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Super Sixth in exq,.oi tati on, Operation G'obr St Lo, France, 25 Jul 44. Armored School, student research report. May 49.

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CGSC Form 160 Army--CGSC-P2-1798--7 Mar 52-3M 13 Mar 51

ST LO

AVRANGMH S

SUPER SIXTH IN EXPLOITATION

(6TH ARMORED DIVISION, NORMANDY TO BRIEST)

OPERATION COBRA

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED

COMIITEE 9, OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE THE~ ARMORED SCHOOL

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WAYNE W. FRAME~ MAJOR LeROY D. BRUvIITT MIAJOR GEORGE P. IJINTHW'AITE

MAJOR ARTHUR J. McBRIDE CAPTAIN HERBERT W.* HARTUJNG

CAPTAIN DW2'IGHT D. BONHAM CAPTAIN GERALD G.' COADY ).st LIUTENANT JAMES R. DEW

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY( MAY 1~949

cssc

Major General Robert W. Grow

:ii H{E DIVISION 00M1 yND.

Major General Robert Walker Grow, 0-4621, born in Iowa, a graduate of the University of Minnesota, and integrated into the

Regular Ary from the Minnesota National Guard in 1916, was the combat leader of the 6th Armored Division.

General Grow saw service on the Mexican border in 1916, and in World War I was field artillery instructor at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and later with the Amoy of Occupation in Germany. In the interim between World Tar I and World War II, he was graduated from the Army

War College, Command and General Staff School, and the Troop Officers and Advanced Equitation classes of the Cavalry School. He advanced through the grades and was promoted to Major General on 17 September

1943.

His first association with armor commenced in 1930 with his assignment to the Mechanized Force at Fort Eustis, Virginia. Later he wasp for four years, in the Office of the Chief of Cavalry in charge of equipment for mechanized cavalry. He served as G-3 of the 2d

Armored Division, and upon the expansion of armor, commencing in l9l, was assigned to other armored units. In May 1943 he took command of the 6th Armored division and was its commander until the end of the war in Europe. In late 19 the division was inactivated and he com- madded, the 3d Armored Division and the 26th Infantry Division until they were inactia .Returning to the United States and Fort Knox, he assumed command of the Replacement Training Center. Later he

iii served in Iran as Chief of the MiM.itary Mis sign, and in September

194+ returned to'tl United Sta.tes to become Comanding General of Fort Devens.

eneral Grow has been decorated with the Distinguished Service

Cross, the Distnguishe Serice Medal, the Silver Star with Oak Leaf

Cluster, the Legion rf Merit, the Bronze Star, the French Legion of

Honor, the French Croix de Guerre, the Belgium Croix de Guerre, and

the Luxembourg Order Nationale de la Conrome. PREFACE

The mission of the Research Committee presenting this report is to analyze the contributions of armor in Operation "COBRA" which took place on the continent of EUROPE in July 1944.

The general value of such an analysis is self-evident; however, to clarify in detail the reason for such interpretation of facts the following extract is recorded from a report presented to the

Secretary of VWar, June 1935, by General Douglas MacArthur:

More than most professions, the military is forced to depend on intelligent interpretation of the past for sign posts charting the future.. Devoid of opportunity in peace for self instruction through actual practice in his profession, the soldier makes maximum use of historical record in assuring the readiness of himself and his command to function efficiently in emergency. The facts derived from historical analysis he applies to conditions of the present and proximate future, thus developing synthesis of approximate method, organization, and doctrine,

The 6th Armored Division has been selected for study in this operation for the following reasons:

1.. Present day doctrine in the Army emphasizes the use of an armored division as a fighting unit capable of independent action.

The 6th Armored Division was used in such a manner,

2. Our doctrine further points out a primary method of utilizing an armored division, namely in an exploitation role following a penetration by other ground forces. The 6th. Armored Division was com-

mitted in precisely this manner.

3,. The mission of the 6th Armored Division, "Seize BREST," is a

further example of present teaching: that is, the armored division

should be utilized.to seize a key objective. BREST, ranked as a major objective on the highest strategic level, with a port which was to relieve the demands placed on supply installations on the COTENTIN

Peninsula,

4. Last, and of equal importance, this was the initial commitment

0 for the 6th Armored Division and the problems encountered, errors and successes, are felt to be similar to those that may be faced by any nonbattle-tried division of the future,

No attempt is made to minimize errors or inadequacies discovered, or on the other hand to glorify the unit in any way; rather an attempt is made in this study to seek the reason for the results., No tactical plan can be successful unless adequate administrative support is rendered. Therefore, the contents of this report covers the tactical account and the administrative. They are inseparable and must be considered with equal emphasis.

Further research of this operation would undoubtedly lead to more detailed explanations, as many after-action reports and allied papers were not available for this study. However, the committee feels that salient points and conclusions drawn therefrom will most likely remain unchanged.

To the division commander and those members of the Super Sixth who offered invaluable assistance in the preparation of this report, and others Whose names appear in the bibliography, we are deeply in- debted for their untiring efforts in furnishing many details which otherwise would not have been available.

Svi TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER 1 INTRDUCION .*...... *.. "**...... 9. Phases of the Cobra Plan...., ...... ,...... m The Enemy Situation..-... *** ,...... * **. D--Day, 25 July 1944...... *...., ..... 26 Jul.y 1944...... e...... g.,...e. 27 July 1944. . ..-...... 28 July 1944. .... "...... "g.. * . . a e gee * ~*e me. Armor in Action. "e...e . .me...... * . 4.gse~ 0 ee ee e CHAPTER II PREPARATION IN ENGLAND Section I Tactical Training...... e*.s*e C. em e e-e e " "....." II. Intelligence Activities... eggee. e g.e scee III Logistical Preparation... mogeemee ' V G-1.Activities.... 5.. * ceegeg ego.....

CHAPZSR III CONCENTRATION Section I Preparation for Combat...... " .~e.eg.m II Intelligence Ac'Wivities....g m g " e . e. C gs.ms III Supply..f...... s. .. egemeigf C C C m e C '0 IV eeeeggeggeoeeemm

CHAPTER IV THE PENETRATION Section I The First Action...... :.... C ~4 e.g C.. e4g egee II Intelligence...... 0a,. 9Ce*getgeCee.eg. III Supply~in the Penetration...Ce..eo e ge.em.e g gee. IV G-1 Activities.... " .. . . e C . g e ceeme e C 9~

CHAPTER V EXPLOITATION Section I The Dash to BES&T...... ,, ..... C e CC*9 We g ~ e 95 II Intell igence."...... -...... 110 C...... 117 Lgi1sAtiit...... 1V 127

CHAPTER VI CONTAINLIENT OF BR ST Section I Enemy to the Front, E~nemy to the Rear...... 4 II Intelligence.-...... e....ge...e...6.ememeceg se. 147 III Logistical Situation Terminatedi.,...... 152 'V G.-1 Activities.4...... f..v..." 167

CHAPTER. VII SPECIAL STUDIES Section I French Forces of~ the Interior...... , 176 II Hedgerow Cutters... .-...... *.... ."..-...... " 184 III. G3-2 Special: Teams....e.:...... ""...... 187 IV Comparison of~Division Trains, 1944-1949...... 192 V Class III Supplies in the BRITTUANY Campaign.. 197

vii TAKJA OF ONN :( fin Page

CHAP TER V.rct 51,J viiRY .AND CONCLUSIONS :ation I Summary. .:...... ~.. a a ...... * a a, 202 II Conclusions...... *. .. CC,... 208

APPENDIX I i Section I 6th Armored Division Order of Battle.....,. " II German Order of Battle...... vi

APPEDNDIX II TACTICAL STUDY OF TERRAIN AND ti2iATHiR...... " xii

APPZNDh III RATIONS CO ,AP RISON.. .""...... f ."" .. " Xi

APPENDIX IV G-2. ST.iTISTIO TL,dY . ".....ease... Jocv

APPENDIX V EISCZIIAN ZOUS Section I Terrain Map...... "...... , ...... ( In Ii 0-3 Map.."...... "...... "...... ( pocket III 6th Armored Division Field Orders 1-~9 incl..( at rear LV T/O (old and new) with Major items of equip-( of fo2lder

viii CHAT . R 1

INTrODUCTs'ION

The First United States Aryn under the coiland of Lieutenant

General Omar h. Bradley, on 6 June 1944 secured a lodgemnent area on the continent of Europe in the form of a beachhead in Normandy,

France.

Tis Nor-nandyr beachhead Was expanded hedgerow by hedgerow against bitter and fanatical resistance by the ene-y, who. used every bit of their well-known skl1 in an attempt to throw the Allied armies back into the sea. his ,as onl2y haitler's boast, however, and in spite of the Lest efforts of the Germanis, th4e First Army, on

25 Ju4.y, was in a position to launch a -;'breakout from the maneuver restricting bocage country.

This offensive, appropriately named "uCOBP.A ," when executed liberated several thousand square miles of French territory and paved the wray for subsequent mirssions which freed all of northwpest

France. Tile opc-ration provided the opporunite r for armored units to display, thieir trey ndous nower and abi ity to drive deep into eneruy defenses,, regar dless of thle fact that the terrain was unsuit- able for rap~id . ovomnt.

The 6th Armored Division played a .major role in I!COERA,"

entering action on 27 July. The "Super Sixth" was placed under

control of VIII Corps with a vievw to exp oiting successes. First

Army's secondary attack became thie main attack through the use of accounts of this action is covered in the chapters to follow.

Lieutenant General Bradley, at the direction of General

Eisenhower, ordered the planning of COBRAt early in July 1944.-

The First Army initially p).erued to use 12 infantry divisions and three armored divisions for this operation. Pitted against this force-was a total of approximately 29 German divisions, each of varying strength. Further, 33 German divisions wore disposed else- where in France, most of them in the CAIAIS area, with BRIT?\Y being the most likely area to furnish reserves to the Nazi divisions opposing "COBRA. BRITTANY also contained the key port of

ERET, a vital factor in theatre planning from the standpoint of logistics. The port facilities of B.RLT were scheduled to relieve the strain being placed on CHERBOLG and the beaches,

Phases of the Cobra Plan

Phase one was to include an intense aerial bombardment by fighter bombers, medium and heavy bombers, of an area approximately 2500 yards deep and 6000 yards wide in front of the, main effort. The area was to be. determined exactly when the main position of the enemy was uncovered, but the bomb line was tentatively set for the P~?JLRS$--T . LO road. In addition, the area was to be

subjected to all the artillery fire (light, medium, and heavy) that could possibly be massed. This great fire preparation was designed to stun and reduce the. onenyts will to resist. Obviously

surprise was a secondary consideration in this plan, once it wa$ in readiness. The cover plan was being conducted on theater level, with Montgomery attempting to hold the German armor at CA EN and General Eisenhower feinting with dumrmy landings in the vir Lty of

PAS DE CA1IIS.

The f ollow-through was to be accomplished by two infantry divisions of the corps making the main effort. These divisions wre to attack through the enemy line, effecting a penetration,

and then fan our, so as to block the flanks, allowing other units gq exploit further to the south.

Phase two was the exploitation phase and was to be effected by moving two armored divisions and one motorized infantry division through the gap and dov n the I two main routes opened by the pene- trating forces. The 3d Armored Division was to have as its objective the high ground west of and including COUT NC S. The 2d Armored

Division was to seize the high ground on the eastern bank of the

SI~N1E river northwest of GAVRAY, capture-the town of BREHIAL, and block all movement "of enemy reinforcements to the north. The motorized infantry division was to follow the left armored columnri,

prepared to support the armor.

Phase three was to be . the. consolidation portion of the plan.

During both of the previous phases the three corps of the Army

engaged in making the secondary attack were to continue strong

pressure against the enemy and prevent any withdraal which he naght attemi pt to make. In phase three these corps were to increase

the pressure untiJ, the enemy was forced to withdraw on terms dic-

tated byFirst Army. The corps were furthor- to exploit every ad-

vantage gaind from the disorganized state of the enemy. As

events later occurred, VIIX Corps, one of those making a secondary attack,- pursued its mission with such aggressiveness that it made gains completely out of proportion to its strength.

The fire plan received special attention. The artillery and air support previously mentioned were prescribed in detail and

checked and rechecked by the Army commander. The air support plan was essentially as follows:

1. Twenty minutes bombardment by 350 fighter bombers on a narrow strip along the P Ml S- SST.ICJ road.

2. One hour bombardment by 1500 heavy bombers on an area: 2500 by 6000 yards in front of the corps making the main effo±t.

3. Bomdbardment by 350 ighter bonbers on the original narrow

strip. This bomsibardtent was to begin at H-hour and last for

approximrately twenty minutes.'

4. Bombardent by 396 medium bombers on the souther half of

the bombing area, commencing at H-hour plus 30, and lasting until

H hour plus 75 minutes.

5. Bombardment of bridges along the V tE and SIMOT rivers.

6. Tactical air reconnaissance and fighter support was to be

continuous.

-This operation was to be the largest on the continent since

the invasion, and the principle of mass was to be exploited in de.

tail, both as regards fire support and the assault by troops.

The target date for this operation was oiriginally set for

Lt July, but due to poor weather it was postponed several times

and D-Day was finally set as 25 July.

The composition of First Army on D-Day was as follows: FIRST ARbPZ

VIII CORPS VII CORPS

h "Infantry Division 1st Infantry Division (MVtzd)

79t th 2rnfantry Division 4th Inflantry Division $3d Infantry Division 9th Infantry Division 90t h Infantr~y Division 30th Infantry Division

4t h Armored Division 2d Armored Division (liv Djv)

3d ,Arrnor d Division (Hv Div)

EI cote

29th Infantry Division 2d InfantryP Division 35th Infantry Division 5th Infantry Division These corps were disposed from west to southeast in the order of VIII Corps, VII Corps, XIX Corps, and V Corps. The right flank of. VIII Corps rested. on the English Channel, while the left

(east) flank of First Army was in contact with the British Second

Army along the DIOME river.

The main effort was to be made by 'VII Corps on a narrow front just west of ST. LO in the vicinity of HEBECROVEN, while the remaining corps maintained the pressure role.

Meanwhile, the Third United States Army, wider the command of Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., was moving into the picture. After D-Day, 6 June, the Third Army, at this time still in ENGLAND, was directed to complete training and move to FRANCE.

This was accomplished and by 17 July,. General Patton had the majority

of his trbops in assembly areas awaiting orders. On 22 July the

Third Army received its first operational directive. Tentative

boundaries were assigned and units were located in areas that would

expedite movement. Based on Third Army directives, corps and divi-

sions prepared plans.

The 6th Armored Division was on the troop list of Third

Army. However, it entered combat on 27 July as a division of the

VIII Corps, then a part of First Army. Prior planning provided for

VIII Corps to become operational. In order to provide the transition

for transfer of troops, VIII Corps passed to operational control of

Third Army on 2S July. In turn, the new Third Army became operational

as a. field force in combat on 1 August. The ommittment, the sound-

ness of high level advance plannig, now paid great dividends when the gate was opened by VIII Corps and armored columns were cut loose to exploit, achieving success as to be outstanding in annuals of military history.

During, the time interval between the. original planning and the issuance of corps orders, the Germans had moved additional strength,, particularly armor, toward the break-through area which necessitatcd minor changes, particularly in VII Corps plans. The

VII Corps order, when issued, proscribed an initial attack with three infantry divisions abreast, disposed frot wrest to east in the order of 9)th, 4th, and 30th Infantry Divisions. The 30th Infantry

Division was to secure the crossings of the; V.TE river as far south as T.SSY, as. well as protect the immediate flank of the initial penetration. The additional division (4th Infantry Division 'which the corps corunande' desired to emaploy was placed on a narrow front in the center and was given the initial objctiv at the south ern. of the penetration. All three of these divisions were specifically directed to clear the routes within their zones of action as soon as their initial objectives had bon secured. This was done to allow the rapid movemecnt of the 1st infantry Division (motorized for the operation), and of the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions down their respective roads. These thre units were scheduled as the exploiting forces of the corps:

The assigned objectiyes for these exploiting divisions were as follows:

The 2d Armored Division (reinforced) was. to seize initially the line IE L NII1 41lE ldRAN--ST. SAIS-Di -BON-F0SSE--HILL l$3. One combat: command ws -to seize objectives between CRi&NGC S and ST.

D1LNNIS-I -GAST, thei move to GQUTkIdC :S to reinforced the 3d

Armored Division. The 3d Armored Division, minus CE (plus one infantry battalion of the 1st Infantry Division) was to seize the southern exits of C01JTAN.CES and secure the south flank of the 1st

Infantry Division between HYEiNVSELL and CERISY-LA-Si . The 1st

Infantry Division, minus one battalion combat team, plus CCB of the 3d Armored Division, was to pass through a gap in the 9th In- faix try Division and block the enemy in. front of VIII Corps between

COUTANCS and FONTNAY,

The Enemy Situation

The situation at the time First Army surged forward was far from favorable for the Germans in the break-through area. To begin with, German losses since D-Day, 6 June, had been considerable.

The efforts of the Allied fgrces had cost the Nazi forces approximately 160,000 men, around 400 tanks;, and about 2500 vehicles.

Eleven German generals were lost by death, dismissal, or capture, and the entire replacement situation was strained. Allied air superiority enabled fighters to operate almost at will in destroying enemy columns moving into the battle zone, hence Germaan battalions and odd regiments continued to arrive, usually in piecemeal fashion.

These reinforcements seldom arrived in sufficient strength to de-

'cisively affect the course of battle. There was a small amount of tank replacements, but continued losses generally nullified any gains, A chronic fuel shortage and lack of proper maintenance facilities added to the difficult transport problem. Ammunition shortages, again due to transportation difficulties,, limited artillery activity.

The of ficer corps wja's =still suffering from the turmoil result-

ing fromt the attcne ted assination of Hitler by high-ranking German officers. High level cooperation between the German .Army, Navy, and

Air Forces)was not good. it is interesting to observe that the Ger- mans ha&. captured a :document covering the Normandy invasion plans on the day aftr' the assault,.. This was in Hitler's hands within a short

time, however, ho ,refused to believe it and chose to think the Allied

main effort w'ould bei hade in the PAS-DE-CALIS area. This error in

estimate restricted the amount of reserves the German field comsmwanders were permitted 'to move. into the Normandy area. The Fuchcr's intuition

betrayed hira i ere in Normandy as elsewihere., It is not to be construed

that these high level differences had too much of an effect on the

troops in the line. Their, chief complaint was_ the lack of air support

and disillusionment in their highly propagandizc4 miracle weapons.

In addition, All.id superiority in men and material continued to

loweer their hopes; however, it is to be noted that the German officers

and soldiers fought with skill, determination, and in many instances,

fanatical zeal. They utilized the te :rain suited to defense to best

advantage and inflicted trmedous casualties. They constantly counter-

attacked, and only gavye up ground after a:vicious struggle. They were

a wel disciplined professional, army.

D, 25 July 1944

The w(.ather was clear aid' "1COBRA' began with the mightiest

aerial bombardment yret experienced by the Germ ans.. The positions

were softened up &:or almost two hours by .2596 aircraft, half of them four engined bombers. It seemed impossible that huan beings could live through such destruction; however, when, the infantry moved forward at 1100 hours the G rnans came out of their fox holes. They were shaken but still belligerent ard fought stubbornly, resisting with small arms, mortars, artillor, support, anid dug-in tanks. It is apparent 'that fire alone will hot dr 'c a deterrined enemy from his poition.

Despite casualties due to inaccuracies in bombing,/VIII Corps pushed forwi rd and through the sheer weight of their assault managed to pierce the forward positions, but. only after the enew3yTs light and medium artillery had. been silenced. After those forward positions

had been penetrated, the corps made better progress and by the end of the day had moved forward approximately two miles. This was a

considerable distance in terrain where advances had previously been measured in yards. General Bradley estimated that the eneny's position was definitely broken on this day.

The only missions of VIII Corps, commanded by General Troy

diddleton, on 25 July were (1) support VII Corps artillery and (2)

protect the right flank of VII Corps by advancing oire infantry divi-

sion. The attack. of this division on-25 July progressed to within

100 :yards of the 2ISSAY--ST. L0 highway, thus accomplishing their mission.

The remainder of. First Army executed a role of pressure

throughout the day.

26 July 1944

Although there was heavy resistance- to the west, opposition to the front of VII Corps was relatively light and advances were deep..

Leading elements of the corps reached LA, OQN'VII\I& and CANISY by nihtfall..

VIII. Corps advances on, 26 July were against very heavy resistance and nuerous violent counterattaks, The corps penetrated the enemy main line of resistance in its zone and broke through to the vital i;SAY-ST. LO road. VIII Corps recurds 1154 casualties on this day, more than twice the number suffered in any subsequent one day action,,. German casualties were also extensive, but only 78 Nazi prisoners were taken, indicative of the tenacious German resistance.

Other corps of the First Army on the 26th mlade limited advances to the south.

