l;kfxL jflif{s

jif{ $$ c° $%

k|sfzs ;}lgs hg;Dks{ lgb]{zgfno hËL c•f, sf7df8f}+ @)^* /fi6klt« ejg, zLtnlgjf; sf7df8f}+, g]kfn .

8f= /fdj/0f ofbj /fi6«klt

z'esfdgf ;Gb]z

æ;]gf lbj; @)^*Æ sf] cj;/df æl;kfxL jflif{s klqsfÆsf] $% cf}+ cª\s k|sfzg x'g nfu]sfdf v'zL JoQm ub{5' .

/fi6 « / /fli6otfsf« ] ;/If0f+ Pjd \ ;Dj4g{ tyf dn' ssf' ] ljsf; / lxtsf nflu cxf/fq] lqmofzLn gkfnL] ;gfsf] ] pQ/fQ/] kult| / ;dl4sf[ ] nflu xflbs{ zesfdgf' JoQm ub5{ ' . ;fy,} cfÎgf ] :yfkgfsf] p2Zo] / /fi6n« ] ;Dk' sf] ] lhDdjf/L] cg?k' gkfnL] ;gfn] ] ljutdf u/sf] ] alnbfg tyf ofubfg] ;fjef{ d} gkfnsf] ] Oltxf;df pNnvgLo] kIfsf ?kdf /xg ] / gkfnL] ;gfaf6] kblz| t{ cgkd' /fi6elQm« / k/fqmd ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL hgtfsf] nflu k|]/0ffsf] ;|f]t alg/xg]5 eGg] dnfO{ ljZjf; nfu]sf] 5 .

;d[4 / ;d'Ggt /fi6« lgdf{0fsf nflu k|fs[lts ;Dkbfsf] ;+/If0f, ljkb\ Joj:yfkg tyf p4f/sfodf{ ctngLo' ofubfg] k¥ofp' b“ } cfPsf,] ;o+ Qm' /fi6 « ;3sf+ ] sfofb{ z] cg?k' ljZj zflGt :yfkgf h:tf] kljq sfo{df ljut cfwf ztfAbL cl3b]lv cljl5Gg ?kdf v6L cfPsf] g]kfnL ;]gf k]zfut bIftfsf] b[li6sf]0fn] cGt/f{li6«o :t/d} pTs[i6 /x]sf] s'/f xfdLn] dfq geO{ ljZj ;d'bfo ;d]tn] JoQm ub}{ cfPsf] 5 . xfnsf lbgx?df g]kfnL ;]gfsf tflnd k|lti7fgx?df ljb]zL ;}lgsx?sf] ;xeflutf ;d]t a9\b} hfg'n] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] uf}/j cem} a9\b} uPsf] d}n] dx;'; u/]sf] 5' .

cGtdf, æ;]gf lbj; @)^*Æ sf] cj;/df /fi6«sf] nflu k|f0ff]T;u{ ug]{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;Dk"0f{ jL/ ;k"tx?k|lt efjk"0f{ >4f~hnL ck{0f ub}{ ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL ;}lgs kl/jf/ Pj+ ;]jflgj[Q ;}lgs kl/jf/df ;'v zflGt / k|ultsf] sfdgf JoQm ub}{ o; ;]gf lbj;sf] cj;/df k|sflzt x'g] æl;kfxL jflif{s klqsf @)^*Æ sf] $% cf}+ cÍn] jf}l4s / Jofj;flos ;fy{stf l;4 ug{ ;sf];\ egL xflb{s z'e]R5f JoQm ub{5' . ldlt @)^* df3 @% ut] a'waf/ . sf7df8f}+, g]kfn .

k|wfgdGqL

z'esfdgf

/fli6«o ;'/Iff, ;fj{ef}d cv08tf / :jflwtgfsf nflu ;a} lqmofzLn tyf jL/tfk"0f{ Pjd\ uf}/jzfnL Oltxf; af]s]sf] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] æ;]gf lbj; @)^*Æ sf] cj;/df ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL ;]gf kl/jf/x?nfO{ xflb{s z'esfdgf lbg rfxG5' .

g]kfnsf] PsLs/0fsf] cleofgb]lv xfn;Dd d'n'ssf] ;'/Iffsf] nflu g]kfnL ;]gfn] b]vfPsf] axfb'/L, ;fx; / alnbfgsf] d xflb{s ;/fxgf ub}{ d'n'ssf] /Iffy{ cfÎgf] hLjg alnbfg lbg] jL/ of]4fk|lt xflb{s >4f~hnL JoQm ug{ rfxG5' .

g]kfnL ;]gfn] /fli6«o ;'/Iffsf cltl/Qm ljsf; lgdf{0f, k|fs[lts ;Dkbfsf] ;+/If0f / d'n'ssf clt ;+j]bgzLn ;+/rgfsf] ;'/Iffy{ k'¥ofPsf] of]ubfg k|z+;gLo /lxcfPsf] 5 . oL sfdsf cltl/Qm ljut kfr“ bzsblv] zflGt ;gfdfkm] t{ ljZjzflGt :yfkgf sfodf{ gkfnL] ;gfn] ] k¥ofPsf[' ] ofubfgsf] ] ;+o'Qm /fi6«;+3 / cGt/f{li6«o ;d'bfon] ;d]t d'Qms07n] k|z+;f u/]sf] 5 . o; sfo{n] g]kfnsf] cGt/f{li6«o k|lti7f;d]t a9fPsf] 5 .

æl;kfxLÆ jflif{s klqsf k|sfzgn] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] uf}/jk"0f{ Oltxf; tyf /fli6«o ;'/Iff / ljsf;df v]ln/x]sf] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsfaf/] ;j{;fwf/0fnfO{ ;xL hfgsf/L lbg ;kmn x'g]5 eGg] ck]Iff /fv]sf] 5' ;fy} æ;]gf lbj; @)^*Æ sf] o; cj;/df /fli6«o tyf cGt/f{li6«o :t/df g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;Dkfbg u/sf] oL ;a } sfdsf ] pRr kz| ;f+ ub {} cfufdL lbgdf tflsPsf] lhDdjf/L] cem kefjsf/L9Ën| ] ;Dkfbg ug{ ;kmntf ldnf];\ eGg] z'esfdgf lbg rfxG5' .

@^ df3, @)^* 8f= afa'/fd e§/fO{ sf7df8f}+, g]kfn .

pk–k|wfg, u[x / /IffdGqL

z'esfdgf

;]gf lbj;sf] kfjg cj;/df æl;kfxL jflif{s klqsf @)^*Æ sf] $% cf}+ cÍ k|sflzt x'g] ePsf]df v';L JoQm ub}{ xflb{s awfO{ tyf z'esfdgf k|s6 ub{5' . l;kfxL jflif{s klqsf k|sfzgn] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;+u7gfTds kIf / o;sf] ljljw e"ldsfx?nfO{ /fi6« / ;d:t /fi6«jf;Lsf] ;fk]Ifdf d'vl/t ug]{5 eGg] ljZjf; lnPsf] 5' .

ljzfn gkfn] lgdf0fsf{ ] Pltxfl;s] cleofgblv] g } gkfnL] ;gfn] ] /fli6o« Pstf, ;fjef{ ldstf,} efuf} lns] cv08tf, /fli6o« ;/Iffsf' ;fy } zflGt / ;dl4sf[ nflu pNnvgLo] eldsf" lgjfx{ ub {} cfPsf] 5 . To;}u/L ljsf; lgdf{0f, k|fs[lts ;|f]t, ;fwgsf] ;+/If0f / ;Da4{g cflbdf o;n] ;Dkfbg ub}{ cfPsf ] cu0fL| eldsf" ;Dk0f" { gkfnLsf] ] xbodf[ clj:d/0fLo ?kdf /xb“ } cfPsf ] 5 . /fli6o« :jfwLgtfsf] /Iff / hgtfsf ] ;jfdf] ;bf ;dlkt{ gkfnL] ;gfsf] ] æ;gf] lbj;Æ n ] :jtGq gkfn] /fi6s« } cEobonfO' { ;dt] kltlglwTj| ug {] s/fnfO' { xbo[ ud+ ub {} o; cj;/df gkfnL] ;gfsf] ] ctngLo' /fi6elQm,« alnbfg / lgi7fsf] d pRr k|z+;f ub{5' .

uf/jzfnL} Oltxf; afs] sf] ] gkfnL] ;gfn] ] ljutblv] jtdfg;Dd,{ lxdfnblv] t/fO;Dd{ / drLb] lv] dxfsfnL;Dd ;Dk0f" { gkfnLsf] ] ;femf ;Dkltsf ] ?kdf pbfx/0fLo 5lj lgdf0f{ u/sf] ] 5 . gkfnL] ;gfaf6] ;Dkflbt sfo{x?af6 ;]gfsf] dgf]an cem pRr agfpg g]kfn ;/sf/nfO{ ;d]t pT;fx / pTk|]/0ff ldn]sf] 5 .

cGtdf, æ;gf] lbj; @)^*Æ sf ] cj;/df ;Dk0f" { axfnjfnf ;lgs,} ltgsf kl/jf/ tyf cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs kl/jf/sf] ;'v zflGt, ;d[l4 tyf pQ/f]Q/ k|ultsf] sfdgf ub}{ æl;kfxL jflif{s klqsf @)^*Æ sf] $% cf}+ cÍsf] nflu ;kmntfsf] z'esfdgf JoQm ub{5' . wGojfb . ldlt @)^* df3 @$ ut] d+unjf/ ljho s'df/ uR5bf/ sf7df8f}+, g]kfn .

/Iff /fHodGqL

z'esfdgf

æ;]gf lbj; @)^*Æ sf] z'e–cj;;/df g]kfnL ;]gfk|lt xflb{s awfO{ tyf z'esfdgf JoQm ub5{ ' . o; } cj;/df gkfnL] ;gfsf] ] dv–kq' æl;kfxL jflifs{ klqsf @)^*Æ sf ] $% cf +} cÍ ksflzt| x'g nfu]sf]df z'e]R5f k|s6 ug{ rfxG5' .

uf}/jzfnL g]kfn /fi6«sf] lgdf{0f, cv08 /fli6«o ;Dk|e';Qfsf] /Iff / ;Dj4{g Pj+ g]kfnL hgtfsf ] ;/Iffdf' gkfnL] ;gfn] ] u/sf] ] ofubfg] / cfkmgf\ ] :yfkgfsfnblv] cfhkoGt{ /fli6o« cfjZostfsf] 38Ldf /fHosf] gLlt, lgb]{zgcg'?k u/]sf] alnbfg clj:d/0fLo 5 . ljz'4 c/fhg}lts, Joj;flos Pj+ ljlwsf] zf;gk|lt sl6a4 g]kfnL ;]gfaf6 ;Dkfbg ul/Psf sfo{x? Hofb} g} k|z+;fof]Uo 5g\ .

o; cj;/df ljleGg Pltxfl;s] sfnv08x?df gkfnL] ;gfn] ] ;Dkfbg u/sf] dxTjk0f" { sfox?{ / of]ubfg :jfwLg g]kfnL Oltxf;sf] cd"No ;DklQsf] ?kdf /xg] tYonfO{ cfTd;ft ub}{ jt{dfg /fli6o,« cGt/fli6{ o« kl/l:ylt / cfjZostfcg?k' o;n ] lgjfx{ ub {} cfPsf ] dxTjk0f" { eldsfk" lt| xflbs{ cfef/ k|s6 ub5{ ' .

cGtdf, st{Jokfngfsf] l;nl;nfdf k|f0ff]T;u{ ug]{ ;Dk"0f{ jL/ ;}lgsx?k|lt xflb{s >4f~hnL ck0f{ ub {} kgM' Psk6s gkfnL] ;gfsf] axfnjfn tyf etk" j" { ;lgsx?} / ltgsf kl/jf/ ;adf} xflbs{ z'e–sfdgf JoQm ub{5' . wGojfb .

ldlt @)^* df3 @$ ut] d+unjf/ /fdjrg ofbj z'esfdgf != æ;gf] lbj; @)^*Æ sf ] ;vb' cj;/df gkfnL] ;gfsf] ;snbhf,{ gkfnL] ;gfdf] sfo/t{ lghfdlt sd{rf/L Pj+ ltgsf kl/jf/sf] ;'v, zflGt, ;d[l4 tyf pQ/f]Q/ k|ultsf] nflu xflb{s d+undo z'e–sfdgf JoQm ub{5' . To:t} /fli6«o :jflwgtf tyf cv08tfsf] /Iff / g]kfnL hgtfsf] zflGt tyf cfwf/e"t xs lxtsf] ;+/IF0fsf bf}/fg Oltxf;sfnb]lv jt{dfg;Dd st{Jokfngfsf] l;nl;nfdf jL/ult k|fKt ug{' ePsf ;snbhf{sf] cfTdfsf] rL/ zflGtsf] sfdgfsf ;fy} 3fOt] eO{ pkrf/sf] qmddf /xsf] tyf cËeË eO { kg:yf' kgfsf{ ] qmddf /xsf] ;Dk0F" { 3fOt ] lj/fdLx¿sf ] zL3 | :jf:Yonfesf] sfdgf ub{5' . @= æ/ftf] / rGb| ;"o{ h·L lgzfg xfd|f]Æ eGg] cfbz{ jfSonfO{ cfTd;ft\ u/L nfdf] Pj+ uf}/jdo Oltxf; af]s]sf] g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfkm\gf] :yfkgfsfnb]lv g} /fli6«o :jtGqtf, ;fj{ef}d;Qf, ef}uf]lns cv08tf, /fli6«o Pstfsf] /Iff tyf ;+j4{g ub}{ ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL hgtfsf] cfwf/e"t lxtsf] /Iff ug]{ cfkmgf\ ] kd| v' bfloTj klt| ;bf ;dlkt{ /lxcfPsf ] 5 / eljiodf ;dt] ;w “} ;dlkt{ /lx/xg ] 5 . o:tf] clåtLo Oltxf; af]s]sf] ;+u7gn] cfufdL lbgx¿df klg ;bf em}“ /fi6« lxt, /fli6«o :jtGqtf tyf /fi6«jf;Lsf] sNof0fsf] nflu ;+:yfut¿kdf ;dlk{t /xg] s'/f ;a}nfO{ ljZj:t t'Nofpg rfxG5' . #= gkfnL] ;gfn] ] /fli6o« tyf cGt/fli6{ o« hutdf kz] u/sf] ] pRrtd cgzf;g,' jL/tf, stJolgi7f,{ kzfut] bIftf tyf OdfGbfl/tfaf6 gkfnL] ;gfsf] ] dfq geO { ;du | /fi6s« } cGt/fli6{ o« hutdf kz| ;f+ ePsf] 5 . xfn g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;+rflnt ljleGg tflndx¿df ;}lgs /0fgLlt, /0fsf}zn, snf, ;Lk cflb xfl;n ug { cdl/sf,] ef/t tyf rLg nufot ljleGg ljsl;t ldq/fi6x¿n« ] cf—cfkmgf\ ] lzIffyL{ clws[tx¿ ;xefuL u/fpg' g} g]kfnL ;]gfsf] pRrtd\ k]zfut bIftfsf] sb/ xf] . $= ljut b'O{ jif{b]lvsf] nuftf/ k|of; :j¿k k|fKt k]zfut bIftfnfO{ ;+:yfut ub}{ cfufdL lbgx¿df ;snbhf{nfO{ :t/o'Qm af;:yfg pknAw u/fpg tbf?stfsf;fy nfu]sf] ;a}nfO{ ljlbt} 5 / o; uxg sfo{nfO{ cfufdL lbgx¿df ;d]t k|efjsf/L ¿kdf lg/Gt/tf lbOg] 5 . %= cGTodf, ;]gf lbj;sf] pknIodf k|sfzg ul/“b} cfPsf] l;kfxL jflif{s klqsfÚ sf] o; $% cf}+ ;+:s/0f g]kfnL ;]gf tyf ljljw If]qsf] 1fg xfl;n ug{ dxTjk"0f{ k':tssf] ¿kdf :yflkt x'g ;sf];\ eGg] z'esfdgfsf ;fy} k|sfzgdf ;+nUg ;a}nfO{ xflb{s wGojfb lbg rfxG5' .

5q dfg l;+x u'?Ë hËL c•f dxf/yL ldlt @)^*.!!. ut] . k|wfg ;]gfklt

g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* ;DkfbsLo

;]gf lbj; @)^* sf] ;'vb cj;/df /fi6« tyf /fi6«jf;Lx?sf] ;]jfdf clj/n lqmofzLn g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;Dk"0f{ ;snbhf{x?df pQ/f]Q/ k|ultsf] sfdgf ub}{ /fli6«o ;'/Iff sfo{df cem pRr lgi7f / ;]jfefjsf ;fy Joj;flos ;}lgs eO{ ;dlk{t x'g] ;+sNk ub{5f}F . uf}/jdo nfdf] Oltxf; af]s]sf] g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfkm\gf] :yfkgfsfnb]lv g} /fli6«o :jtGqtf, ;fj{ef}d;Qf, ef}uf]lns cv08tf, /fli6«o Pstfsf] ;+/If0f tyf ;Da4{gnufot k|lt/Iff h:tf ;jf{]kl/ /fli6«o lxtnfO{ ;b}j cIf'00f /fVg'sf] ;fy;fy} ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL hgtfsf] cfwf/e"t lxtx?sf] /Iff ug{] cfkm\gf] k|d'v bfloTjk|lt ;bf ;dlk{t /xL cfPsf] 5 / eljiodf ;d]t ;dlk{t /xL /xg]5 . ljZj dfglrqdf g]kfnnfO{ Pstfj4 Pj+ ;fj{ef}d /fi6«sf] ?kdf :yflkt u/fpg] ;Dk"0f{ jL/ k"j{hx?k|lt g]kfnL ;]gf uj{sf;fy xflb{s >4f / ;Ddfg k|s6 ub{5 . jL/ ;k"tx?sf] c6n /fi6« elQm cufw dft[e"ld k|]d / /fli6«o :jfledfgsf] af6f]nfO{ cfTd;ft ub{} g]kfnL ;]gf cfkm\gf] st{Jodf cljrn /xFb} cfPsf] Joxf]/f ljlbt} 5 . o;}qmddf g]kfnL e"uf]nsf] lxdfnb]lv t/fO{;Dd clg k"j{ d]rLb]lv klZrd dxfsfnL;Dd t}gfy /xL g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfkm"nfO{ ;'Dk]sf] lhDd]jf/L jkmfbf/Lk"j{s lgjf{x ub{} cfO/x]sf] 5 . jt{dfg cj:yfdf g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;+ljwfg k|bQ /fli6«o ;'/Iff;DaGwL lhDd]jf/Lnufot cfGtl/ s ;'/Iff sfo{ jftfj/0f tyf jGohGt' ;+/If0f / k|j4{gsf] ;fy} ;+o'Qm /fi6«;+3sf] cfXjfgdf zflGt :yfkgfy{ sfo{df ;xeflutf Pj+ /fli6«o dxTjsf] ljsf; lgdf{0f sfo{, dfgj ;[lht jf k|fs[lts k|sf]k Joj:yfkg tyf g]kfn ;/sf/n] ljlwjt ?kdf lbOPsf] ;Dk"0f{ lhDd]jf/Lx?nfO{ s'zntfk"j{s ;zQm Pj+ k|+z;gLo 9+un] ;Dkfbg u/L /fi6«sf] dfg, OHht / k|lti7fnfO{ /fli6«o tyf cGt/f{li6«o If]qdf km}nfpg ;kmn ePsf] 5 . :yfkgfsf] c9fO{ ;o jif{ nfdf] P]ltxfl;s Pj+ uf}/jdo ofqfsf] qmddf k|blz{t jL/tf, cbDo zfx;, k/fqmd / pRr cg'zf;g Pj+ cufw dft[e"ld k|]d g]kfnL ;]gfsf] cfd kl/rosf] ?kdf /x]sf] 5 . Oltxf;sf] s7Lg df]8x?df g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;snbhf{x?n] b]vfPsf] ct'ngLo jlnbfg / Tofusf] ufyf k|ftM :d/0fLo 5 h'g jt{dfgdfdfq geO{ o'u o'ufGt;Dd g]kfnL Oltxf;sf] cd"No lglwsf] ?kdf /lx/xg] s'/f lglZrt 5 . pNn]lvt k[i7e"ld;Fu} jb\ln+bf] ljZj kl/j]z / ultdfg /fli6«o kl/l:yltsf aLr cfkm"nfO{ k|fKt x/]s e"ldsfx?df g]kfnL ;]gf cToGt ;xh, ;hu / lhDd]jf/Ljf]wsf ;fy cufl8 a9\b} cfPsf] 5 . eljiodf cfOkg{ ;Sg] h:tf];'s} lhDd]jf/Lx?nfO{ lgjf{x ug{ g]kfnL ;]gfleq ;do ;fk]If tflndx? tLa| ?kdf ;+rfng x'Fb} cfPsf] s'/f oxfFg]/ k|f;+lus x'G5 . o;}u/L xfnsf tflndx?df !* /fi6«sf ljb]zL ;}lgs lzIffyL{x?n] ;d]t ;xefuL hgfpg' g]kfnL ;]gfsf] Joj;flos ;Ifdtfsf] Bf]tssf] ?kdf

175s l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf lng ;lsG5 h;n] ;}lgs ;+u7gnfO{ cem r':t :k'mt{ / b'?:t agfpg ;xof]u k'Ug'sf] ;fy} Joj;flos ;Ifdtf cGt/f{li6«o :t/sf] ePsf] k'li6 ub{5 . o:tf tflndx? ljz'4 ;}lgs k|s[ltcg'?ksf ljifodfq geP/ xfn ljkb\ Joa:yfkg k|s[lt ;+/If0f dfgj clwsf/ tyf dfgjLo sfg'g ;}lgs gful/s ;DaGw cflb h:tf ljifox?df ;d]t hf]8 lbPsfn] o;af6 g]kfnL ;]gfleq ljBdfg jx'cfoflds kIfx?;Fu g]kfnL ;]gf cem k|efjsf/L ?kdf hf]l8g] b]lvG5 . /fli6«o zlQmsf] Ps dxTjk"0f{ / cleGg ;+oGqsf] ?kdf ljsl;t g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ g]kfn ;/sf/sf] nIo / of]hgfcg'?k ;+rflnt ljleGg ljsf;sf k"jf{wf/x?, ;b/d'sfd;Dd df]6/ af6f] k'¥ofpg] of]hgfb]lv sf7df8f}+ t/fO{ hf]8\g b|'tdfu{ lgdf{0f sfo{x?df g]kfnL ;]gfsf] e"ldsf dxTjk"0f{ /xL cfPsf] 5 . ;fy} uf}/jdo Oltxf; lgdf{0f u/]sf] g]kfnL ;]gf /fli6«o ;'/Iff tyf d'n'sjf;Lsf] jx'kIfLo lxtdf dfq geO{ ljZj zflGt :yfkgf sfo{ h:tf] k'gLt sfo{df ;d]t ljut %# jif{b]lv pRr cg'zf;g, pGgt Joj;flos Ifdtf / st{Jok/fo0ftf ;du| ljZj ;dfh;fd' k|:t't u/]sf] 5 . oL / o:t} /fli6«o / cGt/f{li6«o lhDd]jf/L tyf e"ldsfx?df b[9 ?kdf k|:t't x'Fb} cfPsf] g]kfnL ;]gf ;f+u7lgs / k|efjsfl/tf clej[l4sf] nflu ;b}j lqmofzLn 5 . o;af/] rrf{ ubf{ ev{/dfq} ;+rfngdf /x]sf] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfgaf6 /fi6«s} nflu cfjZos bIf :jf:Yo hgzlQm tof/ ug{] sfo{df dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf /xL cfPsf] 5 . To;}u/L cGt/f{li6«o :t/sf] :kf]6{; P08 lkmlhsn 6]«lgª ;]G6/ lgdf{0f u/L /fli6«o tyf cGt/f{li6«o :t/sf] v]nf8Lx? pTkfbg ug]{tkm{ ;d]t ljz]if hf]8 lbPsf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfaf6 ;+rflnt ljljw ultljlwx? ;+u7gfTds :t/ clej[l4 ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sfo{ cflbdf s]lGb|t /xb} cfPsf] 5 . h;af6 g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ /fi6« / /fi6«jf;Lsf] lxtdf h:tf];'s} r'gf}tL tyf Jojwfgx?sf] ;fdgf ug{] Ifdtf / phf{ k|bfg ug{] 5 eGg] b[9 ljZjf; lnPsf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gf cfw'lgs g]kfn /fi6«sf] ljutb]lv jt{dfg;Dd g]kfnL ;dfh / ;+:s[ltsf] cleGg kf6f]sf] ?kdf cToGt k|efjsf/L ;jf{]Tjd'vL sfo{x?;Fu k|:t't eO/x]sf] k|i6 x'G5 . ctM o; 38Ldf /fli6«o ;]jfdf ;dlk{t /xFbfsf] jvt k|f0f pT;u{ ug{] ;Dk"0f jL/ ;}lgsx?k|lt k'gZr xflb{s >4f ;'dg ck{0f ub{} tLg} ;k"tx?n] b]vfPsf] af6f]df b[9tfk"j{s ofqf/t /xg] k|ltj4tf JoQm ub}{ st{Jokfngfsf l;nl;nfdf c+ue+u ePsf ;Dk"0f{ ;snbhf{k|lt ;Ddfg k|s6 ub{5f} . ;]gf lbj; @)^* sf] z'e d'x't{df k|sflzt l;kfxL jflif{s klqsf lgtfGt ;+fu7lgsdfq geO{ cfd g]kfnL hgtf / /fHosf] k|d'v ;'/Iff lgsfosf] ?kdf /x]sf] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] cGof]Gofl>t ;DaGw ;fy} /fli6«o ;'/Iffs]f lhDd]jf/L hg pQ/bfloTj Pj+ g]kfnL ;]gfaf6 ;do ;fk]If ;Dkfbg ul/Fb} cfPsf] ljljw hgd'vL sfo{x?nfO{ k|ltljlDjt ug{] ;ldIffTds ljZn]if0f ePsf] s'/f :d/0f u/fpF5f} . cGTodf l;kfxL jflif{sdf cfkm\gf] cd"No n]v tyf /rgfx? k|bfg u/L ;xof]u ug'{ x'g] k|f1, ljåfg, n]vs, /yLj[Gb, clws[t tyf ;snbhf{x? / k|ToIf jf ck|ToIf ?kdf ;xof]u k'¥ofpg' x'g] ;Dk"0f{nfO{ ;}lgs hg;Dks{ lgb{]zgfno xflb{s s[t1tf k|s6 u/L eljiodf ;d]t o:t} ;xof]u tyf z'e]R5fsf] ck]Iff ub{5 .

176v g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* ljifo ;"rL l;=g+= ljifo n]vs k]h g+= != The Future of Peace Operations Maj Gen Rajendra Chhetri ! @= ;]gfdf hftLo OsfO{, ;dfj]zLs/0f tyf cf/If0f ;xfos /yL lahos'df/ zfxL !) #= Augment Co-operation between the Nepalese Army and Brig Gen Binoj Basnyat !^ the Ministry of Defense through Effective Civil Military Relations $= Nepal’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping: An Analysis of Brig Gen Purna B. Silwal @# Achievements and Challenges %= g]kfn c+u|]h o'4sf] sf/0f / kl/0ffd d=;]= k|]dl;+x a:Goft @* ^= Prospects for US-China cooperation in combating terrorism Brig Gen Himalaya Shumsher #$ in South Asia Thapa &= d]l8sn sf]/ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]ansf] ;|f]t ;=/= wd{jxfb'/ aflgof $& *= The Mandarin Duck Formation of General Qi Jiguang Trailokya Raj Aryal %% (= /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx? ;DaGwL Ps ;+lIfKt cWoog ;]gfgL ljlht /fh /]UdL %* !)= A brief appraisal of “Analysis of Air Based, Mechanization Chiran Jung Thapa ^* and Vertical Envelopment Concepts and Technologies” !!= ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]if ;+rfng, Aoj:yfkg tyf kf/blz{tf xl/axfb'/ v8\sf &) !@= Political Ownership Of The Military And Civil-military Lt Col Surendra Singh Rawal && Relations !#= A Brief Introduction To Changing World Order And Major Ajaya Gurung *$ International Relation !$= cEof; j}/L k|xf/ tyf ah| k|xf/ Ps ;+:d/0f k|=;]= e'jg vqL () !%= Traffi c Regulations Brig Gen (Retd) Dipak Gurung (^ !^= Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve Hikmat Bahadur Bisht (( !&= Development And Prosperity Of Asia Pacifi c In The 21st Pilot Lt Col Man Bdr Karki !)# Century !*= l;kfxLsf] lemgf] cfzf k|=;]= /fdrGb| sfsL{ !)^ !(= Panauti & Its Nostalgic Cultural Sites Poonam R. L. Rana !)* @)= a8fdxf/fhflw/fh k[YjL gf/fo0f zfxsf] ;'/Iff gLlt x'=s= lgd{n a:g]t !!% @!= ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] cWoog, dxTj tyf pkfb]otf d=;]= -c=k|f=_ /ltGb| vqL !!& @@= National Army, Regime Change and the Question of PitambarBhandari !@! Sovereign Monopoly @#= Mahashivartri Kumari Dikshya Gurung !@* @$= Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel (1891–1944) Major Pawan Khatri !#) @%= The Relation between Information Warfare and Insurgency Lt Col Lalit Bahadur Kunwar !#$ @^= Theories of Clausewitz in the Analysis of Current War in Maj Ranjit Thapa !$@ Afghanistan @&= g]kfnL ;]gfdf k|o'Qm sYoefiffsf] ljZn]if0f 8f= e"kxl/ kf}8]n !$( @*= cd]l/sL ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs æn]hg ckm d]l/6Æ / g]kfn–cd]l/sf pkk|fWofks 8f=ljgf]b yfkf !%* s"6gLlts ;DaGwsf] :yfkgf @(= k"j{ k|wfg ;]gfklt dxf/yL >L tf]/0f zDz]/ /f0ffsf] ;+lIfKt hLjgL xl/x/ zDz]/ /f0ff !^# #)= “Transitional Pacts” as Determinants of Future Civil Lt Col Santosh B Poudyal !^% Military Relation 177s g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* The Future of Peace Operations

- Maj.Gen. Rajendra Chhetri

The UN was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to save humanity from hell. - Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations (1953 to 1961) 1. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold’s observation remains relevant, although threats to peace and security have drastically changed in the 21st century. The United Nations (UN) continues as the sole credible and legitimate international organization that serves all mankind. UN Peace Operations have been used to contribute to international peace and security since the UN’s inception. The UN has undertaken a number of peacekeeping operations in different parts of the world with varying mandates, scopes, and duration – seeking to resolve various kinds of confl icts. During the Cold War era, these peace operations were designed on a traditional model and primarily sought to resolve confl icts between states.1 Following the Cold War, the rise in intra-state confl icts (insurgencies, genocidal ethnic violence, civil wars etc.) has complicated traditional peace operations. New missions are likely to be carried out by multidimensional operations; they are more complex; they sometimes involve a comprehensive approach. These new missions are multi-disciplinary and increasingly focused on building peace during a post- confl ict transition, which requires integrated programs. The tasks of peacekeeping missions have become more diverse and extensive in recent days; their success predominantly depends on the use of multi-disciplinary experts, including non-military components. 2. This article briefl y examines the evolution and theoretical concepts of UN Peace Operations, noting challenges and opportunities and various reform efforts. It focuses primarily on analyzing fundamental aspects of peace operations – personnel, mandates, materials, and funding. Theoretical and Doctrinal Concepts 3. UN peacekeeping is defi ned as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the fi eld, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of confl ict and the making of peace.”2 Consistent with established principles of UN peacekeeping, Marrack Goulding defi nes peacekeeping as: Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve confl icts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum necessary.3 4. All peacekeeping operations share some key features: They are based on the basic principles of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality, and no use of force except in self-defense, and in defense of the mandate.4 The UN published its capstone doctrine in 2008 to provide principles and guidelines for conduct of peace operations. United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines, a publication of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

1 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

(DPKO), lists numerous factors for successful operations, drawing on lessons of the best practices that the world body has derived in its more than six decades of experiences.5 5. Another conceptual issue concerns the legitimacy and credibility of peace operations. These concepts play key roles in peace operations. Timely establishment of a UN mission’s legitimacy and credibility is vital: The international community will support only legitimate responses to credible threats to peace or to national sovereignty. But in order to have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the local actors, the UN peacekeeping mission must have a multinational image. Hence, it is desirable that the mission have as many national fl ags as possible. Legitimacy and credibility on the ground is sustained by the mission’s conduct and actions; by the UN’s fi rmness and fairness in exercising the mandate; and by the UN’s use of force, respect for local customs, and respect for national sovereignty. 6. Failure to deploy in a timely manner will also tarnish the credibility of the peacekeeping mission. Early and timely deployment can often be a key to success. However, the UN is an umbrella organization: It brings together many nations to respond to crises and threats. Its structure prevents rapid decision-making. This structural problem has at times even challenged the capacity of the UN to perform its core function, such as in Rwanda and in Darfur. Further, UN- deployed troops must be adequate for the task at hand. The size and capabilities of deployed forces may actually be a function of the degree of political support that the mission enjoys from major powers, rather than a function of actual needs. 7. When deployed, the peacekeeping force must be robust and capable of establishing a credible deterrence. Robustness means “having a force that has the credibility to deter those who mean harm with power to take the use of force.”6 A robust force is needed to enforce the mandates, to abide by Rules of Engagement (ROE), to maintain an effective force posture. A robust force is well-equipped, has an effective command and control system, has enabling and supporting elements (including fi re power), and has an effective logistics system. A robust force must be capable of defending itself and other mission components. It must be able to carry out the mission’s mandate. This usually means a relatively large and well-equipped force is needed to carry out a fi rm mandate. However, UN constraints on military force – “non-use of force except in self defense and in the defense of the mandate” – do not seem to allow for the need for a robust force. It is particularly important that the peacekeepers have ROEs that authorize suffi cient use of force to deny an aggressor’s attempt to seize the initiative and thwart the peacekeeping mission Various Reform Efforts 8. UN peacekeeping has undertaken meaningful reform efforts in the post-Cold War period. In June 1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali submitted “An Agenda for Peace,” in which he described various aspects of peace operations and suggested how the UN could respond to various forms of confl icts.7 The UN had undertaken many complex peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, not all of which were successful. Its strategy, modality, and policies were insuffi cient to assure appropriate UN responses to genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia. Under such circumstances, UN peacekeeping operations came under harsh scrutiny, and the UN commissioned a panel to review the issue under the chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi. In August 2002, this committee presented its fi ndings in a Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, a document widely known as the Brahimi Report.8 9. The Brahimi Report serves as the 21st century vision for UN peacekeeping operations.9 It sets the tone for major reforms to make peacekeeping more responsive, more capable, and more effective. Peacekeeping today involves a much broader approach as civilian and police 2 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* components serve hand-in-hand with the military. 10. The Brahimi Report was well accepted by the UNHQ and the member states. As a result, the DPKO prepared a reform strategy entitled “Peace Operations 2010.”10 It establishes reform policies and procedures for peacekeeping, focusing on fi ve key areas: personnel, doctrine, partnerships, resources, and organization.11 It encourages “recruitment and retention of highly qualifi ed personnel by providing structures and support they would need to build a career as United Nations Peacekeepers.”12 However, it is not an easy task for the UN to recruit uniformed professional manpower, with the exception of some military retirees. Yet a signifi cant number of uniformed personnel joined the UN service after retirement for UN civilian jobs. The UN has a system to recruit serving military professionals from TCCs to serve on temporary assignments with UN. 11. The second area of reform was to articulate doctrinally what peacekeeping missions are suited to achieve and what they are not. Reform also focused on recording experiences that have worked or not worked in the past. Another key area was “the establishment of frameworks for interactive partnership.”13 This has resulted in identifying some regional and international bodies as key peacekeeping partners as well as identifi cation of the areas in which such partnerships will be best suited. Attempts are being made to establish such partnerships, particularly with regional organizations and NGO/INGOs. But much needs to be done to establish such partnerships. Even so, the UN has entered into new relationships with the African Union (AU) in a number of missions in Africa and has established greater cooperation with the World Bank. Peacekeepers’ ability to implement the mandate is directly related to its capacity to enforce the mandate; hence another area of reform focuses on strengthening the UN’s ability to secure the essential resources to execute operations. The fi fth area is “the establishment of integrated organizational structures at headquarters and in the fi eld”.14 12. Further, in June 2007, the General Assembly approved Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s proposal to restructure the DPKO and to create a separate Department of Field Support (DFS). These reforms were designed to increase available resources at the headquarters and build new capacities with integrated structures to match the growing demands for UN peacekeeping activities. 13. Almost decade after implementation of Brahimi report, in July 2009 the DPKO and the DFS jointly prepared a planning document titled “A New Partnership Agenda – Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” as another effort to reform peace operations. Their report represents the most current thinking on future peace operations. It recognizes that their UN peacekeeping partnership stands at a cross roads. It notes the need to continue ongoing discussions about the future directions of UN peacekeeping in order for the UN to best serve the international community. It calls for setting up a “new horizon” of “achievable immediate, medium, and long term goals.” 14. This new-horizon paper recommends many reform measures that can make peacekeeping a more effi cient UN venture. It very correctly asserts that for peace operations to be successful, a wide range of partners must participate. Such broad partnerships will enable a clearer political strategy and direction. They will also enhance cohesive mission planning and management. Their document also recommends methods for faster deployment as well as the need for clarity and delivery of critical roles. It also admits the need for improving UN effi ciency in crisis management. Likewise, it identifi es the need to project future needs using a capability- driven approach. Finally, it cites the need for new fi eld support with a view to expanding the partnership for peacekeeping. This document offers some strong recommendations for making

3 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf a qualitative improvement in peacekeeping in order to meet new challenges - including those of personnel, mandate, materials, and funding. Challenges 15. The Cold War’s end found the UN in greater demand than ever before to deal with peace and security issues.15 Although peace operations have become more credible and legitimate tools for resolving confl icts in the post-Cold War era, meeting the increasing demand has exceeded the capacity of the world body. Confl icts in the 21st century have tended to be characterized by uncertainty, complexity, fl uidity, and persistence. These features make peace operations increasingly challenging and demanding. Mingst and Karns observe that: The United Nations will continue to be challenged to respond to diverse threats to international peace and security…require member states to reconcile the dilemmas of the post-Cold War world in making choices about where and how to utilize UN capabilities for enforcement.16 16. Over the last few years, UN peacekeepers have responded unprecedented numbers, with a budget of US$ 7.8 billion. To meet these unprecedented requirements, ongoing peace operations have encountered various challenges in four key areas – personnel, mandate, materials, and funding. In the following sections, these challenges are examined in detail. Personnel 17. UN Peace Operations are often criticized for an inability to generate peacekeepers from developed countries. Security of their personnel, possible health hazards in mission areas, lack of medical facilities (including day and night evacuation capabilities), and national political attitudes toward host countries are some of the factors cited by countries that are reluctant to provide peacekeeping personnel. Most TCCs are seeking more active participation during the planning process of a particular mission in order to gain more transparency. The strategic military cell established in UNHQ for UNIFIL is an example in which TCCs assumed a more active role. 18. Some prominent TCCs are highly selective in the matter of contributing personnel. These countries prefer to commit their personnel in key staff/command positions only for selected missions. Some European countries like Ireland, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Finland are also highly selective in their troop contributions. Most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, including the U.S. and U.K., are heavily committed in Afghanistan and elsewhere, which gives them valid excuse not to commit more troops to UN peace operations. Whatever the reasons, the UN lacks capable, well-trained, and well-equipped peacekeepers from developed countries, and this shortfall undermines the effectiveness of peace operations. 19. TCCs have pledged to provide standby troops and staff offi cers at short notice to be deployed in accord with standby arrangements. However, because of efforts to sustain complex surge capacities in potential theaters, standby arrangement systems have not worked effectively to facilitate timely deployments and adequate projections of UN forces. 20. New TCCs have volunteered in recent years; however, most of them either do not possess the capabilities to meet force requirements or they are not in position to commit more troops to meet UN requirements. This personnel issue has been exacerbated by high rates of turnover of uniformed personnel in peacekeeping operations. Most TCCs rotate their troops every six months, which is the time they need to understand the dynamics of the area of operations. This constant and relatively quick turnover has resulted in the non-retention of experienced manpower. 4 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

21. Another concern is the caveats that the contributing countries bring into the area of operations. National caveats are not common among TCC. However, they are mission specifi c and also differ from mission to mission and TCC to TCC. Fortunately, very few TCC have such caveats. But these caveats can prevent the mission leadership from adopting the best course of action available. National caveats often defeat the purpose of peacekeeping. They undermine the effective performance of the mandated task and reduce the mission’s positive impact on the ground. Peacekeepers also have a tendency to respond fi rst to directives from home countries, which often undermines the established chain of command. This problem arises when the mission leader perceives a need to take action beyond a purely defensive posture. Such decisions may pose risks that some member states are unwilling to accept. So in times of crisis the force commander’s authority may be severely limited.17 22. Unlike traditional missions that are headed by military commanders who exercise complete control, most recent peacekeeping missions have been led by political appointees (Special Representative of the Secretary General - SRSG).18 There must be a balance between civil control of peacekeeping and the requirement of understanding of military strategy. Occasionally peace operations have given rise to command and control challenges between civilian and military components in the fi eld and UNHQ. 23. The concept of hybrid missions has added complexity to peace operations.19 Indeed, this concept presents some signifi cant challenges in may mission areas – in command, control, and communication; in interoperability; in disparities of pay and allowances; in logistical support; and so on. Most of these issues are related to personnel, mandate, material, and funding. Host countries may accept hybrid forces for political reasons, such as the UNAMID mission in Darfur. Such missions may not proceed smoothly; they will need support from a lead nation. Mandate 24. A clear, unambiguous, and achievable mandate is essential for successful peace operations. Lack of a suitable mandate will make it diffi cult to achieve the desired end state of the mission. There are occasional complaints about disconnects between Security Council mandates and resources allocated to implement them. But often such problems are caused by a lack of political commitment during implementation of the mandate in the fi eld and by stakeholders’ failure to assume ownership of the mission. The UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) is a classic example of a mission that failed because of fl awed implementation. Complex mandates can dilute forces, such as in missions in Africa which have lengthy mandates that include laundry lists of problems. Mandates must be applied without favor or prejudice to any party. MONUC provides an example in which the area of operations is so vast that UN forces and supporting elements are simply insuffi cient to perform mandated tasks. . Materials 25. Modern peace operations demand robust forces, appropriately equipped and augmented with necessary enabling units. However, the UN is having diffi culty in generating critical enabling assets - such as utility helicopters, tactical helicopters with night-fl ying capabilities, fi xed-wing reconnaissance squadrons, transport aircrafts, unarmed air vehicles (UAVs), and other such assets. These shortfalls adversely affect successful execution of mission mandates. Often, the militaries of the various contributing nations provide varying qualities of equipment and trainings, which contributes to issues of compatibility and interoperability. 26. Lack of strategic-lift capability and facilities to manage large deployments in the fi eld is

5 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf adversely affecting rapid UN deployments of personnel and materials. Decision-makers should consider the cost effectiveness of chartering strategic lift capabilities or procuring appropriate aircraft to support a large number of fi eld missions. The UN may have to compromise monetary factors to fulfi ll its operational requirements. The UN also lacks operational and tactical lift capabilities in the mission area. If the UN is going to satisfy the current demand for peacekeeping operations, it must fi nd solutions to a myriad of material problems. Funding 27. The current peacekeeping budget exceeds over seven billion dollars annually. The peacekeeping budget is shared among the UN member states. Occasionally, the partial or even full cost of a particular mission is shared by a host country or a small group of interested countries. The U.S. and Japan pay a signifi cant percentage of the UN peacekeeping budget, whereas some economically prosperous countries, including China and India, pay a small amount, glaringly disproportionate to their economic capabilities. 28. The UN is also experiencing budgetary issues in sustaining peace operations. Member states are not paying their dues on time. UN peace operations almost collapsed when the U.S. did not pay its dues in the 1990s. Modern multi-dimensional and robust peace operations obviously demand more resources. However, the cost of UN peace operations is much less than any high-profi le military operations. One report claims that one day of the fi rst Gulf War cost more than the annual budget of all concurrent UN peace operations. Future Prospects 29. The end of the Cold War has given UN peace operations enormous opportunities to contribute to international peace and security, which is obviously a credible and legitimate role. To maintain its credibility and legitimacy, a mission must based on a clear and deliverable mandate with resources and capabilities to match; it must be conducted confi dently and professionally to earn the respect of the involved parties and the host country’s population. UN peace operations are deployed in volatile environments, so they are likely to be tested for weakness early in the mission. Therefore, peace operations must be robust in all aspects to deter or counter all possible threats. Post-Cold War confl icts involve many actors; not all parties in these confl icts are amenable to negotiations. Also, the peace established in confl ict- ridden nations is often fragile. Many non-state actors may attempt to destroy the fragile peace. Accordingly, a robust force with rapid deployment capabilities should characterize future peacekeeping forces.20 30. Rapid evolution of their doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures has enhanced effectiveness and standardization of UN peace operations. Strengthening the standby capabilities and over-the-horizon forces will provide the UN with the fl exibility to generate troops in timely manner. The UN has made signifi cant efforts to increase interoperability and preparedness of the troops through its reform program. Many new countries are willing to participate in peacekeeping and willingly carrying out high-risk operations in Chapter VII missions, such as MONUC and UNAMID. The UN’s New Horizon concept is believed to be a breakthrough for addressing the growing need for multidimensional and robust peacekeeping. 31. The UN now needs to focus on minimizing TCCs’ caveats and restrictions — as well as those of host nations, parties to the confl ict, and other formal and informal entities. TCCs must be made aware that once they contribute troops for a particular mission, these troops will operate under tactical control of mission leadership. TCCs should clearly understand that they are responsible only for administrative and logistical requirements - not for operational control.

6 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

32. Hybrid missions have certainly added a new dimension to peace operations; however, their effectiveness is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, such missions can strengthen UN relations with regional organizations. They will also enhance regional players’ s e nse of ownership and will alleviate cross-cultural issues and thereby reduce peacekeepers’ vulnerability to undermining their image. Such missions are comparatively less costly. Regional solutions based on a hybrid concept can succeed with suffi cient attention to capacity-building and standardization of such organizations. If problems are addressed carefully, regional organizations can play a dynamic role by participating side-by-side with international organizations. Clear Standing Operating Procedures will mitigate most misunderstandings and eliminate weak areas. A better selection of key international staff and expediting offi ces under the necessary fi gureheads can enhance hybrid missions. 33. In recent years, fi ve permanent members of the Security Council (P5) nations made little or no direct contributions to UN peacekeeping. However, the world’s most powerful militaries are recently heavily engaged in responding to global terrorism and security problems, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. So it may not be fair to say that the P5 and developed nations are not contributing to UN peacekeeping in the contemporary world. Sizeable forces from France, Italy, Spain, and China are currently serving in UNIFIL. China has also contributed to several other missions. 34. We must not overlook the fact that Multi National Forces (MNF) played a vital role either as a leading element or as a bridging force in the past. The U.S.-led MNF stabilized the Haitian situation before the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was deployed in 1995. Similarly, the French-led MNF stabilized the situation in the Ivory Coast prior to UN deployment in that country. Likewise, in Ituri province of DRC, a French-led MNF stabilized the situation before the UN could deploy peacekeepers. 35. Even so, the price for the equipment needed to sustain the UN peacekeeping missions cannot be compared to contributions of blood. Yet the P5’s contributions in Darfur in heavy equipment and logistics support are enormous. Nevertheless, P5 nations and developed countries need to contribute more to make peace operations more credible and effective. In order to encourage greater P5 troop contributions to UN peacekeeping in the future, other UN member states should acknowledge that the fi ght against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan is a common global problem. If this global menace is defeated, the world will be much safer. Then these nations will be relieved from committing troops to such operations and can commit their troops and resources to UN peace operations. 36. The UN needs to be more focused in planning and in implementing its peacekeeping operations. But it has improved in the wake of a series of reform efforts. Yet there is more to be accomplished. The UN has formulated impressive policies, but too often these policies are not implemented. For example, some of the aspects of Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) have not been implemented as they were conceived. In other cases, the UN compromises too easily in exercising its new approach when the going gets diffi cult. The proposed strategic reserves concept has not materialized mainly due to budgetary problems. Likewise, the standing police proposal received favorable attention because it seemed cost- effective. But the UN needs peacekeeping troops more than it needs police. 37. Without a sound plan, a mission will not succeed; therefore, there should be no compromise in any shortcut approach to or negligence in planning. The IMPP m u st be thoroughly implemented to produce a workable plan. As the Brahimi Report suggested, development of more responsive stand-by arrangement is essential for rapid deployments. Late deployments in

7 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf critical situations are sometimes worse than no deployment. The UN has witnessed the horrifi c results of its inadequate rapid deployment capability. Yet it has done little to fi x this problem. This international forum must consider creating and maintaining a deployable nucleus HQ and a few rapidly deployable reserve units. With such assets, the UN can provide fi rst-entry forces to carry out critical missions. Such reserves could be provided by regional arrangements or by identifying lead nations or over-the-horizon forces for a probable mission area. The UN needs to maintain a reliable TCCs list in addition to its list of traditional TCCs to generate timely responses and to maintain a robust posture. This initiative will enhance UN’s credibility and deterrence capabilities. 38. Workable mandates with requisite authorizations of clear missions from the Security Council will demonstrate international will. Consent of the parties; impartiality and uses of force only in self-defense; protection of civilians, and defense of the mandate will continue to serve as basic principles of UN peacekeeping. UN credibility will suffer if it authorizes missions with limited mandates or only partial consent from confl icted parties. 39. Establishment of a separate UN Department for Field Support has enhanced the logistics and administration of peace operations. Implementation of focused logistics support mechanisms for deployed forces and more effective COE/UNOE management systems for deployed units will facilitate peace operations in a more structured and effective manner. The UN should focus on streamlining its slow and ponderous bureaucracy, acknowledging that “the best plan implemented too late is not as good as an average plan implemented in time.” 40. Despite scores of technical and practical problems, UN peace operations provide the most credible, legitimate, and impartial tool to enhance global peace, security, and stability. The post-Cold War global situation has increased the need for more UN peace operations to respond to the various hotspots of world. Demand for UN peace operations will continue to grow because threats to international peace and security are growing daily. Conclusion 41. The UN must acknowledge that what might have been good in the past will no longer suffi ce. It cannot continue to conduct peacekeeping without developing vital capabilities. Failure to acknowledge current shortfalls puts future missions at risk. This is particularly urgent because the demand for peacekeeping keeps rising, while the resources to support it become increasingly diffi cult to fi nd. This is not just a routine numbers game involving troops and equipment. The mandates are becoming increasingly complex and creating new expectations. In effect, the UN’s future is at risk. 42. Peace operations have entered in new era since the end of the Cold War. But various challenges in this new era have made peacekeeping more complex and multi-dimensional, in contrast to traditional peace operations. Fortunately, policy makers in New York have given new direction to peace operations by making the missions multi-disciplinary to overcome the new challenges. But, new dimensions have also offered new opportunities. Indeed United Nations peace operations are the most viable, credible, and legitimate tools for maintaining international peace and security. 43. In recent years, the UN has approved profound changes designed to improve its ability to meet new 21st century peace operation challenges. However, this admirable international security forum must muster suffi cient human, fi nancial, and logistical resources to continue to carry out its noble endeavor of peacekeeping.

8 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

Endnotes 1 The United Nations was created by a world community determined to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” during an international conference of 50 countries held in San Francisco in April 1945. The delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals, worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States, in August-October 1944. This origin of the UN accounts for the increased responsibilities granted to the victorious nations of World War II within the Organization; their leading role prevails today in the dominant roles of the fi ve permanent members of the Security Council. The signing of the treaty that describes its status marked its creation: The Charter of the United Nations. 2 An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992. 3 Marrack Goulding, The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 69, No. 3 (Jul, 1993), pp. 455. 4 United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines, UNDPKO, UN HQ, NY, (2008) 5 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines list the following factors as being important to achieving success: a) Genuine commitment to a political process by the parties to work towards peace. b) Clear, credible and achievable mandates, with matching resources. c) Unity of purpose in the Security Council, with active diplomatic support. d) Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors. e) Host country commitment to unhindered operations and freedom of movement. f) Integrated UN approach, effective coordination with other actors and good communication with host country authorities and population. g) Missions need to demonstrate their credibility, strengthen their legitimacy and promote national and local ownership. 6 Anonymous. 7 An Agenda for Peace… 8 Brahimi Report, http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/summary.htm 9 Ibid. 10 In the year 2005, the DPKO UNHQ reviewed the implementation of Brahimi Report. Based on lessons learned, the DPKO prepared a reform strategy titled “Peace Operations 2010”, which evaluated the capacities that need to strengthen to meet the DPKO’s goals over the next fi ve years. 11 “Peace Operations 2010” reform strategy, excerpts from the Secretary General’s report to the General Assembly on 24 February 2006. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Karen A. Mingst & Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 2000, pp.1 16 Irid., pp.113 17 Jean-Marie Guehenno and Jake Sherman, Command and Control Arrangements in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, International Forum – Challenges of Peace Operations, Version of 22 October 2009, pp.6 18 Military Force Commanders wear double hats as head of the mission and head of the military component in most traditional peacekeeping missions, i.e., – UNIFIL, UNFICYP, UNDOF. 19 Changing nature of confl ict in the post-Cold War era and especially the confl ict having regional effect for, e.g., the confl ict in Darfur has a spillover effect in Chad and Central African Republic. Similarly the confl ict in west - Africa Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast are interrelated. It is the same lot of militias roving from one area to another; in such scenarios establishment of regional command structure of PKO could be given thought of and new concept of MOU arrangement with the regional organization or sub regional organization could be considered. Similarly the joint PKO (Hybrid missions) could be the new dimensions or future of PKO. 20 The aim of the PKF force should be to stabilize the situation in shortest possible time and hand over to other international law enforcing agencies to consolidate the peace achieved (ideal would be UN formed police unit) and at the same time immediately start peace building activities directed at the root cause of the confl ict.

