy, funding of the war debt, and bankingwere all prominentpolitical issues long before the ConstitutionalConvention (Hammond 1957; Jillson and Wilson, forthcoming). Whether to ally more closely with Britain or France reflected divisions that extendedback nearly to the Revolution.It is thereforeunlikely that Hamilton's plan, rearousingold concerns, would produce entirely new lines of cleavage.And even if they did, why were these financialand foreign policy issues so divisive as to

2Buel (1972) agrees that Hamilton's program marked a new beginning in American politics but stressesthe importanceof ideologicalfactors. 3Bell (1973); Hoadley (1980, 1986); Libby (1912, 1913). Henderson (1973, 1974) and Ryan (1971) identify sectionallybased blocs that developedearly. The exception is Bowling (1968) who sees a pro- administrationand an antiadministrationbloc with the latter solidly based on the antifederalistsin the first session and becomingmore sectionalas southernfederalists joined.

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 298 John H. Aldrichand Ruth W. Grant lead men who sharedstrongly antiparty views to begin the processthat culminated in the organizationof nationalpolitical parties? Addressing these questionshas led us to a new interpretation. We believe that, while the Constitutionand the Republicanand Federalistpar- ties were indeed new organizationalforms, there was greatcontinuity nonetheless from the 1780s throughthe end of the century.The politicalthought of those who becamethe Republicansowed much to the antifederalists.Equally important, the formationof opposition to Hamilton and eventuallyto his Federalistparty owed much to the actions of antifederalistsin the First Congress,as evidenced by their votes on the floor of Congress.Antifederalist representatives made a criticalcon- tributionto the legislativeconflict that led Jeffersonand Madison to organizethe Republicanparty. Moreover, Republicanswere able to organize, not so much in spite of their antipartyviews, as because of them. They understoodthemselves to be fighting againstan antirepublicanparty, on behalf of the people as a whole, and only until the politicalenemy was defeated.Consequently, their efforts at politicalorganiza- tion could escape the usual condemnationof parties.4The ideology of the Jeffer- sonian Republicans provides the context within which their partisan activities make sense; it explains their opposition to the policies of the first administration; and it bearsa strikingresemblance to antifederalistthought. Investigatingthe continuity between the antifederalistsand the JeffersonianRepublicans is thus a com- mentaryon the relationbetween ideologyand institutionaldevelopment.5 Earlierinterpretations have emphasizedone or the other but have not explored their relation. One group of studies begins with the premise that parties are groups of men united either by their adherenceto fundamentalprinciples or by enduringcommon interests(Bowers 1926;Henry 1891;Hildreth 1856;Parrington 1930;and Beard 1928;Binkley [1943] 1962;Dauer 1953;Main 1973, respectively). Since partiesare understoodas naturaland inevitableexpressions of these under- lying differences, no explanation is offered for how men with antiparty views might have justifiedtheir own partisanactivities, or for why it is that new sorts of party organizationsbegan to emerge in the new republic. Moreover, continuities

4Partieswere condemned as "partial"in two senses; as representingthe interests of a part to the detrimentof the good of the whole and as biasedin their judgmentbecause acting in their own case. 'The bulk of the historicalresearch on the relationbetween the antifederalistsand Republicanshas focused on the socioeconomiccomposition of the groups supportingor opposing ratificationand sup- portingeither Federalistsor Republicans.Generally, the evidence suggests a high degree of correspondence between the political affiliationsof these groups, (variouslyidentified as "cosmopolitan"and "localist,"agrarian and commercial,etc.) in the 1780s and 1790s. In addition, a considerablyhigher proportionof antifederalistsjoined the Republicansthan joined the Federalistsin the early stages of the party conflict, and Republicanranks were later swelled by severalgroups that had previouslysup- portedthe Federalists.See Dauer 1953;Fischer 1965;Main 1973;and Risjord1969. While this evidence creates a presumptionin favor of the position that the conflicts of the 1790s were not entirely new, it does not addressthe question of the influenceof the ratificationcontroversy on party developmentor of the influence of the antifederalistsas such. The ideologicalconnection is most fully elaboratedin Banning(1978, 92-125).

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Antifederalists,the First Congress,and the First Parties 299 of politicalcleavages are establishedsimpy by noting similaritiesin the composition of competinggroups over time, without considerationof historicallinkages in the actionsof politiciansarranging active groups,alignments, and realignments.In short, when party strife is viewed either as a contest of "high" principlesor as a contest of "low"interests, the politics drops out of the picture. An alternativeapproach, and the currentlydominant one, places partydevelopment within the largerprocess of politicalmodernization and nation building. For those taking this approach, there is less concern with continuities of political issues than with the institutional characteristicsthat make the Federalists and especiallythe Republicansthe first politicalparties.6 A partyis understoodto be a distinctivelymodern institutionfulfilling specific politicalfunctions. But what en- abled men who still conceived of partiesas dangerouspolitical forces to form an effective political party?After all, national parties might have failed to develop despite their usefulness. One must still explain why the Republicanssuccessfully rose to the challengeby creatinga "modern"political institution in a mannerthat surpassedthe partisanefforts of the Federalists.7 The emphasison the Republicanparty as the first modern party has obscured the importanceof its origin in the ongoing ideologicalcontroversy over establishing nationalrepublicanism on a secure foundation.It is argued that the Republi- cans organizedin responseto politicalnecessities, simply rationalizingtheir activities "afterthe fact" (Chambers1963, 43-44); that the antifederalistsdisappeared after ratification,and that the partisandivisions in the First Congressreflect con- troversiesover particularinterests unrelated to the principleddisputes of the ratification campaignor earlier political controversies.These are the claims that are challengedhere. We claim instead that the organizationof the JeffersonianRepublicans would not have developedas it did without the context of the continuingconflict over republicanideology. Through an analysisof the debates of the First Congress, we will show in section 2 the role of antifederalistlegislators in keeping the "regime" question alive and in interpretingHamilton's program as an attackon republican institutions.Through an analysisof roll-call voting in the First Congress,we will show in section3 thatantifederalist representatives tended to vote togetheron constitutional questions;that they tended to vote together in opposition to Hamilton's proposals,lending supportto the contentionthat those proposalswere interpreted as constitutionalin scope; and that, while they were a small proportionof the

'Older institutionalforms that originatedin societies with fixed social orderswere graduallyreplaced in Americawith forms more appropriateto a society becomingdemocratic in the broadsense. Democ- ratizationinvolves an increasingemphasis on elections. It is for this reason that the JeffersonianRe- publicansare often consideredto be the first "modem" political party, because they were the first to turn, even if tentatively,to the electoralarena. In addition,some authorsargue that the Constitutionit- self provided new institutionalconditions conducive to party development(see Bell 1973; Chambers 1963;and Rudolph 1956). 'For some alternativeexplanations see Buel (1972, 91-92), Cunningham(1957, 258), and Hofstadter (1969, 4, 8, 18).

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Congress, they formed a significant proportion of the opposition forces that Hamilton'ssupporters were barelyable to defeat.

ANALYSIS OF DEBATES Jeffersonand Madisontook the first steps towardbuilding the Republicanparty in response to the alarmingevents of the First Congress. Accordingto the stan- dardinterpretation, these events were entirelyunprecedented.

The first session of Congress was devoted to establishing the executive departmentsand the judicial branch, and to other housewarmingchores. It was not until 1790 and 1791 that Hamiltonpresented his proposals,and a new politicalera opened (Chambers1963, 36). Yet, the claim that there was a radicaldiscontinuity between the politics of 1787- 1788 and the politics of 1790-1791 deserves to be greeted with some skepticism. First, almost every issue that was consequentialin the developmentof the first parties in the 1790s had been hotly contested, often in strikinglysimilar form, in the ContinentalCongress. Second, many of the same individualsparticipated in the ratificationcontroversy (and in the ContinentalCongress) and in the development of the first parties shortly thereafter.That these events were entirely unrelated is implausible. Jillson and Wilson (forthcoming)devote a chapterof their study of the Conti- nental Congress, for example, to the highly circumscribedrole members of the Continental Congress were willing to grant executive officers (see also Thach 1923, esp. pp. 55-75). They also give considerableattention to conflictsover economic issues that mirror Hamilton's proposalsnearly a decade later. These in- cluded debateover the formationof the superintendentof finance(the analogueto the secretaryof the treasuryin the First Congress)in 1781, and continuingdebate during the first half of the 1780s over SuperintendentRobert Morris's "Report on the Public Credit,"national debt, assumptionof state debts, and even the formation of a National Bank (with Morris's supportersin the Congress led by James Wilson [PA] and Hamilton). Relationswith France and even John Jay in his role as secretaryof foreignaffairs were significantconcerns in this period (albeitin this case in negotiationswith Spain), rehearsingpartisan conflict over the Jay Treaty a decadelater. Even the temporaryand permanentlocation of a home for the Con- gresswas debatedon essentiallythe same termsas it would be in the First Congress. These issues, and the frequentstalemate in resolvingthem due to the structure of the Congressunder the Articles of Confederation,helped set the stage for the ConstitutionalConvention. That is, stalemate over such basic and, as it would turn out, recurringissues was a significantforce in raising the "regimequestion" of the feasibility of Confederation.The failures of the Confederationled to the proposednew constitution,and the ratificationdebate raised the regime question in a new form, shifting its focus to the viability of a stronger, federal republic. With many in the First Congresshaving served in the ContinentalCongress and virtuallyall having figured prominentlyon one side or the other of ratification,it