27,4ulyr194

From the standpoint of First Army the decisive actions of the operations took place on this day. The Germans apparently realized their precarious position, which had been brought about by the penetration of VII Co-rps. Attempts were begun by the enemy to withdraw all along the front and stabilize their positions before General

Bradley could exploit his advantage, The; enemy offered bitter resistance in the VII Corps zone. This was in an attempt to hold open a route. of escape for German tunits in the American VIII Corps zone of action. VIII Corps realized by the middle of the afternoon that the enemy across the entire corps front vas engaged in a desperate attempt to escape complete destruction an.d was withdrawiring as rapidly as possible. 'II.'Corps iamediately pressed its advantage by the Ger- man defenses were wtelrl prepared. Enemy troops now consisted mainly of small delaying groups; the entire zone wa. extensively mined with

both road and personnel mines; blown bridges, and nu erous booby

traps.

It is interesting to note that although VIII Corps had be-

gun the operation in a secondary role the situation had altered;the

6th Armored Division, committed at this time, spearheaded powerful

reserves to make the secondary attack assume the role of the main

attack. ieanwhile on other corps fronts moderate advances had been

'made in the pressure role.

28 July 1944

The heavy in-fighting phase of "COBRA" was finished on this

date xi th the taking of COUTANCS, and Bradley made arrangements to

expsoit every advantage by passing operational control of VIII Corps

to Lieutenant General .atton. tI Old Flood and Guts" had his Third

Army massed in rear of VIII Corps, waiting 'for, the order to start

rolling, and coordination was furthered with the area under one

coinmander. Steady advances:, were made throughout the entire First

Arny zone from 29: to 31 July, and by 1 August the bottom of the

corridor was open. Third Army became operational on 1 August and

rolled into action with a rapidity and boldness that has become

legendary

Armor in Action

The efforts of the armored divisions who. participated in

the initial =stages of this operatioh are not to be discredited, for

they battled not only the enemy but terrain that was almost impassable.

It is certain that armor had performed its share in forcing the. battle

12 out of the peninsula; however the detailed accounts of these actions must wait for other analysts. In this study we shall follow the 6th

Armored Division from NORANDY to BREST. We shall discover that the

"Super Sixths was employed in a-manner that has become a model for a rapidly moving, heavily armed force. General Robert TI? Grow, the

6th Armored Division commander, raced his division the length of the

Brittany Peninsula, more than 200 miles, in seven days. Secondary roads ;were used as much as possible in an effort to reach the objective of BREST before German forces could properly withdraw. We find the division engaged in combat frequently because combat was unavoid- able, and again when orders from higher headquarters so directed.

-e find that the division did not capture BREST and these

reasons have been analyzed. The. failure to capture BREST, instead

of nullifying the lessons tobe_ learned, serves instead to highlight

them. It is desired to point out that BREST was finally taken by

three infantry divisions, supported by a large amount of corps

artillery, only after 39 days of hard fighting, at the end of which

time approximately 30,000 prisoners were taken from the ,fortress.

Thile on- the outskirts of BfEST we find the 6th Armored Divi-

sion preparing to attack the city and suddenly executing a 180 degree

turn in order to fight an entire German division that had been by-

passed. The successful attack on this German division was made while

simultaneously containing BREST with a skeleton force

It is specifically-to be noted that, although this was the

initial action of the 6th Armored Division, the situations encountered were always met with courage and determination. The "Super Sixth" and its commander today hold the reputation of having been one of the most aggressive teams in EurOpe, Their actions in this operation will serve as a guide_to students of military history for many years to come. The resultant successes prove that the principles of armored employment as now formulated are sound, logical, and most efficient, Adherence to these basic principles will ensure repeated successes on the battlefield. CHAPTER II

PRSEPARATION IN ENGLAD3D

Section .I

Tactical Training

The 6th Armored Division arrived in G~IAGOW SCOTLAND, on

22 February 1944.' Three days were spent in debarking and preparing for movement to their first overseas permanent quarters, which were located in the vicinity of OXFQRD-SThAWQORD IN AVON CHELTNHAM,

ENGLAlD. The area occupied by the division measured approximately

20 by 40 miles and was located about 75 mriles northwest of LONDON.

The Super Sixth was to remain in this area for a period of more than four months, participating in the last phase of precombat training.

The first week was spent in getting settled and in new and unfamiliar surroundings, checking and rechecking equipment and supplies. The billets varied from pyramidal tents with floors,

Nissen huts, lofts of public buildings, and warehotises to more elaborate private dwellings. An abandoned insane asylum was' included as a billet for one of the divisional units.

Training- was a continuation of that started in the Zone of

Interior, with special emphasis placed on the firing of weapons,

small unit problems, and crew drill. It followed the directives received from higher headquarters and particularly Letter Of In-

-struction No. 2, Headquarters United States Third Army, which

stated that-, .. c. General training. (1) More. emphasis. will be placed on the hardening of men and officers.. All soldiers and officors should be able to run a mile with combat, pack in ten minutes and march eight miles in two hours. When soldiers are in actual contact with the enemy, it is almost impossible to maintain physical condition, but if the physical condition is high before they gain contact it. will not fall off, sufficiently during contact to be detrimental. (2) Much time is wasted in mounting -and dismounting mortars and machine guns. Standing gun drill will be practiced so that the operation will be automatic and can be accomplished in the dark. The ladder method of ranging' with mortars is recommended. (3) aur ability to ight at night, as opposed to moving into a position at night for an attack at dawn, is pitiably bad. We must learn to execute the attack in the dark. (4+) Sharpen axes, pickaxes, and shovels now, and keep them sharp. (5) Battles are fought by platoons and squads. Place emphasis on snail unit combat' instruction so that it is conducted with the same precision as close-order- drill. A good resolution applied iwith vigor now is better than a perfect solution ten minutes later. (6) In instruction from the squad to the regiment, sand tables should be used, and the officer or non-corm being instructed should give the actual orders he will give in combat. Sand tables need not be complicated, A piece of. ground in the lee of a building is just as good and much simpler. (7) Officers and men must know their equipment. They must train with the equipment they intend to use in battle. Equipment must bo in the best operational condition when taken to the Theater of Operations. d. Guides for Officers. (1) Officers must possess solf-confidence and the confidence of their menu Two of the best ways of producing this is meticulously conducted close-order drill, conducted by officers, and, platoon marches of forty.-eight to sixty hours, during which the platoon is wholly on its own. (2) In the first actions, new troops must receive aggressive leadership by all grades, including general officers, who' must be seen in the front line during action.1

In a later paragraph of the same directive General Patton hasp this to say about armor:

.,,a. The primary mission of armored units is the attacking of infantry and artillery. The enemy;s rear is the happy hunt- ing ground for armor... Use every means to get there. . The tactical and technical° training of our armored units is correct. Added emphasis should bo put on tank crew training with a view to-hitting the enemy first. C, Against counterattacks, the of f nsivo use of armor st.,, 2d r tD flthnMk is decisive. Hence a deep pienetration by -Jfantry, whose rear is protected by armor, is feasible and safe. d. There is no such thing as ttank' country" in a restrictive sense. Some types of country' are better than others, but tanks have and can operate anywhere. e. The intcgrity of armored divisions should be pro- served through the use 'of GHQ tank battalions for special, close supporting missions with infantry., On such missions, the tanks should advance by bounds, from cover to cover in the rear of the infantry. They will only be exposed when the situation demands their intervention9 in such cases they will attack in 2 Close association with the inf antry. .. 9

The division training was intensive, because all commanders knew that in the not too distant future the real enemy would -be looming up on the horizon in place of the simulated targets now dotting,the training area landscape.

Phaes of aiin

The program was broken-down into three general phases, each conducted concurrently within the division. , The elapsed time for the completion of the three phases was 90 days.

Phase I concerned the matters and means of control from. individual unit commanders up to the division commander. This training consisted of field exercises including column composition' or disposition of combined teams both as a means of. tactical maneuver and as a road march, It included coordination of movement of teams to improve techniqgues of. moving in and out of areas in a minimum of time4 Roadside coiling and uncoiling as a part of march control was stressed and this form of. off-.the...road-ino vement was later evolved into the division standing operating procedure., Communication officers and. their assistants were extremely busy during this phase, maintaining the various types of comnruniation equipment so necessary to F 1inander.vm as a means of exercising cormmand and control. indivduals were taught the impc'tance of correctly camou- flaging and concealing themselves, their vehicles- and the division installations, 'Last, but not least, individual combat deportment and discipline was emphasized as Generaljrow believed this to be the foundation of coordinated teamwork Qf any fighting unit.

Other than the firing -of weapons, the most stressed phase of training was the unit tactical problems. Training progressed from small squad problems to the combat command combined team level. Squad leaders were given problems in- the form of missions and were required to carry out these missions under realistic battle conditions. Con- structive critiques were held after the comzpletion of each t'xission" by the next higher cormander. By concentrating on this type of prob-

1cm, the more competent loaders replaced 'the weaker ones before the unit entered combat and while the enemy was still an .imaginary one.

The training of combined teams of large units was not carried on to any great extent because of limited maneuver space, although in the latter weeks of training in ENGLA tanks and infantry did "marry up!l for short periods of time.. The training of the larger units as teams also enabled the staffs of battalions and combat commands to participate in this training in the form of command post exercises.

Tactical -problems were written which required the staffs to function as they would in 'actual combat, a form of training urgently needed by the great majority of the staff offici's of the division

Phase, II was devoted to combat f riing, fire and maneuver of combined teams, and artillery firing.. It might be termed the t'shooting phase' because General Grow was a firm believer in the thought

18E that if a man can shoot he will live Overcoming what appeared to be insurrmountable obstacles, the division built the largest small-arms firing range in the United Kingdom, with 350 firing points,- and every man in the division fired for qualification in small arms within 30 days. 3 A bivouac area in the immediate vicinity sheltered 3000 troops

and every one of these men were engaged in--niring or in some function

thereto from daylight until dark. The range was a complete one in

all respectsi It had 500-yard ranges, deep pits., sunken approaches

to and from the pits, so that firing was uninterrupted, even at the

farthest ranges fired.

In addition, an infantry combat range was built and every in-

fantry company of the Super Sixth engaged in company proble ts, using.

live small-arms amnmunition at one time or another during their train-

ing,

Tank crewi concntrated on-increasing proficiency with their

crew-served weapons. To add interest and to insure pro-battle indoc-

trination, crows fired live ammunition on the Castle-i artin tank range

on a co mpetitive basis. The infantry mortar and .machine gun crews

also fired their weapons on this range.

Division artillery was not to be outodone by the firing of the

tankers and the infantry, and here, too., a concentrated effort was

made to have every ran, of the gun crew fire his ar'tillery piece,, This

was accom'aished despite the fact thab amirrt' .tion for training pur-

poses ras. extrec3ly difficult to obtain.

When the firing phase was compleed every man in the divisio

was convinced that he.was as familiar with his weapon as was any soldier of any division who had not had actual, combat experience.

The third and last phase, but an equally important one, was the training in the billeting area. It included formal inspections, combat loading of vehicles, combat equipment to be carried on individuals and the maintenance of all equipment to the highest possible degree.

Whie the troops were training, the staffs, from the division general staff down to the battalion, were being trained in staff procedures by their participation in command post exercises and by stress.- ing use of correct staff procedures in their everyday duties.

Schools for officers and noncomnissibned officers were held at £requent intervals and were conducted down to battalion level. Al- though company noncoissioned officer schools were not required, many were held during the division s stay in ENGLAND. In addition to the unit schools, selected officers and noncommuissioned officers were trained- in. the various British Army schools.

.This w.,as a, well rounded progrem, properly planned and energetically supervised by both commanders and staff officers. The final test of t:e dtivision s ;effective training was to be conducted on the cottinci ofJRIJUOPP against an enemy that also was well trained and hardened by many campaigns.

It is a IwnnLo. fact that initial entr~y into combat .s characte 'izod by ;r~rc: shock to all izndivd.,cu-La and -ore-combat training must acnsuro automatic or 'second naturo' t reaction to situations as they appear. This reaction can only bo obtained through constant and realistic practice, General Grow closely supervised much of the training of the division. The day by day report of training listed below is from his

personal diary, and is quoted as a matter of interest to the reader.

28 February. I outlined training program to unit X)s and went over school program in. detail with Taylor, whom I put in charge.

29 February. This note may be of interest to others also. I attended conference in London with Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, Hodges, walkere, Watson, Gaffey, Oliver, and Pinky Wright. .Deci-. sion was made here that 2d and 3d Armored would remain "heavy" and all others "light.' t At this time I asked for a field artillery command headquarters battery, a QCI battalion, a TD battalion and an AAA battalion assigned or permanently attached. Eisen- hower promised to try to comply. I always used this as an argu- mert to keep our attached units permanently- and this we were able to do, although often" after a fight with some corps headquarters.

2 March. Inspected training areas. Directed Taylor to re-- vise his school program so as to ,give combined operations only. I authorized battalion schools to give branch instruction.

3 3March. Began to bear down on discipline in small things.

5 March. Inspected training areas and made mental notes for problems.

6 March, First session of fivision Officers School. Map reading and plane identification.

7 March. Inspected ranges on Salisbury Plain. Visiting 2d .Armored. I. D. White,. emphasized importance of mine removal, dismounted reconnaissance, and grenades

8 March. Visited Bristol and Cheltenham and lined up ranges in Wales. Most of our tanks received today. All equiprtent except artillery coming in Last.

910 March. General Patton visited and saw most all units and was highly pleased.

13 March. Attached to XXCorps. I .reported' to Wialker. Division Officers School including night cross-country hike, point to point.

14 arch, Inspected and selected ranges in Wales. 15 March. Still trying to nail dowrn ranges. Made plans for all types of firing. Radio procedure school for division officers.

16 March, *"forked on school and range programs all day with officers concerned.

17 March. Selected Barnsley Wold for small arms range. Set up a School of Fire to train instructors for all small arms,.

18 March . Work started on buts Barnsley Wold.

20 March . Finally got clearance on the Castle Martin ranges in ltales,

21 March. Visited battalion weapons schools.

22 March. Visited battalion weapons schools. Division Officers School in evening--G-2 situation, trains(, SOP, etc.

23 March. Barnsley °Told opened.--rifle and carbine schools MG School opened at Bloxham 1000" range. Drafted plans for April shooting.

24 March. Conference of commanders at which firing program for April was fixed which is the basis for all work in April.

25 March. Had to raise the butts on Barnsley IWold range due to 'lovers" but the small arms schools finished today successfully.

28 March. All units doing preparatory marksmanship.

29 March. Division Officers School-G-2 and field orders.

30 March. To London to check weapon shortages--chiefly MWs (anirtille ry).

1 April. First units move to Barnsley ?"old to start shooting tomorrow. (Incidentally these included 9th Infantry Battalion.)

3 April. First of the series of officer terrain exercises under Taylor.

7April. First group finished at Barnsley (Told. Best small arms record the division ever made.

11 Aprl. Started construction of transition range. Second- group doing well at- Barnsley Wold

12-April. Checked transition range and laid out assault. course for use of bayonet and grenades under covering machine gun and rifle fire, This for all rifle squads. 13 April. Headquarters Battery,- Field Artillery Command, now authorized, is getting organized. Practically 100% are qualifying. at Barnsley ,''old and all failures will fire again.

14 April. Drafted instructions for- radio school for officers.

15 April, ETOJSA. G-2 team began giving precapture instruction- t units. Small arms school started on transition range.

16 April. New, and last, group on Barnsley Wold.

17 April. First tank battalion (68th) started for Castle Martin, >ales. Division officers terrain exercise.

1S April, Set up plans for assault. guns, mortars, and heavy machine guns plus reconnaissance squadron at Castle Martin. Visited Headquarters Company school on document security in the evening.

19 April. First unit started on the transition range and squad assault course, (9th, Infantry.)

20 April. Started planning battle drills.

21 April. Finishing up on Barnsley 1old this week and turning this magnificent range over to the Air Force Engineers. In afternoon drove to Castle Martin and the next day inspected. submachine gun,' 37-mm, 75-mm, antiaircraft, moving vehicle, moving target, mortar, bazooka, and grenade practice. General Patoon visited Castle Martin same day and told- me we had until 5 June for training.

23 April, m7atch tank platoon combat firing problems and noted that shooting was good but reconnaissance and tactics poor.

24 April. Division officers terrain exercise.

25 April. Arranged for field artillery- service practice in !ales in May. Made plans for special bazooka and anti-bazooka firing courses; battle drill for tank platoons; combined infantry- tank attack drill. Review of our small arms practice today is most encouraging. Personnel are enthusiastic about results and have great confidence.

26 April. A note of interest. Joe Holly visited us and asked for recomme-datiens as to tank battalions.- I.,recommended; -one light -company with 75-mm, oxe company with 90-.mm, and three companies with 105-mm howitzer.: Division officers; communication school in evening. 28 April,. Transition and assault courses still going strong, ?'working on the May program.

1 Ma Ordered a battle drill: tank platoon versus antitank platoon. Division officers terrain exercise--attack of fortified posit ion.

3 May. Officers communication school in evening. Started 700 men to northwest Wales for antiaircraft practice under Clayton.

4 ay. Visited Castle: Martin again. Tactics still poor. Shooting excellent. Left in the evening for central Wales to. see artillery practice which I observed next day.

6 May. Checked bazooka school and approved record course. Checked tank versus antitank battle drill and approved it,. It emphasizes recqnnaissance and getting the first, hit.-

8 J4;av. Demonstration of tank versus antitank for all tank officers- and tank commanders. Division officers terrain exercise-- withdrawal.

9May. Visited camouflage school; bazooka range and the new close combat tank course at Barnsley Wold where tank commanders * use submachine guns from turrets of moving tanks against enemy bazooka men. (This proved itself in' combat.)

11 May. Besides visiting all- ranges, took in the vehicle waterproofing school at Division Trains.

12 May. Visited the antiaircraft range on Anglesey Island, NW Wales, where all of our AA men are having service practice.

15 . ake-up 'week on Barnsley Wold. -Division offieers terrain exercise--defensive.

16 May,. Laid out tank-infantry, battle drill courses on the ground. Worked up first big CPX plan.

17 May. Division officers communication school. Visited mine schools being put on by the engineers. Dry-ran a tank- infantry battle drill.

21 May. ,At commanders meeting . prescribed CPX plans and plans for combat command firing exercises on West Downs.

22 May. All day on tank-infantry battle drill (company of each3 Plans announced at this time that one infantry company will always be with tank battalion anid vice versa, and that leading attack element will always be mixed. The new TDs (M-l8) arrived. (NOTE: Not mentioned in these notes are the many ceremonies which kept up' esprit and appearance. I took at least one battalion parade or review a week.)

23 May. First session of the division indirect fire school under Riley.

24 May.. First division GPX started. Finished 26 May.

29 May. Division officers school--German order of battle.

31 May. Lined up plans for combat exercises on Salisbury Plain. XX Corps artillery CPX in division area with our artillery participating.

1 June, First division assembly in Europe (and last before combat. I told division what I expected.

3 June. Completed series of reviews of all units. ETOUSA G-2 team still visiting units demonstrating German uniforms, etc.

9 June. Prepared directives for training to 8 July,, when.I expect to "button up."

10 June. To West Downs to observe infantry AT and machine. gun platoons firing. Also checked 'Barnsley Wold where the Medical Battalion; is completing carbine firing: (They didn_'t want to be caught short in case they had to shoot.)

11-12 June. On the West Downs ranges.

14 June. Division officers school--FRANCE.

16 June. Drove to the south coast to see the T target practice. (Also watched the 79th Division load out at Portland.) 19 June. Troops started for Salisbury Plain for final combat exercises which lasted through 23 June. Three combat commands combined exercises, firing all weapons.

28 -June., First -of a series of infantry attack problems em- phasizing use of ground, infiltration, and covering fire.

29 June, Big demonstration.--ttest of flame-throwing tanks which we fixed up for Joe Holly. Not impressed.

30 June. Division officers sphool--embarkation procedure.

3 July. Troops now all busy on modifications and buttoning up. Division officers school--attached teams (all of which proved their value in combat)., 5 Jul. Special officers school on the mine exploder. (Did not prove out in combat.)

6 July. Special infantry battalion battle drill; "fighting the 1h&Tes. Much improement in infantry battalion.

SJuly. Combat loading inspections. Last of infantry battalion battle drills. First port calls came in.

10 July. At unit COs meeting, overseas, movement orders were given so that only the date and word "'go" remained.

12-14 July. Final division CPX, all headquarters units in the field. Problem included "channel" crossing ad attack.

1.5 Jul Division moved to SOUTHAMPTON.

17 July. Embarked.

18 July. Landed on UTAH beach.

This training program conducted by the 6th Armored Division obviously was sound in its concept. These procedures and techniques, repetitious as they may have appeared to the individual soldier, later- enabled the division to maintain the momentum of- attack, once committed, and to carry out its first combat mission in a very creditable manner.

-26' Section II

Intelligence Activities

Let us. now take a look into. the type of intelligence training that was being taught to the personnel of the Super Sixth. This training followed the tried, and true intelligence methods found to be so effective by combat divisions that had already entered combat. It followed the_: same- pattern as taught in the UNITED STA 'S, with greater emphasis on countrintelligence measures and' the safeguarding of military information.

Censorship of mail and photographs played an important part in the overall_ security program. No reference was permitted to be made of commanders and staffs, unit; names, unit geographical, locations, morale, training activities, or future plans. An offiicer was desig. nated. in each company-sized unit as the unit censor. Each unit censor was given a number and issued a like-number:ed censorship stamp. It was his responsibility to-read the unit's outgoing mail and if no security violation was within, to seal, stanr.p, and sin. each letter.