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– ;xfos /yL lahos'df/ zfxL ljifo k|j]z != ;+;f/sf k|foM w]/}h;f] d'n'sx?df ax'eflifs, ax'wfld{s, ax'hftLo / ax';f+:s[lts dflg;x?sf] ;ld>0f /x]sf] ;dfh kfOG5 . ;fy}, w]/} b]zx?df hghflt tyf cflbjf;Lx?sf] klg a;f]af; /x]sf] x'G5 . g]kfnsf] ;Gbe{df klg of] tYo nfu" x'G5 . sl/a kf}g] tLg s/f]8 hg;+Vof ePsf] o; tkf]e"ld g]kfn ljleGg hft–hflt, efiff, efifL tyf wd{–;Dk|bfo ldn]/ ag]sf] Ps ;fgf] kxf8L /fHo xf] . cfheGbf b'O{ ztfAbLcufl8 g} a8fdxf/fh :j=>L % k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] lbJo pkb]zdf klg ærf/ hft 5QL; j0f{sf] ;femf k"mnaf/LÆ egL j0f{g u/]af6 klg g]kfn ;a} hft–hfltsf] ;femf af;:yfg / oxf“sf afl;Gbf Psdfq g]kfnL x'g\ eGg] k'li6 x'g cfp“5 . x'gt lxGb" hftLo j0ff{qmd cg';f/ a|f≈d0f, If]qL, j}Zo / z'b| u/L d'Vo rf/ hftdf ljefhg u/]sf] kfOG5 . g]kfndf hol:ylt dNnn] j0f{ljefhg tyf 5'jf5't k|yfsf] cf}krfl/s?kdf ljhf/f]k0f u/]sf] eP tfklg lj=;+= @)@! sf] d'n'sL P]gn] ;f] hftLo e]befjsf] cGTo ul/;s]sf] 5 . To;}n] g]kfnsf] Pp6}dfq d'Vo hflt …g]kfnLÚ dfq xf] eGg'df cltzof]lQm x'g]5}g . @= b]zsf] k|zf;lgs, /fhgLlts, cfly{s If]qx? nufot ;]gf, k|x/L, Gofofno, z}lIfs k|lti7fg cflb PsfOx?df klg /fi6«sf ;a} ju{, j0f{, hft–hflt, cflbjf;L tyf wd{–;Dk|bfosf JolQmx?sf] k|ltlglwTj ePsf] x'G5 . xfd|f] b]zsf] ;/sf/L tyf u}/–;/sf/L ;+3–;+u7gx?df klg o:t} k|ltlglwTj ePsf] kfOG5 . To;dWo] g]kfnL ;]gf klg Ps ;dfj]zL ;+u7g xf] . g]kfndf a;f]af; ug]{ ;a} hft–hflt, ;Dk|bfo, wd{, ;+:s[ltsf JolQmx? o; ;+u7gdf ;dflxt ePsf 5g\ . cfhsfn s]xL blnt tyf hghflt ;+3–;+u7gx?n] cf/If0f / ;dfj]zLs/0fsf] d'2fnfO{ cufl8 ;f/]sf] kfOG5 . s]xL dw];jfbL bnx?n] klg g]kfnL ;]gfdf dw];Lsf] ;+Vof Go"g ePsf]n] dw];L o'jfnfO{ ;fd"lxs?kdf ;]gfdf egf{ ug'{ kg]{ egL jsfnt ul//x]sf5g\ . ;+VofTds lx;fan] x]bf{ /fHosf w]/} If]qx?df afx'g / IF]qLx?sf] k|ltlglwTj a9L b]lvG5 . t/, jf:tljstf s] xf] eg] k/fk"j{sfnb]lv g} afx'g IF]qLx? :jefj}n] cWoogzLn x'G5g\, ;fy} oL hfltx?df ;/sf/L ;]jfx?df sfd ug]{ Ps j+zfg'ut u'0f klg 5, To;}n] cfºgf] cWoog / of]Uotfsf] cfwf/df oL hfltx? /fHosf] /fhgLlts tyf cGo IF]qx?df cufl8 b]lvPsf x'g\ . To;f] t /fHosf s]xL lglZrt ljefu tyf ;+u7gx?, ljb]zL ;]gf, kj{tf/f]x0f, 6«]ls¨, /fkml6¨ cflb k]zfx?df dw]zL tyf t/fO{af;L ;d'bfo tyf cflbjf;L / hghfltx?sf] afx'Notf sfod 5, o;tk{m klg Wofg lbg' kg]{ b]lvG5 . #= hgcfGbf]ng–@ kZrft u0ftGq :yfkgf ePkl5 g]kfndf sfg'gtM ;dfj]zLs/0fsf] gLlt nfu" ePsf] 5, h;cg';f/ /fHosf ;a} ;/sf/L ;+u7gx?df gof“ egf{ tyf lgo'lQm ubf{ cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf ePsf] 5 . ;f] Joj:yf cg';f/ %% k|ltzt v'Nnf k|ltof]lutfåf/f / $% k|ltzt ljleGg hghflt, cflbjf;L, dw];L, lk5l8Psf ju{ / dlxnfx?sf] nflu cf/If0f ul/Psf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn] klg oxL lgodsf] kl/lwleq /xL clws[t tyf cGobhf{sf] egf{ k|lqmof ;'? ul/;s]sf]5 . t/ cfhsf] cfw'lgs tyf j}1flgs o'udf …cf/If0f ls ;dfgtfÚ eGg] ;DaGwdf hf]8bf/ jx; rnfpg' kg]{ ;do;fk]If b]lvPsf] 5 . ;]gfdf hftLo kmf}hsf] P]ltxfl;s k[i7e"ld $= ;]gfdf hftLo kmf}hsf] ;+u7g tyf Joj:yf ;DaGwdf o;sf] P]ltxfl;s k[i7e"ldsf] cWoog tyf ljZn]if0f ul/g' kb{5 . cd]l/sfsf] :jtGqtf o'4eGbf cufl8 sfnf hfltx? ;]gfsf] nflu cof]Uo 7flgGYof] . t/ k|]m~r o'4sf] bf}/fg kmf}hsf] sdL x'“bf sfnf hfltnfO{ klg cd]l/sL ;]gfdf ;lDdlnt u/fOPsf] lyof] . vf;u/L ;g\ !*@) df blIf0f sf/f]lngfdf Toxf“sf tTsfnLg o'4 dGqL hf]xg l;= sfnxf]pgsf] cfb]z cg';f/ sfnf hfltnfO{ ;]gfdf ;l/s u/fOPsf] lyPg, t/ klg :yn ;]gf / hn ;]gfdf dhb'/sf]?kdf sfnf hfltx? g} /flvPsf x'Gy] . cd]l/sfdf ;g\ !*!@ sf] o'4, d]lS;sf] o'4 tyf u[xo'4sf] bf}/fgdf 7"nf] ;+Vofdf ;]gfdf hgzlQmsf] cfjZostf k/]sf] lyof] . vf; u/]/ cd]l/sfsf] u[xo'4sf] ;dodf g} clgjfo{ ;}lgs ;]jfdf b'O{ nfv hd{g, cd]l/sg / !,&),))) eGbfa9L cfOl/; cd]l/sg ;]gfn] ;+3Lo ;]gfdf ;]jf u/]sf lyP . o;/L cd]l/sg ;]gfdf hftLo ;]gfsf] ;dfj]zL ;+u7g ePsf] emns kfOG5 .

10 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

%= sfnf hfltnfO{ k|f/Dedf cd]l/sL ;+3Lo ;]gfdf ;+nUg u/fpg /fHon] vf;} k|f]T;fxg u/]sf] kfOGb}g . t/ ;dosf] qmd;“u} cd]l/sgx? u[xo'4sf] cltl/Qm cGo o'4x?df ;+nUg x'g' k/]sf] sf/0f kmf}hsf] sdL ePsf] lyof] eg] csf]{lt/ o'4df 3fOt]x?sf] ;+Vof a9\g', uf]/fx? ;]gfdf egf{sf] nflu sd cfpg' tyf sfnf hfltsf] 7"nf] ;+Vof o'4sfndf bf;Tjaf6 d'Qm x“'b} hfgfn] sfnf a]/f]huf/x?sf] ;+Vof a9\b} uO/x]sf] cj:yfdf cd]l/sL ;+3Lo ;]gfdf clk|msg cd]l/sgx?nfO{ klg gLltut?kdf egf{ ug{ z'? ul/Psf] lyof] . To;a]nf ;+3Lo cd]l/sg ;]gfdf ! nfv *^ xhf/ sfnf hfltsf ;]gfx? lyP, h'g To; a]nfsf] ;+3Lo ;]gfsf] s"n ;+Vofsf] !) k|ltzt ;+Vof lyof] . To;}a]nf ;+3Lo hn;]gfsf] Ps rf}yfO{ ;+Vofdf klg clk|msg cd]l/sgx? /x]sf lyP . ;+3Lo hn;]gfsf w]/}h;f] kfgL hxfhx? k"0f{?kdf sfnf hfltx?n] g} ;+rfng ub{y] . ;+3Lo ;]gfdf To;a]nf sfnf hfltsf] dfq rf/j6f /]lhd]G6 v8f ul/Psf] lyof] . k|yd ljZjo'4sf] cf;kf;df cfP/ cd]l/sL ;]gfdf sfnf hfltsf] @ j6f l8lehg -k[tgf_ v8f u/L k|mfG;df tflnd u/fpg ;d]t k7fOPsf] lyof] . t/ kf]ln; cd]l/sgx?n] cfºg} hfltsf] jl/i7 clws[t tyf hjfgx? ;lDdlnt u/L 5'§} hftLo o'lg6 agfpg] dfunfO{ eg] To;a]nfsf] cd]l/sL ;]gfsf clwsf/Lx?n] :jLs[lt lbPsf lyPgg\ . t/ cfOl/; cd]l/sgx?sf] eg] cd]l/sL ;]gfdf 5'§} PsfO u7g ul/Psf] lyof] . h'nfO{ !($* df tTsfnLg cd]l/sL /fi6«klt x\of/L P;=6«'Dofgn] ;]gfdf hftLo ;dfof]hg ug{ sfo{sf/L cfb]z;d]t hf/L ug'{ ePsf] lyof], h;sf] sfof{Gjog sf]l/og o'4sf] bf}/fg ;DkGg ePsf] lyof] . o;}sf] glthf:j?k cfh cd]l/sL ;]gfdf y'k|} sfnf hg/n tyf P8ld/n (Generals & Admirals) x?sf] afx'Notf /x]sf] kfOG5 . ^= ljZjdf hftLo tyf If]qLo ;]gfsf] rrf{ ubf{ ef/t cu|k+lQmdf kg{ cfp“5 . ef/tdf O:6–OlG8of sDkgL -la|l6z_ sf] k|j]z;“u;“u} pgLx?n] cfºgf] k|of]hgsf] nflu ef/tdf ;}Go egf{sf] k|f/De u/]sf] Oltxf;df kfOG5 . c+u|]hx?n] cfºgf] ;'/Iffsf] nflu la|l6z ;]gfnfO{ g} ef/tdf NofPsf lyP, t/ Tof] ;]gfsf] Joj:yfkg Hofb} dx+uf] kb{Yof] . To;}n] ef/tLox? t'?Gt 7"nf] ;+Vofdf pknJw x'g], ;:tf]df sfd nufpg ;lsg], Joj:yfkg ug{ ;lhnf] cflb sf/0fn] ubf{ ;g\ !&%& lt/ n8{ SnfOen] ef/tLox?nfO{ ;]gfdf egf{ ug{ ;'? u/]sf lyP . h;sf] kmn:j?k Bengal Army v8f ePsf] lyof], t/ of] cfdL{ hftLo / wfld{s cfwf/df v8f ul/Psf] lyPg . c+u|]hx? ef/tdf Jofkf/ ug{ cfPsf lyP t/ kl5 uP/ pgLx?sf] p2]Zo ablnof] / /fhgLlttk{m xft xfNg k'u] . ;g\ !&%& b]lv !*$( ;Dd c+u|]hx?n] ef/tdf jf:tljs zf;ssf] ?kdf cflwkTo hdfPsf lyP . o; cjlwdf c+u|]hx?n] ;g\ !&%& df a+ufnsf] gjfa, ;g\ !&^$ df cjwsf] gjfa, ;g\ !&(( df d};'/, ;g\ !*)# df d/fyf, ;g\ !*$# df l;Gw / ;g\ !*$( df k+hfjdf ;d]t ljho k|fKt ul/;s]sf lyP . o;n] ubf{ c+u|]hx? ef/tdf ;}Go zlQm lj:tf/ ug{df sl:;P/ nflu k/]sf lyP eGg] k|df0f kfOG5 . &= c+u|]hx?n] hftLotf / wd{nfO{ ;]gf egf{sf] cfwf/ gagfP klg pgLx?sf] 5gf]6df lxGb":tfgL /fhk't jf lxGb":tfgL k7fg d'lZnd jf /f]lxNnf d'lZndx?nfO{ ;]gf egf{df k|fyldstf lbg] ub{y], lsgeg] logLx? cUnf / /fd|f] zf/Ll/s agf]6 (Bearing) ePsf x'Gy] . c+u|]hx?n] ef/tdf ;g\ !&$)–!&%& sf] cjlwdf If]qLo tyf hftLotfsf] cfwf/df :ki6?kdf b]lvg] u/L tLg k|sf/sf kmf}hx? v8f u/]sf lyP, tL x'g\ db|f; cfdL{, a+ufn cfdL{ / aDa] cfdL{ . z'?df oL ;]gfx? k|lt/Iffsf] nflu :yfkgf ul/P tfklg ;g\ !&%& kl5 logLx?nfO{ cfqmfds e"ldsfdf ;d]t k|of]u ul/Psf] lyof] . ;g\ !*%& df a+ufn cfdL{, db|f; cfdL{ / aDa] cfdL{sf] ;+Vof qmdzM !,!*,^^#, $(,&#& / #!,^)! k'u]sf] lyof] . a+ufn cfdL{df lxGb"x?sf] afx'Notf ePklg o;sf] k}bn kmf}hdf d'lZndsf] afx'Notf lyof] . db|f; cfdL{df klg lxGb"x?sf] afx'Notf lyof] t/ k}bn kmf}hdf eg] d'lZndx? g} a9L ;+Vofdf lyP . aDa] cfdL{df k"0f{?kdf lxGb"x?sf] g} jr{:j /x]sf] lyof] . c+u|]hx?n] ;]gfdf egf{ ug{ s]xL hft–hfltx?nfO{ k|fyldstf lbg] ub{y], h;nfO{ "Martial Races" sf] ;+1f lbOPsf] lyof] . *= ;g\ !*$^ df ef/tdf c+u|]hx?n] ;}Go egf{ ;DaGwdf dxTjk"0f{ gLltsf] th'{df u/]sf lyP . h; cg';f/ klxnf] k6s a+ufn cfdL{df l;vx? egf{ lnOof] ;fy} uf]/vfnLx?nfO{ klg gLltut ?kdf c+u|]h–ef/tLo ;]gfdf egf{ ug{ z'? ul/Psf] lyof] . ef/tsf k|yd c+u|]h efO;/f]on] ;g\ !*$^ sf] ;}Go egf{ gLltsf] ;dy{g ub}{ k+hfaL -l;v, d'lZnd, lxGb"_ / k7fg hfltnfO{ ;]gfdf egf{ ug{ z'? u/]sf lyP . To;kl5 ljleGg l;v tyf k+hfaL /]lhd]G6x? v8f ePsf lyP . ;g\ !*%^ df efO;/f]o 8nxf}hLn] a+ufn cfdL{df k+hfaL / uf]/vfnL ;]gfsf] ;+Vofdf a[l4 ug{ cfb]z lbPsf lyP . ;g\ !*%&–%* tfsf lxGb"sf] tNnf] hfltsf] o'lg6 klg v8f ul/Psf] lyof] . ;g\ !*%*–!**% sf] cjlwdf c+u|]h–ef/tLo ;]gfdf lxGb" / k+hfaL hftLo kmf}hsf] afx'Notf /x]sf] lyof] . ;g\ !*&*–*) sf] bf];|f] ckmufg o'4 / !**%–*( sf] t];|f] jdf{ o'4df c+u|]hx?n] a+ufn, aDa] / db|f; cfdL{sf hftLo kmf}hx?nfO{ Jofks ;+Vof

11 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf k|of]u u/]sf lyP . h'nfO{ !($! df c+u|]h zf;gsfndf 8f=la=cf/= cDa]8s/n] dxf/fi6«sf] cg';"lrt hfltdf kg]{ dx/x?sf] /]lhd]G6 v8f ug{ ;/sf/nfO{ l;kmfl/; u/L :yfkgf;d]t ul/Psf] lyof], t/ Tof] /]lhd]G6 ljleGg sf/0fn] ubf{ lbuf] /xg ;s]g . ef/t :jtGq ePkl5 gf]e]Da/ !($& df g]kfn–ef/t–la|6]gaLr x:tfIfl/t ;Demf}tf cg';f/ c+u|]h–ef/tLo ;]gfdf To;a]nf /x]sf uf]vf{ /]lhd]G6x? dWo] $ /]lhd]G6 la|l6;;“u hfg] / ^ /]lhd]G6 ef/tdf g} /xg] ;xdlt ePsf] lyof] . cfh klg ef/tLo ;]gfdf /fhk't, l;v, uf]/vf, gfuf, hf6, d/f7f cflb /]lhd]G6x? /x]sf 5g\ . g]kfnL ;]gfdf hftLo kmf}hsf] P]ltxfl;s kIf (= g]kfn–c+u|]h o'4 -;g\ !*!$–!^_ sf] bf}/fg g]kfnL kmf}hsf] ;fx; / axfb'/L b]v]/ ;f] o'4kZrft c+u|]hx?n] ef/tLo ;]gfdf cgf}krfl/s?kn] g]kfnLx?nfO{ egf{ ug{ ;'? u/]sf lyP . c+u|]hx?n] ef/tsf ;;fgf /fHox?df cfqmd0f ubf{ ljb]zL -g]kfnL_ ;]gf lg;+sf]r k|of]u ug{ ;lsg] x'gfn] klg g]kfnLx?nfO{ egf{ ug{ ;'? u/]sf x'g\ . o;/L egf{ ubf{ c+u|]hx?n] g]kfnL o'4e"lddf jL/tf b]vfPsf ;fx;L / /fd|f] lhp8fn k/]sf JolQmx? 5gf]6 u/]sf lyP . t;y{, a[l6;x?n] g]kfnsf /fO{, lnDa', du/, u'?¨ h:tf hft–hfltnfO{ 5fg]/ c+u|]h–ef/tLo ;]gfdf egf{ u/L uf]vf{ /]lhd]G6 v8f u/]sf lyP . To;kl5 tTsfnLg g]kfn ;/sf/n] To:tf cd"No o'jfzlQmnfO{ ljb]lzgaf6 /f]Sg] p2]Zon] g]kfndf klg cGo kN6gx?sf] ;fy;fy} hftLo kN6gx? klg v8f u/]sf] kfOG5 . h;cg';f/ lj=;+=!*^& efb| !@ ut] e}/agfy /fO{ / lnDa'x?sf] kN6g, lj=;+= !*$@ k'; !^ ut] k'/fgf] uf]/v du/x?sf] kN6g / lj=;+= !*$@ efb| !# ut] ejfgLbn du/x?sf] kN6gsf] ?kdf v8f ul/Psf] lyof] . To:t} ;g\ !*%%–%^ sf] g]kfn–ltAat o'4kl5 >L sfnLaS; u0fsf u'?¨ hfltx?nfO{ ;d]t ;dfj]z u/L sfnLaxfb'/ u0f :yfkgf ul/Psf] lyof] . k|yd ljZjo'4kZrft To; u0fsf tTsfnLg u0fklt k|d'v ;]gfgL >L lrqaxfb'/ u'?¨n] tTsfnLg >L # dxf/fhdf lgj]bg u/L of] u0fdf u'?¨dfq egf{ x'g kfpg] u/L >L sfnLaxfb'/ u0fnfO{ u'?¨ kN6g agfOPsf] lyof] . !)= >L ejfgLbn kN6gdf sl/a !#% jif{;Dd clws[t afx]ssf bhf{df du/x?dfq lyP, t/ ;g\ !(%@ sf] ;]gfsf] k'gu{7gkZrft of] Joj:yf x6\of] . ;f]xL ;fn vf/]hLdf k/]sf] e}/jgfy kN6g klg lj=;+=@)#! kmfu'g @& ut] e}/jgfy u0fsf] ?kdf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] 5ftfwf/L kmf}hsf] ?kdf :yfkgf eof] . t/ Tof] u0fdf /fO{, lnDa'dfq egf{ lng] k'/fgf] k|rngdf eg] kl/jt{g ePsf] 5 . >L sfnLaxfb'/ u0f / >L k'/fgf] uf]/v u0fn] cfh klg g]kfnL ;]gfdf qmdzM u'?¨ / du/ kN6gsf] ?kdf cfºgf] jr{:j sfod} /fv]sf 5g\ . lj=;+= @)$& ;fnsf] k|hftGqsf] k'gM:yfkgfkZrft g]kfnL ;]gfdf ldlt @)^#÷)@÷@* ut ] ls/f“t d"nsf JolQmx? ;lDdlnt >L l/k'db{g u0f / dw];L tyf t/fO{ d"nsf JolQmx? ;lDdlnt >L gof“ ;a'h u0f :yfkgf ePsf 5g\ . clxn] ;f] u0fx? qmdzM ;nf{xL / cf]vn9'+ufdf sfo{/t 5g\ . !!= g]kfnL ;]gf ;a} hfthfltsf] k"mnaf/L xf] . o; ;+u7gdf hflt / If]qsf] lx;fan] s;}nfO{ sfvfkfvf ul/Psf] 5}g . g]kfndf ePsf sl/a !)) eGbf a9L hfthfltx?dWo] w]/} hfthfltx? g]kfnL ;]gf?kL k"mnaf/Ldf xft]dfnf] u/L c6fPsf 5g\ . ;]gfdf dfly pNn]lvt s]xL hfltut u0fx? eP tfklg tL hfltx?nfO{ ;d"xut?kdf egf{ ul/Psf] eg] xf]Og . g]kfn ;/sf/ / g]kfnL ;]gfsf clws[t tyf ;}Go egf{;DaGwL gLlt tyf lgod cg';f/ g} egf{ x'g OR5's ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL bfh'efO{ tyf lbbL alxgLx?nfO{ :yflkt dfkb08cg';f/ cfjZos kg]{ ;Dk"0f{ k/LIffx? lnP/ of]Uo JolQmx? 5gf]6 ug]{ sfd x'G5 . To;/L 5gf]6 ePsf JolQmx?nfO{ lgod cg';f/ cfwf/e"t ;}Go tflnd lbO{ ;f] tflnd pQL0f{ u/]kl5dfq ljleGg u0f tyf u'Ndx?df ;?jf u/L k7fOG5 . o; qmddf g]kfnL ;]gfdf xfn ljBdfg pk/f]Qm $ j6f hftLo u0fx?df klg Toxf“ kbk"lt{ ug'{ kg]{ ;+Vof cg';f/ ljleGg cfjZos hfltx?nfO{ ;DalGwt hftLo u0fx?df ;?jf u/L k7fpg] ul/Psf] 5 . t/ clws[tsf] xsdf eg] pQm hfltut u0fx?df s'g} klg hfltsf clws[t -u0fklt ;d]t_x?nfO{ v6fpg] Joj:yf /xL cfPsf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf hfltut cfwf/df u0f÷u'Ndx?sf] Joj:yf ul/g' cg'ko'Qm g} klg b]lvGb}g . t/ o; ;DaGwdf klg jx; x'g' kg]{ b]lvG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;dfj]zLs/0f !@= g]kfnsf ljleGg ;/sf/L dGqfno, ljefu tyf sfof{nox? dWo] g]kfnL ;]gf hftLo k|ltlglwTjsf lx;fan] Ps ;dfj]zL ;+:yfdf kg{ cfp“5 . of] Ps /fli6«o ;]gf xf] . oxf“ k"j{ d]rLb]lv klZrd dxfsfnL;Ddsf / lxdfn, kxf8, t/fO{ ;a} If]qsf ;Dk"0f{ hfthfltx? ;dflji6 ePsf 5g\ . jt{dfg g]kfnsf] cGtl/d ;+ljwfg @)^# sf] wf/f !$$ sf] pkwf/f -$ s_ cg';f/ -kf“rf} ;+zf]wgåf/f yk_ …g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ /fli6«o :j?k k|bfg ug{ / ;dfj]zL agfpg dw];L, cflbjf;L, hghflt, blnt, dlxnf, lk5l8Psf IF]q nufotsf hgtfsf] k|j]z ;dfgtf / ;dfj]zL l;4fGtsf] cfwf/df sfg"gdf Joj:yf u/L ;'lglZrt ul/g] 5Ú egL pNn]v ul/Psf] kfOG5 . To;kl5 g]kfn ;/sf/åf/f hf/L 12 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

;dfj]zLs/0f P]gsf] Joj:yf cg';f/ g]kfnL ;]gfn] klg clws[t tyf cGobhf{sf] egf{df /fHosf] ;dfj]zLs/0fsf] l;4fGtnfO{ k"0f{tM c+lusf/ ul/;s]sf] 5 . clxn] ;]gfn] egf{ ubf{ %% k|ltzt v'Nnf tyf $% k|ltzt cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf cg';f/ egf{ lng] u/]sf] 5 . ;f] $% k|ltztnfO{ ztk|ltzt dfgL @* k|ltzt dw];L, @) k|ltzt dlxnf, !% k|ltzt blnt, % k|ltzt lk5l8Psf ju{ tyf #@ k|ltzt cflbjf;L / hghfltaf6 egf{ lng] ul/G5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;g\ !(^@ af6 k|fljlwstk{mdfq dlxnfnfO{ egf{ lng] ul/Psf]df lj=;+= @)^) ;fnb]lv ck|fljlws ;fwf/0ftk{m klg clws[t / cGobhf{df dlxnfx?nfO{ egf{ lng ;'? ul/Psf] 5 . !#= g]kfnsf] ljleGg hfthfltsf] hg;+Vofsf] cg'kftsf] cfwf/df ljZn]if0f ubf{ g]kfnL ;]gfdf If]qLx?sf] s]xL a9L jr{:j 5 . To;kl5 7s'/L, du/, u'?¨, g]jf/, /fO{, bdfO{, 3lt{, ;Gof;L, s'dfn, xhfd÷7fs'/ cflb hfthflt klg hg;+Vofsf] cg'kftdf ;]gfdf s]xL a9L ;+Vofdf g} b]lvG5 . t/ a|f≈d0f, tfdf¨, sfdL, lnDa', ;fsL{ tyf yf? hfltx? hg;+Vofsf] cg'kfteGbf s]xL dfq sd ;+Vofdf ;]gfdf ;]jf/t /x]sf] kfOG5 . ;]gfdf egf{ x'g cfpg] ljleGg hghfltsf] ;+Vofdf x'g] 36a9sf ljljw sf/0fx? /x]sf 5g\ . tL dWo] IF]qL, 7s'/L hfltx? k/fk"j{sfnb]lv ;]gfdf ;]jf u/L cfPsf] x'“bf ljutdf j+zfg'ut?kdf pgLx?sf ;Gtfgx? klg a9L dfqfdf ;]gfdf g} hfg] rfxgf ug'{, ;]gfdf s7f]/ zf/Ll/s >d ug{ ufxf/f] dfg]/ k|foMh;f] g]jf/ tyf dw];L ;d'bfox? ;]gfdf ;]jf ug]{ OR5f gb]vfpg', a|f≈d0f, If]qL, 7s'/L cflb hfltx? cGo hfltsf] bf“hf]df a9L cWoogzLn x'gfn] klg ;]gfdf a9L ;+Vofdf k|j]z kfpg' OToflb sf/0fx? /x]sf] kfOPsf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;g\ @))* df l;kfxL / kmnf]j;{ kbsf] nflu egf{ lemSg wflb¨, nlntk'/, ;nf{xL, bf¨ / cf]vn9'+ufdf egf{ s]Gb| :yfkgf u/L cfj]bg dfu ubf{ kg{ cfPsf] !%,*@% lgj]bsx?dWo] !)=^ k|ltzt -!,^*# hgf_ dw];L / %=# k|ltzt -*#%_ blntn] dfq ;]gfdf cfpg OR5f b]vfPsf lyP, hasL ;f]xL ;dodf a|f≈d0f÷IF]qLaf6 %#=# k|ltzt / hghfltaf6 #)=( k|ltztn] egf{sf] nflu lgj]bg lbPsf lyP . o;af6 klg g]kfnL ;]gfdf lsg a|f≈d0f÷If]qLsf] ;+Vof a9L ePsf] xf] eGg] :jtM ljZn]if0f ug{ ;lsG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ljlzi6 >]0fLdf /x]sf pk/yL / ;f]eGbf dflysf /yLa[Gbx?sf] h'nfO{ @)!) sf] Pp6f hfltut tYofÍ cWoog ubf{ b'O{ hgf k|fljlws;lxt ( hgf If]qL, @ hgf a|f≈d0f, % hgf u'?¨, @ hgf 7s'/L, ! hgf /f0ff / ! hgf g]jf/ sfo{/t /x]sf] b]lvPsf] lyof] . ;]gfdf cf/If0f !$= s'g} klg b]zsf] ;]gfdf ;a} hfthflt / If]qsf JolQmx?n] ;dfg?kdf k|j]z kfpg' k5{, o;df s;}sf] b'O{dt 5}g . g]kfnL ;]gfn] klg oxL bz{gnfO{ c+ufn]/ cfºgf] ;+u7gnfO{ k"0f{ ;dfj]zL agfPsf] 5 / of] qmdn] lg/Gt/tf ;d]t kfO/x]sf] 5 . t/ ;dfj]zLs/0fsf] gfddf …cf/If0fÚ sf] Joj:yf ug'{ slQsf] pko'Qm 5 < of] Ps 7"nf] jx;sf] ljifo x'g cfp“5 . ;+;f/s} 7"nf] k|hftflGqs d'n's ef/tsf] ljzfn ;]gfdf egf{ lemSg cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf 5}g . ljZjsf] s'g} klg d'n'ssf] ;]gfdf egf{sf] nflu hfthflt, wd{, ;d'bfo, ln¨ tyf IF]q cflbsf] cfwf/df cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf ePsf] lj/n} b]Vg kfOG5 . t/ g]kfnL ;]gfdf $% k|ltzt cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf 5, of] Ps dgg of]Uo tftf] ljifo xf] . o;df ;Dk"0f{ /fhgLlts g]t[Tjju{, a'l4hLjL tyf of]hgflabx?n] ulx/f] ;f]+r lbg} kg]{ b]lvG5 . s]xL lglZrt hfthflt tyf If]qnfO{ cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf ubf{ csf]{ hfthflt tyf If]qsf] clwsf/df wSsf k5{ ls eGg] klg ;f]Rg' kg]{ x'g ;S5 . g]kfn h:tf] !)) eGbf a9L hft–hflt ePsf] / () eGbf a9L efiff af]lng] ;dfhsf ;a}n] cf–cfºgf] hfltsf] nflu cf/If0fsf] dfu u/]df /fHon] s:tf] k|ltlqmof hgfpnf < of] Ps ;f]rgLo / r'gf}tLk"0f{ ljifo x'g ;S5 /fHosf] nflu . !%= ljut s]xL dlxgfb]lv dw];jfbL bnx?åf/f !) xhf/ dw];Lx?nfO{ ;]gfdf ;d"xut k|j]z lbg' kg]{ dfux? ;txdf cfPsf 5g\ . ;fy} k|f/Dedf #))) dw];Lx?nfO{ ;]gfdf ;d"xut egf{ lnOg] egL ;/sf/L k|jQmfaf6 klg ;'lggdf cfPsf] 5 . t/, o;} ljifonfO{ lnP/ ut * k'; @)^* df /IffdGqLsf sfo{ef/;d]t ;dfn]sf pk–k|wfg dGqLaf6 ljBdfg Joj:yf -cf/If0f_ cg';f/} dw];Lnufot ;d'bfoaf6 ;]gfdf egf{ lnOg] eGg] hfgsf/L klg cfPsf] 5 . o;} ;Gbe{df ;jf]{Rr cbfntdf k/]sf] Pp6f l/6df ldlt @)^* k'; !! ut] dw];L o'jfsf] ;]gfdf ;fd"lxs egf{ /f]Sg cGtl/d cfb]z;d]t hf/L eO;s]sf] l:ylt 5 . To;sf] nuQ} Pg]skf dfcf]jfbL ;ef;b ;Gtf]ifs'df/ yf?sf] g]t[Tjdf ul7t df]rf{n] ut % k'; @)^* df yf?nufot k"jL{ t/fO{sf ljleGg hfltsf] ;]gfdf ;fd"lxs k|j]zsf] dfu u/]sf] lyof] . pQm df]rf{n] t/fO{sf cflbjf;L yf?, bg'jf/, /fhj+zL, /fhwfdL, lwdfn, d]r], emfu8, ;Gyfn, b/fO{, ugufO{, tfhk'l/ofnufot hghfltaf6 !% xhf/ o'jfnfO{ g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;fd"lxs k|j]z u/fpg dfu u/]sf] kfOPsf] 5 . To;}u/L s0ff{nLsf a'l4hLjL ju{n] klg ut & k'; @)^* df Ps e]nf u/L s0ff{nL If]qsf] ljsf; tyf /Iffsf] nflu 5'§} ;]gf u7g ug{ dfu u/]sf] kfOPsf] 5 . 13 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

!^= g]kfnL ;]gfsf] jt{dfg (%,&%# :jLs[t b/aGbLdf a|f≈d0f÷IF]qL %),)#*, cflbjf;L–hghflt @(,@@!, dw];L %,$##, blnt ^,!!% / dlxnf !,$(! sfo{/t /x]sf] k|fKt tYofÍdf pNn]v ePsf] kfOG5 . of] ;+Vof cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf ePkl5 x'g cfPsf] xf]Og . ;/sf/n] cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf u/]sf] t ev{/ b'O{–rf/ jif{dfq ePsf] 5 . cfhsf] k|lt:kwf{Tds o'udf ;a}nfO{ ;dfg?kdf k|lt:kwf{ ug{ lbOg' k5{ . …cf/If0fÚ sf] Joj:yfn] ubf{ …;dfgtfÚ sf] l;4fGtdf k|efj kfg'{ x“'b}g . t;y{, /fHon] cf/If0fdfeGbf lk5l8Psf ju{ tyf cflbjf;L, hghflt cflbsf] pTyfgsf] nflu ljz]if sfo{qmdx?sf] th'{df u/]/ ;a} hfthfltsf] ;zlQms/0fdf hf]8 lbg' kb{5, tf ls pgLx? /fHosf] x/]s c+udf ;dfg?kdf k|lt:kwf{ ug{ ;s'g\ . cf/If0fsf] Joj:yf gx'“bf klg g]kfn ;/sf/sf] jg, gfkL, kz' ;]jf, s[lif cflb If]qx?df dw];L / t/fO{ d'nsf JolQmx?sf] afx'Notf sfod} 5 . g]kfnL ;]gf eg]sf] Ps /fli6«o ;]gf xf], To;}n] o:tf] ;]gfdf hfltut?kdf …;fd"lxs k|j]zÚ tyf …cf/If0fÚ h:tf Joj:yfx? /fli6«o rl/q ljkl/t x'g ;Sb5g\ . bL3{sfndf o:tf] Joj:yfn] /fli6«o ;]gfsf] nflu k|To'Tkfbs x'g ;S5 / o;n] eljiodf ;]gfleq b"/ufdL gsf/fTds k|efj lgDTofpg af6f] vf]Ng] ;Defjgf x'G5 . ;fy}, s'g} klg hfltsf] g]kfnL ;]gfdf …;fd"lxs k|j]zsf] ljifoÚ g]kfnsf] ;+ljwfg, P]g, lgod / k|rlnt d"No / dfGotfsf] cg's"n x'g] b]lv+b}g . lgZsif{ !&= ef/tdf c+u|]hn] ;]gfdf hfltut?kdf egf{ ug]{ k|lqmofnfO{ ;g\ !*%& sf] ljb|f]xkl5 eg] s]xL sd u/]sf] b]lvG5 . ef/t :jtGqtfkl5 ;g\ !($( df hftLo, eflifo / wd{sf] cfwf/df ;]gfdf egf{ ug]{ Joj:yfnfO{ ;/sf/n] k"0f{?kdf x6fPsf] lyof] . ef/tLo ;]gfn] cd[t;/df lzv k[ystfjfbLx? lj?4 ;+rfng u/]sf] 'Operation Blue Star' kl5 ef/tLo ;]gfnfO{ ;a} hft–hfltsf] ldl>t /]lhd]G6 agfpg] k|:tfj cfPsf] lyof], t/ Tof] sfof{Gjogdf cfpg ;s]g . cfh ef/tdf !) nfveGbf a9L o'jfn] ;]gfdf ;]jf ug]{ df}sf kfO/x]sf 5g\ . Toxf“ cg';"lrt hflt / cg';"lrt hghfltsf] gfddf ;]gfdf s'g} cf/If0f / sf]6fsf] Joj:yf 5}g . ef/tLo ;+ljwfgsf] wf/f !% -$_ cg';f/ ef/tLo ;]gf k"0f{?kdf lg/k]If /x]sf] eGg] pNn]v ePsf] 5 . To;}n] klg ef/tLo ;]gfdf hfltut cfwf/df ;}Go egf{ ug]{ Joj:yf 5}g . ef/tLo ;]gfdf clxn] klg ljleGg hft–hfltsf] /]lhd]G6x? eP tfklg ;}Go egf{ ubf{ k|fGt tyf s]Gb| zfl;t k|b]zx?nfO{ lbOPsf] sf]6f cg';f/ egf{ ul/G5 . ef/tdf xfn ljleGg hft–hfltsf] /]lhd]G6 sfod /x] klg o;n] b]zsf ;Dk"0f{ hft–hfltnfO{ ;d]6g g;s]sf] eGg] ljleGg a'l4hLjLx?sf] egfO{ /x]sf] kfOG5 . c+u|]hsf] kfnfdf v8f ul/Psf] hftLo / If]lqo /]lhd]G6x?nfO{ cfhsf] kl/k|]Iodf x6fpg' kg]{ w]/}sf] dfu /x]sf] 5 . nf]s;efdf k|lt/Iff ah]6sf] 5nkmnsf] qmddf klg obfsbf of] k|;+u p7g] u/]sf] 5 . Ps ef/tLo cg';Gwfgstf{ cf]d/ vflnbLn] cfºgf] Pp6f y]l;;df æcfhsf] ef/tLo ;z:q kmf}hsf] agfj6n] ef/tsf] ljljwtf af]s]sf] ;dfhsf] P]gf x'g g;Sg]Æ egL pNn]v ug'{ ePsf] kfOG5 . o;af6 klg clxn] ef/tdf hftLotfdf cfwfl/t kmf}hsf] ;+u7g ul/g[' pko'Qm gePsf] eGg] hgdt cufl8 cfO/x]sf] b]lvG5 . Oltxf;df @)) jif{ k'/fgf] ef/tLo ;]gfdf t'?Gt 7"nf] kl/jt{g ug{ ;do nfUg] x'“bf clxn] klg ef/tLo ;]gfsf] k}bn kmf}hdf hftLotfsf cfwf/df /]lhd]G6x? sfo{/t 5g\, h;df g]kfnLx?sf] uf]vf{ /]lhd]G6 klg Ps xf] . !*= jt{dfg kl/jlt{t ;Gbe{df /fi6«sf k|foM ;a} tx tyf tKsfsf JolQmx?sf] Wofg g]kfnL ;]gftk{m hfg] u/]sf] 5, of] :jefljs klg xf] . ljutdf nfdf] ;do;Dd of] ;]gfnfO{ …/fhfsf] ;]gfÚ egL cfIf]k nufOPsf] lyof], t/ lj=;+= @)$& ;fnkl5 klg g]t[Tj txaf6 g]kfnL ;]gftk{m vf;} Wofg lbOPsf] kfOPg . t/ cfh k'gM ;a} bn tyf g]t[Tj txsf] Wofg ;]gftk{m df]l8Psf] 5 . of] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] nflu v';L / uf}/jsf] ljifo xf] . g]kfnL ;]gf cfh klg w]/} r'gf}tLx?;“u h'lw/x]sf] 5 . clxn] klg g]kfnL ;]gfsf $@ k|ltzt hjfgx? o'4sfnLg a+s/df a:5g\, ;/sf/n] ;]gfsf] nflu lalgof]hg u/]sf] @) c/a ?k}of“sf] ah]6sf] () k|ltzteGbf a9L lx:;f tna, eQf tyf /f;gdf vr{ x'G5 . ce}m klg ;a} ;}lgsnfO{ ;'Tgsf] nflu JolQmut Ps÷Ps uf]6f vf6 k'u]sf] 5}g, cGo ef}lts k"jf{wf/ cefjsf] af/]df t pNn]v u/L ;fWo 5}g . Pshgf o'jf÷o'jtLnfO{ cfjZos cfwf/e"t tflnd lbP/ ;}lgs agfpg 36Ldf klg ^ nfv ?k}of“ vr{ x'G5 . ;]gfsf clwsf+z hjfgx?n] clxn] klg %) jif{eGbf k'/fgf] xltof/ k|of]u ug{ afWo 5g\ . gof“gof“ k|ljlw tyf ;/–;fdfgx? ce}m klg ;]gfsf] xftdf kg{ ;s]sf] 5}g . ;/sf/n] jt{dfg cj:yfsf] ljZn]if0f u/L tof/ ug'{ kg]{ …/fli6«o ;'/Iff gLltÚ ;d]t cfh;Dd aGg ;s]sf] 5}g . jt{dfg kl/k|]Iodf /fi6«df slt ;]gf cfjZos kb{5 eGg] ;DaGwdf cfh;Dd cWoog tyf cf}lrTosf] vf]hL ePsf] kfOPsf] 5}g . ;]gfsf] ;+VofTds ljsf;eGbf u'0ffTds ljsf; ug]{tk{m g]t[Tj txsf] vf;} Wofg uPsf] b]lvPsf] 5}g . b]zsf ;a} ;'/Iff c+ux?nfO{ s] s:tf] sfof{b]z lbg] eGg] ;DaGwdf vf;} :ki6 ls6fg ePsf] kfOGb}g . o:tf] cj:yfdf g]t[Tjju{ ;]gfdf hft–hfltsf] ;d"xut k|j]z

14 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* tyf cf/If0f h:tf ljifodf gcNdlnsg /fli6«o ;]gfsf] dgf]an, sfo{s'zntf / o;sf] u'0f:t/ clej[l4 ug{df ljz]if Wofg lbg' kg]{ ;dosf] dfu /x]sf] 5 . c:t' M Bibliography (work cited) k|sflzt k':ts != g]kfnsf] cGtl/d ;+ljwfg @)^#, ;ftf}+ k|sfzg, sf7df8f}+M g]kfn ;/sf/ sfg"g, Gofo tyf ;+;bLo Joj:yf dGqfno, lj=;+= @)^%= @= kf08]o, dw';"wg g]kfnsf hghfltx?, t];|F] ;+:s/0f, sf7df8f}+M k}/jL k|sfzg, lj=;+= @)^#= #= a}B, t'N;L/fd tyf cGo g]kfnsf] ;}lgs Oltxf; -efu–@_, sf7df8f}+M g]kfnL h+uL c8\8f, lj=;+= @)^%= n]v, /rgf tyf ;dfrf/ $= æs0ff{nL ;]gf dfuÆ -;dfrf/_ cGgk"0f{ kf]i6, jif{ !), c+s @#!, * k'; @)^*, z'qmaf/= %= vqL, /ltGb| æ;]gfdf /fhgLlts/0fsf] ;+s]tÆ gful/s, jif{ #, c+s @#^, & k'; @)^*, laxLaf/= ^= 3n], lvd æ;}lgs ;+Vof yKbfsf] bL3{sfnLg c;/Æ sflGtk'/, jif{ !(, c+s #)!, & k'; @)^*, laxLaf/= &= e§/fO{, r"8fdl0f æn]gb]gdf ;]gfÆ g]kfn, jif{ !@, c+s !^, !* d+l;/ @)^*, cfOtaf/= *= ædw];L a6flnog agfpg] lg0f{oÆ -;dfrf/_ sflGtk'/, jif{ !(, c+s #)), ^ k'; @)^*, a'waf/= (= æ/fli6«o ;]gfnfO{ hftLo kN6g gagfpmÆ -;dfrf/_ sflGtk'/, jif{ !(, c+s #)!, & k'; @)^*, laxLaf/= !)= l/hfn, Pg=lk= ædw];L ;]gf ;dfj]zLs/0fsf] cf}lrToÆ gof“ klqsf, jif{ %, c+s @$^, !@ k'; @)^*, d+unaf/= !! -;dfrf/_ cGgk"0f{ kf]i6, jif{ !), c+s @#%, !@ k'; @)^*, d+unaf/= !@= æ;]gfdf tLg xhf/ dw];L lng] lg0f{oÆ -;dfrf/_ gful/s, jif{ #, c+s @#%, ^ k'; @)^*, a'waf/= !#= æ;]gfdf dw];L egf{ cf/If0f sf]6faf6}Æ -;dfrf/_ sflGtk'/, jif{ !(, c+s #)#, ( k'; @)^*, zlgaf/= ljleGg j]e;fO6 14. "British Recruitment Policy and the Indian Army-1757-1947" (www. sikhphilosophy. net) 15. "Ethnicity and caste in Nepal" (en.wikipedia.org) 16. "Ethnicity and Military " (www.answers.com) 17. "Ethnicity and Race in the military in US" (www.answers.com) 18. "Is Indian Army Secular?" (legalserviceindia.com/articles/indian-army.htm) 19. "Nepal: Distribution of Principal Ethnic Group, 1990" (www. countrystudies.us/nepal/31.htm) 20. "Regimentation in Indian Army" (www.hisdustantimes.com) 21. "State of Inclusiveness in Nepalese Army" (www.nepalarmy. mil.np/inclusiveness.php) 22. "Who serves in U.S. Military? The Demographics of Enlisted Troops and Offi cers" (www.heritage.org)

zlxb, jL/ / ;Gt ;a}eGbf 7'nf] pkflw xf] . — UnfO:6g

15 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf Augment Co-operation between the Nepalese Army and the Ministry of Defense through Effective Civil Military Relations - Brig Gen Binoj Basnyat 1. When you are addressing the concern “Civil Military Relations” (CMR) you come across commonly used different terms like civil control, political control or civil supremacy over the armed forces, you are dealing with the productive measures that apply the society and the interest to oversee the army or political oversight, in other words idyllic defi nition may vary. In democracies the armed forces have maintained their credibility at the same time you will get to read of many challenges that leadership of the forces face. The question is how the civil society will control those who possess the ultimate power of coercion or oppression. All forms of government weather from democracies to autocracies, the issue is do they get compliance or maintain order by consent or coercion to the regime in power and to the procedures of governance. There are enormous theoretical discussions on CMR. 2. Civil control can be understood in democracies as the control by civilian offi cials elected by the people. The procedure can allow a state to establish its values and rationale, its institution and practices by the popular will rather than on the choices of military leaders. In the last two centuries, war has become too complex--the preparations too elaborate, the weapons too sophisticated, command too arduous, operations too intricate--to leave the waging of combat to amateurs or part-time practitioners. As a result, the professional military's infl uence has grown, either from circumstance or from necessity.1 3. This paper is an attempt to generate debates on Nepal’s changing security environment as well as fi nd measures to effectively professionalize the Nepalese Army (NA) and at the same time oversee political control. It has been widely recognized that Nepal has been passing through a transition in its political, social, foreign and security policy purviews. 4. Democratic control of armed forces focuses not only on the subordination of the military to democratically elected civilian authorities, but also to the legal standards and principles of democracy enforced by the agencies of government. This is central to the theory and practice of CMR. 5. James Burk suggests that democratic values include the idea that “those with authority ought to be elected representatives of the people and these representatives ought to exercise ultimate authority over the uniform military elite”. 2 It is necessary to align the interests of both the military leaders and the democratic society. 6. Half a century ago the great theorist of civilian control, Samuel P. Huntington, argued in The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations, that the approach to the most favourable way of civilian supremacy was to acknowledge such "self- directed military professionalism."3 7. Civil control has signifi cance in Nepal than ever before for the consolidation of democracy at the same time not jeopardizing the non political and professional organization,

1 http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html, accessed 25 Sept 2011 2 Burk, J, “Theories of democratic Civil-Military Relations,’ Armed Forces and Society, vol 29, iss 1, Fall 2002. Pg 8. 3 http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html, accessed 25 Sept 2011

16 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* therefore all appear to rummage around for a valuable means and measures that can engage in recreation to enhance the co-operation between the NA and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) for each and every one of the multiethnic society to exercise their rights. Therefore the foundation can be determined by the following determinants fi rstly by the existence of a democratic government and the rule of law, secondly the accountability to public institutions thirdly is effective countervailing power and lastly by military tradition committed to neutrality and for all. 8. I feel it is essential to look into the backdrop of the ongoing political dilemma in Nepal that is related to the Security Sector Development (SSD). The clause that spelt democratization of the NA in the constitution soared oodles of different opinion, the NA translating it as professionalization, and others as control over by the MoD but the main concern was the misgiving of NA going against the pronouncement of a legitimate government. The interim constitution para 114 provides the basis for the Nepalese Army. Sub-para 3 and 4 of para 114 is as follows and plays an important role in the building the co-operative and creating conducive environment for enhancing the relationship between the NA and the MoD under CMR “The Council of Ministers shall control, mobilize and manage the Nepal Army in accordance with the law. The Council of Ministers shall, with the consent of the political parties and by seeking the advice of the concerned committee of the Legislature-Parliament, formulate an extensive work plan for the democratization of the Nepal Army and implement it. In the case of formulating and implementing the action plan pursuant to clause (3), determination of the appropriate number of the Nepal Army, its democratic structure and national and inclusive character shall be developed, and training shall be imparted to the army in accordance with the norms and values of democracy and human rights.”4 9. Political instability plays a signifi cant share in the formulation of the constitution and establishment of peace in the nation that the people so desire but also assists the countries to deepen its wounds. The impact may be unimaginable. What is the time doing? It may be benevolent to the political parties that have come to govern adequate time to consolidate and legitimize but at the same time the question is; is it really serving the overall security state of affairs. The dawdling economic development and unemployment is inviting multi dimensional challenges may it be ethnic issues and values that the nation stood for. The difference inside the political parties and intra party dissimilarity in ideological theme may be observed as creating this security vacuum. 10. This scepticism may impact the relation that the MoD and the NA would desire under the CMR heading but at the same time the people have in hand the constituent assembly that can pronounce the national interest and the security policy, which will provide a platform for the MoD and high level military generals. 11. The Cabinet few months ago endorsed the structure of the MoD as shown in fi gure 1 as a major restructuring initiative. The government has started the process of revamp the MoD to make more effi cient the line of communication and implement better civilian oversight of the NA.5

4 http://www.nic.gov.np/download/interim-constitution.pdf, accessed on 25 Sept 2011 5 http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2011/08/02/top-story/the-shake-up-government-sets-defence- ministry-revamp-process-rolling/224717.html, accessed 24 Sept 2011

17 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

Figure 1: Major Restructuring Initiative 12. Machiavelli would disagree that a "military man cannot be a good man", Voltaire would depict them as the "manifestation of brute force in rationalized form",6 and Samuel Adams would state that a standing army, however necessary it may be, is always dangerous to the liberties of the people,7 more than a few post-war political scientists began thinking of the military as a lawful pressure assembly, competent of singing a positive role in the socio- political alteration of the newly states transiting to democracies after armed confl ict.8 Amount of them come into view with Finer’s hypothesis that "in all countries ruled by civilians, the armed forces...are in no better, but certainly no worse a moral position than any (other) branch of civil management...to persuade the political elites to their point of view".9 13. The change in the attitude of the civil society towards the military institution was not due to probability; it was because of the commitment of the armed forces. The Second World War terminated the long-established position of the military as an instrument of a state’s territorial expansion, its usefulness as a conjugal force was improved. It may be argued that one of the few highly 'westernized' institutions, the military was seen as the single most effective pressure group capable of playing a positive role in an attempt to reach a higher level in the social and political progress of a nation state.10The introduction of liberal, western economic and political institutions in non relevant states had upset the permanence of the latter’s long-established socio-political structure; the military appeared to be the only group capable of enforcing and preserving political steadiness and order. Hence, as the duties of the offi cers had to undergo such a substantial change and the entire institution was asked to play a multidimensional domestic role, the western academic world was forced to re-examine its old views on CMR. 14. A number of theorists like Janowitz, however, started to point out that one should not perplex discipline and organizational capacity. Whereas the military offi cers have been trained

6 Quoted from Lyle McAlister, 'Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America', Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, Vol.160, (1965), p86 7 H.A. Cushing, (ed) The writings of Samuel Adams [New York: Putnam, 1907] p250 8 Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations [Chicago:University of Chicago Press 1964], p101 9 Allan Millet, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military [Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1979], p137 10 John Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964], p339 18 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* to operate effi ciently when assigned to specifi c tasks, their effect on the broad economic development of any country would, at best, be minimal due to "limitations inherent in the profession".11 The process of democratization and CMR cannot take place and bring result overnight; 12however, it gives the impression that it constitutes the only viable solution to peace and security. As President Clinton pointed out in his speech at Georgetown University in 1991, countries with democratic governments are more likely to be reliable partners in trade and diplomacy and less likely a threat to peace than those with other forms of government.13 15. For a better perceptive of the type of CMR which control a political life of a country as well as its level of democratization, the creation of a multi-factorial model is needed. The following factors must be measured for a composite one: First, the armed forces. A close surveillance to the size of the military institution,14 the social background 15 and the level of professionalization16 of its associates, their political ideology,17 their level of consistency and unity18 as well as that of their aspiration to protect their institutions interest,19 could, as Janowitz disagrees, offer us a better possibility for “comprehend (ing) both the offi cers, (their) internal competence and their leaning to interfere in domestic politics”.20 16. Second, the organization should take into account the outcome of the domestic social,21 economic22 and the political23 environment in which the armed forces exist and perform.

11 Janowitz, op.cit., p80 12 “Democratic governance” , Kagan argues, relies mainly on the fact that there is “a body of citizens who possess a good understanding of the principles of democracy or who have developed a character consistent with the democratic way of life’. All this takes time-not just years but decades.” quoted from Strobe Talbott, ‘Democracy and the National Interest’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, November/December 1996, p.62 13 At the same time, Huntington was confi rming Clinton’s ideology by pointing out that “ From the early nineteenth century down to 1990...democracies did no t, with only trivial or formal exceptions, fi ght other democracies...On the basis of past experience, an overwhelmingly democratic world is likely to be a world relatively free of international violence.” in S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991] p.29 14 Whereas Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in America [New York: Schocken, 1961]p.324 and Stanislav Andrenski, Military Organization and Society [Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1968] p.5 claim that large militaries constitute a great danger to ademocratic government, Aristide Zolberg, ‘The structure of political confl ict in thenew states of tropical Africa’, American Political Science Review, Vol.64, (1970), andEdward Feit, Armed Bureaucrats [Boston: Muffl in, 1973] pp6-7, argue that the smallerthe size of the military, the greater their propensity to intervene. 15 Manfred Halpern, ‘Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class’, in Johnson,(1962), op.cit., pp286-7, Eric Nordlinger, ‘Soldiers in Mufti’, American Political ScienceReview, Vol. 64, (1970), and Jose Nunn, ‘The Middle Class Military Coup’, in ClaudioVeliz (ed), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America [London: Oxford University Press,1967] 16 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State [Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UniversityPress, 1957]; Bengt Abrahamson, Military Professionalization and Political Power[Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972] ; Jacques VanDoorn, Military Profession and MilitaryRegimes [The Hague: Mouton, 1969] 17 Morris Janowitz and Jacques VanDoorn (eds), On Military Ideology [Rotterdam:Rotterdam University Press, 1971] 18 William Thompson, ‘Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes’,Comparative Political Studies, Vol.9, (1976) and Clapman and Philip, op.cit., p.6 19 Finer, op.cit., p.41, Nordlinger, (1977), op.cit., p.78 and William Thompson,‘Corporate coup-maker grievances and types of regime targets’, ComparativePolitical Studies, Vol.12, (1980) 20 Janowitz, (1964), op.cit., p.2 21 Huntington, (1968), op.cit, pp.195-196, Putnam, op.cit., p.96, Andrenski, op.cit.,pp.55-99 22 Ergil Fossum, ‘Factors infl uencing the occurrence of military coups in LatinAmerica’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.4, (1967) 23 Huntington, (1968), op.cit., pp193-194 and Juan Linz, The Breakdown ofDemocratic Regimes [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986] 19 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

Consideration must be paid to political factor since it greatly determines if the process of democratization has established strong roots in any country.24 Third, the role of the international factor and more particularly the persuade which the important foreign powers exercise upon both the armed forces and the domestic forces of the country.25 Last but not least, the past and present role of the military organization in the progression of CMR in any state should be examined. Foreign power does play an important role and a stress must be put. The ‘military factor’ in CMR is only examined and concerned only after an intervention occurs at the same time the role of the military is often than not neglected in domestic issues or domestic policy making process. But writers emphasize the abrupt factor that lead to military intervention; they forget that the armed forces as "a system of continuous purposive activity of specifi ed kind"26 functions within the civil society before the pre-intervention stage. As Johnson tips out, "the direct control of government by high ranking offi cers or military juntas is only a crude indication of the role that the armed forces may be playing at a given moment, for men in uniform have sundry ways of making their will felt". 27As a result, patron-client relations not only inside the military establishment but also between its members and the civilian government ought not to be overlooked.28 The planned and smooth, or violent, transition from military rule to another form of government, (mainly democratic), in peripheral countries, and its effect on the evolution of civilian rule in them, deserves attention.29 Since the role of the military indecision-making processes often exceeds its immediate sphere of occupational reference, its changing role in a transformed society must be scrutinized. 17. If Nepal lies at the lap of China and the top of India both emerging economics and with the largest top fi ve standing armies can also be observed as the heart of the two giants of Asia- Pacifi c region. Even if the vicinity is close and the difference is almost in everything from their perception, size, population, religion, culture. Their economic performance is immense but the geo-strategic importance for both China and India may be considered for the evolution of CMR. 18. One of the high points in efforts to democratize the nation and civil control over the NA was the willingness of the political parties including the UNCPM under the democratic framework. It is imperative for democratic political control and democratic military professionalism as essential elements for military institutions in a democratic state. 19. The civilian political elite should and must relate with the professional military in defi ning threats and then establishing constitutional and institutional defense policies on size and complexity, recruitment, training, career planning, retention, retirement, budgets and acquisitions, force deployment and power projection, rules of engagement and human rights protection. Other important areas include defense diplomacy, the relationship of the military to

24 Thomas Bruneau and Alex MacLeod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Partiesand the Consolidation of Democracy [Boulder: Lynne Riemer, 1986], Felipe Aguero,The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Context: Spain inComparative Perspective [Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Duke University, 1991] andGeoffrey Prindham, ‘Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: DemocraticConsolidation in Southern Europe’, West European Politics, Vol.13, (1990) 25 Geoffrey Prindham (ed), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context ofRegime Transition in Southern Europe [New York: St. Martin’s, 1991], Kenneth Maxwell(ed), Democracy and Foreign Policy [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992] 26 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations (edit) TalcottParsons [New York: Free Press, 1964], p151 27 Johnson, (1964), op.cit., p7 28 Harold Grouch, 'Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia', World Politics, Vol.31, (1979), pp577-578 29 Henri Barkey, 'Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition', Armed Forces andSociety, Vol.16, (1990) and Linz, Stepan and Gunther, op.cit.