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Antifederalists,the First Congress,and the First Parties 301 should be no surprisethat unsettledconstitutional issues and recurringsubstantive issues should have been understoodby all in terms of this regime questionand the debateover ratificationso recentlyconcluded. Thus, we argue that the "housewarmingchores" kept alive, and were under- stood as, issues raisedin the ratificationdebates; the distributionof powerbetween the departmentsof government,between the generaland state governments,and between northernand southerninterests, for example.Hamilton's proposals were interpreted in the context of the divisions over these concerns, just as were Morris'ssimilar plans in 1783. And by the end of the First Congress,the divisive- ness in the House had itself become a cause for concern. The antifederalists,of course, might have died out as a politicalforce on the na- tionallevel even though the generalissues of the ratificationcontroversy persisted.8 But, the ratificationcompromise, with its promise of amendments,prompted an- tifederaliststo seek representationin the First Congress.9They succeeded in cap- turing 14 of the 65 seats (or 22%, see appendixI). Many antifederalistsalso saw a role for themselves beyond the fight for amendmentsbecause they believed they had a duty to try to check the more dangeroustendencies of the Constitutionalsys- tem (see for exampleLee 1825, 94-95, 98; Aldrich,forthcoming). The analysis of the debates will provide evidence for our argument,showing that ideologicalconcerns of the ratificationcontroversy remained particularly sa- lient on constitutionalquestions and on Hamilton's plan. In section 3, we will show that the ideological concerns voiced by the antifederalistswere backed by their actions in roll-call voting. In these two sections we will also show how anti- federalistconcerns over the regime question contributedto dividing those in the First Congress who had so recently been united in support of the new constitution. The antifederalists'votes combined with the antiadministrationFederalists to create a bloc, led by Madison, with sufficient strength to challenge and, at times, temporarilyblock enactmentof Hamilton'splan. It was the coalitionof antifederalistsand antiadministrationFederalists that Jefferson and Madison used as a basis for buildingthe Republicanparty. During the First Congress,antifederalist representatives were a vocal minority who held their share of committee appointmentsand who made their presence felt, often promptingdebates in the House that closely resembledratification debates. Even seemingly noncontroversialproposals were greeted by antifederalist objectionsor treated as constitutionalquestions, perhapsas a result of excessive fear that dangerousprecedents would be established.For example,Aedanus Burke (SC) and Thomas Tucker (SC) objected to a resolutionthat the presidentshould

8The usual argument is that the antifederalistsdied because their issue died (Bassett 1906, 42; Chambers 1963, 29; Libby 1912, 294). The implicationis that the antifederalistswere defined by a simple oppositionto the Constitution.In fact, they shareda complex understandingof republicanpoli- tics and an abidinginterest in the futureof the Union (see Kenyon 1966;Storing 1981b). 9Antifederalslates of candidatesfor the First Congress were nominated in several states (Paullin 1904).

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 302 John H. Aldrichand Ruth W. Grant declarea day of Thanksgivingat the close of the first session becauseit mimicked Europeancustoms, becauseit was an interferenceby the House in a religiousmat- ter, and because, if there was to be a day of Thanksgiving,it should be by state authority.'"Thomas Sumter (SC) and Tucker argued that the House should not relinquishits authorityto the presidentin the matterof the appointmentof com- missioners to deal with the Indians."Even the question of providing plates and furnitureto the presidentwas treatedas a constitutionalone. 12 Almost every issue before the House was debatedpartially in terms of its effect on the characterof the republic.'3Many federalistsalso seemed to be acutelyaware of the importanceof the proceedings for the fate of the Constitutionalexperi- ment.'4Fisher Ames (MA) remarkedthat "an ill administrationof the new constitution was more to be feared, as inimical to the liberties of the people, than any hostility from the principlesof the constitution."'5One aspect of this sharedself- consciousnesswas the concern that the House be free from factionaldivisiveness, particularlyalong sectional lines. In devising a revenue law, the first business of the first session, representativeswere pleasedthat such divisivenesshad not mate- rialized.Madison and Ames congratulatedthe House on the dispositionshown to "conductour business with harmonyand concert."16 But the harmonyof the House was disrupted when it was proposed that the presidenthave sole authorityto remove the heads of executive departmentsfrom office. The debate produced the familiarfederalist and antifederalistarguments and some of the passion associatedwith them. One representativecharged that those who were too jealous of presidentialpower would ruin the government."7 Anothervoiced his suspicion that those favoringpresidential removal power were deliberatelyviolating the Constitution.'8A third charged that the question had been ingeniouslyhandled so as to settle the principlebefore establishing the Trea- sury Department."'

"The Debatesand Proceedingsin the Congressof the UnitedStates, compiled by Joseph Gales 1834, Sept. 25, 1789, 915. Hereaftercited as Annals. "Ibid. Aug. 11, 1789, 690-97. '2Ibid.July 13, 1789, 634-38. '3Ibid. March26, 1790;May 3, 1790;Jan. 26, 1790. On the Post Office and delegationof authorityto the President,see ibid. April 13, June 16, July 8, and July 22, 1790. ElbridgeGerry (MA) arguedthat Congress has no authority to pass legislation requiringstate officers to take an oath supporting the Constitution,and that argumentincluded the standardattack on the "sweepingclause," ibid. May 6, 1789, 266. '4Lienesch(1988, chaps. 6, 7) explains what people on both sides expected of the political future during this difficulttransitional period. There was no greatconfidence on either side that the constitutional experimentwould succeed. '"Annals,May 9, 1789, 297. '6Ibid.May 5, 1789, 254, 257. See ibid. May 7, 1789, 285. "Ibid.June 25, 1789, 599. '8Ibid.June 18, 1789, 545-46. 'Ibid. June 18, 1789, 529-32.

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It was acknowledgedthat this questionwas essentiallythe same as that raisedby ratification.20The opponentsof the bill recalledantifederalist fears: that the power of the governmentwould be expandedby legislativeinterpretation of the obscure languageof the Constitution2'and that the governmentwould become a monarchy with all of its concomitantevils.22 They envisioned a coterie of ministers depen- dent on the presidentand intrudinginto the legislature,as in England,as the ulti- mate result of the removal clause.23Gerry argued in characteristicantifederalist fashion that presidentialremoval power would be consistent with a hereditary monarchy,but would be dangeroushere, since we lack the safeguardsof monar- chical systems.24(Roll-call votes on presidentialremoval power are described in appendixII and in section III as votes C1-C3.) The objectionto establishingministers in the British style was particularlypro- nounced with respect to the Treasury Department. A Treasury ministry would corruptthe legislatureand producea system of favoritism.A clause in the bill establishing the Treasury Department that would make it the secretary'sduty to "digestand reportplans" provoked considerable debate. Even to permit the secretary of the treasuryto report revenue plans to the House would be "laying the foundationfor an aristocracyor a detestablemonarchy."25 There was also consid- erableconcern with personalcorruption in the TreasuryDepartment. A bill proposed by Burke was passed prohibitingtreasury officers' involvement in specula- tion, commerce, etc.26All of this concern predates Hamilton's accession to the treasuryand his funding proposals.It indicatesa predispositionto see his actions and those proposalsas a manifestationof the generaldangerous tendencies of the Treasury Department,as it was organized,to produce corruptionand legislative faction and to hasten the rise of a monarchyor aristocracyon the ruins of the republic.27 During the ratificationcampaign, antifederalists had argued that the constitu- tionalprovision for representationin the House was insufficientto guardagainst the dominationof the governmentby an aristocraticparty hostile to the interestsof the peopleas a whole. "Party"most often referredto socialdivisions, "orders," "classes or descriptionsof men," or "politicalopinions" associated with those classes. The

2"Ibid.June 18, 1789, 533. 2Ibid. June 17, 1789, 502, 508;June 18, 1789, 513-16. 22Ibid.June 18, 1789, 549. 23Ibid.June 17, 1789, 487, 490;June 18, 1789, 519, 534ff. 24Ibid.June 19, 1789, 575. 2"Ibid.June 25, 1789, 593, 606; May 19, 1789, 388. The alternativewas to allow him only to prepare and reportestimates of the public revenueand expenditures. 26Ibid.June 30, 1789, 611. 2"Theorganization of the judiciaryalso occasioneda debate along federalist-antifederalistlines. Just as antifederalistshad argued againstconcurrent powers of taxation,they arguedagainst the establish- ment of inferior federal courts as threateningto the preservationof liberty and of the state governments, ibid. Aug. 24, Aug. 29, Aug. 31, 1789.