If a letter contained a security violation, the unit censor was authorized to delete the word or words by blocking out in black ink or cutting from the letter. After unit censor approval, the letter was mailed through the Axiy Post Office system. The base censor picked from these letters at random for additional security check.

Reports of. serious censorship violations were forwarded by the base censor to army headquarters, then to the, commanding officer of the unit concerned, where measures were ,taken to prevent a repetition of the violation, Photographs had to be developed and processed through

army channels and when developed, also censored and stamped by the

.developing agency,.

Counterintelligence was very important in respect to signal

security. On orders from higher headquarters, radio silence was in-

stituted and remained in effect for a designated period, This silent

,period was followed by a period of as much traffic as possible, using

all the voice and code sets in the division.

Miany radio schools were held in the division and all radio

operators impressed with the importance of radio security. While in

ENGLAI) the Link Call (single call) system of radio procedure was

learned in order to reduce station call, signs and to shorten the call

up system.

The 6th Armored Division, at this time, did not get into the

higher planning stage, as it was the policy of. the Third Army that

personnel informed of the plans should b-ke pt to a mrinimum and those

informed of the plan were .given only such information as their

particular duties required. This relieved the G-2 &f organizing and

supervising the security of planning areas and war rooms in subordinate

units. This was in keeping with ltStandard Phasing of Planning Levels. "-

The division was kept abreast of the tactical situation on

the continent after 11D Day. t.. This information was disseminated to the

battalions through G-2 channels as well as newspapers and radio broad-

casts. Lessons learned by the First United States Army were related

through channels and later assisted the division materially in de-

feating the enemy. This dissemination of information was in direct contrast to the German method of rigidly restricting battle information to units directly concerned.

A very important phase of intelligence training was the great emphasis put on the sociological aspects of the many nationalities to be encountered on the continent, as well, as the geographic and political makeup of these countries. This information was disseminated to all troops by prepared booklets and informal discussions led by the battalion S"2's and company grade officers. The people and countries studied were those of FRANOE, BEIGIUM, LU URG, GERMY, and THE TH&RLAS. The studies covered the custom and traditions, nature of the people, religious and political beliefs, location and importance of industrial cor mu ties, location ard importance of faming -communities, type of terrain, and the military aspects of the terrain. This -training led to an important relationship with our allies as well as our enemy.

Identification of enemy troops and equipment was :stressed in many ways. Teams visited units in the division, showing the -actual uniform worn by the German soldier and characteristics of each as to rank and branch, Ecjuipment was identified through the use of models and silhouettes, with stress being placed on the recognition of enemy tanks and airplanes.

ktumorous coi d post exercises were held in which the G2 and all the &-2s participated-. These exercises were designed for the intelligence personnel to learn and perform correct inte;olligence procedures as would be carried out in combat,

Intelligence personnel were responsible for the antiaircraft warning system in the division and throu.ghf trial and error found that

Z9~). to have a well coordinated system it was necessary to designate, in

each company, an intelligence NOO. This NCO was especially trained in his duties and became a key link in the antiaircraft warning system.

On tactical problems all phases of intelligence were stressed.

Counterintelligence by seeking concealment, radio security, and the

draping of camouflage nets. Combat intelligence by units seeking in-

formation and being impressed that any observation or material object

may be of great value to the intelligence system.

The march to the.embarkation point was made with great secrecy.

The, British people in 'the midlands are security conscious; however,

all personnel- were restricted upon -being alerted. Minimum personnel

knew the designation and strict control of each column was performed

by these individuals. Pveryone was cautioned that this march must be

made with "no slip ups" and that a rigid time schedule must be kept.

Halts were made only in the country and any contact with civilians-

forbidden, The units marched directly into a compound and there

awaited orders to load for the continent. 4

The military intelligence training' closely followed the

directives sent down from higher headquarters. It included censorship

of mail, counterintelligence measures and other security measures so

necessary to a well-trained unit preparing to enter combat for the

first time. As in all other training, this training was very closely

supervised, especially by intelligence officers and noncommissioned

officers. Section III

Logistical Preparation

The task for supplying the division during its brief stay in

ENGLAND was a never-ending one. It began when the first troops landed and will still going on when the division embarked for FRANCE many months later.

To support the men and equipment of the 6th Armored Division, tons of supplies were required from the -Zone of Interior. This tonnage demand required precious shipping space, so vital a part of the logistical buildup in ENGLAND. The operation of transporting supplies from the UNITED STATES to the UNITED KINGDOM was facilitated by discharging

cargo through established ports and over the network of rail lines to

supply installations scatteed throuout the island.

The division, on arrival in the Communication Zone, European

Theater of Operations, became a, supply. responsibility of Lieutenant

GeneraLjohn C* H. Leet s Services of Supply. General Eisenhoer

described his chief of services as a modern Cromwell, and felt that

his unyielding -methods, were vital to success in. the logistics field,

The UNITED KINGDOM was divided into five base 'sections -for;the

services of supply4 Organizations within the boundaries of a base

section were supplied by the service of supply of that base section.

Movement of the division upon debarkation at the port of entry to their

billets in southern ENGLAND was -the first contact with the service of

supply for the division

The middle of February, 1944, Lieutenant Colonel James C. Boggs,

31 Assistant Chief of Staff,' G-4, 6th Armored Division, had established an office in thle division headquarters at BATSFO D PARK, IMORETON-ON-

MAii, E1GLAND. This section was organized and ready for work.

The G-4 section-- immediately became a nerve center of activity.

Many things remained to be accomplished, 'one as important as the other, and all to be done at once. Adding to the confusion, commanders of units swarmed the section, eager and determined to acquire equipment for their organizations.

Wdhile orderly confusion reigned in- the G-4 section, liaison was established with the next higher headquarters. Each of the services within the division, under the guidance of the G-4, contacted their counterpart in the chain of supply, anxous to mold their organizations into the logistical structure, Liaison and personnel visits were the answers to the. millions of questions and provided an orienta- tion on the functions of the services of supply. Mutual liaison soon provided the desirable, and the division' was now on firm footing with the logistical services.

During liaison work, old friendships were renewed and new 'ac- quaintances iimade. With this in mind, the division supply personnel attempted the old American custom of politics in trying to procure equipment: rapidly., It was soon discovered that the priority system dictated the iixe of distributing supplies and equipment.

One of the first problems of the division G~- was solved through liaison w'ith the Third Army and servi'ces of supply. The Third Arnty informed, the division that their Class I section would not function in supplying of Class I, but that strength reports would, go direct to the services of supply. Rations in turn would be delivered directly to the division until such time that organic transportation was re. ceived by the division, enabling it to support itself.

Procuring vital equipment for the division was demanding the uk of G-4 setons time. The division wsreorgnized in Septemer

b1943 under the tables of organization for the new light type armored division., Old equipment was turned in to supply agencies in the desert training area in the UNfITD STATES during January 1944. Alerted at this time, the division moved to the port of embarkation without equipment. New equipment for issue to the division was in storage at the Tidwoxth Ordnance Depot.7 (Major items of equipment for the light armored division, as the 6th Armored Division was now organized, is shown in Appendix V.>

Supply of major items of equipment, TIE and T/BA, to the division were to be issued automatically by the services of supply.

"Must" or critical items listed in the pertinent Standard Nomenclature

Lists were to be shipped with major items to which they pertained..

For example, first-echelon tools and spare parts kits for general purpose vehicles were to be issued with the vehicle, Lkewise, organizational spare parts kits, tools, and eqipkment for combat vehicles were issued with the vehicle.

The division was to deal directly with the services of supply in their base section, regarding the availability of equipment for initial issue, If trouble was experienced by the division in obtaining critical items, the Third Army G-4 was to be contacted, who in turn was to take up the problem with headquarters, services of supply. The supply of ordnance material, other than T/E and T/BA, was through the organic 128th Ordnance Battalion. The division ordnance dealt directly with the ordnance section, service of supply, through normal procedures in obtaining parts ard materials for vehicle repair.

Directives were not finding their way into the division and on

6 March 1944, Letter of Instruction No.- 1, Headquarters, Third Army, was received and in substance brought the attention of all to supply procedures and emphasized supply discipline. Third Army follcwed with

Letter of Instruction No. 2, dated 3 April 1944, this time directing the maintenance: of weapons and preventive maintenance of vehicles and other equipment in accordance with Army Regulations.

The division reverted to Third Army control on 8 March, at which time the majority of major items of equipment had been received from base sections. This, however, was not the case of artillery equipment which was most difficult to obtain. General Grow made several trips to -LONDON to see General Saylor to expedite the issue of equipment. Subsequentissues on 28 June and-5 July realized the fuliment of all shortages.

Reports on authorized major items- of equipment "on hand" were submitted on the 20th of each month in the form of "Special Materiel

Status Report.". One copy was sent to" each, the Third Army ordnance officer and headquarters, services of supply .

Planning and preparation for the commitment of -the division to combat was intensified day by day. Supply personnel found themselves attending the -Third Army school for logistics. Procedures to be used when the Third Army became operational was the basis of this instruction.

Equipment was constantly brought up-to-date with? improvisions

and modifications in design as the need for changes became apparent.

A division board created by the commanding general tested and passed

on all modifications, after which they were standardized, The handling

of ordnance equipment was not.:a simple matter, For example, tanks,

when received, had an amazing assortment of accessories such as

machine guns, radios, tools, spare parts, sights for guns, periscopes,

cleaning rods for guns, and many other items, 'protected with preserva-

tives that; took many hours to clean.

Third Army, preparing for the movement of their units to the

continent, on 26 April 1944, issued advance instructions to the divi-

sion on-supply and equipment preparations in the form of "Administra-

tive Instructions Preliminary to Mounting."

Evidence of thoughtful planning was noted when maintenance

sections of the division were visited. Maintenance personnel of the

units were busy making gadgets and" Aiodifications Half.-tracks -were

being modified to carry the bedrolls on the outside, on the rear of 8 the vehicle,

Organizations lacking Standard Operating Procedures for combat

stowage of equipment were now busy with ;"dry runs ." To perform their

combat loading plans and procedures, many inspections were accomplished.

Repetition of loading and inspecting brought forth recommendations by

the armored infantry battalions. These recommendations were for sup-. plemrentary vehicles to be' issued the organizations to enable the fufillment of their requirement for hauling supplies initially in cor:Lat. Sutsequently additional half-tracks were issued to the organizations to provide then transportation for the extra fuel, lubricants, and ammunition. These vehicles eventually were to be.- come automatic replacement for initial vehicle losses in battle.

Third Army Circular- No. 10, published 4 May, covering traffic regulations, w-as received and distributed to lower units of the division for study. It was 'published at that time. to f aiiliarizo all personnel with the essential basic rals to be followed to moot operational traffic conditions and to establish. responsibility for the method and control of road traffic on the continent.

Third Army plans had progressed to where it was considered essential to hold a conference w'ith_ the G-4#s of divisions, and repro-ft scntatives of higher headquartors of the srvieos of supply, On 19

1ay 1944, lieutenant Colonel Boggs attended tis conference in the office of the Acting Chief of Staff G.-4, Third Army A rusume of the supply plan in general was presented. Questions of policy and prop- ceduro in preparation of uits for continental operations were discussed, with many questions cleared up. The diviion G.-4 was particularly cautioned to chock on the proper ouipment of the division. Equipmentr must be serviceable and u..nits capable. of maintaining it in. the fie-ld. Basic loads had to be complete and properly stowed.

By 28 May the' division had been assigned :sup ly priority number five 'by the Third Army. This priority providod for eighty

36 per cent of all equipment, ard stressed command responsibility for supply discipline.

In compliance with "Instructions Preliminary to Mounting," the division quartermaster, Lieutenant Colonel Walter A. Boyle, procured 125 sets of individual clothing, tariff size. This, with 125 sets of individual equipment, was loaded on one truck and trailer, ready for departure. The planning of the capacities of trucks to haul the reserve rations load, fuel, and lubricants was now in a critical stage.

The fuel ard lubricants requirements for a light armpred divi-

sion in combat at this point was of vital concern to the G.-4 and the

division quartermaster. To set the basis for fuel and lubricant re-

quirements, a conference was held with Colonel E. Busch, Third .Ary

quartermaster. It was impossible to obtain an agreement as to thie daily gas, oil, and lubricant requirements. The estimate varied be.-

tween the wide limits of 40,000 to 100,,000 gallons of gasoline per day.

Within the division supply agencies this problem was solved by agreement that a minimum of 50,000 gallons of gasoline would be carried on

trucks of the division trains and. additional gas cans would be pro-

cured. 9 These additional cans- would be carried in all space available

in combat vehicles. ,Oil, in addition to gasolineo, would be carried

in proportionate amounts. The majority of tanks had been modified

with carrying racks mounted on the outside of the vehicle, which per-

mitted them to carry from 30 to 60 galLons of gasoline and qil. The

.quartermaster supply trucks in the division trains would carry 100

per- cent overload. This overload would allow 300 fivc-gallon cans of gas to be carried on each truck and 75 on the one-ton trailer towed by

the truck. 0

The, division, when reorganized from the heavy to the present light type armored division, lost the organic quartermaster supply battalion arid the division service company. These organizations had provided the means of transportation for carrying the division rations,

gasoline, lubricants, and ammunition for the mobile reserve. The

Third Army, now planning for transportation to carry this supply within

the armored division, notified the G-4 of the 6th Armored Division' that

quartermaster truck and/or gasoline companies would be attached to the

division for support upon arrival of the division on the continent,

The conmmanders of these quartermaster truck battalions and the

company commanders were briefed on their missions at, the logistical

conferences, Third Army Headquarters, in the presence of the division

G- 4. These companies, with the mission of supporting the division by

transporting supplies, now had a vital role in combat. operations,

The quartermaster companies, lacking sufficient expe rience to

perform efficiently in their new role, were sent to the continent as rapidly as shipping was available. Arrangements wore made with First

Army to assign them missions hauling supplies in support of the First

Army. This mission was to continue. until the Third Army arrived on

the continent and became operational,

The division ordnance officer, Lieutenant Colone'. Raymond B.

Graeves, was supervising the functions oC the organic 28th Ordnance

Battalion. Checking the. authorized spare parts, basic load in accord.

ance with approved Standard Nomenclature Lists, he discovered that due

3V to the critical nature of supplies, the basic load of major items of equipment, as listed in the appopriate nomenclature lists for the division ordnance, were not authorized at this time. In spite of this critical shortage of spar; parts and suppies to make up the basic load, the supply personnel, through persistarce, did procure

a total of 191 tons of spare parts. These supplies wore loaded on

41 2-1/2-ton G1C trucks and 3$ one-ton trailers.

Requirement charts for cleaning and preserving materials were issued to tho division by the Third Army. These charts were issued for requisitioning the basic load for cleaning and preserving materials.

Materials such as bore cleaner, preserving oils, and cleaning patches were in constant demand and used in such quantity that requisitioning was continuous to maintain the basic load. Figures for this chart were compiled by an ordnance board at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

Ammunition and tonnage charts for basic loads, 'indicating the amount of amunition, i n ammunition containers, and the number of rounds that could be carried on each type vehicle were distributed by

Third Army to the division,

Third Ar Yr Ordnance Bulletin No, ,, dated 25 Miay 1944, pertaining to advanced planning concerning evacuation and captured materials was received.12 The directive stated t'aat the division was responsible for evacuating equipment to designated collecting points generally in the vicinity of an ordnance mainten .'e' or ,3upply organi-

zation*. Collecting points on axis. of advance could be designated by the division conmiander if the situation warranted. These points were to coincide with the maintenance axis of the army. The evacuation services of the division were to be augmented by the attachment of army units to the division when the Third Army became operational or when the division was. committed to action.

Captured enemy ordnance materiel other than amraunition was a responsibility of the division commander. This materiel was to be turned over to the nearest ordnance organization. When captured enemy materiel could not be moved to an ordnance areas it was to be-reported to the army ordnance officer, When considered necessary by the divi--

sion commander, combat units could use captured enemy materiel and ammunition; reporting to the army ordnance officer the material sed by the troops for combat purposes.

Traiiing Memorandumi No. 14, Third Army, dated 28 April 1944,E contained the provisions for compliance by the chemi.cal warfare officer. It was directed that one and one-half quart decontaminating apparatus be procured and mounted on all vehicles. These were to be kept filled with decontaminating agent non-corrosive (DNAC). nspec- tions were to be made to insure that each soldier was properly equipped with individual chemical warfare equipment. kandatory equipment to be carried were the gas mask, ointment, protective cape covrs, sleeve dctectors, BAL (Br anti-.lewsite) and .the eye shields. The eye shields had proved to be of -xt remo value to tank crews aE a substitute for goggles. Cti r ch rmic supplies required to be ::.c:c > in the divi-

sioe were the My& therm ite grenades, capable of pr'odu..i:g 4300 degrees of heat in 35 seconds. This item was to be used to destroy equipment which had to be abandoned in enemy-hwld territory. Additional use for the grenade was to set fire to enemy-held buildings. The 1k-1.4 white phosphorous grenade, colored smoke grenades, ordinary smoke grenades, and smoke pots were procured to fill the chemical warfare requirements.

The logistical planning of the G-4, now progressing at terrific pace, received from Third Army during the week of 17.24 June 1944 itsbarking Procedure,? This procedure covered the points to be stressed in loading and the movement of vehicles to the port and -onto the craft, preparatory to embarking for FANCiG;.

Inspecting the quality and checking the quantity of%equipment now became the order of the day. Clothing inspection standards did not allow the least torn or frayed clothing. Clothing that did not meet the standards was turned in and replacement drawn. With this accomplished, the troops Were now ready to leave NGLANIA on -a moments notice.

Among the final directives published by the Third Army in the

United Kingdom before proceeding to the continent was the Administra- tive Qrder No. 3, dated 27 June 1944.. This order was designed for operations of the division on the continent. Axn appendix-to the order contained forms to be followed in the submission of daily tank status r ports and G-4 periodic reports. The administrative procedure prescribed was to become effective upon arrival of the divisin on the continent. - This procedure was formulated and issued in the United

Kingdom in order that the division would have timely information on the supply procedures to be followed in combat operations, This enabled the division G-4 to formulate advanced planning and simplified issuance of later admnistrative orders.- The only addition- to be, required was-- the locations of supply points, and if the situation warranted, minor modifications.

The resupply of the Class V for the division was to be based on the expenditures from the basic load. To reduce paper work, the opny requirement to obtain axirnunition in combat was the submission of

a transportation order containing a certificate to the effect that

amounts requested Were to replace expenditures of the basic load.

It was realized by the Third Army that the major tonnage reception on' the continent, would be over the. NCEUvIMS)Y beaches to

supply the division, To support the proposed operation of the divi-

sion, plans for supply by water to ports along the coast were con-

sidered. This plan, if effected, would reduce the long supply line

from the beachhead area and avoid congestion and shorten limited lines

of cornunication. As planned, the port of CMHRBOURG was to be in full

operation, when the, division would be committed.

Successively, it was anticipated that as the ports of .GRIANVWEIE,

ST. MALL), ST. BREUC, MOPJAIX, and BIREST were captured, they vould be developed for logistic support.

The Third Army headquarters now established at NEHOU, FtRANCE,

published an unnumbered remorandum dated 7 July lW4. This adminis-

trative iemorandum gave the location of supply points, evacuation

hospitals, and cemeteries to be used.. Simultaneously with the receipt

of the order, the division was alerted for movement to the continent.

Liaison. officers were immediately dispatched to the port of SOUTHAM1PTON

and PORTLAND, whore the division was to embark.

Instructions' for movement of troops to concentration and marshalling areas. and for their embarkation were prepared and issued by the services of supply, European Theater of Operations. In addition, the services of supply prescribed administrative and preliminary

scion.

The , marshalling, areas provided for the temporary housing of

troops within a short marching distance of the piers for embarkation

and the thards. " The fthards ' were concrete ramps that covered the

shore line to the, waterts edge. These facilitated and expedited the

loading of vehicles on landing craft.

Since the exact time and dates for sailing of vessels were not.

always as scheduled and delays often occurd., it was expected that

some of the organizations might remain in the marshalling area for

several days, In theoe areas a final check. and replacement of items

of equipment that proved necessary was accomplished. Instructions

brought by the division liaison officers from the ports were given to

the troops in their briefing. before loading.

On 15 July 1944 the military police of the services of supply

started escorting, in serials, the 'elements of the division to the

ports of SOUTHAPTON and PCITLA\W). The concentration of the division

was accomplished by 17 July 1944. Elements of the division were moved

onto ,the tthards1 ' and loaded as liaison officers at the port called for

thei. Loading was generally accompished in the -afternoon during low

tide. This. allowed the LST' s to dry out and vehicles did not have to

be driven through water to load, as the low tide left the craft sit-

ting on the concrete Thards..! These vehicles were driven on backward

to facilitate unloading. Men and vehicles reain ed on the ship during the night and sailed when the early morning tide lifted the LST s clear.

During an interview of Major Joe Langston, .3, 9th Armored

Infantry Battalion, he stated he had never before or since seen an operation run as smoothly as the march to the port and the loading of n and equipient of the division.