20 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* the international community, peace operations and regional security issues. Such discussions should clarify the boundaries of acceptable involvement of the NA in national and international politics, its relationship with the media, NGOs, nascent environmental pressure groups and other new non-state actors. 20. The dialogue on civil control with the civil society on CMR should be constructively achieved without the usual complicating Nepalese factors of ethnicity, religion, inaccuracy and plain mischief. What is the relation between the commander and the statesman? 21. Lastly, sustained commitment of external actors to the professionalization process can be very important resource building and assistance in capacity building of the MoD and the NA. 22. The structural alterations of the MoD should lead to facilitating the responsibilities of the NA in performing its responsibilities and professionalizing the organization under CMR through god governance. References Books 1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. (Vintage Books, 1964) 2. Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder. The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy. (Doubleday, 1954) 3. Lyle McAlister, 'Changing Concepts of the Role of the Military in Latin America', Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, Vol.160, (1965) 4. H.A. Cushing, (ed) The writings of Samuel Adams [New York: Putnam, 1907] 5. Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations [Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1964] 6. Allan Millet, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military [Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1979] 7. John Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964] 8. “Democratic governance”, Democracy and the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, Vol.75, November/December 1996 9. S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991] 10. Alexis deTocqueville, Democracy in America [New York: Schocken, 1961] 11. Manfred Halpern, ‘Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class’, in Johnson, (1962 12. Eric Nordlinger, ‘Soldiers in Mufti’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, (1970) 13. Jose Nunn, ‘The Middle Class Military Coup’, in Claudio Veliz (ed), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America [London: Oxford University Press, 1967] 14. Bengt Abrahamson, Military Professionalization and Political Power [Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972] 15. Jacques VanDoorn, Military Profession and Military Regimes [The Hague: Mouton, 1969] 16. Morris Janowitz and Jacques VanDoorn (eds), On Military Ideology [Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971] 17. William Thompson, ‘Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.9, (1976)

21 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

18. Finer, op.cit., Nordlinger, (1977), op.cit., and William Thompson , ‘Corporate coup-maker grievances and types of regime targets’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol.12, (1980) 19. Janowitz, (1964) 20. Ergil Fossum, ‘Factors infl uencing the occurrence of military coups in Latin America’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.4, (1967) 21. Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986] 22. Thomas Bruneau and Alex MacLeod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy [Boulder: Lynne Riemer, 1986], Felipe Aguero, The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Context: Spain in Comparative Perspective [Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Duke University, 1991] and Geoffrey Prindham, ‘Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe’, West European Politics, Vol.13, (1990) 23. Geoffrey Prindham (ed), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe [New York: St. Martin’s, 1991], Kenneth Maxwell (ed), Democracy and Foreign Policy [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1992] 24. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations (edit) Talcott Parsons [New York: Free Press, 1964] 25. Harold Grouch, 'Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia', World Politics, Vol.31, (1979) 26. Henri Barkey, 'Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition', Armed Forces and Society, Vol.16, (1990) and Linz, Stepan and Gunther, op.cit. Web Sites 1. ekantipur.com 2. nepalnews.com 3. www.core-hamburg.de/documents/yearbook/english/07/Cottey-en.pdf 4. www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/karabeli.pdf 5. www.nic.gov.np/download/interim-constitution.pdf 6. www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0003.pdf 7. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilian_control_of_the_military 8. www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl.../kohn.html 9. www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/DOCS/.../dmpaper12.html 10. www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45870 11. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_3/kohn.html 12. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil-military_relations Journals 1. China’s Strategic Perspective – 2, Institute fi r National Strategic Studies, Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing the PLA’s Role in Elite Politics, by Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders 2. Civil Military Relations: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of the Military in the Political Transformation of Post-War Turkey and Greece: 1980-1995, by Dr. Gerassimos Karabelias (Final Report submitted to North Atlantic, Treaty Organization (NATO) in June 1998) 3. Nepal Interim Constitution by UNDP

22 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* Nepal’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping: An Analysis of Achievements and Challenges

- Brig Gen Purna B. Silwal1 Background

1. “Peacekeeping is not a job of soldiers, but only soldiers can do it”, said UN General Secretary Dag Hammerskjöld back in 1961. The demand for UN peacekeepers has been rising ever since the end of the cold war era. As of 30 November 1990, number of UN peacekeepers was 10,3042. Twenty years down the road as of November 2010, the fi gure surged to 99,2453. The continuous surge of UN Missions for the maintenance of international peace and security is the manifestation of trust and confi dence parties in the confl ict worldwide have bestowed in the United Nations as impartial and most trustworthy international body. Now, UN peacekeeping remains stabilized with the fi gure 98,647 (November 2011) in 15 UN peacekeeping missions around the world. To backup the surge, annual budget of UN peacekeeping has reached over USD 7 billion. 2. As far as Nepal’s contribution is concerned, it soared amazingly from 851 in 1990 to 5,3184 in Apr 2010. Now, Nepal ranks sixth largest contributor5 with 4,281 peacekeepers to the UN peacekeeping after Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria and Ethiopia. Nepal’s entry into in this noble cause began in 1958 with six military observers in United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). Nepal contributed formed military units for the fi rst time in Sinai in 1974. As of now Nepal has participated in over 40 different UN peacekeeping missions including the diffi cult ones. More than 80,000 troops and police have participated in the UN peacekeeping in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America and 64 brave soldiers and policemen have made their ultimate sacrifi ce to the cause of international peace and security. Four Nepalese Army Generals thus have far served as Force Commander in UN Missions in Middle East and Africa. Aim 3. Aim of this paper is to analyze achievements and challenges of Nepal’s contribution to the UN peacekeeping. Policy and Capacity Dimension 4. The fundamental objective of the foreign policy is to enhance the dignity of Nepal in the international arena by maintaining the sovereignty, integrity and independence of the country6. Thus far, contribution of troops and police peacekeepers to the UN has been one of

1 Brig Gen Silwal has served as Military Adviser in the Permanent Mission of Nepal to the United Nations, New York from July 2008 to July 2011. 2 UN Peacekeeping Resources: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml 3 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml 4 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml 5 The status is based on the fi gure as of 30 Nov 2011 as mentioned in the UN website. 6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mofa.gov.np/foreignpolicy/

23 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf the visible and effective tools of the Government of Nepal to enhance her image and dignity in the international arena. The participation in the UN peacekeeping has been a great opportunity for country like Nepal to contribute something within its capacity for the maintenance of international peace and security. 5. As far as my personal experience goes, at times, United Nations has given high priority for the deployment of Nepalese troops in the fi eld missions. DPKO has directly made special requests to Nepal to contribute troops to some specifi c missions for a particular role. This is however, not a normal practice of decision-making process in the DPKO. This is the vindication of image and credibility Nepalese peacekeepers have earned thus far in tough confl ict environments. Nepal’s contribution of Force Reserve Battalion to Chad (MINURCAT) and South Sudan (UNMISS) are some examples, among other, to this effect. The operational role of the Force Reserve Battalion is extremely challenging. 6. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations popularly known as Brahimi report has stressed that UN should have the capacity to deploy peacekeepers within 30 days in traditional peacekeeping missions and within 90 days in multidimensional and complex peacekeeping missions. There are number of countries that can meet these standards. Nepal needs to do a lot to build such capacities to deploy troops and police formed units in peacekeeping missions within the stipulated time. Government of Nepal should invest some funds to equip at least one infantry / mechanized battalion and one FPU to keep them ready for this purpose. This would avoid Darfur like situation where procurement and deployment of major equipment such as APCs was a serious problem. Bilateral assistance is one way of fi lling the equipment gap for peacekeeping. During my tenure, after long diplomatic negotiation, the United States of America assisted Nepal with ten bullet proof military vehicles namely, HMMVs for Special Force Company in Darfur. Equipping units for peacekeeping should be the government responsibility rather than that of institutional alone. 7. Nepal has some added advantages for acceptance in UN peacekeeping due to the fact that Nepal is non-aligned, impartial, peace-loving and Hindu country, though offi cially secular. These characters have provided edge over many other contributors in specifi c host country situation. The bravery, discipline, loyalty, professionalism, and the image of Gorkha soldiers have value added to Nepal’s acceptance in UN peacekeeping. 8. The caveat put up by some troop contributing countries has been a serious problem in implementation of the UN mandates in the UN peacekeeping missions. Nepal has never put up any caveats that would undermine the Force Commanders’ orders and instruction. Nepalese battalion and company commanders have fully complied with the orders from mission headquarters in accordance with the national policy. Nepal has been redeploying whole units or part of it for permanent or temporary period in full compliance with the UN’s policy. This has been highly commended by the DPKO. New Trends and Challenges 9. In recent years, the United Nations has undertaken some policy review after 2000’s landmark Brahimi report. To assess major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN peacekeeping today, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) have jointly undertaken New Horizon Initiative in 2009. New Horizon aims to “reinvigorate the ongoing dialogue with stakeholders on possible solutions to better

24 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* calibrate UN Peacekeeping to meet current and future requirements”7. Based on the New Horizon concept, UN has been engaging new and capable troops and police contributing countries to broaden the base of the troop contributors. DFS has undertaken a study on ‘Global Field Support Strategy’ (GFSS) within the framework of New Horizon concepts. According to the GFSS, UN will establish Global Support Center in Brindisi, Italy and Regional Support Center in Kampala, Uganda soon. Another important project it has undertaken is designing of modern and environment friendly camps for uniformed peacekeepers in the fi eld. 10. As part of the ‘Capacity Driven Strategy’ of New Horizon Initiative, DPKO has undertaken three projects – development of standards for infantry battalion, development of standards for staff offi cers and development of standards for medical unit. Based on the recommended policy guidelines, troop contributing countries will have to fulfi ll these standards for their participation in future. Deployment of major equipments such as APCs on timely basis has been a critical challenge to Nepal. Government of Nepal should take a leadership role for the management of procurement, maintenance and reimbursement of major equipments. Unless equipment issues were resolved through policy decisions, Nepal’s image will be tarnished in the international fi eld. 11. During this author’s tour of duty as Military Adviser in the Permanent Mission of Nepal to the U.N., Nepal’s contribution surged by over 40%, from about 3,600 to about 5,400 military and police peacekeepers. For the fi rst time in Nepal’s history, the fi gures surpassed 5,000 peacekeepers. The latest deployment took place in Darfur, Chad, and Lebanon. Mobile and Static Security has recently been deployed as part of United Nations Guard Unit (UNGU) in Iraq and deployment of Force Reserve Battalion to South Sudan is underway. With the deployment of UNGU in Iraq, Nepal’s relations with United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA) will be established. Until 2011, Nepal has maintained the deployment of four mechanized battalions, one engineer company, one special force company, one sector reserve company and two MP Units in Lebanon, DR Congo, Haiti, Darfur, and Liberia. Four FPUs are deployed in Liberia, Haiti and Darfur. To ensure sustained contribution, Nepal should develop capacities to diversify Nepal’s contribution from predominantly combat units (Infantry/mechanized) to support units such as Level II Hospital, Military Utility Helicopters, Engineer Company, MP Units and Transporter Company. Military Utility Helicopters are in high demand in UN peacekeeping missions. UN is in short supply of about 50% of authorized military utility helicopters. 12. Countries emerging from the confl ict have large number of military force looking for the opportunity to participate in UN peacekeeping. Some capable East Asian countries contribute small number of troops and they fall under potential large contributors. United Nations is exploring new and capable countries that can deploy well-equipped and highly trained troops in peacekeeping missions. UN peacekeeping is therefore, highly competitive enterprise now. Nepal should keep track of fast-changing demands and requirements of the United Nations and carryout capability reform accordingly. Likewise, UN requires highly competitive staff offi cers to work at fi eld mission and UN headquarters. They have to work with counterparts from Europe, Asia and Africa. A lot of troops contributing countries coming from these regions are native English and French speakers and some of them have English or French as their offi cial language. 7 The New Horizon Process document handout.

25 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

13. Currently, DPKO has target of hiring 20% female in Police component and 5% female in military component in UN peacekeeping. Now, 111 Nepalese female are participating in UN peacekeeping. This makes 2.6% of the current number. Now India and Bangladesh have deployed female FPU in fi eld missions. Enhancement of female peacekeepers is one of the areas where Nepal can explore its potential. Nepal’s Concerns 14. Nepal has been voicing its serious concerns in the United Nations that Nepal does deserve senior positions at managerial and decision-making level in DPKO and fi eld missions as being one of the oldest and largest troop contributing countries. As of now Nepal has got only one Deputy Military Adviser’s position in the Offi ce of Military Affairs in DPKO. In 53 year’s history of Nepal’s contribution to the UN peacekeeping, only four Major Generals have got Force Commander’s position in Israel & Iraq-Kuwait (UNTSO and UNIKOM), Golan Heights (UNDOF), Cyprus (UNFYCIP) and Sudan (UNMIS). Nepal is lagging behind in getting senior staff offi cer’s vacancies in fi eld mission headquarters. High level diplomatic lobby and enhancement of offi cer’s competencies are both equally important elements in this regard. Achievements 15. For last several years, Nepal has constantly maintained the rank of fi fth largest troop and police contributing country on the basis of three year’s average ranking. There are no other sectors where Nepal has gained such a height in international arena except peacekeeping. The contributions of Nepalese peacekeepers in many parts of the world have made the difference to bring about peace and stability. Nepalese peacekeepers have been a good ambassador to promote Nepalese cultures, tourism and history in different part of the world. While giving out message on the fi ftieth anniversary of Nepal’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called it a “shining example”. In early 2011, General- Secretary Ban Ki-moon highly praised the performance of Special Force and Sector Reserve Company in Darfur before the Permanent Representatives of top ten troop contributing countries who were meeting him to discuss the issue of salary raise to UN peacekeepers. 16. Nepal was elected as member in Security Council in 1969-70 and 1989-90. As fi ve top providers of military personnel and civilian police to the UN missions Nepal has been the member of 31-member Peace Building Commission (PBC) from the outset. Other four members are Bangladesh, India, Nigeria and Pakistan. This is a matter of great achievement and pride for a small country like Nepal. 17. As one of the top-fi fteen troops and police contributors, Nepalese Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal was invited by United States President Barrack Obama as chair of Security Council to the Security Council meeting in 2009. This was unprecedented recognition to Nepal as one of the old and top troop contributor to UN peacekeeping. In the meeting, Prime Minister Nepal had the opportunity to deliver Nepal’s perspectives in UN peacekeeping and international peace and security. 18. Nepal’s UN peacekeeping training centre imparts training to military offi cers of United States, UK, China, Bangladesh and many other friendly countries. This is the oldest peacekeeping training centre in South Asia. This is one area where Nepal can really develop and strengthen cooperation with the United Nations, and the world and regional powers. Nepal 26 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* has lot to share with other stakeholders and they are prepared to listen from Nepal as the oldest contributor to UN peacekeeping. Therefore, a national effort and commitment is required to develop and strengthen this centre. 19. As largest contributor, Nepal has been participating in all thematic discussion forums on peacekeeping conducted worldwide. United Nations and other host countries have invited Nepal in all such forums. I have personally participated and shared Nepal’s experience in number of forums in New York. All say, they want to listen from country like Nepal about its vast experiences in UN peacekeeping. 20. Thousands of Nepalese Army and police offi cers and men have received international exposures in the UN missions around the world. Exchange of ideas and professional cultures with peacekeepers from developed and developing countries have attributed a lot for the development of professionalism. Way Forward and Conclusion 21. There is no doubt that the participation in UN peacekeeping is at the best interest of Nepal. It has short and long term benefi ts to Nepal especially as least developed, small, buffer and land-locked country. Government of Nepal should adopt systematic approach at policy and operational level to improve preparedness and diplomatic skills in UN peacekeeping. Intra-governmental and intra-agency coordination and cooperation must be shaped and institutionalized to achieve national and foreign policy objectives. 22. At operational level, Nepalese Army should give more emphasis on professional and language skills development of offi cers and men. Today, knowledge on English, French and local language of host country matters a lot to demonstrate professionalism and communication skills. Another important aspect is the management of support side which includes swift procurement of major equipment and the maintenance in particular. Experience reveals that maintenance of equipment in order for keeping the units in operational readiness is most important. Weaknesses in this aspect would tarnish Nepal’s image in the fi eld missions. An institutional mechanism should be established to move this process in coordinated, sustained and coherent manner. 23. Lastly, Military Adviser in the Permanent Mission of Nepal to the UN should be selected from amongst the best. The Military Adviser needs to have three important skills- professional, language / communication and diplomatic. Bibliography 1. UN website, 2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 3. Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi report), 4. The New Horizon Process, United Nations Peacekeeping, < http://www.un.org/en/ peacekeeping/operations/newhorizon.shtml> 5. Data Archive in the Offi ce of Military Adviser in the Permanent Mission of Nepal to the U.N., New York

27 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf g]kfn c+u|]h o'4sf] sf/0f / kl/0ffd

– dxf ;]gfgL k|]dl;+x a:Goft, Ph.D. cg';Gwfgdf cK7]/f] != g]kfn c+u|]h o'4df g]kfnL ;]gfn] n8]sf] n8fO{+x?sf] af/]df g]kfnsf] tkm{af6 olsg clen]vx? k|FKt ePsf] b]lv+b}g . jf:tjdf of] o'4 tTsfnLg j]nfot ;fd|fHo;+u ge} j]nfotaf6 ef/tdf Jofkf/ ug{ cfPsf] Oi6 OlG8of s+kgL gfds k|fOe]6 c+u;+u ePsf] lyof] . g]kfnL hËL c8\8Fdf /x]sf k'/fgf o'4 clen]vx?df clGtd g]kfn-ef]6 o'4b]lv dfq cf+l;s?kdf pknAw /x]sf] a'lemG5 . k|fKt hfgsf/L / o; n]vsn] b]v]cg';f/ xfn k//fi6« dGqfnosf] h};L sf]7fdf ;]gf ;DaGwL cgluGtL k'/fgf sfuhkq 5g\ .! ;'lgG5, tL sfuhkq xfn /fli6«o clen]vfnodf k'u]sf 5g\ . To;df o; o'4af/] y'k|} sfuhft /x]sf] 5 . ltgnfO{ ;fj{hlgs ul/Psf] 5}g . xfn;Dd n]lvPsf / k|sflzt ePsf k':ts tyf n]vx? a[l6;x?n] n]v]sf k':tsx?af6 cg'jflbt 5g, d'Vo ;|f]t tL g} x'g\ . To;df pgLx?n] cfkm\gf] o'4 s;/L ;+rfng u/] eGg] af/]df j0F{g ul/Psf 5g\ . o'4df ljh]tfn] hlxn] klg b'idgnfO{ a9fO{ r9fO{ u/L n]v]sf] x'G5, tf ls To;af6 a9f] axfb'/Ltfsf] ;fy o'4 lht]sf] b]lvof];\ . tf ls, d';f]nfO{ la/fnf]n] df/]sf ] h:tf]dfq gxf];\ . t/, g]kfn /fHo cfk}mn] eg] s;/L o'4 n8\of] eg]/ n]lvPsf] e]l6+b}g . cfk\mgf] o'4sf] :j?k (Design of battle) yfxf g} gkfO{ n]lvPsf] ;}lgs Oltxf; c+w]/f]df 9'Ëf xfg] h:t} x'G5 . g]kfnL kIFsf] sltko j0F{gx? clt /fi6«jfbL, jL/, axfb'/ eP/ n]lvPsf klg 5g\, h;df lbOPsf cf+s8F / o'4 j0F{g l;g]dfsf h:tf klg 5g\ . ;}lgs cf“vf / ljZn]if0Faf6 n]lvPsf kfO+b}gg\ . c+u|]hnfO{ ufnL u/]/ / xfdL g]kfnLn] Tof] o'4 xf/]sf lyof} eGg g;s]/ km'na'§f eg'{ kbf{ klg sltko ljj/0Fx? ckTofl/nf 5g\ . oL sdhf]/L n]vs jf AolQmsf]dfq xf]Og, /fi6«s} xf] . /fi6«n] clen]v /fv]df jf b]vfO{ lbPdfdfq AolQmn] ;xL Oltxf; n]Vg ;S5 . o;y{, pQm Limitation leq of] n]vs klg k/]sf] 5 . oBlk, g]kfn c+u|]h o'4 ePsf s]xL d'Vo :ynx?sf] hldgL cWoog x]/]/ klg of] n]v tof/ ul/Psf] 5 . xfdLn] xf/]sf] n8FO“nfO{ xf/]sf xf}+ / sdhf]/L ePsf] g]t[Tj ju{sf] sdhf]/L b]vfpg] k|of; ug{' h?/L 5 . pu|/fi6«jfbL eP/ xf/]sf] o'4nfO{ lht]sf] egL n]Vg'eGbf casf] k':tfnfO{ jf:tljs Oltxf;sf] hfgsf/L u/fpg' xfdL n]vsx?sf] g}ltstf 7fGb5' . o'4 x'g'sf] sf/0F

@= g]kfn c+u|]h o'4 x'g'df g]kfn / O{i6 OlG8of sDkgL aLrsf] /fhg}lts OR5fdf plAhPsf] åGå (Clash on Political Intrest) g} xf] . g]kfn gj pboLdfg ;fd|fHo agfpg] e"ldsfdf lyof], t/ ;fd|fHo agfpg p;n] w]/} kl/>d ug{ af“sL g} lyof] . t'ngf ug'{kbf{ uf]vf{ h:tf] ;fgf] /fHoaf6@ ;'? u/]sf] ljho cleofg k"j{df l;lSsd / klZrddf sf“u8f, pQ/df lxdfno / blIf0fdf k'l0Fof, ;/fg, uf]/vk'/, a/]nL glhs nufotsf] dw];;Dd k'Ug ;kmn ePsf] lyof] . tL :yfgx? clxn] ef/tsf] clt pAhfp x'g] e"dL / 7"nf ;x/n] 9flsPsf 5g\ . tL hdLg clxn] klg g]kfnsf] ePsf] eP slt ;DkGg g]kfn x'GYof] xf]nf < sNkgf ug{ ;lsG5 . csf]{ s'/f uf]vf{nLx? t/fOdf hdLGbf/ / ltgsf] df}hf sAhf u/]/ g]kfnsf] cfly{s l:ylt alnof] kfb}{ lyP . o;/L g]kfn blIf0f-klZrd Onfsf RofKb} PsLs/0F cleofgdf lyof] eg] c+u|]h pQ/-k"jL{ Onfsfdf cfkm\gf] ;fd|fHo a9fp“b} lyof] . xfn g]kfnsf] blIF0FL l;dfjtL{ Onfsf, hxf“ g]kfnn] sAhf u/]sf] lyof], tL :yfg c+u|]hn] g]kfnnfO{ 5f8\g] jfnf lyPg eg] csf]{ p;sf] d'Vo OR5f eg]sf] ltAat / rLg;“usf] Aofkf/ dfu{ v'nfpg' lyof] . h'g p2]Zo sf7df08f}, l;lSsd / s'dfp If]q p;n] sAhf u/]dfdfq ;Dej lyof] . To;a]nf p;nfO{ s'dfp+ If]q a9L dxTjk"0F{ nfUof] . lsgeg] To; If]q sAhf u/]df ltAat / rLg;“u Aofkf/ ug]{ af6f] v'Ng] / w]/} pAhfp x'g] km“f6 klg xft nfUg] lyof] . t;y{ c+u|]h s'dfp+nfO{ a9L dxTj lbGYof] h'g g]kfnLsf] sAhfdf lyof] . #= jf:tjdf c+u|]h zlQm sf7df08f}nfO{ sAhf ug]{eGbf klg zlQmzfnL g]kfnsf] kv]6f sf6]/ o;sf] ;}Go zlQmnfO{ /f]Sg rfxGYof] . pgLx?sf] o'4 /0FgLltdf g]kfn b]z k"/}nfO{ Pp6f ;Lldt kxf8L e"-efudf Contain ug{ rfxGy] .

! =lj=;+=@)%* df n]vsn] ( dlxgf hlt Toxf+ /x]sf] k'/fgf sfuhkq 5fglag ug]{ 6f]nLdf sfd u/]sf] lyof] . @ To;avt uf]vf{ /fHo afO;]–rf}aL;]eGbf aflx/sf], ;a}eGbf sfG5f] / ul/a klg lyof] .

28 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

$= g]kfn blIf0f-klZrddf / c+u|]h pQ/-k"j{df /fHo lj:tf/ ub}{ a9\bf cjZo klg b'O{j6f zlQmsf] Ps 7Fp“df e]6 x'GYof] g} < clg b'j} b]zsf] political intrest df Clash kg]{ k|jn ;Defjgf lyof] / ;f]af/] b'j} b]zn] cGbfh nufPsf klg lyP . pQm Clash eg]sf] Military confontration g} xf] / Tof] g} To;avtsf] pkfo klg lyof] . o;y{ k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxb]lvs} blIF0Ftkm{sf] ;Ldf ljjfb / g]kfnn] s'dfp+, u9jfn;Dd sAhf ug'{ g} c+u|]hsf] nflu 7"nf] Threat aGof] .# East India Company k};f sdfpg cfPsf]n] p;n] hlxn] klg cfly{s kmfObf g} x]b{Yof] . csf]{ zAbdf eGg' kbf{ c+u|]hsf] cfly{s /0FgLltdf g]kfnaf6 afwf k'Ug] eP/ klg g]kfn-c+u|]h o'4 ePsf] lyof] . ljzfn ;fd|fHo v8f ul/;s]sf] c+u|]h / gof“ zlQmsf]?kdf pbfPsf] g]kfnaLrsf] d'Vo åGå /fhg}lts OR5fzlQm g} lyof] . oBlk lgDg cGo sf/0Fn] ;d]t o'4sf] k[i7e"dL tof/ u/]sf] lyof]M- -s_ afO;]-rf}aL;] /fHo 5“b} g]kfn / ef/tLo ;Ldfgfsf] olsg x'g g;sL To;avt klg ljjflbt lyof] . k|foMh;f] t/fO{sf] kmf“6x? a+ufn / cjwsf gjfjsf] /x]sf] / g]kfn;“u ;Ldf hf]l8Psf lyP . tL hUuf afO;]- rf}aL;] /fHo;“u ;Ldf hf]l8Psf g]kfnsf /fhfx?n] g} /fHosf] tkm{af6 gjfjx?nfO{ s/ ltb}{ sdfp“b} cfPsf lyP eg] sltko hUuf No man's land h:t} e} slxn] g]kfnn] t slxn] gjfjx?n] hj/h:t cf-cfk\mgf] :jfldTjdf /fVg] u/]sf] klg b]lvG5 .$ kl5 c+u|]hn] gjfjx?nfO{ k/flht u/]kl5 tL hUufx?sf] :jfldTjsf] bfjf c+u|]hn] u/] . k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxs} kfnfb]lv k"jL{ t/fO{df ;Ldfgf÷hUuf ljjfb kb}{ cfPsf] lyof] . kl5 l;lSsdb]lv sf“u8F;Dd g]kfnn] sAhf ubf{ s/La ()) sf];sf]] df]xF]8fdf w]/} 7fp“df g]kfnLn] c+u|]hsf] hUuf ldRof] eGg] cf/f]k cfO/x]sf] lyof] .% tL hUUfF c+u|]hsf] cfly{s rfxgf;“u hf]l8Psfn] g]kfnLnfO{ 5f8\g rfxb}gy] . ;'?–;'?sf] ljjfb oxL hUuf ;DaGwL lsrnf]af6} ePsf] lyof] . -v_ k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxsf] PsLs/0F sf/0Fn] k"jL{ t/fO{df c+u|]h;“u ;Ldf ljjfb e}/x]sf] ;dodf sflGtk'/ -sf7df08f}_ sf /fhf hok|sfz dNnn] /fhf k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxsf] efjL sflGtk'/dflysf] xdnf /f]Sg / uf]vf{nL gfsfaGbLaf6 kf/ kfpg pgn] O{:6 OlG8of sDkgLnfO{ ;}Go ;xof]u dfu] .^ ;f]xL cg'?k c+u|]h SofK6]g lsgnssf] g]t[Tjdf kmf}h sflGtk'/tkm{ /jfgf eof] . t/ l;Gw'nL lhNnfsf] 9'Ë]af;-9'Ë]e~Hof“ª / kf}jfu9L -cf8f_ df ltgnfO{ uf]vf{nL kmf}hn] Multiple ambush df kf/]/ g/fd|/L x/fPkl5 ltgLx? efu], sf7df08f} hfg ;s]gg\ .& k'gM tL c+u|]h hgsk'/af6 xl/x/k'/u9L x'“b} sf7df08F} a9\g] sf]lz;df nfUbf ltgLx?nfO{ g]kfnL kmf}hn] xl/x/k'/u9L tn /x]sf] afUdtL gbLdf g} xdnf u/L km]l/ klg v]b] . o;/L uf]vf{nLx?nfO{ jjf{b ug]{ nIo;lxt c+u|]hn] sflGtk'/nfO{ ;xof]u ug{ ;]gf k7fPkl5 uf]vf{nL / c+u|]haLr cf}krfl/s?kn] b'ZdgL ;f“lwof] eg] c+u|]h kf}jfu9L / xl/x/k'/u9Lsf] xf/nfO{ s'g} g s'g} ?kn] abnf lng] kvf{O{df lyof] . -u_ lqmlZrogx? cfk\mgf] wd{cg';f/ ufO{sf] df;' vfg] / g]kfnLx? ufO{nfO{ k"hf u/L ufO{nfO{ b]jL dfGg] ePsf]n] wfld{s sf/0F b]vfO{ lqmlZrognfO{ ckljq hft dflgGYof] . t/ dNnsfnb]lv g} ltgLx? sf7df08F}} pkTosfsf ljleGg :yfgdf la/fdLnfO{ cf}ifwf]krf/ ug]{ / wd{ k|rf/ klg ub{y] .* ;fy} tL lqmlZrogx? /fhgLltdf xft xfnL pkTosfsf /fhfx? aLr h'wf+pg], ahfpg] klg ub{y] . Tof] s'/f] k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxn] a'em]sf lyP eg] sflGtk'/ / pkTosfsf tLgj6} /fHo lht]kl5 pgn] tL lqmlZrogx?nfO{ cfk\mgf] /fHoaf6 nv]6] . tL klZrdf lqmlZrogx? k[YjLgf/fo0fsf] dxfb'Zdg ag] / ef/tdf /x]sf] c+u|]hx?nfO{ eP gePsf] s'/f nufP/ uf]vf{nL lj?4 df]rf{aGbL ug{ yfn] . ;Totfsf] vf]hL ug{ af“sL /x] tfklg k[YjLgf/fo0Fn] sLlt{k'/sf] xdnfdf sLlt{k'/]sf] gfs sf6]/ ;hfo lbP eg]/ k|rf/ ug]{ ltg} lqmlZrogx? lyP .( g]kfnL clen]vdf of] s'/f 5}g . ;f]af/] ljb]zLsf] egfO{nfO{ g]kfndf xfn cfP/ a9fO{ r9fO{ ul/Psf] 5 . o;/L wd{df /fhgLlt ld;fP/ uf]vf{nL / c+u|]hsf] j}dgZotf a9]sf] lyof] . -3_ /fhs'df/axfb'/ zfx b/af/Lof if8\oGqsf] sf/0F k6s k6s ef/tdf lgjf{l;t x'“bf pgsf] o'/f]lkog kfb/L÷ lqmlZrog;“u e]6 ePsf] lyof] . axfb'/ zfx /f]uL ePsfn] tL kfb/Lx?n] lbPsf] cf}ifwLn] pgnfO{ /fd|f]

# k|]dl;+x a:Goftåf/f lnlvt k|sfzg pGd'v g]kfn c+u|]h o'4 gfds k':tsaf6 pWb[t . $ 6]saxfb'/ >]i7 -;+_, g]kfnsf /fhfx? tyf t/fOsf yf?, -sf7df8f}+ M g]kfn / PlzofnL cg';Gwfg s]Gb|, lj=;+= @)%*_, k[=$& . % P]hg, k[= @% . ^ k|]dl;+x a:Goft, g]klnh kmf]6{;\ PG8 lb /f]Pn g]kfnLh cfdL{ Og kmf]6{ Aof6N;, -nlntk'/ M ;femf k|sfzg, ;g\ @))%, k[=#% . & P]hg, k[= . * n'Rofgf] k]t]s -;+_, ltAat / g]kfndf O6flnog wd{ k|rf/sx?, -sf7df8f}+ M g]kfn /fhsLo k|1f k|lti7fg, la=;+= @)^)_ k[= ^#–^% tyf o'j/fh uf}td ……csf]{ k[YjLgf/fo0fsf] vf]hLÚÚ -n]v_, /fhwfgL b}lgs klqsf, k[= $, la=;+= @)^* k'if @^ ut] . ( n'Rofgf] k]t]s, k"j{jt, k[=…#Ú .

29 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

ePsf] klg lyof] . cK7]/f]df kbf{;fy kfPsf axfb'/ zfxsf] tL lqmlZrog kfb/L;“u /fd|f] ;DaGw a9\of] . kl5 pgL g]kfn kmls{P / /fhsfhdf xft xfNg] df}sf kfP . oxL a]nf tL kfb/Lx?sf] kxntfdf c“u|]h;“u ;g\ !&(@ df afl0FHo ;lGw eof] . h;df c“u|]h kIFaf6 cAb'n sjfbL/ vfgn] g]t[Tj u/]sf lyP .!) t/ kl5 Tof] ;lGw g]kfn ;/sf/n] dfg]g . c+u|]hn] Aofkf/ ug]{ ;kgf k"/f ug{ g;s]kl5 g]kfn;“u b'ZdgL a9]sf] lyof] . -ª_ c“u|]hn] g]kfnnfO{ b'ZdgL 7fg]sf] d'Vo sf/0F dWo] klxnf]– g]kfnn] u/]sf] blIF0f-klZrd Onfsfsf] /fHo lj:tf/ / bf];|f] ltAat / rLg;“u Aofkf/ ug]{ af6f] g]kfnn] aGb ul/lbPsf] pNn]v ul/;lsPsf] 5 . t;y{ k};fsf] dxTj a'em]sf] c“u|]h h;/L klg sf7df08F} / ltAat;“u Aofkf/ ug{ rfxGYof] . pQm kIFdf sfd xf];\ egL ljleGg lgx“'n] aftf{ ug{ c“u|]hn] ljleGg JolQmx?sf] g]t[Tjdf ;b\efjgf jf jftf{ 6f]nL k7Fof] . h:t}– ;g\ !&(@ df cAb'n sjflb/ vfgsf] g]t[Tjdf, ;g\ !&(# df sg]{n ljlnod ss{k]l6«sf] g]t[Tjdf / ;g\ !*)! sf] ;lGw cg';f/ SofK6]g gS; (Knox) sf] g]t[Tjdf cfPsf] 6f]nL ;d]tn] c+u|]hsf OR5f k"/f ug{ g;ls ckdfghgs dgl:ylt lnP/ kms{g' k/]sf] lyof] . tL cfly{s kIF lyP tfklg To;nfO{ c+u|]hn] s'6g}lts ckdfg 7fg]sf] lyof] .!! ;g\ !*)! df c“u|]hsf] klxnf] a[l6z /]lh8]G6 (British Resident) e} g]kfn cfPsf SofK6]g gS; !*)# df vfnL xft kms{g k/]sf] lyof] .!@ -r_ kj{" /fhf /0Faxfb'/ zfx agf/;sf] lgjf{;gaf6 g]kfn kms]{kl5 eLd;]g yfkf d'Vo sfhL eP .!# /0Faxfb'/ zfxsf] xTof ePkl5 g]kfnL /fhgLltdf eLd;]g yfkf c;fWo} zlQmzfnL eP . pgdf o'jf hf];, /fi6«jfbL efjgf, s]xL u5'{ eGg] efjgf, c“u|]hsf] a9\bf] bjfjsf] k|ltsf/ ug]{ c7f]6 ePsf bx|f] AolQm lyP . k6s k6s c“u|]h;“u ePsf /fhg}lts c;xdlto Aojxf/af6 g]kfnn] c“u|]h;“u o'4 ug}{ k5{ eGg] ;f]r lnO;s]sf lyP . To;}n] c“u|]h;“u o'4 x'g' s]xL jif{b]lv g} pgn] c“u|]h lj?4 n8\gsf] nflu cGt/f{li6«o ;xof]u h'6fpg rL+gLof afbzfx, ltAatL ;/sf/, ef/tLo d/f7F, UjfnLo/sf] /fhf, k+hfjL l;v tyf ef/tLo /f]lxNnf;+u kqfrf/ tyf b"t k7FP/ c“u|]h lj/f]wL ;+u7g tof/ ub}{ lyP . h'g s'/f] c“u|]hn] yfxf kfPsf] lyof] . To;}n] p g]kfnL ;}Go zlQmsf] rf“8F]eGbf rf“8F] kv]6f sf6]/ ckfË agfpg rfxGYof] . -5_ a[l6; /]lh8]G6 e} ;g\ !*)! af6 !*)# ;Dd sF7DFf08F} a;]sf SofK6]g gS;n] cfkm\gf] s'6g}lts dof{bfdf ga;L, g]kfn b/af/sf ef/bf/nfO{ nf]e, nfnrf, 3';df kf/]/ b/af/Lof /fhgLltdf x:tIF]k u/]sfn] pgL l5§} kms{g k/]sf] lyof] .!$ h;af6 c“u|]hsf] g]kfnk|lt b'Zdlgo dg;fo k|i6 x'GYof] . g]kfn Tof] sfo{af6 c“u|]h;“u l/;fPsf] lyof] . -h_ c“u|]hnfO{ g]kfn lj?4 cfqmd0f u/fpgsf] nflu PsLs/0F o'4df uf]vf{nL;+u xf/ vfP/ efu]sf afO;]- rf}aL;] w]/} /fhf /hf}6fn] pS;fPsf lyP .!% pgLx?n] g]kfnLsf] sdhf]/L, ;}lgs l:ylt, b/afl/of /fhgLlt af/]df vj/ lbg] / c“u|]hnfO{ g]kfn lj/f]wL agfpg w]/} e"ldsf v]n]sf lyP . h;af6 c“u|]h xdnfsf] nflu hf]l:;Psf] lyof] . -em_ sf7df08f} pkTosfsf] tTsfnLg # /fHoleq /x]sf d7 dlGb/x?sf] d"lt{, 5fgf, 9F]sf, tf]/0F cflbdf ;'g} ;'g 5g\ . pkTosf sAhf ug{ ;lsPdf 7"nf] cfly{s nfe x'g] / ltAat;“usf] Aofkf/ klg l;w} c+u|]hsf] xftdf kg]{ s'/fn] pgLx? nfnflot lyP . ;'?df Tof] OR5f eP tfklg kl5 uP/ sf7df08F} sAhf ug]{ nIo c“u|]hn] 5f8]sf] a'lemG5 . -`_ To;sfndf c“u|]hsf] s§/ zq' eg]sf] k|m]Grx? lyP . eLd;]g yfkf hg/n ePkl5 pgn] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] k]zfut tflnd / xftxltof/sf] ;'wf/ ug{sf] nflu k|mfG;af6 ;}lgs clws[tx? lemsfO{ sfo{ ;Dkfbg u/]sf lyP . k|m]Gr cfdL{ ;/xg} hg]{n-sg]{n / ;]gfsf] kf]zfs agfOof] .!^ pgLx?s} ;Nnfxcg';f/ k]zfut cfdL{ agfpg Barrack System sf] Joj:yf e} sf7df08f}df 5fpgLx? ag] . ;}lgs x]8Sjf6{/ aGof] . hxf“ clxn] /fli6«o ;+u|xfno a;]sf] 5 .!& tL ;a} sfo{n] c“u|]h g]kfn;“u l/;fPsf] lyof] . !) rGb| aL= vfGb'/L, P l/8L:sf]e8{ lxli6« ckm g]kfn, -lbNnL M 1fg ;fu/ klAns]zg, ;g\ !((&_ k[= 7^ . !! P]hg, k[= &&–&* . !@ P]hg . !# P]hg . !$ rGb| lb vfh'/L, k"j{jt, k[= &*–&( . !% k|]dl;+x a:Goft, k"j{jt, k[= . !^ k|]dl;+x a:Goft, zfxL g]kfnL ;]gf / k|wfg;]gfkltx?, -sf7df8f}+ M nIdL a:Goft tyf ;jf]{Rrdfgl;+x a:Goft, lj=;+= @)%#_, k[=%^ . !& ;}lgs ;+u|xfno 5fpgL sf7f8f}+df /x]sf] clen]v cg';f/ . 30 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* -6_ t/fO{ IF]qsf] hUuf ljjfbs} l;nl;nfdf /f}tx6 Onfsfdf g]kfn ;/sf/sf] tkm{af6 ;'Aaf nId0F lu/L /]vb]vsf] nflu vl§Psf lyP . hUufsf] ef]u rng g]kfnn] ub}{ /x]sf] lyof] . ;f] s'/f] c“u|]hsf] s7k'tnL e} /fh ul//x]sf] hdLGbf/ jL/lszf]/ l;+xn] sl/j !^)) kmf}h NofO{ ;'Aaf nId0F lu/L / pgsf] ;'/IFfsdL{dfyL PSsfl; cfqmd0f u/], nId0f lu/L / ;'/IFfsdL{x? dfl/P .!* o;af6 7"nf] ljjfb eof] . To; sfo{sf] g}lts lhDdf c“u|]hn] lng' kb{Yof] . s'6g}lts kxntfdf bf]ifLsf] 5fglag u/L sf/jfxL u5'{ eg]/ c“u|]hn] g]kfnnfO{ cfZjf;g lbof] . t/ kl5, To; xTofsf08sf] k"/f bf]if g]kfnnfO{ lbP/ c“u|]h klG5of] . To;kl5 g]kfn ;fx|} l/;fof], g]kfnLsf] tftf] /ut plDng ;'? eof] . o'4sf] tTsfnLg sf/0F (An inmidiate Cause)M %= g]kfnL lj?4sf] c“u|]hsf] lyrf]ldrf]n] klg ;Ldf gf£b} lyof] . b'j} kIf aLr >[lht ljjfbx? s'6g}lts tl/sfn] ;dfwfg x'g'eGbf emgemg rs{b} lyP . To;avtsf] d'Vo ljjfb eg]sf] ;Ldf÷hUufsf] g} lyof] . g]kfnLn] c+u|]hL /fhsf] hUuf ldr]sf] cf/f]k c“u|]hsf] lyof] . o;k6s a'6jn / :o'/fh -slkna:t'_ sf ] hUuf ljjfbn] pu| ?k lnof] . kfNkfsf /fhf k[YjLkfn ;]gsf] sf7df8f}+ af]nfP/ em'SsfP/ xTof u/]kl5 eLd;]g yfkfsf lktf hg/n cd/l;++x yfkfnfO{ kfNkfsf] k|zf;s agfO{ k7fOof] .!( a'6jn / :o'/fh Onfsf klg pgs} dftxtdf kb{Yof] . To; Onfsfdf ePsf hUuf kfNkfnL /fhfn] cjwsf] gjfjnfO{ s/ lt/]/ sdfO{ vfPsf lyP . gjfjsf] /fHo c“u|]hn] lnPkl5 tL hUufsf] :jfldTj c“u|]hn] lnP/ g]kfnLnfO{ sdfO{ vfg klg lbg rfxGg lyof] . kfNkfnL /fhfn] lt/] ;/x s/ lt/]/ v]tLkftL ug{ g]kfn ;/sf/n] c“u|]hnfO{ cg'/f]w u¥of] . t}klg s'/f] ldn]g / c“u|]hn] tL hUUffaf6 g]kfnLnfO{ lgsfnL cfk\mgf] ;'/IFf 7fgf v8F u¥of] . Tof] s'/f hg/n cd/l;+x yfkfn] ckdfg 7fg] . To;kl5 pgn] tL 7Fgfsf ;'/IFf kmf}hnfO{ nv]6L k"j{jt sdfO{ cfPsf] hUuf lkmtf{ u/] .@) Tof] s'/f c“u|]hsf bnfnx?n] a9fO{ r9FO{ c“u|]hnfO{ nufP . ca 7"n} c“u|]hL ;}lgs 6f]nL cfO{ g]kfnL rf}sLx? eTsfP/ pgLx?nfO{ kL6kf6 kf/L v]b] / a'6jn / :o'/fhdf k"0F{ clwsf/ hdfP . To; Onfsfdf alnof] ;'/IFf rf}sLx? v8f u/L c“u|]h xfsLd kmls{P . ^= tL ;a} s'/f] hg/n cd/l;+xn] yfxf kfPkl5 pgL l/;n] cfuf] eP . g]kfn b/af/df ;f]af/] va/ ul/of] . b/af/ af6 eLd;]g yfkfn] h;/L klg a'6jn / :o'/fhdflysf] g]kfnLsf] lgoGq0F g5f8\g] cfb]z cd/l;+xnfO{ uof] . ca cd/l;+x 7"nf] kmf}hL bnan lnP/ a'6jn / :o'/fh uP/ ToxL /x]sf] c“u|]hL rf}sLdfly wfjf ug{ nufP . ck|Tofl;t xdnfaf6 c“u|]hL rf}lsbf/x? efufefu eof] eg] !* hgf d/], ^ hgf 3fOt] eP .@! tL ;a} Onfsf g]kfnLn] km]l/ klg sAhfdf lnP . a'6jn / :o'/fh g]kfnsf] hUuf gx'g' / c“u|]hL rf}sLdfly g]kfnn] xdnf u/]/ dfG5] df/Llbg', To; ljjfbnfO{ s"6g}lts tl/sfn] ;dfwfg ug{ kxn gul/g' h:tf kIfnfO{ xfdLn] dgg ug'{ kb{5 . c“u|]hnfO{ dfq ufnL ug'{ plrt gx'g klg ;S5 . of] clGtd 36gfkl5 c“u|]hn] g]kfnL lj?4 cf}krfl/s?kn] o'4 ug]{ lg0f{o u¥of] . ;g\ !*!$, gf]e]Da/ ! sf] lbg British Indian Governor General Lord Moira -n8{ df]O/f_ n] g]kfn lj?4 c“u|]h o'4sf] ljlwjt\ 3f]if0Ff u/] / o'4 ;'? eof] .@@ o'4af6 k/]sf c;/ &= ;sf/fTds kIfM -s_ cfkm"eGbf alnof] / cfw'lgs o'4 ;fdu|Ln] ;';lHht zlQm;“u o'4 n8]sf]n] ;'uf}nL ;lGw kl5sf] lbgx?df g]kfnL ;]gfdf k]zfut tflnd ;'? ul/of] . ;]gfnfO{ Aof/]sdf /fvL 5fpgL v8f eP . ;}lgs d'Vofnosf] :yfkgf, :joDe" af?bvfgf, afnfh'df xltof/ sf/vfgf cflb v8f eP .@# k|mfG;af6 ;}lgs clws[tx? lemsfO{ km]l/ klg cfw'lgs tflnd lbOof] . ;}lgs ;'ljwf a9fOof] . ;+VofTdseGbf u'0FfTds ;]gf agfpg g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;+Vof s6f}tL u/L r':t k|sf/sf] ;]gf /flvof] .

!* hf]g k]Dan, b OGe]hg ckm g]kfn, -cS;kmf]8{ M Snf/]G8g k|];, ;g !(&!_, k[=$$ . !( k|]dl;+x a:Goftsf] k|sfzg x'“b} u/]sf] k':ts g]kfn c+u|]h o'4af6 pWb[t . @) hf]g k]Dan, k"j{jt, k[= $& . @! P]hg . @@ lzjk|;fb zdf{ tyf cGo, k"j{jt, k[= #*! . @# k|]dl;+x a:Goft, k"j{jt= -kfb\ l6Kk0fL !^_ k[= %& .

31 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

-v_ o'4s} a]nf c“u|]h tyf ef/tLo d'nsf c“u|]h kmf}h;“usf] ;Dks{af6 g]kfnL ;]gfdf lzIFf, ;Eotf, cf}ifwL pkrf/ (Medical System) vfglkg, njfO{vjfO{ cflbdf ;fdflhs r]tgf a9\of] . -u_ ;]gfdf /x]sf k'/fgf sfhL u|'k -eLd;]g yfkfsf] kl/jf/ afx]s_ / gof“ hg]{nL u|'k -eLd;]g yfkfsf] kl/jf/_ sf] xfgyfksf] cGt eof] . k'/fgf sfhL u|'k ;a}h;f]n] ;]gfaf6 cjsfz lnP .@$ cj hg]{n-sg]{n ;d"xsf] dfq ;]gfdf ks8 /x\of] . h] h;f] u/] tfklg Unity in effort eof] . -3_ o'4 xf/] klg g]kfnLsf] n8\g] ;Lk, lg8/kg, axfb'/LnfO{ c+u|]hdfkm{t cGo o'/f]k]nL d'n'sn] ;d]t yfxf kfP . oxL+af6 g]kfnLnfO{ æaxfb'/x?sf] axfb'/sf]Æ ?kdf u0Fgf ug{ yflnof] .

-ª_ g]kfnL ;]gfsf]eGbf East India Company sf] ;}lgs ;'ljwf /fd|f] lyof] . To;}u/L Toxf“ klZrd d'n'ssf] ;fdflhs ;Eotf eNsGYof] klg . pgLx? lzlIft lyP, Toxf“ hftkft lyPg . To:tf b]zaf6 tflnd k|fKt g]kfnL nfx'/]x?n] a[l6; ;]gfdf egf{ eO{ cGttM g]kfns} cfly{s, ;fdflhs, /fhg}lts tyf z}lIFs IF]qdf kl/jt{g NofP .@% hxf“hxf“+ nfx'/]x?sf] 3gf a;f]af; 5, Toxf“ clxn] klg g]kfnLx?sf] /fd|f] cg'zf;g, ;RrfO{, lzIFf, ;/;kmfO{, ;Ddfg h:tf pTs[i6 ;Eotf b]lvG5 . Tof] g]kfn c“u|]h o'4kl5 ljsf; x'“b} uPsf] ;sf/fTds kf6f] xf] . sdhf]/L kIf -s_ k"j{df l6:6fb]lv klZrddf ;tnh gbL;Dd ePsf] a[xt g]kfnsf] sl/j cfwf e"-efu o'4sf] sf/0fn] 5f8\g' k¥of] .@^ h'g g]kfnLsf] nflu 7"nf] lk8F aGof] . /fhf b|Ao zfx, /fhf /fd zfx, /fhf g/e'kfn zfx, /fhf k[YjLgf/fo0F zfx, /fgL /fh]Gb|nIdL, /fhs'df/ axfb'/ zfx;d]tsf] g]t[Tj / k|]/0Ffaf6 PsLs[t ljzfn g]kfn tf;sf] 3/ h:t} elTsof] . -v_ g]kfn-rLg-ltAat o'4df g]kfnn] rLgnfO{ 7"nf] dflnssf] ?kdf dfg]/ o'4 cGt u/]sf] lyof] . To; o'4kl5sf cf}krfl/s sfuhkqdf ;d]t rLgsf] afbzfxn] g]kfnsf /fhfnfO{ æd]/f g'gsf] ;f]emf] ug]{ ltldÆ h:tf ckdfghgs zAb /fvL n]vfk9L u/]sf] kfOG5 .@& ca c“u|]h;“usf]] o'4kl5 eg] rLgsf] ;fy;fy} c“u|]hsf] em08} em08} bf;Tj g} :jLsf/ ug'{ k¥of] . h'g Legecy lj=;+=@))& ;fn;Dd /x]sf] lyof] .