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 304 John H. Aldrichand Ruth W. Grant naturalaristocracy, the naturaldemocracy, the merchants,farmers, manufacturers, etc., all had legitimatethough partial interests which must be balancedin the legislative process.The prospectsof meetingthis conditionin a consolidatedgovernment, with few representativesand a wide varietyof intereststo be represented,was very slim. The democraticclass, the "substantialyeomanry" of the country, would be unableto protecttheir interests.28Antifederalists were also concernedthat the interests of southernstates would be sacrificedto an overbearingnorthern majority.29 In addition to the problem of balancingparties with legitimateclaims, checks had to be providedagainst a "juntoof unprincipledmen," a faction of aristocrats seeking to furthertheir own privateinterests and ambitions.30To empowerexecu- tive ministers, particularlyin mattersof nationalfinance, was to create the temp- tation to corrupt the legislative process. Democratic deliberationmight then be replaced by an alliance between executive policy makersand wealthy legislators with a personalstake in the government'sfinancial policies. The House would not include enough membersof the democraticclasses to check this development.For those who were critical of the composition of the House, the Treasury Depart- ment seemed to be a real sourceof danger. The debateson amendmentsto the Constitutionmight be expected to provide an even more striking example of a continuationof the Federalist-antifederalist divisions into the First Congress. But the House divided into three groups, and the issue was fought out largelyon proceduralgrounds. One group was composed of Federalistsunsympathetic to amendments,one of antifederalists,and the third of Federalists following Madison's lead. Madison's strategy was to pass amendments to safeguardindividual rights but to leave the powersof the governmentin- tact and avoid reopeninga full considerationof the Constitution.He hoped to effectively kill any movement for a second constitutionalconvention by satisfying disaffectedconstituents in this limited manner.3" When Madison first presented his proposals on June 8, 1789, the first two groupsjoined in urginga postponement.On July 21, the two Federalistgroups al- lied and referredMadison's proposals to a select committeeover antifederalistob- jections that all amendmentsproposed by the state ratifyingconventions should

28"AFarmer," in Storing 1981a, 5.1.52, 56-60; Cato V, VI, in Storing 1981a, 2.6.38, 43, 48; Lee to Randolph,Oct. 16, 1787, in Lee 1825, 78ff.; "Lettersfrom the FederalFarmer," II, III, VII, in Storing 1981a, 2.8.25, 39, 97-99; MelanctonSmith, in Elliott 1827. See McWilliams1989; Storing 1981b. 29WilliamGrayson, "Debates in the Virginia Convention," in Kenyon 1966, 286; Lee to Gov. Randolph,Oct. 16, 1787, in Lee 1825, 80-81. 30"Wherethere is a small representationa sufficient number to carryany measure,may, with ease, be influencedby bribes, offices and civilities; they may easily form privatejuntas, and outdoor meet- ings, agree on measures,and carrythem by silent votes." "Letters from the Federal Farmer,"III, in Storing 1981a, 2.8.33. See also Centinel, I, in Storing 1981a, 2.7.24; "Letters from the Federal Farmer,"VII, in Storing 1981a,2.8.97-99; G. Livingston, "Debatesin the New York Convention,"in Kenyon 1966, 391. 3MAnnals,June 8, 1789, 432-33.

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Antifederalists,the First Congress,and the First Parties 305 be consideredin a Committeeof the Whole. By effectively limiting consideration to Madison's proposals, the federalists thwarted antifederalistefforts to secure substantialchanges in the Constitution.Nonetheless, the antifederalistsfought a persistentand consistentlylosing battle that generatedsome heated debate, reca- pitulatingarguments of the ratificationcampaign.32 The antifederalistswere bitterly disappointedwith the outcome of the amendment debates.Burke called the amendments"froth."33 Senator Richard Henry Lee (VA), unwilling to give up, wrote to PatrickHenry that, at the next election, rep- resentativesshould be instructed to push for further amendments,but the issue was not revived (Lee 1825, 102). Several attempts were made in August to pass substantialamendments, but all failed (see appendix II and section III, votes C5-C7). The organizationof executive departmentsand amendmentsare the two items of business that could be consideredas completing the Constitution.With these issues settled, one might expect the intensity of the debates to diminish as the House turned to policy mattersnot directlyrelated to the characterof the government. But, the last major matter of the first session, the location of the capital, raisedthe rhetoricin the House to a new pitch. The questionwas consideredto be a crucial test of the capacity of the general governmentto resolve equitably the conflictinglegitimate interests of each section, in part becausethis issue had been unresolvedin the ContinentalCongress. To some extent, this issue was important becauseit was one of more or less pure, unalloyedinterests that were quite different from beliefs about the nature and purpose of the republicanregime. In part, then, for this very reason, representativeswarned that an unjust decision would lead to a dissolutionof the Union.34 Considerablealarm was raised when it was learned that the eastern members had caucusedbefore the debate in the House and decided on a temporarycapital in New York with a permanentcapital on the Susquehanna.Such behaviorwas said to be an infringementon the right of free debateand a partisaneffort to control the legislature:

Are the Eastern members to dictate in this business and fix the seat of governmentof the United States?Why not also fix the principles of government?... This looks like aristocracy, not the united, but the partialvoice of Americais to decide . . Madison remindedthe House of his earlierpraise of the spirit of harmonyduring the debate on the tonnage bill and then remarkedthat Virginia would not have joined the Union if she could have seen the proceedingsnow.36 It was, of course, the antifederalistswho had predictedthat southerninterests would be sacrificedto

32Ibid.Aug. 13-15, 1789. 33Ibid.Aug. 15, 1789, 745. 34Ibid.Aug. 27, 1789, 788-89; Sept. 3, 1789, 855. 31Ibid.Sept. 3, 1789, 844, 833, 858. See Sept. 5, 1789, 878-79. 36Ibid.Sept. 3, 1789, 857.

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 306 John H. Aldrichand Ruth W. Grant a northern party, and several members reminded the House of that fact.37The experienceof the first session, then, did little to allay the anxiety of the members. The tendencyto treat every questionas involving the fate of republicanismand of the Union persisted. The second session was largelydevoted to Hamilton'sFirst Reporton the Pub- lic Credit which containeda plan for funding the debt without discriminatingbe- tween its present and original holders and for assuming the debts of the states. Hamilton and his supportersconsidered establishing sound public credit crucial in creatinga firm foundationfor the new government.Hamilton wrote that "the individualand aggregateproperty of the citizens of the United States . . . their character as a people; the cause of good government: all depend on sound public credit."38Ames said that any attempt to fund the debt that interfered with the rights of contract would destroy the liberties of the people, violate the Constitution,and eventually dissolve the social compact.39There were warnings that, if the issue were not equitablyresolved, the diversityand intensity of public opinion on the question and the differencesof interest between creditorsof the states and of the generalgovernment would create destructivefactions among the people.' The opponentsof the plan were no less concernedwith its effect on "the cause of good government."They arguedthat a permanentlyfunded debt is incompat- ible with republicanism.In England, they said, funding was intended to create a moneyed interest to supporta politicalparty in opposing the landed interest. The funding plan would centralizewealth geographicallyand in the hands of the few, while interestpayments would be providedby taxes on the "honestand hardwork- ing part of the community."4"Speculators stood to benefit most by the plan.42 From an antifederalistpoint of view, the plan was consonant with the tendency of the Constitutionalsystem to place political power in the hands of a moneyed aristocracy. These argumentswere raisedprimarily in the debateon discriminationbetween presentand originalholders of the debt. Madisonbroke with Hamiltonin propos- ing a discriminationwhich would provide some compensationto those original holders who had become creditors in support of the war effort and had been forced by necessity to sell their severely depreciated securities. The proposal

37Ibid. Sept. 3, 1789, 837, 856. 38"FirstReport on Public Credit,"Hamilton 1934, 4. 39Annals,Feb. 15, 1790, 1221-22; Feb. 9, 1790, 1153-55. See Feb. 17, 1790, 1242. ?Ibid. Feb. 10, 1790, 1169, 1172. 4Ibid. Feb. 8, 1790, 1142; Feb. 10, 1790, 1173, 1175; Feb. 16, 1790, 124-29; Feb. 18, 1790, 1271. See also, Lee to Henry (Lee 1825),June 10, 1790, 100. 42Ibid.Jan. 28, 1790, 1094, 1098, 1099-1102. "Funding the debt may or may not be a blessing ... But this I sincerelyregret. It will add strengthand power to that factionthat broughtabout the late 2d. revolution,and it will make their princely fortunes"(Burke to Samuel Bryan, March 3, 1790, Record Group 59, NationalArchives, cited in Bickfordand Bowling 1989, 61).