Once loaded and under way, some of the craft wont directly to

UTAH BEACH, while others anchored off the ISiS OF WIGHT a few miles

off shore from SOUJTHA1t'TON, awaiting instructions.

complete supply and equipping of the 6th Armored Division had now been accomplished. The coordination and cooperation of the

porsorne := both in the services of supply and- the logistic personnel

of the division, is one worthy of mention. The guidance of the service

of the division by Lieutenant Colonel Bogge was that of an. officer well

trained and enthusiastic in his work. This officer, with his faithful

enlisted men in the section, worked day and night, Sundays and holidays,

in sincere performance of their duties to overcome all their problems.

In loyal support of the G-4 were the tireless efforts of

Colonel Elmer H. Droste, planning the role of the division trains;

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond B. Graves and the personnel o:' the 128th

Ordnance Battalion, who played'a vital role in the preparation of

equipment and massing of supplies, making the commitment of the diviL.

sion to combat assured of their support. Lieutenant Colonel Walter

L. Boyle, the division quartermaster, now master of insurmountable

problems, gave the division confidence in their supply of food-, clo-

thing, fuel, and lubricants. This well-molded teaniwork of the personnel in the logistics field gave the division a feeling of complete confidence,

The logistical planning in I1GLAE was sound. It entailed a lot of hard wort; by supply personnel from division headquarters down to individual company units. LAthough spare parts were items of a critical nature, it was found that by diligent effort on the part of supply personnel, sufficient items were' procured to last the division for many days. This same situation was true of other items of short supply

The supply'-schools supervised by the division G-4 adequately trained the supply personnel in their many and var'ied duties. The period in INNGLAND was time well spent as far as ironing out the rough edges in the logistica.l plan. Problems that seemed remote at the time were cleared up and when these same problems arose at a later date were easily -and quickly overcome.

The long hours spent by the supply personnel in planning the logistical support of the division proved to be hours profitably spent for a good fighting unit must be one that has a sound logistical plan to support it. The plan-to supply the 6th Armored Division prved to be sound. Section 'IV

G-l Activities

A successful unit must 1e a Wel administered unit. It is a well-known fact that if the little things are taken care of, the big things will take care of themisplves, The four months in ENGLAND were spent in final planning and training for combat, not the least of which was the, training of the ;dministrative- and personnel sections at' all echelons of the division The division; s courand post in

S1'GLAND was at ]3ATSFCRD.

A very important part of the final plans included determination of the administrative policies of the Third United States Army

From this date forward the division planned and trained in accordance with Third Army directives?. Army G-i and Adjutant General sections visited the division and conducted conferences on casualty reporting procedures, promotion, reclassification, policies in connection with proper handling of the dead, and methods for requisitioning replace. ments. 1

In order to insure uniform administration, instructors with combat experience were detailed from Third Army to conduct schools for the unit personnel officers, sergeant majors, anid personnel sergeants of each of tho assigned divisions. The 6th Armored Division

personnel attended such a school under supervision of XX Gorps at

MOr TON ON Tom MARSH, 29-30 May 1944. Admiistrative methods of special interest to army included; use of daily sumnaries pf morning reports from units in forward areas; securing of reports of stragglers and apprehensions from the pirovost:: marshal and reports of burial from: the chaplain and graves registration officez by the adjutant general; preparati.on of battle casualty reports and morning reports from the sumiuaries and othier information descd bed as. secured by the adjutant general,

The.6th Armored Division was at f ;ll strength in NGLA3D.

Being a alight" division however, this represented but two.tkards of

the 'strength of the earlier ="heavy" divisions.

In accordance with Thbird Army policy authorizing an over. strer 04h in senior officers, the division received three such officers just before departu~re fro i EzNGLAND 0 The three officers, a colonel and two lieutenant colonels, were attached to division headquarters, reserve command,, and one of the combat coy ands y respectively, to be assigned to T/O positions when needed,

Planks were reviewed to insure that combat units woold be kept

at full strength at all times. This principle' was emphasized by

Ge er l at on*..Replacements are sp a.re parts--supplies. They must b e asked for in time by the front lines , and the need for them must be anticipated in the rear. An educated guess is just as accurate and far faster than compiled error. During lull, you can. balance the account. Keep your combat units full. A company without riflemen is just as useless, a~s a tank without gas. 17 The morale of .thy; men of the division was extremely high throughout this period. The samne personnel, had been working together

'since their early training days at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas, sand the

Louisiana maneuvers. A high'- degr e of unit pride had been deve loped, Officers and enlisted men alike took a personal pride in the success of the organization.

The level of disciPline was equaly ie as a result of the personal interest which the noihomissioned officers took in their respectiye units, and the example set by the officers. 'tThere is only one kind of discipline, PERF'ECT DI8CIPIIN .'t-

A problemu of major G-l. inportance receiving special attention at this stage of the planning was that of graves registration. The assistant special services officer was designated division graves registration officer 'under the supervision of the division quarter-- master. Each battalion also. appointed a graves registration officer.

Attachment of quartermastor graves registration personnel to the division for evacuation of bodies to "cemeteries was planned with ,higher headquarters,

The Civil Affairs Detachment, commanded by Major Royce

Weisexberger, consisted of three officers and appropriate vehicles and drivers. Th ENGLAND this .,detachment studied civil problems and language. The limited claims of the English populace furnished little or no training as they were few and minor in nature. The matter of civili~ traffic, which was to become a Civil Affairs problem in

FRANCE, was not considered during this period as it was believed the presence- and. movement of the tanks would automatically take care of that condition.

The Public Relations Officer of the division was Captain J. J.

.Cowan'. The division public relations officer attended a conference at Third Arriay headquarters on 10 June 1944, -at which plans and policies regarding public relations on the continent were discussed. The functions of the -public- relations. officer at division level was explained by~the Army commander.

Planning and training in ENGLAND ended-with the movement into the staging area 15 July 1944.

The G-1 training stressed the importance of timely requisi tioning ,of replacements so they would be available when needed.

Administrative plans were prepared under the diirect supervision. of combat trained personnel technicians send dovw- from. Arpyy. headquarters for this one specific purpose- 'The admi nstrative training as in all other phases of training, stressed the practical and combat tested training which proved so successful to the divisions that had already entered combat.

NIQS FOR CHAP R II

General George 3. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It, (Boston: Houghton Mifflen Company), pp. 406-409.

2 Ibid p. 413.

3 Lt Col Michael J. Galvin, G-3, 6th ArmoredDvision, Personal Letter.

ItL Col, Frank K. Britton, CC, 9th Armored Infantry Battalion, Personal Interview, 15 October 1948..

SGeneral ,Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, (New York; Doubleday and -Company, Inc., 1948 .

6 Combat. istory of the Suzper S h, (Yadkinville, NC), p. 7.

7 Colonel Albert E. Harris, CO, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mecz), Personal lIntqvie, 5b Januay 1. :

Major Paul C. Root, -3, 50th Armored Infantry Battalion, Personal Interview, 8 Decembcr 1948. 9 Colonel E.. Busch, extracts from a letter, "Support of ani Armored Division in Cobat, The I:iilita .v Reiewl XXVI, No., 6, (September 1946), p._ 56.' 10Major Joe V. Langston,&-3, 9th Armored Infanitry Battalion, Personal Interview,. 186 January .1949. 1Lt Col ?Raymond E. Graeves, HIstorical Record. 12th Ordnaace Battalion, (APO 256~ August 1944), p. 3. 12 After Action Report, Third 1JS Army, Vol II, Part 5.

13 mbid. 14 Lt Col James S. ioncrief, Jr., 0-1, 6th Armored Div sion, Personal Interview, 1-0 F~oruary 1949. G5Pit". , After Action Report, Adjutant General Section,~ p. 2 .

'Lt Col George W. Moore, Jr.., Adjutant General, 6th Armiored Division,, Personal Letter, 135 March 1949. 17 o Ci.,lar As I Knew It, p. 397.

18Thid, p. 39'x.

50. - CH.PTER III

CONCENTr TION

Section I

Preparation for Combat

The stay in ENGLJAIdP was a prof~itable. one. The troops received invaluable training during this period, their last organized training before entering combat. The fighting on the eontinent, although progressing in a satisfactory maner, was practically a stalemate at

ST. 14oand IESSAY'. In was at this time that the 6th Armored received, the long expected alert for inmmediate movement across the channel.

The crossing of the channel was uneventful initially and about

.one.-third of the division debarked late in the afternoon of the 18th.

General Grow _was the first member of the Super Sixth to land in FRNCE on UTH BEACH. Later in the evening the weather suddenly changed and the remainder of the troops had one of the roughest crossings, experienced by any division. It was an additional three days before the balance of the division could be landed. On 22 July the last man of the combat elements left the ship, marched across UTAhH BEACH,. and boarded, trucks ready for a vent re into the unknowvn.

As' soon as a unit debarked and reorganized, it 'moved to the

division bivouac area in the vicinity of IES IESNIL, FAGdE. The

division closed into the area late in the afternoon of 24 July.

The folloviing days Were spent in preparing the troops, equipment, and vehicles for their first combat missjon. The composition of commands of .the Super Sixth for their first action was as follows:, I j

Arxnd Inf~ 44th Aid Inf Bn 50th Armd Inff Bn 9th Bn 68th Tk Bn 69t~h Tk Bn 14th Tk Bn 231st Armd FA Bn C/603d TD Bn 25th Armd Engr B/6o3d TD( Sn C/25th Armd Engr Bn Bn(-) I63dTDBn (- ) 5/25th Ammd Engr Bn fI tB/86th Cay Ron Sep (/) 8-

128th .Armd FA n 212th Arend FA Bn 777th AAA Bn (--)

In addition, the 146th Armored Signal Cormpany, the 76th Medical. Battalion, Armored, the 128th Ordnance na~ntenance Battalion, the 3803d and 3398th Quartermaster Truck Comupanies) and the -3916th Quartermaster Gasoline Company played no small pa.rt in assistingthe division in carrying out their~numerous missions during this spectacular operation. Commanders and staffs worked from early morning until late evening ironing out the last minute details of the newly organized t eams . The. important things during the period. 18-21 July was the conduct of test -firing at "'hedgerow ranges" with time-shell, cannist er, and superquick fuze. In firing the main amment of the tanks and the infantry mortars, conclusions were drawn as to proper employment in hedgerow opertions,. aintenance on vehicles and equipment -was a never-ending task, Mgen who were not required for maintenance and other

coiapany duties' .were given close-order , drill, crew drill, and took conditioning marches. The training stressed physical conditioning, as

all qommanders realized it was just a matter of days, or possibly of

:hours, before the division would see its firstaction. While visiting

VIII Corps headquarters on 27 July, General" Grow received orders com- mitting his division. He immlediately issued fragmentary orders to his

units, to conserve time.

The division had. been trained to a, fine edge and was now

ready to perform any assigned. mission.

The G-2 was coordinating closely with the 0'-3 and the intelli-

gence activities were discovered tobe in harmony with thc situation.

-53 Section II

Intelligence Activities

During this final preparation the G-3 was feverishly active gathering information,

As the division arrived on the continent the German air amn was reasonably active and all troops were again impressed regarding their previous training in dispersion, concealment, and camouflage.

Areas of tactical interest were visited and valuable information secured on defenses, weapons, and terrain. E veryone became very conscious of the terrain and reconnaissance parties were active in all directions to become familiar with it. Terrain studies and maps were used to compare the reaationship of map with terrain. ' All maps were found to be very accurate.2 Oe of these occasions was on the

25th of July, when Colonel Wood of the 79th Infantry Division took

General Grow on a terrain study of an action the 79th had fought a few weeks before. At this point the German positions and tactics used were described and examined in detail.

The division, for the first time, could hear the enemy artillery.

Subordinate commanders became cognizant of artillery intelligence in the form of shell reports, The purpose, information desired, and 3value of shell reports was disseminated throughout the command.

The Third Army made arrangements for the IId teams to visit the First Army prisoner of war enclosure at FORJ~iIGN.Y Each team spent three days at this cage. 3 The division was under strict. radio silence and the working out of liaison details an~d the exchange of nece~s ary inforwmation was difficult due. to the lack of this valuable counication medium.

Sound standard intelligence procedures were employed to gain information from .friendly .units and the troops ,were brought face to face with the fact that enemy action was soon to. be a. reality. Section II:

$uppLy

No tactical plan can be accomplished unless it can-be supported logistically and the G-4 was now perhaps the busiest individual in the division.. His was a mjor task. In spite of the tremendous preparation that had been made in ENGLMND, the numerous supply details remained to be accomplished with Third and First Army. The majority of the units crossed the English Channel on L$Ts. The average time for the movement of the units from their, bases in ENGLlhID to the assembly area near 1E ISSINIL was ten days.4 In loadiig the LSTs, the integrity of the unit was maintained as far as practicable, In no case was an organization split below platoon level when loaded in

ENGIgAD. Elements of the division started landing on UTAH EICH on

18 July 1944, with the last elements of the service elements coming ashore on 26 July 1944.

The reception of the units at the beach was well coordinated.

Liaison officers from, the division were there with instructions. At low tide the vehicles were driven off the LSTs over the beach, where military police of the beach area maintenance section escorted. .them to an assembly area approximately one mile from the beach. The vehicles, not having been waterproofed, were rapidly formed in their respective unit columns. These coumns then proceeded to a nearby ammunition dump and took an overload of ten to 20 per cent. The division, having obtained authority, turned in the basic load-'of antitank mines. Combat reports, plus training experience with small-arms fire exploding the mine's on the outside of vehicles, prompted this action. This space was filled by 37-mm canister ammunition for the light tanks, as well as a large amount of caliber .30 amunition for machine guns and rifles.

Time was now vital to the final preparation of equipment.

Mechanics gave the vehicles their final check, guns were cleaned by the

crews, and final test firing accomplished. :adio repairmen and operators

checked their sets for proper channels and aligned the sets. Through

these preparations, the radio repairmen found that many radios had be-

come inoperative through mildew and fungus. These sets had to be re-

placed. * This required last minute efforts of the G-4 and signal officer

to procure replacements.

Final checking found four M-4 howmitzers without sights.

Immedately the 128th Ordnance Battalion modified some sights taken

from captured German guns and installed them. Mtodifications on some of

the 1/4-ton trucks were made. The machine gun pedestals which had been

mounted in back of the front seats were moved to the dash board~ This

allowed the rear seat to be removed, providing more cargo space.

Personnel of the division ordnance battalion visiting other

ordnance organizations which had been in combat in support of armor

found that further . modifications could be made to increase the orderly

stow'age of ammunition in tanks. The maintenance personnel of the

ordnance proceeded to modify as many tanks as they could by cutting

out the honeycombed ammunition racks in, the tanks. This increased the

ammunition capacity to 130 rounds' :of 75-mm shells. and 10,000 rounds

of caliber .30 ammunition for machine guns.

Equipment racks on the rear of the tanks, as well as hedgerow cutters, wer °e fabricated and installed.

Arrangements had been made with First Army to supply arriving units of the Third Army from First Army dumps. The Third Army had no supply installations at this time.7 VIII Corps, to which the division had been assigned,. was designated a separate command. under the Third

Army, with direct supply channels to the First Army which was to control all depot install..ations until 1 August. The VIII Corps was allotted only 1.2, S74 rounds of artillery ammunition for the period 26-31 July

1944. This, in turn, caused a restriction of ammunition of 1/5 unit of fire per unit to be imposed on, the division when committed during this period.

First Army Administrative Order No.. 3, dated 22 June 1944, with

Changes I through 5, designated the locations of supply installations.

The War Department disapproved a recommendation for a ration breakdown section to be added to the division quartermaster section of the light. type armored division. The disapproval stated that the plan for, procurement and issue of Class Isupplies, as set forth in paragraph

207, FM 100-10, Field Service Regulations, was considered adequate.

By 22 July 1944-the Third Army had established a "considerable amnount of its own supply dumps and service instacllations, Wherever possible, supply dumps and service inst4lations of t.,he First Army were being jointly operated by placing Third Armay personnel on the job with the installations This, in turn, would provide a rapid change over of operation to the Third Army upon becoming operational.

The procedures to take over First Army dumps in the proposed

Third Army area was evident when the Third Army Administrative Order 1o101 was received by the division. The order designated the supply points of Glass I and III (controlled and operated by the Third Army), and Class II and IT quartermaster and medical supply points (controlled and operated by the Third Army). The Class V ammunition dumps were to be operated ard controlled by the First Army, with Third Amy units attached.

During this phase of the logistical buildup, process was impeded because of the adverse weather onditions. Rain was playing havoc with the operation of the large dumps established in the fields. Mud was a. continuous -pr oblem. The troops hauling supplies from the dumps over dirt roads had reason to believe the legend that the NORMVIANDY peasant attributed the sturdy leg and shoulder muscles of his livestock to the exercise they received in pulling through that muddy soil. In spite of planking and steal matting, the dumps were a mire. Many wheeled vehicles could not go in and out under their own power. Trucks coming for supplies had to be towed by bulldozers and other vehicles.

Brake drums on' the vehicles wore deteriorating because the supply vehicles were' constantly going in and out of the boggy dumps for supplies. Seepage of mud and grit into the brake drums inner surfaces scored the drums and ruined the brake linings. In addition,, tire troubles had become excessive because the vehicles ran over shell £rag- merts, twisted. steel fence posts, and other foreign materials that had worked loose in the solid earth and were now in the mud where vehicles would run over them. These factors added to the maintenance and supply. problem. The supply of tires at this time was critical.

Real estate in occupied and liberated territories was to be

5. acquired under the provisions of the European Theater of Operations,

Procurement Regulations and Procedure for Acquisition of Real Estate,

Communication zone real estate officers were to be permanently as--

signed as "town majors"t tto specific areas unider control of United States

Forces. These "town majors" attached to divisions and corps, reverted

to comminunication zone control when, they took over their assigned areas.

Work of the "1town majors!? was to be supervised and supplemented

by the engineers of the echelon to which they were attached.

At ONAHABEiACH the average daily tonnage was now ,10,000 tons,

while on the smaller UTAH BACH an average daily tonnage of 5,000 tons

was being maintained. Minor ports of ISIGMNY, CA NTEN, GRANI]CMp,

ST. \AAST, and EARFLER were adding to the buildup with 400,tons per

day at each port. The tonnage from the port of CHER'30RG, which was

now in operation, had reached 3,500 tons daily. This port was rapidly

expanding in -preparation to directly support the Third Army.

The crross. channel supply of fuel constituted a special problem.

The lines of communication over which the fueld had to be brought from

the United Kingdom to the battle front were not long, but the method

of transport was complicated. The rate of' consumption was anticipated

to be very high,. considering that an' armored division like the Sixth

would consume 50,000 to 75,000 gallons every 24 hours of operation.

In order to save shipping, to increase the rate of supply, and to pre-

veti interference of bad weather, submarine pipe lines wore laid across

the channel to the port of CHERBQRG. These lines wore three-inch

flexible pipe with a discharge capacity of 250 tons of fuel per day per

line. This- fuel was emptied into huge storage tanks at CHI-EI0RG.

:60 Prom CHIB0R an overland pipe line was laid to LAYSi .DE PUIT$,

'whore a reserve stock of 1,500,000 gallons of" gasoline was built up for the Third Arrmy in support of the ItCQBR.At operation. This pipe line became known as the ltMjor Line. tt In addition to the submarine lines, tankrs. brought gasoline from the United Kingdom, while others were routed directly from the United States. These tankers anchored. off shore and discharged their cargo through a flexible tube to a. pipe line on the shore, where it was pumped to storage tanks along the coast. This system was used extensively as P( T N BESSN arid the inland storage tanks at MOUNT GAYIN. This latter pipe line became known as the "Mviinor System."

The Third Army GLass I dumps, during this period, accumulated a reserve of l,,500,000 operational rations for the impending operation.

Many Class I supply points were now established in the vicinity of

Class -II supply points; these supply .points at this time were capable of furnishing oly minimum logistical support. A 15-day reserve of

Class II and IV quartermaster suppies was now on hand. In addition, a sales store was in operation at ST. JACQUIE3 IE 1VTiZHQt where sales to officers of the division were made. This same installation honored the division requisitions for Class II and IV supplies and made last minute issue before the division jumped off in the "COBIA" operation.

The 6th Armored Division, on receipt of warning orers, gave the final instructions to personnel of the G- section and. service units. The quartermaster imnediately issued a three-day supply of emergency, rations. These were to be carried in each vehicle. Two days' reserve rations were on t rucks, of the uits and in the division trains. .A timely issue of two weeks' supply PL rations was made with

the ration issue.

In the final attempt to secure maps, a limited quantity was pro-

cured from the engineer section of the Third Army map depot. This depot,

hating ju.st become operational, had maps that were of little value, as

they covered only the area from IL MESNIL to COUTANQE. This area would

be outrun by the division in passing the infantry front, lines. Person-

nel of the division, through desperate efforts, procured road maps of

FRAC from any sources. they could find. The First Army had the bulk

of maps under their control and had not, at this time, divided their

stocks ith the Third Army.l

more barracks bags and some officers trunk lockers turned up

and at the last minute had to be turned in for-storage. At the same

time personnel were discarding the bulky gas masks. Some of the masks

were discarded by turning them in to supply points, others were placed

on unit supply -trucks. Authority by division commander was given for

this storage; however, commanders of lower units, in most cases, auth-

orized the storage of this equipment on trucks of the trains.' 1

Red ross supplies for the division were now available by con-

tacting Mtir Bowers at the First Army quartermaster office at ISINGY.

