Karlsrud, J and Rosén, F 2013 In the Eye of the Beholder? The UN and stability the Use of Drones to Protect Civilians. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 27, pp. 1-10, DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.5334/sta.bo

ARTICLE In the Eye of the Beholder? The UN and the Use of Drones to Protect Civilians John Karlsrud* and Frederik Rosén†

The debate on the UN’s possible use of drones for peacekeeping took a turn in 2013 when the Security Council granted the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) permis- sion to contract surveillance drones for MONUSCO, its peacekeeping mission in the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This article examines what drone capability may entail for UN peacekeeping missions. We find that surveillance drones can help missions acquire better information and improve the situational awareness of its troops, as well as inform decision-making by leadership, police, and civilian components of the mission. We see a significant potential in the use of surveil- lance drones to improve efforts to protect civilians, increase UN troops’ situational aware- ness, and improve access to vulnerable populations in high-risk theaters. The use of drones can dramatically improve information-gathering capacities in proximity to populations at risk, thereby strengthening the ability of peacekeepers to monitor and respond to human rights abuses as well as violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). Drones may also enable peacekeepers to maintain stealth surveillance of potential spoilers, including arms smugglers and embargo breakers. They could additionally improve UN forces’ own targeting practices, further contributing to the protection of civilians (PoC). Furthermore, we empha- size how drone capability significantly increases peacekeepers’ precautionary obligations under IHL in targeting situations: the availability of drones triggers the obligation to use them to gather information in order to avoid civilian casualties or other violations of IHL or international human rights law. There may soon come a shift among human rights groups, from being skeptical of the use of drones by UN peacekeepers to demanding that peacekeeping operations be equipped with surveillance drones for humanitarian and human rights reasons – shift- ing the current debate, which has focused largely on the negative impact of the use of drones, to a more balanced debate that considers more objectively what drones are and what they can be used for. Finally, the debate about armed drones looms on the horizon for the UN as well – and we outline some of the key dilemmas that the inclusion of such a capability will entail.

The UN’s Previous Experiences with Drones * Norwegian Institute of International Affairs The UN already has experience using drones (NUPI), Norway for aerial surveillance. In 2006, the peace- [email protected] keeping mission in the Democratic Repub- † Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Denmark lic of Congo (DRC), MONUC (as the mission [email protected] was then called), was supported for a period Art. 27, page 2 of 10 Karlsrud and Rosén: In the Eye of the Beholder? of time by a European force (EUFOR) and disaster-stricken areas (Relief Map Warper Belgian troops brought with them surveil- 2010). More recently UNOSAT conducted lance drones. Both missions operated under a field mapping operation with drones for a UN mandate. One of the drones, however, the International Organization of Migration was shot down and the other crashed, kill- (IOM) to map sites of IDPs (Unmanned Vehi- ing one person and injuring several others cles, 2012). in Kinshasa, ending that particular effort to employ drones (Isango 2006). ‘MONUSCO Drones’ as a Defining There are also less-publicized instances Moment where UN peacekeeping missions have used In March 2013 MONUSCO was given the for- surveillance drones. On August 31, 2006, mal go-ahead to contract drone capability, as UN Security Resolution 1706 mandated the well as a new mandate. This new mandate use of aerial surveillance ‘to monitor trans- included an intervention brigade mandated border activities of armed groups along the to ‘take all necessary measures’ to ‘neutral- Sudanese borders with Chad and the Cen- ize’ and ‘disarm’ groups that pose a threat tral African Republic in particular through to ‘state authority and civilian security’ (UN regular ground and aerial reconnaissance 2013: 7–8). These two developments stirred activities’ (UN Security Council 2006: 4). In up a debate about how drones can be used 2008, a UN civilian mission (MINURCAT) was to document the use of force in the context deployed alongside EUFOR troops to protect of UN peacekeeping. According to UN offi- refugees, internally-displaced persons (IDPs), cials, the MONUSCO drones are considered and humanitarian personnel in eastern Chad capable of enhancing the ability of the UN to and the northeastern corner of the Central protect civilians. The drones will carry pho- African Republic. One year later, the force tographic equipment and will be ‘equipped was replaced by UN troops, but as prepara- with infrared technology that can detect tions to replace the European forces were troops hidden beneath forest canopy or still in their infancy, a major portion of the operating at night, allowing them to track European forces were re-hatted to ensure a movements of armed militias, assist patrols