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Antifederalists,the First Congress,and the First Parties 307 would have decreasedthe profitsof the presentholders who had bought them out. His proposalwas opposed on the groundsthat it interferedwith the rights of contract and that the transferabilityof securitieswas essentialto their value and must be respected.The proposallost by a wide margin,36 to 13.4 The votes on assumptionof the state debts were considerablycloser. The major argumentscentered on the effect of assumptionon the relationbetween the states and the general government.44Proponents of assumption argued that it would unite all creditorsin support of the generalgovernment and cement the bonds of Union.45Its opponents arguedthat assumptionwas a dangerousstep towardcon- solidation,that antifederalistfears were being realized.46In particular,as the antifederalistshad predicted,it seemed that concurrentpowers of taxationwere pro- ducing a rationalefor consolidatingmeasures.47 Proponents of assumptionargued that the states would not have the resourcesto pay the debt since the generalgov- ernmenthad effectivelymonopolized most sourcesof revenue.48Opponents feared both that the generalgovernment would have to resort to direct taxationand that the people would lose their attachmentto the state governmentsif they were not taxed by those governments.49 Competingstate interests were involved in the question of assumptionas well. Those states that had substantiallypaid off their creditorsstood to lose by the assumption, if there were not an equitablesettlement of accounts.They fearedthat they would essentiallybe bailing out the states that had dischargedvery little of their debt. As the debatesproceeded, representatives became increasingly frank in advocatingthe interestsof their particularstates. The debate on public credit had begun in an atmosphereof relative harmony. In early February,the question was considerablyless agitated,for example, than the discussions of the "Quakermemorials" requesting Congress to inhibit the slave trade as much as possible.50But on assumption,the House was closely divided with sharp differencesof both opinion and state interest, and personalat- tacksand accusationsof proceduralmaneuvering were frequent.For the first time, representativesattacked Hamilton. Bitter remarkswere made to the effect that the

43Annals,Feb. 11, 15, 19, 22, 1790. 'The question of assumptionhad been raised at the ConstitutionalConvention and dropped, and questionswere now raisedas to the constitutionalityof the measure(Farrand [1911] 1966, Vol. II, 355, 377;Annals, Feb. 25, 1790; 1357;Feb. 23, 1790, 1314;Feb. 24, 1790, 1328). 41"First Report on Public Credit," Hamilton 1934, 17-18; Annals, May 25, 1790 1608; March 30, 1790, 1493;April 22, 1790; 1538;Feb. 25, 1790, 1354;July 23, 1790, 1691-92. 'Ibid. March30, 1790, 1493;April 22, 1790, 1538;Feb. 25, 1790, 1354;July 23, 1790, 1691-92. 47SeeBrutus I, in Storing 1981a, 2.9.5; "Letters from the Federal Farmer,"III, in Storing 1981a, 2.8.39; R. R. Livingston in Elliott 1827, II, 346; Mason in Storing 1981a, 5.17.1; "An Old Whig," VI, in Storing 1981a,3.3.33; Smith, in Elliott 1827, II, 333, 337, 372. 48Annals,Feb. 23, 1790, 1321;Feb. 24, 1790, 1333-34. 9Ibid.Feb. 23, 1790, 1312;Feb. 25, 1790, 1343-44; March 1, 1790, 1380;March 9, 1790, 1418. 5"Debateson the Quakermemorials occurred on Feb. 11 and 12; March 8, 16, 17, 22, and 23, 1790.

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House had become the representativesof the secretaryof the treasuryand not of their constituents.51 This was the prevailingatmosphere when a bill from the Senate reintroduced the question of the location of the capital. The bill set the temporarycapital at Philadelphiaand the permanent capital on the Potomac. Objections to Phila- delphia were immediatelyraised, linking the funding issue with the capitalques- tion. Opponents of the temporaryresidence at Philadelphiasuspected that, once establishedthere, the governmentwould never move to the Potomac. Funding had alreadyinvigorated the easternstates, and the South would languishwithout a southerncapital. The Quakermemorials had shown that Pennsylvaniawas no fit place for southerners.52 In contrastto the capital debate in the first session, this discussion was almost entirely a matter of charges and counterchargesof political dealing and strategy. Hints were made that the fate of assumptionand of the residence question were linked.53As is well known, Madison,Jefferson, and Hamiltondid attemptto trade northern votes on the Potomac for southern votes on assumption,even though there is some dispute as to whether this deal was consummatedor, if so, effective (Bowling 1971; Cooke 1970). After assumptionwas defeated in the House by a narrowmargin on April 12, the bill was revived and finally passed on July 24 (see appendixII and section II for roll-callvotes concerningassumption, H1-H7). The suspicion that the eventual move to the Potomac would be blocked persisted into the third session and affectedthe debateson the nationalbank (for roll call votes on the bank see appendix II and section III, votes H8-H1 1).54Some membersfeared that to establisha bank at Philadelphiawould secure that city as the permanentcapital.55 Opponents of the bank bill had no antipathyto government banks as such. Rather,the issue was one of the proper use and distribution of political power between the general governmentand the states, regions of the country, and classes of men in the society. They arguedthat the bill infringedon state powers to incorporatebanks and that there should be several banks serving several locations.56To make matters worse, proponentsof the bank relied on the doctrine of implied powers, which again was anticipatedby the antifederalists.57 Opponents of the bill argued that that doctrine effectively destroys any limits on

5"Annals,March 1, 1790, 1380;March 11, 1790, 1425;see March 15, 1790, 1449-50. 52Ibid.July 6, 1790. "Ibid.July 6-9, 1790. 54Beforethe bill to incorporatethe bankwas introduced,the House had passed a bill establishingthe militia and a bill to lay excise taxes on whiskey.In both cases, argumentsfrom the ratificationcampaign surfacedregarding state powers, the antirepublicancharacter of excises, etc. On the militia, see Annals, Dec. 22, 1790. On excises, see especially,Jan. 5 andJan. 21, 1791. "Ibid. Feb. 5, 1791, 1931;Bell 1973, 129;Bowling 1968, 232. "'Annals,Feb. 2, 1791, 1895;Feb. 4, 1791;Feb. 5, 1791, 1936;Feb. 8, 1791, 1957. 5"Libby(1912) is incorrectin assertingthat it was not. See Annals, Feb. 2, 1791, 1901; Brutus, V, XII, in Storing 1981a,2.9.59-61, 149-152; "Lettersfrom the Federal Farmer,"IV in Storing 1981a, 2.8.50.

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Antifederalists,the First Congress,and the First Parties 309 governmentand any distinctionbetween Americanconstitutional government and Europeandespotism.58 Proponents of the bill replied that jealousyof governmental power would shacklethe governmentcompletely.59 Opponentsof the bank saw it as an unconstitutionalmonopoly that would con- centrate wealth and influence in the capital and in the hands of "a moneyed interest at the devotion of the government."'0The benefits would be felt by the mercantileinterest and not at all by the yeoman farmer.61In brief, the bankwould exacerbatethe evil effects of the funding system generallyin creatingthat danger- ous bond between politicalpower and the interestsof a particularsocial order that the antifederalistshad warnedagainst. Hamilton was frank in stating his intention that the funding system attach to the government"that descriptionof men, who are in every society the only firm supportersof government."62To Madison, as to the antifederalists,this system amountedto the creationof an artificialparty. It exacerbatedthe unavoidableevils of naturalparties by favoringone interest at the expense of anotherand by creating unnecessaryopportunities for a few to accumulatewealth.63 The greatestdanger from the creationof this party lay in the corruptionof the legislature.Jefferson charged that the funding system passed only becauselegisla- tors who stood to benefit from it financiallyvoted on the question;that Hamilton intended to createa corruptsquadron in the legislatureunder his control with the purposeof establishinga monarchy.'John Taylor of Carolinewrote: The principleof the governmentis representationand responsibility-the end, the common good ... If the will of the nation pronounceslaw throughits politicalorgans, the principleoper- ates, and the end is attainable.But if a paper interest influencesthe majorityof the legislature, the principleitself, from which alone the end is deducible,is destroyed(1794, 10). Already it is whispered that the public debt is the support of the government-that the public will cannot be entrustedwith a legislativeinfluence . . the last vicious principle of that English model, so slavishlycopied, is thus avowed(1794, 5). The basic elements of this republicanargument are present in the VirginiaReso- lution on Assumption,drafted by PatrickHenry. The funding plan createda faction of "the few," an aristocraticjunta, in control of the legislature effectively excluding representationof the people from the legislative process. Hamilton's plan for the funding of the debt was thus linked, in the minds of opponents,with a change from republicanto hereditaryforms of government,i.e., to aristocracyor monarchy.65