-u_ g]kfn c“u|]h o'4 cufl8;Dd g]kfnsf] ;Ldfgf xfn d]rL gbL glhs /x]sf] a+ufnsf] vf8L (Bay of Bengal) ;Dd hf]l8P/ ;fd''lb|s dfu{ (Sea access) kfPsf] lyof] . t/ o'4 kl5 g]kfnsf] ;Ldfgf d]rL gbL ePsf]n] ;f] ;'lawfaf6 alGrt e} g]kfn Land locked nation aGg k'Uof] . -3_ hgwgsf] Iflt x'g' o'4sf] ljz]iftf g} xf] . o; o'4df g]kfnn] elQm yfkf, xl:tbn zfx nufotsf xhf/f}+ jL/ tyf jL/+ugf u'dfof] . gfnfkfgL, h}ys / dnfp+sf] lsNnfaf6 ;of}+ g]kfnL jL/+ugf gf/Lx?;d]t n8]sf lyP .@* csf]{tkm{ x]g]{ xf] eg] To; o'4df g]kfnn] 7"nf] wg/fzL vr{ ug'{ k/]sf] lyof] . -ª_ ;'uf}nLsf] ;lGwkl5, hf] o'4af6 c;Gt'i6 lyP, y'k|} g]kfnLx? g]kfnL ;]gfaf6 cjsfz lnO{ ljb]lzPsf lyP . gfnfkfgL o'4sf gfos aneb| s'“j/n] To;sf] g]t[Tj u/L s/La @ sDkgL kmf}h;lxt k+hfasf] /fhf /0Flht l;+xsf]df gf]s/L ug{ k'u] .@( ptf a8FsfhL cd/l;+x yfkf ;}lgs gf]s/Laf6 ;Gof; lnO{ l;Gw'kfNrf]s lhNnfsf] ef]tfª eGg] 7fp“df a:g k'u] . kl5 uf];fOs'08 uO{ Wofg ubf{ub}{ pgsf] ToxL+ d[To' ePsf] lyof] .#) -r_ cyf]{kfh{gsf] nflu eg]/ h;/L kl/eflift ul/P tfklg g]kfnLx?n] a[l6;-OlG8og cfdL{df egf{ x'g] k|rng ;'? eof] . h'g /fli6«o ;Ddfgsf] nflu /fd|f] xf]Og . klxnf] / bf];|f] ljZjo'4df t /f0Ffx?n] vf]hL vf]hL

@$ t'n;L/fd a}B tyf cGo, g]kfnsf] ;}lgs Oltxf; efu–@ -sf7df8f}+, hËL c8\8f, lj=;+= @)%%_ k[= $)% . @% lj=;+= !*&@ -;g !*!%_ af6 g} g]kfnLx? a[l6; ;]gfdf elt{ x'g uPsf lyP . @^ rg' jL vfGb'/L, k"j{jt, k[= @!@–!# . @& k//fi6« dGqfnosf] h};L sf]7fdf /x]sf k'/fgf sfuh kqdf /x]sf] laj/0f, o; n]vsn] k9] cg';f/ tyf hf]g k]Dan, k"j{jt, k[= %@ . @* gf/Lx? n8\g'sf] sf/0f tt\sfnLg sfhL nufotsf cGr pRr ;}lgs clws[tx?n] cfk\mgf hxfg kl/jf/ lsNnf leq /fVg] rngn] ubf{ g} xf] . @( t'n;L/fd a}B tyf cGo, k"j{jt, k[= %*^–%*& . #) P]hg, k[= $)% . 32 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

g]kfnL o'jfnfO{ a[l6; ;]gfdf elt{ x'g k7FP . of] k|yf o'4df xf/kl5 g]kfnLnfO{ hj/h:tL yf]kl/Psf] lyof] . xfn;Dd klg g]kfnLx? To; k|yfsf] Legecy af6 a[l6; uf]vf{ / ef/tLo uf]vf{sf] gfdaf6 ef/tLo / a]nfotL ;]gfdf sfd ub}{ cfPsf 5g\ . -5_ a[l6;n] s'dfp“ / l;lSsd lnPsf]n] pgLx?n] ;Lw} ltAat;“u Aofkf/ ug{ yfn] . h;af6 g]kfnnfO{ cfly{s 3f6f x'g uof] . -h_ /fhf k[YjLgf/fo0F zfxsf] ;do lj=;+= !*)) b]lv /fhf /0faxfb'/sf] kfnf] !*^^ ;fn;Dd g]kfn /fli6«o PsLs/0F o'4df / aLrdf g]kfn-ltAat o'4 tyf g]kfn-rLg-ltAat o'4df Ao:t lyof] . kl5 uP/ c“u|]h;“usf] o'4df xf]ldg' k¥of] . ;'uf}nL ;lGwkl5 g]kfn s'g} klg ;}lgs sf/jfxLdf Involve ePg, Ps lsl;dsf] km';{bL ;do eof] . t/ h+uaxfb'/ /f0ff k|wfgdGqL ePkl5 eg] ltAatsf] x]kfxf gLltnfO{ 7Ls kfg{ 7"n} t/Lsfn] g]kfnn] ltAat lj?4 clGtd k6s xdnf u/L ljho k|fKt u¥of] .#! /fhf gfafns x'g], /fgLsf] xftdf zf;g / ef/bf/x?sf] zlQm xTofpg] dxTjfsf+IFfn] g]kfn ljleGg vnssf] /fhg}lts u'6 / pku'6df ljeflht eof] . Empty Vessel makes much sounds eg]em+} sfd gkfPsf ef/bf/x?sf] /fhg}lts lvrftflgn] g]kfnsf] /fhgLlt ;fx|} k|b"lift eof] . h;sf] sf/0Fn] kl5 uP/ k|wfgdGqLx?sf] xTof, sf]tkj{, e08f/vfn kj{, 38 ;fn kj{ h:tf 36gfx? 36] . -em_ o'4sf] ljhokZrft a]nfotsf] g]kfndf cf}krfl/s?kn] a[l6; /]lh8]G;L v'Nof], p;sf] nflu of] /fhg}lts ;kmntf lyof] . h;sf] cl:tTj kl5;Dd klg /lx/x\of] . a[l6; /]hL8]G;L, n}grp/, sf7df08F}dfkm{t j}w / cj}w tl/sfn] ;+slnt g]kfnsf xhf/f+} xhf/ cd"No k'/fgf sfuhkq, b:tfj]h, ;/;fdfgx? j]nfot k'¥ofOP, g]kfnsf] nflu Tof] 7"nf] 3f6f lyof] .#@ h;sf] sf/0Fn] g]kfnsf] Oltxf; ckf+u ePsf] 5 eg]df cTo'lQm gxf]nf . -`_ g]kfnsf] /fhgLltdf pQm o'4kl5 c“u|]haf6 w]/} x:tIF]k ;'? eof] . o;a]nf a:Goft vns zlQmaf6 kfvf nflu;s]sf lyP . /fhf, /fgL, kf“8] / yfkf u'6aLr ef“8e}nf] dRrfpg ljleGg bfpk]r klg eof] . cGttM g]kfndf sf]t kj{ kl5sf] !)$ jif{;Dd x/]s s'/fsf] nflu a]nfot ;/sf/ g]kfnsf] cGt/f{li6«o cleefjs aGof] . g]kfnL ;]gfsf] d"Nofª\sg

*= cGtdf s'g} klg b]zsf] ;]gf o'4sf] ;dodf Pp6f cf}hf/ -Tool_ dfq xf] . o;sf] k|of]u /fi6«n] ub{5 . /fHon] v6fPsf] 7fp“df vl§g' / eg]sf] sfd ug'{ p;sf] st{Jo xf] . lj=;++ !^!^ df ;]gfklt euL/y k+tsf] g]t[Tjdf uf]vf{sf /fhf b|Jo zfxn] v8F u/]sf] o; ;]gfsf] Oltxf;df x/–xd];f b]zsf] nflu ;dlk{t 5 . o; o['4df klg g]kfnL ;]gfn] /utsf] alnbfg lbPsf]] lyof] . ljz]if u/L s'dfp, gfnfkfgL, -vn+uf_, h}ys, dnfp, a'6jn, xl/x/k'/ u9Lsf] o'4x?df xhf/f}+ g]kfnL jL/x?sf] Hofg uPsf] lyof] . elQm yfkf h:tf dxfg of]4fn] jL/ult kfP .## sltko k|lts"n l:yltdf klg pgLx?n] b]zsf] nflu dl/d]6] . sdhf]/ o'4 ;fdu|L, xftxltof/ / Joj:yfksLo /fd|f] ;xof]u geP/ klg pgLx?n] c“u|]h lj?4 h'g axfb'/L b]vfP To;n] zq' kIfnfO{ klg k|efljt kf¥of] . (= o'4df hLt / xf/ x'G5, of] zf:jt ;To xf] . cjZo klg xfg]{sf] o'4snf, ;xf; / cg'zf;gsf] d"NofÍg ul/G5\, h'g g]kfnL ;]gfdf pRr:t/sf] lyof] . /fhg}lts lx;fjn] o'4sf] hLt / xf/nfO{ dxTj lbOG5 eg] ;}lgs cf“vfaf6 o'4df k|of]u ePsf o'4 ;Lk -War skill_ sf] d"NofÍg ul/G5 . o'4 lhTg' / xfg'{df /fHosf] ;xof]u / cfk"lt{sf] 7"nf] xft /xG5 . t;y{, o'4 ;fdu|L / yk kmf}hx?sf] ;do cg';f/sf] Joj:yf gx'g'df tTsfnLg ;/sf/ kIF lhDd]jf/ b]lvG5 . ;]gfsf] tkm{af6 ul/Psf x/]s sf/jfxL cjZo klg pRr:t/sf] lyof] . ckjfbsf] ?kdf s'dfpsf] o'4df k|zf;s rf}t/f jd zfxn] u/]sf] /fi6«3ftnfO{ eg] g]kfnsf] Oltxf;n] Ifdf lbg ;Sb}g . h;n] c“u|]h;“u ldn]/ s'dfpm If]q 5f8L, g]kfnL kmf}hnfO{ 5f]/L kmsf{Psf lyP . h;sf] c;/ u9jfndf /x]sf] a8fsfhL cd/l;+x dftxtsf] kmf}hnfO{ k¥of] / /fhwfgLaf6 u9jfn hfg] nfO{g ckm sDo"lgs]zg c“u|]hn] aGb ul/lbP . #! lzjk|;fb zdf{ tyf cGo, k"j{jt, k[= $$! . #@ k|]dl;+x a:Goftsf] k|sfzg x'b} u/]sf] g]kfn c“u|]h o'4 gfds k':tsaf6 pWb[t . ## lzjk|;fb zdf{ tyf cGo,k"j{jt, k[= $*% . 33 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf Prospects for US-China Cooperation in Combating Terrorism in South Asia

- Brig Gen Himalaya Shumsher Thapa Introduction 1. Former U.S President Bill Clinton rightly described South Asia1 as the most dangerous place on the earth.2 With 1.5 billion people and 23 percent of the world’s population, it offers one of the most complex security situations in the world. It faces multifaceted challenges– terrorism, poor governance, poverty, transnational crime, environment degradation, and inter and intra-state confl icts. It remains the fl ash point for any future nuclear confl ict and an epicenter for militant Islamic terrorism. The region is one of the poorest in the world with 488 million people living on less than a dollar a day.3 2. To successfully confront these challenges will require international collaboration. All countries in the region have a national interest in containing terrorism. However, the countries can’t handle the threat alone. There’s a growing realization among the member countries that the problem of terrorism is international and can only be dealt with through multilateral cooperation. The US and China are the two dominant external players in the region. Since 9/11 there has been a converging of US and Chinese interests on counterterrorism. A major question is whether they can cooperate to take advantage of this convergence to promote peace and stability in the region. 3. This paper focuses on the prospects for US-China cooperation in combating terrorism in South Asia. First, it outlines the challenges faced by the region, primarily focusing on terrorism emanating from Islamist militancy; second, it examines regional efforts and the failure to control terrorism; third, it analyzes new possibilities for a converging of US and Chinese interests; and fi nally it makes recommendations for tackling this serious challenge. The Challenges 4. South Asia faces a diverse range of challenges, both traditional and non-traditional in nature. State collapse in one of the countries could prove potentially devastating for the stability in the region. Mahin Karim describes South Asia possessing all the ingredients for a geopolitical nightmare.4 Terrorism and South Asia 5. South Asia confronts a wide area of terrorist threats. India faces an Islamist separatist movement in Kashmir, militant Islamist elsewhere in the country, and an ongoing Maoist- Naxalite insurgency in south and north-east India. The Maoist-Naxalite movement has formed a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ), affecting 20 states and 180 districts.5 There are separatist movements in India’s east and north-east of India. Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, mainly Laskhar-e-Taiba (LeT),6 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM),7 and Haqqani network8 have wide-ranging operations and pose an enormous threat to the security of India and Afghanistan. Pakistan was blamed by India for sponsoring LeT attacks on Mumbai on November 26, 2008, which led to the termination of ongoing discussions between India and Pakistan.9 6. Pakistan, on the other hand, is facing considerable challenges from militant Islamist like Al Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)10. The Taliban, which was successfully overthrown by US-led force in 2001, has regrouped in Pakistan and is threatening the security of

34 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

Afghanistan.11Besides Al Qaeda and TTP, LeT, JeM, Haqqani network, the anti-Shia Lashkar- i-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Harkat-ul-jihad-al-islami Pakistan (HUJI-P) are some of the prominent Islamist militant groups active in Pakistan. 7. Bangladesh too, is affected by Islamist terrorists who went unchecked under the previous Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government such as Jamaat-ul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB)12 and Harkat-ul-jihad-al-islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B). In Nepal, there are ongoing militant and separatist activities in the south and north-east of the country. Nuclear Proliferation 8. Regional concerns about terrorism are compounded by the potential for nuclear proliferation. India and Pakistan both possess nuclear weapons. Nuclear deals signed between US and India, and China and Pakistan have further complicated the problem. In recent years, Pakistan’s has considerably developed its nuclear arsenal, possibly reaching as many as 90-100 nuclear warheads. According to Bruce Reidel and Pavneet Singh, “Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world.”13 It appears that Pakistan is manufacturing fi ssile material, adding more production facilities and deploying more delivery vehicles, thereby improving its nuclear weapons both qualitatively and quantitatively.14 Although it’s not clear whether the Pakistan’s expansion of its nuclear weapons is in response to the US-India nuclear agreement signed in 2008, its “minimum credible deterrent” is primarily focused to dissuade India from opting for any military option against Pakistan.15 Trends in Islamist Militancy in South Asia 9. The broader concern about terrorism is aggravated by specifi c concerns relating to rising Islamist militancy in South Asia. Close to half of the world’s total Muslim population, 525 million or about 33% of all South Asia’s population, is concentrated in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.16 Pakistan has become an international hub for militant Islamic terrorism, mainly due to increasing activities of Al-Qaeda, LeT, JeM, TTP, Taliban and the Haqqani network. These groups pose immense security threats not only to India and Afghanistan but to Pakistan as well, thereby threatening regional, US, Chinese, and Western interests. The US is particularly apprehensive about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities, and fears these could fall into the hands of Islamist militants who can destabilize the region with vast ramifi cations for the rest of the world. It is imperative for Pakistan to realize that its “support for Islamist militancy as strategically shortsighted”17 and that its confrontational stance with neighbors, particularly India, has created more regional hostility, which could lead to a major confl ict with India in the future. Al Qaeda and its Nexus with other Affi liates in Pakistan 10. Al Qaeda’s success in forging better ties with Pakistan’s jihadist groups has provided it with a secure safe haven in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and a new power base. Despite Pakistan’s decade-long involvement in the “war on terror,” there is clear proof of Al Qaeda’s and its affi liates growing strength and escalating activities within Pakistan.18 Amir states that Pakistan “is undergoing a radical change mostly from the phase of Talibanization of its society to Pakistanization of Al Qaeda.”19 The investigation of the May 2011 suicide attack on the Mehran Naval Base near Karachi revealed that it was a well coordinated attack planned by Al Qaeda, TTP and Punjabi Taliban to destabilize Pakistan. Ideologically an alliance has developed between the Al-Qaeda-Taliban alliance and LeT, JeM and other jihadists together, enabling them an edge over Pakistan.20 11. It appears that despite the elimination of Bin Laden, Al Qaeda still remains an effective

35 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf threat to regional and global security, as it attracts youths and conducts increasing operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan with support from other Islamist militants. Similarly, LeT has close links with the organized criminal syndicate of Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company,21 and other national and regional terrorist organizations and presents a credible threat to the region. Experts are of the view that with the passage of time these jihadists have become more powerful, independent, and better connected and pose greater security threat than ever before. Radicalization of Pakistani Society 12. Oakley and Hammes argue that the most dangerous outcome in Pakistan from the confl ict in Afghanistan is the “increasing radicalization of Pakistani society.”22 In Pakistan there were 180 incidents of suicide bombing and 1,906 terror attacks in 2009-2010.23 Since 9/11 about 35,000 Pakistan have been killed in terror-related violence.24 The radicalization has mainly been attributed to fundamentalist teachings in madrassas, state inability to address socio-economic problems and failure of moderate forces to deliver credible results. Civilian casualties from drone attacks conducted by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Pakistan have further aggravated the Islamists’ infl u ence. Radicalization has also been seen in the Pakistani Army. A recent article by Amir Mir describes the arrest of Brigadier Ali Khan of the Pakistani Army due to his links with the banned Hizbul Tehrir (HuT), an Islamist militant outfi t with close links with Al- Qaeda.25 The above incident is not the fi rst and perhaps will not be the last, but it sends an alarming signal to the Pakistan military about future security threats emanating from Islamist militants. If Pakistan does not act boldly and take decisive measures against Islamist militants, there’s a strong possibility of Pakistan losing the grip of the state. Regional Efforts to Control Terrorism 13. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is the regional body of South Asian countries. Although all countries in the region recognize the benefi ts of economic and security co-operation, efforts to improve these developments have been hindered by the political will of the leaders. Since the inception of SAARC in Dec 1985, there has been growing concerns about terrorism and a call for greater regional cooperation among the member countries, which have fi gured signifi cantly during SAARC summits. Disagreement and hostility between India and Pakistan is the central cause in preventing any signifi cant cooperative progress. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 14. South Asia is comprised of eight nations. These countries together have formed the SAARC, which was founded on the premise of a peaceful and prosperous South Asia. Nine countries including China and US hold observer status.26 Regional efforts by the member countries to tackle terrorism were acknowledged from the initial creation of SAARC. Both India and Pakistan have been skeptical about SAARC formation since its inception in December, 1985. Indian policymakers feared the possibility of smaller countries ganging up to regionalize all bilateral issues, while Pakistan perceived that India was organizing other neighbors against her to expand its economic dominance in the region.27 The seed of mistrust between these two antagonist countries existed from the very beginning and has been a hindrance in resolving many key issues, including terrorism. 15. SAARC has been successful in creating a Free Trade Area (FTA) with the implementation of South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) which came into force in 2008. Intra-SAARC trade reached $687 million in 2009 from just $14 million in 2006. An Asian Development Bank (ADB) study carried out in 2008 reported that SAFTA has a potential for trade of $85.1 billion. Some argue that SAARC is just a talk-shop without any concrete outcome. Nevertheless 36 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

SAARC has provided a platform for experts and policymakers to meet regularly and hold dialogues on key security, developmental and trade issues. Steps taken by SAARC to Curb Terrorism 16. The challenge of terrorism was recognized from the beginning of SAARC’s establishment, and SAARC members undertook many initiatives to combat it.28 The SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was signed by member countries on November 1, 1987 in Kathmandu, Nepal and came into force on August 22, 1988,29 and later the Additional Protocol on Terrorism was signed on January 6, 2004.30 The member countries signed a legal agreement during the 15th SAARC summit, held in Sri Lanka in 2008, that vowed to combat terrorism as the main challenge facing the region.31 This Convention has yet to be ratifi ed by the member countries. 17. South Asia has been a victim of hostility carried out by numerous groups with varied objectives and different ideologies. Home Minister of India, P. Chidambaram described “terrorism as the biggest existentialist challenge in South Asia” and further emphasized that the menace must be tackled through cooperation among SAARC countries.32Although, both India and Pakistan seem determined to cooperate in combating terrorism, in reality there has been little progress to address this growing threat. Failure of SAARC 18. After nearly 26 years since its inception, neither the SAARC countries have been able to move the process of integration forward, nor has the organization been able to promote peace, stability and economic integration. The regular struggle for power and political infl uence between India and Pakistan poses a severe challenge not only to the nations and the region but to global security as well. 19. As most of the threats are transnational in nature, it is of vital importance for the leaders to recognize the signifi cance of regional institutions and strengthen SAARC. Former President Musharraf rightly stated, “We must expand the SAARC charter to discuss bilateral issues at the regional level.”33 He further noted that there can be no development without peace and there can be no peace while political issues and disputes continue to worsen. To evolve SAARC into a full fl edged ‘regional entity’ will depend upon the ability of the leaders to address the long standing border issues, differences over sharing of resources and transnational challenges through peaceful dialogues and strengthening institutions. New Possibilities 20. China’s willingness to cooperate with other nations, especially on counterterrorism, is perceived as an indication of China’s need to take greater responsibility for maintaining world peace and to demonstrate that China can be supportive of the international system. Chinese experts are apprehensive about the motives for US intervention in weak and failing states without approval of the UN, such as the US invasion of Iraq, and view such moves as counter productive. However, the Chinese didn’t rule out the military option on another occasion and accepted the US intervention in Afghanistan in response to 9/11 terrorist attacks.34 China opposes terrorism and has shown willingness to cooperate in combating terrorism with the US. China’s threat from militant Islamic terrorism emanates from Muslim Uyghur 35 in Xinjiang Province, frequently referred to as the threat from the three evils, “terrorism, separatism and extremism.”36Since 9/11, the bilateral cooperation between the US and China on counterterrorism has provided the opportunity for both the countries to set aside their

37 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf differences and focus on new realities in international geopolitics. 21. Since 2005, the extent of cooperation between the US and China in counterterrorism has increased. In September 2005 US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, acknowledged that “China and the US can do more together in the global fi ght against terrorism” and further called on China to be a “responsible stakeholder.”37 Similarly, the US hosted US- China Counterterrorism Sub-Dialogue from 14-15 September, 2009 in Washington D.C. concluded by their opposition to all forms of terrorism and promoting peace and stability in various regions of the world.38Chinese analysts recognize that Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that threaten US interests and challenge international peace are also a threat to Chinese interests as well.39 The rise of China’s interests in the region may offer an opportunity to collaborate with the US on counterterrorism where both countries can secure their national interests and simultaneously assist South Asian countries in promoting peace, stability and economic development. Chinese Interests in the Region 22. China has enormous interests in South Asia, politically, economically, militarily, and diplomatically because of its close proximity, geo-strategic location, growing trade, political infl uence, threats from Uyghur separatists and Tibetans fi ghting for autonomy, and the increasing US interests in the region, mainly in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. As Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia were becoming more dangerous and capable of launching terrorist activities against Chinese interests at home and abroad, China took the initiative by forming the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with Russia and other Central Asian republics to form a joint effort against the “three evils.” The SCO through its regional counterterrorism cooperation has been partly successful in curbing separatism, extremism, the spread of terrorism and even drug traffi cking. 23. Security Interests China’s main concern regarding militant Islamic terrorism focuses on increasing Uyghur activities in Xingjian province and the belief that other militant Islamist organizations based in Pakistan and Afghanistan are supporting the Uyghur cause to destabilize China and threaten its national security. China blamed Muslim extremists trained by Pakistan for the attacks conducted by Uyghur separatists in Kashgar in July, 2011, which killed seven and injured 22 people.40China desires to garner wider support among the international community because of the Uyghur separatists having close links with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. China believes that the US is maintaining a double standard with regard to releasing Uyghurs from Guntanamo prison to third countries rather than handing them over to Chinese authorities. China is also concerned that the recently elected Tibetan Prime Minister-in-exile, Lobsang Sangay, a Harvard scholar could arouse more aggressive tendencies and even militancy among younger Tibetans.41 Recent high level visits by Chinese delegations and increasing Chinese assistance to Nepal in development and security refl ects China’s growing security concern in its periphery. 24. Economic Interests China has huge economic interests in the region, Recent trends show that China is investing heavily in its neighboring countries; with $61.7 billion42 trade with India in 2010 (India’s largest partner), investing $3.2 billion Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan (though the US is providing the security), funding various projects in Pakistan worth $25 billion43 and huge investments worth $821.4 million in Sri Lanka with assured assistance of $3 billion in infrastructure development.44 Similarly, China has promised to fund

38 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* developments along Bangladesh coastline with $9 billion. India, on the contrary, is getting paranoid about the huge investments made by China in neighboring countries which might lead to extra dependency on China, reducing India’s infl uence in the region. 25. Pakistan has recently requested China further develop its Gwadar port, and build a network linking Gwadar, Urumqi and Beijing to Shanghai. Such links would benefi t China in enhancing its trade with Europe and the Middle East while reducing its dependence on sea-borne trade through the overcrowded and unreliable Malacca Straits, and would assist in the build-up of Chinese naval power. Pakistan sees this development as facilitating China’s relations with the Muslim world and assisting Islamabad and Beijing in curtailing militant Islamic terrorism.45 China has vital energy interests in Central Asia (with investment of more than $10 billion) and growing trade with Iran, the Middle East and North Africa. 26. Diplomatic Interests As China’s economy grows it will play a more dominant role in the region, assisting neighbors with huge investments in developing infrastructure, modernizing its military and controlling important sea-lanes through “string of pearls” strategy which includes the port of Gwadar (Pakistan), and construction of other ports like Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Chittagong (Bangladesh), and Sittwe (Myanmar).46 China will use its soft power to achieve its goal to “stabilize the periphery” and continue with its economic modernization program and the building of peace and stability in the region.47 Although China’s relations with Pakistan remain central, its relations with India is signifi cantly developing and converging as both countries assume a greater role on the global stage, especially on issues like securing affordable energy supplies and a new global climate change agreement.48 US Interests in the Region 27. The 21st century is often described as “the Asian century,” a shifting of global power away from the Atlantic towards the Indian and Pacifi c Oceans.49The focus on Afghanistan has distracted the US from formulating a comprehensive and coordinated regional strategy for South Asia. Any regional strategy for South Asia should focus on recognizing the signifi cance of the various states to the US interests.50US interests in greater engagement with regional organizations of South and Central Asia, with China’s support, was highlighted by Assistant Secretary Robert O. Blake’s media roundtable in Beijing China.51 28. Security Interests Pakistan is strategically signifi cant with the world’s second highest Muslim population of about 187 million people,52 is facing multifaceted problems, ranging from political and economic instability to natural calamities, and a deteriorating security situation. Irrespective of the consequences from the attack on Bin Laden which has frayed US-Pakistan relations, both countries need each other’s help to pursue their interests. Pakistan in recent days has been wary of growing US engagement with India, and therefore getting closer to and forging many agreements with China. Since 9/11, the US has assisted Pakistan with nearly $20 billion which has more than doubled since President Obama took offi ce in 2009.53 The US considers Pakistan’s instability, predominantly terrorism and possession of nuclear weapons as vital national interests and is very concerned about nuclear weapons falling into the hands of militant Islamists. 29. Transnational militant Islamic terrorism will continue to pose a threat to US interests in the days to come. Al-Qaeda for the time being has been damaged but it will always continue to attack the US and its interests worldwide. Other regional militant Islamist terrorists groups like TTP, LeT, and others with global reach, will continue to strike the interests of the US, India and Pakistan, as well as NATO allies.54 These organizations whenever possible will join hands with other terrorist groups and organized syndicates like D-Company to pursue their

39 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf interests. The US sees India as a viable partner to balance growing Chinese infl uence in the region and has signed the US-India Nuclear Deal in 2008 and forged a Strategic Partnership with India. 30. Economic Interests South Asian countries with their enormous fossil fuel, rare earth elements, and natural gas reserves make attractive economic partners.55 The US presence in the region provides an opportunity to pursue its economic interests and monitor increasing Chinese and Iranian infl uence in South and Central Asia which might threaten those interests. US markets are expected to benefi t and grow from the richer and prosperous Asia. US exports of goods and services to China are projected to reach more than $100 billion this year.56 India is a partner that provides opportunities for promoting US economic, political, and military interests in South Asia and beyond.57 India’s growing economy, geo-strategic location, with vast human capital (1.189 billion),58 political infl uence and military power is the most attractive strategic partner for the US in the region. President Barrack Obama stated that the US “sees Asia-and especially India-as a market of the future” and has praised the “opportunity to sell our exports in one of the fastest growing markets in the world.”59 The US-India bilateral trade has increased by 30% in 2010 reaching $ 48.8 billion which refl ecting increase in trade between these two countries.60 31. Domestic Interests Any US regional strategy must recognize the fact that the world is no longer dominated by the US, and that US resources are constrained. The new reality in US domestic politics will invariably shape the US foreign policy and engagement in the region.61 The US spends around $10 billion a month in Afghanistan alone which as Senator John Kerry states is “unsustainable.”62 The present economic crisis and domestic politics, notably against the backdrop of Presidential elections in 2012, will be crucial in shaping US regional strategy in the region. Recommendations 32. Since 9/11, the US and Chinese perceptions of the challenges and threats in South Asia have been converging, especially on the issues of militant Islamic terrorism. Both the US and China have long-term economic, diplomatic and military interests in the region, and terrorism poses a considerable threat to those interests. There is a strong realization by the two countries that besides addressing these threats with short-term initiatives, long-term cooperative, comprehensive strategies are imperative for more permanently dealing with the root causes of the problem, focusing on issues of poverty, weak infrastructure, educational reforms, health and other public services, illiteracy, organized crime, religious extremism, poor governance and unemployment. 33. Stability in Pakistan The failure to stabilize Pakistan would not only affect the region but would have vast ramifi cations throughout Central Asia and Middle East as well, seriously jeopardizing US and Chinese interests. Preventing Pakistan from being taken over by Islamist militants is not only vital for the US and China but also essential for the safety of the global community. Since the US cannot solve Pakistan’s problem alone, China with its huge economic, diplomatic and security interests can play an important role in bringing stability in Pakistan. Stability in Pakistan is a win-win equation, not only for the US and China but for the region as a whole. 34. The US and China both have huge economic and security interests in the region. Instability in Pakistan will not only affect security but have immense economic implications in the region and the world. Therefore it is of paramount importance for the US, China and India to assist Pakistan in its economic development and prevent it from being overtaken by militant

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Islamists. Because of the US fi nancial crisis and the deterioration of US-Pakistan relations, China may have to play a greater role to secure its economic Resumption of two-way traffi c between Afghanistan and India, and Iran-Pakistan-India gas and oil pipeline could benefi t Pakistan both in terms of its much needed energy demands and the transit fees. Other friendly countries in the Middle East can also play an important role in assisting Pakistan. Economic growth on one hand would help to stabilize Pakistan, improve socio-economic conditions, create more jobs, reform the education system, build infrastructure and, on the other hand, it would assist in de-radicalization, marginalizing terrorist groups and reduce anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. 35. The US and China must use every diplomatic tool and effort to encourage Pakistan to deny support to terrorist organizations emanating from Pakistan against Afghanistan and India. The US and China can assist Pakistan (military as well as in the public sector) by providing much needed training, technological know-how and enhancing its capacity. Similarly, India and Afghanistan on the other hand must be ready to make necessary compromises in dealing with contentious issues like Kashmir and power sharing in Afghanistan. Both India and Afghanistan must realize that growing Islamist militancy in Pakistan would have a spillover effect in their countries, which would be detrimental to their national security. Both, the US and China can use their diplomatic skills to bring both India and Pakistan to negotiate in resolving the long standing contentious Kashmir issue. 36. Strengthening SAARC as a Regional Organization The creation of SAARC was well intentioned but it has been ineffective in enhancing regional cohesiveness and thus has failed in terms of economic integration and regionalism.63 If peace is to be accomplished through economic integration it is imperative to have a change in the mindsets whereby leaders can discuss contentious issues like Kashmir. The future of SAARC lies in long-lasting peace and economic integration, and the dexterity of its leaders to resolve domestic and regional issues. Lessons learned from other regional organization like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), support the premise that their success was mainly based on cooperation in trade and economic integration. It can be argued that without a properly integrated economy, the region can never thrive.64 Since the recently formed SAFTA has been successful in promoting intra-SAARC trade, SAARC members must be ready to dismantle custom barriers, and agree on common import policy to advance trade and investments among the member countries. For example, the vast hydropower potential of Nepal (about 40,000 MW)65 could be utilized to benefi t the countries in the region. The US and China must make use of their observer status to convince and assist in bringing the member countries together in enhancing SAARC as a regional entity. 37. Concept of SAARC Regional Security Organization The US and China can cooperate to help SAARC to form a regional security organization. US, China, India and Pakistan have huge security, economic and diplomatic interests in Afghanistan. It is certain that ISAF will be drawing down from Afghanistan. The recent surge in incident by various terrorist groups, mainly Taliban and Haqqani network, illustrates that the security situation in Afghanistan is still unstable and needs to be strengthened 38. Currently, South Asian countries, namely Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nepal, rank 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th respectively in their contribution to UN peacekeeping missions totaling 34,931 personnel. Likewise, China is the 7th largest budget contributor with 3.94 percent, and 15th largest contributor with 1,997 troops.66 Together with China, the South Asian countries contribute more than 30 percent of the total 122,000 peacekeepers. Sometimes troops from various countries operate together under a unifi ed command. It can be argued that if such

41 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf cooperation can exist in UN Peacekeeping operations, why can’t it be brought to bear in promoting peace in South Asia? The vast experience and knowledge gained by these countries in promoting peace and security in various part of the world could be developed to form a SAARC regional security apparatus in a neutral country like Nepal and be utilized to promote peace and stability in the region and beyond. 39. UN peacekeeping also offers an opportunity to break from a zero-sum game in relations between the US and China. It is one of the fi elds where China is willing to cooperate, which could be helpful rather than threatening to the US and its allies.67 The US (the largest budget contributor with 27.17 percent) and China can work together with the SAARC countries (under the auspices of the UN) to develop a regional security strategy, contributing various skills, technical know-how and resources needed to provide security assistance in Afghanistan during and after the withdrawal of ISAF. It can be argued that these member countries coming from the same region, having enormous experience in peacekeeping, with similar culture and social backgrounds and from different religious beliefs, could be well suited to bring peace and security in Afghanistan. The formulation of such a mechanism on one hand will facilitate the development of confi dence building measures among the member countries as they work together to assist another member country (i.e. Afghanistan), on the other hand it will strengthen the bonds of regional friendship to tackle other important regional issues. 40. Developing Regional Counterterrorism Cooperation Countries in the region have so far been reluctant to engage in any concrete counterterrorism cooperation. Although there had been limited cooperation between India-Bhutan, India-Sri Lanka and India-Bangladesh in the past, willingness to deal with the larger issues like growing militant Islamic terrorism has so far been unsuccessful. On the contrary, the Islamist militants have forged better relations not only within these countries but with various organized syndicates, and terrorist and separatist groups in the region and are getting more organized, connected and powerful. Since there’s a trust defi cit among the member countries due to their vested interests, the US and China, could use their military, economic and political infl uence to encourage and support the countries in the region to forge a consensus to tackle this rapidly growing menace before it is too late. 41. Because of the transnational nature of militant Islamic terrorism, no country in the region is capable of formulating a mechanism to combat this menace on its own. Since it is less likely that India and Pakistan will cooperate on counterterrorism, there is an opportunity for the US and China to use their diplomatic, military and economic leverage to persuade India to lower its profi le in Afghanistan and likewise to encourage Pakistan to discontinue supporting terrorist activities in India. The US and China can help South Asian countries develop a joint counterterrorism center (preferably in a neutral country), and assist in information sharing, training, electronic surveillance, cross border management, and formulate a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. The formation of joint center and its activities will not only enhance member countries capability but will also assist US and China in monitoring the trends, strategy and future threats that the terrorists can pose to the region and beyond. 42. Tackling of militant Islamic terrorism can provide a platform for future cooperation Riedel and Singh propose that the US, China and Pakistan cooperate to deal with the threat emanating from the Taliban, since each has a huge interest in “sustaining a stable Pakistan.”68 Against the backdrop of an extended bilateral dialogue between the US and China on combating militant Islamic terrorism in South Asia, the collaboration can provide a platform to address other important regional and global challenges like security and stability of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of ISAF in 2014, climate change, disaster management, nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, and economic growth.

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Conclusion 43. The shift in the perception of China with regards to terrorism refl ects a change in strategic thinking which provides an opportunity for both the US and China to work more closely. Although there are some impediments to greater US-China cooperation in South Asia, including a rivalry for strategic dominance, differences over human rights, and the role of domestic politics in both countries, there is a convergence of interests: promoting peace and stability, energy security, trade, and combating terrorism. Addressing these crucial challenges will require wider cooperation not only with longtime allies but with new partners who have similar interests in the region. 44. Ensuring stability in Pakistan by addressing its security and economic needs must be a top priority not only for the US and China but for all countries in the region as well. Strengthening of the SAARC as a regional organization could facilitate in building trust, enhancing economic integration and resolving contentious issues such as Kashmir. There is an immediate need for these countries to recognize the growing threat posed by transnational terrorism and hence work together in formulating a well coordinated counterterrorism strategy. With assistance from the US and China, SAARC countries can use their vast experience of peacekeeping in developing a regional security apparatus, effective in dealing with regional security challenges including terrorism. 45. This convergence of interests in combating militant Islamic terrorism in South Asia allows the possibility of greater US-China cooperation and strengthening the broader strategic relationship between the two countries in future. As Henry Kissinger has rightly stated, “The future of Asia will be shaped to a signifi cant degree by how China and America envision it” and “the extent to which each nation is able to achieve some congruence with the other’s historical regional role.”69 (Endnotes) 1 South Asia is comprised of eight nations-Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 2 Maleeha Lodhi, “Viewpoint: Security Challenges in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review, summer 2001, 118, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/82lodhi.pdf, accessed on August 1, 2011. 3 World Bank, “Reshaping Global Geography,” World Development Report 2009, http://econ. worldbank.org / W B SITE/EXT ERNAL/EX TDEC/EXT RESEAR CH/EX TWDRS/EX TWDR 2 009 / 0,,menuPK:4231145~pagePK:64167702~piPK:64167676~theSitePK:4231059,00.html, accessed on July 20, 2011. 4 Mahin Karim, “Ecological and Nontraditional Security Challenges in South Asia,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #28, June 2011, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Preview/SR28_ EcoSecuritySouthAsia_preview.pdf, accessed on July 21, 2011.

5 The India Research Group, “Ending Maoist Insurgency in India: Practical Propositions,” India Research Group, April 23, 2010, http://tirgroup.org/pub/ending-maoist-insurgency-in-india-practical-propositions, accessed on August 21, 2011. 6 Laskhar-e Taiba, meaning “army of the pure” has been active since 1993. It’s the military wing of a well funded Pakistani Islamist organization Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irshad, founded in 1989, to fi ght alongside the Taliban. Experts believe that LeT received funding and instructions from Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in exchange to target Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir and train Muslim extremists in India. Pakistan government has repeatedly denied allegation of supporting terrorism. 7 JeM also known as the Army of Mohammad is an extremist group based in Pakistan. It was founded in 2000, by Masood Azhar, after his release from prison in Indian. JeM aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan, and has openly declared war against the US. JeM continues to operate openly despite the 2002 ban on its activities. It has close ties with Afghan Arabs and the Taliban. It’s believed that Osama bin Laden provided funds to JeM. 8 Founded by Jalluddin Haqqani, a popular warlord who continues to resist the extension of Karzai government in

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Afghanistan. He fought as a Mujahedin against the Soviet, receiving substantial assistance from the CIA through ISI. He later joined the Taliban and was a Minister, but held separate power in his home town of Zadran. It the strongest faction of the Taliban and has close links with Al Qaeda. The important Taliban “Peshawar Shura” is headquarter in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The militia headed by Gulbuaddin Hikmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani are fi ghting US forces alongside Taliban. CIA, in 2008 assessment specifi cally pointed to links of ISI with militant network of Jalaluddin Haqqani which maintains close ties to senior fi gures of Al Qaeda in Pakistan tribal areas. 9 Sumit Ganguly, “Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects,” The National Bureau of National Research, December 2009, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=412, accessed on August 2, 2011. 10 TTP started with Taliban supporters and sympathizers operating in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) initiated when many small militant groups operating independently started networking. Its infl uence appears to be spreading across FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPP). Pockets within Punjab and Sind provinces have also been affected by TTP. It’s estimated that TTP has around 10, 000 militias, targeting Pakistan security forces and symbols of state. Its main aim is to enforce Sharia, unite against coalition force in Afghanistan and fi ght defensive Jihad against Pakistan Army. 11 Sumit Ganguly, “Counterterrorism Cooperation in South Asia: History and Prospects.” 12 Islamic organization operating in Bangladesh was founded in 1998 by Abdur Rahman and gained public prominence in 2001 when bombs and documents detailing the activities of the organization were discovered. The organization was offi cially banned by the government of Bangladesh in February 2005 after attacks on NGO’s but struck back in mid- August when it detonated 463 bombs within 50 minutes in 63 out of 64 districts, throughout Bangladesh. It has an extensive network of organizations, including connections to legal Islamist organizations. 13 Bruce Reidel and Pavneet Singh, “U.S.-China Relations: Seeking Strategic Convergence in Pakistan,” Brookings Foreign Policy Paper, Number 18, January 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0112_us_ china_relations_riedel/0112_US_China_Relations_Riedel.pdf, accessed on September 10, 2011. 14 Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service, July 20, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf, accessed on September 17, 2011. 15 Ibid. 16 CIA, “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/xx.html and http://hinduexistence.wordpress.com/tag/increasing-muslim-population-in-india-will-create-severe- persecution/, accessed on June 28, 2011. 17 Amir Mir, “Al-Qaeda’s roots grow deeper in Pakistan,” Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ MI10Df01.html, accessed on September 13, 2011. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company is the largest organized criminal syndicate in Asia. Its network is all around the world with operations focusing in India, Afghanistan, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, South Africa and Pakistan. It controls much of the smuggling activity at key ports such as Dubai, Karachi and Mumbai. It is the only syndicate that includes members from a particular religious background (Islam).In addition to weapons traffi cking and narcotics, racketeering, extortion, money laundering and contract killings, D-Company is accused of permitting Al Qaeda, LeT and ISI to use its smuggling routes for intelligence gathering missions and conduct attacks. It is widely known that D-Company was closely involved in 1993 Mumbai bombings. With its 5,000 members and a criminal-terrorism ‘fusion’ model, it presents a credible threat to the US interests in South Asia. 22 Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes, “Prioritizing Strategic Interests in South Asia,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, No 256, June, 2010, http:// www.ndu/inss, accessed on July 25, 2011. 23 Rashid Ahmad, “Terrorism and SAARC,” Daily Times, July 07, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page= 2010%5C07%5C07%5Cstory_7-7-2010_pg3_4, accessed on August 20, 2011. 24 Amir Mir, “Islamists break Pakistan’s military ranks,” Asia Times, June 24, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_ Asia/MF24Df03.html, accessed on July 28, 2011. 25 Amir Mir, “Islamists break Pakistan’s military ranks.” 26 Madhavi Bhasin, “SAARC I-Evolution,” Foreign Policy Association, (May 4, 2010), http://foreignpolicyblogs. com/2010/05/04/saarc-i-evolution/, accessed on July 24, 2011.

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27 Chandra D Bhatta, “Regional Integration and Peace in South Asia: An Analysis,” http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org. uk/dl/RegionalIntegration.PDF, accessed on July 22, 2011. 28 Rashid Ahmad, “Terrorism and SAARC.” 29 SAARC website, http://www.saarc-sec.org/SAARC-Conventions/63/, accessed on August 21, 2011. 30 The Additional Protocol constitutes a single document under which the member countries have undertaken to initiate within their national legal frameworks certain measures to combat terrorism by suppressing and eradicating the fi nancing of terrorism, seizing and confi scating of funds and other assets, preventing money laundering, cooperation on immigration and customs control, cooperation among law enforcement agencies, providing legal assistance and holding consultations among them. 31 Rashid Ahmad, “ Terrorism and SAARC” 32 Terrorism as the biggest existentialist challenge in South Asia by Home Minister of India P. Chidambaram in Thimphu, Bhutan. Indian Times, July 23, 2011, www.indiantimes.com/article/084Wd7C23GfNc?q=South+Asia, accessed on August 21, 2011. 33 Muhammad Jamshed Iqbal, “SAARC: Origin, Growth, Potential and Achievements,” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol XXVII/2 (2006).136, http://www.nihcr.edu.pk/Latest_English_Journal/SAARC_Jamshed_Iqbal.pdf, accessed on July 21, 2011. 34 Banning Garrett and Jonathan Adams, “U.S.-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats,” United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 126, September, 2004), http://www.usip.org/publications/us- china-cooperation-problem-failing-states-and-transnational-threats, accessed on August 10, 2011. 35 Muslim Uyghurs are of Turkic origin and till recently formed the bulk of population in China's western-most Xinjiang- Uighur Autonomous Region. The Chinese government responded by moving Han Chinese into the area. The ethnic group has decreased to a minority as a result of Han migration, regional protests and violence in recent years. The Uyghur’s are using militant measures to achieve independence, or at least autonomy, and seek to call their area Turkistan. Analysts say that the majority of Uyghurs do not favor an Islamic state. 36 Denny Roy, “Lukewarm Partner: Chinese Support for U.S. Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Asia Pacifi c Center for Security Studies, March 2006, http://www.apcss.org/Publications/APSSS/LukewarmPartnerChinaandCTinSEA.pdf, accessed on October 1, 2011. 37 Shirley A.Kan, “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, September 11, 2008, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33001.pdf, accessed on October 1, 2011. 38 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Sub-Dialogue,” Media Note, Offi ce of the Spokesman, Washington D.C. September 22, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/sept/129485.htm, accessed on October 4, 2011. 39 Denny Roy, “Lukewarm Partner: Chinese Support for U.S. Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia.” 40 Lousie Watt, “China Blames Pakistan-Trained Militants for Attack,” The Associated Press, August 1, 2011, http://www. forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/08/01/general-as-china-violence_8594214.html, accessed on August 2, 2011. 41 Stratfor, “Dalai Lama’s New Leadership Plan Challenges Beijing,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, August 9, 2011, http:// www.stratfor.com/memberships/200198/geopolitical_diary/20110809-dalai-lamas-new-leadership-plan-challenges- beijing, accessed on August 9, 2011. 42 Teresita Cruz-del Rosario, “Enter the Dragon, Softly: Chinese Aid in South, South East and Central Asia,” National University of Singapore, June 17, 2011, Working Paper Series, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1885213, accessed on September 11, 2011. 43 Dawn “Chinese investment in Pakistan crosses $ 25 billion mark,” Dawn.Com/Business, August 6, 2011, http://www. dawn.com/2011/08/06/chinese-investment-in-pakistan-crosses-25-billion-mark.html, accessed on August 27, 2011. 44Saroj Pathirana, “Sri Lanka gains from Indo-Chinese supremacy battle,” BBC News Business, November21, 2010, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11753549, accessed on September 8, 2011. 45 Zee news Bureau, “Pakistan seeks China’s help to develop Gwadar port,” Zee News Beijing, August 11, 2011), http:// zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/pakistan-seeks-china-help-to-develop-gwadar-port_726102.html, accessed on August 27, 2011. 46 Wall Street Journal, “Beijing Agrees to Operate a Key Port, Pakistan Says,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2011, http:// online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303654804576339323765033308.html, accessed on September 11, 2011.

45 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

47 Teresita Cruz-del Rosario, “Enter the Dragon, Softly: Chinese Aid in South, South East and Central Asia.” 48 Allison Jackson, “China, India could shame rich nations: UN scientists,” AFP, October 30, 2009, http://www.google. com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5haqohmGQyum3VBSdfUSqynzOyKdw, accessed on October 1, 2011. 49 Danny Quah, “The Global Economy’s Shifting Centre of Gravity,” Global Policy 2, January, 2011, http://onlinelibrary. wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00066.x/pdf, accessed on August 25, 2011. 50 Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes, “Prioritizing Strategic Interests in South Asia.” 51 Assistant Secretary of State Robert O. Blake’s Media Roundtable in Beijing, China, Press Conference, March 18, 2011, http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2011/158583.htm, accessed on August 21, 2011. 52 Rich Exner, “36 percent of the world’s population lives in China and India: Sunday Number,” Cleveland.com, July 3, 2011, http://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/index.ssf/2011/07/36_percent_of_worlds_populatio.html, accessed on August 10, 2011. 53 Subodh Varma, “Since 9/11, Pak has got nearly $ 20 billion in US aid,” (Times of India, May 7, 2011), http://articles. timesofi ndia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-07/pakistan/29519745_1_coalition-support-funds-pakistan-crs, accessed on October 2, 2011. 54 David W. Barno, “Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia.” 55 “BP Statistical Review of World Energy” (June 2010), http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview, accessed on July 25, 2011. 56 U.S Census Bureau, “Top Trading partners-Total Trade, Exports, Imports: Year to Date, November 2010” (January 13, 2011), http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1011yr.html, accessed on August 25, 2011. 57 David W. Barno, “Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia.” 58 CIA, “The World Factbook.” 59 Dan Robinson, “Obama in Mumbai Calls India Market of the Future,” Voice of America, Mumbai, November 6, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Obama-Calls-For-More-Trade-with-India-106817488.html, accessed on August 7, 2011. 60 Foreign Trade, “Trade in Goods with India,” U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5330. html, accessed on October 6, 2011. 61 David W. Barno, “Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia.” 62 “Kerry: bin Laden killing could lead to greater Afghanistan stability, bringing US troops back home,” WBUR NEWS & WIRE SERVICES, May 10, 2011, http://www.wbur.org/2011/05/10/kerry-afghan, accessed on August 25, 2011. 63 Chandra D Bhatta, “Regional Integration and Peace in South Asia: An Analysis.” 64 Ibid. 65 Hydropower in Nepal, http://www.ippan.org.np/HPinNepal.html, accessed on September 18, 2011. 66 United Nations Peacekeeping, “Background Note,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote. pdf, accessed on September 18, 2011. 67 Gideon Rachman, ‘Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety,’ (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 288-289. 68 Bruce Reidel and Pavneet Singh, “U.S.-China Relations: Seeking Strategic Convergence in Pakistan.” 69 Henry Kissinger, ‘On China,’ (New York: The Penguin Press, 2011), 529.

“As long as I have a want, I have a reason for living. Satisfaction is death.”

- George Bernard Shaw

46 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* d]l8sn sf]/–g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]ansf] ;|f]t

– ;=/= wd{axfb'/ aflgof+ kl/ro

!= g]kfnL ;]gfsf] d]l8sn sf]/ eGgfn] ;+lIfKt ¿kdf P]ltxfl;ssfndf >L lqe'jg rGb| -lq-rGb|_ ldln6/L c:ktfn tyf jt{dfg cj:yfdf >L sfo{/yL ljefu ;}lgs :jf:Yo dxflgb]{zgfno cGt{utsf ljleGg o'lg6 tyf ;jo'lg6x¿sf] ;dli6ut ;+/rgfx¿ eGg] a'lemG5 . o; cg';f/ >L k|wfg;]gfkltHo"nfO{ g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ pknJw u/fpg' kg]{ ;a} k|sf/sf d]l8sn ;kf]6{ ;DaGwL /fo ;'emfj / ;Nnfx lbg' >L ;}lgs :jf:Yo dxflgb]{zgfnosf] k|d'v lhDd]jf/L /x]sf] 5 . d]l8sn sf]/nfO{ Combat Service Support c+usf] ¿kdf lnOPsf] 5 . @= d]l8sn sf]/n] g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;a} c+ux¿nfO{ zflGt / o'4sfnLg cj:yfdf lg/Gt/ / e/kbf]{ d]l8sn ;kf]6{ k|bfg ub}{ axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|fKt ;sn bhf{ / pgLx¿sf kl/jf/x¿nfO{ cf}ifwf]krf/ ;]jf k'¥ofO{ dgf]an lj:tf/df k|ToIf / pNn]vgLo e"ldsf lgjf{x ul//x]sf] 5 . o;sf] cltl/Qm b]zleq cfOkg]{ ljleGg ljkbsfnLg cj:yfdf cfd g]kfnL hgtfnfO{ d]l8sn p4f/ tyf /fxt pknJw u/fO{ pgLx¿sf] dg lhTg ;kmn ePsf] 5 . d]l8sn sf]/n] ;+o'Qm /fi6« ;+3Lo zflGt :yfkgfy{ sfo{df t}gfy /x“bf :yfgLo hgtf tyf ljb]zL ;]gfx¿nfO{ ;d]t pkrf/ ;]jf k|bfg u/L g]kfn / g]kfnLsf] gfd ljb]zdf phfu/ ug{ dxTjk"0f{ of]ubfg k'¥ofPsf] 5 . p2]Zo #= o; n]vn] g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/n] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]an lj:tf/df k'¥ofPsf] of]ubfgaf/] k|sfz kfg]{5 . If]q

$= k|:t't n]vnfO{ lgDg a'“bfx¿df s]lGb|t /xL j0f{g ul/g]5M- -s_ d]l8sn sf]/sf] P]ltxfl;s k[i7e"dL -v_ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnsf] kl/ro -u_ d]l8sn sf]/sf] jt{dfg ;+/rgf -3_ d]l8sn sf]/n] k'¥ofPsf] ;]jfx¿ -ª_ d]l8sn sf]/ ;DaGwL dxTjk"0f{ / rfvnfUbf tYofÍx¿ -r_ d]l8sn sf]/ / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]jn aLr ;DaGw -5_ d]l8sn sf]/sf pknJwLx¿ -h_ ;'emfjx¿ P]ltxfl;s k[i7e"dL

%= ;fwf/0f= lj=;+= !(&!-&% ;fnsf] k|yd ljZj o'4df g]kfnL kmf]}hn] k|bz{g u/]sf] jL/tfsf] k|l;l4 ;+;f/e/ km}lnPsf] lyof] . To; o'4df w]/} g]kfnL ;}lgsx¿n] jL/ult k|fKt u/]sf lyP . o;} kl/k]|Ifdf tTsfnLg /f0Ff k|wfgdGqL rGb| zDz]/n] kmf}hsf ;sn bhf{x¿sf] tna a9fpg] / :jf:Yo ;]jfdf yk ;'ljwf lbnfpg] of]hgf cg'¿k lj=;+= !(*@ ;fn efb| @$ ut] -tbg';f/ O{=;+=!(@% ;]K6]Da/ )(_ sf lbg :j= /fi6«lktf >L % dxf/fhflw/fh lqe'jg jL/ ljqmd zfxb]jaf6 dxf“sfn:yfgdf >L lq-rGb| ldln6/L c:ktfnsf] 9f]sfdf nufOPsf] ;'gsf] tfNrf vf]nL ;d'b\3f6g ul/aS;]sf] lyof]] . ;f]xL lbg c:ktfn ejgsf] 5tdf /flvPsf] 9nf}6] l;kfxLsf] k|ltdfnfO{ cgfj/0f;d]t ul/Psf] lyof] . c:ktfnsf] lgdf0f{ ;'¿ ubf{ o;sf] k|:tfljt gfd jL/ d]df]l/on ldln6/L c:ktfn /flvg] elgP tfklg 47 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf c:ktfnsf] lgdf{0Fdf /f0Ff k|wfgdGqL rGb| zDz]/sf] ljz]if of]ubfg /x]sf]n] lq-rGb| ldln6/L c:ktfn /xg uPsf] lyof] . o;af6 k|yd ljZjo'4df jL/ult k|fKt ug]{ ;Dk"0F{ ;}lgsx¿sf] ;DemgfnfO{ g} rL/:d/0fLo agfpg ;fd"lxs :df/ssf] ¿kdf o; c:ktfnsf] :yfkgf ug]{ p2]Zo /x]sf] lyof], h;nfO{ c:ktfn ejgsf] kf]l6{sf]sf] bfof“ afof“ lznfn]vdf n]lvPsf] ">L !)* kz'kltgfysf r/0fsdndf zL/ w/L of] c:ktfn ;Djt\ !(&!-&% sf] 7"nf] n8fO“df Hofg lbg] /fHosf ;k't jL/x¿sf] ;Demgfsf vflt/n] agfOof]" (To the glori of Sri Pashupatinath and to the memory of those brave sons of the Kingdom of Nepal who fell in the great War 1914-18 A.D.) n] k|i6 kfb{5 . tTsfnLg lq–rGb| ldln6/L c:ktfnsf] k|yd Commanding Offi cer n]=s=8F=>L gGbnfn zfx x'g'x'GYof] .

^= >L lq–rGb | ldn6/L c:ktfnsf] ef}lts ;'ljwf= cfkm\g} k"hL“ / ;Lkn] g]kfnLx¿af6 agfOPsf] of] c:ktfndf 9n lgsf;b]lv lnP/ vfg]kfgL, xfjf, 3fd, lah'nL;d]tsf] /fd|f] k|aGw ul/Psf] lyof] . cfw'lgs c:ktfndf x'g] sIfx¿ h:t} ck/]zg sIf, Pg]:y]l6:6 sIF, xft w'g] / Changing sIF, dfOg/ cf]=6L= / 8«]l;Ë sIF, kmfd]{;L, la/fdL hf“Rg] sIF, 8FS6/ l8p6L sIF, dRo{'/L / kf]i6df6{d k/LIf0f sIF, efG5f 3/ / 8FOlgË xn OToflb a]Unf a]Un} lgd{f0F ul/Psf lyP . la/fdLx¿sf] ;+Vof a9\g uPdf kfn 6f“u]/ sf}zLdf /fVg ;Sg] k|aGw;d]t ldnfOPsf] lyof] . j]nfotsf Oltxf;sf/ kl;{en Nof08gn] cfkm\gf] æg]kfnÆ gfds k':tsdf o; c:ktfnaf/] æcfw'lgs 9F“rfn] agfOPsf] / Plzofsf] ;aeGbf /fd|f] ;fwgo'Qm c:ktfnx¿dWo] Ps / lxGb":yfgsf w]/} ;}lgs cv8fx¿n] Oiof{ ul/g]Æ eg]/ pNn]v u/]sf 5g\ . c:ktfnsf] lgdf{0F sfo{ /fd|/L k"/f u/]sf]df O{=lrkm s0f]{n lszf]/ g/l;+x /f0ffnfO{ pgsf] sfdsf] sb/:j¿k lrkm s0f]{naf6 sdfl08Ë sg]{ndf kbf]lGgt ug'{sf] ;fy} ¿=@))) ;d]t kfl/tf]lifs k|FKt u/]sf lyP . sfd ug]{ cGo hjfgx¿n] klg Ogfd kfPsf lyP . o; c:ktfn lgdf{0fdf k|FoM ;a} g]kfnL ;fdfgx¿sf] k|of]u ul/Psf] lyof] / ljz]if1 / sfdbf/ klg ;a} g]kfnL lyP . o; c:ktfn ;'¿df ^$ j]8af6 ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] . c:ktfnsf] lgldQ lkpg] kfgL sf7df8f}+ zx/df ljt/0F ul/Psf] kfOkaf6 NofO{ Jojl:yt ul/Psf] lyof] . To;a]nf k|z:t dfqfdf kfgLsf] cfk"lt{ gePsf] sf/0Fn] /fgL kf]v/Lsf] g}CTo s'gfdf lah'nLsf] kDk h8fg u/L ;f]xL kDkåf/f c:ktfndf kfgLsf] Joj:yf ul/Psf] lyof] . &= 9nf}6sf] l;kfxLsf] ;flns= o; c:ktfnnfO{ ;}lgs :df/ssf] ¿kdf lrgfpg / 6f9Faf6 o;nfO{ ;lhnf];“u b]Vg ;lsg] u/L c:ktfn ejgsf] 5tsf] cu| efudf 5 lkm6 cUnf] Pp6f ;}lgssf] k|ltdf v8f ul/Psf] 5 . /Tgaxfb'/ tdf]6nfO{ pgsf] ;Lk / bIftfsf] k/LIf0F ug{ rGb| zDz]/s} zflns agfpg lbPkZrft ;f] zflns agfpg lhDdf lbOPsf] lyof] . tof/ ePkl5 d"lt{ agfpg nfu]sf] vr{ ldgfxf x'g'sf] ;fy} ¿=#))).- kfl/tf]lifs;lxt /Tgaxfb'/ tdf]6nfO{ ljz]if bhf{ / vfguL;d]t lbO{ sb/ ul/Psf] lyof] . *= lznf :tDe= c:ktfn ejgsf] cufl8 snfk"0f{ 9+uaf6 agfOPsf] :tDesf] ¿kdf lznfn]v /flvPsf] 5 . ci6sf]0F cfsf/sf tLg kq 9'“ufsf] k|:t/df of] lznf :tDe /flvPsf] 5 . Pp6} 9'“ufsf] zLv/ z}nLdf ag]sf] rf/kf6] cfsf/sf] of] :tDe ( lkm6 prfO{sf] 5 . To;dfly 9'“uf s} 8]9 lkm6 cUnf] >L kz'kltgfy dlGb/sf] k|ltdf /flvPsf] 5 . lznfn]vsf] :tDedf c:ktfnsf] gfd, pb\3f6g u/]sf] ldlt, c:ktfn vr{sf] aGbf]a:t / eljiodf k|ultsf] nflu lng ;lsg] sbdaf/] j0F{g ul/Psf] 5 . (= cflys{ Joj:yf= o; c:ktfnsf] :yfkgfdf s'g} ljb]zL k"hL“ tyf cfly{s ;xfotfsf] k|of]u ul/Psf] lyPg . O{=lrkm s0f]{n lszf]/ g/l;+x /f0ffn] cfkm\gf] k|ltj]bg efif0Fdf pNn]v u/]cg';f/ c:ktfn lgdf{0Fdf ¿=#,)(,!$^ -¿= tLgnfv gf}xhf/ Ps;o 5ofnL;_ vr{ ePsf] pNn]v ul/Psf] 5 . !)= ;+rfng Joj:yf= o; c:ktfnsf] ;+rfng gLlt lgwf{/0f tyf ;'kl/j]If0Fsf nflu ljleGg 6«i6x¿ /flvPsf lyP . hËLtkm{ ;a} sfd hËLnf7 -k=s=h=_ n] x]g]{ eP tfklg gjlgld{t ;}lgs c:ktfnsf] lhDd]jf/L tTsfnLg sdf08/ O{g lrkmnfO{ g} lbOPsf] lyof] . !!= c:ktfn :yfgfGt/0f= dxfsfn:yfg cjl:yt o; c:ktfnn] ;dofg's"n cfw'lgs :jf:Yo ;]jf k|bfg ub}{ cfO/x]sf]df lbg k|ltlbg alx/Ë (Out Door) / cGt/Ë (In Door) la/fdLx¿sf] ;+Vofdf a[l4 x“'b} uO/x]sf]n] g]kfnL ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L of]hgf cGtu{t axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs / kl/jf/x¿nfO{;d]t pkrf/ ;]jf lbg] gLlt sfof{Gjog ePkl5 lq-rGb| ldln6/L c:ktfn x/]s b[li6sf]0faf6 ;fgf] ePsf] dx;'; x'g uof] . :jf:Yo ;]jfdf ePsf] ce"tk"j{ k|ult / gljg pkrf/ k|a[lt qmlds¿kdf o; c:ktfndf klg leqb} uPsf], zx/sf] aLr efudf c:ktfn /x]sf] / o; :yfgdf ef}lts ;'ljwf a9Fpg k|FoM c;Dej h:t} ePaf6 c:ktfnnfO{ :yfgfGt/0F ug]{ lg0F{ocg';f/

48 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

5fpgLl:yt :joDe"sf] blIf0F k6flËgLdf ;}lgs c:ktfn agfpg] lg0F{o eof] . o;}cg';f/ tTsfnLg >L % dxf/fhflw/fh jL/]Gb| jL/ljqmd zfxb]jsf] $@ cf}+ z'ehGdf]T;jsf] cj;/df ldlt @)$# ;fn kf}if !% ut] c:ktfnsf] lznfGof;, $% cf}+ z'ehGdf]T;jsf] cj;/df ldlt @)$^ ;fn kf}if !$ ut] >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn egL gfdfs/0F tyf tTsfnLg ;DdfggLo k|wfg;]gfklt dxf/yL >L wd{kfn j/l;+x yfkfaf6 >L % dxf/fhflw/fh jL/]Gb| jL/ljqmd zfxb]jsf] :j0f{ z'ehGdf]T;jsf] cj;/df ldlt @)%@ ;fn kf}if !# ut] ;d'b\3f6g ePsf] lyof] . >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnsf] kl/ro

!@= >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn sf7df8f}+sf] 5fpgLdf s/Lj !$$ /f]kgL IF]qkmndf cjl:yt 5 . ";j{ /f]u lgjf/0f" cfbz{ jfSo /x]sf] o; c:ktfn ljleGg ljefu tyf ljz]if1x¿sf] ;fy} cTofw'lgs pks/0fx¿n] ;';lHht Ps ;'ljwfo'Qm General Hospital sf] ¿kdf lrlgg k'u]sf] 5 . sdf08F06 -;xfos /yL_ sf] g]t[Tjdf lSnlgsn /lhi6«f/ -;xfos /yL_, Infantry sf k|zf;g /lhi6«f/ -dxf-;]gfgL_ tyf d]6«f]]g -dxf-;]gfgL_ sfo{/t /xL c:ktfnsf] ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg eO/x]sf] 5 . >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnsf] k|yd Commandant ;=/=8F=>L dbgdfg dNn -ldlt @)$^.(.!$ )$(.!!.@) ;Dd_ /xg' ePsf] lyof] .