27 July J.944 found Colonel Droste in the office of the divi-

sion G-3 receiving instructions as to the units to be attached to the

division trains upon receipt of orders. Immediately thereafter a meeting of all trains unit commanders and attached unit coiiixaanders was

held. Final plans for the trains organization were mnade in order to be prepared to follow the division. The division was now prepared logisi a~l z :oy combat. Supply personnel were keyed to provide efficient service, backed by army installations. The locations of' installations were as shown in appendix

6.. Section IV

C-1 Activities

The end of the planning stage was approaching. Combat was near at hand.. 0-4 activities were confined to organization and the, adaption of plans to field conditions.

As the elements of the division assembled in N0RMANDY the com- man4 post was located in the vicinity of IE 1ESNIL, and major units in the surrounding area near the villages of FI ERVI1J , BSitVl .E,

ST. MvAURICE and ST. G AINEY

The 4tvision, including attachments, .was at full combat strength with every position filled by physically fit personnel trained for his assignment * Attachments included- the 603d Tank Destroyer Battalion,

777th AAA AW ttalion, 990th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, and normal intelligence teams. Fortunately, the procedure for careful recording of casualties and the procuring of replacements was not needed while in the IE ISNIL assembly area. The original assignment to xx Corps, Third Army,, not yet operational, was terminated 25 JJly when the division was assigned to VIII Corps of the First Army This change was of immediate interest to the personnel staff whose. plans and or'anization had been based upon the policies of the former corps and army.' The 0-I visited VIII Corps headqarters frequently during this period, in order to determine if the requirements of that headquarters would require any change of plans, 3 After careful study and close coordination, it was found that present plans conformed with the desires of the new comnmand. The tAd.inistative CenimerT ' baccai.o & ola Li i12.c4; for the first time when it was set up -in the lE ZSNIL vicinity, where it was to, remain during the following days of initial combat. This headoarters, controlled by the adjutant general, Lieutenant Colonel

George 'VWT.Moore, Jr., was composed of the unit personnel sections and the special staff sections of the inspector general, staff judge advocate, and finance officer. The division chaplain and special service officer also operated from here whenever conditions warrantedul

The administrative center operated as an independent installation, entirely separated from division trains, except when transportation was needed to imve the center.

The final coordination of procedures was effected at a con. ference of the G l, adjutant general, Unit S-.l.s,. and graves registration officers was held on 27 July. Casualty reporting, evacuation of

the dead,. disposition of the personal effects of casualties and other

related matters were discussed in detail, and refinements of responsibility and cooperation clarified.

The excellence of discipline accounted for the complete ab-

sence of disciplinary action which existed in spite of the natural

confusion of the strange situation and surroundings in which the troops now found themselves. The conmand had been well trained and indoctri-

nated with the quality of discipline which makes it second nature for

the soldier to give his full cooperation to his leader and obey com-

mands with enthusiasm. It is note strange, therefore, that the complete

attention of the command turned to the leaders in anticipation of

directions. Morale depends on incentives to .n'ALn iLc "or1 a_ r:t c cn o motives The knowledge that the job for which each man had trained was near at hand and the desire for group approval, recognition, domination, and adventure provided the determination and zest required for high morale.- Thus, with a minimum of careful leadership, morale was maintained at a high level by the excitement of -the moment,

Civil- affairs activities were negligible in the LE- IESNIL assembly area. Permanent. detachments had been in operation in this area for some time and were handling the routine problems of military- civilian relations.*Preparation for future operation was fortified by information obtained by visiting these permanent detachments and observing their methods.

This stage of final G-l preparation, wh-en viewed in retrospect, might appear totally -lacking in positive action. The very fact that a final check of the details of administration was made without major change or adjustments attests to the careful planning with which. the foundation for smooth and continuous administrative support had been constructed.

We find sound, careful planning has characterized the activities of all general staff sections. The division is well trained,; aggres-

sively minded, with proper respect for the enemy s capabilities, The tremendous burden of logistical planning has been adequately ac-

complished on the whole and a .sound administrative basis has been completed,

The division is now ready for action. I'aarrative of. operations, 6th Armored Division, 1 November 1944, p. 42. 2Lt Col Frank K. Britton, CC), 9th Armtored Infantry Battalion, Personal Inte rviewe, December 1948~

3After Action Report, Third. United States- Army, Vol II, Part, 3, p. 7. Combat History of .the Super Sixth, (Yadkinville, N. C. , 1946) p. 1. Colonel Albert i&. Harris, CC), 86th Reconnaissance Squadron, Personal. Interview, December 1948. 6 Rpr Rp ot396, Army Ground Forces Board No. 2, 12 November 1948. 7 p. .Cit., Third Army After Action Report, Vol II, Part.3. 8 Ct , Third Army After~ Action Report, Vol I, _pp. 1-4. Historical Section, U1 S. Arty, First Army Report of _Opera- te~ns, (Washington, D. C. , 1945) , Book 'I. 10 p.CtThird ,Armyr After Action Retort, Vol I, pp. 1-10.

Ma jor Paul C.' Root, S-3, 50th Armored Infantry Battalion, Personal Interview,. December 1948. 12 After Action Reports, Units iindicated. 1 t. Co-I J. S. Mobncrief, Jr. , C-Il, 6th Armored Division, PersnaInterview, February 1949. 14 Lt Col George W. M.oore,. Jr., Adjutant General, 6th Armored Division,, Personal. Letter, 'March 1948. CHAiSR IV

THE EN~TETTION

Section 1

The First Action

The battle is the pay off. The 6th Armored Division was coin-

mitted to action by. a terse order to move one troop of the cavalry

reconnaissance scuadron, mechanized, through the 8th Infantry Division

via MIUJLIS to seize the high ground in the vicinity of 1E BEiGARD.

The remainder of the division was to be prepared to mve at daylight

28 July to pass through the 79th Infantry Division at IESSAY and ad-

vance astride the LLSSAY--COUTANC ES highway, by-passing COUTP= LACES

to the west and proceeding via MONTVV TIN-ST4R- IE to GRiIiVILLE. This

order was received in division headquarters on 27 July. Captain

.Frederick H. Eickhoff' a Troop A, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,

was ordered to carry out the mission. This task was accomplished with-

out hitting enemy resistance.

Let us examine the overall plan. Operation HCOBRj?4 I was to

effect a clean penetration of the German main line of resistance on a

narrow front just to the west of ST. LO; drive two armored divisions

and a motorized infantry division through the gap in the hostile main

line of resistance.; use one armored division to block the enemy from

reinforcing from either the south or the east, and then to swing the

other armored division and the motorized infantry division west toward

the coast and thus envelop all German forces north. of COUTANCS.l The First Ay plan was to attack south and southwest on the

Cotentin Peninsula. VII Corps had the mission of destroying the enemy in the COUTiC S--ST. LO area. VIII Corps was to secure the high ground northwest of COUTANCES.

It was not until 2iOO July that Cpmbat Command A of the 6th

Armiored Division moved out of its area to advance south along the division axis. For routes of advance, see Appendix V, G-3 map:. CCA passed through the 79th Infantry Division, crossed the AY River and. continued on toward its objective. The advance. was slow, clue to the large number of enemy mines and booby traps in the area. Light enemy resistance was net that evening, but the advance was not interrupted to any great extent by this iactor. CQA went into bivouac in the area of lIE BI3NGARD, the area Troop A had seized the preceding afternoon.

Troop A passed to the control of Combat Command A at this time. During the night two troops of the reconnaissance battalion reconnoitered for crossis of the: NSNIN River for the next day's action. 'The division, less Combat Co nand A, remained in place durin the entire day due to the extreme traffic congestion near WSSAY.

Late in the afternoon of the 28th it had become apparent at

VIII Corps headquarters that the enemy had made a successful withdrawal across the entire corps front the night before. Patrols from front line units did not report -this withdrawal until it had been completed.

This is a striking example of the possible results of failure to promptly report information. The corps commander, on receipt of the information, immediately decided to exploit this unexpected success.

The 6th Armored Division and the 4th Armored Division wore given priorities on the roads running south, the infantry divisions being relegated to secondary roads. Congestion along the main highways was extremely heavy during this period. Vehicles of the two armored divisions were getting in each other's way. COUTANGES was probably the

Worst bottleneck for traffic the American troops had met thus far. Had the situation been less favorable, this lack of traffic control could have been disastrous. After passing COUTAtCJCS, the 4th Armored Divi- sion advanced on the left (east) of the corps zone to capture AiVRANCHi3; the kth Armored Division, on the right, was to seize GRLIJVILIE The

79th Infantry Division was to -,ollow to the rear of the 6th Armored

Division and to be in general support of the division.

Comrjbat Commarnd A started: out on the advance south early on the

29th, .but was stopped by enemy small-arms fire from the south bank of theSSINNE River at PONT E Li fOCH . The bridge across the river had been destroyed, so plans were mzade for a coordinated assault crossing on either side of the destroyed bridge. The 44th Armored Infantry

Battalion (reinforced by the 68th Tank Battalion) made the attack.

Division artillery, being in position prior to the jump off, supported the attack. The enemy resistance was light and by 2145 :bridgehead had been secured. During the night the 25th Armored Engineer Battalion constructed a bridge and ford across the river. W4hile the bridge was being constructed, Combat Command A rested, for the night. The entire division closed in this area during the afternoon and evening.

The enemy retreat to the southa in front of the advancing VIII

Corps had now taken the' proportions of a rout. Too, the terrain south of the SIENNE River was somewhat of an improvement over the other areas the division had just passed. The fields were substantially larger thani those in the hedgerow country to the north and now only scattered woods spotted the landscape.

GRANVIU was still the division objective. It is situated at the edge of' a plain and thus offered poor terrain 'for a determined defense. However, AVRANCIES, objective of' the 4th Armored givis ion, is situated on elevated terrain overlooking the sea, with, steep cliffs.

It is south of the S River and forms a formidable barrier to troops attacking from the north. It was estimated that' the capabilities of the enemy would permit only small isolated defensive groups from the

S]BNNE River to AVRANCHEX% but that a defensive line could be manned from VILEDIEU to AVRANCIIS. To overrun this line before the enemy could prepare it in strength was the Army commander's objective and this, in turn, .was the objective o f the 6th Armored avision comhtnder.

Tn .rder to :add impetus to the attack on 30 JulyGeneral Grow order'ed Combat Command B to pass through Combat Command A's bridgehead at PONT E LA R0CF and drive south through IHAL to the vicinity of

GRANVILLE. This was done principally to save time, since Combat Com- mand A had dismounted to make the river crossing and the troops were now separated from their vehicles. Combat command B was to secure the east and. south exits of' GRANVIILL and then attack and capture the city.

Reserve command was ordered to advance to BREHAL following Combat

Cohunand B, thence to GRANVILUE, where it would block the north and northeast exits and then aid Combat Command B in its attack on the city.

The 79th Infantry Division, now situated north of the SIENE River, was to. be prepared to support the 6th Armored Division on call. At dawn on the 30th, Combat Commnand B.passed through Combat

Command A at the bridgehead, with a troop of the reconnaissance battalion leading the column. Combat Command B moved swiftly down the road, encountering onlyr-light small-arms fire along its advance. l- though the point had cleared the line of departure, one hour before the main body, the small-arms fire along the way had delayed it long enough that by the time BREHAL was in sight the advance guard had closed up on the point. Three-quarters of a mile north of BREHIAL the small-ams fire

'became intense; the enemy firing from wooded positions along the road.

The point, by leapfrogging and firing into the woods and hedgerows, permitted Combat Commnnd B to continue to advance without interruption.

It is apparent that the point commander was accomplishing his Miscion in a sound maner. The point must aggressively attack all opposition, in order to eliminate small enemy detachments that would slow down the main body.

Just on the outskirts of town a road block was encountered by the lead tank. It was only protected by small a.rms and surprisingly enough,.-no antitank guns were in evidence. The point commander" requested an air strike. The request was granted and shortly thereafter four P-47Ts' made six or eight strafing passes over the obstacle. The lead tank of the point rammed into the roadblock and opened a passage for the remainder of the command.

Company A of the 50th armored Infantry Battalion. had dismounted after receiving sporadic mortar and light artillery Lire. The combat command commander decided to' clear the town so the armor 'could pass through without mishap. Tanks and armorcd -cars sprayed the buildings with their machine guns and the infantry followed along and mopped up.

The enemy resistance, brisk at first, slowed to a few sniper shots as the, tank-infantry teams moved to the south edge of town. Aggressive use of fire was :naing ?.t possible for the.division to continue its momentum.

By 1325 BREHAL had been cleared. Combat Cornnd B continued on the main BRED If--GRIUNVILI road but shortly after leaving town enemy artillery fire began to interdict the road, forcing the. combat comand comader to shift his main axis, of advance to secondary roads.

Here we see the advantage of assigning an armored unit an axis.

Specific routes are restrictive. Combat Command B bivouacked for the night a few miles south of BRPHAij

Reserve command followed Combat Command B through BREHAI and then went into positions northeast of GRA1NVILiL, prepared :to attack the city in conjunction- with Combat Command B. Combat Command A bivouacked for the night jutst noirth of B1'EHAL,

During the night of 30-31 July the enemy evacuated GRANVIU6.

When this information was reported to division headquarters, the reserve command was ordered to proceed through GRANU:JVILIE and 'down. the

coastal road, clearing the coastal area as it moved. Reserve command moved to atn area southeast of dRANiV-iUE and sent one platoon from the

l5th Tank Battalion into the, town, along with the Division (-3, to capture it. The town ,surrendered without resistance, The command moved south to the vicinity of BACILLY where it went into bivouac

Combat. Comnnd -Bt.s mission was to clear the GR. iJILE--VRAN-C HS

highway north of SMARTILLY. -Disposed in three combat teams, each team was composed of an infantry company, a tank company, and a battery of artillery. One teara took the coastal road where scattered enemy resistance along the route made it necessary to clear many small pockets. At one point along this road tanks were brought up to place direct fire upon -boats evacuating German troops from the peninsula.

Another teach took the GRANVIh E-.-AVR.AI'C1ES road and the third team took a route generally paralleling this road. The combat command went into bivouac near S0UILbT.

Combat Comnand A again followed along as division reserve. It remained at S~RTIUY for the night.. Despite the fact that this combat command was Qnly following along behind Combat Command B and reserve comand, it., did not get into its bivouac area until alost midnight because of the large amount of traffic along the roads.

At 1500 on 31 July the division commvander chanced to be at the head of the-.Combat Command B colums- when he received a corps order changing the boundaries and giving the division more room to the east in what had previously been the 4th Armored Division zone of action.

General Grow was to continue to move' his division south toward

AVR-i9iC-ES. This information was immediately, transmitted to the 6th

Armored Division columns, but since the 4th Armored Division was still on this road, the division. commander -ordered the '1 &uper Sixth" to keep to the seaward side of the road. The order giving the 6th Armored

Division the additional area had not reached the 4th Armored Division

command post late that day when the coinsmanding generals of both divi-

sions mutually agreed on bivouac areas for their respective troops.

General' Grow selected an area about. one and one-half miles north of

.74 AVRANCES for his command post for the night.

At 2100 hours VIII Corps. order arrived, directing the 6th

Armored- Divison to relieve the 4th Armored. Division at AVRANCHES and at- PONTAAULT. AVRANC}f&S is situated at the bend of the Contentin and the Brittany peninsulas, on the Atlantic coast. All main roads to the south and west of the Contentin Peninsula converge at AVRANCHES.

Here all traffic bound for Brittany and southern FRANCE is canalized to one highway for a distance of four miles. The road was vehicle bound, one after another, for hours at a time. If the Allied forces hadnxt had air superiority and column cover for this traffic hazard at this critical time, the big push might have been delayed for days.

As it was, the column was strafed by enemy planes, especially during the hours of darkness.

After the highway crosses the SBi.EUN& River at PONTAUBAULT, one r'oad fans out west into Brittany, while another leads to FOUGERES.

Thus, while AVRACHES is a, key junction for north-south traffic, it is also the terminus for three important roads from the east. For these reasons, AVtRACrI-E had to be held at all costs.:

No -indication was given that an imediate advance beyond

AVANCHES was contemplated, therefore the reserve command was ordered to effect the relief of the 4th Armored -Division at both AVRA1'CkES and at P0NTAUBAULT. The division policy at this time and throughout

,the entire operation was to use the reserve command headquarters primarily to control all combat troops temporarily held in .division reserve and secondarily to carry out defensive missions for the division. Thre were times when it was necessary to commit the reserve

75 command in offensive action as a leading element, but this was the exception. The division commander planned to have the reserve command merely relieve, the 4th Arnored Division in place and then pass through his other two combat commands when the new advance began. Reserve command moved out to relieve the 4th Armored Division on the night of

31 Ju'ly. Before the mission was completed the Third Army had become operational and the_ 6th Armored Division was ordered to proceed to

MREST with all possible speed.

The penetration had been a success. The Super Sixth had corn- pleted one phase of an armored action and was doing remarkably 'well for a young division, young in the number of days it had been in combat.

The 6th Armored Division had been committed to ac tion in a penetration and the tactics employed by the commanders were generally

sound. The principles of employment, as used by this division, had been battle-tested by other armored units in previous engagements and were successful.

When speed was essential, speed was used to prevent the enemy from organizing his defenses at any time during his hasty withdrawal.

When time was of the 'essence, the division commander passed one con- bat command through another. Combined teams were employed to good

advantage throughout this first part .of the operation. Column cover was used extensivrely. The principles of emploment. of armor used by

the 6th Armored Division during the latter days of July 1944 were

sound then, and are sound now. The inseparable companion of tactics

is enemy terrain and weather, and it behooves us to turn our attention

to these factors and examine them in detail,

76 Section II

Irrtell/i'enoe

During this phase of operation the enemy situation shifted from one of stubborn, well,-organized defense to uncoordinated, frantic, and desperate attempts' to stem the onrushing tide of armor that unrelent- lessly forced its way southwardi

The enemy opposing the 79th Infantry Division in the 6th Armored Division zone is believed to include elements of the 243d, 353d, 77th, 91st, and 265th Infantry Divisions plus reinforcements to these units. ,+xtensive use of booby traps and wires had been made. Reports indicate enemy line unstable. 2

Field Order No, 1 included information as to the enemy situation. Ib the Cr-, after, months of training and anticipation,, the phrase tThias Is It" was a reality.

Third Any indicated the following eney capabilities at this. time with the order of probable adoption;

(1) Continued delay and local counterattacks S of AX River and inundations to E;, while moving bulk of forces to favorable terrain in (2)for organized defense. (2) The enemy is, capable of maintaining an aggressive defensive attitude along entire battle front, defending the high ground S of COUTANCES--ST.LO road, running generally E from MIONThIARTIN SUR xv R--TORIGNY---FIAIS3, while continuing to assemble reserves sufficient to undertake major counteroffensive. (3) The enemy is capable by 26 July of assemblying a reserve composed of three Pz Div,' (1 SSs 9 5, 10.SS) -which, independently or reinforced by 48, 84, or 89 Inf Div, 3 SS or' 11 Pz Div (reported moving since 9 Jun), plus an undetermined number of GHQ artillery and separate Armored units, for launching a coordinated counteroffensive against the lodgment. (4) The enemy can delay our advance by occupying successive defensive positions (1) along the high ground S of GRANILIE--- VV. -FI jRS road and (2) along a secordary ridge ,runnig from AV ANQESw--MORTAII-DO 0NT while continuing to assemble reserve necessary. to attempt to contain the lodgnment within the-CONTENTIN Peninsula, Probabilities. Capabilities (1) &nd (P-)are favored in that order, as the significan-t facts, indicate that these capabilities are in lie with the strategy so far pursued by the enemy. 'However, capabilities (3) and (4) gain strength i n light of the Infantry com. .mitrients of past week an-d the opportxuhiies thereby~ presented. On 27 JuLy VIII Corps units corntinued the attack to the south. - Etensive mines and booby traps were exncountered, causing axrioying delays, but the tempo of the advance increased rapic~ly as 'the day wore on. The enemy was making a general withdrawal in the corps sec'- tor and 'it becamae increasingly evident that the effects of the VII

Corps attack (main attack of 'the ~irst Ars') was being felt on the enemy in front of the VIII Corps, Resistance was limited to delaying tactics, usually by small groups of riflemen who had become separated or lost from their units during the withdrawal action. E~nemny air was active, however, and on three different occasions 100 enemy aircraft appeared and in each instance were engaged by Allied planes. En.emy artillery was relatively active 'during the day but this activity ceased at midnight. It was reported by a prisoner of war that artillery was. available btit shortage of armunuition was acute. This enemy situation was instrumental "the decision to employ the 4.th and 6th Armored

Divis .o s to "sspe .rhoa&.a rapid drive to the south. 28 July fou icd the 6th Armtored Division stil12 continuing to move south and facing little enemy resistance but again encountering extenscive mhines al~ong the approaches to the bridge of the AY River and through the town of 1&,SSAY. LESAY w'&s one of the most comnpletel.y mined -and booby trapped cities ever encountered by-the 6th Armored Division. After 'passing this latter obstacle, the 6th advanced. down the highway toward COUTANCES against light enemy resistance. COUTANCLS was bypassed to the west at PONT DE LA ROCHE and the leading elements ran into almost inmediate trouble in the form of blown bridges over the S)ENNE River, covered by enemy fire.