continued presence of troops on the ground. heading into hostile territory, and document One of these troop contributors brought atrocities’ (Lynch 2013). surveillance drone capability as part of its There is no doubt that the ‘MONUSCO national setup during the EUFOR period; drones’ represent a defining moment in the when they were re-hatted, the UN ‘inherited’ history of UN peacekeeping and aerial sur- this capability. It was put to use when Chad veillance. The UN would also like to expand was invaded by domestic opposition forces the use of drones to other countries, includ- that came across the border from Darfur dur- ing Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and South Sudan ing the spring of 2009. The drone capabil- (Lynch 2013). Close attention is thus being ity proved very useful to the mission, as UN paid to how the ‘MONUSCO drones’ will work forces could closely monitor the movement out. DRC, however, may not be the best coun- of the opposition forces and enhance the try to start testing the use of drones in peace- protection of refugees, IDPs, and humani- keeping. Certain regions of the country are tarian aid workers accordingly, thereby liv- covered with rainforest so dense that neither ing up to the mandate of the mission. In cameras nor infrared optics are able to pen- Haiti, immediately following the 2010 earth- etrate it. Surveillance drones can be useful in quake, the Operational Satellite Applications areas where the vegetation is less dense, but Programme (UNOSAT), part of the United tropical weather conditions in eastern DRC Nations Institute for Training and Research will put the drones to the test during the (UNITAR), used satellite imagery to map rainy season. There will also be many other Karlsrud and Rosén: In the Eye of the Beholder? Art. 27, page 3 of 10 lessons to draw regarding contracts and con- member states to all forms of information tract management, storage, analysis, and dis- gathering, including aerial surveillance. As semination of drone-collected material. a result, peacekeeping missions have been Similar to other commentators, we argue slow to adopt new technology (Dorn 2010). that drones can dramatically increase the While member states generally do under- general capability of a UN peacekeeping stand the need for peacekeeping missions operation – improving access to vulnerable to acquire capabilities that can enable them populations, providing better information to better fulfill their mandates – including on potential threats to civilians, and increas- protecting civilians and UN personnel and ing access to information in cases where maintaining sufficient situational aware- the UN must use force to protect civilians. ness – it has taken time for member states Drones represent a new way of ‘seeing and to agree to equip UN peacekeeping missions knowing’ in peacekeeping and can dramati- with surveillance and monitoring capabili- cally improve peacekeepers’ access to infor- ties. Only quite recently did the UN include mation. However, there are several issues a sector devoted to the collection, analysis, that need to be considered while shaping and dissemination of information in con- an effective UN drone capability, as well nection with peacekeeping missions, the as certain questions that must be tackled Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), which before drones become a standard compo- was established in 2006. Today the JMAC has nent of peacekeeping missions. Considera- become a staple ingredient in UN missions, tion must also be given to the rapid advances enabling them to collect and analyze infor- in drone technology and the changing costs mation – in essence having a better under- of acquiring and maintaining a drone capa- standing of the environments in which they bility. Larger surveillance drones have been are operating – and improving their ability improved, communications technology and to execute their mandates. monitoring technology have matured, and smaller drones are about to become stand- The UN and the Image of the ‘Killer Drone’ ard military equipment. In the following sec- Even if drones in the context of military tions, we aim to open the floor for a compre- operations are used mostly for surveillance, hensive discussion of UN missions and the the focus of the current public debate has use of drones. been on the use of drones for targeting. The controversies here spring primarily from the Resistance to Drones in disputed morality and lawfulness of using Peacekeeping drones for targeted and signature killings, First of all, the resistance towards drones in often with civilian casualties as collateral the UN needs to be addressed. The emotion- damage (see for example OHCHR 2013). ally-laden uneasiness surrounding drones in In the official discourse on drones, names general has clearly shaped attitudes toward like ‘Predator’ and ‘Reaper’ connote ‘killer the use of drones in a UN context. Member drones’ and US military imperialism. The states have been skeptical, due to concerns image of drones in connection with armed about drones being used for intelligence pur- conflict has been formed largely by the idea poses as well as a widespread resistance to that drones are tools of remoteness and dis- targeted killings. tance, built to execute actions of aggression by remote control. Similarly, in discussing The UN, Drones, and Intelligence surveillance capability in a national context, MONUSCO’s mandate to