!#= ^$ a]8 ;+Vofaf6 z'¿ ul/Psf] tTsfnLg lq-rGb| c:ktfn xfn o; c:ktfndf %!* la/fdL a]8 ;+Vof /x]sf] 5 . o; c:ktfnn] lb+b} cfPsf] :jf:Yo ;]jf ;'ljwfnfO{ ;dofg's"n cem k|efjsf/L agfpg] x]t'n] c:ktfndf xfn ;lh{sn, d]l8sn, xf8hf]gL{, cf“vf, bf“t, 5fnf, :qL/f]u afn/f]u, k|;'tL, d'6' /f]u, 5ftL /f]u, dfgl;s /f]u, :gfo' /f]u, SofG;/, lnyf]l6«K;L, x]df]8fO{nLl;;, PS;-/], l;=l6=:Sofg, Pd=cf/=cfO{=, Kofyf]nf]hL, Pr=cfO{=le=P8\; /f]u cflb ;DaGwL ;]jf ;'ljwf;d]t k|bfg ub}{ cFO/x]sf] 5 . ldlt @)^$÷!)÷)! ut]af6 gof“ cf]=lk=l8=ejgdf /x]sf] GOPD df /xg] u/L Accident & Emergency (A & E) ;]jf;d]t z'¿ ul/Psf] 5, h;af6 la/fdLx¿ nfeflGjt eO/x]sf 5g\ . d]l8sn sf]/sf] jt{dfg ;+/rgf !$= Oltxf;nfO{ cWoog ubf{ lj=;+=@)@) ;fndf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] d]l8sn sf]/sf] ¿kdf >L ;}lgs :jf:Yo ljefusf] :yfkgf ePsf] b]lvG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfsf] cfw'lgsLs/0f / lj:tf/;“u} >L g]kfn ;/sf/sf] ldlt @)^#÷)&÷#) ut]sf] lg0f{o adf]lhd xfn d]l8sn sf]/sf] ;jf]{Rr c+udf >L sfo{/yL ljefu cGt{ut >L ;}lgs :jf:Yo dxflgb]{zgfno :yfkgf ePsf] 5 . pkrf/ ;]jfnfO{ k|efjsf/L, a9L ;lhnf] / nrsbf/ kfg]{ p2]Zon] o; dxflgb]{zgfno cGtu{t xfn >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn, >L ;}lgs k'g:yf{kgf s]Gb|, @ lkmN8 c:ktfnx¿, !% lkmN8 PDa'n]G; u'Ndx¿ / lzIf0f lgsfosf] ¿kdf >L g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfg cGt{ut tTsfnLg lq-rGb| ldln6/L c:ktfn dxf“sfn:yfgdf College of Nursing / e08f/vfndf College of Medicine :yfkgf ePsf] 5 . d]l8sn sf]/n] k"¥ofPsf] ;]jfx? !%= d]l8sn sf]/n] k'¥ofPsf] ;]jfx¿ gf}nf] geP tfklg ;dli6ut¿kdf ljutb]lv xfn;Dd la/fdL pkrf/ ;]jf / lzIf0f If]qdf k'¥ofPsf ;]jfx¿ lgDgfg';f/ k|:t't ul/Psf] 5M- -s_ g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;Dk"0f{ axfnjfnf, cjsfz k|fKt ;sn bhf{ tyf tLgsf kl/jf/x¿, /Iff dGqfno tyf /Iff n]vf lgoGqssf] sfof{nosf sd{rf/Lx¿, ;z:q k|x/L, g]kfn k|x/L, /fli6o« cg';Gwfg ljefu, kmfo/ la|u]8, ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfnosf ljBfyL{ tyf sd{rf/Lx¿, g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfgsf ljBfyL{x¿ tyf s/f/df sfo{/t gl;{Ë :6fkmx¿nfO{ lgMz'Ns pkrf/ ;]jf k|bfg ub}{ cfO/x]sf] . -v_ b]zsf] ljleGg :yfgdf 36\g] k|fs[lts tyf s[ltd ljkb\, dxfdf/L, b'3{6gf cflb 36gfx¿df hgtfnfO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf k|bfg ug'{sf] ;fy} cfkTsfnLg cj:yfdf b]zsf] h'g;'s} :yfgaf6 klg Air Medical Evacuation ;'ljwf pknJw u/fp“b} cfO/x]sf] . -u_ cfsl:ds k|s[ltsf u}x| ;}lgs gful/sx¿nfO{ pkrf/ ;]jf k|bfg ul//x]sf] . o;} l;nl;nfdf @)%* ;fn d+l;/ !! ut]af6 b]zdf z'¿ ePsf] ;+s6sfnLg cj:yfdf >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnn] 3fOt] ;}lgs tyf 3fOt] gful/sx¿sf] pkrf/df k'¥ofPsf] :jf:Yo ;]jf Oltxf;df clj:d/0fLo¿kdf /x]sf]5 . -3_ ;do ;dodf b]lvg] dxfdf/L ;+qmfds ;¿jf /f]ux¿ h:t} emf8f kvfnf, cfp“, 6fO{kmfO{8, x]kf6fOl6; 49 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

tyf k|f0f3fts HIV AIDS h:tf /f]ux¿sf] af/]df ;Dk"0f{ ;}lgsx¿nfO{ :yfg ljz]ifd} uP/ hfgsf/Ld"ns lzIff k|bfg ug]{ u/]sf] . -ª_ ;do ;fk]If :jf:Yo ;]jf:t/ a[l4 ug]{ p2]Zo cg'¿k c:ktfnsf] tflnd s]Gb|n] cGoq o'lg6x¿sf ;}lgsx¿nfO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf ;DaGwL ljljw tflndx¿ ;+rfng u/L ;+:yf tyf JolQm :jodnfO{ pknJwLd"ns Jojxfl/s ;Lk k|bfg u/fO/x]sf] . o;af6 ;DalGwt o'lg6x¿nfO{ :yfg ljz]ifdf g} ;fdfGo pkrf/ u/fpg d2t k'lu/x]sf] . -r_ pkTosf leqsf o'lg6x¿df ;+rfng ul/Psf tflndx¿df cfjZostf cg';f/ cf}ifwL;lxtsf] d]l8sn hgzlQm :yfg ljz]ifd} uO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf k|bfg ub}{ cfO/x]sf] . -5_ hglxt sfo{dfkm{t b'u{d Onfsfsf hgtfx¿nfO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf k|bfg ub}{ cfO/x]sf] . -h_ ;+o'Qm /fi6« ;+3Lo zflGt ;]gfdf vl§g] o'lg6x¿df Level-I c:ktfn :yfkgf u/L cfkm\gf ;}lgs, ldq /fi6«x¿sf ;}lgs tyf :yfgLo hgtfnfO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf pknJw u/fO{/x]sf] . -em_ g]kfndf tflnd/t\ ljleGg ldq /fi6«x¿sf ;}lgsx¿ tyf kl/jf/x¿nfO{ :jf:Yo ;]jf pknJw u/fO/x]sf] . -`_ :jb]z leqsf ljleGg :jf:Yo ;+:yfg tyf c:ktfnx¿ aLr pkrf/ ;]jf, ;]ldgf/, tflnd cflb sfo{qmdx¿df ;xsfo{ ul//x]sf] . -6_ d]l8sn ;]jfsf] If]qdf ljleGg ldq /fi6«x¿sf ;}lgs tyf u}/ ;}lgs d]l8sn OsfOx¿;“u tflnd, cEof; tyf cGt/lqmofdf ;xsfo{ ul//x]sf] . -7_ College of Nursing df ldlt @)^*÷)*÷!! ut]af6 PCL Nursing / ldlt @)^*÷*÷@& ut]af6 B.Sc. Nursing tyf BN ;fy} College of Medicine df ldlt @)^*÷)(÷)# ut]af6 MBBS sIff ;'¿ ul/;s]sf] . -8_ >LdtL ;+3sf ;b:ox¿ tyf :6fkm g;{x¿nfO{ Voluntary Jobs pknJw u/fO/x]sf] . d]l8sn sf]/ ;DaGwL dxTjk"0f{ / rfvnfUbf tYof°x?

!^= d]l8sn sf]/ ;DaGwL dxTjk"0f{ / rfvnfUbf tYofÍx¿ lgDgfg';f/ k|:t't ul/Psf 5gM- -s_ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfnsf] ;a}eGbf 7"nf] lgMz'Ns pkrf/ k|bfg ug]{ c:ktfnsf] ¿kdf /x]sf] . -v_ g]kfndf tTsfnLg lq–rGb| ldln6/L c:ktfn >L jL/ c:ktfnkZrft bf];|f] k'/fgf] ;'ljwf ;DkGg c:ktfnsf] ¿kdf /x]sf] . -u_ g]kfndf ;a}eGbf cufl8 Lithotripsy tyf MRI ;"ljwf >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnaf6 ;'¿ ePsf] . -3_ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfndf VVIP sf] nflu ;'ljwf ;DkGg Ambulance ePsf] Psdfq c:ktfn /x]sf] . -ª_ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfnsf ;'/Iff c+ux¿sf] c:ktfndWo] h]i7 c:ktfn /x]sf] . -r_ g]kfnsf ;'/Iff c+ux¿dWo] ;a}eGbf cufl8 g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/n] g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfg :yfkgf u/]sf] . -5_ g]kfnsf ;a} c:ktfnx¿eGbf >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfndf ljz]if1 8fS6/x¿sf] ;+Vof w]/} /x]sf] . 8fS6/x¿sf] s"n b/jGbLdWo] em08} %) k|ltzt ;+Vof ljz]if1 8fS6/x¿sf] /x]sf] . -h_ g]kfndf ePsf c:ktfnx¿dWo] ;a}eGbf klxn] >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfndf dlxnf sdf08f06 -;xfos /yL_ lgo'lQm x'g' ePsf] . -em_ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn cfkm\g} ;|f]t ;fwgaf6 k/]sf] ;dodf b]zsf] s'g} klg :yfgdf tTsfn} t}gfy x'g ;Sg] Psdfq ;IFd c:ktfn /x]sf] . 50 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

-`_ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfndf ;a}eGbf a9L ;+Vofdf d]l8sn hgzlQm ePsf] c:ktfnsf] ¿kdf /x]sf] . -6_ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfndf la=lk=d]df]l/on c:ktfn / jL/ c:ktfn kl5sf] ;a}eGbf a9L a]8 ;+Vof -xfn %!* a]8 / lgs6 eljiodf !))) a]8 pknJw u/fO{ u}/ ;}lgs la/fdLx¿nfO{ ;d]t pkrf/ u/fpg] nIo /fv]sf]_ ePsf] c:ktfnsf] ¿kdf /x]sf] . -7_ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn g]kfndf cfkm\g} Oxygen Plant ePsf] Psdfq c:ktfnsf] ¿kdf /x]sf] . -8_ jflif{s ¿kdf >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnaf6 pkrf/ ePsf la/fdLx¿sf] nut kl/lzi6 æsÆ df pNn]v ul/Psf] 5 . d]l8sn sf]/ / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]jn aLr ;DaGw !&= g]kfnL ;]gfn] g]kfn ;/sf/ tyf g]kfnL ;]gf sNof0fsf/L of]hgfdfkm{t ljleGg sNof0fsf/L ;'ljwfx¿ k|fKt ul//x]sf] 5 . g]kfn ;/sf/af6 k|fKt eO/x]sf] ;'ljwfsf] cltl/Qm g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfkm\g} sNof0fsf/L sf]ifdfkm{t ;sn bhf{ tyf pgLx¿sf cfl>t kl/jf/n] lgMz'Ns pkrf/ ;]jf k|fKt ul//x]sf 5g\, h'g lghfdtL ;]jf / cGo ;'/Iff c+ux¿df sfo{/t g]kfnL gful/sx¿n] k|fKt ug]{ ;'ljwfeGbf w]/} a[xt\ 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn] sNof0fsf/L of]hgf cGtu{tsf cGo ;]jfx¿ h:t} hËL sf/afxLsf] l;nl;nfdf 3fOt] jf d[To" ePdf cfly{s ;xfotf, czQm 3fOt] ;xof]u, s[ofsd{ vr{, aLdf of]hgf, :jf:Yo aLdf, b'3{6gf aLdf, czQm Ifltk"lt{, sfg"gL ;xfotf, ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L lga[lQe/0f, cfjf; ;'ljwf, e"=k"= ;}lgs ;+u7gsf] cIfo sf]ifdf ;xof]u, :jb]z tyf ljb]z 5fqa[lQ, k|wfg ;]gfklt 5Fqa[lQ, Veteran's Home, ;}lgs dxflaBfno, g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo la1fg ;+:yfg 5fqa[lQ, ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L C0f ;x'lnot h:tf sfo{qmdx¿nfO{ cem} a[xt ub}{ nu]sf] 5 . o;sf] cltl/Qm ;sn bhf{sf kl/jf/nfO{ lgMz'Ns ;Lkd"ns tflndx¿ k|bfg u/L pgLx¿nfO{ :jfjnDaL agfpg] lbzftk{m sbd rfln;s]sf] 5 . axfnjfnf ;sn bhf{x¿nfO{ ;d]t ;]jfs} l;nl;nfdf ;Lkd"ns tflnd k|bfg u/L cjsfz k|fKt ePkl5 cfkm\g} v'§fdf pleg ;Sg] ;Ifd agfpg] sfo{ ljutb]lv ub}{ cfPsf] 5 . ;du|df g]kfnL ;]gfn] k|bfg ug]{ :jf:Yo ;]jf, :jf:Yo aLdf tyf ljljw sNof0fsf/L Mechanism af6 ;sn bhf{ tyf kl/jf/x¿ nfeflGjt e}/x]sf 5g\ .

!*= dfly pNn]lvt sNof0fsf/L ;x'lnotx¿sf] dxTj cf-cfk\mg} :yfgdf eP klg g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/n] pknJw u/fO/x]sf] lgMz'Ns :jb]z tyf ljb]zdf ul/g] pkrf/nfO{ ljz]if dxTjsf ;fy x]g{ ;lsG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn] /fli6«o PsLs/0f cleofgb]lv Oltxf;sf] ljleGg sfnv08df g]kfn / g]kfnL hgtfsf] ;'/Iff / enfO{sf] nflu cfkm\gf] Hofg cfx'tL lb+b} cfPsf] Oltxf; ;fIfL 5, h;n] ubf{ g]kfnL ;]gfn] g]kfnL hgtfsf] ;w}“ ;fy kfO/x]sf] 5 . o'4sf] ;dodf g]kfnL ;]gfn] 5fltdf uf]nL yfk]/ b]z / hgtfsf] enfO{sf] nflu nl8/≈of] . o;/L n8\gsf] nflu g]kfn ;/sf/ / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] sNof0fsf/L of]hgfaf6 k|fKt x'g] sNof0fsf/L ;'ljwfx¿nfO{ dxTjk"0f{ Motivating Factor sf]¿kdf lng ;lsG5 . cem} lglZrt¿kdf ls6fgLsf] ;fy eGg' kbf{ g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/n] o'4sf] d}bfgb]lv pgLx¿sf] cfl>t kl/jf/x¿nfO{ lgMz'Ns pknJw u/fpg] d]l8sn ;]jfnfO{ ;Dk"0f{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]an pRr kfg]{ Ps k|d'v Contributing Factor sf]¿kdf lng ;lsG5 . log} ;]jf ;x'lnotsf] sf/0f x/]s l;kfxLn] o'4sf] d}bfgdf h:tf];'s} hf]lvd klg Right Cause sf] nflu slQ klg ljrlnt geO{ lgjf{x ug{ k|f]T;flxt x'G5, oL ;a}sf] sf/stTj d]l8sn sf]/nfO{ lng ;lsG5 . t;y{, d]l8sn sf]/nfO{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]an pRr /fVg] Pp6f dxTjk"0f{ ;|f]tsf]¿kdf lng ;lsG5 . d]l8sn sf]/sf pknJwLx¿

!(= ljutb]lv xfn;Dd g]kfnL ;]gf d]l8sn sf]/sf] pknJwLx¿ a'“bfut¿kdf lgDgfg';f/ k|:t't ul/Psf] 5M- -s_ sGb|df] >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn / k'g:y{fkgf s]Gb|, k"j{ tyf klZrd If]qsf] nflu lkmN8 c:ktfnx¿ / ;a} jflxgL txdf jflxgL lkmN8 PDa"n]G; ;+rfng u/L Decentralization dfkm{t pkrf/ ;]jfnfO{ a9L ;IFd, nrs / k|efjsf/L agfPsf] . -v_ >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn leq} HIV Center :yfkgf u/L /fi6«JofkL¿kdf HIV/AIDS lgoGq0f cleofgdf pNn]vgLo of]ubfg k'¥ofPsf] . -u_ xfQLkfOn], O{G;]km\nfOl6;, d]gO{GhfOl6;, x]kf6fOl6; la h:tf /f]u lgjf/0f ug]{ /fli6«o cleofgdf pNn]vgLo of]ubfg k'¥ofO/x]sf] . 51 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

-3_ ldlt @)^&÷^÷)@ ut] b]lv g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfg cGt{ut College of Medicine / College of Nursing :yfkgf u/L ;f]sf] Jojxfl/s 1fg >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnjf6 pknAw u/fpg] ePaf6 ca pk|FGt o; c:ktfn General Hospital dfq geO{ Teaching Hospital ;d]t x'g k'u]sf] . -ª_ cfkm\gf Medical Personnel x¿sf] nflu :t/ cg';f/ :jb]z / ljb]zdf lgMz'Ns j[lQ ljsf;sf cj;/x¿ pknAw u/fO{ /fi6«s} nflu of]Uo / Huge Medical Man Power tof/ u/]sf] . -r_ lautsf] åGåaf6 kLl8t ;}lgs tyf u}/ ;}lgs 3fOt]x¿ tyf ckfËx¿sf] k'g:yf{kgsf] nflu ;}lgs k'g:y{fkgf s]Gb| :yfkgf u/L xfn ;f]nfO{ /fli6«o:t/sf] k'g:y{fkgf s]Gb| lgdf{0f ug]{tkm{ k|of; eO/x]sf] . -5_ h:tf];'s} kl/l:yltdf -h:t}M g]kfn ;/sf/af6 kof{Kt cfly{s pNemg lgsf; gx'“bf ;d]t_ klg g]kfnL ;]gfsf jxfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|FKt ;sn bhf{ / kl/jf/nfO{ lg/Gt/ lgMz'Ns pkrf/ ;]jf pknAw u/fPsf] . -h_ cfjZos kg]{ cf}ifwL / d]l8sn ;fdu|Lx¿ oy]i6 / ;dod} k'tf{n u/L Local Purchase nfO{ lg¿T;flxt ub}{ ldtJooLtf xfl;n ul//x]sf] . -em_ /fli6«o ljkb\sf] 38L tyf cGo ;dodf klg ;a}eGbf l56F] / cu|kª\lQmdf /x]/ g]kfnL hgtfnfO{ d]l8sn /fxt pknAw u/fO{ hgtfsf] dg lhTg ;kmn /x]sf] . -`_ Hospital Preparedness for Emergency sf] nflu tof/L xfntdf /x]sf] . -6_ Mass Casualty Evacuation sf] nflu ;IFd / ;w+“} tof/Ldf /x]sf] . -7_ g]kfndf pkrf/ x'g g;Sg] Chronic lj/fdLx¿nfO{ pRr pkrf/ ;'ljwf k|FKt c:ktfn -:jb]z tyf ljb]z_ df nlu lgMz'Ns pkrf/ ;]jf pknAw u/fPsf] . -8_ g]kfndf >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfndf dfq uDeL/ k|s[ltsf lj/fdLx¿nfO{ ICU, CCU, HCU sf] cltl/Qm ITCU ;'ljwf ;d]t pknAw u/fPsf] . -9_ ;}lgs c:ktfn eP klg Emergency sf] ;dodf u}/ ;}lgs tyf c;xfo lj/fdLx¿nfO{ lgMz'Ns First Aid pkrf/ pknAw u/fPsf] .

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54 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* The Mandarin Duck Formation of General Qi Jiguang

- Trailokya Raj Aryal

1. In the 16th century China soldiers had one of the lowest social standings1. The ruling Ming dynasty (1368-1644) had decided that the military should sustain itself and the soldiers, except those deployed in the frontier regions were not even supplied with ration, let alone given any pay. As a result, the soldiers had to either sell or mortgage their land given to them by the state for farming following the peace time policy of creating a self-sustained army. Naturally, this led to a high desertion of the soldiers.2 Many of those who stayed on too were preoccupied with making their ends meet, rather than executing their responsibility as soldiers. Unsurprisingly, both domestic and external forces made attempts to undermine the state’s authority by staging rebellions and attacking the frontier regions. In many instances, a small number of bandits, nomads and pirates easily defeated hundreds and thousands of soldiers. Although the rebellions and frontier attacks were quelled by suffering huge losses, the problem of pirates along the east coast of the empire needed a careful handling. According to Ray Huang, in one instance in 1555 AD, “A band of pirates, reportedly fi fty to seventy men, was bold enough to maraud inland on a route that encircled the southern capital, which unbelievably had a garrison boasting, at least on paper, 120,000 men.”3 Clearly, something needed to be done and the responsibility to effectively deal with the pirates fell on General Qi Jiguang. 2. General Qi Jiguang (1528-1588 AD) came from a military family and as it was the tradition then, following his father’s death, he inherited his father’s position in the army as the Commander-in-Chief of the Dengzhou Garrison at the age of 17. 4 His discipline, bravery in the battlefi elds, leadership and loyalty to the empire soon earned him not only the respect of his subordinates, but also the nick name, Tiger General and as such it was not a surprise that in 1557 AD he was appointed to deal with the pirates in the eastern coast, in what is today’s Zhejiang province, where the foreign pirates working together with the locals had emerged as a formidable force. They not only came inland to establish their bases, but also seized walled cities. But since they came in ships and targeted the coastal regions, many historians refer to them as pirates. 3. General Qi was aware of Sun Tzu’s maxim that before fi ghting an organized enemy, one must know himself and the enemy well. He understood that the pirates and their local accomplices were exploiting the army’s weakness arising from low morale, lack of discipline and training. He was quite aware of the problems in the army such as salary, recruitment methods and the system of rewards and punishment. Therefore, he had to revamp the military before fi ghting the pirates. According to Huang, “His book, Ji Xiao Xin Shu (New Book Recording Effective Techniques), reveals that Qi himself settled the recruiting procedure, decided the pay scale, devised general rules governing personnel assignment, standardized the organization of combat formations, selected weapons… and issued his own orders of court

1 http://totallyhistory.com/ming-dynasty-military/ 2 Fairbank, John K. & Goldman, M. 2006. China: A New History. Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press. 3 Huang, R. 1981. 1587, A Year of No Signifi cance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline. New Haven, USA: Yale University Press. 4 http://history.cultural-china.com/en/50History11684.html

55 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf martial, which, based on the principle of group responsibility, compelled both offi cers and men to guarantee one another’s performance in combat on threat of the death penalty” 5 as the problem of soldiers fl eeing at the fi rst sight of the enemy was quite common. Not surprisingly, with his determination and leadership, General Qi was soon able to create a disciplined army. His next step was to train the solders for combats. 4. As the pirates were skilled at using contact weapons, he too, emphasized the training on the use of contact weapons for his troops. The fact that he even came up with the steps to manufacture the short sword proves that he was determined to strike a deadly blow to the pirates.6 5. However, like every able general, General Qi understood that although the weapons were important, it was the team spirit of the soldiers that led to victory in battles. He fi gured out that the pirates’ invincibility resulted from their close teamwork in small units and skilled handling of contact weapons. As Huang explains, “Infantry tactics, in fact accounted for most of their (pirates’) fi eld performance. The twin swords were wielded with such dexterity that onlookers ‘could only see the fl ash of the weapon, not the man.’ ’’7 Therefore, he developed a tactic called the Mandarin Duck Formatio (Yuan Yang Zhen) to emphasize teamwork in small units and it was this tactic that was instrumental in defeating the pirates. 6. The Mandarin Duck Formation was based around a unit of 12 men. According to Turnbull, “Four spearmen constituted the main striking force, with four more soldiers acting as a protective shield. Two of them had shields: the one on the right held an elongated pentagon- shaped shield, while the man on the left had a round shield. He was supposed to throw javelins then crawl forward towards the enemy to lure them into the open. They were followed by two men carrying bamboo trees complete with upper branches. These simple devices were intended to pinion the pirates to the ground. Behind the spearmen were two rearguard men with fork-headed polearms, from which arrows could be fi red by gunpowder. A corporal and a cook/porter completed the dozen.” 8 Since the formation resembled a duck, it became known as the “mandarin duck formation.” The beauty or the essence of this formation was such that there was no room for individual heroism, the squad of 12 men had to work as a team and one member’s mistake could cost the life of all and “under no circumstances should the lancers

Fig 1: Mandarin Duck Formation (Courtesy: China History Forum)

5 Huang, 1981. 6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ji_Xiao_Xin_Shu 7 Huang, 1981 8 Turnbull, S. 2007. Pirate of the Far East: 811-1639. USA: Osprey Publishing

56 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* be separated from their protective screen”. However, when the situation demanded, General Qi allowed the “formation to split into two identical sections and proceed abreast; or leaving the fork carriers behind, it could line up the eight soldiers in a continuous front line with the lancers alternating with those carrying shields and bamboo trees.” 9 7. As someone well-versed in the Sun Tzu’s classic, The Art of War, General Qi realized that battle was a costly affair and a general needed to take many factors into account before launching an attack on the enemy. Therefore, following Sun Tzu’s advice, he developed a network of spies who would report to him about the enemy’s activities. He took the intelligence reports seriously and planned his offensives based on them. And just as Sun Tzu writes in the sixth chapter of his book, Strengths and Weaknesses, General Qi made sure that his troops occupied the battlefi eld fi rst and waited for the enemy. 8. Given all these preparations, it was not surprising that General Qi’s army started to emerge victorious in the battlefi elds. The pirates then had no choice but to move southward to Fujian. General Qi followed them there too, and was able to rid the country of the problem that had been plaguing it for many decades. By the early 1560s, there were no more pirate raids in China’s coastal regions. However, defeating the pirates was only one of General Qi’s achievements in his long illustrious career. After defeating the pirates in the south, he was sent to fi ght the rebels in the north. There too he emerged victorious10. There is no doubt that he was an exceptional general whose main concern was to defend his country from internal and external security threats and he fulfi lled his duty with utmost dedication until his dismissal in 1585 AD owing to political reasons. His role in strengthening China’s defense is acknowledged by all, and it comes as no surprise that he is considered one of the most famous generals in Chinese history. 9. One can argue that General Qi’s success against the pirates had three main components— leadership, innovative approach to problem solving and the ability to put theories into practice. If it was not for his leadership, it would have been impossible to create a disciplined army. He realized that if a general is to earn his soldiers’ respect and loyalty, then he had to not only instill discipline on them, but also take care of their immediate problems. Therefore, he made sure that his troops were paid and fed while on active duty. If he had not come up with the Mandarin Duck Formation, an innovative approach to problem solving by focusing on close cooperation among the squad members, then perhaps, he would not have been successful to wipe out the pirates. Similarly, his success also underscores the fact that a general should be well-versed in military theories and put those theories in practice to emerge victorious in the battlefi elds. 10. Although the nature of warfare has changed a lot from General Qi’s time and the modern warfare is fought more with technology as opposed to the ancient and medieval practice of close combats, the formula for success, i.e., close teamwork, leadership and problem solving skills of the commanding general are as important today, as it was in the past. Therefore, there is no reason why we should not study the lives of the past military heroes, both national and international, as their lives, just like General Qi’s, provide us with a valuable lesson that when a general is just, upright, skilled and dedicated to the cause of national defense, there is no way of defeating his troops.

9 Huang, 1981 10 http://history.cultural-china.com/en/50History11684.html

57 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿ ;DaGwL Ps ;+lIfKt cWoog

– ;]gfgL ljlht/fh /]UdL kl/ro != ;fdfGo cy{df To:tf tTjx¿ h;n] Pp6f /fi6«sf] ;dli6ut zlQm -Overall Power_ df 7f]; of]ubfg lbO/x]sf x'G5g\, To;nfO{ /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿ -Elements of National Power_ elgG5 . csf]{ zAbdf eGg] xf] eg] h'g tTjx¿df k|ToIf jf ck|ToIf ?kdf /fli6«o zlQmdf clej[l4 ug{ ;Sg] ;fdYo{ jf Ifdtf -Potentiality or Capability_ x'G5, To;nfO{ g} /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿ elgG5 . To:tf tTjx¿ cfkm}df k"0f{ gx'g] / Pscfk;df ;DalGwt Pj+ k"/s /x]sf x'G5g\, To;}n] o:tf tTjx¿nfO{ dxTjsf] cfwf/df juL{s/0f -Categories_ ug{ eg] ufx|f] x'G5 . @= /fli6o« zlQmsf tTjx¿ ;DaGwL ljZn]if0f ug'{eGbf cufl8 o;;“u ;DalGwt zlQm / /fhg}lts zlQm -Power and Political Power_ tyf /fli6«o zlQmsf ;fwgx¿ -Instruments of National Power_ sf] af/]df pNn]v ug{ pko'Qm x'g] b]lvG5 . -s_ zlQm / /fhg}lts zlQm s'g} klg /fi6«sf] /fli6«o zlQmnfO{ slxn]sfxL“ To; /fi6«sf] zlQm jf /fhg}lts zlQm;“u hf]8]/ x]g]{ u/]sf] ;d]t kfOG5 . zlQmnfO{ lj:t[t?kdf x]bf{, k|sfz rGb|fsf cg';f/, æcfkm\gf] cfsf+IffnfO{ kl/k"lt{ ug{sf] nflu c?nfO{ lgoGq0f ug{ ;Sg' jf cfkm\gf] OR5f÷rfxgf cg';f/ c?nfO{ rNg] agfpg ;Sg] Ifdtf jf ;fdYo{ xf]Æ eGg] a'lemG5 -Chandra Prakash 2004, 73_ . >Lw/ vqLsf] ljrf/df, æzlQm dfkg ug{ g;lsP tfklg ;DalGwt kIfn] csf]{ kIfsf] lqmofsnfk tyf Jojxf/df s]-slt x:tIf]k jf k|efj kfg{ ;S5 To;}sf] cfwf/df g} p;sf] zlQm slt 5 eGg] hfGg' kg]{ x'G5Æ -Khatri 2001, 7_ . af:tjdf, du{Gyfpsf] egfO{ h:t}, æcGt/f{li6«o /fhgLlt klg cGo /fhgLlt h:t} zlQmsf] 6s/fj g} xf]Æ -Morgenthau 1973, 27_ . To:t}, s]xL ljåfgx¿sf] egfOdf, æ/fhg}lts zlQm eGgfn], h;n] /fhg}lts zlQmsf] cEof; u5{ tyf h;dfly cEof; ul/G5 ltgLx¿ aLrsf] dgf]j}1flgs ;DaGw xf] / o:tf] zlQm k|of]u ug]{n] csf]{ kIfsf s]xL lqmofsnfkx¿df lgoGq0f ug{ ;Ifd x'G5 h'g csf]{ kIfsf] lbdfudf kf/]sf] k|efjsf] sf/0fn] g} ;Dej x'G5Æ . /fli6«o zlQmsf] ;DaGwdf, æof] o:tf] IFdtf xf] h;sf] k|of]uaf6 g} s'g} klg /fi6« cfkm\gf /fli6«o :jfy{x¿ k"lt{ ug{ ;IFd x'G5 / o;af6 g} cGt/f{li6«o k|0ffnLdf pQm /fi6«sf] :yfg -Status_ lgwf{/0F x'G5Æ eGg] h:tf egfOx¿ klg kfOG5g\ . t/, cGt/f{li6o?kdf« dfGotf k|fKt o:tf] cÍul0ftLo ;"q eg] 5}g, h;af6 s'g} /fi6«sf] jf:tljs zlQm s]-slt 5 eGg] olsg lx;fa lgsfNg jf dfkg ug{ ;lsof];\ . -v_ /fli6«o zlQmsf ;fwgx¿ s'g} klg /fi6«n] cfkm\gf] zlQmsf] k|of]u jf k|bz{g ug]{ dfWod -Tools or Means_ nfO{ g} /fli6«o zlQmsf ;fwgx¿ elgG5 . o:tf ;fwgx¿nfO{ /fhg}lts -Political_, cfly{s -Economic_, ;}lgs -Military_ / va/ -Informational_ u/L d'Votof rf/ k|sf/df af“l8Psf] kfOG5 . obfsbf ljleGg /rgfx¿df p:t} h:tf] nfUg] u/L JofVof u/]sf] ;d]t kfOP klg, /fli6«o zlQmsf ;fwgx¿ eGgfn] zlQm k|of]u ug]{ dfWod / /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿ eGgfn] /fli6«o zlQmnfO{ 6]jf lbg] tTj ePsf] x'“bf oL b'O{ zAbfjnLx¿nfO{ km/s-km/s cy{df k|of]u ul/G5 . #= /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿nfO lgDg cg';f/ x]g{ ;lsg] b]lvG5M -s_ s'g} klg /fi6nfO{« cfkm\gf] :jtGqtf, ef}uf]lns cv08tf, ;fj{ef}d;Qf / /fli6o« PstfnfO{ cIf'00f /fVb} cfkm\gf d"No dfGotf Pj+ klxrfgx¿ -Norms, Values and Identities_ sfod /fv]/ /fi6«sf] ;du| ljsf; ug{ /fli6«o zlQmsf] cfjZostf kb{5 . /fli6«o zlQm ljleGg tTjaf6 lgdf{0F x'g] tyf To:tf tTjx¿df /fhg}lts, cfly{s / ;}lgs If]q jf /fi6«sf] ;dli6ut zlQm clej[l4sf] nflu k|ToIf jf ck|ToIf?kdf of]ubfg ug{ ;Sg] Ifdtf ePsf] x'“bf To:tf tTjx¿sf] dxTj w]/} g} /x]sf] x'G5 . -v_ l;4fGttM ljZjsf x/]s /fi6« cfkm\gf] /fi6«df ePsf /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿sf] n]vfhf]vf u/]/

58 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

To:tf x/]s tTjx¿nfO{ leGbfleGb} / ;dli6ut?kdf /fli6o« zlQm s;/L a9fpg] eg]/ ;b}j sl6a4 x'G5 . k|To]s /fi6n]« cfkm\gf x/]s cj:yfnfO{ lj:t[tdf ljZn]if0f u/]/ cfkm\gf] /fli6o« zlQmsf] Ifdtf cg';f/ cfkm\gf] /fli6«o lxt -National's Interests_ kl/eflift u/L /fli6«o p2]Zox¿ -National's Goals/Objectives_ to u/]/ To;nfO{ k|fKt ug{ /fli6«o gLlt (National Policies) / ljleGg /fli6«o /0fgLlt -National Strategies_ lgwf{/0f ug]{ ub{5 . To;}n] x/]s /fi6«sf] nflu cfkm\gf] /fli6«o zlQm tyf /fli6«o zlQmdf 6]jf lbg] To:tf x/]s tTjx¿sf] dxTj /x]sf] x'G5 .

-u_ sg}' klg To:tf zlQmsf tTjx¿ cfkm}df kl/k"0f{ -Independent_ x'“b}gg\ / o:tf tTjx¿ Ps cfk;df k"/s -Complementary_, ;DalGwt Pj+ ;xof]uL -Co-operative_ x'G5g\ . cem k|i6?kdf eGbf To:tf tTjx¿ Pp6f ;du| k|0ffnLsf Ps cleGg cËx¿ -Integral Parts of a System_ x'g\, h;n] /fli6«o zlQmdf dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]N5g\ / cfk;df Ps ljz]if cGt/;DaGw -Synergistic Interrelationship_ åf/f /fi6«sf] zlQm a9fpg] ub{5g\ . To;}n] oL x/]s tTjx¿sf] cf-cfkm\g}] dxTj /x]sf] x'G5 . p2]Zo $= o; cWoogsf] p2]Zo /fli6«o zlQmsf dxTjk"0F{ tTjx¿sf] af/]df ;+lIfKt?kdf ljZn]if0f u/L o:tf tTjx¿sf] dxTjsf] ljifodf k|sfz kfg'{ xf] . /fli6«o zlQmsf ljleGg tTjx¿ %= ljleGg ljåfg Pj+ n]vsx¿n] ljleGg vfnsf tTjx¿nfO{ /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿sf] ?kdf JofVof u/]sf] kfOG5 . kfNd{/ / kfsL{G;n] e"uf]n -Geography_, sRrf kbfy{ / k|fs[lts ;|f]t -Raw Materials and Natural Resources_, hg;+Vof -Population_, k|ljlw -Technology_, cfbz{÷ljrf/ -Ideology_, g}ltstf -Moral_ / g]t[Tj -Leadership_ nfO{ d'Vo tTjx¿sf] ?kdf lnPsf] kfOG5 -Parlmer and Parkins 2007, 31_ . du]{Gyfpn], tL nufot /fli6«o rl/q / k|lta4tf -National Character and Will_, ;]gf -Military_, ;/sf/sf] :t/ / s"6gLlt -Quality of Government and Diplomacy_ tyf cy{tGq -Economy_ nfO{ ;d]t /fli6«o zlQmsf] tTjx¿sf] ?kdf lnPsf] kfOG5 -Morgenthau op.cit._ . o;afx]s pgn] hg;+Vofdf dfgjLo Ifdtf -Human Potentiality_ tyf k|ljlwdf lj1fg / cf}Bf]lus Ifdtf -Science and Industrial Capicity_ nfO{ ;d]t ;d]6]sf] kfOG5 -Ibid._ . o;}u/L rGb|fn], oL tTjx¿df ljrf/ -Idea_ / tLI0ftf÷af}l4s Ifdtf -Intelligence_ h:tf tTjx¿ ;d]t yk u/L ;Dk"0f{ tTjx¿nfO{ k|fs[lts -Natural_, ;fdflhs -Social_ / j}rfl/s -Ideation_ u/L tLg k|sf/df juL{s/0f u/]sf 5g\ -Chandra op.cit., 75_ . o:tf tTjx¿nfO{ ljleGg ljåfgx¿n] l:y/ (Stable) / kl/jt{glzn (Changing Constantly) jf b]lvg] (Tangible) / cb[Zo (Intangible) u/L cGo ljleGg k|sf/x¿df juL{s/0F u/]sf] ;d]t kfOG5 . o;/L ljleGg k':ts / /rgfx¿ cWoogkZrft ;fdfGotof cfk;df a9L cGt/lgxLt Pj+ ;DalGwt tTjx¿nfO{ Ps} 7fp“df /fv]/ cWoog / ljZn]if0f ubf{ ;lhnf] x'g] dx;'; ul/Psf] x'“bf /fli6«o zlQmsf d'Vo-d'Vo tTjx¿nfO{ lgDg cg';f/ lng pko'Qm x'g] b]lvG5 . -s_ e"uf]n -v_ hg;+Vof÷dfgjLo ;|f]t, /fli6«o rl/q÷k|lta4tf / g}ltstf -u_ k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{ -3_ lj1fg Pj+ k|ljlw cf}Bf]lus Ifdtf / cfly{s ;|f]t÷;Defjgfx¿ -ª_ ;]gfsf] :t/ -r_ ;/sf/ Pj+ s'6gLlts :t/, g]t[Tj / cfbz{÷ljrf/ /fli6«o zlQmsf] tTj – e"uf]n ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f ^= /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿dWo] ;fdfGotof /fi6«sf] e"uf]n g} ;aeGbf a9L l:y/ tTj xf] . t/ klg o;nfO{ l:y/

59 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf tTj g} xf] eg]/ 7F]s'jf eg] ug{ ;lsGg / ;'8fgaf6 6'lqmP/ xfn;fn} lgdf{0F ePsf] gof“ /fi6« blIf0f ;'8fg o;sf] kl5Nnf] pbfx/0F xf] . cTofw'lgs k|ljlwsf] ljsf; nfdf] b"/Laf6 k|xf/ ug{ ;lsg] If]Kof:q / cf0Fljs xft-xltof/ x¿sf] pTkfbg nufotsf sf/0fx¿n] ubf{ ;}lgs b[li6sf]0faf6 x]bf{ e"uf]nsf] dxTj s]xL 36\g uPsf] 5 eGg] ts{ /x] tfklg o;sf] dxTj jf:tjd} 36]sf] kfOb}g . jf:tjdf s'g} klg /fi6«sf] e"uf]nsf] ljZn]if0F ubf{ To; /fi6«sf] e"-/fhgLlt -Geo-Politics_ nufotsf ljifox¿nfO{ ;d]t ;d]6]/ x]g'{ kg]{ x'G5 . ef}uf]lns tTjsf] ljZn]if0f ubf{ kfNd{/ / kfsL{G;sf cg';f/ IF]qkmn÷cfsf/ -Size/Shape_, cjl:ylt -Location_, hnjfo' -Climate_, e"-agf]6 -Topography_ / l;dfgfx¿ -Boundaries_ n] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]Ng] ub{5 -Parlmer and Parkins op.cit., 35_ . ;fgf] /fi6« ePklg, hndfu{af6 x'g] Jofkf/sf] nflu cg's"n :yfgdf /x]sf] / pko'Qm aGb/ufxx¿sf] sf/0f l;Ëfk'/sf] cjl:ylt Hofb} dxTjk"0f{ x'g k'Uof] . bf];|f] ljZjo'4df cGo sf/0fx¿sf ;fy} tTsfnLg ;f]leot ;+3sf] ljzfne"ld / ljifd df};dsf] sf/0fn] ubf{ hd{gLn] p;sf] ;Dk"0f{ e"-efu sAhf ug{ g;s]/ lkmtf{ x'g' k¥of] . Oh/fon Ps ;fgf] /fi6« eP klg rf/}lt/ d'l:nd /fi6«x¿sf] dfemdf /x]sf] x'“bf ljZj /fhgLltdf o;n] Ps ljz]if dxTj /fVb5 . ljZjsf sof}+ 6fk'sf ?kdf /x]sf ;fgf /fi6«x¿ -h:t}- dflNbE;_ cGo ljleGg kIfx¿df ;an eP klg hnjfo' kl/jt{g / a9\bf] ljZj tfkqmd -Climate Change and Global Warming_ sf sf/0fn] ubf{ sfnfGt/df cfkm\gf] cl:tTjsf] ljifodf g} lrlGtt /x]sf] ;d]t kfOG5 . To:t}, e"-kl/j]li7t /fi6«x¿n] ;d'lGb|dfu{df kx'“r gePs} sf/0f cfkm\g} vfnsf ;d:ofx¿ ef]lu/x]sf] klg kfOG5 . xfdLn] clk|msfsf s}of}+ /fi6«x¿n] cGo l5d]sL /fi6«x¿sf] cfGtl/s ;+s6sf sf/0f pTkGg ePsf z/0FfyL{ tyf cGo ljljw lsl;dsf ;d:ofx¿nfO{ k|ToIF?kdf Joxf]g'{ k/]sf] klg b]v]sf 5f+} . o;sf ;fy} Pp6F /fi6«df z'? ePsf] wfld{s÷hftLo ;d:of, l5d]sL /fi6«x¿df cfuf];/L s;/L km}lng] u5{ eGg] s'/f klg xfdLn] clk|msfs} ljleGg /fi6«x¿sf] Oltxf;af6 yfxf kfPsf 5f}+ . o;n] klg s'g} klg /fi6«, l5d]sL /fi6«x¿df ljBdfg jf eljiodf pTkGg x'g ;Sg] ljifd kl/l:yltx¿af6 k|ToIF jf ck|ToIF?kdf k|efljt x'g ;Sg] ;Defjgf ;b}a /lx/xG5 eGg] s'/fsf] k'li6 ub{5 . dflysf pbfx/0fx¿af6 s'g} /fi6«sf] cfkm\gf] e"uf]n jf ljz]if ef}uf]lns cjl:yltsf] sf/0Fn] ubf{ g} /fli6«o zlQmdf 7f]; of]ubfg lbO/x]sf] jf lbg ;Sg] tyf s'g} /fi6«x¿ cfkm\gf] ef}uf]lns l:yltsf sf/0fn] g} ;d:ofdf /x]sf] jf eljiodf ;d:of Joxf]g'{ kg]{ ;Defjgf /x]sf] klg b]lvG5 . &= g]kfnnfO{ Pp6f pbfx/0f -Case Study_ sf] ?kdf lnP/ p;sf] ef}uf]lns l:yltnfO{ ljljw kIfx¿af6 x]/L s]-s;/L Pp6f ;fgf] /fi6«sf] ef}uf]lns cjl:yltnfO{ /fli6«o zlQmsf] Ps ;an tTjsf]?kdf kl/0ft ug{ ;lsG5 eGg] pbfx/0f lng ;lsG5 -Regmi 2009_ . ;fdfGotof g]kfnsf] ef}uf]lns cjl:yltnfO{ ljleGg kIFx¿af6 ;+lIfKtdf o;/L x]g{ ;lsG5 . -s_ cjl:ylt / l;dfgf ljZjsf b'O{ ljzfn /fi6«x¿ rLg / ef/tn] 3]l/Psf] e"-kl/j]li7t /fi6« g]kfnsf] ef/t;“u s/La !%() ls=ld= v'nf l;dfgf / rLg;“u s/La !$!$ ls=ld= l;dfgf hf]l8Psf] 5 . -v_ IF]qkmn÷cfsf/ g]kfn If]qkmnsf] lx;fan] ljZjsf] t];|f] 7"nf] /fi6« rLgeGbf sl/a ^* u'0ff / ljZjsf] ;ftf}+ 7"nf] /fi6« ef/teGbf sl/a @# u'0ff ;fgf] /x]sf] 5 . -u_ e"-agf]6 / hnjfo' !%%, ^*% / !&% qmdzM lxdfn, kxf8 / ;dyn e"-efu /x]sf] g]kfndf s/La !$$ b]lv @$) ls=ld= -pQ/-blIf0f_ sf] sd b"/Ldf ^$ ld= b]lv **$* ld= ;Ddsf] prfO{ /x]sf] x'“bf, e"-agf]6 / hnjfo'df 7"nf] ljljwtf /x]sf] 5 . -3_ l5d]sL /fi6«x¿nfO{ g]kfnsf] ef}uflns cjl:yltsf] dxTj ;+o'Qm /fi6« ;+3df æle6f]Æ sf] clwsf/ /x]sf] ;'/Iff kl/ifb\sf] :yfoL ;b:o, cy{tGqdf ljZjsf] xfn bf];|f] / klxnf] x'g] k|of;df /x]sf], cf0fljs xft-xltof/n] ;'-;DkGg ljZjsf !) eGbf sd /fi6«x¿dWo] Ps /x]sf] tyf ljZjsf] ;aeGbf a9L hg;+Vof ePsf] rLgn] cGo sf/0Fx¿sf ;fy} cfkm\gf] ;Da]bgzLn :jzfl;t If]q ltAat;“u l;dfgf hf]l8Psfn] klg g]kfnnfO{ Hofb} g} dxTjsf ;fy x]g]{ u/]sf] kfOG5 . o;sf ;fy} ;'/Iff kl/ifb\df :yfoL ;b:o aGg k|of;/t, cf0fljs xft-xltof/n] ;'-;DkGg, ljZjsf] bf];|f] a9L hg;+Vof ePsf] / ljZjsf] /fd|f] cy{tGq ePsf bz /fi6«x¿dWo] Ps /x]sf] ef/t b'j} b]zsf gful/sx¿ /fxbfgL÷k|j]zf1f kq ljgf g} Ps csf]{ b]zdf cfjt- hfjt ug{ ;Sg] k|Fjwfg tyf b'O{ /fi6«sf hgtfx¿ aLr cfk;df /x]sf] ;fdflhs, ;f+:s[lts Pj+ eflifs ;DaGw nufotsf sf/0fx¿n] ubf{ klg g]kfnnfO{ ljz]if dxTjsf] ?kdf ln+b} cfPsf] kfOG5 . ef/t cfkm\gf] ljleGg /fHox¿df km}lnPsf] dfcf]jfbL / gSznjfbL h:tf ljleGg ljb|f]xL ultljlw, cfkm\gf] e"lddf x'g ;Sg]

60 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

cft+ssf/L ultljlw tyf cGt/b]zLo cfk/flws ultljlw -Cross Border Crimes_ cflbdf g]kfnL e"-efu k|of]udf cfpg ;Sg] s'/fk|lt ;r]t /x]sf] a'lemG5 eg] rLg klg ltAat ;DaGwL ultljlwdf g]kfnsf] e"ld k|of]u x'g ;Sg] ;Defjgfk|lt ;b}j ;+a]bgzLn /x]sf] kfOG5 . *= ældq abNg ;lsG5 t/ l5d]sL abNg ;lsGgÆ eGg] sygnfO{ dWogh/ /fVb} g]kfnnfO{ g} Case Study sf] ?kdf x]bf{ e"-kl/j]li7t ;fgf] / sd ljsl;t /fi6« eP klg cfkm\gf] ef}uf]lns cjl:yltnfO{ dgg ub}{ cGo s'/fsf] ;fy} lgDgfg';f/ cufl8 a9]df x/]s b[li6sf]0Faf6 b'O{ ljzfn /fi6«sf] aLrdf /x] tfklg cfkm\gf] ef}uf]lns cjl:ylt g]kfnsf] nflu cj;/sf] ?kdf / cem k|i6;“u eGbf /fli6«o zlQmsf] Ps dxTjk"0f{ tTjsf] ?kdf kl/0Ft x'g ;Sg] b]lvG5 -Ibid._ . -s_ ;d lgs6tf (Equi-Proximity) sf] l;4fGt cg'?k /fd|f] ;DaGw /fVg] olb cfkm\gf] cy{tGqnfO{ tLa| ultdf a[l4 ug{ b'j} l5d]sL /fi6«x¿;“u jf:tjd} /fd|f] / ;d-lgs6tf -Equi-Proximity_ sf] l;4fGt cg';f/sf] ;DaGw sfod /fVg ;s]df . -v_ cGt/fli{ 6«o If]qdf cfkm\gf] egfO / e"ldsf /fVg ;xof]u b'j} l5d]sL /fi6«x¿;“u /fd|f] ;DaGw /fvL cfjZos k/]sf] ;dodf cGt/f{li6o« If]qdf cfkm\gf] egfO{ /fVg / cfkm\gf] e"ldsf b]vfpg ;lqmo Pj+ ;sf/fTds ;xof]u lng ;s]df . -u_ aGb/ufx, /]n / ;8sdfu{sf] ;b'kof]u e"-kl/j]li7t eP klg ef/tsf] e"ld x'“b} ef/t Pj“ a+unfb]zsf aGb/ufx / rLgsf aGb/ufx;Dd ;'ud kx“'+rsf] ;'ljwf k|fKt ug{ ;s]df tyf b'j} /fi6«x¿df tLa|?kdf ljsf; ePsf] /]n Pj+ ;8sdfu{sf] k|0FfnL -Network_ sf] ;xh k|of]u / ;b'kof]u ug{ ;kmn ePdf . -3_ Link State sf] ?kdf ljsf; ug{ ;s]df b'O{ l5d]sL /fi6«x¿ aLr a9\bf] cfk;L Jofkf/nfO{ dWogh/ /fvL ;xL tl/sfaf6 cfkm\gf] /fi6« x“'b} b'O{ /fi6«sf] Jofkf/ / ko{6g dfu{sf] lj:tf/ eO{ Link State sf] ?kdf cfkm"nfO{ ljsf; ug{ ;s]df . -ª_ pko'Qm ;}Go tof/L g]kfnsf] las6 Pj+ ljifd e"-agf]6 / xfjfkfgLnfO{ dWogh/ /fvL ;f]xL cg';f/sf] /0fsf}zntfsf] ljsf; / pko'Qm tof/L u/]df eljiodf ljz]if kl/l:ylt ;[hgf eO{ 7"nf] kmf}h Pj+ cTofw'lgs xft-xltof/ k|of]u ePdf klg g]kfnsf s]xL zx/x¿nfO{ cf+lzs?kdf Wj:t ug{ jf sAhf ug{ ;lsxfn] klg k"/} e"-efunfO{ sAhf ug{ tyf lgoGq0f u/L /fVg ;Dej b]lv+b}g . (= o;/L x/]s /fi6«n] cfkm\gf] ljlzi6 ef}uf]lns cjl:yltnfO{ ;b'kof]u -Exploit_ ub}{ ;f]xL cg';f/ cfkm\gf gLlt tyf /0FgLlt to u/L To;nfO{ Jojxf/df ptfg{ ;s]df cfkm\gf] e"uf]n jf ef}uf]lns cjl:yltnfO{ g} /fli6«o zlQmsf] Ps ;an tTjsf] ?kdf kl/0ft ug{ ;lsg] b]lvG5 . /fli6«o zlQmsf] tTj – hg;+Vof÷dfgjLo ;|f]t, /fli6«o rl/q÷k|lta4tf / g}ltstf ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f !)= oy]i6 hg;+Vof s'g} /fi6«sf] nflu ;d:of jf Ps k|sf/n] af]emsf] ?kdf klg x'g ;S5 eg] s'g} /fi6«df /fli6«o zlQmsf] tTjsf] ?kdf /x]sf] x'G5 . ;fdfGotof ljsl;t /fi6«x¿sf] nflu hg;+Vof zlQmsf] ;|f]t / sd ljsl;t /fi6«sf nflu ToxL hg;+VofnfO{ ;xL tl/sfaf6 ;b'kof]u ug{ g;Sbf 7Ls ljk/Lt x'G5 eGg] ul/G5 . s'g} klg /fi6«sf] hg;+Vofn] tadfq /fli6«o zlQmdf oy]i6 6]jf lbg ;S5, ha hgtfx¿ cfk;df ;b\efj /fV5g\, /fli6«o lxtk|lt Psh'6 x'G5g\ tyf pgLx¿df /fli6«otfsf] efjgf x'G5 . cGo kIfx¿df ;an eP klg hflt, wd{ / ;fDk|bflostf h:tf ljifox¿df ljjfb eO{ cfk;df km'6 eP/ jf u/fOP/ pTkGg ePsf cfGtl/s snxsf sf/0fn] ubf{ g} ljZjsf sof}+ /fi6«x¿df 7"nf-7"nf ;+s6x¿ plAhPsf] pbfx/0fx¿af/] xfdLnfO{ ljlbt} 5 . jf:tjdf, kfNd{/ / kfsL{G;sf] ljrf/df h:t}, æpd]/ / n}lËs l:ylt, hGd / d[To'b/, hLjg:t/, :jf:Yo, lzIff, pTkfbglzntf, k/Dk/f, wfld{s ljZjf;, ufp“ / zx/sf] hg3gTj, hftLo / ;fDk|bflos ;b\efj h:tf ljljw s'/fx¿n] klg hg;+Vof To; /fi6«sf] zlQm jf sdhf]/L x'G5 eGg] s'/fsf] s]xL xb;Dd lgSof}{n u5{Æ -Parlmer and Parkins op.cit., 65_ . !!= /fli6«o rl/q÷k|lta4tf, hgtfsf] ;f]rfO -Thinking_, Jojxf/ -Behaviour_, b[li6sf]0f -Attitude_ / cGo ljljw s'/fx¿af6 emlNsG5 . o;}u/L s'g} klg /fi6«sf] g}ltstf To; /fi6«sf hgtfsf] OdfGbfl/tf -Loyalty_, cf“6