The SINE River was just a shallow cree1p in the zone finally used for crossing. The enemy on the high ground south of the river was estimated as a large determined force, but in makeng a coordinated attack with an entire combat command, the assault elements found few enemy and very little resistance. One or two 2Q-m guns and scattered small-arms fire caused the deployment of this combat command.4

Obviously the shattered condition of enemy lines of communication was taking effect. The German commander was unable to recognize that here was his last chance to plug the hole. If thetth managed to get through the rupture would be coplete. The secondary defenses were being rapidly shattered.

South of COWUANCJE3 to below GRANVILLE the roads were congested by the enemy withdrawing in disorder. A prisoner of war captured at this time stated that 32 batteries of artillery Were to the south, but even though short of ammunition, they had been forced to leave am. munition, behind in their withdrawal, due to limited transportation.

It is apparent that the German forces were in a state of utter confusion, unable to bring, their available forces to bear at the critical point.

The. 30th of July found the, division moving against scattered resistance except at 3REHAL, where enemy artillery and mortar fire was encountered. A estimated infantry battalion, supported by a battery of four self-propelled E8-mm guns, plus small caliber antitank guns, occupied the town and vicinity, The town was captured after a determined ight and the enemy, in withdrawing from B1 FHAL, fought a tenacious rear-guard action.

The division, on 31 July, continued its attack to the south against scattered enemy resistance. The enemy evacuated GRjuIJVILIB during the night and the town surrendered without offering resistance.

That night the division relieved the 4th Armored Division at AVRNCHEES and received a concentrated enemy air attack, The enemy concentrated his night boxmbing attacks in an effort to get the bridges on the crowded roads leading in and out of A CFl.ANES and the town of AVRAWCHES itself. the damage and delay inflicted by the enemyts bombing was negligible, due to .the antiaircraft defenses around the city and the small caliber weapons in the columns,. The 6th, through bold action with intelligent use of air cover, was causing the enemy to reflect seriously on the probability that the. armor could not be stopped.

Losses of the enemy4 were mounting in the entire sector and the German cortuaner-in..chie±' was considering the possibility of bringing up ret- inforcenents in a manner, similar to that used by the French in World

Wear I in the defense of ?ARIS. Taxicabs and all available transportation was used in a desperate effort to throw troops into the line.

The 4th ,Armored .Division, pushing south of AVRAI'4Cf{ , captured

DUCEY and the dams on the ELU E Rtiver south of the totwvn. Fortunately, these dams were captured intact; otherwise 'the Germans, by blowing them, would have flooded the river valley and would have impeded the progress of the 6th Armored Division and the entire VIII Corps considerably. This period, 25-31 July, was one of. excremely rapid advance of armor against a defeated, disorganized, and demoralized .enemy.

Resistance was sporadic and advainces, were limited more by traffic problems. The eather was characterized by brilliant sunshine and

Wari temperatures, which materially aided the thrust southward. Only

a few prisoners were 'captured by VIII Corps units, but Pits were from the 77th, 91st, 243d, 265th; 353d, and "Das"$ Reich" divisions, pre-

viously known to have elements on the corps front, as well as from

the 17th SS Pz Gr Division and the 5th Para Division. Morale of the

enemy was reaching depths previously unknown by these professional

troops. ,The boldness employed by the 6th Armored was having the de-

sired shock effect and the small delaying groups felt themselves

completely incapable of dealing with this jaggernaut of an armored

division forcing its way forward by heavy uses of fire and maneuvex.

t is interesting to note the-reactions of select German

generals to Operation "COfBA.1 1

General Alfred Schlemm, commander of the First Parachute

Army, said :

I realize now how ignorant I was of the truth. I see now that all the assurances of Goebbels were nothing but lies and that by July 1944 the war was alr ady well lost, Hitler alone knew this and he kept it from us.

At one oclock on the morning of 31 July, Lieutenant1 General

$peidel rang Field Marshall Von Kluge, the commander in-chief West,

to report tithe left flank has collapsed." Forty-five minutes later

General Faz'ribacher, commanding a corps in Brittany, stated to General

Von Kluge that he was having difficulty in obtaining cooperation of the naval and air force units stationed in the ports and airfields in

Brittany.

On 31145 July, Field Mrshall Von Kiuge talked with General

Worliinont and said "Reports shoe the enemy is in AVRAICHES and nay be also in VIIJEDIIN. These key positions, for future operations, must. be. held at all costs."

In retrospect it can be determined that this was one of the decisive engagements of the war. German thoroughness was to no avail, pr iiarily because Hitler alone held the key to decisive action and ho was too far removed from the tactical picture to influence the action in a timely manner. Section IM.

Supply. and Service

Wvere the logistical preparations s.dequate? What are the problems encountered by a G-4 during th&initial actions of an untried division? I3t us examine the record anti: ;see how the division met these requisites of combat.

On 2$ July 1944, as the. 6th Armored Division ,was rolling south toward iSSAY, the important work of keeping the division well supplied assumed. greater proportions and the problems increased as the supply lines .lengthened.

New attachments and the assignment of organic units had to be considered and with this end in view, . Division Fie. Order No. 1 was published. This ordered directed the lBit trains (field trains) of the division, now in an assembly area at FLEIaVILL, .FIANCE, to come under division controls. ese trains were to support the division in their present location and be prepared to advance on order,, behind the reserve command. The "A"t trains (combat trains) were directed to move with their respective units.7 _It is to be noted that recent military terminology designates the U'Att trains as. combat trains; "Bt trains a.re now referred to as field trains..

For the protection of the trains, the 777th AAA Automatic

Weapqns Battalion headquarters, and Batteries C and D were attached.

The 990th ,TreadwayBridge Company,- minus the elements supporting the combat commands, was also attached to the trains. The 531st Ordnance

Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank):, which had been attached to VIII

.83 Corps and given the 'direct support mission of the division, assembled

in the vicinity of. BARiTV1ZI'.

The evacuation of the dead was next to be considered and the

3042d Graves Registration Company, a VII Corps unit, was ordered in

direct support of the division.,- This un .t was to maintain the

cem~eteries to which the 6th Armored Divi ion was to evacuate those

killed in action. The Orgiandes Cemetery, which had been opened by

First Army on 21 July 194, was deignated as the cemetery for VIII

Corps unit, The Blossville Cemetery, a First Army cemetery, was to

be transferred to the Third Army when it became operational.

i anticipation of the rapid changes in Army ordnance troops

and the subsequent disposition, Third Army published the first daily

station list on 28.July. This station list included the ordnance

attachments to be xade to the 6th Armored Division.

On the afternoon of 28. July the 3398th Quartermaster Truck

.Company and the 3916th Quatermaster Truck Gas Company, both of which

had been attached to the division by VIII Corps order, joined the

trains,

The 76th Medical Battalion, organic' to the division, had

ordered Companies A and B in direct support of Combat Commands A and

B, respectively. The battalion; minus the attachments, was to remain

with the trains for the operation of the division clearing station

and the necessary medical supply.,

On 29 July the division commander directed the trains to be

prepared~ to move on order from their present location. In anticipa-

tion of this move, the 3398th Quartermaster Truck Company was sent to a Class III supply dump in the beach area, to load 90,000 gallons of gasoline, which was in five-gallon cans. This fuel was to constitute a reserve portion of the division mobile Class III supply. The balance of the fuel reserve Witas to be carried in the gasoline tankers of the

3916th Quartermaster Gsoline Company. The 3803d Quartermaster Truck.

Company, a previous attachment, had not joined the division at this time. This First Army unit, which had been dispatched from ENGILAND to FRANCE early in July for operational training and thus make then better qualified to support any unit to which they might be attached, was enroute to join.

The warning order to prepare the trains for movement was issued by the division Go4 late in the afternoon of 29 Julyi

At 300550 July the division trains were rolling and the first serial of the 6th Armored Division trains were crossing the initial point, two and one-half miles south of FIERVIJLL,, FRANCE

The organization and composition of the division trains as they Were committed in their first move to support the 6th Armored

Division was as shown:

)I" r 766

Hqi._.O" 76 128 [§iD]H l~L _ i M'GH3____L ____f~-

EliDElem 566 990 Tdwy Br 338 I y ~ 33. 3916 Trk -: Trk Gas After a move of 21 mil~es~, the division trains were ordered- into assembly inthe 'vicinity of' LE BINGiARD, FRANCE.

Enroute to the assembly areas, the division trains had encountered 'exce ssive traffic snarls and .the narrow roads added to the confusion. Civiioan end mzilitary vehicles rwere travel n; in both directions, and thae debris of battle added to the traffic hazard. During the night of *29-30 Ju~ly the 990th Treadway Bridge Com- pany, minus the elements with the combat coaxglands, had dispatched to the organic 25th Engineer Battalion six Brockway trucks loaded with bridge equipment for the operation. The empty trucks, on return to the. division trains, were immediately dispatched to the beach area engineer dump for 'resupply. It is interesting to note that the 990th Treadway Bridge Comte pany, on initial attach~ment to the division, was minus the * 50 caliber, machine gun ring mounts. These mounts, which were mounited above t}e assistant driver, on the 'open cab type tru~cks, were for antiaircraft protection. The shortage of these items was to be felt considerably in later operations.

Oclosing in the assembly area at 1~BIN~GAD, the immediate problem of personnel evacuation conf ronted the division G-4. In addl. tion to the evacuation of the dead and wounded,, trucks were needed. fob the evacuation of 179 German prisoners of wa~r, The Pv s had to be tran-sported from LE BINGAIRD to the VIII Corps enclosure at ST. JORES. Ivedical evacuation of wounded was through the division clearing station to the 53d Field. Hospital, which was in support of the division. The

48th Rpplaceinent Battalion, a VIII Corps unit, was designated to replace personnel casualties.

In the assembly area each unit was issued 1/50,000 maps of

the division front, south of GRANVILU. These were issued in limited

quantity, some units receiving one copy of an area, and as many as

800 of another area--this was later to prove a considerable handicap

to the artillery units. Requests for additional maps to the Third

Army Topographical Engineer Map Depot were not able to be fulfilled,

for the Third Army had none in stock and First Army stocks had, not

been fully allocated.

In the final preparations, previous to becoming operational,

the G-4 of Third Army had issued the supply and evacuation general

plan. In addition to designating the individual and unit reserves,

the evacuation plan) 'medical support, and graves registration attach-

ments were assigned, locations and anticipated locations of supply installations were further designated in this order.

While in the, assembly area efforts were being made to satisfy

a tremendous logistical demand. In their first combat role they faced

the problem of fulfilling the requirements of the reinforced division,

which now stood at sorne 600 to 700 tons of supplies each night. Most

of this supply tonnage was devoted to gasoline and lubricants,,

On the morning of O July the trains moved from the IE BIG.ARD

assembly area to the new area in the vicinity of ANNOVIL.E, a distance

of 21 miles.

The new area presented a unique problem, for upon arrival the

trains found 180 dead horses in the immediate vicinity. The stench

from these. dead anirhals was most unpleasant and the civilian populace requested assistance from the division in the disposal of the carcasses.

The division civil affairs officer presented, the problem to the G-4 and soon the work of disposal was under way. The 990th Treadway Dridge

Company unloaded -their cranes and bulldozers, and with French civilian assistance, buried the animals.

While in the area a new problem presented itself--that of water purification. The purification equipment, which had been thought adequate, proved unsatisfactory. Two water points had been initially planned for the division, It was found, necessary, however, to attach one water supply unit to each combat command and one to reserve command to meet their' demands. Attaching the fourth unit to the trains solyed the problem of adequate water supply.

In the late afternoon of 30 July the Division Field Order No.

4~ was issued. This new order directed the trains to move on the division axis to $REHAL, then to an assembly area one-half mile east of

ST. AUBIN DES PR EAUX.

On receiving the order the trains began their movement, and traveled a distance of 28 miles, closing in an assembly area four miles northwest of AVRA iCI-S, at IZ IESNIL, at 2255 on this day. Here, VIII

Corps Administrative Order No. 13, dated 30 July 1L14, was received by the division G-4. This report confirmed verbal orders and instructions which had been issued during the past 24 hours by the VIII Corps staff.-

Operations during the day; in. conjunction with the 79th Infantry

Division, resulted, in the capture of 4000 prisoners of war.9 The

,problem of the evacuation of those Pis's was given, the 6th Armored Divi- sion. Aildivisional vehicles were either loaded to capacity or enroute hauling items for resupply., Coord~iating with VIII Corps, the evacuation problem wras met by dispatch.Th; truc~ks tQ the PW enclosure and evacuating the enemy personnel during. the night.

The announcement that the Third, Army had become operaional was made in the AV I.CHLS assembly area, on 1 August. This served to boost morale and the thought that on completion of the penetration at AVRA.T~CF S the, divisiton was on its was to BREST gave new spirit to all personnel,

It~cannot be overemphasized that flexibility must be the key note .of the G-: arid the services. Their problems are ever changing and continuou The' successful ,solving of the many problemns incident to the initial phase of the first .combat operation deserves commendation.

NoQv, with battle experience the 6th Armored Division could be assured of more than adequate logistical support for" any tactical operation it .might undertak~e.

In order to round out this phase, it is, well to examine the personnel problems of the divisioni. Section IV

G-1 Activities

The testing of the personnel organization is of particular interest because no "light' t arnred division had been combat tested prior to "COBRA." One. of the principal departures of this type organization from that of the battle tried "heavy" division was the absence of the regimental headquarters.,

The G-L section started combat operations on 27 July. Absence of detailed information upon which to judge the effectiveness of the personnel plans made the initial combat period difficult and trying for the 0-Al, Lieutenant Colonel J.o. Moncrief, Jr.

faly, minor problems were experienced in adapting the internal

anagement of the Con nand post to combat conditions. The xrmovement of the headuarters from LE ISNIL to locations near AU PEIJEY, BRHAL, and AVNANC-S 4, along the axis of advance required very close supervision. ] ach location presented a slightly different problem and the procedure in the early stages wvas not sufficiently flexible for automatic execution of transferring activities to the new CP,

The tacti.cal and logistical strength of the division was expanded by the attachment of additional units. On 28 July the 3398th

Quartermaster Tuck Company, 3396th Gas T'ansportation 'Company, and

Battery C, 965th Field Artillery Battalion, were attached. The

3$93d Quartermaster Truck Company was added the following day. Two battalions of field artillory, the 83d Armored Field Artillery Battalion and the 174th Field Artiltery Battalion, were attached 31 July. 10 The division's first casualties were suffered when a light tank of Company F, 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Suadron (I chanized), was destroyed ,by enemy artillery on 29 July. This action resulted in the deaths of Sergeant Paul Pisko, Irain, 'Ohio, and Private First

Class John Pickney, Naqshville, Tennessee; the wounding of Technician

5th Grade John Dudley, , hiteville, North Carolina; and the necessity for listing as -inissing in actionti Private John Gironetti of New Yprk

City,.

Battle losses were reasonably light ard did not materially

affect the combat efficiency of the unit. Total casualties for the period 27 July-.-l August were 28 killed, 37 wounded, and 13 mis sing.

No replaceients were received during July. The lack of replacements is riot surprising, considering the heavy losses of the First Army in the ST. Lo area at this time, and the resulting high priority of the

divisions in that area

For the two-day period, 28-29 July, the casualties of the divi-

sion were nine killed and ten woiunded. The 76th edical Battalion

handled 46 casualties on the sanie two days. In comparing these statis-

tics, it is clear that the organic medical battalion handled a mini 4um

of 35 casualties other than: those of its otin units. It is probable

that these casualties were from other divisions in the vicinity. The

practice of evacuating casualties to the nearest medical station, re.

gardless of unit, is believed desirable in the interest of more rapid

care for the wounded and a resulting reduction in fatalities.

The training of the nedical personnel, had been very thorough

and their combat- mission was therefore performed in excellent manner.. Discipline, the habit of intelligent obedience, when built with diligent training on the rock of, ;understanding, will withstand the tempest of battle. The discipline of this organization was the product of sound training and good leadership. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is no record of straggling, absence without

leave, misbeiavior before the enemy, or other of the disciplinary problems which frequently occur in initial 'coibat. But the storm had not yet reached its full fury.

Discipline is always very closely related to efficiency and morale. In this instance these qualities were interwoven to an un--

usual degree. The original high morale, light casualties, and apparent initial success contributed to a state of individual and group self-

satisfaction which was intoxicating. Troops generally were "Sager

Beaverst? at this stage of the game.

An important factor in the miaintenance of morale is mail

service. Men who have recently left their families are especially

dependent upon mail from home. The' .Adjutant Generalt s postal section

processed 14.5 pouches of letters and. 384 bags of parcels for the

period 27-31 July. This uninterrupted mail service providedvital

support.

Graves registration was a major problem. Rapid y moving multiple columns (made it extremely difficult for the battalion graves

registration officers to know of, and locate, the dead. Graves regis-

tration personnol from Armly failed to report as expected. As a result

of these conditions, the well-laid plans for accounting and evacuation

of the dead wore found difficult to exccute, even in these first says. As early as 1 August it wqs found necessary to assign an additional

soldier to assist the graves registration officer. The solution to this problem was solved by constant effort of all concerned.

A total of 833 prisoners of war were captured during the period

of this chapter. Of this number, 339 and 447 were taken on 30 and

31 July, respectively. 1 2 The large number of prisoners proved a test

of the plans for their care and: evacuation. Lack of transportation

and congested traffic problems made rapid evaucation of prisoners

impracticable. It was found necessary to establish temporary en-

closures during periods of peak loads. Since the prisoners of war

were not held longer than one day before evacuation, it is not believed

that the .temporary enclosures created any unusual administrative

problems.

The civil affairs detachment was made of four officers and six

enlisted men. One officer and one enlisted man operated with each

combat' command; the other officer and three enlisted men remained

*either with division headquarters or the division trains. Initial

contacts with civilians in each town taken was made by the division

civil affairs personnel and information was passed on to the detach-

maents which, subsequently, took over these towns.

Qombat leadership, though inexperienced in the business of

war, proved excellent. Leaders at -all levels realized the full in.-

portance of the problems at hand, and knowing what was expected, made

heroic efforts to accomplish their missions.

Mistakes were made and this, must be considered normal. No

preparation, however complete, can hope to foresee all contingencies. Corrective action must be practiced aggressively,, coupled with attention to all phases, of the xmissioni.

As resistance. crumbled, the division muoved smoothly into the exploitation phase., Now is the time to strike deep., A further m~ission

is needed to give purpose to this opportunity.

N077S FOR CH1 PTR IV 1 AGO Licrofilm'Job #59, Reel #50, After Action Reports, VIII Corps.

Field Order No. 1,6th Armored Division, 27 July 1944, p. 1.

After Action Report, Third US Army, Vol 1I, 'art 3, p. XLI. .Colonel Albert E. Hlarris, 00, 86th Cavalry Reconinaissanice squadron (ec z), Pesonal Satr view, 5 January 1949.

Milton Shulman, Defeat in the West, p. 16. 6 Ibid pp, 142, 143.

7,Major P1 C. 3hoemaker, Divsion Trains. Unt Journal., (Seaville, France: July 1944), p. 1 General Dwight D., Pisenhower, Crusade in 3]urope, (New York: Doubleday, Inc., July 1948), p. 296, Op i., AG30 MITczofilni. 10 After Action Report, 6th Armored Division. SAfter Action Report,. 86th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mecz),p. . 32G0.l Journal, 6th Armnored Division. CHAPTE&R V

EXPLOITATION

Section I

The Dash, to 8n.ST

General George S3.Patton 1 s Third United States Army becarnme operaional at 4idnight 31 July 1.944. Four hours later a .simple, concise ,order wras received in the 6th Armored Division coy tand post, from VIII Corps, wh-ich was now under Third- Army. The order merely said; "Do not stop at PON\TAUB TULT bridijehead. Push west up the center line of the peninsula. in two or more colursns, by-.pass determined res .stance, capture BEST.' 2. The order, although ectremeJy simple in content, was to send the 6th Armored Division across FPUAC. to BSIT 'on a lone mission, cut off from~ all supporting troops for dayis at a time,. It can be coni- sie red a classic e,,rap2. of a separate division in exploitation, The VIII Cqrps 4.ssion was to capture the, BRIT AM4Y 'Peninsula. The 6th Armored Division was to take J3ZjST with~ all, possible speed.

The 4th Armored Division was ordered to P1Ag43 and V NMTS to cut off the peninsula. The armrored divisions were to be closely supported by infantry divsisi:ons; the 79th Infantry Division was to follow behind. the 6th Armored Division, Later orders directed the $3d Infantry

Division to support the division in this operation, but on 4 August the division corn~ander received word. that no infantry would be ir}

,support of, his d-ivision in the attack on BD.Z$T. -Two roads were selected by corps for thL division, to follow, merely, a$ guides. See Appendix V, G-3 map, for routes taen by the div} sion. The orders directed the division to by-pass the major ce nters of resistance in order to reach the objective with al3. possible speed.

The mission given the 6th Arxored, Division was one of gigantic proportions, but one that, if carried out promptly and boldly, could do much to shorten the supply lines, once the Allied forces started their advance to the east to capture the industrial centers and strong points of GC iNY.