employ drones has debates have tended to focus on the domes- drawn quite a few headlines. The reason for tic use of drones for policing and how this this is without doubt a sensitivity among UN may encroach upon civil liberties. We argue Art. 27, page 4 of 10 Karlsrud and Rosén: In the Eye of the Beholder? that the concerns over the use of drones force, but the history of seeing the enemy stem not from the drone technology itself, in war: a history moving from hilltops and but rather what it can be used for. watchtowers to the use of binoculars, bal- Similarly, there have been fears that the loons, and airplanes, and then on to radar, cheap, unmanned, and stealth qualities of night vision, satellites…and drones. Drone drones make the transgression of sovereign technology offers a comprehensive surveil- borders less risky, as has been the case with lance system with extensive capabilities for US drone operations. It has also been pointed patrolling and controlling territories. Prox- out how resistance to drone use among some imity and visibility, rather than remoteness, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) is also should be the main point of departure in based on fears that drones may reduce the analyzing the implications of drone technol- need for troops on the ground, that ‘drones ogy (Gregory 2012). would replace the legions of U.N. peacekeep- ers’ (Lynch 2013). Lifting the ‘Fog of War’ We do not deny that there are serious chal- In popular discourse people may still asso- lenges involved in the use of so-called ‘killer ciate drones with the ‘War on Terror’ in drones’ in e.g. Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere, but the fact and the Sahel. But we also see how this par- is that drones are now being used every- ticular discourse on drones has a very unfor- where on a daily basis - from the local real- tunate impact on the political will to explore estate broker who wants to take pictures the use of drones for protection purposes. for a sales brochure, to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, to London during the 2011 Proximity and ‘Seeing’ riots. With new technology (better cameras, Another conceptual issue that needs to be better algorithms, better means of analyz- resolved is the idea that the use of drones ing data) the proximity factor will only equates to peacekeeping by remote control. increase - and the ‘fog of war’ will slowly lift To the contrary, drone technology can in cer- from UN peacekeeping missions. Remote- tain circumstances help bring peacekeepers controlled, unmanned, and unarmed aerial closer to adversaries and civilians in need surveillance vehicles – in combination with of protection. Having drones in the air over other information systems like sensors, sat- particularly volatile areas would allow peace- ellite pictures, and tactical information from keepers to register suspicious behavior, even peacekeepers on the ground – may lead to at night, and monitor movements of groups a knowledge revolution in UN peacekeep- and individuals, checking for weapons and ing, as they have already done in other areas. other items that would indicate hostile Having state-of-the-art drone technology for intentions. Drones could also be used for peacekeeping in the near future may provide detecting arms smuggling and breaches of possibilities for the detailed registration of embargos. There is thus reason to believe anything that moves within large territories, that the presence of drones could have a even at night and zoomed in very closely. deterrent effect on adversaries. However, we need to do away with the idea that remote- Transaction Costs: Economic controlled drones embody a new and radical- Drones may expand monitoring capacity ized ‘distance’ in the history of armed force. significantly. However, information will not Drones are not the final step in a techno- automatically translate into operationally- logical development moving from the stone improved situational awareness. Analysis sling, to the longbow, to modern-day cruise and dissemination of information needs missiles and, now, to drones. The most note- specialized capacity depending on how the worthy historical trajectory of drone technol- UN wants to use drones. There is a big dif- ogy is not the history of remotely deployed ference between using drones for the overall Karlsrud and Rosén: In the Eye of the Beholder? Art. 27, page 5 of 10 monitoring of a situation and using them for will have less leeway for failing to respond actual combat support. It is common practice to atrocities if knowledge is available in real for militaries with extensive drone capability time; this will significantly lower the accept- simply to link up individual soldiers by radio ance threshold for civilian casualties. to drone operators. This is, in principle, no different from using walkie-talkies with the Precautionary Obligations reconnaissance unit on, say, a hilltop, but the The increasing availability and impending technical set-up for on-site monitoring sup- omnipresence of drones will have important port by drones is more complicated and also consequences for how IHL is understood, much more expensive. as was the case when radar was introduced to modern warfare. Radical improvements Transaction Costs: Strategic in knowledge accessibility will also lead to Choices and Responsibilities heightened requirements for the applica- Complex operational environments - along tion of this