61 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

-Courage_, ljZjf; -Faith_ / cfTd;Ddfg -Dignity_ af6 JoQm x'G5 . jf:tjdf /fli6«o g}ltstf hgtfx¿sf] ljleGg ljz]iftfx¿sf] ;du| ?k xf] / pgLx¿ æc? ;a} s'/fx¿eGbf xfd|f]] /fi6« dfly xf]Æ eGg] h:tf /fi6«k|]dL efjgfx¿af6 k|]l/t ePdf To;n] klg /fli6«o zlQmsf] tTjsf] ?kdf sfd u5{ . !@= sd ljsl;t /fi6«x¿sf] cj:yf x]bf{ Toxf“ z}lIfs If]q Tolt u'0f:t/Lo g/x]sf], a]/f]huf/Lsf] ;d:of JofKt /x]sf], ePsf af}l4s ju{ klg ;bfsf] nflu ljsl;t /fi6«x¿df knfog -Brain Drain_ x'g] ;d:of /x]sf] / cGo ljljw ;d:ofx¿sf sf/0f cfkm\gf] /fi6« leq} pBf]u÷Joj;fo ug'{sf] ;§f /f]huf/Lsf] nflu ljb]zdf hfg] h:tf k|j[lQ;d]t JofKt /x]sf] kfOG5 . o:tf /fi6«x¿df 5f]6f] cjlwsf] nflu cfly{s cj:yf wfGgdfq j}b]lzs /f]huf/sf] ljsNk 7Ls} xf]nf, t/ Psflt/ b]zleq s[lif pTkfbg ug{ / pBf]uwGbf Pj+ snsf/vfgf cflb ;+rfng ug{ kf}/vL xft gx'g] / csf]{tkm{ eg] ljb]zdf ;:tf] Pj++ cbIf sfdbf/ -Unskilled Labour_ sf] ?kdf kl;gf aufpg] sfo{ ;b}j lg/Gt/?kdf rNg ;S5÷;Sb}g jf 7Ls xf]÷xf]Og eGg] af/]df To:tf /fi6«x¿n] ulxl/P/ cWoog ug'{ kg]{ b]lvG5 . sd ljsl;t /fi6«x¿n] klg cGt/f{li6«o :t/÷dfkb08 cg';f/sf] Jojxfl/s Pj+ k|fljlws lzIffsf] ljsf; af}l4s ju{sf] :yfoL knfog /f]Sg 7f]; gLltsf] th'{df / j}b]lzs /f]huf/sf] ljsNksf] Joj:yf ub}{ ;fdflhs-/fhg}lts-;f“:s[lts ;lxi0f'tf sfod /fvL hgtfsf ljleGg cfsf+Iff / efjgfx¿nfO{ ;d]6]/ s'g} klg ;Defljt d'7e]6 Pj+ cGt/åGånfO{ cfpg' cufl8 g} ;dfwfg ub}{ cfkm\gf] /fli6«o zlQm a9fpg ;Ifd x'g' kg]{ b]lvG5 . af:tjdf s[lif If]q xf];\, pBf]u snsf/vfgf xf];\ jf cGo ljsf; lgdf{0fsf sfo{ g} lsg gxf];\, oL If]qsf] ljsf;sf] nflu cfw'lgs k|ljlw, k"“hL / b"/bzL{ of]hgfsf ;fy} ljz]if u/L dfgj>dsf] ;d]t Hofb} g} 7"nf] dxTj x'G5 . To;}n] cfkm\gf] hg;+Vof dfgjLo ;|f]tnfO{ ;Ifd bIf Pj+ ;an agfO{ To;nfO{ ;xL tl/sfn] ;b'kof]u u/]/ x/]s /fi6«n] cfkm\gf] /fli6«o zlQm a9fpg lg/Gt/?kdf k|of; ug'{ kg]{ b]lvG5 . /fli6«o zlQmsf] tTj – k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{ ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f !#= k|s[ltaf6 pkxf/ k|fKt, ;b'kof]u ug{ ;lsg] ;fwgx¿ -h:t}– k|foM ;a} vlgh kbfy{, jGohGt', jg:klt, jiff{ / hldgsf] pTkfbgzLntf_ nfO{ k|fs[lts ;|f]t elgG5 . tL dWo] s'g} -vlgh / jgh+un_ nfO{ k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{ b'j}sf]?kdf klg lng ;lsG5 . To:t} s]xL jg:kltx¿ -h:t}- /a/, s6g cflb_ nfO{ sRrf kbfy{sf] ?kdf ?v la?jf /f]k]/ pTkfbg ug{ klg ;lsG5 . sRrf kbfy{nfO{ klg jg:klthGo pTkfbg -Vegetable Products_, kz'hGo pTkfbg -Animal Products_ / vlgh -Minerals_ u/L tLg efudf a“f8]sf] kfOG5 . To;}u/L vlghnfO{ klg wft' (Metal), u}/-wft' -Non-Metal_ / OGwg -Fuel_ u/L k'gM tLg efudf juL{s/0f ug]{ u/]sf] kfOG5 . kfNd{/ / kfsL{G;sf] ljrf/df æs'g} /fi6«df sRrf kbfy{ eP klg pgLx¿n] To;df >d -Labour_, k|ljlw -Technology_ / k"“hL -Capital_ hf]8]/ -yk u/]/_ dfq ;Defljt IfdtfnfO{ jf:tljs pkof]udf kl/0ft ug{ ;S5g\Æ -Ibid._ . pbfx/0fsf] nflu, hdLgd'lg /x]sf vlghx¿ ;Dklt -Asset_ xf]Ogg\ t/ ;Defjgf jf Ifdtf -Potentiality_ dfq x'g\ . !$= k|s[ltn] k|foM ;a} /fi6«x¿nfO{ ljleGg vfnsf k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{sf] e08f/ k|bfg u/]sf] 5 . s'g} /fi6«df /x]sf] k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{x¿ g} slxn] sfxL“ Tof] /fi6«sf] ;d'Gglt jf åGåsf] sf/0F klg x'g ;S5 . dWo-k"j{sf clwsf+z e"-efudf phf8 d?e"ld /x]sf s}of}+ u/La /fi6«x¿df t]n -Oil_ pTkfbg z'? ePkl5 s] s;/L tL /fi6«x¿sf] cj:yfdf Jofks kl/jt{g eof] / sof+} clk|msL /fi6«x¿df /x]sf ax'd"No vlghn] g} Toxf“sf] åGåsf] ljleGg h8x¿dWo] k|ToIF jf ck|ToIF?kdf Ps d'Vo h8sf]?kdf sfo{ u/]sf]] pbfx/0fx¿n] klg of] s'/f k|i6 x'G5 . /fi6«df ePsf k|fs[lts ;|f]t / sRrf kbfy{nfO{ ;xL tl/sfn] ;b'kof]u ug{ ;Sg] g;Sg] s'/fdf g} oL ;|f]tx¿n] /fli6«o zlQmdf s]-slt 6]jf lbG5 eGg] s'/f e/ k5{ . !%= g]kfnnfO{ Pp6f Case Study sf] ?kdf lnP/ Pp6f /fi6«df vlgh kbfy{sf] oy]i6 e08f/ geP klg ePsf ;|f]t Pj+ ;fwgnfO{ ;xL tl/sfaf6 / Hofb} ;+j]bgzLn eP/ s]-s;/L ;b'kof]u ul/Pdf /fli6«o zlQmdf 6]jf lbg;S5 eg]/ ;Defjgf cWoogsf] pbfx/0f lng ;lsG5 -Regmi op.cit._ . -s_ hn;|f]tsf] ;b'kof]u g]kfndf ^))) gbL vf]nfx¿ ldn]/ Pp6f k|0FfnL agfPsf] 5 . ;}4flGts ?kdf *#=@# xhf/ d]ufjf6 / cfly{s Jojxfl/s ?kdf $@ xhf/ d]ufjf6 hnljB't pTkfbg ug{ ;Sg] g]kfnsf] Ifdtf /x]sf] dflgG5 . of] Ifdtf g]kfnsf] nflu dfq geO{ ldq /fi6«x¿sf] nflu ;d]t / ljz]iftM ef/tsf]

62 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

nflu Ps dxTjk"0f{ ljifo xf] . ljz]ifu/L g]kfnsf] hn;|f]tn] ef/tdf l;+rfOsf] nflu ;d]t 7"nf] dxTj /fVb5 . hnjfo' kl/jt{g nufotsf k|fs[lts ;d:ofx¿, hn;|f]tnfO{ ;xL tl/sfn] af“8kmf“8 ug]{ ljifo / cfGtl/s gLlt lgdf{0f Pj+ sfof{Gjog h:tf ljleGg kIfx¿df /x]sf ljljw ;d:ofx¿ g} g]kfnsf] hn;|f]tsf] ;xL pkof]udf afwf c8\rgsf] ?kdf ljBdfg /x]sf] kfOG5 . g]kfnn] cfkm\gf] o:tf] ax'd"No ;|f]tnfO{ hnljB't pTkfbg, l;+rfO, vfg]kfgL, cf}Bflus k|of]u, hn-;+;fwgx¿;“u ;DalGwt ko{6g Pj+ dT:okfng h:tf ljleGg sfo{x¿sf] nflu Hofb} g} ;+j]bgzLn eP/ ;b'kof]u ug'{ kg]{ b]lvG5 . æslt hnljB't pTkfbg eof] / slt hn;|f]t ;b'kof]u eof] dfq eGbf klg /fi6«n] jf:tljstfdf o;af6 slt kmfObf p7fof] <Æ eGg] s'/f a9L dxTjk"0f{ x'G5 . cGo /fi6«x¿;“u o:tf ;|f]tx¿sf] af“8kmf“8 jf ldn]/ ;b'kof]u ubf{ lj:t[tdf cWoog u/L ;DalGwt ;a} kIfsf] lht x'g] kl/l:ylt -Win-Win Situation_ sf] ;[hgf x'g' cTofjZos x'G5 . -v_ jg–h+unsf] ;b'kof]u sl/a #)% eGbf a9L e"-efu 9fs]sf] jgh+un g]kfnsf] Ps dxTjk"0f{ ;|f]t xf], h;n] sf7-bfp/f h:tf jg k}bfjf/x¿, ljleGg hLjhGt'x¿nfO{ vfgf Pj+ af;:yfg tyf ljleGg dxTjk"0f{ h8La'6Lx¿dfq k|bfg gu/L ljZjsf] a9\bf] tfkqmd lj?4sf] cleofg -Fighting Against Global Warming_ df ;d]t dxTjk"0f{ of]ubfg lbOcfPsf] 5 . g]kfn cfkm\gf] o:tf] dxTjk"0f{ ;|f]tsf] ;xL ;Def/ / ;b'kof]u ug{ ;Ifd x'g' kb{5 . -u_ cGo ljljw ;|f]t / ;Defjgfx¿ g]kfnsf] pRr lxdfnx¿df ax'd"No hl8a'6L kfOg], Toxf“ ko{6sLo cfsif{0f ug]{ Ifdtf /x]sf] / Toxf“ rNg] xfjfaf6 jfo' zlQm -Wind Power_ pTkfbg ug{ ;lsg] ;DefJotf /x]sf] 5 . kxf8L e"-efudf lgdf{0f sfo{x¿sf] nflu cTofjZos /x]sf] 9'Ëf, /f]8f tyf l;d]G6 pTkfbg ug{ cfjZos kg]{ sRrf kbfy{x¿sf] e08f/ /x]sf] 5 . o;}u/L t/fO{ Pj+ ljleGg pkTosf -Valley_ x¿df pj{/f e"ld /x]sf] 5 . o;sf ;fy} /fi6«sf ljleGg efux¿df vlgh kbfy{sf] ;Defjgf tyf cgluGtL ko{6sLo cfsif{s :ynx¿;d]t /x]sf 5g\ . s[lif If]qsf] cfw'lgsLs/0f, cf}Bf]lus If]qnfO{ cfjZos kg]{ sRrf kbfy{ pTkfbg ug]{tkm{ nlIft s[lif pTkfbg, h8La'6Lsf] ;b'kof]u u/L tof/L cf}iflw pTkfbg tyf vlghj:t'sf] ;DefJotf cWoog u/L ;b'kof]u ug]{ nufotsf sfo{ ug{ ;s]df o;n] klg g]kfnsf] /fli6«o zlQm a[l4 ug{ 7f]; of]ubfg lbg ;Sg]5 . !^= o;/L x/]s /fi6«n] cfkm";“u ePsf / ;Defljt k|Fs[lts ;|f]t Pj+ sRrf kbfy{sf] dxTj a'emL To;nfO{ oyf;Dej ;b'kof]u -Exploit_ ug{ ;s]df To;n] klg pQm /fi6«sf] /fli6«o zlQm clej[l4 ug{ 7f]; e"ldsf v]Ng ;S5 . /fli6«o zlQmsf] tTj – lj1fg k|ljlw, cf}Bf]lus Ifdtf / cfly{s ;|f]t÷;DefJotf ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f !&= æk|ljlwnfO{ ;fdfGotof k|of]ufTds lj1fg -Applied Science_ klg elgG5Æ -Parlmer and Parkins op.cit., 68_ . x/]s If]qdf dflg;n] b|'t ultdf ljsf; ug{ ;s]sf] sf/0f lj1fg Pj+ k|ljlwsf] tLj| ljsf;n] ubf{ g} xf] . x/]s /fi6«n] ablnbf] ;do / ljsl;t k|ljlw;“u} cfkm\gf k'/fgf ;f]r tl/sf Pj+ k|ljlwnfO{ klg qmdzM kl/dfh{g Pj+ kl/jt{g ub}{ n}hfg' cfjZos x'G5 . cfhsf] ljZjdf clt g} dxTjk"0F{ /x]sf] ;+rf/sf] ljsf;sf] nflu ;d]t lj1fg Pj+ k|ljlwn] 7"nf] e"ldsf v]n]sf] 5 . !*= Pp6f /fi6« cfkm\gf ljljw cfjZostfx¿df cfTdlge{/ x'g tyf cGo /fi6«x¿df cfkm\gf pTkfbg ePsf a:t'x¿ lgof{t u/L cfly{s?kdf ;an x'g Tof] /fi6n]« cfkm\gf] cf}Bf]lus Ifdtfdf clej[l4 ug { cfjZos x'G5 . ædhb'/sf] xs-lxtsf nfluÆ eGg] h:tf nf]slk|o gf/fx¿sf] cf8df cyjf cGo s'/fx¿sf] gfddf Joj:yfkg jf cGo b}lgs lqmofsnfkdf x'g] x:tIf]k, v/fa ;'/Iff k|Tofe"lt, sRrf kbfy{ Pj+ k"+hLsf] cefj, pko'Qm gLlt lgodsf] sdL / ljb]zL pTkfbgx¿;“u k|lt:kwf{ ug{ g;Sg' h:tf sf/0fx¿n] ubf{ klg s}of}+ /fi6«x¿n] cf}Bf]lus Ifdtf tyf cfly{s ljsf; ug{ ;Q}mgg\ . /fi6«sf] cfly{s ljsf;df ljleGg If]q -Sectors_ sf] of]ubfg /xg] u5{ / /fd|f] cfly{s ljsf;sf] nflu oL ;a} IF]q Pj+ kIf cg's"n x'g' kb{5 . !(= kof{Kt vlgh / t]n tyf cTofw'lgs k|ljlw Pj+ kof{Kt k"“hL geP klg sd ljsl;t /fi6«x?n] cfkm";“u ePsf cGo ;|f]tx?nfO{ ;xL ;b'kof]u ug{ ;s]df klg cfly{s ljsf; u/L /fli6«o zlQmdf 6]jf lbg ;Sg] b]lvG5 . To;sf s]xL pbfx/0fx?sf ?kdf ko{6g pBf]u, a}b]lzs /f]huf/, sRrf kbfy{ nufot cGo ;Defjgfx?sf] ;b'kof]u tyf cfjZos k"“hL lgdf{0fsf] nflu a}slNks pkfox?nfO{ lng ;lsG5 .

63 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf -s_ ko{6g pBf]u j}b]lzs d'b|f cfh{g / /f]huf/L ;[hgf ug{sf] nflu ko{6g pBf]u klg Ps pko'Qm ljsNk x'g ;Sb5 . ko{6g pBf]unfO{ pknlAwd"ns agfpg /fi6«df ePsf ko{6sLo cfsif{0fx¿sf] oy]i6 k|rf/-k|;f/ Pj+ kof{Kt ko{6g ultljlwsf] ;+rfng, ko{6ssf] nflu pko'Qm jf;:yfg Pj+ cGo ;'ljwfx¿sf] ljsf; tyf ;'/lIFt jftfj/0fsf] ;[hgf ug'{ clgjfo{ x'G5 . ;+VofTdsdfq eGbf klg u'0ffTds?kdf ko{6s leq\ofpg]tkm{ ;b}j k|of; ug'{k5{ . -v_ j}b]lzs /f]huf/ j}b]lzs /f]huf/nfO{ cNksfnLg cfly{s ;|f]tsf] ljsNksf] ?kdf klg lng ;lsG5, t/ o;af6 cfpg] k"“hLsf] ;xL ;b'kof]u ug{ ;Sg' k5{ . o; ;DaGwL sf/f]af/ ug]{ s]xL Joj;foLx¿nfO{ dfq kmfObf x'g] cj:yf eGbf klg o;n] /fli6«o lxtsf] nflu 7f]; 6]jf lbg ;Sg] / o;af6 k|fKt x'g] k"“hLnfO{ ;[hgfTds sfo{df pkof]u x'g] jftfj/0F agfpg' kb{5 . -u_ sRrf kbfy{ Pj+ cGo ;DefJo j:t'sf] ;b'kof]u /fi6«sf] cfly{s ljsf;sf] nflu cfkm";“u ePsf sRrf kbfy{x¿ lgof{t ug'{eGbf klg tof/L j:t'x¿ -Redymade Products_ sf] lgof{t ;Defjgfsf] vf]hL ub}{ gof“ pBf]ux¿sf] :yfkgf tyf cfkm\gf] pTkfbgx¿sf] nflu cGt/f{li6«o ahf/sf] vf]hL cflb sfo{ ug{ pko'Qm x'G5 . o;sf ;fy} ljZjsf] a9\bf] hg;+Vof / 36\bf] pAhfp e"ld Pj+ kfgLsf] ;|f]tsf] ;d:ofnfO{ dWogh/ /fvL vfBfGg pTkfbgdf cfkm\gf] /fli6«o cfjZostfdf cfTdlge{/ eO{ lgof{t ug{;d]t ;IFd ePdf eljiodf To;n] 7"nf] of]ubfg lbg ;S5 . -3_ cfjZos k"+hL lgdf{0Fsf pkfox¿ pBf]u :yfkgf ug{ cfjZos kg]{ k"“hL lgdf{0fsf] nflu /fli6«o lxt x'g] vfnsf] a}b]lzs nufgLsf] vf]hLsf ;fy} hgtfdf s/ ltg]{ afgL tyf crn ;Dkltdfdfq k"“hL vr{ u'g{sf] ;§f s'g} Joj;fodf nufgL ug]{ ;+:s[lt -Investment Culture_ sf] ljsf;, 3'; vfg] Pj+ lbg] k|j[lQsf] cGTo / /fi6«nfO{ kmfObf x'g] olsg x'g] u/L ljb]zdf /x]sf cfkm\gf cfk|jf;L gful/sx¿nfO{ nufgL ug{ k|f]T;flxt u/]/ k"“hL ;+sng ug{ ;lsG5 . /fli6«o zlQmsf] tTj – ;]gfsf] :t/ ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f @)= ;}lgs Ifdtf / tof/Lkg -Preparedness_ ;]gfsf ljleGg s'/fx¿ -Factors_ df e/ k5{ -h:t}- k|ljlw, g]t[Tj, u'0ffTds / ;+VofTds l:ylt cflb_ . h]=P=gfossf] ljrf/df, æ/fi6«sf] n8\g ;Sg] Ifdtfsf] ljsf; ug{, ;+Vof / xft- xltof/ dfq ;a} s'/f xf]Ogg\, of] o:tf] snf klg xf] h'g /fli6«o rl/q;“u ;d]t w]/} ;DalGwt x'G5Æ -Naik 2002, 52_ . xft-xltof/ t vl/b ug{ jf ;xof]u k|fKt ug{ klg ;lsG5 t/ xft-xltof/sf] ;xL k|of]u tyf xltof/ k|of]u ug]{ ;]gfsf] rl/q, k|lta4tf, cfTdan Pj+ ;dk{0fefj h:tf s'/fx¿ a9L dxTjk"0f{ x'G5g\ . cTofw'lgs xft-xltof/, If]Kof:q Pj+ xjfO{ zlQmn] s]xL k"jf{wf/x¿ Wj:t ug{, cfkm\gf] k}bnL kmf}hnfO{ cufl8 a9\g Pj+ s]xL ;Lldt e"-efux¿ lgoGq0f ug{ ;xof]u unf{ jf ;lhnf] agfpnf t/ OR5f zlQm ePsf] /fi6«k|]dL ;]gfnfO{ hgtfsf] ;fy eof] eg] xft-xltof/ Pj+ pks/0Fsf] b[li6sf]0faf6 sdhf]/ /fi6«dfly klg zq' /fi6«n] sfnfGt/;Dd cfkm\gf] ljhonfO{ sfod /fVg eg] ;Sb}g . @!= xfnsf] kl/l:yltdf Pp6f /fi6«n] ljljw vfnsf ;+efljt vt/fnfO{ cf“sng u/L ;f]xL cg';f/ tof/L xfntdf /xg} kb{5 . vt/fnfO{ ljleGg tl/sfn] JofVof ug]{ u/]sf] kfOP tfklg x/]s /fi6«df pAhLg ;Sg] -Manufactured_ / lgoGq0f ug{ g;lsg] k|fs[lts -Autonomous Natural_ vfnsf vt/fx¿sf] ;Defjgf ;b}j ljBdfg /xG5 . pAhLg ;Sg] vt/fnfO{ klg b'O{ b]z aLr x'g ;Sg] ljleGg vfnsf o'4x¿ -Intra State War_, b]z leq} cfk/flws ;+u7g cft+ssf/L ;d"x / ljb|f]x cflbaf6 pTkGg x'g ;Sg] h:tf -Trans-national_ vt/f tyf hg;+Vof a[l4, ljleGg /f]u / hnjfo' kl/jt{g cflb;“u ;DalGwt -Ecological_ vt/fx¿ u/L k'gM ljleGg k|sf/df juL{s/0f ug]{ u/]sf] klg kfOG5 . e"sDk, af9L-klx/f], ;'Vvf / Hjfnfd'vL ljikmf]6g cflb lgoGq0f ug{ g;lsg] k|fs[lts vt/fsf pbfx/0fx¿ x'g\ . x/]s /fi6«n] o:tf ljljw vfnsf ;Defljt vt/fx¿nfO{ lj:t[t?kdf cWoog / k"jf{g'dfg u/]/ cfkm\gf ;]gfnfO{ To:tf vt/fsf] ;fdgf ug{ tyf ;Defljt k|fs[lts ljkb\kZrft k'glg{df{0f ug{ ;d]t ;fdYo{jfg agfO{ tof/L xfntdf /fVg' cfjZos x'G5 . rfx] cfkm\gf] /fi6« / ;]gf ;fgf] g} lsg gxf];\ ;'/Iff ;DaGwL ;+j]bgzLn ljifodf a[xt 1fg geO{ xr'jf ts{sf] e/df s;}n] cfkm\gf] /fi6«sf] ;]gfsf ;DaGwdf pbfx/0Fsf] nflu -æoqf 7"nf Pj+ zlQmzfnL /fi6«x¿sf] cufl8 xfd|f] ;]gfn] s] ug{ ;S5 / <Æ eGg] h:tf_ lg/fzfhgs Pj+ gsf/fTds cleJolQmx¿ lbG5g\ / To:tf vfnsf e|d km}nfpg k|of; u5{g\ eg] of t Tof] pgLx¿sf] c1fgtfsf] sf/0f, pgLx¿ Tof] /fi6« lj?4 nfu]sf] s'g}

64 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* c/fli6o« zlQmåf/f k|fof]lht ePsf] sf/0F jf ;DalGwtsf] sfo/ dgl:yltsf] sf/0fn] klg o:tf cleJolQm lbO/x]sf x'g ;S5g\ eGg] cg'dfg nufpg ;lsG5 . t/, ;]gfsf ;DaGwdf ;d]t ;sf/fTds p2]Zosf;fy ul/g] cfnf]rgf -Positive Criticism_ tyf cf}NofOg] sdL sdhf]/Lx¿nfO{ eg] ;b}j cfTd;ft ug}{ kb{5 . @@= x'g t ljZjsf sof}+ /fi6«x¿ -s/La @) j6f_ df, ;]gf g/x]sf] jf Hofb} Go"g ;+Vofdf ;}Go zlQm /x]sf jf cw{ ;}lgs k|s[ltsf kmf}hx¿dfq /x]sf pbfx/0fx¿ klg gePsf xf]Ogg\ . o:tf /fi6«x¿n] cGo zlQm;DkGg /fi6«x¿;“u lnlvt, clnlvt jf v'Nnf uf]Ko ljleGg vfnsf ;lGw ;Demf}tf u/L cfjZos k/]sf] ;dodf ;xof]u k|fKt ug{ ldnfPsf] kfOG5 . pbfx/0fsf] nflu, Andorra n] cfkm\gf] ;'/Iffsf] nflu France / Spain ;“u ;g\ !((# df ;Demf}tf u/]sf] 5 . To:t} Kiribati n] k/]sf] v08df ;}Go ;xof]u Australia / New Zealand ;“u lnG5, Marshall Islands, Micronesia / Palau sf] ;'/Iff United States of America sf] lhDdfdf /x]sf] 5 eg] Manaco sf] ;'/Iff France sf] lhDdfdf /x]sf] 5 . To:t} s]xL /fi6«x¿sf] ;'/Iffsf] lhDdf If]qLo ;'/Iff k|0ffnL cGt/ut /x]sf] klg kfOG5 -h:t}- Dominica, Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines_ . s]xL /fi6«x¿df cfkm\gf ;]gf geP klg cw{;}lgs an jf ljz]if k|x/L eg] /x]sf 5g\ -h:t}- Haiti df k|x/L Pj+ s]xL cw{;}lgs ansf o'lg6x¿ /x]sf 5g\ eg] Mouritius df cw{;}lgs Pj+ t6Lo ;'/Iff an /x]sf 5g\_ -Wikipedia 2011, "List of Countries without Armed Forces"_ . o;/L ljZjsf s]xL /fi6«x¿df ljz]if kl/l:yltjz -h:t}- Hofb} g} sdhf]/ cfly{s cj:yf, ;]gfn] æ;}lgs s'Æ ug]{ k|of; u/]kl5 jf cGo ljz]if sf/0Fn] vf/]hLdf k/]/ cyjf ck|ToIf?kdf zlQmzfnL /fi6«sf] k|e'TjnfO{ afWofTds ?kdf :jLsf/]/_ / ljz]if P]ltxfl;s, /fhg}lts jf ef}uf]lns sf/0fx¿n] ubf{ s]xL ckjfb -Rear/Exception_ sf ?kdf Go"g pbfx/0fx¿ kfOP tfklg Pp6f ;fj{ef}d\ ;DkGg /fi6«n] cfkm\gf] ljljw w/ftnLo oyfy{nfO{ dWogh/ /fvL cfkm\gf ljleGg vfnsf ;Defljt vt/f lj?4 n8\g tyf cGo ljljw sfo{x¿sf] nflu pko'Qm ;+Vofdf /fli6«o ;]gf clgjfo{?kdf /fv]s} kfOG5 . @#= ljleGg /fi6«x¿sf cf-cfkm\g} P]ltxfl;s k[i7e"ld / uf}/jsf ufyfx¿ /x]sf x'G5g\ . pbfx/0fsf] nflu– ljZjsf ;fgf Hofb} sd /fi6«x¿n] dfq æcfkm" slxNo} s;}sf] pklgj]z gePsf] tyf ;b}j :jtGq /x]sf]Æ egL, lz/ 7f8f] u/]/ cfTd;Ddfgk"j{s eGg ;S5g\ / To:t} /fi6«x¿dWo] g]kfn klg Ps xf] . Oltxf;df g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfkm\gf] cbDo ;fx; / k/fqmd b]vfO{ cfkm"eGbf Hofb} zlQmzfnL ;]gf;“u;d]t ljleGg o'4 d}bfgx¿df ljho ePsf] x'gfn] g} g]kfnLx¿n] cfh o;/L uf}/j ug{ kfPsf] b]lvG5 . ;]gfnfO{ ljleGg /fi6«x¿n] cfkm\gf] cfjZostf tyf ljleGg cj:yfsf] ljrf/ u/L /fi6«sf] k"jf{wf/ lgdf{0f k|s[lt ;+/If0f h:tf sfo{x¿df;d]t nufpg] u/]sf 5g\ . ljZjsf ;fgf Pj+ sd ljsl;t /fi6«x¿ klg ;+o'Qm–/fi6« ;+3sf] cf≈jfgdf zflGt ;}lgssf?kdf cfkm\gf] ;]gfnfO{ ;xefuL u/fO{ ljZj ;fd' cfkm\gf] /fi6«sf] ;sf/fTds wf/0ff lgdf{0f ug{ ;kmn ePsf] kfOG5 . g]kfn klg ljleGg ;+s6u|:t /fi6«x¿df ;+o'Qm /fi6«;+3sf] cf≈jfgdf cfkm\gf] ;]gfnfO{ ;xefuL u/fpg] ljZjsf k|d'v /fi6«x¿dWo] Ps /lx cfPsf] 5 . o;/L k|To]s /fi6n]« cfkm\gf] cj:yf / cfjZostf x]/]/ cfkm\gf] ;]gfnfO{ u'0ffTds?kdf ljsf; ug{ cTofw'lgs xft-xltof/ Pj+ pks/0fx¿åf/f ;';lHht u/L cfjZos tflnd lbP/ pko'Qm ;+u7gfTds ;+/rgf lgdf{0F u/L ;/sf/sf] k"0f{ lgoGq0fdf t/ /fhg}lts x:tIf]k/lxt /fVg ;Sg' kb{5 . o;f] ug{ ;s]df g} pQm /fi6«sf] ;]gfn] /fi6«df cfpg ;Sg] vt/fsf] ;fdgf ub}{ /fli6«o zlQmsf] Ps dxTjk"0f{ tTjsf] ?kdf sfo{ ug'{sf] ;fy} /fli6«o zlQmsf cGo tTjx¿nfO{ 7f]; ?kdf 6]jf lbg ;Sg] b]lvG5 . /fli6«o zlQmsf] tTj – ;/sf/ Pj+ s"6gLlts :t/, g]t[Tj / cfbz{ ljrf/ ;DaGwL ;+lIfKt ljZn]if0f @$= ;/sf/n] sfod ug]{ :t/n] klg /fli6«o zlQmsf] Ps dxTjk"0f{ tTjsf] ?kdf g} sfo{ ub{5 . clk|msfsf s}of}+ /fi6«x¿df sRrf kbfy{ / k|fs[lts ;|f]t kof{Kt eP klg cGo sf/0fx¿sF] ;Fy} Toxf“sf] ;/sf/n] ;xL g]t[Tj lbg g;Sbf pQm ;|f]t ;xL tl/sfn] /fi6«sf] nflu ;b'kof]u geO/x]sf] / /fli6«o zlQmdf 7f]; ?kdf 6]jf lbg ;s]sf] kfOb}g . elgG5, ;/sf/ klg :t/Lo gx'g] / :yfoL ;/sf/sf] ?kdf dflgg] k|zf;g klg /fhgLlts x:tIF]k Pj+ e|i6frf/ h:tf ljljw sf/0Fn] ubf{ ;xL 9+uaf6 grNg] /fi6«x¿df s'g} klg ;dodf ;+s6sf] cj:yf cfpg ;Sb5 . x/]s /fi6«sf] ;/sf/n] cfkm"n] lgdf{0F ug]{ gLlt Pj+ To;sf] sfof{Gjogdf b]lvg] cGt/df sdL Nofpg tyf cfkm\gf] of]hgf Pj+ hgtfsf cfsf+IFfx¿ aLrdf efjgfTds lgs6tfsf] cj:yf ;[hgf ug{ ;Sg' kg]{ b]lvG5 . @%= du{Gyfp n]V5g\– æs"6gLlt To:tf] snf xf], h;n] ;a} /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿nfO{ Ps ;"qdf cfj4 ub}{ Pp6} l9Ssf agfO{ To;nfO{ ;xL lbzf / tf}n k|bfg u/]/ To;af6 Ifdtf clea[l4 ub}{ jf:tljs?kdf /fi6«sf] zlQm a9fpg

65 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

;Dej t'Nofp“5Æ -Morgenthau op.cit., 140_ . pgsf] ljrf/df, jf:tjdf s"6gLltnfO{ s;}n] /fli6o« zlQmsf] dl:tissf] ?kdf klg lng ;S5g\ . ljZjsf sd ljsl;t /fi6«x¿n] klg of]Uo s'zn / ;xL s"6gLlt1x¿nfO{ kl/rfng u/L cfkm\gf] p2]Zo k|flKtdf nlIft -Mission Oriented_ s"6gLlt ug{' pko'Qm x'g] b]lvG5 . o:tf /fi6«x¿n] cfkm\gf] P]ltxfl;s 36gfqmdnfO{ dgg u/L ljut\df ul/Psf ljleGg ;lGw ;Demf}tfx¿af6 ePsf kmfObf a]kmfObfx¿sf] ulxl/P/ ;"Id cWoog u/L cfjZostf cg';f/ To;df kl/dfh{g, kl/jt{g ug{ k|of; ug{ tyf eljiodf ug'{ kg]{ ;lGw ;Demf}tfx¿sf] af/]df klg /fi6«lxtsf] nflu cg's"n x'g] s'/fsf] olsg u/]/dfq ug{ pko'Qm x'g] b]lvG5 . kof{Kt sf/0f Pj+ ljsNkx¿;lxt tfls{s?kdf cfkm\gf s'/fx¿ /fVg tyf To;/L cfkm\gf] kmfObf x'g] u/L ;lGw ;Demf}tf ug{ oy]i6 tof/L ug{] lhDd]jf/ JolQmx¿df /fi6«k|]d Pj+ cfkm\gf hgtfk|lt OdfGbfl/tfsf] efjgf x'g} k5{ . @^= /fi6«nfO{ g]t[Tj k|bfg ug]{ JolQmx¿ -Leadership_ df /fli6«o zlQmsf cGo tTjx¿sf] ;b'kof]u /fi6«lxt / /fi6f]Ggltsf]« nflu ug{ ;Sg] v"aLn] klg /fli6o« zlQm a9fpg dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]N5 . eGg] ul/G5 ls s'g} klg /fi6sf]« g]t[Tjju{sf] cfkm\gf] kf6L{nfO{ k"0f{?kdf lgoGq0f ug{ ;Sg] v'aL, /fi6«nfO{ ;xL lbzfdf 8f]¥ofpg] c7f]6, OdfGbfl/tf, /fi6«k|]dL efjgf tyf ;lx tl/sfaf6 7"nf lg0f{ox¿ lnP/ sfof{Gjog ug{ ;Sg] cf“6n] klg Tof] /fi6«nfO{ ;xL lbzfdf cufl8 a9Fpg 7"nf] e"ldsf v]N5 . /fi6«sf] /fli6«o zlQm clea[l4 x'g g]t[Tjju{, æ/fli6«o lxt ;b}j JolQmut / kf6L{ut lxteGbf dfly x'G5Æ eGg] efjgf ePsf ænf]slk|otf eGbf OdfGbfl/tfdf ljZjf; ug]{Æ vfnsf / Tofu ;dk{0F efj ePsf k|hftflGqs d"No Pj+ dfGotfx¿k|lt sl6a4 tyf x/]s b[li6sf]0faf6 pbfx/0FLo x'g}k5{ eGg] vfnsf ;}4flGts dfGotfx¿ Ps lx;fan] ljZjJofkL?kdf :yflkt eO;s]sf] 5 . @&= dWok"j{ tyf pQ/L clk|msfsf ljleGg /fi6«x¿df xfn;fn} ljsl;t 36gfqmdn] s'g} klg /fi6«sf] s'g} kf6L{ ljz]if jf g]t[Tj ju{n] hgefjgf / hgcfsf+IFf cg'?k ;a}nfO{ ;d]6]/ ;xL tl/sfn] cufl8 a9\g g;s]df ljzfn hgnx/ Pj+ hgbjfan] To:tf /fi6«x¿df 7"nf] kl/jt{g NofP/} 5f8\5 eGg] pbfx/0F klg b]vfPsf] 5 . ljZjsf sof}+ ;d:ofu|:t /fi6«x¿df s'g} ljz]if cj:yf Pj+ kl/l:yltsf] sf/0Fn] ubf{ 7"nf] /fhg}lts kl/jt{gkZrft / ljz]ifu/L ;+qmd0fsfnLg cj:yfdf /fi6«sf ;a} ;+oGqx¿ c:tJo:t x'gfn] /fli6«o Pstfsf k|tLsx¿ -Symbols of National Unity_ df vfnLkg -Vaccum_ sf] cj:yf ;[hgf x'g ;S5 . o:tf] cj:yfdf ljleGg afx\o jf cfGtl/s zlQmx¿n] cfkm\gf] :jfy{l;4 ug{ c/fhstf -Anarchy_ km}nfpg k|of; ug{ ;S5g\ eg] /fi6«sf] sfg"gL Joj:yf -Law and Order_ df ljljw ;d:ofx¿ ;d]t cfpg ;S5 . To:tf /fi6«x¿df ;Qfk|FKtL jf To:t} vfnsf tTsfnLg kmfObfsf] p2]Zon] ul/g] lg0F{ox¿n] eljiosf] Ps ljGb'df uP/, Tof] /fi6«sf] nflu k|To'Tkfbs tyf Hofb} g} vt/gfs klg x'g ;S5 eGg] s'/fx¿ ljleGg /fi6«x¿sf Oltxf;n] klg k|dfl0Ft ul/;s]sf] 5 . t/, h:tf];'s} ljifd kl/l:yltdf klg æ/fli6«o :jfy{nfO{ g} ;fd"lxs nIo -Common Goal_Æ sf] ?kdf lnO{ g]t[Tjju{n] hgtfnfO{ pT;flxt / pTk|]l/t ug{ ;s]df x/]s /fi6«df /fli6«o zlQm clej[l4 ug{ 7f]; d2t k'Ug hfg] b]lvG5 . dn]lzof nufotsf /fi6«x¿sf] pbfx/0faf6 klg k|lta4 / of]Uo g]t[Tj ePdf 5f]6F] ;dodf g} ;a}nfO{ cfZro{rlst x'g] u/L /fi6«df 7"nf] kl/jt{g Nofpg ;lsG5 eg]/ b]vfO;s]sf] 5 . @*= x/]s /fi6«sf hgtfx¿n] ljleGg ljrf/wf/fx¿df ljZjf; ug]{ eP tfklg pgLx¿nfO{ efjgfTds?kdf Ps;"qdf cfj4 u/L /fi6«f]Ggltsf] nflu Pp6} lbzfdf k|jflxt ug{ ;lsof] eg] To;af6 klg /fli6«o zlQmdf a[l4 x'g hfG5 . h'g /fi6«df æcf-cfkm\gf ljrf/k|lt /x]sf] cf:yfeGbf ;fd"lxs lxtnfO{ a9L dxTj lbg]Æ cfbz{ ;f]rfOsf] ljsf; x'G5, To; /fi6«sf] /fli6«o zlQm b|'t ultdf a9\g] ;Defjgf a9L x'g] b]lvG5 . pk;+xf/ @(= x/]s /fi6«sf] nflu cfkm\gf] /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿sf] dxTj Hofb} g} w]/} /x]sf] x'G5 . To:tf x/]s tTjsf] cfkm}df ljz]if dxTj eP klg To:tf tTjx¿n] Ps cfk;sf] ;x-;DaGw, ;xof]u / ;dGjon] dfq ;dli6ut glthf lbG5, lsgsL oL tTjx¿ Pp6f ;du| k|0ffnLsf] cTofjZos Pj+ ckl/xfo{ efu h:t} x'g\ . To;}n] s'g} klg /fi6«df Pp6f jf s]xL tTjx¿ Hofb} sdhf]/ eO{ af“sL cGo tTjx¿ hlt;'s} ;an eP klg ;dli6 ?kdf /fli6«o zlQmdf 7f]; of]ubfg lbg g;Sg] x'+bf, /fi6«sf x/]s To:tf tTjx¿nfO{ ;an Pj+ ;'b[9 agfpg cTofjZos x'G5 . #)= x/]s /fi6«n] lj:t[t cWoog, a[xt ;f]r / ;fd"lxs k|of;af6 /fli6«o zlQmsf x/]s tTjx¿nfO{ ;dGjofTds 9+uaf6 ;an Pj+ ;'b[9 agfpg ;s]dfdfq /fi6«sf] ;dli6ut zlQm a9\g hfg] tyf To:tf tTjx¿n] /fi6«sf] rf}tkmL{ lxtsf] nflu ;d]t 7f]; of]ubfg lbg ;Sg] b]lvG5 . ljz]ifu/L sd ljsl;t, ljleGg vfnsf åGåx¿df km;]/ pGglt 66 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* ug{ g;s]sf tyf 7"nf] åGå jf /fhg}lts kl/jt{gkZrft ;+qmd0FsfnLg cj:yfdf /x]sf sdhf]/ /fi6«x¿sf] nflu /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjx¿ ;DaGwL cWoogsf] emg\ a9L dxTj /x]sf] b]lvG5 . o:tf /fi6«x¿n] cfkm";“u ePsf /fli6«o zlQmsf tTjsf] klxrfg u/L tL tTjx¿sf] ;xL tl/sfn] ;b'kof]u u/]dfdfq b|'t ultdf cfkmgf] /fli6«o zlQm a9Fpg ;IFd x'g ;Sg] b]lvG5 . ;Gbe{ ;fdu|Lx? != Chandra, Prakash. 2004. Theories of International Relations. Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd. @= Khatri, Sridhar K. 2001. “Nepal in the International System”. The Political Economy of Small states. Anand Aditya, ed. Kathmandu: Nepal Foundation For Advance Studies (NEFAS) and Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Nepal. #= Morgenthau, Hans J. 1973. Politics Among Nations-The Struggle for Power and Peace. Calcutta: Scientifi c Book Agency. $= Naik, J.A. 2002. A Text Book of International Relations. New Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd. %= Parlmer, Normans D. and Howard C. Perkins. 2007. International Relations. Delhi: A.I.T.B.S. Publishers and Distributors. ^= Regmi, Bijit Raj. 2009. “Nepal’s Elements of National Power Potentials and Strategies to Enhance.” Unpublished Thesis, Submitted to Tribhuvan University, in partial fulfi llment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Strategic Studies. &== Wikipedia. “List of Countries without Armed Forces.” 2011. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List _of _countries _without _armed _forces. (Accessed on 05, September 2011). *= Adhikari, Sudeepta. 2004. Political Geography. Jaipur: Rawat Publication. (= Dahal, Ram Kumar. 2064. Nepal and International Relations (Text in Nepali). Kathmandu: Dikshanta Prakashan. !)= Khand, Jitendra Dhoj. 2005. National Security. Kathmandu: Julu, Rajendra and Milan D. Khand. !!= Regmi, Bijit Raj. 2011. “Circumstances of Establishment and Important Aspects of UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Confl icts of West Asia and Africa.” Unpublished Thesis, Submitted to Tribhuvan University, in partial fulfi llment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science. !@= Singh, Jashwant. 1996. National Security. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors. !#= Wikipedia. “List of Countries by Size of Armed Forces”. 2011. !$= "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_size_of_armed_forces" (Accessed on 04, September 2011). !%= Other related articles published in the different magazines/papers and different websites.

67 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf A Brief Appraisal of “Analysis of Air Based Mechanization and Vertical Envelopment Concepts and Technologies” - Chiran Jung Thapa 1. The study, “Analysis of Air-Based, Mechanization and Vertical Envelopment concepts and Technologies, conducted by the Rand Arroyo Center assesses the ability to insert mechanized forces in enemy-controlled terrain through the use of rotorcraft (including tilt- rotor craft) and proposes methods to increase system effectiveness. “Vertical envelopment” as used in this report refers to the use of rotorcraft (including tilt-rotor aircraft) to vertically insert a battle force to conduct an offensive maneuver in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy’s rear. This study was specifi cally conducted to assist the U.S. military. However, this study is useful for many other militaries around the globe. 2. The scope of this study is broad as it delves into the complete operation of air mechanized battle force concept. The concept of air mechanized battle force is divided into two phases: air maneuver or insertion of the force and ground combat. The fact that both the transportation and the combat components are included makes this study more appealing because it presents a complete estimation of an operation. 3. Option set explored in air maneuver phase of analysis are: a) Flight Paths , b) Situational awareness, c) level of air defenses active in simulation and d) Airlifter thermal and visual signatures. The metrics used in this model more or less refl ect the option sets. For the air maneuver phase the study uses three broad categories, i) survivability, ii) mobility and iii) sensor/weapon mix to quantify results. These three categories are further divided to represent these quantifi cations more accurately. The homogeneous nature of the options has enabled sub- optimized metrics with greater objectivity. For the ground force, deployability, survivability, lethality and mobility are the quantifi able metrics used. Both the option set and metrics are complimentary. Since the study seeks to fi nd out ways to maximize effectiveness, the option set is very applicable. Survivability is one of the most signifi cant metrics that could be employed to calculate effectiveness. 4. The simulation model employed in this study is an intricate web of models carefully picked to represent each of the components being analyzed. Three sectors: a) information domination, b) maneuver & fi repower and c) force protection employ separate models. Simulation tools used for the air maneuver phase are CAGIS, CHAMP AND RJARS, while JANUS, MADAM, CHAMP, and RJARS serve as simulation models for ground combat phase. These are deterministic models but not quite as predictive. However, since this study seeks to predict the outcomes of force on force combat for the year 2020, these models might not be adequate to refl ect the changes that could occur in the nature of warfare, the availability of weapons and the capability and the types of enemies. 5. The study uses high-resolution constructive simulation as a tool to explore the military utility of new war fi ghting concepts. The simulation tools are useful for two reasons. First, the simulation can help quantify outcomes of highly complex force on force engagements through sensitivity and parametric analysis. Second, it can provide context to war fi ghting concepts by defi ning force entities and laying out their associated battle plans in a digitized terrain. 6. Solely opting for vertical option puts limitations on other options. By employing only rotary crafts, it limits the concept of inserting mechanized forces into enemy controlled area through other options like carrier crafts or land vehicles. However, given the terrain limitations,

68 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* lack of air strips for larger carrier crafts, time constraints and issues of maneuverability, the use of rotor crafts for envelopment option appears most attractive. Also, the question addressed about the requirements of a deployable force capable of completing the range of vertical envelopment mission is original and important. While trying to measure the effectiveness, it is crucial to address the characteristics of the force deployed and fi nd out which optimal mix will result in the best effectiveness. 7. As useful as this study maybe, this study also has a few shortcomings. The Air Defense Artillery type (ADA) used in this study is the one available at the time the study was conducted. The study incorporates no changes that could occur in the range or lethality of these weapon systems. Any change in any variable could perhaps yield a different result set. Also, in the general scenario, the enemy chosen is the Russian Army. Certainly employing Russian Army as the enemy in the scenario represents the worst case because they are a force with notable capability. However, using the Russians as the enemy force rules out the possibility of other armies surpassing the Russian capability by 2020. Given the end of cold war and disintegration of Soviet Union, it is clearly evident the capability of the Russian Army has waned signifi cantly. Perhaps China, North Korea or even Iran would better represent a potential enemy. 8. Another inadequacy stems from the scenario setting. The study only focuses on one single scenario on mixed terrain. Also, the setting is set for day time (with clear visibility) and presumed that the fl ying capability at night is equivalent due to the presence of night vision capability. However, there is potential bias in this case as it discounts the weather. Weather impacts visibility. Visibility in turn affects the fl ying capability, which has implications on the overall mission. Another bias is that effect of small arms fi re is an omitted variable. Usually when the troops are being dismounted, the crafts are easily susceptible to receive small arms fi re as they are within the range. 9. The Data set used involves a wide set of data procured through national ground intelligence center and Janes defense book; these are reliable set of data. Although it may sound infeasible, but the study would be more productive if it was able to employ some data sets obtained from the Russian Army itself. Although historical data has been inputted to the model to predict outcomes, new data set needs to be generated to accurately predict the outcomes of a 2020 engagement. Due to future setting of this study and the lack of data to represent that time period, the study would have been useful in predicting outcomes if some hypothetical data set with improved capabilities of both forces is employed. 10. Insights presented at the end of the study provide invaluable information for future engagements. However, they are somewhat redundant too. In general, high levels of Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), increased situational awareness (intelligence on the locations of high-end enemy air defense systems) special fl ight tactics, and stealth were listed as major factors affecting survivability. There seems to be nothing original in these fi ndings because it is almost an acknowledged fact that better technology and intelligence are always favorable if utilized with profi ciency. The insights, however, do lead to the fact that there are other investigations that need to be conducted to enhance the air-based mechanized capacity. It specifi cally presents what technological options would enhance the vertical envelopment capability. 11. In this high tech and globalized era, newer technologies, tactics and procedures are being developed. In this context, it is essential for militaries to explore and assess the utility of these new developments. More importantly, it becomes imperative to assess the possibility of the use of these new developments to counter possible military threats that may arise in spontaneity. For such contingencies, having the air based mechanization and vertical envelopment capability would undoubtedly be a great force multiplier.

69 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]if ;+rfng, Joj:yfkg tyf kf/blz{tf

– xl/axfb'/ v8\sf pk–dxfn]vfk/LIFs -c=k|f=_ k[i7e"dL != æax'hg lxtfo a'xhg ;'vfoÆ sf] p2]Zo /fvL /fi6«sf nflu k|F0Ff]T;u{ ug{ tTk/ g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;sn bhf{, cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs / ltgsf cfl>t kl/jf/x?sf] a[xt lxtsf nflu cf}ifwf]krf/, lzIFF, kl/jf/ cfjf; / ljleGg cfly{s /fxt tyf sNof0fsf/L sfo{ ;~rfng ug]{ p2]Zon] @)#) ;fndf g]kfnL ;]gf /fi6«;+3sf] cu'jfO{df ljleGg /fi6«x?df zflGt :yfkgf ug]{ ldzgdf ;xefuL ePjfkt k|FKt /sddWo] zflGt ;]gfdf hfg] ;}lgsx?nfO{ lgodcg';f/ kfpg] /sd e'QmfgL lbO{ art x'g cfPsf] ?=! s/f]8 @$ nfv ! xhf/ $ ;o ^ ?k}of &) k};faf6 lj=;+= @)#@ ;fndf ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] :yfkgf ePsf] xf] . ;fljsdf ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if lgodfjnL, @)#@ / @)^! cg';f/ ;+rfng x“'b} cfPsf]df xfn of] sf]if ;}lgs P]g, @)^# tyf ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if lgodfjnL, @)^% cGt/ ut ;+rflnt 5 . sfg"gL Joj:yf @= ;}lgs P]g, @)^# sf] bkmf @( -#_ adf]lhd & ;b:oLo sNof0Fsf/L sf]if ;~rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldltsf] Joj:yf eP cg'?k sfo{ ;~rfng x'“b} cfPsf] 5 . #= pQm P]gdf Joj:yf eP cg';f/ sf]ifsf] ;+/IFsdf k|wfgdGqLHo" / ;x–;+/IFsdf /IFFdGqLHo" /xg] Joj:yf 5 eg] ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ug{ lgDgfg';f/sf] sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldlt u7g u/L sNof0Fsf/L sfo{, sNof0Fsf/L of]hgf tyf cfod"ns sfo{ ;DaGwL gLlt lgwf{/0F nufot sfo{x? ub}{ cfPsf] 5 . $= ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if ;~rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldlt -s_ k|wfg ;]gfklt – cWoIF -v_ ;+/IFsaf6 e"tk"j{ / axfnjfn ;}lgs clws[tdWo]af6 dgf]lgt @ hgf – ;b:o -u_ k|wfg ;]gfkltaf6 axfnjfnf / e"tk"j{ ;}lgs clws[t dWo]af6 dgf]lgt @ hgf – ;b:o -3_ k|ltlglw cy{ dGqfno -/f=k= k|yd >]0FLsf] clws[t_ – ;b:o -ª_ k|ltlglw /IFF dGqfno -/f=k= k|yd >]0FLsf] clws[t_ – ;b:o sf]ifsf] k|of]u %= ;}lgs P]g, @)^# cg';f/ b]xfosf] k|of]hgsf] nflu dfq sf]ifsf] k|of]u ug{ ;lsg] k|fjwfg /x]sf] 5 . -s_ g]kfnL ;]gfsf axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs JolQm / lghsf cfl>t kl/jf/sf] lgldQ cfjZostf cg';f/ sNof0fsf/L sfo{ ;~rfng ug{ . -v_ sNof0fsf/L of]hgf tyf cfod"ns sfo{ ;~rfng ug{ . -u_ ;fljsdf ;~rflnt sNof0Fsf/L sfo{x?nfO{ lg/Gt/tf lbg . -3_ g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ cfjZos kg]{ ljljw ;fdu|Lsf] cfk"lt{ ug{ tyf o:tf ;fdu|Lsf] pTkfbg tyf ;~ro ug{ . -ª_ g]kfnL ;]gf, ;+o'Qm /fi6« ;+3sf] cf≈jfgdf zflGt ;]gfdf ;lDdlnt x'“bf ;f];“u ;DalGwt sfo{sf] nflu cfjZos kg]{ /sd tyf ;/;fdfg pknAw u/fpg . 70 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* sf]ifsf] cfo;|f]t ^= sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] d'Vo cfo;|f]t ;+o'Qm /fi6«;+3sf] cf≈jfgdf g]kfnL ;]gfn] efu lnPjfkt k|fKt x'g] /sd g} xf] . o;sf] cltl/Qm cGo ljljw yk cfo;|f]tx? lgDg cg';f/ /x]sf 5g\ . -s_ d'Vo cfo;|f]t -!_ zflGt;]gfdf efu lnPjfkt k|fKt x'g] /sd . @_ a+s} tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?df lgIF]k ul/Psf] /sdaf6 k|FKt x'g] Jofh . -v_ ljljw cfo;|f]t -!_ ljBfnox?sf] ljBfyL{x?af6 k|FKt x'g] z'Ns . -@_ kl/jf/ cfjf; ef8Fjfkt k|FKt x'g] /sd .