The .area across the peninsula did not favor the attacker. It was a countrwr of hedgerows, som:e of ther six feet high, which proved to be very effective barriers. Good observation was difficult to find,, and. the rivers, for the most part, were unfordable because of the s- ift currents and steep banks. Despite thi's, the Super Sixth raced the length of the peninsula in seven days, using mostly secondary roads and by-passing resistance whenever possible.

The reserve co ixmiand was in thea process of relieving the 4th

Armored Division. at the FO TAUAULT bridgehead, wfhen General Patton' visited the division command post shortly after sunrise, General Grow asked the Army comimander if he had any specific orders; he answered that there was only one: ttC=apture EBEST." The bott leneck road at

AVRANCHES would not permit the division commander to send one of his combat commands through the reserve cornumiand until that unit had cleared the toywn. For this reason he directed the conunander of the reserve com maiid to continue -the advance to the southwest as the leading unit of the division,, to secure a bri dgeh d at PQ1TORON . Once;the bridgehead was established, the combat comands would. advance toward. EST in two coimmls, Co: bat Connaxrd B taking tne x'cute to the north and

Combat Commuand A to follow the southern route. The reserve comrpand would follow the combioat congnand r.aking the greatest advance.

General Grow stressed the fact that speed was the essential factor in the dash to BRST. The reserve cormnand comander, well aware of the time eleimeht involved in securing the bridgehead at PONT0RSON, regrouped his forces and immediately moved out on this new mission.

The leading team of the reserve command consisted of an infantry co dpany) a tank company, and a battery of field artillery. Although this leading team received consisderable small arms and sniper fire along the route,, it was able to reach it objective by 1100. When the main body reached B EE,, just short of the objective, the enemy opened up with

88ts, mortars, bazookas, and heavy smal-arms fire. The Germans had a well camouflaged defensive position and had played an age old military trick on the reserve commaand by allowing the leading units to pass but hitting the main body with all available fire. The enemy destroyed three field artillery guns before they could go into firi.ng position.

The 15th Tank Battalion quickly went into position and opened fire on the enemuly strongpoint. The infantry dismounted and deployed to the right and left of the road and then advanced forward to. eliminate the machine guns and bazooka positions. The 'ield artillery batteries quiciL y began firing, and with observation from a liaison plane, located and de'stroyjed mortar positions and three batteries of horse-drawn artillery. Although long range enemy fire destroyed several of the_ divisiont s vehic1 es,. the combat effectiveness was not seriously affected.

By 1230 all resistance was eliminated with the exception of oc asional

97 sniper fire. Tha infantz'y secused the: cros roads at EI.E The miain body continued pan to ?QNTC3ON to secure the bridgehead established there.

The first orga]nized enemy position on the advance to 13RST had. been encountered and. by the use of combined teads of tanks,infantry, and field artillery, was quickly eliminated. Speed and aggressive action in deployig the fighting teams prevented the enemy from carrying out a series of delaying, actions which rxdght have cost the advancing unit a considerable amount of ti e and untold casualties. While thie reserve corguand was in the midst of its battle at BR.E, the other elements of the division were moving from their assemlbly area north of AVh . WC1 and slowly wending - heir way through this bottleneck.

The road through AVRANCG{& was now cluttered with burning enerry tanks anid vehicles, which made the diva sion .s. advance still xniore difficult. Combat Command A swn g south; and crossed-the COU ,$NON !iver at AN . Afl

SUFI CQU ESNON, which was, due south of theo reserve coimi:and bridgehead at

EOiNTO ,SON., QouTat Cor.w.and B closed into its bivouac area east of PONTQESQN under cover of the reserve com.a d, prepared to pass throutgh that unit the next day. The advr.nce on BPEST began inearnest on the second of August.

The obstacles at AVRAhC 5 had been cleared by all the fighting units the preceding day and the division was able to advance 'in two columns,

Troops of thre 86th Cavalry econnai ssance Squadron,, after a short delay

due to at traffic tie up, were In the lead of oth colui:ens. There were no friendly vehicles and, e juipment from other units to prevent the -divi-

sion f rom. using all. its speed anid fire power to overcome any enemy resistance it might encouanter' along, the way.

Co bat Comrmad A and Comnbat Cor iand 1 gmoved out at daylight,

Comkbat Cot±im and . A taking the southern route and Cozmbat Oomma1i-r.-d B pas sing through the reserve" corxiud and' contining on the northern route. The reserve couaand was nude up of elements s filar to those of the combat commsands and was directed to f o Jw the northern route after Combat

Commend B passed through it. Divisiqn trains, consistin~g of the organic services of the division, plus three quar termiaster truck companies and the 990th Treadway Bridge Com:pany, was charged with its normad. misin of supplying the division with fuel and aiuntion and any other su.pplies that. m:ighit be needed in 'this operation.

Combat Cok and B was the first to hit organ Qzedenemy resistance on this date. When the advance guard reached LA VALIY, east of DINAN, it ran into strong enemy resistance. An outpost wa overcomes, but artillery, mortar, bazooka, machine gun, antitan;k, and small-armas fir e continued and substantiated the belief that this was the enemy outpost line of resistance for DXINAU, a city reported to be strongly held.

One of the prisoners captured had a docum;ent which -revealed a plan, for the defense of the city. Ttelligence reports indicated the main high". way bri.dge into DINAN was heavily nined, ierm t nkas ore. also known to be in the area

Me diumr tanks were placed in direct Lire positions, battalion support weapons were brought forward, and addi.tionial inf°antry companies were ade avsrailab .e for it mediate use. Everything was in read1iness

.for the attack on L~AN ZY. General Grow had anticipated that DINAN might be strongly defended, so during the night of 1-2 .August he. and h sts Gin 3 c sa s e ect he a t ua n ita ts h ro uald e br e u n ea b t le tto h 'pas o s st t hfe r c mit Cy rcbw ith t oCu t ms adjue r io u s delays. WUhen word was received at the division core grid post that Qombat

Coa nzd had hit a strong enemny ou~tpost east of DINh ,- the G.-3 wvas sent forward to have the cormmand by-pass the resistance and to proceed to

BUh'ST by way of E3:CH!5I1IT. Since part of his cormmand was already cor- maitted, the Comwbat Command 13 corm=nger decided it wiould be too much of a risk to. disengage his force immiediately, the attack on I d: ALAY was coritiniued. This oh ectivQ was trk.en without difficulty and the combat coi:mmand prepared to move to LCTF82IL after a heavy artillery concentration was pleaed on DIN iN to deceive thle enemy. As t-e co's ;iarid started its Love to B CFR".~L some friendly planes, not in support of the division, app,:;red amA of f ered to fly any

mssions the Gom.bat cosy;ander wranted flown.. The planes were requested to strafe DIN i' and th en fly tcticl, re conn issance to the southwest to report any t~roops wrhich r. z, ht interfere with the impending movemhent.

Both missions tore quickly carried out. Combcat Corgi and 1 continued on its way to EL12Ih Y, covered:d r c~ rd. Twvo enem1y tanks mioved up on the ',eft flank of the colu in and opened fire. The tanhks wrere attacked by fr.iend'ly air and by an 117 , wihch took one under direct fire and destroyed it. The other tank wi.thdrew without inflicting any damage. The combiat commiand successively disen gfagd itself fron the hard fighting at D:.NA T and went into a bivouac area for the night in the vicinity of B T- L Combat Cormrand A traveled the entire day without incident. It passed through (M2I and bivoua cked in the vicini te of QUJLDTiLLG.~

100 Tide iwVo CO i'ioL p:oved than' an az':.or ed columln is flexible by going to the aid of the Navy on this date. A platoon of tanks and one of engineers wore se~it to IDOL wrher^e, after a brief skirmish, they r'escued some 50 sailors -and a few .news correspondents who. were headed for ST. l,. ,, not knowing that this town was still held by the eheny.

The reserve comiuand was switched to the southern route to follow Con-- bat Cormiand A twhen, it beca. re apparent that Combat Commiand B wro uld be delayed at DXNAN.

The 6th ,Armored Division had coxpleted another day of hard Lighting and was successfully carrying out its mission to move to MBIST wi\thout delay.

A t mitdnic;hit 2-3 August the comb.iat corx-,ande ra had gathered in the division com-,and post to receive the orders for the next day's action. One of -therm fell asleep while the division co mmander was issuing his order. General, Grow decided his whole division mutst be tired and ordered the combat coms>~ilds to spend the 'morning of 3 Augus t working on rmaintenance and in giving the troops some much needed rest.

Another reason for issuing the ol~der vsas to allow the 86th Cavalry

Reconnaissance $qjuadroni, ,ic c i zed., to get out in front of the colum7Ins and cover the division zone. Since the division was alone on this

mission it asFolt that a brod fa.s recoia naissanoo wa~s necessary to detect strong pockets of resistance and obstacles,. as well as to determine the best routes. As a result of this corder, th--e comba.t con-_I hands did not starft out on their mJission until noon.' Coat Coma r.L< n d A mias sed the route at GAJLJ and traveled ,southwest instead of a-rectly West,. As a: result of -this wrong turn, they

101: met ~~ ~ 'zc~ ~A~&.Tecfx~ ~org ize ~ c onandero,.i~ decided to defeat the enermy here rather than be harassed by them. It was esti- matedI that theo tQwn was held by approximately 250 enemy, well du~g in. The 44th Axiored, Infantry Battalion nacie a coordinated attack, supported by the 212th Arm~orod io ld .Artillery By ttalidn, aned was able to oveorc om;e all enemy resistance_ before dlark, The omrmand bivouacked here for the night.

While the division com ander was watching the fighting at

1AU G0N C a liai.Sonl officer from VIII Corps handed his a piece of paper with a penciled order in General i.:ddleton t s handwriting. This piece of paper ordered Genet a. Grow to stop all r ovema4,nt to the west acr4 to divert sufficient troops to capture DL q,1A the city that Com-.bat Command

B was ordered to by-pass the- precedi'ng day. Ger eral Grow tried to reach the corps coommavnder by radio to get this order revoked. Uowever, it was imrposible to reach corps headq'aarters that night,

Since almzost all oi the troops of the division had passed the city , it was necessary to make a retrograde miovement. To carry out this task with the minirmun inibel of troops, General Grow ordered the cozawoander of Co mxbat Cozmmaid A to leave his inf~iantry anid tanks in pilace, to tarwo his artililery b .t~aion and the treeps of the reserve command, which were at this time to the north and east of Combat Comimand A1is present locat'Lon,. and to make an attack on DflTA,4 from the southwest on the following- day.

When the order to take DIVAN w .s received by the division co m mandcer, Comibat Comnmand 13 was well in advance of the other division troops. It was not until thr'ee. hot rs later that word reached' the

102 commander ofP Co :mbat Co mm.and Bto pull into an assembly area and await further orders. The command had reached a point about eight iles east of~ LDUDE C b r this ime,

g arly on 4 August, Combat Commnad -~started out to capture

Df The task organization for this isision was as follows,

AQ)6

9 l529 212 8

D25 A +T A 60rij ! 9 6o3

,t oon the temporary Comb'at Commanid A had reached BROONS, where it wac halted on division order,. The Army coimmander had visited

the division command post that mnorning, arid upon hearing that Combat

Command A was sent back to take a town, immtediately ordered the division commander not to take DiIHN, out to, proceed to E3 24T. Sinultane-- ously, orders were recei.ved. from VIII Corps cancelling the attack on

DlhAN. No reason was ever given why the division w.as ordered to attack DINAN after by-passing it, or why the attack wa s called. off before it began.

It took the remainder ,off the afternoon to reorganize the com-

mands in their or'iinal form°ation 6 A-s a result of this delay, the

cozmmands were ord ;red to travel throughout the night, As it turned out,

.10: the order to take DINS iv after it ha.d been by--passed by the division

caused the Super Sixth to be delayed a 'ull. 24 hours on its arrival

at EI-,ST.

The two leading combat commands advan ced throughout the night without encountering any serious delays except for blocwn bridges -along

bott routes. Now that the Allies were making such rapid progress into

enermy geld territory, the French Forces of the Interior carne out into

the open to freely offer their assistance to the divisional troops.

During the night march the FF served as guides through the towns and

harassed the departure of the Qermans from these same towns. It was

from the FF1 that the division learned that CAI.H LIY- was strongly held

and that the bridges in thle vicinity were blown, For these reasons,

the division co ramander ordered the columns to by-pass CAHJIAIX. Two

days later the Ger1mans left the city and fled to BiiST to strengthen

the enemy defenses there,

Combat Coymmnd A by-passed COAE?.HSX to the south and west and

continued on towdfard GOULGQAT,the next city where enemy resistance was

known' to be strong. As the reconnaissance troop in the lead of Coribat

Comand A reaqhed the outskirts of HUFIG0'AST they had a brief skirmish

but quickly passed through the torn. Upon turning west it encountered

an enery position including a battery of artillery. Subsequent to the

movement of the reconnaissance troop through the town, and prior to

the arrival of C omat Coriand f ss advance, guard, a large German force

roved into HUELGO1T fron the adjoining woods, Ihfantry, artillery, and tamcs of the advance guard' cl9arrd the town of all enemy- resis-

tance. The min body passed through and the oorr and spent the night

104 at KLRAU%.

Re serve commnand, iunknown to Combat Command A,. resumed it s advance from the vicinity of GOUEJiC. In an effort to join the rear of

Conllat Conmland A, it m:arch north .of Cr£ORAI2X toward }-IULLXGOAT via

POULAOUJ1EN. At POU:LLAOEN the advance guard Qontacted and rapidly overcame a small enemy force, after which the colum1n continued its advance. The route from POULLAQEN to IIL&LGOAT is a defile. As the column approached HIJELQOA.T WOODS, small-arms and moftar fire was received from an enes y force estimated at 200. The road was heavily mined. Fire placed oti the' enemy position destroyfied a large ammnition dump. Infantry ele ments of the advance guard 'rere deployed and efforts were made to reduce the m:o.ne d area so tank elements could be emaployed. At this time the G-3 trans1 tted orders to the commander of the reserve command to establish a perimeter of defense pending an attackc on HUIILGOAT by Combat Coimmand A, which; was then coming up from the south. fe serve co na~d poulled back to hiigh ground near P0ULLAOEN, where it established its parim eter, of defense and remained there for the night.

Combat Qoy mand B by.-passed C RH IX to the east and north and marched to IL.CLOITIL. Just east of _that towon the commanid met and destroyed; a small enemy 'force, but in the fight lost several sm,-all vehicle:, Com:bat Command 13 rec ived heavy fire fromyt I CLOITRL, but since threyr could not overcome the resistance before nightfall, went into an assembly area in the mimediate vicinity and here spent the night, During the right t~he one.my withdrew from the town.

Tntel.ligence reports indicated that T.O tLAIX and LANDIVISIA(U

105 were strongly held, Based on this in. ormtation, the division commnder ordered both col.uns to move nor'th between these two cities arnd then turn west and approach bi JST from the north. In taing thi s route the -columins would enounter no serious river crossings andc wouad probably approach BRI ST against its weaikest defenses. Qombat Con iion A and

Co mbat Cori and B moved out early- on 6 August The route followed by Combat Command A was a devious orne over poor roads, and progress was extre~fel y slow. Combat Commxand B, on the outside flank,, made such better time becau~se of the better roads encountered. It was temporarily delayed by en y resistance south of ii0!Qj:AL anci at S1EV A. The reserve oomina d, wh;rich had been foll.owin g Comba Comomand A the previous day, now was ordered to f ollow Combat Commiand B,

The city of BREST was knoiA'i to be strongly held. The 6th Armored Division pl an contemplated an approach in three columns; Com-ibat Command

B on- the right, or west, flank, approaching south- from BOURG--ELANC; reserve command, to be. in thle center coming do a from ?WUVTIN; and CombatCmmand Aapproaching fromz the northeast thrioug-h ST. tHO and GUIPAVAS.

During thne entire day of 7 August the division .s efforts to arrive- at its attack positions were hampered' by bad roads, unfavorable terrain, and several encoun rs with the enemy', As a result of this, the commands did not arrive at the attac, positions at the sa ie tirme,

After taking E I'. V.VZ4, Comzbat Command, B had a clear road into BR ,ST except for a slkirmish at PLOUV Ir and another at B0U G* B ,A1NC Al- though Cobat Commaand B had a longer route and met oppositiona all the way, it was the first of the three commands to arrive in its attack

106' position. Reserve coI' ind arrived late inthe evening, and Comr.bat Corxuuazid A) de 4 -e treniely bad roads, wa~ rnot able to reach its ,attack position that day anid halted for- the nightb some distance. to the north of its assigned position. It was impossible, therefore, to strike BTST as early as had been. contefnplatec This was un- fortunate. As =was proved later, the defenses in the vicinity of

QUIPAVS were riot prepared to meet a strong attack on thia date. Since the commands of the d iyision did not arrive at the same time, the enemy was given. sufficient warning to prepare his defeinses to the nor tde st and to seiht his cantia"+ircraft guns for ground fire. These defenses continued to be str'engthened by reenforceiments arriving from the Croon Peninsula, so the task of taking BXMLT became more difI.'i-M cult each hour.

At this tine the division was feeling the first pinch for gasoline. The task of supplying the division had become trem.endous,

Division trains instal .ations were subject to sporadic attacks.

Personnel from the baned and the 990th Theadway Bridge Com:pany were required to guard supply~ dumps and repul~se the attacks on. the trains..

The trains received considerable attention from enemy aircraft.

F'ortunately, two batteries of antiaircraft artillery had been attached tLo division trains in case of air attacks. The division had mroved so far ahead of corps and army units that evacuation of wounded and prisoners beccam an ilnpossib ility, Woundecd were carried forwa; rd in rTbulanc e s

Astudy r E t he si}tuati.on wacs I ads during the night of 7-8 august and it- detormined.riw;as that a coordinated attack, c~4lr ioy ing the

107 entire poer o t ef C:eViiorn, would be nece'ssar",y to t .ke ErCEST and

that this attack would. have to be made, withotut delay or even more

forces would be reuired. Plans for a woordirated attack were pre-

pared, but since a certain amount of reconnaissanoc, reor anization,

occupation of attack positins, and supporting artillery positions

would be necessary on ,8 August, the attack was ordered for daylight

9 August.

In the meantie, early in the morning of 8 August, the divi-

sion G-2 and an interpreter entered BR2ST in a 1/4-ton truck under a

w hite flag to present the German coiiander with" a dened. for the sur-

render of the city, Unfortunately, the cojmmand of B EST had passed

to the coy;:anding general of a eran n paratroop division the preceding

day. He had managed to reach the city from the south just in' trime to

substantially reinforce the defenses' of B3ST. The German general was

polite, bput he refused to consider the surrender of the city.

The magnificent strides made by the 6th Armored Division

through the Brattany Peninsula proved that an armored unit uses its

mobility to close with and destroy the enemyW. Several tines the speed

of the division g evented the enemy from organizing costly delaying

positions. The team.s. of the division were quickly committed from

march fomiations to inflict heavy casualties on the retreating enemy.

The exposed :lanks of the columns were protected by the fast _movement of the combat- comands.

In the, dash to B3EST armor concentrated its power at the deci-

sive points of action. Te Super Sixth made generous use of marching

fire. As its columns approached crossroads, side roads, or mn-mde obstacles, thee poinrts were automatically taken uncier Live to neutralize the possibility of enemir resistance. Since s2peed was so essential in this issi~cn, any short cut to reduce enemy resistance was tried and, if successful, used again and again. Throughout this exploitation phase the enemy fought stuibbornly and well, wherever met. However, he was frequently _caught by surprise

and although he selected the best terrain to defend, the division did not choose ' to Light him on his ground, but preferred to by-pass those organized centers of resistance,

General Grow moved his reserve conmand behind the unit making the greatest advances. If one combat co m and was delayed, the reserve command was shlifted to another route. Speed was necessary and the division coi sander Fwept his combat comnands adAvancing by shifting his reserve coxma d to the faster moving *oute 0 The exploitation phase of the 6th Ar'mored Division did not brirng out any new principles, but it did prove the soundness of the armored force tactics.

The enemy situation has been briefly touched upon,. However, it is of sufficient importance to examine in detail.

109 Sectipn 11 Intelligece in the 2poitsLion

en~emy resistance in front of the .6th $:^nored Division can be evaluated as typea,, Little if any coordinated defenses stood in front

of' them~. Delaying actions by isolated groups comprised the most potent

threat.

As the 6th Armored Division turned west at PQOTAUBAULT one might consider the division entering the exploitation phase of of fen.-

sive action. The commanding general'is orders) pursuant to instructions' from LI eutenant Genera, Patton,. were

Tine is of the-essence.. i,4ght resistance aill be brushed aside,, taking wi ate-ve , losses are necessary -to get forward~ at top speed. Heavy resistance will-be: by.-passed; leaving if necessary reconnaissance or advance guard elemrents to contain it. A new reconnaissance force a-d advance guard rill be r^econ- stituted on the march when required and the or iginial. reconnaissance. force axnd advance guard fall in behind coljrn as rear~

ga*These orders were carried out' explicitly in almost every case in the race to aIT. The enemy capabilities at this tine (1 august) were as follows:

Capaboilitie s of the enemy a s estimated 1 August. (D / 56) were divided into those of BY ITrh and those opposing thae Third Army front.. In B l;2TAIj1Y it was estimated he could evacuate by land or delay to the west, defending the peninsula by utilizing favorabl e terrain for sporadic defense . He could delay in the northern, porti.on while evacuating. to the east by. land in the sotuthern portion.. Or he co uld wit hdraw into a~nd. defend the heavily fortified BRITTIY ports fr"o.± the landward side. On the Third; Aar front the enemy was considered capable of defending to the south while attempting to crganizs a major armnored counterattack against the Ar my rs "east .Llamk designed to dr'ive a wedge to the sea and sever the Armny1s north. south supply line, He was alsoconsidered capable of e ecuting piecemeal110~rtac-

I1Q against units o1 the Arm'r then operating in the vicinity of E N1v23 and DIAN., and to the north of the $B1UNE IFiver. The situation. was too fluid at the- time to accurately formulate close-in enemy capabilities.