58Annals,Feb. 5, 1791, 1934;Feb. 7, 1791, 1941. 59Ibid.Feb. 3, 1791, 1905;Feb. 4, 1791, 1911. 'Ibid. Feb. 5, 1791, 1936. 6'Ibid.Feb. 1 and Feb. 2, 1791. 62Hamiltonto George Washington,Sept. 9, 1792, Hamilton,ed., 1850, vol. VI, 305. 63Madison,"Parties," National Gazette,Jan. 23, 1793, in Hunt, ed., 1904, vol. VI. 'Jefferson to Washington,Sept. 9, 1792, and May 23, 1792, in Washingtoned., [1854] 1861, vol. III. 6""Insteadof viewing Hamilton'ssystem as a forward-lookingprospectus for economic growth ... these anguishedrepublicans saw it as a blueprintfor retrogression,as a falling away from the virtuous contoursof the republicansociety that Franklinand the revolutionarieshad envisioned.In Americato

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The dominationof the legislatureby this faction was no less a threat to union than to republicanism,because the division in the legislaturefell along geographi- cal lines. As the antifederalistshad feared, southern interests were consistently sacrificedto a northernmajority, and threats of secession were frequent."Thus, both of the evils of party were evident. An imbalancebetween parties of interest had been manipulated,and in partcreated, by an aristocraticfaction. Antiadministrationrepresentatives, and later Republicans,adopted an interpretation of the political events of the 1790s that correspondedto antifederalist predictionsof the tendency of governmentunder the Constitution,and they recognized the correspondence: ... the anti-federalchampions are now strengthenedin argumentby the fulfillmentof their predictions ... the republicanfederalists who espoused the same governmentfor its intrinsic merits, are disarmedof their weapons;that which they denied as prophecy,having now become true history . . .67 By the end of the First Congress, the division in the House was itself a source of alarmfor the futureof the government.Important measures had been passedby bare majorities;members had engagedin politicalbargaining and suppressedfree and fair deliberation;representatives recognized that different ideas on the great questionsof governmentcorresponded to geographicaldivisions.68 The first small steps towardthe creationof the Republicanparty after the close of the First Congresswere a responseto a factionalizedCongress in which the issues of the ratificationcampaign were exacerbatedrather than resolved. All of the majorissues facing the First Congresshad been anticipatedbefore and during the ratificationcampaign, and they provokedarguments in the House along Federalist- antifederalistlines. Hamilton'sprogram was no exception. It tapped existing ideo- logicaland sectionaldivisions rather than creatingnew persistentblocs. There was never a point during the First Congressat which either the "regimequestion" or the antifederalistswere put to rest. The first requirementfor a justificationof partyactivity among men with a general antipathy to party is this understandingthat nothing less than the regime itself is at stake. That the antifederalistsand the Republicanssaw the early measures of the new governmentas creatinga substantialthreat to the preservationof a republicanunion is clear. And, as we shall see, these perceptionsdid shape their actions. become like England was decay, not progress,"McCoy 1980, 161. See Banning 1978, 128; Madison, "The Union: Who are its Real Friends?,"National Gazette,April 2, 1792, in Hunt ed., 1904, vol. VI, 104-105. "Jeffersonto Washington,May 23, 1792, in Washington,ed., [1854] 1861; Madison, "Government of the United States,"Feb. 6, 1792, National Gazette,in Hunt, ed., 1904;Taylor 1754;Washington to David Stuart,March 28, 1790, in Sparks,ed., 1836, vol. X. 6'Jeffersonto Washington,May 23, 1792, in Washington,ed., 1861. See also Henry Lee to Madison, April 3, 1790, in Hunt, ed., 1904, vol. VI. 'Annals, April 22, 1791, 1534;May 24, 1791;July 23, 1791, 1694. See also ibid., Feb. 4, 1791, 1919; Feb 5, 1791, 1930-31; Feb. 7, 1791, 1938; Madison to H. Lee, April 13, 1790, in Hunt, ed., 1904, vol. VI.

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ANALYSIS OF ROLL-CALL VOTES In the last section, we sought to demonstratethat the First Congresswas domi- nated by recurringconcerns rather than by unprecedentedconflicts. In roll-call voting on these recurringissues, antifederalistsplayed a criticalrole, often joined by Federalistswho opposed their erstwhileallies in ratificationby formingan anti- administrationcoalition. The impact of antifederalistsin the First Congress is found in their voting behavioras well as in debate. Continuityin views and actions should not be surprising,since there was continuity in personnel. Seven of the 14 antifederalistshad been elected to the Conti- nental Congress (although one did not serve), all but one of the remaininghad served in the Revolution,and many had served as delegatesto their state's ratify- ing convention. Significant numbers of Federalist representativeshad also had prior experiencein nationalpolitics. Nine of the 14 antiadministrationand 23 of the 36 pro-administrationFederalists in the First Congress(as identifiedin Martis 1989)also were elected to the earlierCongress.69 As noted above, most of the issues debatedin the First Congresshad also been contentious issues in the ContinentalCongress in the 1780s. Several forces con- verged in the Continental Congress that left these important issues unresolved and seemingly unresolvable,thus preparingthe way for the new Constitution. Structurally,votes were cast by individualsbut counted by states. That is, each state had one vote, determinedby how a majorityof that state'sdelegates voted on the floor. Thus if a delegationvoted 2 yes and 2 no, that state would cast no vote, and a state was requiredto have at least two delegatesvote before its vote counted. Abstentionwas alwayshigh, and it increasedover the 1780s. The Articlesof Con- federation further required any important motion to receive at least nine state votes to pass. The effect of evenly divided delegations,high rates of abstention, and the necessity of nine affirmativevotes was that passagerequired, effectively, unanimityin state votes. As a result, importantproblems could not be resolved under the Articles(see Jillson and Wilson, forthcoming). In political terms, there was generally a clear majority of what Jillson and Wilson call "nationalists,"such as Hamilton and Madison, throughoutthe 1780s. Riker (personalcommunication), for example, calculatesthat nationalists(whom he calls "federalists")held a majority of state delegations from 1783 to 1787 (except in 1784 when they only held a plurality).They held the requiredextraor- dinarymajority, however, only in 1787, a year in which abstentionwas especially high and in which, of course, the ConstitutionalConvention was held. The result was that their majoritywas often insufficientfor passingnationalist motions, even if united (which they rarelywere). Jillson and Wilson (forthcoming)provide a series of two dimensionalrepresen- tationsof voting choices by membersof the ContinentalCongress annually and on

69GeorgeLeonard (MA) was the sole member of the First Congress whose position on ratification cannotbe ascertained.He was a supporterof the administrationin the First Congressbut did not serve in the ContinentalCongress.

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various issues throughout the 1780s that are roughly comparableto those presented by Hoadley (1980, 1986) for the First Congress(as well as other early Con- gresses). In both cases, there is considerablediversity in revealed preferences (both within years and over time). Both find, for example, some degree of sectional divisions,but also some clusteringaround the three groupsconsidered here; antifederalistsand anti- and pro-administrationFederalists.70 We will illustrateby comparingJillson and Wilson's (forthcoming)mapping of 1783 (figure 8.4), the year in which Morris's Report on Public Credit was considered, and Hoadley's mappingof the First Congress(1986, figure20, 95). In 1783, a structuringof preferencesof individualsalong the lines of the three regional groupings (New England, Middle States and the South) is reasonably clear, with the center of each group formingpoints of a triangle,but with each regional group coveringa large areain the figure (amongother exceptions,Madison and Williamson(NC) both antiadministrationFederalists, are within the Middle States grouping).Hoadley's results from the First Congressshow that most New Englanders(located in the northwestportion of the space) are far removed from most southerners (located in the southeast). The Middle States are, however, deeply divided, with most New Yorkersin the northeastcorner, and representatives from Pennsylvaniaand New Jersey mostly in the southwest corner (with Marylandersliterally all over the map). No one is locatedin the center. Both maps also illustratesome commonalitywithin the antifederalistsand the pro- and antiadministrationFederalists.7" Two antifederalists(Bland [VA] and Gerry [MA]) served in 1783. Bland is, in Jillson-Wilson's mapping, closer to Gerry (albeit not that close) than to Madison, let alone Hamilton. Several pro- administrationFederalists, Boudinot (NJ), Fitzsimmons(PA), and Hamilton, are very close together in their mapping.72Madison and Williamson,antiadministration Federalists, along with pro-administrationfederalist Carroll (MD) are also close to each other and in the same Middle States cluster as Hamilton, reflecting the importanceof nationalismover sectionalism.Even so, they are at some dis- tance from the Hamilton cluster and are clearly closer to the two antifederalists than to Hamilton, Boudinot, or Fitzsimmons. Hoadley places vectors summariz- ing the direction of voting on particularissues on his mapping of the First Con- gress. What he calls the "nationalauthority" vector (includingmost of our constitutional issues) divides his Federalists from antifederalists,while the "domestic economic" vector (including our votes on Hamilton's plan) is oriented about 30 degrees (by our visual estimation)from the nationalauthority vector. That is, these two sets of issues are aligned somewhatdifferently, but they are stronglyre- lated to each other (Hoadley 1986, 99-100). Not only, then, do these two analyses

'?This identificationrefers to those who served in the Continentaland the First Congressfor exam- ining the Jillson and Wilson results. "There were too few membersof the First Congressin any one ContinentalCongress, however, to provideanything more than suggestiveobservations. 'But so too is antiadministrationFederalist William Floyd (NY).