knowledge when using force, as with the fact that unconventional armed well as an increase in the demand for the use groups do not travel in easily detectible mili- of force. We thus argue that the debate that tary equipment such as tanks and ships, but has focused thus far on ‘killer drones’, while rather move by foot, pickup, or motorbike important, has been able to capture only - call for a different approach to situational part of the larger picture. A knowledge revo- awareness besides radar and high-altitude lution is underway that will have dramatic imaging. Drone technology’s possibility of implications for the interpretation of IHL in delivering high-quality, close-up images in modern warfare. real time could significantly improve the situ- From an IHL perspective there is little ational awareness of UN peacekeepers. Con- doubt that drones significantly increase the sider one possible scenario: an attack on a precautionary obligations of peacekeepers village a few kilometers from the compound (Rosén 2013). With increased access to infor- is being reported, yet currently the only way mation and knowledge, peacekeepers must to assess the situation is by moving troops use force in a manner that is proportional, into the area, which could take hours. With taking all due precautions to avoid civilian drones, it would take only minutes from the casualties. This has not been reflected upon arrival of a report before high-quality images in the debate surrounding drones in the UN could be reviewed. and deserves further attention. While this intuitively sounds like a positive The debate can also lead to greater aware- development, increased situational aware- ness about the potential use of drones to ness would also put additional pressure on strengthen PoC in conflict settings, as well commanders by expanding the range of as the legal obligations of those operating strategic options. In a typical peacekeeping drones to ensure that all data captured with environment where smaller violent incidents drone technology are saved for scrutiny in frequently take place, real-time awareness cases of dispute and loss of civilian lives. may place an extra burden on decision-mak- The principles of proportionality, ‘all feasi- ers to determine whether or not to engage ble precaution’, and other relevant rules of - compared to situations with less available war will have to be reinterpreted in light information where errors and mistakes may of new realities. The UN will, as always, be be excused by non-transparent or confusing expected to perform to the highest possible environments. The expanded scope of strate- standards. This implies that all actions that gic choices produced by more detailed situa- may involve the use of force must be filmed tional awareness will demand more compre- and stored for possible post-action scru- hensive decision-making processes, affecting tiny. It may also involve a demand to share the responsibilities of officers. Peacekeepers such documentation with the wider public to Art. 27, page 6 of 10 Karlsrud and Rosén: In the Eye of the Beholder? ensure full transparency and accountability Outsourcing Drone Capability for such actions. A further question that has Drone technology gets complicated as soon to be asked is whether there will be moral, or as drones move up in size. Smaller low-alti- even legal, responsibility for member states tude drones (like the Raven) can be controlled or the UN to procure the newest available by hand-held remote controls. But larger technology, if such technology could reduce drones with longer range and heftier sur- civilian casualties. veillance technology require a satellite base and fairly sophisticated piloting technology. Ownership of Data Nothing indicates that the UN will or should The sensitive aspects of information col- build its own drone fleet in the near future. lected by drones in humanitarian and peace- UN DPKO and the Department for Field Sup- keeping operations concern not only the port (DFS) would thus be dependent on con- targets of the surveillance drones - such as tributing states or would have to purchase the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the M-23, services from private companies. In both or the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du cases, questions arise as to the handling of Rwanda (FDLR) (UN 2013) - but also the large such outsourcing. Contracting services from amounts of extra-data which are collected a company would entail the usual complica- and stored. The sensitivity of drone technol- tions of outsourcing with regard to imple- ogy in peacekeeping missions thus looks a menting contracts and obligating funds. In lot like the CCTV dilemma: most people have addition to transparency and accountability no problem with the filming of perpetrators issues, contracts would also need to regulate in public spaces - the problem is all the other the specialized task of monitoring. Contract- private data also captured by CCTV technol- ing for situational awareness is a crucial task ogy. The following questions will have to be of great importance to decision-makers and addressed should the UN engage drones for this needs to be recognized in the contracts. peacekeeping operations in a more compre- Decisions made by contractors with regard hensive manner: to maneuvering drones over this, and not that, area could have grave consequences for • What should be done with the informa- troops or