Prior to- 1 .August the enemy, desperately pressed for infantry in TNOP.MANDY, siphoned out m~ost of the divisions in BRITTANY for pie ce, meal commtnrent against the expanding lodgment. As a result enemy troops estimated in BR.ITTM. on 1 August were only el.ements of the

26 5th, 266th, and 343d tnf antry Division s, naval units manning harbor and coast defenses, and ground anda air servie-units. The total ITTANY garrison was estimated, at less than ten battalions of infantry,, probably not exceed ing four battalions not in conrtact, and approximately- 60,000 naval and service troops.

As the division pushed on to the west the enemy continued its" disorgan-ized withdrawal precipated by the ..TRAI. FS brqa ,through. Ex.- cept in e. few local, areas and around the import.ant port cities, the enermy never succeeded in establishing a cohesive front line. These local areas were smal centers of resistance and were found in the tow~ns and villages where the German tro ops were bill.eted. in their occupation of FAnQ~G. the armored columns by-passed these towns and villages the Germans were ,hastily- evacuated and the strong defensive positions abandoned. These defenders, singly and in groups of regimental sizes tureked north, south, and west by foot, stolen car, and horse cart,, laden with stolen goods, to the port strongholds of BE~ST, CI i .'9 Si,. ;.DLO, CROZQN, and DiA0ULA S. The German trans.- portatioi was :imm'obile and prisoners of war stated- that the gasoline

supply was so low that its use was limited, to Itriger" tank-s and

officers inspecting troops. A nu ibe ' of enemy troops were also ob--

111 served without aams. After being .'hit by our armor the Germans would be scattered and disorganized, .Remnants would reassemble in groups of 10 to 20 and resistance consisted, primarily of delaying actions, in order to allow as many as possible an opportunity to withdraw into the coastal cities which afforded great defensive advantages. These remnants also hid out in the wouds and would prey upon single unarmored vehicles and :supply trains. There were frequent instances of messengers and liaison off+icers being ambushed in the woods.

The 6th Armored Division engaged these centers of resistance and fought on nq ground except at their own election. The enemy was engaged only when it was quioke to defeat himl that to by-pass.

The nmain strongholds encountered and the enemy situation in each are as follows:

1. R. The Germans attaked. the flank of the division ith approx.imately 1000 troops armed with bazookas and small arms, and supported by 88-nim artillery and.:mortar ire. This was a coordinated and surprise attack by the Germans and the di.visign was fo ced ;to Light..

Known enemy losses in this action were three batteries of horse-drayn artillery, one -irrmngun captured and two 88--mm guns destroyed.

2. ST. HALO. ST. -ALO was knowin to be an enemy fortification with approximately 20,000 enemy troops and uerous coastal batteries of heavy caliber capable of firing landward..: The defenses of ST. HxdUO extended over ten niles south and east of the city to the DOL road.

The DOL road was an excellent axis for the division,, however, to avoid engagement here the division selected a route -further to the south

It is interesting to note that it took a. large infantry force over a Lee to reduce ST. :t .t a later. date and. had the 6th rmored become involved here, -the-drive to BR ST would have ended,

3. D INAN. DINAN was on the original route selected by the division and held by an estimated enemy force of 40Q0, supported by artijlery, antitank guns,. Mortars, and a few tanks. The German defenses were dug in''behind an unfordable stream with steep high barnks and all bridges destroyed. The estimate that the city would be heavily defended w~s later substantiated by a document taken from a prisoner which revealed a rather formidable plan for defense of the city,' The division by-passed DIAN to the south and again being involved here would have deb ayed the march to B EST by days,

LQAU0NRTJ ,IONwas another strong point and was held by an esitated X00 troops. The 6th imored Division had intended to by- pass this town by turning west at GL; hoever, vron&i turnwas made and this town was attacked by accident It was. easier to carry the action through than to disengage.

5. CAR.IATs. Inforrmation from the FF1 indicated that OARHAIX' was held by a Gerian force of 2000 paratroopers and had set up strong defensive positions behind destroyed bridges on an unfordable str'ean with high banks. CA.HAT-. D? was bypassed and the Germans evacuated their strong defensive positions so as not to get cute off0

b. H{ULG0AT. An estimated enemnny force of 500 wiere contacted at HJLG0AT, including a .battery of artillery. The route from

FOULAEN to HUJLG0AT is a defile and as the division approached the.

HULG0 T W4OODS, s all-rms and mortar fire was received from the enemy. The rroad was heavily pined, but caused little delay, as elements

113 of. the division atv :ake tqhze twn 2ri anxzothcr1 ctoni_ and secux]:ed it after a brief skirmish. Remnants of the enemy forces withdrew into the. MQ Z.LKfl defenses, 7., JV 0 IA1L{. The defenses of 10iQ hA consisted of a German infanitry division. (266th Infantry Division) numbering approximately

3500 men. The 6th 'Armnored by-passed MQLA ,, which caused the German infantry division to abandon its str'ong position and commence its mox1vement to the BRFL8T area. On 9 Augu~st they were m1et and destroyed by the 6th Armored Division in a meeting engagement,. as will be related later. S. LC LOITRE. Just eat of 12 C ,I'h. a sma .1 skirmish took place with a small German force.. The enemy lost several machine guns,

15 killed and five ocaptured. On .reaching L~ QLOIT1,E proper, light artillery. fire and heavy fire from mortars and machine guns was received.

This resistance was reduced after a brief fight.

9. C' AT~cA JUF* CHAIIFA U1F was passed to the north 'as in- for natioxi was received, that it was held by approximately 1000 Germans holding, strong defenlsive positions.

10,. CATLULIN, This town was held by an estima.ted paratroop division, with numerous supporting armas, :of 6000 men defendingenigthe main route into BREZST from the south0, This parat roop division was avoided as the 6tch Armored Division headed north0 11. Cuter Def'enses' of BEST. Fnemy resistance became heavier as the 6th Ar ored Division neared DRBST~ Shelling became heavier and a determnined stand by the eneiny forces could be realized,

It must again be repeated that the 6th,- Armored Division. en-,

114 countered resistaffnce al-l along tshe route, but t11 abov e mecntioned places were considered enemy strong peints or prepared defensive positions, and becoming engaged would have stopped or slowed the division's race to B ST.

So thoroughly disorganized was the enemy (60,000 men) by the swift drive of the 6th Armored Division that thousands of enemy outside the port fotrtesses were wanders in a hostile land, whose only hope of salvation was surrender and this they did by the hundreds.

Within their fortresses the enemy remained, defending himself against the day of rescue (which never caie) promised by the German High Command.

A final attempt by the Germian forces to help the troops. cowed in the port fortresses was in the form of a couterattack to cut the lifeline of the 6th Armored Division. On 7 Agust, on the front of the VII Corps which was operating as the right flank corps of the

First United States Ar , a German armored counterattack was lawched, with the evident object of driving through to A i. CL 8 and cutting the supply routes of the Third Army. The German forces conSsted of the remnants of four panzer divisions, but in actual strength was probably eojival °- to about one reinforced division. The Germans captued 2ORT IN but here their ad vranoe was halted. The attack had been launched without air cover and Allied planes took a heavy toll of G, r~an armor. Further threeea s tc our lInes of comjLvincation never m.aterialized and L% TAfl was r~etaken. later :py thne eicans$,

Thus We find reiterated the fact that once armor gets into the backfield of enemlly defenses, speed is of the easscnce. Small delaying grouups cannot long hope to slow1, up a determined and aggressive

2.15 armored diviion Te eney,, ho ever, IS always capable. of creating havoc with supply lines and 'it is with interest that we see the

116 SectionII

The exploitation is per'haps the most demanding phase: of combat for, the G-4 and service elements of the armored division. The normal problems are intensified by extended distances, enemy action and the

ab~solu.te necessity of keeping the 'divisi~on mobile through timely

support.

On 1 August 194.4 mqany supply dumps and service installations were turned over' to Third Amy, including the United States Military

'Cemetery No. 1 at.BLOSSlVIlJE, the prisoner of war enclosure at ST.

JORE&S, and the VIII Corps ammunition supply points. These points had been increased i.n capacity by VIII Corps and now had a reserve of

6000 tons of ammunition, ;Another installation transferred at this time was the map depot at MONTSURVENT,, and difficulties were excperienced in transferri .g map stocks.3 'inally, a command directive was issued which e stab- .shed credits for the Third Aatet at the map depot. c nhinat;L.on of factors slowed down the shipment of. supplies from LG2LAN First of these was the, poor. condition of the port .facilities at CIERBCG. The second ;factor was the storms in late June that destroyed most of the artificial ports that had been erected at the beaches.

:Wos t of the supplies coming to the continent were, however,

:handled over the 'beaches. The condition of facilities at CHE1BORG made it necessary to rapidly expand the beach maintenance area. In doing

this the original beach raaintenance area ww.s takon over, by the advance

.217 section, cornuication zones which arrived 1Agst 9440

The concentration of 1,500,000 gallons .d$ gasoline and the same number of operational type rations, in the vicirpity of tA AYE 1EUITS arid NEHOU, constituted the total reserve of thy.Third Army. The type

"tB1tration previously issued was discontinued ind operational rations were the only rations now supplied to the troops.

For the issue of these supplies of gasqine and rations, the

Third Army supply plan required that daily telegrams of requirements

be submitted 48 hours in advance of issue. Another requirement was that

each unit submit a Daily Tank Status Report. .s report showed the

following: tanks operational or operational within- six hours; combat

vehicles that were disabled but repairable by the division within six

hours; and disabled vehicles that had to be evacuated to a higher

echelon for repa

The Army commander would not permit the replacement of disabled

vehicles which had beer} evacuated to a higher echelon while the divi-

sion was operating in the BREST Peninsula.. This was done in order to

conserre the tracks of the medium tanks, the supply of which was

criti r ~The division was notified by Third A rmy that they would re-,

ceive no track-laying vehicles except light tanks until they had started

east from BREST and had passed a line running north and south through

Another serious problem that faced the -Army commander was medical

support for the units as they fanned out in then peninsula. Evacuation

and hospitalization had to be provided. Ambulance companies were at-

tached to divisions to handle the evacuation. Units having ambulance co mpanies from iFirst Armiy found. them~ replaced by a zbulance companies of Third Army, thus the 566th Ambulance Company was relieved from ate. tachnent to the 6th Ag ed Division and the 595th Amnbulanc e Company took its p:lace. Hospitalization was taken care otf when the 64th Medi.- oaI Group was assigned to VIII COrps. A .member of this group, the 54th

Fel Hospital, moved southffrom ST. SAUVEUR LEVICQM'IB with the _miss ion of close support.

The division trains commander was; busy regrouping serials and organizing personnel in the trains area, four miles northwest of AVHANCHES. The attachxments of the 990th Tfread raj Bridge Company that had been with the combat commands now rejoined their company,, which was a part of the division trains Mvany prisoners of war were being brought: to the division en~- closure, whi ;h wa&s located in the trains area. The largest group received dux ng an,-r one day was ten truck loads the 9th Infantry had oaptured. .a all, the trucks in, the trains were either loaded or else already on their way to procure supplies, a field expedient had to be, ins.~~k~ The uniit trucks, loaded with prisoners, were. sent back to 1;} VIlI cJorps collecting point and after "unloading the prisoners they -. \-ld continue to the rear anal procure supplies at the Army dumps.

This system avoided unnecessary shifting of supplies from one truck to an~other and also kept the division reserve suppl.y .intact, It was anticipated that supplies would become critical during this period of operations.

AVRANCHESX, four miles south of the trains area) .was .rapidly becoming a traffic bottleneck. The road through this. town was the only

119. north-south road hold by the Allies, and the Germhans were counter- attacking with all their strength to cut it. This would have cut off the combat units from their supplies, if the Germans had succeeded.

Enemy air was out in strength over AVRANCHES and vicinity during the day, making three bombing ard strafing raids on the trains area, causing minor damage and a few casualties.

Third Army assigned the division a priority on the road through

AVRAWHES and the military police platoon from the division trains were put into action, They were stationed both in the, town and on the road leading into and out of the town, to facilitate the guidance and rapid movement of the division trains during the night of 1-2 August 1944.

The division trains, left the assembly area 012255 August 1914.4 and moved approximately 13 miles to a new assembly area in the vicinity of PFEtE . The last unit closed in the new area 020350 August 1944, but the move was not without incident. Even though the column moved during the roars of darkness, it was bombed and strafed while passing through

AVRANCHES and while crossing the LE SUIU1E River, six miles south of the towvn. This enemy action caused some serials to stop and disperse but after a short delay the colun moved on again,

The trains commander inspected the damage done by the airraids as soon as all units had closed in the new area. Several men had been killed, but the vehicles were only slightly damaged. It was at this time that the men from the 990th Treadway Bridge Company stated they desired ring mounts on their trucks.

It was this move that caused the field trains of the 174th

Field Artillery Battalion to become lost from the division trains.

120 They had been up witl their battalion when the move was made and were unable to find the new location of the trains. laa4y ,i c drl;i x, they oame upon an. ambu. of the 595th AbulanOce Company anui we e ien directions to the new area

Whlen organizing the as embl area it was common procedure to set up the ammunition control point in the truck park of the division trains area. This became the central dispatch point for all classes of supply. Personnel of this DSCP no-rmally maintained liaison with the

Army supply installations This liaison work provided the DSCP with information pertaining to the type, quantity, and availability of ammunition for the division. Initially the unit combat trains arriving at the DSCP for resupply were dispatched on to the supply points of the

However, it now took the trucks more than 24,hours to make the round trip and it was felt that unit trucks should not be away from their Lmits for that length of time during thip critical period. Re-. supply, then, had to be issued to units from the division reserve which was carried on the trucks of the attached quartermaster truck companies

As soon as these trucks were empty, a convoy was formed and sent back to Army for supplies to replenish the division reserve.

The division trains remained in the assembly. area near PRECY on 2 August 1944. They were strafed several times by- the Germans, causing some 'casualties and minor damage to a few vehicles. Late in the day the trains commander received Division Field Order No. 6.

This order directed the trains to be prepared to move on orders, and to follow Combat Command A which was moving on an axis generally along

121 route 'IC" designaed by VIII Corps.*

Oni th n ng of 3August the division trains moved. unmolested by German air attacks to an assembly area in the vicinity of MEDREAC, approxiatey 44 -niiles from P CY&

:It would 'bae well. to pause here for a moment and see how the cours f operations was taking shape and how the supporting supply plan of Arm', Was begining to urnfold.- 'Teoperational plan wras- going so wet~. that: the supply plan,,for support o~f it was really going to ~have to, ~ve. rap4idy~ to keep up. The Az'ir G'" began the movement of su p te~ south of the.l SE~LUE River lto support the °operations of VIII Corps to the we t. At the da.me time further displacement fore nd of the Armi Iumpsv was considered and coordinated byr VIII Corps; Army

Spply Point No.; 5 was =opened at BR and it cntained. 3000 tons of ammin ntion a

In spite .of this rpa ,d movement of the Army supply ,points, the division's conti;nued rdance caused the supply vehiles of the 6th .Armored Division to, .oe thr ough enemy-infested country. $nipers and ,road; blocks were: te~ ule rat er than the- exception. he persnnaL 'of V1 e 4ivision trains .captured several prisoners on 31August" 1944, and upon; iziterz'ogation they- revealed. some interesting staatements c xrnina the e emyt s statua of suppl. It was stated the Germans in the peninsul.a were particularly short of gasoli ne and that the usc of it,' h4d been restricted to heavy- tames and inspecting officers.

A tragic note was, injected here:wh en 0haplain Schwer and his driver;, who were attached to the dvision: trains, wnt forward to visit the combat elements and did not return.- Later they were found dead

22 in their vehicle in the vicinity of ILTJCOAT,

Early in the morning, 4 August 1944, a gas 4duip that had been established near CARHAIX was fired on by enemy snipers. Personnel of the 777h AAA units, who were on guard, took seve a1 prisoners, but the irzing coat nved. At approximately 0100 the trains commander tried to contact the division forward echelon to get help, but they were out of communication range. By using available supply personnel with equipment procured from the ordnance battalion, outposts and patrols were set up around the perimeter of the area. This proved satisfactory and little sniper fire was evident during the remainder of the time the trains were i this area.

The division trains left MEDREAC 041700 August 1944 and moved approximately 51 miles to the vicinity of 10YAL POdTIVY. The last seria.. closed in the new area 042330 August 1944. Sporadic bursts of enemy fire were experienced throughout the entire march. Even in the new area the trains were still subjected to sniper fire. The division

G-4 returned to the division trains area and reported that small enemy groups had been constantly harassing the units trains also, These eneryy groups had become separated from their units as a result of the steamroller tactics of the combat elements of the division. The FF1 now began rendering valuable assistance as they were being stationed along the supply route4

This main supply route of the division was rapidly getting so long that division trains was finding it difficult to get enough gasoline up to .the front. General Grow took a personal interest, in this situation, as\ shown in the following extract of his personal accoun.t-

In my conversation with General Patton at noon on 4 August he asked me where I wanted Ary to dump gas tomorrow (5 August). I said: tpONTIVY and pointed it out on the map, about 25 miles ahead of our present leading elements. He gasped (as near as General Patton can gasp), then laughed and said: "It '11 be there." It was. (Thi,, of course, was followed up by thedivision G4.)

Ir a ediately thereafter the division trains moved forward. The situation along the route became such that a new route had to be pre.. scribed. They hd not gone far on the new route before a blown bridge loomed in front of them and the trains were ordered into a temporary assembly area util the bridge could be replaced. Many prisoners were taken by the trains persornel while in this area and in one instance

38 German soldiers were captured whil riding in a civilian bus.

Finally the bridge was completed and the trains moved on through the r ght, arriving at an assembly area near I;ESQU N, 060320 August, after traveling approximately 51 mles.

It had now become necessary for the combat elements to collect friendly dead and leave them at the City Hals of the villages as they passed through. It was the responsibility of the division trains to evacuate these bodies to cemeteries for burial.

:Due to the rpaid advance and consequent stretching of the supply line, the ambulances found difficulty in performing their missions. In many instances the ambulances of the 76th Medical Battalion became rolling hospitals as they moved forward with casualties. When the-ar bulances of the 595th Ambulance Corap'any returned from a trip to the rear they would load the casualties that had been moving forward and race to the rear with them Their only guard was the red cross symbol

124 painted on the si de of the asblances.

n 6 August 1944 it was again necessary for the division G 4 to request-, help from VIII Corps to get gasoline up to the division.

He requested $0,000 gallons, and it was delivered the following day.

In, addition to this help provided by corps, it was still necessary for the division trucks to race back and forth, hauling gasoline. If the unit trains were not on hand to receive it, a dump was established so, the empty trucks could return for more gasoline. These dumps required guards, and under Warrant Officer Thompson, the division band became

supply dump guards.

This constant driving, both day and night, took its toll in

drivers. They were not only half-dead from lack of sleep but they had no maps and were constantly in danger of being ambushed by the Germans.

The division.-G-4 persistantly urged VIII Corps to lend him men to act

as assistant drivers, but none were. forthcoming.

Third Army Administrative Order No. 5 -was received 6 August,

and listed the latest locations of Army service and supply installations.

Attention was also directed to location of traffic control points and

traffic regulations. The order also specified the establishment of

uniform signs. They were to be of metal, a certain size, and painted black with white lettering.

Evacuation of prisoners of war was getting to be an acute

problem. because of their volume. They also had to be carried forward

and in many instances this was done in their own transport, which had

been captured with them,,, The FF1 assisted the military police in

guarding these prisoners at the division collecting point in the divi-

125 sion trains area. Combat elements brought the prisoners back to the trains area in empty supply vehicles sometimes, but frequently they were marched on Loot.

It can be seen by looking at a map of the BRITTANY Peninsula that there were numerous ports on the northern coast that could have shortened the supply lines considerably if they could have been used,

The Germans must have had the same idea because these ports were either defended to the bitter end or the facilities were destroyed to such an extent that they were useless to the Allies.

Division Field Order No. 7, dated 6 August 1944, attached the following units to the division trains for its protection:

Company D, 15th Tank Battalion.

Company C, 9th Armored Infantry Battalion

One platoon of Company C, 603d Tank Destroyer Battalion.

Ini providing this protection, the division commander directed that the trains commander be responsible for the protection of the elements of the trains going to the rear as well as those elements going forward.

The division trains remained in the assembly area at I.ESQUERN during the days 6-7 August 1944, On 7 August several hundred prisoners were taken by the combat troops now guarding the trains.

The lifeblood cf the 6th was petroleum, oil, and lubricants.

The division was able to move and exercise its basic capabilities only because an outstanding supporting job was, done with the supplies available.

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