nr 4 oktober/december 2018 The people’s war in by Ilmari Käihkö titel: Volunteer Battalions: Story of a Heroic Deed of Battalions That Saved Ukraine författare: Kateryna Hladka, Veronika Myronova, Oleg Pokalchuk, Vasilisa Trofymovych and Artem Shevchenko förlag: Folio, , 2017 following the maidan revolution in Febru­ Volunteer battalions offers an attempt at ary 2014, Ukraine was in disarray. With an official history of the forces which, as hollowed out security forces geared more the subtitle of the book makes clear, saved towards internal than external threats, the Ukraine against all odds in 2014. These barely established interim government looked ”patriotic” volunteers served an important powerlessly as was occupied by the so- role in the war that escalated during the called little green men, or un­marked Russian spring to encompass increasing violence and soldiers. Following a fast and questionable Russian assistance. In August, the forces referendum, the peninsula was rapidly an­ of the Ukrainian Anti-Terrorist Operation nexed by . This inspired a similar (ATO) were defeated in a counter-offensive ”Russian spring” in , which of Russian regular units near , which claimed the lives of around 400 Ukrainian further threatened the sovereignty of Ukrai­ soldiers (p. 155). This forced the government nian territory. to sue for a unilateral ceasefire, and to sub­ The situation was dire. As the Interim mit to the first Minsk ceasefire agreement President admitted, in September. With almost immediate viola­ ”our country had neither the government tions, hostilities flared up in full in January system, nor the defence system back then” 2015. The defeat of government forces in (p. 30). Ukraine – Europe’s second largest led to the second Minsk agree­ country with a population of 45 million – ment in February. Subsequently, the war has had a combat-ready force of mere 5,000 increasingly become reminiscent of the First soldiers. As the instigator of the book un­ World War, with troops in fixed defensive der review, the Minister of Internal Affairs positions, covering from enemy artillery and noted, “the internal military sniper fire. To date the war has resulted in troops and police were demoralized. There over 10,000 deaths, and forced over two were only a couple of units actually capable million to leave their homes. of resisting the separatists. Something inno­ The book under review contains ten chap­ vative and efficient had to be done” (pp3 -4). ters, which focus on different theatres of the

180 litteratur war until the events of Ilovaisk. Chronological expected in an official history, which does chapters on Maidan self-defence, Crimean not attempt to critically discuss the root annexation and discussion of separatism in causes of the war. The celebratory tone is the southeast offer some necessary context. also clear in the focus of the book: it only Compiled in the style that became popular discusses the volunteer formations under after glasnost as previously suppressed stories Avakov’s ministry, thus excluding those under became publishable, every chapter contains the Ministry of Defence (MoD). a number of interviews of an eclectic cast Despite these issues, the work is a remark­ of characters, ranging from a journalist to able addition to the almost non-existing Avakov to other top security and political English literature on the volunteers. Especially elites. It is usually these voices of participants, the early pages of Volunteer battalions con­ rather than the pithy comments from the au­ tain previously unknown details about the thors, which carry on the story. Translated dynamics that led to the mobilization of from an almost twice as long Ukrainian these units. As a whole, the story of the book edition published a year earlier that covered paints an interesting and troubling image of events up until Debaltseve, this work would modern war in Europe, which is the focus of have benefited from better editing and struc­ the rest of this review, after a short descrip­ ture. Occasionally translations are clumsy, tion of the volunteer battalions themselves. with numerous but generally harmless typos. Witnessing a state-in-breaking, thousands The choice of chapters from the original of ”patriots” took upon themselves the main­ version is also odd. For instance, one would taining of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In assume that international audiences would this manner, the volunteers highlight the be interested about foreign fighters in the relationship and tension between the state, ATO, a topic of one whole chapter in the nations and war. A developed idea of na­ original work. tionalism not only existed without much The main problem with the book is that state interference, but also mobilized those the reader is provided little information re­ willing to fight for state borders. That this garding the interviews. For instance, the lack was done despite the state that often rather of indication when these were made raises hindered than helped needs to be emphasized. questions about the accuracy of accounts: For instance, numerous volunteers were un­ Were they recorded immediately after the able or unwilling to enlist through the army events, or three years later? The absence enlistment offices. Even after the revolution, of any kind of discussion regarding the se­ the state clearly lacked legitimacy in the lection of interviewees in turn supports the eyes of the more critical volunteers, many notion that the work is an official account of whom had fought against internal secu­ that celebrates the role Avakov played in rity forces during the protests. the formation of these units. I acquired my Outdated formal, often Soviet-era practic­ own copy of the original Ukrainian version es and laws stopped others from enlisting. from a disgruntled volunteer who received One of the many volunteers turned down by it in an official ceremony from the minister draft board noted that “draft doctors are the himself. Wanting nothing to do with him or best businessmen.” They could make money his book, the volunteer donated it to me. As from both those who want to join, as well these kinds of critical voices have not made as those who do not. Combined with state their way to the volume, it comes with a weakness, many of those who wanted to fight clear bias. Then again, this is perhaps to be for Ukraine had hence no other option than