civilians. The UN therefore needs tion gathered by UN drones? to consider the intricate questions of respon- • Who could and should have access to sibility when outsourcing situational aware- live video streams? ness. The critical question of ownership over • Who could and should have access to video streams and recordings also needs to recorded streams? be addressed. Furthermore, there will be • Could the information gathered be used concerns as regards possible links between as evidence by, for instance, the Interna- contracting companies and member state tional Criminal Court? defense and/or intelligence industries. In • Should drones also be used as a conven- order to accommodate outsourced drone tional police tool, for instance, to fight capability, the UN will need to develop spe- organized crime? cialized contracting policies and contract management officers to manage the sensi- To protect the integrity of UN peacekeep- tive issues entailed in contracting drones. ing, there must be effective regulation to ensure that any information collected with The Future drones is the property of the UN alone. Any Reading this, some supporters of drones – leaks of information collected in this man- and of UN peacekeeping in general – may ner would rapidly destroy the legitimacy of change their minds and want to reverse the UN drones. implementation process. From experience Karlsrud and Rosén: In the Eye of the Beholder? Art. 27, page 7 of 10 we know that in war and peacekeeping oper- advantages in identifying targets and striking ations actions are often messy and full clar- with precision’ (Shane 2012). ity is reached only with the benefit of hind- sight. This hindsight will be greatly improved Conclusions and Recommendations through the use of drones, which, while gen- We would like to warn against the belief that erally a positive, would also be a legal liability technological solutions can alone solve com- for the UN in cases where civilians are killed. plex problems. MONUSCO has repeatedly Legal action from groups that could be the asked for more troops, more helicopters, and victim of disproportional use of force should other forms of support to help it implement thus be anticipated. its mandate. Drones and the Intervention However, the processes described here Brigade are the latest of many capabilities cannot be reversed. Acquiring and operat- provided to the mission to help it protect ing drones is becoming less expensive every civilians and remove threats. However, with- day and we believe that soon human rights out political solutions and the provision of groups will actually be demanding that security and services by the government in drones be included as a staple ingredient in areas like eastern DRC, no amount of troops peacekeeping operations. The UN will need or capabilities can enable the UN to success- to recognize that opting not to use drones fully implement its mandate. Surveillance could indeed someday be considered a drones are merely a technical tool that can breach of IHL. provide peacekeeping operations with better We also foresee an expansion of the debate knowledge. Like any technical aid they are on what purposes drones can be used for in not a cure-all; they cannot mediate between peace operations, as well as humanitarian parties or help societies emerge from conflict and development work. This could include a and rebuild. Furthermore, the use of drones wide range of areas, including humanitarian in areas such as South Sudan and other action, disarmament, monitoring of popu- theaters where low-level threats across vast lation movements (displacement, resettle- areas are a dominant feature (particularly ment), and banditry (e.g. cattle rustling in in regions with less dense vegetation than South Sudan). the DRC) may be more relevant when future Finally, we foresee that a debate over operations are to be considered. whether the UN should have weaponized With regard to the recent mandate and drones is not too far away. In the case of the Intervention Brigade, we would cau- MONUSCO, the use of armed drones appears tion against the aggressive posture that to be in line with the protection mandate MONUSCO has now been given by the issued by the Security Council, where there Security Council. Combined with the newly is specific mention of ‘the effective protec- acquired drone capability, this may lead to tion of civilians, humanitarian personnel unforeseen consequences for mission leader- and human rights defenders under immi- ship and UN headquarters. The use of drones nent threat of physical violence, as well as combined with the robust use of force will the protection of United Nations personnel, trigger considerably stricter precautionary facilities, installations and equipment’. For obligations on behalf of the mission, and that reason, if the UN employs drones capa- the use of force will have to be monitored ble of carrying weapon systems able to mini- with all means possible. Drone capability mize harm and enable the UN to implement will not only help the mission monitor and its mandate more effectively, it is difficult track groups that represent a threat to civil- to find arguments against such armament. ian security, but will also place an obligation Some hold that using armed drones may in on the mission to monitor and record its own fact ‘be ethically obligatory, because of their actions. Art. 27, page 8 of 10 Karlsrud and Rosén: In the Eye of the Beholder?