-#_ MSA (Mission Submission Allowance) k|fKt ug]{x?af6 k|fKt x'g] % k|ltzt /sd . -$_ ljb]zL d'b|f ;6xL sldzg . -%_ jL/]Gb| ;}lgs c:ktfnaf6 ljleGg lzif{sdf k|FKt x'g] /sd . -^_ 6]08/ kmf/d laqmL / ;fdfg l9nf a'emfPjfkt k|fKt x'g] ljnDa z'Ns . -&_ k]6«f]n kDkaf6 k|fKt x'g] cfly{s ;xof]u /sd . -*_ ;}lgs P]g, @)^# n] lbPsf] clwsf/ k|of]u u/L cfh{g u/]sf] ljleGg of]hgf tyf cfod"ns sfo{x?af6 k|FKt x'g] /sd . sf]ifsf] cfly{s cj:yf &= @)#@ ;fndf sl/a ?=! s/f]8 @$ nfvaf6 :yfkgf ePsf] ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] df}Hbft /sd @)^* cfiff9 d;fGt;Dddf ?=!& ca{ $* s/f]8 (# nfv %* xhf/ k'u]sf] 5 . lbgfg'lbg sNof0fsf/L sfo{ IF]q tyf ;xefuLx?sf] ;+Vofdf a[l4 x“'b} uPsf] kl/k|]Ifdf klg sf]ifsf] ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg k|efjsf/L?kdf ;+rfng eP u/]sf] kl/0ffd:j?k sf]ifsf] /sddf a[l4 x'b} uPsf] xf] . sf]ifsf] df}Hbft /sddWo] ?= * ca{ *( s/f]8 %# nfv g]kfnL ?k}ofdf / af“sL /sd ljb]zL d'b|fdf ljleGg a}+s tyf ljlQo ;+:yfx?df lgIF]ksf] ?kdf /x]sf] 5 . a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?sf] juL{s/0Fadf]lhd df}Hbftsf] l:ylt lgDgfg';f/ /x]sf] 5M l;=g++= ljj/0F /sd ?= xhf/df k|ltzt ! s ju{sf jfl0FHo a}+sx? !^#^*&(# (#=^ @ v ju{sf ljsf; a}+sx? $^(^$$ @=& # u ju{sf ljQLo sDkgLx? ^%)(@! #=& s'n hDdf !&$*(#%* !)) zflGt ;]gfdf efu lnPjfkt ;+o'Qm /fi6«;+3af6 k|FKt x'g] /sddf l;kfxLb]lv /yL;Dd a/fa/ /sd s§f ug]{ Joj:yfM *= ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if lgodfjnL, @)^% cg';f/ ;+o'Qm /fi6«;+3sf] cf≈jfgdf zflGt ;]gfdf efu lnPjfkt g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;+o'Qm /fi6«;+3af6 kfpg] eQf /sddf l;kfxLb]lv /yL;Dd @@ k|ltztn] x'g] /sd s§f u/L ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifdf hDdf ug]{ ul/Psf] 5 . o;af6 zflGt ;]gfdf efu lng hfg] ;a} bhf{sf ;}lgs JolQmx?n] a/fa/ /sd kfpg] Joj:yf ul/Paf6 ;fljs Joj:yfdf kl/jt{g ePsf] 5 . sf]ifaf6 ;+rflnt sNof0fsf/L sfo{x? / xfn;Ddsf] pknAwL (= pkrf/ vr{M axfnjfnf ;}lgssf kl/jf/ tyf cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs / ltgsf cfl>t kl/jf/nfO{ sf]ifn] @)#$

71 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

;fnb]lv lgMz'Ns cf}ifwf]krf/ ;'ljwf pknAw u/fp“b} cfPsf] 5 . ;}lgs c:ktfn egf{ e} pkrf/ ubf{ nfUg] vr{sf cltl/Qm dx+uf k|s[ltsf] /f]usf] pkrf/sf] nflu Ps cfly{s jif{df Ps JolQmsf nflu ?= ! nfv;Ddsf] vr{ sf]ifn] Joxf]g]{ Joj:yf 5 . sf]ifaf6 cf]ifwf]krf/ ;'ljwf k|fKt ug]{sf] ;+Vof k|lt jif{ cf}ift # nfveGbf a9L /xg] u/]sf] / cf=j= @)^&÷^* df dfq & xhf/eGbf a9L lj/fdL yk pkrf/sf] nflu c:ktfndf egf{ eO{ ;]jf k|FKt u/]sf 5g\ . o;sf cltl/Qm axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|FKt ;}lgssf >Ldfg tyf >LdtLsf nflu ;}lgs c:ktfndf pkrf/ x'g g;Sg] uDeL/ k|s[ltsf /f]usf nflu k|lt JolQm ?= % nfv jf Ps bDkltsf] nflu ?= !) nfvsf] ;'ljwf k|FKt ug]{ u/L :jf:Yo aLdf sfo{qmd ;+rfng ul/Psf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 pknAw u/fp“b} cfPsf] cf}ifwf]krf/ ;'ljwfnfO{ ut jif{b]lv ljs]Gb|Lt ub}{ hfg] p2]Zocg'?k cfufdL rfn" jif{af6 k[tgfl:yt cf]=lk=l8=x?nfO{ yk ;'ljwf ;DkGg agfpg] / k|To]s k[tgfdf PS;/], d]l8sn Nofa / PDa'n]G; Joj:yf ug]{ gLlt lnOPsf] 5 . !)= kl/jf/ tyf cfjf; ;x'lnot axfnjfnf ;sn bhf{sf ;}lgsx?af6 ;]jfaf6 cjsfz k|fKt ubf{ g]kfn ;/sf/af6 k|fKt ug]{ cjsfz e'QmfgLsf cltl/Qm yk Psd'i6 /sd k|FKt u/L cjsfz kl5sf] hLjg;d]t cfly{s ?kn] ;an /xf];\ egL kl/jf/ cfjf; ;x'lnot sfo{qmd ;+rfng ul/Psf] 5 . o; sfo{qmdjfkt k|ltJolQm dfl;s ?= @)) sf b/n] sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 cg'bfg lbg] tyf pQm /sd lghs} gfddf hDdf ul/ lbg] / cjsfzsf] ;dodf Psd'i6 ;f“jf Aofh;lxt e'QmfgL ul/lbg] Joj:yf ul/Psf] 5 . of] ;x'lnot sfo{qmdaf6 g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;sn bhf{ ;dfg ?kn] lgoldt?kdf nfeflGjt eO/x]sf 5g\ . !!= ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L lgj[lQe/0f ;}lgs ;]jfaf6 cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs tyf lghsf ljwjf÷ljb'/sf nflu dfl;s ?=@)) sf b/n] cfhLjg sNof0fsf/L lgj[lQe/0f sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 pknAw u/fp“b} cfPsf]df cfufdL jif{ @)^*÷^( b]lv ?= !)) yk u/L dfl;s ?= #)) sf b/n] sNof0fsf/L lgj[lQe/0f pknAw u/fpg] Joj:yf ul/Psf] 5 . xfn sNof0fsf/L lgj[lQe/0f k|fKt ug]{ cjsfz k|fKt ;}lgs jf lghsf] xsjfnf;d]t hDdf %^,))* n] sf]ifaf6 lgoldt lgj[lQe/0f ;'ljwf k|FKt ub}{ cfPsf 5g\ . !@= lzIff axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|fKt / jL/ult k|FKt ;}lgssf 5f]/f5f]/Ln] u'0f:t/Lo lzIff ;'ne b/df k|FKt ug{ ;s'g eGg] p2]Zon] @)#% ;fndf dsjfgk'/sf] ledkm]bLdf ;'lkË ax'd'vL SofDk;sf] :yfkgf ul/Psf] / pQm SofDk;nfO{ @)$# ;fndf eQmk'/sf] ;Nnf3f/Ldf :yfgfGt/0f u/fO{ xfn ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfno eQmk'/sf] gfdaf6 ;+rfngdf cfPsf] 5 . sf7df08f} s]Gb|Lt ljBfno ;'ljwfnfO{ qmdzM lj:tf/ ub}{ hfg] p2]Zo cg'?k @)^! ;fndf kf]v/f, @)^@ ;fndf w/fg / @)^# ;fndf ;'v]{tdf ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfnox? :yfkgf u/L ;+rfngdf cfPsf 5g\ . kf]v/fl:yt ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfno z}lIFs jif{ @)^* af6 pRr df=lj=df :t/f]Gglt ul/Psf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifsf lxtflwsf/Lsf 5f]/f5f]/Ln] ;'ne b/df u'0f:t/Lo lzIFf k|fKt ug{ ;s'g egL sf]ifn] rfn' jif{ ;'b"/ klZrdsf] s}nfnLdf ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfno :yfkgf u/L ;+rfngdf NofOPsf] 5 eg] eljiodf dWo k[tgf cGt/ut;d]t ;}lgs cfjf;Lo dxfljBfno :yfkgf ug]{ p2]Zo /x]sf] 5 . o;sf cltl/Qm @)%$ ;fnb]lv ljh]Zj/L 1fgdlGb/ df=lj= / l/k'dlb{gL k|f=lj= ;d]t sf]ifsf] cfly{s ;xof]udf ;+rfng x“'b} cfPsf]df pQm ljBfnox? rfn' z}lIFs jif{ @)^* af6 pRr df=lj= tyf df=lj=df :t/f]Gglt ug]{ lg0f{o ePsf] 5 . sf]ifsf] nufgLdf ;+rflnt ljBfnox?df jL/ult k|FKt ;}lgssf 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{ lgMz'Ns cWoog u/fpg] Joj:yf ul/Psf] 5 eg] cGosf] xsdf /yLj[Gb tyf clws[tx?af6 dfl;s z'Nssf] #$=( k|ltzt, klbsaf6 @!=* k|ltzt / cGobhf{af6 !&=$% k|ltzt c;'n u/L af“sL z'Ns ldgfxf ug]{ Joj:yf ul/Psf] 5 . @)^$ ;fnb]lv s'n ljBFyL{sf] ;+Vof $) k|ltzt;Dd u}x| ;}lgs JolQmsf 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{;d]t egf{ lng] Joj:yf qmlds?kdf nfu' ub}{ hfg] of]hgfnfO{ lg/Gt/tf lbOPsf] 5 . sf]if cGt/ut ;+rflnt ljBfnox?df cWoog/t ljBfyL{sf] ;+Vof @)^* ;fnsf] h]i7;Dddf em08} ^ xhf/ k'u]sf] 5 . sf]if cGt/ut ;+rflnt ;a} ljBfnox?sf] @)^& ;fnsf] cyf{t o;} jif{ k|sflzt k|j]lzsf k/LIFFsf] glthf zt k|ltzt /x]sf] 5 . !#= 5fqj[lQ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] h]x]Gbf/ 5f]/f5f]/Ln] k|fljlws lzIff xfl;n ug{ ;xof]u k'¥ofpg] tyf sf]ifaf6 ;++rflnt ljBfnodf egf{ x'g gkfO{ cGo ljBfnodf b]ze/ sIFf ^ b]lv !@ ;Dd cWoog/t g]kfnL ;]gfsf 5f]/f5f]/LnfO { 5fqj[lQ pknAw u/fO{ lghx?dfly kg]{ cfly{s ef/ s]xL xb;Dd eP klg sd ug]{ p2]Zon] :yfkgf sfnb]lv g} ljleGg 5fqj[lQ sfo{qmdx? ;+rfng x“'b} cfPsf] 5 . !$= ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L 5fqj[lQ -ljb]z÷ljljw_ o; 5fqj[lQ cGtu{t ef/t, a+unfb]z, kfls:tfg / rLgdf

72 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

Pd=lj=lj=P;= cWoog ug{ hfg >L anflws[t ljefu -;}=la=_ af6 5gf}6 ePsf d]l8sn Sof8]6x?nfO{ lglZrt ;'ljwf k|bfg ul/G5 . o;sf] cltl/Qm :jb]z÷ljb]zdf lghL vr{df d]l8sn, O{lGhlgol/Ë, cf]e/l;o/, :6fkm g;{, h]=6L=÷h]=l6=P= tyf lzIFf zf:qtkm{ cWoog ug]{ axfnjfnf tyf cjsfz k|fKt g]kfnL ;]gfsf h]x]Gbf/ 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{ klg 5fqj[lQ:j?k lglZrt /sd k|bfg ul/b} cfPsf]df xfn of] ;'ljwf eg] :ylut ul/Psf] 5 . k"j{ Joj:yf adf]lhd cWoog/t ljBfyL{x?sf xsdf eg] of] ;'ljwfnfO{ lg/Gt/tf lbPsf] 5 . of] 5fqj[lQaf6 o;jif{ nfeflGjt x'g]x?sf] ;+Vof #* /x]sf] 5 . !%= ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L 5fqj[lQ -:jb]z_ g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;]jf/t tyf cjsfz k|FKt ;}lgssf sIFf ^ b]lv !@ ;Dd cWoog ug]{ h]x]Gbf/ 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{ dfl;s ?= %)).)) sf b/n] ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L 5fqj[lQ -:jb]z_ jflif{s x'g] ?=^,))).)) Psd'i6 lbg] Joj:yf 5 . cf=j=)^&÷^* dfdfq of] 5fqj[lQ !# xhf/ @! hgfn] k|FKt ul/;s]sf 5g\ . k|ltjif{ ;fdfGotof !) k|ltztsf b/n] 5fqj[lQ ;+Vof a9fp“b} n}hfg] gLlt 5 . !^= k|wfg;]gfklt 5fqj[lQ @)#@ ;fnb]lv nfu" ePsf] of] 5fqj[lQ axfn /x“bf d[To' ePsf jf hËL sf/jfxLdf jL/ult k|FKt ug]{ ;}lgssf @ hgf 5f]/f 5f]/LnfO{ ^ jif{b]lv !* jif{sf] pd]/;Dd dfl;s ?=^)).)) sf b/n] 5fqj[lQ lbg] Joj:yf /x]sf]df o; jif{b]lv dfl;s ?=!)).)) yk u/L dfl;s ?=&)).)) sf b/n] Psd'i6 jflif{s ?=*,$)).)) 5fqj[lQ k|bfg ul/g] Joj:yf ul/Psf] 5 . of] 5fqj[lQaf6 cf=j= )^&÷^* df nfeflGjt x'g]sf] ;+Vof &^% /x]sf] 5 . !&= g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfg ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 ;+rfng x“'b} cfPsf] cf}ifwf]krf/ ;'ljwfsf] bfloTjnfO{ bL3{sfnLg?kdf Jojl:yt ug{ cjsfz k|FKt jf axfnjfnf ;}lgssf h]x]Gbf/ 5f]/f5f]/LnfO{ :jb]zd} d]l8sn lzIFFsf] df}sf k|bfg ug{ tyf g]kfnL ;]gf :jo+nfO{ cfjZos bIF hgzlQm pTkfbg ug{ / ;du|df sNof0fsf/L sfo{ / sf]ifsf] cfo;|f]t ;d]t clea[l4 ug]{ p2]Zon] ;}lgs P]g, @)^# tyf sNof0fsf/L sf]if lgodfjnL, @)^% sf] kl/lwleq /x]/ g]kfnL ;]gf :jf:Yo lj1fg ;+:yfgsf] :yfkgf u/L ;+rfng ug]{ p2]Zocg'?k rfn' jif{ ;+:yfgsf nflu cfjZos ef}lts k"jf{wf/x? lgdf{0f ug]{ sfo{ eO/x]sf] 5 . lzIFF dGqfnoaf6 ;+:yfg :yfkgfsf] cfzo kq (Letter of Intent) k|FKt eO{ lqe'jg ljZj ljBfno, g]kfn d]l8sn sfplG;n, g]kfn gl;{Ë kl/ifb tyf k|Fljlws lzIFF tyf Joj;flos tflnd kl/ifbaf6 cfjZos ;+aGwg tyf cg'dlt k|fKt eO{ sn]h ckm d]l8l;g / sn]h ckm gl;{Ë ;+rfng eO{;s]sf] 5 . sn]h ckm d]l8l;g cGt/ut MBBS df !)) hgf, sn]h ckm gl;{Ë cGt/ut PCL (Nursing) df $) hgf, BSc (Nursing) df @% hgf / BN (Nursing) df $) hgf;Dd ljBfyL{ egf{ ug{ ;lsg] u/L o; jif{af6 klxnf] ;];g z'? eO;s]sf] 5 . kl/jf/ cfjf; / k"jf{wf/ ljsf; !*= kl/jf/ cfjf; b]zsf] ljleGg :yfgx?df t}gfy ;]gfsf] OsfOx?df sfo{/t ;}lgsx?sf] lxtnfO{ Wofgdf /fvL jxfn eO/x]sf] ;dodf klg s]xL cjlw kl/jf/sf] ;fydf /xg] cj;/ k|fKt xf];\ eGg] p2]Zon] kl/jf/ cfjf; lgdf{0f ub}{ hfg] gLlt cg'?k xfn b]ze/ !&! cfjf; u[x lgdf{0f ;DkGg ePsf 5g\ . lgdf{0f ;DkGg cfjf; u[xdf xfn clws[t, klbs / cGobhf{ u/L ! xhf/ %!# kl/jf/n] cfjf; ;'ljwf lnO/x]sf 5g\ . ;]gfsf] x/]s OsfOdf sDtLdf !) kl/jf/ cfjf; lgdf{0f ug]{ p2]Zo cg'?k sNof0fsf/L of]hgf lgb]{zgfnoaf6 of]hgf ;+rfng x“'b} cfPsf] 5 . kf“rj6} ljsf; IF]qdf cjsfz k|FKt ;}lgsx?sf] nflu c:yfoL cfjf; / hËL sf/jfxLdf c+ue+u ePsf ;}lgsx?nfO{ Joj;flos tyf ;Lkd"ns tflnd lbg] p2]Zon] sf7df08f}df k'g:yf{kgf s]Gb| :yfkgf ug]{ nIoadf]lhd lgdf{0f sfo{ ;DkGg eO{ ljutb]lvg} ;+rfngdf cfPsf] 5 . !(= k"jf{wf/ ljsf; sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 ;+rflnt cf}ifwf]krf/ tyf lzIFF IF]qsf sNof0fsf/L sfo{qmd k|efjsf/L?kdf ;+rfng ug{ cfjZos c:ktfn, ljBfno tyf dxfljBfnox?sf] ef}lts k"jf{wf/ lj:tf/ ub}{ hfg] gLlt cg'?k k"jf{wf/ ljsf; sfo{qmd ;+rfng x“'b} cfPsf] 5 . k"jf{wf/ ljsf;sf] nflu cfjZos /sd sNof0fsf/L sf]ifaf6 Joxf]l/g] / ljsf; lgdf{0f tyf :yklt dxflgb]{zgfnodfkm{t pQm /sd vr{ ul/+b} cfPsf] 5 . a9\bf] lj/fdL rfknfO{ b[li6ut u/L jL/]Gb| c:ktfn 5fpgLsf] ;'ljwf, lj:tf/ tyf ;}lgs ljBfno b]ze/ lj:tf/ ub}{ hfg] gLlt cg';f/ k"jf{wf/ ljsf;df jif]{gL 7"nf] wg/flz vr{ ub}{ hfg' k/]sf] 5 . o;sf cltl/Qm lgdf{0f eO;s]sf ef}lts k"jf{wf/x?sf] ;+/IF0f / lgoldt dd{t ;+ef/df;d]t 7"nf] /sd vr{ x'g] u/]sf] 5 .

73 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf cfly{s /fxt tyf ;fdflhs sNof0fsf/L sfo{x? @)= h·L sf/jfxLdf 3fOt] tyf jL/ult k|FKtnfO { cfly{s ;xof]u hËL sf/jfxLsf] qmddf jL/ult k|FKt ug]{ ;}lgssf] xsjfnfnfO{ tTsfn cfly{s ;xof]u:j?k cfjf; ;xof]u jfkt ?= @% xhf/ tyf cfly{s cg'bfg :j?k ?= ! nfv sNof0fsf/L sf]ifn] pknAw u/fp“b} cfPsf] 5 . o;}u/L s[ofsd{ vr{ jfkt ;d]t Psd'i6 /sd pknAw u/fpb} cfPsf] 5 . hËL sf/jfxLdf 3fOt] ;}lgsx?nfO{ g]kfn ;/sf/af6 k|FKt x'g] /sd a/fa/ g} yk cg'bfg lbg] ;d]t Joj:yf 5 . @!= e"=k"= ;}lgs ;+3nfO{ ;xof]u g]kfnL /fli6«o e"tk"j{ ;}lgs ;+3nfO{ cIfosf]ifdf jflif{s ?= ! nfv lbO{ pQm sf]ifaf6 cflh{t JofhdWo] &% k|ltzt pQm ;+3n] vr{ ug]{ / @% k|ltzt cIFo sf]ifdf yk ub]{ hfg' kg]{ Joj:yf ul/Psf] 5 . ljZj e"=k"= ;}lgs dxf;+3sf] ;b:otf gljs/0f ug{ jflif{s ! xhf/ & ;o ^) o'/f] cg'bfg pknAw u/fp“b} cfPsf] 5 . @@= b}jL k|sf]k /fxt ljleGg b}jL k|sf]k tyf cGo sf/0faf6 kLl8t JolQmx?nfO{ /fxt:j?k ?= %) xhf/;Dd cfly{s /fxt k|bfg ug]{ k|Fjwfg 5 . cf=j= )^&÷^*df b}jL k|sf]k /fxt /sd &% hgfnfO{ ljt/0f ul/Psf] 5 . sf]ifsf] cfGtl/s lgoGq0F Joj:yf @#= sf]ifsf] :yfkgfsf] p2]Zo xfl;n ug{ sf]if cGtu{t x'g] ;a} ultljlwx?sf] lgoGq0F Joj:yfnfO{ k|efjsf/L agfpg lgDgfg';f/sf cfGtl/s Joj:yfx? cjnDag ul/Psf 5g\M -s_ a}+s dfkm{t sf/f]af/ sf]if cGtu{tsf ;a} cfly{s sf/f]af/x? a}+s dfkm{t ug]{ u/fpg] x'“bf gub sf/f]af/df x'g] hf]lvdx?af6 sf]if d'Qm /x]sf] 5 . -v_ ah]6/L lgoGq0F Joj:yf sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifdfly Jooef/ kf/L ul/g] ;a} vr{x? sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldltaf6 :jLs[t jflif{s ah]6df ;dfj]z u/]/dfq lgsf;f lbOg] tyf o:tf] ah]6df yk36 ug{' k/]df ;ldltsf] :jLs[ltdfdfq ug{ ;lsg] afWofTds Joj:yf /x]sf]n] sf]ifsf] ah]6/L lgoGq0F Joj:yf k|efjsf/L /x]sf] 5 . -u_ :ki6 sfo{ ljefhg sf]if cGtu{t ;+rfng ul/g] sNof0Fsf/L sfo{x? tyf zflGt ;]gf ;+rfng ug{ ul/g] vl/b sfo{x?sf] nflu /sd lgsf;f lbg] / cfk"t{s 5gf}6 ug]{ sfo{ 5'§f5'§} lgsfo / lgb]{zgfnox?n] ug]{ u/L cfPsf] 5 . -3_ cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIF0F sf]ifsf] cfo Joosf] lgoldt cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIf0f ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldltn] tf]s]adf]lhd x'g] u/L ;}lgs P]gn] :ki6 Joj:yf u/]sf] 5 . sf]ifsf] cfly{s sf/f]af/df s'g} ;+nUgtf g/x]sf pk/yLsf] ;+of]hsTjdf jl/i7 rf6{8 Psfp06]06, jl/i7 cfly{s ljz]if1 ;lDdlnt cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIF0f af]8{ u7g u/L cf=n]=k= ug]{ / ;f] sf] k|ltj]bg sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldltdf k]z ug]{ Joj:yf 5 . cfly{s jif{ )^&÷^* ;Ddsf] cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIF0f ;DkGg eO;s]sf] 5 . sf]ifsf] cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIF0FnfO{ k|efjsf/L agfpg sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldltsf] :jLs[ltdf cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIF0F lgb]{lzsf hf/L u/L nfu" ul/Psf] 5 . -ª_ sf]ifsf] clGtd n]vfk/LIf0f sf]ifsf] cfly{s sf/f]af/sf] clGtd n]vfk/LIf0f b]zsf] ;jf]{Rr n]vfk/LIf0f ;+:yf dxfn]vf k/LIFssf] sfof{noaf6 x'g] Joj:yf ;}lgs P]g, @)^# n] u/]sf] 5 . dxfn]vfk/LIFssf] sfof{noaf6 k|To]s jif{ lgoldt?kdf n]vfk/LIf0f u/L cfly{s jif{ @)^^÷^& ;Ddsf] n]vfk/LIf0f ;DkGg eO;s]sf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifn] ;+rfng u/]sf ;a} cfly{s sf/f]af/sf ;DaGwdf n]vfk/LIf0faf6 cfly{s sf/f]af/sf] n]vfhf]vf u/L ;+j}wflgs Joj:yfcg';f/ dxfn]vfk/LIFsn] jflif{s k|ltj]bg k|sfzg u/L sf]ifsf] oyfy{ cfly{s sf/f]af/ k|To]s jif{ ;fj{hlgs ug]{ ul/Psf] 5 . of] Joj:yf g} ;+j}wflgs tyf sfg"gL ?kdf sf]ifsf] ultljlw tyf kf/blz{sf ljifodf ;fj{hlgs ul/g] cflwsfl/s dfWod xf] .

74 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* o; jif{sf] a]?h' km5\of}{6sf] k|ult @$= ;}lgs P]g, @)^# tyf ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]if lgodfjnL, @)^% cg';f/ ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] clGtd n]vfk/LIf0fdf ;jf]{Rr n]vfk/LIf0f ;+:yf dxfn]vfk/LIFssf] sfof{noaf6 ug'{ kg]{ k|Fjwfg cg'?k z'?b]lv cfly{s jif{ @)^^÷^& ;Ddsf] d=n]=k=sf] sfof{noaf6 n]vfk/LIf0f ;DkGg u/L ;s]sf] 5 . d=n]=k=sf] jflif{s k|ltj]bg @)^& cg';f/ ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]if nufot cGo ;ldltsf] ;d]t u/L km5\of]{6 ug{ af“sL a]?h' ?= $# s/f]8 ^( nfv !! xhf/dWo] cfly{s jif{ @)^&÷^* df ?= #) s/f]8 %* nfv $$ xhf/ -&)k|ltzt_ km5\of}{6 eO{ of] jif{ a]?h' km5\of}{6 ug]{ sfo{df pNn]vgLo k|ult xf+l;n ePsf] 5 . pQm km5\of}{6dWo] ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifsf] dfq *^ k|ltzt km5\of]{6 ePsf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifsf] a]?h' km5\of}{6sf] k|ult pNn]vlgo ePsf] cfwf/df a]?h' km5\of}{6 d"Nof+sg tyf cg'udg ;ldlt / >L /Iff dGqfnon] wGojfb;lxt k'/:s[t ug]{ lg0f{o u/]sf] 5 . @%= ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]if / cGt/utsf lgsfox?sf] cWofjlws a]?h' km5\of}{6sf] l:ylt sNof0Fsf/L sf]if / cGt/utsf lgsfox?sf] z'?b]lv cfly{s jif{ @)^^÷^& ;Dd d=n]=k=sf] sfof{noaf6 n]vfk/LIf0f u/L cf}NofPsf] hDdf a]?h' ?=!) ca{ %^ s/f]8 ^) nfv @# xhf/dWo] cfly{s jif{ @)^@÷^# b]lv @)^&÷^* ;Dd d=n]=k=sf] sfof{noaf6 ?= ( ca{ *( s/f]8 (@ nfv $) xhf/ km5\of}{6 eO;s]sf] 5 . o; jif{ *^ k|ltzt a]?h' km5\of}{6 ePsf] 5 eg] ;du|df (# k|ltzt a]?h' km5\of}{6 ePsf] x'“bf ;do ;dodf /IFF dGqfno tyf Joj:yflksf ;+;b ;fj{hlgs n]vf ;ldltaf6 a]?h' km5\of}{6sf] k|ltzt cGoGt /fd|f] ePsf]n] wGoafb k|fKt ePsf] ;fy} dlGqkl/ifb cGt/ut a]?h' km5\of}{6 d"Nof+sg tyf cg'udg ;ldltsf] lg0F{o cg';f/ k'/:sf/;d]t k|bfg ug]{ u/]sf] 5 . o;nfO{ ;sf/fTds sfo{sf] ?kdf lng ;lsG5 . sNof0Fsf/L sf]if tyf cGo ;ldltsf] ;d]t af“sL a]?h' ?=^^ s/f]8 ^& nfv *# xhf/ tyf k|To]s jif{ d=n]=k=sf] sfof{noaf6 n]vf k/LIf0f u/L cf+}NofOg] yk a]?h'x?sf ;DaGwdf cfufdL lbgx?df klg a]?h' km5\of}{6 ug]{ u/fpg] sfddf ;lqmo e"ldsf lgjf{x u/L a]?h' z"Go u/fpg]tkm{ sNof0fsf/L of]hgf lgb]{zgfnosf] k|of;nfO{ lg/Gt/tf lbg] Joj:yf ldnfOPsf] 5 . sf]if Joj:yfkgdf ;'wf/ @^= ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] Joj:yfkgnfO{ ;do ;fk]IF?kdf ;'wf/ ub}{ yk kf/bzL{ / Jojl:yt u/fp“b} n}hfg ljut jif{x?df ul/Psf] ;'wf/x?sf] k|ltkmn k|FKt x'g z'? ePsf] 5 eg] ;'wf/sf] qmdnfO{ cfufdL jif{;d]t lg/Gt/tf lbg] p2]Zo /x]sf] 5 . sf]ifsf] n]vf Joj:yfnfO{ sDKo'6/s[t ul/Psf] 5 eg] ut jif{ ul7t sfo{bnaf6 tof/ ePsf] ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] cfly{s k|zf;g sfo{ljlwsf] d:of}bfnfO{ sfg"gL /fosf lgldQ ;]gf k|f8–ljjfsdf k7FOPsf] 5 . sfg"gL /fo k|FKt ePkl5 sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;ldltsf] :jLs[ltdf sfo{ljlw nfu' ul/g] 5 . sfo{ljlw nfu" eO;s]kZrft sf]ifsf] sfo{ ;+rfng ljlw yk kf/bzL{ x'g] ljZjf; lnOPsf] 5 . sf]if cGt/ut ;+rflnt sNof0Fsf/L lgsfox?df sd{rf/L lzIfsx?sf] lgo'lQm / ;]jf ;'ljwfdf Ps?ktf Nofpg s/f/ ;]jf lgodfjnL :jLs[t u/L nfu' ul/Psf] / cfGtl/s n]vfk/LIf0f k|efjsf/L agfpg o;} rfn" cf=j=af6 lgb]{lzsf :jLs[t u/L nfu" ul/Psf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifsf] Joj:yfkg ;'wf/ ;DaGwdf cWoog u/L ;'´fj;lxtsf] k|ltj]bg k]z ug{ ut jif{ lgo'lQm ePsf afx\o k/fdz{bftfsf] k|ltj]bgdf pNn]lvt cfjZos Go"gtd Jofj;flos hgzlQm Joj:yf ug]{ p2]Zo cg'?k rfn" jif{ Ps jl/i7 rf6{8 Psfp06]06sf] lgo'lQm ul/Psf] 5 eg] sf]if cGt/ut sfo{/t sd{rf/Lx?sf] bIFtf clea[l4 ug{ o; jif{ Joj;flos n]vf / ;fdfGo a}+lsË sf/f]af/ ;DaGwL Ps dlxg] tflnd ;+rfng ul/Psf] 5 . sf]ifnfO{ clt cfjZos Joj;flos sd{rf/L lgo'lQm ug]{ tyf sf]if cGt/utsf sd{rf/LnfO{ Joj;flos tflnd lbg] sfo{nfO{ cfufdL jif{;d]t lg/Gt/tf lbOg] gLlt lnOPsf] 5 . sf]ifsf] lgIF]k gLlt @&= ;}lgs sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifdf df}Hbft /sd ljleGg a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfnfO{ lgIF]k pknAw u/fp“bf ;DalGwt a}+ssf] khL"“ kof{Kttf, shf{ tyf nufgLsf] u'0F:t/ l:ylt, Joj:yfkg, ;+rfng glthf tyf t/ntfsf] l:ylt ;d]tnfO{ cWoog u/L juL{s/0F ug]{ / ;f]xL juL{s/0Fsf cfwf/df pknAw u/fpg ;lsg] clwstd lgIF]k ;Ldf tf]Sg] / ;f]xL ;Ldfsf] clwgdf /xL sf]ifsf] /sd lgIF]k pknAw u/fpg] ul/Psf] 5 . g]kfn /fi6« a}+saf6 k|fKt kl5Nnf] ljQLo ;"rgfsf cfwf/df a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?sf] ;do ;dodf k'gM auL{s/0F ug]{ ;d]t ul/Psf] 5 . ljutdf clwstd lgIF]k ;LdfeGbf a9L pknAw u/fOPsf] lgIF]k /sd qmdzM lemSg] / o:tf] a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?nfO{ yk lgIF]k

75 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf pknAw u/fpg] ul/Psf] 5}g . xfn sf]ifsf] df}Hbft /sddWo] sl/a (% k|ltzt df}Hbft æsÆ ju{sf jfl0FHo a}+sx?df /x]sf] 5 . ljBdfg ;d:of / ;'´fj @*= sNof0Fsf/L sf]ifdf Jooef/ kf/L ;+rfng x“'b} cfPsf ljleGg sNof0Fsf/L sfo{x?df ;xefuL x'g]sf] ;+Vof a9\b} hf“bf ;f]xL adf]lhd ;|f]t Joj:yf ug'{kg]{ r'gf}tL 5 eg] sf]ifdf k|FKt x'g] /sd ;Lldt ePsfn] a9\bf] vr{ wfGg j}slNks cfo cfh{gsf ;|f]t vf]Hg h?/L b]lvPsf] 5 . ;}lgs P]g, @)^# df sf]ifaf6 ljleGg IF]qdf nufgL u/L cfo cfh{g k|FKt ug{ ;Sg] k|fjwfg eP tfklg o;tkm{ afx\o k/fdz{bftfaf6 k|fKt x'g] Diagnostic Study Report k|fKt ePkl5 7f]; k|of; ug{ ldnfpg' kg]{ b]lvG5 . @(= g]kfn /fi6« a}+sn] ;d:ofu|:t 3f]if0FF u/]sf] / lj36gdf /x]sf s]xL a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?df ul/Psf] lgIF]k nufgLsf] c;'nLdf ;'wf/ eO/x]sf] 5 . oBkL cem} s]xL a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfaf6 sl7gfO{sf afah'b /sd c;'nLsf] k|of; eO/x]s]f 5 . o:tf s]xL a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?af6 nufgLsf] zt{ adf]lhd ;f“jf Jofh k|fKt x'g ;s]sf] 5}g . s]xL hf]lvddf /x]sf] elgPsf] ;a}h;f] /sdsf ;DaGwdf a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?sf] ;DklŒf /f]Ssf ul/Psf] sf/0Faf6 ;d]t clwsf+z /sd p7\g] b]lvG5 . #)= a}+s tyf ljQLo ;+:yfx?df df}Hbft /sddf cflh{t Jofhdf !% k|ltztsf b/n] ;|f]tdf s/ s§L x'“bf rfn" cf=j=df sl/a ?=!% s/f]8 wg/flz vr{ x'g] u/]sf] 5 . ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]if gfkmfd"ns ;+:yf geO{ ljz'4 sNof0Fsf/L p2]Zon] :yfkgf ePsf] ;+:yf /x]sf] / cfkm\gf lxtflwsf/Lx?nfO{ :jf:Yo, lzIFF tyf cfjf; h:tf cfwf/e"t ;'ljwfx? pknAw u/fpg] p2]Zon] cfkm\gf sfo{qmdx? ;+rfng ub}{ cfPsf] 5 . sf]ifåf/f ;+rflnt lzIFF :jf:Yo h:tf cfwf/e"t ;'ljwfx?n] g]kfn ;/sf/ :j+od ;+rfng ug'{ kg]{ sfo{df ;d]t k|ToIF ;xof]u k'¥ofPsf] x'“bf Jofh cfh{gdf s/ 5'6 u/fpg o; jif{ ;d]t yk cfjZos kxn x'g'kg]{ b]lvG5 . lgisif{ #!= ;}lgs P]g @)^# n] ;}lgs sNof0fsf/L sf]ifnfO{ cem a9L Jojl:yt tyf kf/bzL{ ?kdf ;+rfng ug{ ;DdfggLo k|wfgdGqLsf] ;+of]hsTjdf k|wfg;]gfkltsf] cWoIFtfdf cy{ dGqfnosf] ;x;lrj / /IFf dGqfnosf] ;x;lrj;d]t ;b:o /xg] Joj:yf 5 . o;af6 sf]ifsf] cfly{s sf/f]af/nfO{ lgb]{lzt tyf lgoGq0f ug{ ;3fp k'Ug'sf] ;fy} sf]ifsf] cfly{s sf/f]af/sf] k|s[ltcg';f/ sNof0fsf/L sf]ifsf] p2]Zo kl/k"lt{ ug{sf] nflu cfly{s sf/f]af/ ;DaGwL bIF hgzlQmx? jl/i7 rf6{8 Psfp06]06, jl/i7 cfly{s ljz]if1 nufotsf cGo bIf u}/ ;}lgs JolQmx?sf] ;]jf lng'sf ;fy} afx\o Joj;flos k/fdz{bftfaf6 ;d]t Diagnostic Study u/fO{ k|FKt ;'´fjx?nfO{ sfof{Gjog ug]{ gLlt lnPaf6 sf]if ;+rfng tyf Joj:yfkg ;DaGwL sfo{nfO{ cem a9L k|efjsf/L, Jojl:yt, ldtJooL tyf kf/bzL{ t'Nofpg ;xof]u k'u]sf] 5 .

wgn] /fd|f] ;}lgs k|fKt x“'b}g t/ /fd|f] ;}lgsn] wg k|fKt x'G5 . — Dofsj]nL

76 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* Political Ownership of the Military and Civil- Military Relations

- Lt Col Surendra Singh Rawal Introduction 1. Civil-Military Relations (CMR) is an area of study that focuses on the relations between the particular civil society and its military organization in broader term; specifi cally, it is the relation between the military and the civil authority of the country. CMR can be analyzed from different perspectives focusing on civilian and military's different environment and interaction that cause different outcomes. 2. Hierarchical relation or chain of command in any institution is based on fundamental principles of leadership - authority, responsibility, and accountability. Accountability fl ows upwards; whereas, authority and responsibility fl ow downwards.1 Authority and responsibility are complementary to each other - absence one of them does not lead to effective functioning of any organization. If looked at from superiors' stand point, authority exerts superiors' will upon subordinates; whereas, responsibility demands superiors to take care of subordinates.2 'Responsibility' becomes personal and intimate and generally becomes 'ownership' in those institutions where human behavior plays a crucial role for attainment of their goals. At times, even nuances of human behavioral aspects play a critical role in such organizations. With the same analogy, it can be argued that there are two pillars of relationship between the civilian and the military - control and ownership. Control is basically a regulatory mechanism to impose the state's will upon the military - the institution that poses coercive power. Although control of the military is the vital aspect of civil-military relations, it is less likely to be effective without giving due consideration to another equally important pillar - responsibility or ownership. Therefore, effective control as well as proper ownership of the military seems to be essentials for stable civil-military relations of any country. 3. The range of explanation available in CMR theories includes subjective, objective, democratic, and other forms of control of the armed forces. After analyzing various theories and modalities in CMR, a conclusion can be drawn - existing theories are mainly focused on control of the armed forces, and very less on the ownership aspects.3 The paradigms such as professionalism, principal-agent, and democratic control are more convincing to explain CMR in advanced democracies where sophisticated democratic institutions are in place. Yet, their focus is on mainly 'control' aspect of civil-military relations. CMR in authoritarian and

1 The relationship between authority, responsibility and accountability must be in balance – responsibility and authority must go hand in hand, and accountability cannot be expected and fl ow upwards unless authority and responsibility have fi rst fl owed down. 2 Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility, Answers.com http://wiki.answers. com/Q/What_is_the_difference_between_ authority_and_responsibility#ixzz1jIJGEnos - He argues, "Responsibility involves being accountable for, or having obligations or duties, and acting reasonably. It involves communicating, and being aware of your relationships with others... Authority involves having the power to enforce obedience or compliance. It can also involve a sense of having the right to control others." (Accessed on 13 Jan, 2012) 3 See Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957; Feaver, Peter D. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003; Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1960; Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006. 77 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf non-democratic countries seems to be more subjective, and it too focuses on 'control' of the military by political means. If any, the ownership aspect of CMR is vaguely assimilated in some of the paradigms but not consciously. A Key Question 4. Identifying why and how taking ownership of the military by political leaders contributes to improve CMR provides insights into our understanding of civilian control and CMR. According to the conventional wisdom, 'control' itself improves CMR by intervening or allowing the civilian exercising authority over military affairs. However, many examples show it is not the case most of the times. To 'control' the military, many countries have political institutions and the civilian led ministry of defense in place, yet a signifi cant number of them have experienced an unstable civil-military relations. By unstable, I mean instances in which the military has not followed civilian preferences, either by neglecting civilian orders or by imposing their own policy preferences on their principals. 5. For that reason, it is pertinent to analyze whether ownership of the military contributes to stable CMR or not. Observations show that control alone, without ownership of political leadership of the country, may not contribute to maintain stable civil-military relations. This questions the causality of most CMR and international relations theories which often assume a positive relationship between control of the military and stable civil-military relations. The 'Ownership' Argument 6. Many theories exist in CMR based on professionalism, institutional, sociological, principal-agent, or other frameworks. Although these theories focus on different causes and effects of CMR, their core argument seems that control of the military by the civilian contributes to maintain stable CMR. According to these theories, many countries including Nepal should have enjoyed stable CMR because these countries have been under the civilian control for a long time. However, this is not the case. Therefore, I argue that a complementary "ownership" dimension of civil-military relations is equally important. 7. The arguments based on conventional frameworks are valid explaining the correlation between the control of the military and CMR. However, after carefully analyzing most of the studies, I fi nd that their conclusions are based on the analyses of "control" aspect of CMR without taking much consideration of "ownership" aspect. I believe that the ownership dimension is as much important as the control dimension, and has to be given equal emphasis while analyzing the problem holistically. Why is it necessary to control the military by the civilians? Is the control for the sake of control? Or, there is something else to be achieved by taking control? Of course, the ultimate goal of achieving stable CMR is not control per se, but to gain effectiveness of the military so that it can be used as a reliable instrument of national power.4 Control is thus just one of the means to achieve this end. Hence, there appears to be a gap in the studies of CMR, lacking proper focuses on the fl ip side of the civilian control. I argue that, along with control, taking ownership of the military by political leaders contributes to promote stable CMR. By ownership, I mean taking interest, acquiring knowledge, looking after military's needs, solving problems, and active involvement in military activities - ultimately converging political vision and military objectives to achieve national goals. 8. Thus, a holistic concept of CMR should be the one that encompasses both the facets of CMR - control and ownership. This concept of CMR advocates two equally important aspects

4 Bruneau, Thomas C. "Introduction" Who Guards the Gurdians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, (University of Texas Press, Austin, 2006), 3.

78 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* of leadership - authority and responsibility.5 Such concept encourages or ensures complete submission of the military to the political leaders or entities, making military operations a continuation of politics more realistic than it is with only the control approach. 9. Control of the military specifi cally implies restrain, restrict, or limit the prerogatives of the military. Various mechanisms of control are available in civil-military relations as explained by different theories. However, defi ning roles and missions, budgetary control, acquisition, and personnel management of the military are prominent ones.6 Apart from Ministry of Defense level control, constitutional arrangements and legislative oversight also constitute important aspects of control mechanism in democracy. Level and nature of control by these mechanisms dispense different level of CMR. Control is necessary but not suffi cient condition for stable civil-military relations. Ownership, which is more related to responsibility of political leaders, is also equally important. The ownership aspect has more intimate, compassionate, or sympathetic connotation. There are different attributes of the ownership variable in CMR - caring, supporting, motivating, and encouraging are the common ones. 10. My further argument is that trajectories of CMR depend upon political leader's nature of ownership of the military. This function inherently behaves as the complementary aspect of control thereby contributing to effective civilian control of the military. The term ownership is vague, if not specifi ed properly it tends to be intangible. Ownership, the important variable, has two basic functions in CMR - intention and interest. Here, the intention is defi ned as aim, objective, or purpose of doing something, and interest is defi ned as curiosity, involvement, and personnel or business connections. The intention of taking ownership of the military can be of two forms. (See Figure 1) A parochial intention aims at achieving a narrow goal. For instance, taking ownership of the military by an authoritarian ruler, an oligarch, or an absolute monarch may tend to ensure longevity of their rule by employing or threat of employing military power.7

Figure 1: Different Attributes of Ownership 5 Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility, He argues, "When authority and responsibility get confused, confl ict and tension occurs...a lack of understanding about the nature of the relationship between responsibility and authority can create hard feelings and alienate people from each other." 6 Bruneau, Thomas C. and Goetze, Richard B. Jr, "Ministers of Defense and Democratic Control," Who Guards the Gurdians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, (University of Texas Press, Austin, 2006), 83. 7 Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility, He argues,"The danger with authority is that it can become an end in itself. Authoritarian people are those that focus mainly on their power and authority, forgetting that any position of authority brings with it the responsibility to communicate and relate with others."

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They may also have somewhat broader intention of protecting national interests of the country; however, in most of the cases, the primordial intention is likely to remain protection of their own regime. On the other hand, a broad ownership intends to protect national interests of the country rather than protecting individual or group's vested interests. This ownership can be termed as national ownership as it aspires to achieve national goals by employing the military. 11. Not only the intention, but also the political leaders' interest yields a different kind of ownership. If political leaders do not care about military's need, and just want to maintain an apathetic or formal relation, then the interest is likely to be a formality. On the other hand, if the political leaders care about the military and consider it their important instrument and are compassionate to it, then the interest tends to be intimate. 12. If the military variable is kept constant, the level of CMR correlates to the nature of ownership of the military attained by political entities. If the political leader has a good intention and interest of taking ownership of the military, she or he is going to enjoy successful CMR. When the political leader has an intimate relation with the military and has a broad intention such as protection of democracy or furtherance of national goals, that political leader is going to enjoy a very stable CMR (Q1) (See Figure 2). If the political leader maintains intimate relations with the military but has a parochial intention, such as protection of oligarchic or authoritarian rule, still the political leader enjoys somewhat stable CMR (Q2). On the other hand, when the political leader is uninterested in the military and has a narrow intention of taking ownership of the military, the CMR is likely to be unsuccessful. If the political leader is uninterested in military matters but has a broad intention, the CMR is still going to be unstable (Q3). And, it is going to be very unstable if the political leader is uninterested, maintains a formality with the military, and has parochial intention (Q4).8

Figure 2: Different Interests and Intentions of Political Leader and Nature of CMR Political Leader and Military Chain of Command 13. The military tends to function better under a single chain of command of political leaders; and being a political tool of the state, it cannot remain without political leaders for more than a limited period. If it remains without political leaders for a long period, the military either seeks to fi nd its own political leader, or tends to be an absolute autonomous organization.

8 Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility, He argues," When authority, rather than responsibility, becomes the basis for a relationship... confrontation and blow-ups will likely occur."

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14. Political leader of the military varies depending upon the political system of a country. In an authoritarian system, the authoritarian ruler becomes the political leader, such as a king in an absolute monarchical system of governance. In democratic system too, the types of political leader may be different depending on the power sharing mechanism and type of democratic institutional set up, such as the executive power or the congress. Thus, the prime minister is the political leader of the military in parliamentary democracy, whereas the president is the political leader of the military in presidential democracy.9 In either of the system, although the principal political leader of the military is the president or the prime minister, the parliamentary or congressional committee members also behaves as political leaders of the military because of the system of check and balance. In most political systems the Ministry of Defense acts as an institution to execute the authority and responsibility on behalf of the political leader; thereby, exercising command upon the military on behalf of the chief executive. In some political arrangements, the head of state without or very limited executive power is made supreme commander of the military. Therefore, the question of who would become the political leader of the military depends on the power sharing arrangement and the structure of the political system. However, if there is more than one competing political leader, the military is likely to be less effective. Thus, it will always be better to have only one commanding political leader, even if there is more than one political leader of the military. 15. In any circumstances, if the state mechanism fails to provide political leader for a long time, the military is likely to take one of the three different courses. First, the military tries to fi nd its own political leader. Second, the military may actively involve in politics. In this situation, the military is likely to have either high stake in politics, or orchestrates a coup d'état. Third, the military behaves as an autonomous entity, shielding itself from any infl uences of politics. In some circumstances, it is also possible that some individual, group, or extra- national or international entity may take de-facto leadership of the military overtly or covertly. Obviously, these entities are likely to have their own vested interests. 16. When there is competitive dual political leadership, it puts the military in a dilemma. If the dual leadership is divided, it not only put the military in dilemma, but also is likely to create clashes among the leaders. If the military too divided into different competitive groups, is likely to cause bloodsheds and cripple the political system as well as state mechanism. On top of that, the dual political leaders can emasculate the military making it a useless instrument of the national power because of the contrasting dual chain of command. If there is no contrast in dual chain of command or leadership, then there may not be a serious problem in CMR and civilian control; however, it is less likely to have such desirable situation in crucial political balance of power scenario. When there is dual chain of command or political leadership, the military is likely to receive divergent orders, and it will be in the discretion of the military which order to obey and which not to. This allows the military to take initiative and opportunity to manipulate politics by obeying or not obeying the order in its own convenience. This condition tends to be complex and compounded if happens in less developed countries where political institutions are weak and economic condition is bleak. 17. Therefore, there is an inherent correlation between ownership and loyalty. The wholehearted ownership of the military by political leaders generally results in unwavering

9 Robert A. Dahl asserts, "In a presidential system the chief executive is elected independently of the legislature and is constitutionally vested with important powers. In a parliamentary or cabinet system, the chief executive is chosen and may be removed by the parliament. The classic example of presidential government is the United States; the classic example of parliamentary government is Great Britain." Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, New, (Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 122.

81 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf loyalty from the military. The loyalty makes the military submissive to its leader, which in turn results not only in a stable CMR but also enables the military to serve as an effective instrument of national power. The Sociological Aspect of Ownership 18. The armed servant of a nation is analogous to private servants at home or at private property in many respects, if not all. To receive effective service, the masters should instruct, monitor, and give incentives to the armed servants. The more they are trusted with good monitoring and guidance, the more effective they will be. There may be a good monitoring mechanism in place; however, if servants' interests are not looked after well, they may not have incentives to be motivated. It is also true otherwise, if not monitored properly, it can act as an autonomous entity - this, however, is the 'control' aspect which is not the scope of this paper. Thus, to achieve utility maximization of servants' service, the master must have an intimate caring relationship with the servants. However, it should not be forgotten that the armed servants of a state have two roles to play simultaneously. Unlike, private servants, the armed servants are servants of the state, and at the same time, they are the citizens of the state who also have stake in state's decision making. In that respect, the armed servant concept is not the mirror image of private servants. 19. Human beings are intelligent, political, and social animals; it is not easy to take control of them. Similarly, to take control of an institution having many people as its core component is not as simple as control of other institutions. It is even more diffi cult to control such institution when its members are to be prepared to sacrifi ce their life in others' will. Therefore, behavior of a manpower intensive institution is complex and contingent on various factors. In this regard, the military institution is somewhat unique from other social institutions because of (a) nature of the job - management of violence, and (b) composition - the military heavily rely on human components even in the age of hi-tech and automation.10 Thus morale, motivation, discipline, intimate relation, hierarchical structures etc. are very important in military institution. Problems of Democratic Political Leader of the Military 20. Military leadership assumed by responsible democratic leaders is likely to experience more stable CMR because of the broad political intention espoused by them and their intimate relationship with the military. Yet, the main problem with democracy is periodic changes in the government. Since the concept of political ownership of the military depends on a very intimate relationship between the military and political entities in power, frequent changes in the government make it diffi cult to maintain such intimate relations and ultimately transfer of the loyalty could become a problem. 21. Transferring loyalty is, sometimes, a time consuming process. A new political leader may have different priorities on national interests; in some cases, national interests may have different courses of action because of change of political entities in power. This requires time to adjust the rhythm of both the military and political leaders' functioning. If the change of the regime is by revolution, transfer of loyalty becomes more challenging. 22. In highly institutionalized and developed countries, such transitions may not be very diffi cult and take less time; whereas, in less developed countries where political institutions are not very strong, transitions may be rocky, and take more time. The individual characteristics

10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State. He argues the military's profession as "management of violence" by quoting Harold Lasswell's phrase in his book.

82 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* and experience of the military and civilian leaders may also affect this transition, which ultimately infl uence CMR. If such change of regime is frequent due to political instability, then the transfer of loyalty becomes problematic. Conclusion 24. Some may argue that military's ownership aspect is inherent in the control mechanism or the administrative function of the state. But this seems less plausible rhetoric because of the intrinsic restraining intent prevalent in the function of 'control'.11 When the state feels the necessity of giving extra attention to control the military because of the coercive power it posses, the state also should give due consideration to other equally important dimension of the administration, i.e. responsibility or ownership. There will hardly be any doubt that the control of the military is vital, however, the mere mechanical control may not be suffi cient to achieve effectiveness of the military. The ownership of the military may be implicit in CMR of some of the economically, socially, and politically developed countries because of the well developed state mechanism in place. However, this is not the case in many other scenarios. In case of those countries where political situation is fl uid and democratic institutions are either non-existent or rudimentary, it is imperative to give emphasis on the securing political ownership of the military in order to have stable CMR.

11 Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility, He says,"Authority may be seen by people as being bad or wrong." References 1. Bruneau, Thomas C. and Richard B. Goetze, Jr. "Ministers of Defense and Democratic Control." In Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006. 2. Bruneau, Thomas C. "Democracy and Effectiveness: Adopting Intelligence for the Fight Against Terrorism.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Vol. 21 (2008): 448–460. 3. Bruneau, Thomas C., Florina Cristiana Matei and Sak Sakoda. “National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations.” Defense and Security Analysis Vol. 25, No. 3 (September 2009): 255-269. 4. Feaver, Peter D. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. 5. Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. 6. Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. 7. Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 8. Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1960. 9. Joshi, Bhuwan Lal and Leo E. Rose. Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. 10. Rose, Leo E. Nepal's Strategy for Survival. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 11. Reddy, Prasad., GIIB, What is the Difference Between Authority and Responsibility,Answers.com 12. http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_is_the_difference_between_ authority_and_responsibility#ixzz1jIJ GEnos - (Accessed on 13 Jan, 2012) 13. Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, New, (Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000)

83 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf A Brief Introduction to Changing World Order and International Relation

- Major Ajaya Gurung Introduction 1. Current international relation is revolving around the survival of the nations. The issue of survival has become so complex in the present context of the new world order and directly related with the term "Power" both hard and soft. The existence of ‘Balance of Power’ in international relations is always there and it is natural that it keeps on shifting. In any form of polarity from the very beginning to present world order, there has been balance regionally and globally but in changing form. The world has seen different forms of world order, emergence of world and regional powers, concept of regional security/collective security in due course of time. Political ideologies in present world order seem to be dominated by the economic issues. Global interdependence has become such an interesting issue, which tend to challenge all the political issues overshadowing the ideologies practically. The collective efforts of USA and China to counter their present economic crisis and on the other hand being in a same region with similar economic-political system the hesitance of European nations to support the economy of the Greece is the best example of it. At the same time the inclination of USA's interest to our neighbor India and deteriorating relation with Pakistan shows the shifting of balance of power regionally. Subsequent paragraphs will deal briefl y about the different forms of World Order in the past, present and the future trend, where we might see the multi polarity in near future. Polarity in International relations 2. Polarity in international relations is any of the various ways in which power is distributed within the international system. It describes the nature of the international system at any given period of time. One generally distinguishes four types of systems: Uni-polarity, Bi-polarity, tri- polarity, and Multi-polarity for four or more centers of power. The type of system is completely dependent on the distribution of power and infl uence of states in region or internationally. Uni-polarity 3. Uni-polarity in international politics is a distribution of power in which there is one state with most of the cultural, economic, and military infl uence which is different than hegemony. Before the disintegration of USSR, the balance of power was mainly defi ned in terms of the bi-polarity. The collapse of Soviet Union had left a destabilizing void in international affairs. Many countries today have dropped Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology including the tiny Benin in Western Africa and has vowed to support private enterprise with the changed environment. Previously, the Soviet threat and the US policy used to act as counter force at a constantly shifting geographically and political point, but now the US has become the only component of balance of power in the world, mainly in controversial regional disputes. Involvement of US in Iraq, Afghanistan and current proposal of Lebanon to get the 'State' identity in the UN followed by strong denial of the US in favor of Israel, is the best example of it. It shows that maintaining a balance of power in any specifi c region totally depends on the US. 4. As the last decade progressed, however, observers seemed to change their view of how durable the American dominance would be. Samuel Huntington, in a 1998 lecture, described

84 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* the emerging world as neither uni-polar nor multi-polar but still in some sort of transition from one to the other a hybrid which he termed “uni-multipolar”. A uni-multi-polar world is one in which resolution of key international issues requires action by the single superpower plus some combination of other major states, and in which the single superpower is able to veto action by a combination of other states. Another distinguished scholar, Coral Bell, writing even more recently, put even more emphasis on the American ascendancy. Her recommendations for U.S. policy are similar to Huntington’s and Kissinger’s namely, that the United States would be smart not to throw its weight around and to act in consent with other like-minded big powers and international institutions – but she has on doubt about calling the reality ‘uni-polar.” Bi-polarity 5. Bi-polarity is a distribution of power in which two states have the majority of economic Military, and cultural infl uence internationally or regionally. Often, spheres of infl uence would develop For example, in the Cold War, most Western and democratic states would fall under the infl uence of the USA, while most Communist states would fall under the infl uence of the USSR. After this the two powers will normally maneuver for the support of the unclaimed areas. Multi-polarity 6. Multi-polarity is distribution of power in which more than two nation-states have nearly equal amounts of military, cultural, and economic infl uence. Opinions on the stability of Multi-polarity differ. Classical realist theorists, such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr hold that multi-polarity systems are more stable than bipolar systems, as great powers can gain power through alliances and petty wars that do not directly challenge other powers, in bipolar systems, classical realists argue, this is not possible On the other hand, the neorealist focus on security and invert the formula. States in a multi-polarity system can focus their fears on any number of other powers and, misjudging the intentions of other states, unnecessarily compromise their security, while states in a bipolar system always focus their fears on one other power, meaning that at worst the powers will miscalculate the force required to counter threats and spend slightly too much on the operation. However, due to the complexity of mutually assured destruction scenarios, with nuclear weapons, multi-polarity systems may be more stable than bipolar systems even in the neorealist analysis. This system tends to have many shifting alliances until one of two things happens. Either a balance of power is struck, and neither side wants to attack the other, or one side will attack the other because it either fears the potential of the new alliance, or it feels that it can defeat the other side. 7. One of the major implications of an international system with any number of poles, including a multi-polarity system, is that international decisions will often be made for strategic reasons to maintain a balance of power rather than out of ideological or historical reasons to maintain a balance of power. 8. The ‘Concert of Europe,’ a period from after the Napoleonic Wars to the Crimean War, was an example of peaceful Multi-polarity (the great powers of Europe assembled regularly to discuss international and domestic issues). World War I, World War II, the Thirty Years War, the Warning States Period, the There Kingdoms period and the tripartite division between Song Dynasty/Liao Dynasty/Jin Dynasty/Yuan Dynasty are all examples of a war time Multi- polarity. Multi-polarity Today 10. Those claiming that the world is multi-polarity fall into two main camps. A “superpower is something of the past” view holds that the USA and USSAR in the Cold War were in 85 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf fact superpowers. But argues that due to the complex economic inter dependencies on the international scale and the creation of a global village, the concept of one or more states gaining enough power to claim superpower status is antiquated. The rival view is that even throughout the Cold War, neither the USA nor the USSR were superpowers, but were actually dependent on the smaller states in their “spheres of infl uence”. 11. While the US has a great deal of economic clout and has infl uenced the culture of many nations, their dependency on foreign investors and reliance on foreign trade have created a mutual economic dependency between developed and developing nations. According to those who believe the world is multi-polarity, this interdependency means the US can’t be called a superpower as it isn’t self-suffi cient and relies on the global community to sustain its people’s quality of life. These interdependencies also apply to diplomacy. Considering the complex state of world affairs and the military might of some developing nations, it has become increasing diffi cult to engage in foreign policy if it is not supported by other nations. The diplomatic and economic factors that bind the globe together can sometimes make it diffi cult to act unilaterally, however alliances exist and the US is largely considered to be the sole superpower due to it’s unchallenged strength and infl uence, which would suggest a more Uni-polar world (despite of globalization). Non-polarity 12. Non-polarity can be understood as an international system with numerous centers of power, no one center of power dominates. Centers of power can be Nation-states, corporations, non-governmental organizations, terrorist groups, and such. Power is found in many hands and many places. Balance of Power in International Relations 13. In international relations, a balance of power exists when there is similarity or stability between competing forces. As a term in international law for a ‘just equilibrium’ between the members of the family of nations, it expresses the doctrine intended to prevent any one nation from becoming suffi ciently strong so as to enable it to enforce its will upon the rest. “BoP” is a central concept in neorealist theory. Within a balance of power system, a state may choose to engage in either balancing behavior. In a time of war, the decision to balance or to bandwagon may well determine the survival of the state. 14. More precisely, the theory of Balance of Power has certain key aspects that have been agreed upon throughout the literature on the subject. First of all, the main objective of states, according to the Balance of Power theory is to secure their own safety, consistent with political realism or the realist world-view. Secondly, states reach equilibrium because of this objective of self-preservation. States, by trying to avoid the dominance of one particular state, will ally themselves with other states until equilibrium is reached. 15. As Professor L. Oppenheim points out, equilibrium between the various powers which form the family of nations is, in fact, essential to the very existence of any international law. In the absence of any central authority, the only sanction behind the code of rules established by custom of defi ned in treaties, known as ‘international law’, is the capacity of the powers to hold each other in check. If this system fails, nothing prevents any state suffi ciently powerful from ignoring the law and acting solely according to its convenience and its interests. Rise of ‘Regional Watch Dog’ 16. In the years to come, under uni-polar environment, the unifi cation of Germany, the fall of communism in East Europe and the economic decay of the former Soviet Union, indicates 86 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* the possibility of appearance of ‘Regional Watch Dog’ or ‘multi-polar’ situation. The pattern of ‘multi-polar’ situations could be involving the UK, France, Germany and the erstwhile Soviet Union emerging in Europe, with its counterpart in Asia involving China, Japan and Southeast Asia.1 United Germany could attempt to use its economic power not only in European Union but also in East Europe. On the other hand the political and economic integration of European states is likely to make united Europe an extraordinarily powerful entity. Again an economically strong Japan could seek to establish through investment and trade its historical goal of co- prosperity region 2 China, could also be a major infl uence in the affairs of Asia. However, at present the threats of ‘Regional Watch Dog’ are not immediate, but it is not impossible. Concept of Collective Security 17. Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement in which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any states within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. According to Inis Claude’s article “Collective Security as an Approach to Peace” collective security is seen as a compromise between the concept of world government and a nation-state based balance of power system, where the latter is seen as destructive or not a good enough safeguard for peace, and the fi rst is deemed un-accomplishable at the present time And while collective security is possible, several prerequisites have to be met for it to work. 18. Collective security may be defi ned as a plan for maintaining peace through an organization of sovereign states, whose members pledge them to defend each other against attack. The idea emerged in 1914, was extensively discussed during World War I, and took shape rather imperfectly in the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations and again in the Charter of the United Nations after World War II. The term has subsequently been applied to less idealistic and narrower arrangements for joint defense such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 19. The shorthand term “Collective security”, not used until the 1930s, is more accurately “security for individual nations by collective means”, that is, by membership in an international organization made up of all or most of the states of the world pledged to defend each other from attack “Collective security” is a handier term, and it entered deeply into the international vocabulary when from about 1931 to 1939 many hoped, in vain, that the league of Nations through its machinery for collective action might avert war by checking the “Aggression” of the revisionist powers Germany, Italy, and Japan. 20. “In the present world order the region will be left alone to solve their threat potential until the USA has some interests”3. After suffering a lot the countries of the same region with common interest and understanding may realize the need for collective security. In the case of South Asia it is now full of interstate confl icts. The USA is less likely to involve in South Asia directly. So after suffering a lot the Countries of this region may feel the reality and go for regional security allies. The people of this region have already realized the need for cooperation of each other’s and the best example is South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

1 Henry Kissinger, “How to Achieve the New World Order?”, Time, Weekly Newsmagazine, 14 March 1994 P. 73 2 Ashequa Irshad, “America’s Changing Strategic Interest”, BIISS Journal, vol 18, No 1, 1997 P.12 3 Major Mohd Abdus Salam Talukder “NEW WORLD ORDER AND ITS EFFECTS OVER THIRD WORLD BANGLADESH ARMY JOURNAL.’ 21st Issue, Defence 1993. PP 59 and 62

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21. Basic Principles of Collective Security (a) First: almost every state, especially all major states, have to be in the collective security arrangement and committed to it for to work. The League of Nations faced major problems with this given that the United States, a leading international power, did not join nor give its support to the organization. Similarly, when Italy invaded Abyssinia, Britain’s and France’s governments were more committed to blocking the rise of Germany, and hence did not seriously rebuke Mussolini, who they saw as a potential ally against Adolph Hitler in 1935. (b) Second: no one state can block the decision making process. This was a major issue with the League of Nations, as it gave every state veto power, as well as with the UN, which gives it to 5 powerful nations. Should vetoes be allowed, the collective security arrangement will be greatly weakened as one country can challenge a democratic decision. (c) Third: for sanctions to work, the international economy has to be suffi ciently interdependent such that sanctions harm the intended country enough, but do not harm the countries doing the sanctioning. And for sanctions to work, universality of their application is especially important for them to have an effect. Collective Security in the League of Nations 22. Collective security can be understood as a security arrangement in which all states cooperate collectively to provide security for all by the actions of all against any states within the groups which might challenge the existing order by using force. This contrasts with self-help strategies of engaging in war for purely immediate national interest. An example of the failure of the League of Nation’s collective security is the Manchurian Crisis, when Japan occupied part of China (who was a League member). After the invasion, members of the League passed a resolution calling for Japan to withdraw or face sever penalties. Japan promptly vetoed the resolution, after two years League passed a resolution condemning the invasion. The Japanese replied by quitting the League of Nations. A similar process occured in 1935, when Italy invaded Ethiopia. Sanctions were passed, but Italy would have vetoed any stronger resolution. Additionally, Britain and France sought to court Italy’s government as a potential deterrent to Hitler, given that Mussolini was not in what would become the Axis alliance of WWIL. The absence of the USA from the League of Nations deprived the LN of another major power that could have used economic leverage against either of the aggressor states. Collective Defense and Current Military Alliances 23. Collective defense is an arrangement, usually formalized by a treaty and an organization, among participant states that commit support in defense of a member state if it is attacked by another state outside the organization. NATO is the best known collective defense organization. Its now famous Article V calls on (but does not fully commit) member states to assist another member under attack. This article was raised after the September II attacks on the United States, after which other NATO members provided assistance to the US War on Terror in Afghanistan. Collective defense has its roots in multiparty alliances, and leads to benefi ts as well as risks. On the one hand, by combining and pooling resources, it can reduce and single state’s cost of providing fully for its security. Smaller members of NATO, for example, have fl exibility to invest a greater proportion of their budget on non-military priorities, such as education or health, since they can count on other members to come to their defense, if needed.