181 nr 4 oktober/december 2018 to join the battalions. While volunteers were After all, Ukraine witnessed mobilization of plenty, it was more difficult to find the means peoples on opposing sides who held contrast­ to fight the separatists. With the state unable ing political ideas, respectively supported by to provide arms before the battalions were the government and . In this legalized and integrated into the Ministry situation characterized by weak political of Internal Affairs (MoIA) special police will and lacking state capacity, the volun­ battalions and MoD territorial defence bat­ teers were motivated, enjoyed legitimacy talions, the volunteers largely relied on civil that far surpassed the discredit state security society support from individuals in Ukraine services and mostly politically reliable. This and abroad. It is not an exaggeration to say highlights an important aspect of the war that a nation joined together to fight for evident in all ideas of people’s war, namely Ukraine. Some did this with arms, others its inherently political nature. This politici­ with financial, material and moral support. zation contributed even to the fragmentation As even Volunteer battalions suggest early of state authority. The various chapters in on, there is little reason to romanticize the Volunteer battalions clearly illustrate how volunteers, some of whom were accused of local law officials in the east were considered crimes committed during the war. Neither neutral at best or fifth columnists at worst. was the phenomenon unique, as the clos­ Not unlike in recent counterinsurgency est comparable case comes from the armed literature, even in Ukraine the subversive groups formed during the Yugoslav Wars in ideology of separatism was considered a 1990s and early 2000s, not to speak of par­ disease that would spread among the gener­ amilitary forces before and partisans during ally apolitical population if left unchecked. the Second World War or militias in many In Kharkiv ”pro-Ukrainian activists would contemporary conflicts outside Europe. The not allow anyone to walk along the streets… fact that this mobilization took place in con­ with Russian tricolor flags, or to hold ’ral­ temporary Europe in a war that defies many lies’ supporting the enemy” (p. 73). Further assumptions of what war is supposed to be east unarmed people supporting separatists only makes the case more relevant for study. acted as human shields for armed separatists, Occasionally described as a ”hybrid war” and for instance helped to stop and disarm in the book, the separatism in eastern Ukraine Ukrainian security forces sent to uphold or­ was clearly something that arose in the shad­ der. Facing a recap of Crimean ”little green ow of state weakness. In the aftermath of men” in the east, the volunteer battalions the Crimean annexation, the government became the antidote, or ”little black men”. was largely considered powerless to react The escalating violence later cowed civilians against the separatist claims that surfaced into passivity, but even to taking to arms; not only in and , but even they may not have been interested in war, in Kharkiv – Ukraine’s second-largest city – but the war was interested in them. and . Escalation of violence by both The political nature of the war is also sides resulted in not only a war among the crucial to understanding questions related people (a concept promoted by Sir Rupert to strategy and creation, control and use of Smith a decade ago), but equally if not more force by the Ukrainian forces. Considering importantly a war between people. the relatively limited casualties incurred, While people’s war is typically connected much of the fighting these units conducted to leftist rebels, there is no better way to was clearly small-scale. For instance, the describe the first phase of war in Ukraine. -1 battalion was nearly 900 strong in

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Ilovaisk, where it lost 17 killed. During the talions in the first place). Yet on the other entire war, the battalion losses amounted to hand, the government had criminalized the 30 dead and 1 missing (p. 154). Rather, the separatists as terrorists: ”if faced with armed units organized as special police battalions resistance of Russian saboteurs, we had to often carried ”sweep-and-clear” and ”coun­ liquidate the threat as negotiations with the ter sabotage” operations. This meant that terrorists were impossible and unacceptable” they were maintaining order and looking (p. 65). This effectively meant that violence for separatists, including specific individuals, remained the only available means in a war in liberated areas. According to the head of that because of its internationalized and po­ the Security Service of Ukraine, 2,500 ”ter­ litical nature could hardly be won through rorists and separatists” were ”seized and arrested” (p. 13). Most were exchanged violence alone. This became apparent after for people held by the separatists (who ad­ the government lost its gamble with the sum­ mitted to applying Soviet laws to execute mer offensive, which as noted was countered looters, raising the question what they did by Russian regular troops. Following defeat, with those with opposing political loyalties). the government never recovered initiative. While all Western military forces are well The subsequent events, including the second versed with the Clausewitzian notion of major defeat in Debaltseve, are not covered war as a continuation of politics with other in this English language edition. means, one would do well to consider the Yet in many ways, it is a miracle that Ukrainian example of what this can amount Ukraine survived in the first place, a feat that to in practice. the work under review clearly attributes to The volunteers acted as a critical stopgap the volunteer battalions. A similar kind of measure that bought time for the Ukrainian will to defend portrayed by these to ”set the wheels of the rusty mech­ men and women underlies all conscript sys­ anism of the Ukraine’s Armed Forces… in tems, including the newly reinstated one in motion” (p. 8). Yet while the early months of the war were characterized by chaos, Sweden. The Ukrainian example illustrates decision-makers faced pressure because how these forces were crucial in early days of ”everything had to and was done within the the war and in the execution of some tasks. law… the world was watching us, and we Yet there were few that believed that they had to prove that Ukraine wasn’t Somalia could replace a professional, well-equipped [sic]” (p. 18). Reminding of the importance of force – which, as noted, did not exist in early political context in all war, the new Ukrainian 2014. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian volunteer government had to maintain its international battalions say much about contemporary image against the constant barrage of Russian warfare in a not-too-distant area and from propaganda. This necessitated bringing the the perspective of national defence against volunteers into a legal framework by inte­ the most likely foe. We would do well to grating them to the official force structure. learn from these lessons paid in blood. This Yet as an account by Avakov proves, the official history is an excellent place to start. government was caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, it had to pre­ vent any unnecessary escalation of violence The author is an assistant professor at the that could be exploited by Russia (which Department of Security, Strategy and Leader­ necessitated controlling the volunteer bat­ ship, Swedish Defence University.

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