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Antifederalists,the First Congress,and the First Parties 313 show clearcontinuities, but, as we will soon see, this overviewof Hoadley'sresults is quite close to our own analysis. Aldrich(forthcoming) provides another analysis of voting in the First Congress. With nearly the same three groups as here, he finds that, on average,they form points of a nearly equilateraltriangle, along with the same diversity aroundthese central tendencies all others have found. He points out that this diversity of revealedpreferences made it possible to form voting majoritiesin differentways. While the pro-administrationFederalists were a majorityin the First Congress, they did not hold identicalpreferences, so that differentproposals led to differing patternsof supportand opposition.For example,votes on the locationof the capital (which Hoadley finds nearly orthogonalto the two aforecitedissues) tapped regional coalitions. As a result, Aldrich points out, majority voting cycles were possible. He arguesthat Madison exploited that potentialin temporarilydefeating Hamilton's plan for assumption of the state debt, leading to the proposed vote tradeover it and the capital. These analysesclearly show that there was considerablediversity in preferences and in voting decisions. Put alternatively,voting often seems chaotic when exam- ined over the full range of issues consideredin the First Congress.As in the earlier Congress, there are clear signs that there were regionalelements in voting but not on all, or even many, issues-and there are clear signs of the sort of philosophicdifferences that differentiatedthe first two parties.The result was the potential for the shifting bases of majoritycoalitions that Aldrich describes. For example, our factor analysisof votes in the First Congress yielded 20 significant dimensionsby the usual criterion.73This is a remarkablylarge numberof factors, indicating just how unstructured,in a statistical sense, voting was in the First Congress. Similarly,we computed the Rice index of cohesion for various groups and variouscombinations of issues (see below for some specifics),which is a stan- dard measure of assessing the consistency of voting among members of various groups hypothesizedto be consequential(see Rae and Taylor 1970, for definition and comparisonto alternativemeasures). In general, the cohesion scores are un- usuallylow, suggestinglack of cohesion. Nonetheless, amidstthis generallack of structureto voting, some specificstruc- turing to the data can be found, particularlyon the measureswe discussed earlier which arousedsignificant ideological debate. The reasonwe can reachthis conclu- sion is that we are asking different questions from those posed by the statistical analyses.Put simply, if the question is whether there were legislative"parties" or regularizedvoting blocs covering a wide arrayof issues, the answer is no. If the question is, instead, whether the antifederalistsplayed a key role on the constitutional issues and in forming the opposition to Hamilton, the answeris yes. Espe- cially among antifederalists,their positions advanced through debate coincided with their voting choices. This was particularlytrue for the variousconstitutional

"The usual criterionis an eigenvalueof 1 or greater.The first three factorsexplain 22.6, 14.9, and 12.1%the variance,respectively, a respectableamount, but less than often obtained.

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 314 John H. Aldrichand Ruth W. Grant issues. While that may not be surprising,it was also only somewhatless true for voting on Hamilton'splan. On the constitutionalissues raisedin the first session,for example,antifederalists and pro-administrationFederalists were particularlylikely to vote as opposing, cohesive blocs (Rice cohesion indices averaging56 and 60, respectively,with antiadministrationfederalists being somewhatless cohesive, averagingRice scores of 32).74The series of votes on assumption, per se, were somewhat less, but still moderately,cohesive with "partisan"blocs (averaging37, 49, and 44 for the three groups,respectively).75 Conversely, consider that the 12 votes on the locationof the capitalin the firstsession yielded some degreeof cohesionamong pro-administration Federalists(average Rice scores of 42), but not much cohesivenessamong antiadministrationfederalists (23) and virtually none at all among antifederalists(10). Low levels of cohesion over the capitalare evident as well in the third session (21 for antifederalists,30 for antiadministrationand 5 [!] for pro-administrationfederalists). This rather stark difference between cohesiveness in voting on constitutional issues and assumptioncompared to the capitalis a bit surprising.Voting on the location of the capitalis generallyinterpreted as an expressionof regionalin- terests, almost exclusively, and there is a regionalmakeup to the composition of these three groups. Proadministrationfederalists were mostly from New England (14) or the Middle States (16), with fewer from the South (7). Conversely,over half the antifederalists76and antiadministrationFederalists were from the South.77 Although the locationof the capitaldid not simply pit North againstSouth, there was a clear regional cast to these votes. This suggests that philosophic concerns ratherthan regionalismled to cohesion within each'of the three "partisan"groups, regardlessof region of origin. In figure 1, we report the percentof antifederalistswho voted, on key and divisive votes, for a weaker national government or executive on the constitutional

'4This is based on seven roll-call votes recordedon these issues in the first of three sessions of the First Congress. "This is based on seven votes cast on assumptionof the debt. Overall,a total of 17 votes were cast on assumptionand on funding of the debt and on the bank. Cohesion scores for this set were 28, 36, and 50, respectively.Note that our analysisbelow is based on a somewhatsmaller set of roll-callvotes, specified in appendix II, that removes votes on which there was little division. We also exclude such votes below from the set of constitutionalissues which are also definedin appendixII. Note, however, that our votes constitute a very large portion of Hoadley's set of key votes on his two comparabledi- mensions(1986, table 6, pp. 97-98). To put the cohesion scores in context, over the last century, such scores for the two politicalparties have regularlybeen in the 60+ range, rarelydipping below 50 (see, e.g., Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979). "6Oneof the antifederalists,Richard Bland (VA), died during the First Congress. In the empirical analysis,therefore, there are 14 antifederalistsin votes relatedto constitutionalissues and 13 in votes relatedto Hamilton'sPlan. "Two antifederalistswere from New England, 4 from the Middle States and 8 from the South, while the regionaldistribution of antiadministrationfederalists was 3, 9, and 17, respectively.

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FIGURE 1

PERCENT OF ANTIFEDERALISTSVOTING FOR A WEAKER GOVERNMENT AND AGAINST HAMILTON'S PLAN

100-

80.. 1l1 1

...... 30...... - ......

201...... ' 1'' ''1' ...... '1' ' ' ' '' ' '' ' '' '''''''''

10.0 L I I 111I

Cl C2 C3 C4 C5C6 C7 C8 C9CIOCII HI H2 H3 H4H5 H6 H7 H8 H9HIOHI I Government Structure - Hamilton's Plan ConstitutionalAmendments issues and voted against Hamilton's Plan.78Obviously, the antifederalistswere strongly opposed to proposalsthat were seen as strengtheningthe national governmentor the executive branch.Only once did oppositiondip below 70% and it exceeded 80% more often than not. They were more divided on Hamilton'splan, with its overlayof sectionalinterests as describedearlier, but only once did a ma- joritysupport some aspect of his plan, and oppositionoften exceeded60%. Figure 2 containstwo pieces of evidence. The first (the solid bars)indicates the proportion of the whole House who voted against a stronger government and against Hamilton's plan. Note particularlythat most votes deeply divided the House. Also note that the putativelyantifederalist side was often defeated,but the weakergovernment position carriedthree times and tied once (only to be defeated by the vote of the Speaker).Moreover, the first three votes on Hamilton's plan

"These votes are labelled Cl through ClI, for the 11 constitutionalvotes in chronologicalorder, and HI throughHI 1, for the (coincidentally)II votes on Hamilton'sPlan, also in chronologicalorder. These votes are identifiedsubstantively in appendixII.

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FIGURE2

PERCENT OF CONGRESS IN OPPOSITIONAND PERCENT OF CONGRESS THAT Is ANTIFEDERALISTAND IN OPPOSITION

100-

o- ...... 80......

70......

0- Cl C2C3C4C5C6C7C8C9CIOCI I H H2H3H4H5H6 H7H8H9HIOHI I

Government Structure - Hamilton's Plan ConstitutionalAmendments were defeats for him. The second piece of information(the lined bars) indicates the size of the antifederalistopposition as a proportionof the whole House. With all antifederalistsconstituting a small part of the whole House, these proportions are often small, but the interestingcomparison is to the height of the solid bar. That is, it asks the question,what proportionof the oppositionwas due to the antifederalists?This is shown more directlyin figure 3. Even though antifederalistsmade up only 20% of the House and had unusually high levels of abstention,79the antifederalistsmade up a very large part of the opposition to measuresthat were seen to strengthen the national governmentor the executive branch. This is true even though they were joined by sufficient numbersof others to be in the majorityon three of the last four measures.Even

7'Abstentionrates, in general, were higher in early Congresses than in the contemporaryperiod. Antifederalistswere even more likely to abstain than others. Most of this is due, however, to late seatings of some of the antifederalists.In any case, abstention, whether among antifederalistsor all Members, was typically not strategic. Rather, it is was due primarilyto absences from the seat of government.

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FIGURE 3

PERCENT OF OPPOSITIONTHAT Is ANTIFEDERALIST

100-

90 l- ----. --, --,...... l...... --...... -

60 ......