With the inclusion of drones in UN peace- Unobserved indirect fire is prohibited’ (UN keeping, many questions and issues are 2012: 253). With the inclusion of drones, a emerging. There is a strong need for more new means of observation is added, creat- knowledge and research on the implications ing new opportunities and challenges. We of adding this new capability to missions recommend that the UN further develop in terms of: carrying out mandates (PoC in its guidelines along the lines of those of particular); rules of engagement when using the AU - more clearly specifying the rules of direct and indirect force; monitoring and engagement and when and how to use indi- storing information regarding the use of rect force - and consider the inclusion of a force; monitoring, reporting, and acting on drone capability in this context. We would human rights violations in the mission area; also recommend that the AU update its indi- transborder monitoring; command and con- rect fire policy to include the consequences trol of the use of surveillance drones in UN of having a surveillance drone capability, not missions; contracting versus including drone least since Ugandan troops in Somalia have capability in the regular mission setup - to already this capability. mention only a few. The financial cost of drones is dropping In light of the inclusion of the Intervention fast. The UN now needs to build up its own Brigade in MONUSCO, the Security Council expertise and modalities to handle the use asked MONUSCO and the DPKO to ‘update of drones and the information produced by the mission concept, concept of operations, them. This could be done by including a call rules of engagement, and all other relevant for surveillance drone capability in the list of UN planning documents’ (UN 2013: 11). capabilities to be provided by TCCs. The UN We suggest that the DPKO and DFS should could also choose to include the capability also begin developing policies, doctrines, and the costs in its support division through and manuals for the use of drones, includ- the DFS. ing such aspects as the use of indirect force Guidelines have to be developed for three when a drone capability is deployed or avail- sets of modalities 1) when drone capability is able in the mission. These need to include contracted from a private company, 2) when clear guidelines for all levels of information it is provided by a TCC, and 3) if the mission collection, sharing, managing, and storing. decides to include this capability in its sup- UN peacekeeping missions are held to the port pillar. In the first and last instances, highest standards; MONUSCO, for instance, the drone capability will be under the direct is expected to perform ‘in strict compliance authority of the Special Representative of the with international law, including interna- Secretary-General (SRSG), while if it is pro- tional humanitarian law, and with the human vided by a TCC, the Force Commander will rights due diligence policy on UN-support to have the main tasking authority. As drones non-UN forces (HRDDP)’ (UN 2013: 8). also can be used for humanitarian and civil- The African Union Mission in Somalia ian purposes, there are important advan- (AMISOM) has developed a policy for the tages in placing the authority directly under use of indirect force in instances where the the SRSG. chances of civilian casualties are significantly Drones can help the UN closely moni- high (AU 2011), as well as authorized the tor potential spoilers before using force, to inclusion of a civilian casualty tracking, anal- monitor and record incidents where peace- ysis, and response cell (CCTARC) (Grubeck keepers are using force to protect civilians, 2013). In the recently revised UN Infantry and to save all information thus gathered Battalion Manual, the duty to identify tar- for later scrutiny and to share with the wider gets before the use of indirect fire is clearly public for accountability purposes. However, spelled out: ‘Assured identification of hos- surveillance drones are not a panacea for tile forces prior to engagement is required. the challenges facing UN peacekeeping mis- Karlsrud and Rosén: In the Eye of the Beholder? Art. 27, page 9 of 10 sions. In fact, as we have pointed out, they world/36210223_1_laboratory-for-in- may well add to the complexity, and thus telligence-devices-surveillance-drones- the challenges, faced by UN peacekeeping peacekeeping-missions [Last accessed 28 operations - by establishing higher stand- March 2013]. ards as to when and how force is applied and OHCHR 2013 Statement of the Special requiring documentation at all times in case Rapporteur following meetings in Pa- civilian casualties should occur. This adds to kistan. Geneva: Office of the High Com- the burdens placed on UN and other peace missioner for Human Rights, published operations. In the current debate on drones, 14 March. Available at www.ohchr.org/ the UN will be expected to lead the way in EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. documenting all instances of the use of force aspx?NewsID=13146&LangID=E [Last ac- and drones are indeed a good tool for this. cessed 17 April 2013]. Including drones in UN peacekeeping mis- Relief Map Warper 2010 UNOSAT satellite- sions may prove to be more than the UN bar- identified IDP concentrations, road & gained for - but there is no turning back. bridge obstacles in Carrefour, Haiti. Re- lief Map Warper, 16 January. Available Acknowledgments at http://maps.nypl.org/relief/maps/70 We would like to thank Marina Caparini, [Last accessed 3 May 2013]. Cedric de Coning, Erin Weir, and two anony- Rosén, F 2013 Extremely stealthy and in- mous peer reviewers for thoughtful com- credibly close: drones, control, and le- ments and inputs. Any errors and omissions gal Responsibility. DIIS Working Paper remain our own. 2013:04. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. 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How to cite this article: Karlsrud, J and Rosén, F 2013 In the Eye of the Beholder? The UN and the Use of Drones to Protect Civilians. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2): 27, pp. 1-10, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bo

Published: 21 June 2013

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