FLOWPRINT: Semi-Supervised Mobile-App Fingerprinting on Encrypted Network Traffic
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FLOWPRINT: Semi-Supervised Mobile-App Fingerprinting on Encrypted Network Traffic Thijs van Ede1, Riccardo Bortolameotti2, Andrea Continella3, Jingjing Ren4, Daniel J. Dubois4, Martina Lindorfer5, David Choffnes4, Maarten van Steen1, and Andreas Peter1 1University of Twente, 2Bitdefender, 3UC Santa Barbara, 4Northeastern University, 5TU Wien ft.s.vanede, m.r.vansteen, [email protected], [email protected], facontinella, [email protected], frenjj, d.dubois, [email protected] Abstract—Mobile-application fingerprinting of network traffic However, recognizing mobile apps can be a double-edged is valuable for many security solutions as it provides insights into sword: On the one hand, network flow analysis provides a non- the apps active on a network. Unfortunately, existing techniques intrusive central view of apps on the network without requiring require prior knowledge of apps to be able to recognize them. host access. On the other hand, app detection can be used for However, mobile environments are constantly evolving, i.e., apps censoring and invades users’ privacy. As we show in this work, are regularly installed, updated, and uninstalled. Therefore, it is active apps on a network can not only be reliably fingerprinted infeasible for existing fingerprinting approaches to cover all apps that may appear on a network. Moreover, most mobile traffic is for security purposes, but also in an adversarial setting, despite encrypted, shows similarities with other apps, e.g., due to common traffic encryption. Thus, privacy-conscious users need to be libraries or the use of content delivery networks, and depends on aware of the amount of information that encrypted traffic is still user input, further complicating the fingerprinting process. revealing about their app usage, and should consider additional safeguards, such as VPNs, in certain settings. As a solution, we propose FLOWPRINT, a semi-supervised approach for fingerprinting mobile apps from (encrypted) net- The idea of network-based app detection has already been work traffic. We automatically find temporal correlations among destination-related features of network traffic and use these extensively explored in both industry and academia [2, 4, 5, correlations to generate app fingerprints. Our approach is able 17, 25]. Snort for example offers AppID [21], a system for to fingerprint previously unseen apps, something that existing creating network intrusion detection rules for specified apps, techniques fail to achieve. We evaluate our approach for both while Andromaly [57] attempts to detect unknown software Android and iOS in the setting of app recognition, where we through anomaly detection by comparing its network behavior achieve an accuracy of 89.2%, significantly outperforming state- to that of known apps. Other approaches specifically focus of-the-art solutions. In addition, we show that our approach can on detecting apps containing known vulnerabilities [62], and detect previously unseen apps with a precision of 93.5%, detecting others identify devices across networks based on the list of 72.3% of apps within the first five minutes of communication. apps installed on a device [61]. All these approaches have in common that they require prior knowledge of apps before I. INTRODUCTION being able to distinguish them. However, new apps are easily Security solutions aim at preventing potentially harmful or installed, updated and uninstalled, with almost 2.5 million vulnerable applications from damaging the IT infrastructure or apps to choose from in the Google Play Store alone [60], leaking confidential information. In large enterprise networks, not to mention a number of alternative markets. Furthermore, this is traditionally achieved by installing monitoring agents recent work has shown that even the set of pre-installed apps that protect each individual device [67]. However, for mobile on Android varies greatly per device [30]. Thus, especially devices security operators do not have direct control over the when companies adopt BYOD policies, it is infeasible to know apps installed on each device in their infrastructure, especially in advance which apps will appear on the network. As a when new devices enter networks under bring-your-own-device consequence, unknown apps are either misclassified or bundled (BYOD) policies on a regular basis and with the ease by into a big class of unknown apps. In a real-world setting, a which apps are installed, updated, and uninstalled. In order security operator would need to inspect the unknown traffic to still retain detection capabilities for apps that are active in and decide which app it belongs to, limiting the applicability the network, operators rely on observing the network traffic of existing approaches in practice. of mobile devices. This naturally introduces the challenge of detecting apps in encrypted network traffic, which represents Unlike existing solutions, we assume no prior knowledge the majority of mobile traffic—80% of all Android apps, and about the apps running in the network. We aim at generating 90% of apps targeting Android 9 or higher, adopt Transport fingerprints that act as markers, and that can be used to both Layer Security (TLS) [31]. recognize known apps and automatically detect and isolate previously unseen apps. From this, a security operator can update whitelists, blacklists or conduct targeted investigations on per-app groupings of network traffic. Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium 2020 23-26 February 2020, San Diego, CA, USA ISBN 1-891562-61-4 There are several challenges that make such fingerprinting https://dx.doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2020.24412 non-trivial. This is because mobile network traffic is particu- www.ndss-symposium.org larly homogeneous, highly dynamic, and constantly evolving: Homogeneous. Mobile network traffic is homogeneous be- example, having knowledge about the Google Maps app, cause many apps share common libraries for authentication, allows us to rename unknown_app_X to google_maps. advertisements or analytics [11]. In addition, the vast majority Similarly, unseen app detection requires a training phase on a of traffic uses the same application-level protocol HTTP in set of known apps to identify unknown ones. various forms (HTTP(S)/QUIC) [50]. Furthermore, part of the content is often served through content delivery networks In summary, we make the following contributions: (CDNs) or hosted by cloud providers. Consequently, different • We introduce an approach for semi-supervised fin- apps share many network traffic characteristics. Our work gerprinting by combining destination-based clustering, tackles homogeneous traffic by leveraging the difference in browser isolation and pattern recognition. network destinations that apps communicate with. We show that despite the large overlap in destinations, our approach is • We implement this approach in our prototype FLOW- still able to extract unique patterns in the network traffic. PRINT, the first real-time system for constructing mobile app fingerprints capable of dealing with unseen Dynamic. Mobile network traffic is often dynamic as data that apps, without requiring prior knowledge. apps generate may depend on the behavior of the users, e.g., • We show that, for both Android and iOS apps, our their navigation through an app. Such dynamism may already approach detects known apps with an accuracy of be observed in synthetic datasets that randomly browse through 89.2%, significantly outperforming the state-of-the-art an app’s functionality. Various fingerprinting approaches rely supervised app recognition system AppScanner [62]. on repetitive behavior in network traffic [1, 28]. Despite good Moreover, our approach is able to deal with app results of these methods in smart-home environments and updates and is capable of detecting previously unseen industrial control systems, dynamic traffic could complicate apps with a precision of 93.5%. fingerprinting of mobile apps. Hence, our work aims to create fingerprints that are robust against user interactions by leverag- In the spirit of open science, we make both our prototype and ing information about network destinations on which the user datasets available at https://github.com/Thijsvanede/FlowPrint. has limited influence. We show that our approach achieves similar results on both automated and user-generated datasets. II. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS Evolving. Mobile network traffic is constantly evolving as app To study mobile network traffic and identify strong indica- markets offer effortless installation, update, and uninstallation tors that can be used to recognize mobile apps, we performed of a vast array of apps. Studies have shown that apps are a preliminary analysis on a small dataset. As indicated in regularly updated with new versions, as frequently as once a the introduction, our fingerprinting method should be able to month on average [11, 22]. This is a challenge for existing fin- distinguish mobile apps despite their homogeneous, dynamic gerprinting mechanisms that require prior knowledge of an app and evolving behavior. Hence, in our preliminary analysis we in order to generate fingerprints. When new or updated apps explored features that may be used to fingerprint apps. are introduced into the network, these fingerprinting systems become less accurate, similarly to what Vastel et al. observed in the setting of browser fingerprinting [65]. Moreover, the frac- A. Dataset tion of apps covered by these systems dramatically decreases In order to perform our analyses, we use datasets of