20 1 ...... '...... '' '''' ...... '''.''''.''. ' ......

I = IiIIiX '?..I C1C2C3C4 5S6C7 C8C9CIOCI1 HIH2H3 IH4`H5`H6 H7H8H9HlOH11 GovernmentStructure- ConstitutionalAmendments Hamilton's Plan afterBland's death reducedtheir numbersand even though they were on the win- ning side on the first three votes on Hamilton'splan, they consistentlymade up a quarterand sometimesmore of the oppositionto his measures. This analysisof voting behavior,therefore, conforms to others in showing that voting was largely unstructured.Thus, for example, even though scholars have identified members in terms of potentially "partisan"groupings, the voting patterns of such groups were far too diverse to conclude that these constituted parties. Moreover, as figure 2 illustrates,many of the most importantmatters were not only sharply debated but passed or defeated by relatively small majorities. Nonetheless, antifederalistswere largely united over measures related to the power of the national governmentor its executive branch. And, while they were noticeably more divided over the votes on Hamilton's plan, a majorityof anti- federalistsopposed it on all but one vote, and they constituted a significantpro- portionof the (large)opposition to it, as well as to the more directlyconstitutional measures.They did so in large part because the plan was seen as a measurethat raised constitutionalquestions. Madison and Jeffersonbroke with their erstwhile

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 318 John H. Aldrichand Ruth W. Grant ally over his fiscal policies. As we saw earlier,Madison echoed many of the antifederalist arguments in doing so and could count on substantialsupport from them on the floor. Antifederalistsand antiadministrationfederalists, however, constituted a minorityof the First and Second Congresses.Their defeats in opposing Hamilton's plan led Madison and Jefferson to begin the process of organizing what would become the JeffersonianRepublican party, adoptingthe centralanti- federalistconcern than the nationalgovernment and its executive were becoming too powerfuland threateningto underminerepublican principles, not just on constitutional measuresbut also on policy matters, as revealedby Hamilton's fiscal proposals(for furtherdevelopment of these points, see Aldrich, forthcoming).In these ways, therefore,the antifederalistsand their views and actions served to link the ratificationcontroversies with the subsequentpractice of nationalpolitics. The continuitiesextended not only from the ContinentalCongress, through the ratificationdebate, to the First Congress,but even beyond.Jefferson and Madison's break with Hamilton that soon led to party formationnot only incorporatedan- tifederalistthinking into Republicanideas, but also relied, in part, on antifederalist men. Of the 13 antifederalistswho could, six served in the Second Congress,10 and three others served in later Congresses(one, Josiah Parker[VA], as a Federal- ist). Four served as late as the Sixth Congressor even later, two (Timothy Blood- worth [NC] and John Peter Muhlenberg [PA]) were U.S. senators, Gerry was Madison's vice president, and Tucker served as secretaryof the treasury from 1801 until 1828 (!). That Tucker served all presidentsof the "Virginiadynasty" (and Quincy Adams), and that this antifederalistwas secretaryof the treasury,is particularlyrevealing. Thus, many antifederalistscontinued to be active well after the narrowlyconstitutional measures of the First Congresswere resolvedand well into the period of the first partysystem.

CONCLUSIONS While we agree with most analyststhat there were no modern political parties in the First Congress,and that Hamilton'sprogram triggered the processof party formation,we disagreewith those who conclude from these two observationsthat there was no continuitybetween the politics precedingand during ratificationand the politics of the first partysystem. We argueinstead that the ideologyof antifed- eralismand the votes of antifederalistrepresentatives played a crucialrole. Indeed, without these ideas and men, it would be very difficult to explainwhy Hamilton's programtriggered the controversythat it did. Had the First Congressbeen composed entirelyof federalists,the picture would have been very different.As it was, the indirect and unanticipatedconsequence of the ratificationcompromise that brought antifederalistsinto the House was that opposition to Hamilton was substantial,the House was nearly evenly divided, and it was clear that an organizing effort might turn the tide.

"0Twoothers sought, but were defeatedfor, election to the Second Congress.

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As is often the case with history's losers, the antifederalistshave been consistently underratedas a political force. Their opposition to the Constitution was based on a well-articulated,alternative understanding of republicanismthat per- mitted their participationin national politics after their defeat in the ratification struggle and beyond their partialdefeat in the fight for amendments.Moreover, a full understandingof the process of party development in America requires a recognitionof the antifederalistcontribution at the inception of that process. The continuity between antifederalistsand JeffersonianRepublicans is not simply a matter of a correspondencebetween their ideas or their interests. Political actors made those ideas and interests felt in the nationalcouncils during the transitional period of the first governmentunder the Constitution. In short, while national party organizations,like the Constitution,were new institutionalforms, they did not markpoints of discontinuitywhere politics began all over again in new ways. They should be seen instead as new forms that extended the same ideas and issues. More to the point, the origin of partieswas rooted in the continuingnature of the conflict between federalistand antifederalistunderstandings of republican government. The new institutionalarrangements did, however, interact with the ideology and votes of the antifederalists.As noted above, the requirementof an extraordi- nary majority,other voting rules, and high rates of abstentionmeant that many of the most importantissues simply could not be resolved under the Articles. Even though nationalistsfrequently held a majority,it was too small a majorityto pass motions, even if united. Frequently, nothing at all could pass. In the First Con- gress, those classifiedas pro-administrationheld a majorityof 37 to 28 over antifederalists and antiadministrationFederalists.8" If the First Congress had em- ployed the voting rules of the Articles,there would have been a pro-administration majorityin only five states, plus support from the two states with one representa- tive. There would have been an antiadministrationmajority in five states, while New York would have been evenly divided (see appendixI). Thus, issues, such as Hamilton's plan, that divided supporters and opponents of the administration would have failed, lacking the nine votes needed to pass importantmotions. In fact the majorityof proadministrationrepresentatives was a "workingmajority." That is, underthe new Constitution,if they voted together,their preferenceswould determinethe outcome. Often there was considerabledefection from these general sentiments.Majorities were, in fact, shifting and based on differinglines of cleavage and bases of interests. But with simple majorityrule and a little coordination and organization,Hamilton and his supporterswere able to pass measureswhich would have been defeatedunder the old rules. It was preciselythis (fairlymodest) degree of coordinationand organizationthat Hamiltoniansachieved and that, in turn, demonstratedto Jeffersonand Madison that their only recoursewas to seek to change the sentiment of the majoritythrough elections. The Constitutionhad

8"Therewere 36 pro-administrationfederalists and GeorgeLeonard (MA) who was pro-administration but unclassifiedas federalistor antifederalist(see appendixI and Martis 1989).

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 320 John H. Aldrichand Ruth W. Grant created the more energetic governmentits writers had sought. Without a great deal of differencein proportionatesupport, Hamilton's plan passed essentiallyas written, whereasMorris's plan did not. But Hamiltonianswould not have had to begin to organizewithout the continuingpresence of antifederalistarguments and antifederaliststhemselves. And Jeffersonianswould not have had the ideological "platform"and strengthof numbersto turn successfullyto the tentativeelection- eering that eventuallysecured a workingRepublican majority in the House in the Third Congress. These first partisanorganizations were, in this sense, quite similarto their modern counterparts.Legislative party organizationscommonly seek to hold together potentiallyshifting majorities,much as the Hamiltoniansdid, in the face of such tactics as Madison'suse of proposedamendments to the debt assumptionmeasure to secure sufficient defections to defeat the main measure (which Madison was able to achieve temporarily).And, just as legislative party organizationsseek to secure what it is in their members' collective interests to achieve, so too is it common to employ the electoralparty, even if tentativelyas with the Jeffersonian Republicans,to mobilize supportersin the electorate(i.e., to overcomethe collective action problem in voting) to win elections. In this sense, while both the legislative and electoralorganizations of the first two parties were much less devel- oped than they would be in later party systems, these foreshadowedfurther developmentsand can be considered genuinely modern political parties. At the same time, the motivations for developing the arrangementsthat eventually became the first two partieswere clearlyand stronglyrooted in the differingideologi- cal commitmentsthat we have called here the "regimequestion." This should not be surprisingin generalor in this specific case. Creatingpartisan institutions, no matter how limited in comparisonto those of, say, the second party system, was necessarilyfor the purpose of seeking to secure long-term commitments.While regionalor specific interests could be a part of the rationalefor seeking to affect outcomes over the long term, ideologicalbeliefs are inherently long-term views. Thus, ideologyshould be expectedto be a basis for long-termorganizational development in general. If anything, it should be expected to have been even more importantin this period. On the one hand, the Revolution, the Articles, and the new Constitutionwere all centrallyabout the "Americanexperiment" in republican government,and those in the First Congresshad long been deeply involved in the experiment.On the other hand, the movement toward party confrontedthe deeply held beliefs againstparty, faction, cabal, and intrigue. It is thereforeto be expected that those who did so move would do so only if there were a philosophic as well as a practicalbasis for doing so. The approachtaken here is meant to demonstratethe value of an analysisthat stresses the relation between ideology and institutional development, between Americanpolitical thought and the practiceof Americanpolitics. By takingsuch an approach,it is possible to reach a new understandingof the vituperativepartisan

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:05:57 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Antifederalists,the First Congress,and the First Parties 321 rhetoric of the period, for example. If one views the party battle as a conflict of high principles, one is apt to take the rhetoric too seriously, believing that Hamilton was a monocrator Jeffersona jacobin.If, on the other hand, one views the conflict as a struggle between interested groups, one is likely to take the rhetoricnot quite seriouslyenough; partyrhetoric is epiphenomenal,a tool of the artfulpolitician, and moreor less consciouslyopportunistic. Similarly, if one focuses exclusively on the developmentof new institutionalforms, one is likely to ignore the rhetoricand to view politicalactors as innovatorsin spite of themselves,acting without understandingwhat they were doing. In considering the relation between what men say and what they do, their words need not be either acceptedas accurateor ignored altogether.If one recog- nizes that cries of "monocrat"and "jacobin"were sincere, even if exaggerated, and that they reflectedserious differencesin the opponents'understandings of republicanism,one is led to confront the very interesting problems of why and to what extent these men misunderstoodtheir situation and the ways in which that very misunderstandingmotivated the development of new institutions.82Had Hamilton'sopponents seen him as anything less than a "monocrat,"it is unlikely that they would have been moved to organizethe opposition in the form of a national politicalparty. Finally, this approachreintroduces historical contingency, and with it political actorsas agents of change, into our understandingof partydevelopment. If parties are divided by enduring principles,if partiesare rooted in fundamentaldivisions of interest, or if parties arise to fulfill necessaryinstitutional functions, their ap- pearanceon the scene is simply inevitable.But if it is understoodthat what is po- litically functionalor optimal often fails to occur-if it is rememberedthat the Republicanssucceeded organizationally where the Federalistsfailed, for example, then the importanceof the relationof ideology and institutionsbecomes clear. In creating new institutions, political actors must have some coherent rationalefor what they are doing. Thus, we need to know how political actors view their own situation,interpret the alternativesopen to them, and justify their actions to un- derstandwhy they respondto changingpolitical and social realitiesas they do.

Manuscriptsubmitted 12 October1991 Final manuscriptreceived 12 June 1992

82Therehave been some attempts to explain in general terms the reasons for the exaggerated responses. Louis Hartz (1955) argues that these men failed to perceive their essential similarity as Lockeianliberals because the Americanpolitical spectrum, since Americalacked a feudal experience, lacked the extremes of aristocratsand mobs found in Europe. Howe (1967) argues that they over- reactedto their differencesbecause they shared a cyclical theory of empire, a sense of the criticalim- portance of the historical moment, and the dominant republicanideology of the time accordingto which republicswere particularlyfrail and thereforemust be vigilantlyprotected from faction, the cor- rosiveeffects of prosperityon republicanvirtue, etc.

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APPENDIX I

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:FIRST CONGRESS, 1789-1791

Connecticut Huntington,Benjamin Federalist Pro-Administration Sherman,Roger Federalist Pro-Administration Sturges,Jonathan Federalist Pro-Administration Trumball,Jonathan Federalist Pro-Administration Wadsworth,Jeremiah Federalist Pro-Administration Delaware Vining,John Federalist Pro-Administration Georgia Jackson,James Federalist Antiadministration Baldwin,Abraham Federalist Antiadministration Mathews, George Federalist Antiadministration Maryland Stone, MichaelJenifer Federalist Antiadministration Seney, Joshua Federalist Antiadministration Contee, Benjamin Federalist Antiadministration Smith, William Federalist Antiadministration Gale, George Federalist Pro-Administration Carroll,Daniel Federalist Pro-Administration Massachusetts Ames, Fisher Federalist Pro-Administration Goodhue, Benjamin Federalist Pro-Administration Gerry, Elbridge Antifederalist Antiadministration Sedgwick,Theodore Federalist Pro-Administration Partridge,George Federalist Pro-Administration Thacher, George Federalist Pro-Administration Leonard,George Pro-Administration Grout,Jonathan Antifederalist Antiadministration New Hampshire Foster, Abiel Federalist Pro-Administration Gilman, Nicholas Federalist Pro-Administration Livermore,Samuel Federalist Antiadministration NewJersey Boudinot, Elias Federalist Pro-Administration Cadwalader,Lambert Federalist Pro-Administration Schureman,James Federalist Pro-Administration Sinnickson,Thomas Federalist Pro-Administration New York Floyd, William Federalist Antiadministration Laurance,John Federalist Pro-Administration Benson, Egbert Federalist Pro-Administration Hathorn,John Antifederalist Antiadministration Silvester,Peter Federalist Pro-Administration Van Rensselaer,Jeremiah Antifederalist Antiadministration

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North Carolina Ashe, John Baptista Antifederalist Antiadministration Williamson,Hugh Federalist Antiadministration Bloodworth,Timothy Antifederalist Antiadministration Steele, John Federalist Pro-Administration Sevier,John Federalist Pro-Administration Pennsylvania Clymer, George Federalist Pro-Administration Fitzsimons,Thomas Federalist Pro-Administration Hartley,Thomas Federalist Pro-Administration Hiester, Thomas Antifederalist Antiadministration Muhlenberg,Frederick Federalist Pro-Administration Muhlenberg,John Peter G. Antifederalist Antiadministration Scott, Thomas Federalist Pro-Administration Wynkoop,Henry Federalist Pro-Administration

Rhode Island Bourn, Benjamin Federalist Pro-Administration South Carolina Smith, WilliamL. Federalist Pro-Administration Burke,Aedanus Antifederalist Antiadministration Huger, Daniel Federalist Pro-Administration Sumter, Thomas Antifederalist Antiadministration Tucker, Thomas Tudor Antifederalist Antiadministration

Virginia White, Alexander Federalist Pro-Administration Brown,John Federalist Antiadministration Moore, Andrew Federalist Antiadministration Lee, RichardBland Federalist Pro-Administration Madison,James Federalist Antiadministration Coles, Issac Antifederalist Antiadministration Page,John Federalist Antiadministration Parker,Josiah Antifederalist Antiadministration Bland, Theodoric Antifederalist Antiadministration Griffin, Samuel Federalist Pro-Administration

Source:Based on Martis (1989), Table 1H. As noted (note 70), Bland died in office. He was replacedby WilliamB. Giles, listed as antiadministration,but as neither a Federalistnor antifederalist(since Martis's calculationis based on the First Federal Elections coding). While some refer to Giles as an antifederalist,we have not done so in this paper.

APPENDIX II

ROLL-CALL VOTES ANALYZED

Label Number Description Date Ayes-Nays

C1 HO11003 Amendmentto Foreign AffairsDepartment 6-22-89 30-18 Bill concerningExecutive powers

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C2 HO11004 Amendmentto Foreign AffairsDepartment 6-22-89 31-19 Bill eliminatingpresidential removal power C3 HOI1005 To establishDepartment of ForeignAffairs 6-24-89 29-22 C4 HO11009 To refer ConstitutionalAmendments to 8-10-89 16-34 Committeeof the Whole C5 HOI1010 To add "expressly"to "the powersnot 8-21-89 17-32 delegatedby the Constitution . . ." C6 HOI1011 Constitutionalamendment on Congressional 8-21-89 23-28 elections C7 HOI1012 Constitutionalamendment limiting 8-22-89 9-39 Congressionaltaxing powers C8 HO11029 To amendthe 8th Amendment 9-24-89 37-14 C9 HO11030 Judicialwrits to be issued by the United 9-24-89 25-18 States, not the president CIO HO11031 Judicialwrits to be issued by the United 9-25-89 28-22 States, not the president C1l HO11034 To reverseprevious vote (HO11031) on 9-28-89 25-25 judicialwrits HI H012004 To discuss TreasuryReport in Committee 4-15-90 33-33 of the Whole H2 H012005 Not to discuss assumptionof state debts 4-26-90 32-18 H3 H012040 To pass the Public Debt Bill 7-19-90 40-15 H4 H012042 To rejectassumption of state debts 7-24-90 29-32 H5 H012045 To assume state debts 7-26-90 34-28 H6 H012046 On the date of commencementof interest 7-26-90 33-27 paymentson state debts H7 H012047 On the interestrate on state debts 7-29-90 33-27 H8 H013006 To discuss the BankBill in Committee 2-1-91 23-34 of the Whole H9 H013007 To discuss the BankBill in Committee 2-3-91 21-38 of the Whole HIO H013008 To orderthe questionon the BankBill 2-8-91 38-20 HI1 H013009 To pass the BankBill 2-8-91 39-20

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John H. Aldrich is professor of political science, Duke University, Durham, NC 27706. Ruth W. Grant is assistantprofessor of political science, Duke Uni- versity, Durham, NC 27706.

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