88 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

Conclusion 24. Since many years, the US is the only country that has the combination of military, economic and political power to take the lead in defending, extending freedom, deterring and resisting aggression. Germany and Japan may have the economic punch, but they lack the Military muscle. China and Russia have the potential military might, but they lack the economic power. As the only great power without a history of imperialistic clams on neighboring countries, it seems that the US has the credibility to act as an honest broker considering the fact that on crisis is irrelevant to the US. 25. The new power structure of the world, the ‘Uni-polar’ power equation has three distinct characteristics. Firstly, world’s new power structure has made the US as the only component of balance of power in the world power structure. Thus, there is virtually no balance of power in the world. Secondly, the US interest has become an important factor in solving crisis may it be political or military. The US focuses her interest on areas where America’s interest in involved. Thirdly, the threat to security has taken a new dimension. The new dimension of threat is characterized by escalation of ethnic confl icts, tensions and uncertainties in the former Soviet Union and nuclear proliferation, emergence of regional power, proxy war and increasing activities of terrorism by state and non state actors. The effects of Uni-polar power equation of various region of world are unique. In Middle East, the US will continue to dominate, with the decrease in importance of security dimension. On the other hand, the US will be more concern about Asia as both Japan and China have become infl uential in Asian matters by virtue of their economic might. In the Uni-polar power structure of the world, UN is expected to ;lay a more active role. However, there are accusations of UN being polarized by the interest of the US. Under the Uni-polar environment, the unifi cation of Germany, fall of communism in East Europe, economic decay in former USSR, emergence of China as future economic superpower, indicates the possibility of appearance of ‘Regional Watch Dog’ or Multi-polar situation. Uni-polarity has to given way to a multi polar distribution of power, however, does not men there has been an absence of balancing behavior by other states. Precisely because counterbalancing against an actual hegemony is much more complex than balancing against a rising one, a reconsideration of the type of state strategies that should be categorized as balancing in needed. References Books 1. Karen A. Mingst, Essentials of International Relations (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2004) 2. Racha Chaitanya, The New World Order, (Delhi : Radiant Publisher, 1995). 3. Dewitt, Haglund and Kirton, “Building a New Global Order Emerging Trends In International Security ” Oxford University Press 1993. 4. Trevor N Dupuy, “International Military and Defence Encyclopedia, Volume 2, 5 and 6” 5. Finkelstein, Marina S., and Lawrence S. Finkel-stein, comps. and eds. Collective Security San Francisco, 1966. A handy collection of readings. Periodical 1. Henry Kissinger, “How to Achieve the New World Order?”, Time, Weekly Newsmagazine, March 1994 2. Ashequa Irshad, “America’s Changing Strategic Interest”, BIISS Journal, vol 18. Websites 1. http://eefy.editme.com/UnipolarWorld, Accessed 25 January 2010. 2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polarity_in_international_relations, Accessed 25 January 2010. 3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_security, Accessed 21 january 2010. 4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_power_in_international_relations, Accessed 19 January 2010. 5. http://eefy.editme.com/BipolarWorld, Accessed 15January 2010 89 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf cEof; æj}/L k|xf/Æ tyf æah| k|xf/Æ Ps ;+:d/0f

– k|=;]= e'jg vqL k|:tfjgf != Oltxf;b]lv jt{dfg;Dd cfkm\gf] ;Lldt ;|f]t ;fwgsf] afah'b klg g]kfnL ;]gfn] g]kfn /fi6«sf] :jtGqtf, ;fjef}d;Qf tyf cv08tfnfO{ cIf'00f /fVb} /fli6«o tyf cGt/f{li6«o?kdf cfkm\gf] uf}/jdo k/Dk/f, pRr k]zfutkg, OHht tyf k|lti7f sfod /fVg ;kmn /x“b} cfPsf] 5 . /fi6«sf] kl5Nnf] kl/j]z, ;do tyf kl/l:yltnfO{ cfTd;ft ub}{ uPsf] !) jif{] åGådf /fli6«o lxtnfO{ ;jf]{k/L dfGb} g]kfnL ;]gfn] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf lgjf{x ug{ ;kmn /x\of] h;sf] ;sf/fTds k|ltkmnsf]?kdf b]zsf] ljBdfg zflGt pGd'v cj:yfnfO{ lng ;lsG5 . o; cy{df ljutdf em“} clxn] klg g]kfnL ;]gfn] /fli6«o tyf cGt/f{li6«o?kdf ;a}sf] laZjf; lhTg ;kmn ePsf] cg'ej x'G5 . @= g]kfnL ;]gfn] ljutb]lv jt{dfg;Dd /fli6«o tyf cGt/f{li6«o?kdf cfh{g u/]sf] Vofltsf] k|d'v >]o o; ;+:yfdf cfj4 cg'zfl;t, OdfGbf/, st{Aolgi7, akmfbf/ ;snbhf{x¿nfO{{ hfG5 . /fli6«o ;'/Iff ;+oGqsf] d'Vo c+usf]?kdf :yflkt g]kfnL ;]gfsf] o; lsl;dsf] pRr k]zfutkg -Professionalism_, cg'zf;g tyf st{Aok/fo0ftf sfod /fVg :t/Lo tyf lg/Gt/ tflnd tyf cEof;sf] cfjZostf kb{5 . æl;kfxL eGof ltiff/L /fVGof x'gæ a8fdxf/fhflw/fh k[YjL gf/fo0f zfxsf] o; plQmn] klg tflnd / cEof;sf] dxTjnfO{ bzf{p“5 . ljut ;z:q åGåsf] ;dodf g]kfnL ;]gfn] ;+ufn]sf /fd|f kIf / l;lsPsf kf7x¿nfO{ b[li6ut ub}{ ef]lnsf lbgdf g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ ljleGg tflnd tyf cEof;dfkm{t cem ;zQm k]z]j/, ultlzn agfpg] p2]Zosf ;fy uPsf] b'Oj6f jif{x¿nfO{ g]kfnL ;]gfn] tflnd jif{sf]?kdf dgfof] . k|wfg;]gfkltsf] cfzo (Chief of Army Staff's Intent) adf]lhd g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ cem a9L k]z]j/ -Professional_, cg'zfl;t (Disciplined), pTk|]l/t -Motivated_, pRr dgf]jno'Qm -High Moral_ tyf k|ltli7t (Prestigious) agfpg ljut # jif{b]lv tflndnfO{ ;jf]{k/L dfGb} g]kfnL ;]gfdf tflnd tyf cEof; ;DaGwL ljleGg lqmofsnfkx¿ ;+rfng x'g'sf] ;fy} of] cjlwdf g]kfnL ;]gfsf ljleGg :s"n tyf s]Gb|x¿df ljb]zL lzIFfyL{x¿nfO{;d]t ;xefuL u/fO{ ljleGg tflndx¿;d]t ;+rfng eO;s]sf 5g\ . ljutsf] ;dodf åGåsf sf/0f nfdf] ;dob]lv ;+rfng x'g g;s]sf] ;fd"lxs tflnd -Collective Training_ klg ;'rf? eO;s]sf] 5 . #= 'tflnd jif{ @' sf] kl/k|]Ifdf dWo k[tgfsf] ;'kl/j]IF0fdf >L g+= ( jflxgLsf] ;+of]hgdf ;+rfng ePsf] ;fd'lxs tflndsf] pTsif{sf] ?kdf @)^& sf] r}q dlxgfdf cEof; æj}/L k|xf/æ ;+rfng x'g'sf] ;fy} To;sf] nut} @)^* sf] k"jf{w{df g+= !) jflxgLsf] ljz]if kxndf cEof; æah| k|xf/æ ;d]t ;DkGg ePsf] lyof] . cEof; æj}/L k|xf/æ df g]kfnL ;]gfsf] g+= ( jflxgL c8\8f cGt/utsf klbs u0fx¿, g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ljz]if kmf}h o'lg6x¿ -Special Forces and Special Operation Forces), ljleGg d2tL tyf aGbf]j:tL (Combat Support & Combat Service Support) o'lg6sf kmf}hx¿ ;lDdlnt Ps ;+o'Qm cEof; (Combined Armed Exercise) lyof] . To:t} cEof; æah| k|xf/æ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] Strategic Reserve Force sf] ?kdf /x]sf] g+= !) jflxgL c8\8f cGt/ut ljz]if o'lg6x¿ ;lDdlnt Pp6f ljz]if cEof; lyof] . cEof; æj}/L k|xf/æ sf] ;+rfng tyf cEof; æah| k|xf/æ sf] of]hgf, tof/L tyf ;+rfngsf] bf}/fg n]vs :jodn] xfl;n u/]sf] cg'ejsf] :d/0fdf pQm cEof;x¿sf] pkfb]otf tyf cEof;af6 xfl;n ePsf nIox¿nfO{ k|sfz kfb}]{ pQm cEof;x¿sf] dxTjk"0f{ kIFx¿nfO{ lrq0f ug]{ p2]Zosf ;fy of] n]v n]Vg] hdsf]{ ul/Psf] xf] . cEof; æj}/L k|xf/æ $= g]kfnL ;]gfsf] k]zfut Ifdtf tyf bIftf clej[l4 ug{ tflnd tyf cEof;x¿n] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf lgjf{x ub}{ cfPsf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn] jflif{s?kdf b'O{ r/0fdf ;+rfng ub}{ cfPsf] ;fd'lxs tflnd dfkm{t ;snbhf{x¿n] ljleGg ;dodf u/]sf] JolQmut tflnd, ;Lk tyf snfx¿nfO{ ;d"xut?kdf pkof]u u/L s;/L cfk"mnfO{ lbPsf] 6f:s k"/f ug{ ;lsG5 eGg] s'/fdf cfTde/f];f k}bf ug'{sf] ;fy} o; lsl;dsf tflnd tyf cEof;x¿n] ;snbhf{sf] k]zfut IFdtfnfO{ ;d]t clej[l4 u/]sf] 5 . @)^& ;fndf b'O r/0fdf ;+rfng ePsf] ;fd'lxs tflndsf] pTsif{sf] ?kdf

90 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* d'Vo sf/afxL lbg -l8=8]=_ r}q !# ut]nfO{ dfGb} of] cEof; æj}/L k|xf/æ @ xKtf;Dd ;+rfng ePsf] lyof] eg] of]hgf d'tfljs cEof;sf] kl5Nnf] r/0fdf ;xefuL ePsf g+= !) jflxgL cGt/utsf ljz]if o'lg6x¿ l8=8]= eGbf @ xKtf cufl8 sf7df08f}af6 cEof; Onfsftkm{ k}bn d'e ePsf lyP . %= >L dWo k[tgf x]=Sjf=sf] ;'kl/j]If0fdf >L g+=( jflxgL c8\8fn] ;+of]hg u/L pQm jflxgL c8\8f cGtutsf] >L z]/ u0f, /0feLd u0f, l/k'db{g u0f / k'/fgf] uf]/v u0fsf 6f]nLx¿ d'Vo xdn]jf/ 6f]nLsf] ?kdf /xL g]kfnL ;]gfsf] g+= !) jflxgL c8\8f cGt/utsf ljz]if o'lg6x¿, ljleGg d2tL tyf aGbf]j:tL (Combat Support & Combat Service Support_ sf kmf}hx¿ ;lDdlnt cEof; æj}/L k|xf/æ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] Oltxf;d} clxn];Ddsf] ;a}eGbf 7"nf] ;+o'Qm Combined Arms Exercise xf] . cEof;sf] l8=8]=df x'g] d'Vo sf/afxLsf] k|d'v emnsx¿sf] cjnf]sgsf nflu cfdGq0f ul/Psf cltlyx¿dWo] k|wfg;]gfklt, k|FoM ;a} lk=P;=cf]h=sf hg/nx¿, kmd]{zg tyf o'lg6sf sdf08/x¿, :s"n, sn]h, tflnd s]Gb| tyf Ps]8]dLsf sdf08]G6x¿, o'js clws[t 6f]nL tyf j/k/ o'lg6sf ;snbhf{x¿sf] pkl:yltn] cEof;sf] eAotfnfO{ cem a9fPsf] lyof] . ^= nfdf] ;dosf] cGt/fndf g]kfnL ;]gfsf ;a} cleGg c+ux¿nfO{ ;dfj]z u/L j[xt?kdf ;+rfng ul/Psf pQm Combined Arms Exercise df Infantry- Arty close co-operation, Infantry-Air Close Air Support tyf Infantry-Special Forces Close effort nfO{ ljz]if hf]8 lbOPsf] lyof] . g]kfnL ;]gfsf] Strategic Reserve Force sf] ?kdf /x]sf] g+= !) jflxgL c8\8f cGt/utsf ljz]if o'lg6x¿ (Special Forces & Special Operation Forces) sf] ;d]t ;lqmo ;xeflutf tyf ljljw sf/0fn] nfdf] ;do;Dd ;'rf? x'g g;s]sf] Artillery Firing n] cEof;sf] ;fGble{stf tyf /f}gstfnfO{ cem a9fPsf] lyof] . cEof; æj}/L k|xf/æ sf] cjwf/0ff tyf ;+rfng &= b]zsf] ljleGg :yfgx¿df a9b} uO/x]sf] ck/flws ;z:q ;d"xx¿sf] lx+;fTds ultljlw, ;fDk|bflos efjgfn] ;+ul7t ;z:q ;d"x, If]lqo tyf hfltotfsf] lgx'df ljv08gsf/Lx¿åf/f >[hgf ug{ ;Sg] ljifd kl/l:yltnfO { k"jf{g'dfg u/L cEof;sf] syf tyf kl/l:yltsf] kl/sNkgf ul/Psf] lyof] . cEof;df Strategic Counter Offensive sf] r/0fdf k'u]sf] ljb|f]xLsf] ks8 Onfsf leq v8f ul/Psf] ljb|f]xLsf] d'Vo cv8fnfO{ klbs kmf}h, ljz]if kmf}h, Combat Support & Combat Service Support ;lxtsf] ljz]if 6f:s kmf];{nfO{ Pp6f Infantry Division sf] ;'kl/j]IF0fdf Infantry Brigade sf] ;dGjodf s;/L c;/bf/?kdf kl/rflnt ug{ ;lsG5 eGg] s'/f b]vfpg vf]lhPsf] lyof] .

*= ljb|f]xLsf] d'Vo cv8f leq /x]sf ljb|f]xLsf] Command post, Strong point tyf cGo ljleGg kf]lhzgx¿df Infantry sf] Main effort df ljz]if kmf}h, Combat Support & Combat Service Support nfO{ cEof; bf}/fg lgDg Sequence df r/0fa4?kdf pkof]u u/L ljz]if sf/afxL ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] .

-s_ >L cfl6{n/L lgb]{zgfno cGt/utsf] kmfo/ o'lg6x¿åf/f Artillery xltof/af6 ljb|f]xLsf] kf]lhzgdf kmfo/ u/L Target Softening up sf] sf/afxL .

-v_ Kof/f tflnd lzIffnosf] Path Finder 6f]nLaf6 High Altitude High Opening (HAHO) lk|lG;kndf Free Fall Jump u/L Target Onfsf glhs DZ marking sf] sf/afxL .

-u_ e}/agfy u0fsf] Air borne ;]=d'=af6 Operational Jump u/L lab|f]xL cfpg]/hfg] d'Vo af6f]x¿df Road Block sf] sf/afxL .

-3_ d'Vo xdnf k"j{ u0f d2tL xltof/x¿ *! ld=ld=, MMG/GPMG, *$ ld=ld= sfn{ u':tfe tyf g+= !) jflxgL c8\8f cGt/utsf] AGL (Automatic Grenade Launcher) Team åf/f Target Onfsf ;kf]6{ kmfo/sf] sf/afxL . -ª_ >L g+= ( jflxgL c8\8f cGt/utsf] >L /0feLd u0f, >L l/k'db{g u0f, >L z]/ u0f tyf >L k'/fgf] uf]/v u0faf6 tf]lsPsf kmf}hx¿åf/f ljb|f]xLsf] nf]s]zg d'Vo xdnf .

-r_ xdnfsf] bf}/fg >L OlGhlgo/ lgb]{zgfno cGt/ut /x]sf] >L sfnLzlQm u0f tyf Infantry u0fsf]

91 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

Assault Pioneer 6f]nLaf6 ljb|f]xLåf/f Target Onfsf cufl8 nufOPsf] dfOg tyf jfo/ la|r u/L Infantry Safe Line (ISL) agfpg] sf/afxL . -5_ xdnf bf}/fg >L xjfO dxflgb]{zgfno cGt/utsf] x]lnsK6/åf/f Casevac sf] sf/afxL .

-h_ o'4e}/a u0fsf] Heli-borne Troops åf/f ljb|f]xLsf] sdf08 kf]i6df nG;/ ugl;k x]lnsK6/sf] ;kf]6{df /]8sf] sf/afxL . -em_ sf/afxLsf] bf}/fgdf efu]sf ;fy} cGo sf/afxLsf] nflu Pslqt eO{ xfO8 cfp6df n's]sf ljb|f]xLx¿nfO{ l;+xgfy u0fsf] sdf08f] ;]=d'=åf/f Search & Destroy sf] sf/afxL .

-`_ ljb|F]xLsf] Strong point df >L dxfjL/ u0f …/]Gh/' sf] Heli -borne ;]=d'=åf/f /]8sf] sf/afxL -6_ l/-cu{sf] sf/afxL .

(= cEof;df ;+nUg cGo dxTjk"0f{ c+ux¿dWo] >L ;}lgs xjfO lgb]{zgfnon] Supporting role cGt/ut cfkm\gf] Air assets pkof]u u/L Infantry tyf Special Forces nfO{ d2t k'¥ofpg cfkm\gf] cGt/utsf Pe|f] hxfh, :sfO 6«s, Pd=cfO=!&, nfG;/ ugl;k, P]n'j]6 tyf PSo'/n x]lnsK6/ k|of]udf NofPsf] lyof] . To:t} >L l;Ugn lgb]{zgfno cGt/ut /x]sf] dWo k[tgf x]=Sjf= l;Ugn l6d / g+= ( jflxgL l;Ugn u'Ndn] cEof; bf}/fgdf cfjZos l;Ugn ldnfk u/]sf lyP . >L ;}lgs aGbf]j:tL c8\8fn] cEof; bf}/fgdf cfjZos kg]{ ljleGg aGbf]j:tL s'/fx¿sf] hf]xf] u/]sf] lyof] eg] >L jL/]Gb| c:ktfnn] cEof; ;dodf cfjZos kg]{ d]l8sn ;kf]6{ k|bfg u/]sf] lyof] . cEof; æj}/L k|xf/Æ af6 xfl;n ePsf nIox¿ !)= nfdf] ;dosf] cGt/fndf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dxTjk"0f{ c+ux¿nfO{ ;d]t ;dfj]z u/L a[xt ?kdf ;+rfng ul/Psf] o; Combined Arms Exercise af6 lgDg nIox¿ xfl;n ePsf lyP .

-s_ g]kfnL ;]gfdf klxnf] kN6 Infantry, Special Forces, Combat Support tyf Combat Service Support kmf}hx¿ ;Dd]lnt a[xt ;+o'Qm cEof; Combined Arms Exercise sf] ;kmntfk"j{s ;DkGg ePsf] .

-v_ cEof;af6 Infantry-Arty Close Co-operation, Infantry-Air Close Air Support(CAS) tyf Infantry-Special Forces Close Effort sf] Jojxfl/s cg'ej xfl;n x'g'sf] ;fy} o;n] Infantry, Air, Supporting Arms tyf Special Forces aLrsf] cfk;L ;xof]u tyf ;dembf/LnfO{ a9fPsf] .

-u_ ;+o'Qm cEof;n] ljleGg cfD;{x¿ aLr Ps cfk;sf] Ifdtf tyf sdhf]/L (Capabilities and Limitations) ;d]t kQf nufO{ efjL r'gf}tL tyf vt/f (Challenges and Threats) x¿sf] ;fdgf ug{ ;Ifd t'NofPsf] .

-3_ ljut åGåsfndf l;lsOPsf kf7x¿ (lessons learnt) nfO{ dWogh/ /fVb} ef]lnsf] lbgdf cEof;df kl/sNkgf ul/P h:tf] ljifd kl/l:ylt l;h{gf eO{ 7"nf] :t/sf] sf/afxL ug'{kg]{ cj:yf cfPdf To; k|sf/sf] a[xt sf/afxLsf] ;+rfngsf] nflu o; k|sf/sf] cEof;nfO{ Template sf] ?kdf k|of]u ug{ ;lsg] . -ª_ cEof; ;+rfngn] lhDd]jf/L If]qsf] hldg;“u kmf}hx¿ kl/lrt x'g'sf] ;fy} a[xtdfqfdf ePsf] kmf}h kl/rfngn] :yfgLo hgtfdf;Lldt ;dosf] nflu eP klg ;'/Iffsf] k|Tofe"lt ePsf] . -r_ cEof;;“u} nfdf] ;dob]lv cj?4 cfl6{n/L kmfol/¨ ;'rf? ePsf] .

-5_ cEof; bf}/fg klxnf]kN6 ul/Psf] Pathfi nder jump / Operational jump ;“u} g]kfnL ;]gfsf] k|:tfljt ladfg DZ k|of]udf cfPsf] . cEof; æah| k|xf/Æ

!!= g]kfnL ;]gfsf] Strategic Reserve Force sf]?kdf /x]sf] g+= !) jflxgL cGtu{t /x]sf] ljz]if o'lg6x¿sf]

92 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* cfcfkmg} e"ldsf, ljz]iftf tyf Ifdtf /x]sf] 5 . ljz]if kmf}h o'lg6x¿df tflndsf] ljz]if dxTj x'G5 . oxL tYonfO{ dgg\ ub}{ g+= !) jflxgL tyf cGtu{tsf o'lg6x¿n] lgoldt?kdf ljleGg tflnd tyf cEof;x¿ ;+rfng ub}{ cfP tfklg xfn;Dd jflxgL cGtu{t ;a} o'lg6x¿nfO{ ;lDdlnt u/L cEof; ;+rfng gePsf] cj:yfdf g+= !) jflxgL cGtu{tsf ;a} ljz]if o'lg6x¿sf] e"ldsf tyf ljz]iftfdf cfwfl/t /x]/ ldlt @)^*.)!.@@ ut]b]lv #! ut];Dd cDn]]vu+hsf] 9's'jfaf; Onfsfdf klxnf]kN6 of] Joint exercise ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] . !@= cEof; æah| k|xf/æ sf] tof/Lsf] l;nl;nfdf ldlt @)^& ;fnsf] kf}if dlxgfdf pxL syf j:t'df cfwfl/t /x]/ cd]l/sL ;]gfåf/f ;++rflnt Balance Nail tflnd cGtu{t Military Decision Making and Planning (MDMP) Kofs]hsf];d]t pkof]u u/L g+= !) jflxgL x]=Sjf= tyf cGtu{tsf o'lg6x¿df klxnf] k6s ljz]if sdf08 kf]i6 cEof; (CPX) ;DkGg ePsf] lyof] . pQm CPX sf] Out come sf]?kdf cEof; æah| k|xf/æ ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] . cEof;sf] cjwf/0ff / ;+rfng

!#= b]zsf] ljBdfg kl/l:ylt / eljiodf cfOkg{ ;Sg] ;+efljt vt/fx¿nfO{ dgg\ ub}{ Trans-border Counter Terrorism sf] Concept df cfwfl/t cEof; æah| k|xf/æ df g+= !) jflxgL tyf cGtu{tsf ljz]if o'lg6x¿n] pknAw Air Asset x¿sf] pkof]u ub}{ ;+o'Qm?kdf s;/L ljz]if sf/afxL ;+rfng u/L cfkm\gf] ld;g k"/f ub{5g\ eGg] s'/f b]vfpg vf]lhPsf] lyof] . cEof; bf}/fg cEof;sf] l;gfl/of] cg';f/ tfu]{6sf] Nature cg'?k l;dfkf/Laf6 cgflws[t ?kdf 7"nf] dfqfdf xftxltof/, PDo'lgzg tyf PS;Knf]l;e 8Dk u/L Camp v8f u/L a;]sf Terrorist Camp df ljz]if kmf}hx¿n] Surprise and Swift Action nfO{ d'Vo cfwf/ dfGb} cfkmgf] Pc/af]g{ tyf x]lnaf]g{ 6f]lnnfO{ kl/rfng u/L lbg / /ft b'j}df cfkm\gf] sf/afxL c;/bf/k"j{s ;+rfng u/L tfu]{6 Onfsfdf Direct Action ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] .

!$= cEof; ah| k|xf/ cGtu{t l;df glhs v8f ul/Psf] Terrorist SofDk dfly g+=!) jflxgL cGtu{tsf ljz]if o'lg6x¿af6 lgDg tlt{jdf cfkmgf] ljz]if sf/afxL ;+rfng ul/Psf] lyof] .

-s_ Target Onfsfdf ;xefuL kmf}håf/f x]lnsK6/ tyf k}bn Infi ltration sf] sf/afxL .

-!_ >L o'4 e}/j u0fsf] Recce and Surveillance 6f]nLn] Target Onfsf glhs Heli-drop eO{ k}bn Infi ltration .

-@_ >L dxfjL/ u0f …/]~h/Ú tyf >L l;+xgfy u0f …sdf08f]Ú 6f]nLaf6 Heli-fast-rope u/L Blocking position sf] :yfkgf .

-#_ >L e}/jgfy u0fsf] Assaulting troops åf/f Operational Night jump u/L Target Onfsfdf k}bn Infi ltration .

-v_ Terrorist x¿sf] af/]df lg/Gt/?kdf va/ xfl;n ug{ tyf Terrorist camp sf] Recce tyf Surveillance ug]{ sfo{sf] nflu >L o'4 e}/j u0fsf] Recce and Surveillance 6f]nLåf/f cf]=lk= Position x¿sf] :yfkgf .

-u_ sf/afxL bf}/fg efu]sf Terrorist x¿nfO{ aaf{b ug{ Blocking position v8f ug]{ sf/afxL .

-3_ >L Kof=tf=l;=sf] Path Finding tyf DZ Marking sf] sf/afxLdf >L e}/jgfy u0fsf] Assaulting Troop sf] Operational jump .

-ª_ d'Vo sf/afxL cufl8 DA (Direct Action Assaulting troops) / OP (Recce and Surveillance) 6f]nL aLr Link up sf] sf/afxL .

-r_ Camp Attack sf] H-Hr k"j{ OP (Recce and Surveillance) 6f]nLsf] lkmtf{ (Fox-hole df a;]sf Sniper 6f]nLx¿ afx]s_

-5_ Terrorist camp dfly Camp Attack sf] sf/afxL .

93 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

-h_ Camp Attack kl5 efu]sf Terrorist x¿sf] d'Vo hTyfdfly ORF 6f]nLåf/f Heli-fast-rope u/L Quick Assault sf] sf/afxL .

-em_ Target Onfsftkm{ yk d2tsf] nflu cfp“b} u/]sf] Terrorist sf] Re-enforrcement group dfly >L o'4sjr u0fsf] Mobile Blocking ?kdf t}gfy APC 6f]nLåf/f sf/afxL ;+rfng .

-`_ Camp Attack sf] bf}/fg 3fOt] ePsf 3fOt]x¿sf] Evacuation sf] sf/afxL .

-6_ d'Vo Target af6 ljleGg lbzfdf efu]sf Terrorist x¿dfly Target Onfsf jl/k/L Likely Escape Routes df t}gfy l;+xgfy u0f -sdf08f]_ / dxfjL/ u0f æ/]~h/Æ sf] Blocking 6f]nLåf/f Blocking sf] sf/afxL .

-7_ Para Re-supply sf] sf/afxL .

-8_ Ex-fi ltration sf] sf/afxL . cEof; æah| k|xf/æ af6 xfl;n ePsf nIox¿ !%= cEof; ah| k|xf/af6 lgDg nIox¿ xfl;n ug]{ p2]Zo /flvPsf lyof] . -s_ cEof;sf] k[i7e"lddf jflxgL cGtu{t /x]sf] ljz]if o'lg6x¿sf] Ifdtfsf] hf“r ug]{ . -v_ jflxgL cGtu{tsf ljz]if o'lg6x¿ aLr cfk;L ljZjf;, ;xof]u / ;dembf/L a9fpg] . -u_ jflxgL cGtu{tsf o'lg6x¿ aLr Ps cfk;df ul/g] ;dGjosf] dxTjaf/] olsg ug]{ .

-3_ g]kfnL ;]gfdf /x]sf] Air Assets sf] Capabilities tyf Limitations af/] 1fg xfl;n ug]{ .

-ª_ Air borne tyf Heli-borne Operation ;DaGwL l/k|m];/ ug]{ .

-r_ ;du|?kdf jflxgL tyf cGtu{tsf ljz]if o'lg6x¿sf] Capabilities tyf Limitations nfO{ dgg ub}{ efjL r'gf}lt tyf vt/f (Challenges and Threats) sf] ;fdgf ug{ pRr Operational Readiness xfl;n ug]{ . ;+IF]k !^= æaufP kl;gf tflnddf aUg] 5}g /ut /0fe"lddfÆ eGg] tYonfO{ dgg\ ub}{ g]kfnL ;]gfdf lgoldt?kdf ljleGg tflnd tyf cEof;x¿ ;+rfng ul/+b} cfPsf] 5 . ljut åGåsf] ;dodf l;lsOPsf kf7x¿ (Lessons learnt_ tyf efjL r'gf}lt / vt/f (Challenges and Threats) x¿nfO{ dgg\ ub}{ cfufdL lbgdf g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;+rfng x'g] tflnd tyf cEof;x¿nfO{ kl/dfh{g tyf :t/ pGgt ub}{ n}hfg' cfhsf] cfjZostf xf] . hf/L /x]sf] ;+qmd0fsfn tyf ljBdfg t/n /fhg}lts cj:yfdf g]kfnL ;]gfn] lgjf{x ug'{kg]{ e"ldsf tyf Unforeseen Eventualities nfO{ ;d]t b[li6ut ub}{ g]kfnL ;]gfdf cfufdL lbgdf ;+rfng x'g] tflnd tyf cEof;x¿ Jojxfl/s, k|efjsf/L tyf pRr:t/sf] x'g' cfjZos 5 . !&= s'g} ;dodf Psfw?kdf …kmnfgf] JolQm ljb]z tflnddf uof] /]Ú eGg] xfd|f] ;]gfdf clxn] xfd|} ljleGg :s"n, sn]h, tflnd s]Gb|x¿df ljb]zLx¿nfO{ ;dfj]z u/L tflnd ;+rfng ug]{ x}l;otdf xfdL k'u]sf 5f+} . OdfGbfl/k"j{s eGg'kbf{ xfd|f] ;]gfn] tflndx¿sf] :t/ pGgltdf df/]sf] dxTjk"0f{ km8\sf]sf] ?kdf o;nfO{ lng'kb{5 . o;sf] cnfjf PsLs[t ;}lgs tflnd s]Gb| (IATC) sf] :yfkgf, k[tgf lzIFfnosf] :yfkgf, Army Physical Training and Sports Centre sf] :yfkgf, g]kfnL ;]gf / ljb]zL ;]gf aLr ;+rfng ul/g] ;+o'Qm tflnd (Joint Training), ;fd"lxs tflndsf] ;'rf?kg, cEof; j}/L k|xf/ tyf ah| k|xf/ h:tf a[xt cEof;x¿sf] ;+rfng cflbnfO{ g]kfnL ;]gfn] tflnd ;Gbe{df xfl;n u/]sf dxTjk"0f{ pknlAwx¿sf] ?kdf lng ;lsG5 .

!*= 'Traning is a never ending process' eGg] tYonfO{ b[li6ut ub}{ >L dWo k[tgfsf] ljz]if kxndf g+=(

94 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* jflxgLsf] ;+of]hgdf ;+rfng ePsf] cEof; æj}/L k|xf/Æ tyf g+=!) jflxgLsf] cfjZostf cg'?k ljz]if?kdf ;+rfng ul/Psf] cEof; æah| k|xf/Æ nfO{ cfufdL jif{x¿ gof“ Onfsfx¿df leGg} syf j:t'df kmd]{;g tyf o'lg6x¿sf] /f]n abnL u/L o; lsl;dsf] a[xt / ljz]if cEof;x¿ ;+rfng ub}{ nfg ;s]df o;n] lgZro klg efjL r'gf}lt tyf vt/fx¿;“u ;lhn} ;fdgf ug{ ;Ifd agfpg'sf] ;fy} g]kfnL ;]gfsf] k]zfutkg (Professionalism) df ;d]t gof“ cfofd Nofpg ;Sb5 . ;Gbe{ ;fdfu|Lx¿ != g]kfnL ;]gf tflnd lgb]{zg @)^*÷^( @= cEof; æj}/L k|xf/Æ @)^& sf] of]hgf #= cEof; æah| k|xf/Æ @)^* sf] of]hgf $= cEof; æa}/L k|xf/Æ tyf cEof; æah| k|xf/Æ sf] lg/LIf0f tyf ;+rfngsf] qmddf k|wfg;]gfklt, hËL c8\8fsf ;DalGwt /yLj[Gb, dWo k[tgfklt, g+=( jflxgLklt tyf g+=!) jflxgLkltåf/f ul/Psf] ;Daf]wgsf d'Vo c+zx¿ %= cEof; æa}/L k|xf/Æ tyf æah| k|xf/Æ df n]vs :jodn] xfl;n u/]sf] cg'ej

tL axfb'/ n8fs'nfO{ O{Hht u/ h;n] c;+Vo o'ub]lv o'4 ub}{ xfd|f] lglDt :jtGqtfsf] cd'No k}t[s ;Dklt /Iff u/]/ /flvlbPsf 5g\ .

— j6«08 /;]n

95 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf Traffi c Regulations

- Brig Gen (Retd) Dipak Gurung Kathmandu Traffi c 1. Kathmandu is truly becoming a metropolitan city; its pollution is getting worse day by day and traffi c jams becoming unmanageable. Traffi c signs don’t exist at all and if they do, they don’t matter at all. And nobody cares whose reponsibility it is. Is it the roads department’s responsibility to maintain the road signs or is it the responsibility of the traffi c police or is it Kathmandu Municipality’s or is it the transport management something committees ? Whatsoever, the streets of Kathmandu could be a big attraction to draw tourists to visit Nepal in 2011, our tourism year. The pockmarks of our streets resemble moon surface! 2. The taxi drivers in our beloved country, including the bus drivers (both micro and macro), put the blame of all traffi c wrongs squarely on the private car owners. The private owners put all the blame on the government vehicles. And there is an unspoken heirarchy amongst the government transport too, with each department thinking they have the right of way! And they all collectively put the blame back on the taxi and the bus drivers. The motorcyclists are totally different specie, especially the smaller moped ones and don’t hesitate to overtake from either left side or right side. If they could they would have gone over the top too! Not that they dont try. 3. The pedestrians and the animals have their own stories to tell. The foot over bridges of the capital weren't designed for the pedestrians use. These were designed specially for the motor cyclists to take shelter during the rain! The animals in Nepal don’t have to wait till Tihar to get worshipped. They rein the roads of the country through out the year! The animal rights activists could do a great favor to the society if they could take care of these stray animals than crying hoarse about animal sacrifi ce during Dashain. The Real Cause 4. Many people blame the lack of roads for our traffi c woes. Others think that the density of the vehicles per metre width or length is far greater than anywhere else in the rest of the world. And some think that the traffi c cops are the main reason for the traffi c jams. Wherever there is a traffi c jam you will invariably fi nd a traffi c cop in the midst. And if there are no traffi c cops then people help each other to get out of the jam! 5. And if two, three or four wheelers are to be blamed for our traffi c ills then two legged and four legged ones are also equally to be blamed for the use of road space. Right from Panchayat days the landed gentry have been releasing their unwanted cattle free on the capital roads after consumiing all the dudh, dahi and mohi!! It is different thing that they don’t recognise their own cattle in the streets now. Guilt ridden, most of their pariwar are now working hard in NGOs and INGOs for the protection of animal rights. 6. Driving License The biggest drawback of our driving test to award driving license is that there is no driving test! Except for reversing and parking there is no real driving test. 96 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

The applicants have to sit for a written test but they are not tested on the road driving where they have to actually drive. No wonder there is any driving sense amongst our drivers. 7. Driving Sense Driving sense is lacking specialy amongst the taxi drivers and the micro bus drivers. They will stop anywhere on the road to load or off-load their passengers, without any regard for the other road users. Micro bus drivers, plying on the ring road are notorious for causing traffi c jams. They will stop their buses right on the T of the road junctions, especially at the ring road junctions blocking all other traffi c. And the traffi c cops standing nearby act as if they belong to a totally different palnet! But they become totally different persons during any VIP movement. 8. VIP Traffi c During any VIP movement or SAWARI the traffi c cops are present in enough numbers and act very effi ciently so that the VIPs don’t have to face any traffi c jams. When will ordinary public have own Ordinary Public Traffi c Police so that they don’t have to face any traffi c jams? Aren't we paying taxes or are the VIPs paying any extra? It is quite evident that there are not enough traffi c cops to control the traffi c during normal offi ce hours when they are needed most. And we can again see them in suffi cient numbers when there are impromptu license checks during festival times. Chaad parba hai, bhai! 9. Road Signs Either there are no road signs at all or if we have them they badly need new painting. And whose responsibility it is to maintain those nobody knows. In the driving booklets it is written that the pedestrians should cross the road only at zebra crossings. We have neither any zebras nor any zebra crossings! Who is going to paint the crossings? Unless we have proper road signs how can we enforce proper road discipline? We need to educate people, especially drivers about No Entry, No Parking, No U Turns, No Overtaking, Give Way, Right of Way etc. 10. Right of Way Right of way is not clearly understood by our road users. Normally in left hand drive system the traffi c coming from the right side have the right of way. Major road always get right of way over secondary road. We have our own unwritten system of right of way. The vehicle whose nose gets in fi rst will always and everytime have the right of way! No wonder the pointed noses dominate Nepali politics. 11. Road Space Road Space is not the actual problem here. Even by constructing another ring road we will not be solving the problem. After some time we will face the same problem of congestion again. The real problem is that the drivers do not obey the traffi c rules and regulations. The bus drivers will continue to stop at the road junctions, motor cycles and the taxi drivers will continue to make illegal U turns, vehicles will continue to double park, chowks will continue as bus stops or tempo stops. No wonder chowks are also known as choke points. 12. Bridges Since the opening of the river banks as fast lanes the bridges have become another choke point. The bridges were designed simply for crossing over an obstacle or a river. Now they too have become a bus stop and parking space. With the opening of river bank roads the bridges have become crossing place from all directions including even under the bridge! 13. One Way The narrow streets of Kathmandu must be converted into one way traffi c. Earlier Gairidhara, Baluwatar, Bhatbhateni use to be one way traffi c and the area faced less

97 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf traffi c jams. One way traffi c needs to be reimposed in that section and similar studies need to be carried out in other places too. Traffi c from Baal Mandir must not be allowed north towards Tangal. People staying in the area will be uncomfortable for sometime in the beginning but they will get used to it. Afterall it is for overall good of whole Kathmandu. And that will defi nitely contribute to Nepal Tourism Year (NTY) 2011 too. 14. Only Left Turns As we have the system of left hand drive in the country, only left turns should be permitted in the majority of the busy roads. Especially during rush hours, no Right turns should be allowed. Traffi c jam is a chronic problem along Gaushala – Chahbel section. Jaya Baageshwari section is one way hence Sifal road should also be one-way catering for the traffi c going in the other side. 15. Most of the jams occur when vehicles travelling towards Chahbel from Gaushala try to go to Pashupati or Guheshwari that is, they try to go right and jam is created. Similarly jams are created when the vehicles travelling from Chahbel Ganesh should not be allowed to cross over towards Chahbel. 16. The other choke point is the bridge near Gopi Krishna Hall and Om Hospital. Traffi c from Gopi Krishna should not be allowed to go right towards the bridge. And the traffi c from Om Hospital should be allowed left towards the bridge and should not be allowed to go right towards Chahbel. Similarly traffi c in the other bridges should be allowed to turn left and not allowed to take right turn. Remedy 17. There are people who have specialised in traffi c management and other transport specialists who have better ideas and the traffi c system can be improved in Kathmandu. But till we arrive at the fi nal solution the authorities should take some simple steps to improve the traffi c environment. 18. Only left turns should be allowed during offi ce hours. There should be practical driving tests instead of only reversing and parking. More one way streets should be introduced and strictly followed. Proper road signs must be used and properly maintained. Neither illegal parking nor U turns should be permitted.It is not that there are no rules and regulations, and whatever we have must be followed strictly. And the traffi c police shouldnt work only during sawaris but should work for the general public also. 19. Traffi c education must be incorporated in the SLC syllabus too. And last not least the government must take care of street animals too. By only announcing the tourism year is not enough to attract the tourists. Hard work is needed to improve the infrastructure. The chaos in Kathmandu streets need to be cleared whether tourists come or not. I better stop using my laptop because driving and typing at the same time is quite diffi cult.

“Victory belongs to the most persevering.”

- Napoleon Bonaparte

98 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* SUKLA PHANTA WILDLIFE RESERVE

- Hikmat Bahadur Bisht1 1. It was probably late one autumn in the 16th century when the Tharu people discovered a unique place on earth and named it "SUKILA PHANTA". The Tharus are the people who were entrusted with the job of protecting and serving the ladies and children of the north Indian high cast Rajputs, until they fi nished fi ghting with the invading Turks. The densely forested foothills of Nepal, commonly known as the Tarai, probably were the safest place for the women and children of the warring Rajputs to take shelter. When the Rajputs were completely routed by their enemies, they obviously did not return to join their families. After a long wait, the women decided to marry the male members of their loyal servants, who had protected and served them faithfully during all these diffi cult times. Surprisingly, even today the wife and husband maintain the same traditional relationship, where husbands give their wives a due place in the family and the wives keep their place of high cast, especially in the kitchen. These are the people who are known to us presently as Rana Tharus. To write extensively about these wonderful, friendly people, who are fortunately forgotten, leaving them unspoiled by time and the tide of civilisation, only a separate article will do justice. 2. In late autumn the vast grassland, in full bloom, looks like a huge white carpet as far as one can see. White in the Tharu language is "Sukila", and grassland or savannah is "Phanta". This is the Tharu story of the name of the present day "SUKILA PHANTA". Today some people pronounce it as "SUKLA PHANTA". This is probably a colloquial form of SUKILA PHANTA. For many decades, Sukila Phanta had been a prosperous Tharu village, but primarily due to robbers from India, its settlers abandoned this village. In 1965 Then His Majesty’s Govt. of Nepal declared this part of the Tarai jungle a Royal Hunting Reserve. For a long time this reserve remained a Royal Hunting Reserve exclusively for the Royal family and their guests. It is for this reason that the Royal Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve still remains in its pristine form. Thanks to the Royal family for preserving it in this form and fi nally opening it to foreign tourists after it was gazetted as a wildlife reserve in July 1976 with a new name, "Royal Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve", but the local population continues to call it “Sukila Phanta”. It would be a nice gesture for the government to go back to the original name, "Sukila Phanta", in place of the current offi cial spelling "Sukla Phanta", to respect local sentiments. Such a decision by the government, if ever taken, will be highly appreciated by the local Tharus and the general population. 3. The Royal Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve (RSWR) has been re-named, soon after King Gyanendra made way for Republic Nepal on 24, April 2006 (01.11.2063 BS), as Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve (SWR). Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve is located in the extreme Southwest corner on Nepal's Tarai (28º53'N & 80º11'E) in Kanchanpur District of Mahakali

1 The author of this article, born in Dadeldhura, grew up in Tarai, Kanchanpur and Dadaldhura. He has served in Royal Nepal Army for 18 years including 3 years of diplomatic service in Washington D.C. He is widely travelled mainly hunting in USA and visiting famous national parks and wildlife reserves of the world. He has conducted the tourist camp in the, Royal Sukilaphanta Wildlife Reserve for more than 12 years. Thus knows this “UNIQUE” reserve very well. He calls this reserve "THE OTHER" NEPAL."

99 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

Zone covering 355 km² and ranges in altitude from 150 m to 600 m (WWF Nepal, 2000). The international border between Nepal and India demarcates the southern and western boundaries of the reserve. The Luggabugga Florican Reserve in India lies adjacent to the southern boundary of Sukla Phanta. The western boundary of the reserve is the Mahakali River. The Syali and Radha rivers form the eastern and western boundary respectively for the part of the reserve that extends north of the east-west highway to create more habitats and a corridor from the Terai into the Siwalik Hills (Churia Hills) for the seasonal migration of wildlife. This 355 km² unique reserve consists of a very rich diversity of open grassland, canopy forested jungles, a very large swamp (about 15km².), two small lakes, riverine forests, and one meandering jungle river, the Bamhni, that has its source in crystal clear springs in the northern part on the Reserve. The numbers of large and small Phantas in this reserve are of international importance, fi rst because they support a number of nationally and globally threatened mammals, birds and reptiles. Secondly, the grasslands of this reserve are the most diverse, and have the highest biomass when compared to other similar grasslands in the world. The Phantas of SWR have 54 species of grasses (Schaaf 1978). Largest of all the Phantas of SWR is “Sukila Phanta”, after which this reserve has been named. The area of “Sukila Phanta” proper is approximately 50 km². To this day, no survey has been conducted to determine the exact area of all the Phantas in the reserve. It is a matter of great concern for any nature lover to see that such rare and wonderful grasslands are gradually being taken over by trees. If some effective measures are not taken soon, the present grasslands will disappear. 4. In April, 1953, British Peter Byrne came to Nepal from India, where he had been a Tea Planter. In Katmandu, with the assistance of HRH Prince Basundra, he obtained a professional hunting license for Sukla Phanta (SP), one that allowed him to bring foreign clients to the area for trophy safaris. He operated in Sukla Phanta until 1969 at which time he approached His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and suggested that his SP hunting concession, which was about 155 km2, be turned into a protected wildlife park. The government agreed but had no resources at the time to do this. So Byrne agreed to raise the funding himself. This he did, through the International Wildlife Conservation Society, of which he is one of the original founders, returning to Sukla Phanta to spend the whole of 1969 working to create the reserve, building the park's fi rst bridge on River Bamhni, mapping the whole area, demarcating the boundaries, designing and building the park's inspection roads, providing equipment for guards and game scouts, and doing counts of its wildlife, especially its Swamp Deer, which at that time numbered 3000 animals. From this inspiration, of a professional hunter turned conservationist, Sukla Phanta, which in English means the White Grass Plains, was born. (Byrne) 5. SWR supports 30-recorded species of mammals (Anon), and probably more are present, but not yet recorded. Most prominent among these are Swamp Deer Cervus duvauceli duvauceli (the world's largest herd), Spotted Deer Axis axis, Hog Deer Axis porcinus, and Samber Deer Cervus unicolor, which have made a remarkable comeback from the jungles of the nearby foothills. Barking Deer Muntiacus muntjak, Asian Elephant Elephas maximus, Nilgai Boselaphus tragocamelus, Wild Boar Sus scrofa, and Hispid Hare Caprolagus hispidus are also present. The Bird list of SWR increases every year with new fi ndings by experts and serious bird watchers. Many of them consider SWR a bird watchers' paradise. The present bird list numbers 372 species. Sukila Phanta is internationally important for the following species: Bengal Florican Houbaropsis bengalensis, Swamp Francolin Francolinus gularis, White- rumped Vulture Gyps bengalensis, Slender-billed Vulture Gyps tenuirostris, Bristled Grassbird Chaetornis striatus, Finn’s Weaver Ploceus megarhynchus and Hodgson's Bushchat Saxicola insignis, which nests in central Asia and winters in Sukila Phanta (Inskipp and Inskipp 1983, Baral 1998 abc, Baral and Inskipp 2001, Inskipp and Inskipp 2001). There are a variety of

100 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* reptiles; the most noteworthy of which are the Indian Rock Python Python molurus, Mugger Crocodile Crocodylus palustris, Gharial Gavialis gangeticus, and monitor lizards Varanus spp. There are also 27 species of fi sh found in the lakes and rivers (Bhatta and Shresta 1973). 6. According to IUCN and Bird Life International, this unique reserve supports six species of grassland mammals, one species of reptile, fi fteen globally threatened and 13 near-threatened bird species occur in Sukla Phanta. (Groombridge 1993, BirdLife International 2000, Baral and Inskipp 2009). Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve is of grate interest for the bird-watchers. It has been listed as an important bird area and a number of bird studies have been conducted here. Some of the bird species reach their world limit of distribution at Sukla Phanta. Of all the habitats found in Sukla Phanta, grassland is the most important. Conservation and management of grasslands that are sympathetic to bird populations are urgent at Sukla Phanta. 7. There are a number of claims from the authorities of the reserve that they have seen Pygmy Hogs Sus salvinus in SWR. This is especially important because the Pygmy Hog has been declared as extinct. Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve has a very healthy population of Tigers Panthera Tigris. Tiger counts conducted by Dr. Charles McDougal in 1996-97 and by The King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation in 1999-00 revealed almost the same number of tigers, i.e. 31 animals, including adults and sub-adult cubs. The reserve also supports a herd of elephants consisting of 24 animals, including adults, sub-adults and calves, which keep migrating between Corbett National Park (National Park of India), Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve and the Bardia National Park of Nepal. There are also two young male Elephants that stay mostly in SWR. 8. With respect to human history, it is interesting to recall King Sing Pal, who belonged to the Deuba family of Ruwakhola village in Dadeldhura district of far-west Nepal (Skar 1999), and whose palace was situated at a place called Singhpur in the middle of the reserve. One can still see the ruins of Singhpur Palace and the compound walls. The famous Rani Tal, or Queen’s Lake, is one of the two above-mentioned lakes in the reserve. The Queen loved this lake very much and used to spend most of her time there, according to the Tharu people living in the vicinity. It is because of the proximity of SWR that the culture of the Tharu villagers has been preserved more or less intact, much as it must have been in the sixteenth century when the Tharu ancestors found themselves in Sukila Phanta. 9. Sukla Phanta is a unique wildlife reserve, and it will remain so, if it can be preserved (?) in its pristine form. Within its small area this reserve contains a vast diversity of habitats: dry Sal forest, riverine forests, swamps, a jungle river, lakes and South Asia's largest grasslands which house many globally and nationally threatened mammals, birds and reptiles. On any winter evening, when the grasses are short or burned by park authorities which generates new sprouts of the grasses the animals have congregated in the open Sukila Phanta looks like the game-rich grasslands of Africa. Some foreign naturalists and tourists call it a “MINI AFRICA” and some call it “THE OTHER NEPAL.” References

1. Baral, H. S. (1997) Sukila Phanta: a grassland reserve of international importance. Danphe 6(3): 6-8.

2. Baral, H. S. and Inskipp, C. (2001) Important Bird Areas in Nepal. A report to the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, UK. Bird Conservation Nepal.

101 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

3. Baral, H. S.; Inskipp, C.; Inskipp, T. P. & Regmi, U. R. (1996) Threatened birds of Nepal. BCN & DNPWC, Kathmandu. 4. Baral, H.S. (1998a). Status, distribution and habitat preferences of Swamp Francolin Francolinus gularis in Nepal. Ibisbill 1: 35-70. 5. Baral, H.S. (1998b). Hodgson's Bushchat in Nepal. Unpublished report to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (HMG, Nepal), The Biodiversity Support Program (USA) and Oriental Bird Club (UK). University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 6. Baral, H.S. (1998c). Finn's Weaver Ploceus megarhynchus and Singing Bushlark Mirafra cantillans: two new species for Nepal. Forktail 13: 129-131.

7. Bhatta, D. D. and Shrestha, T. K. (1979) The environment of Sukla Phanta. Curriculum Development Centre. Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur.

8. BirdLife International (2000) Threatened birds of the world. Lynx Edicions and BirdLife International, Barcelona, Spain and Cambridge, UK.

9. Groombridge, B. (Ed. 1993): 1994 IUCN Red List of Threatened Animals, IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK. Ivi + 286pp. 10. Inskipp, C. & Inskipp, T. P. (1982) Results of a preliminary survey of Bengal Floricans Houbaropsis bengalensis in Nepal and India, 1982. International Council for Bird Preservation, Study Report No. 2. Cambridge.

11. Inskipp, C. and Inskipp, T. (2001) A re-visit to Nepal’s lowland protected areas. Danphe 10(1/2): 4-7.

12. Schaff, C. D. (1978) Ecology and behaviour of the northern race of swamp deer (Cervus duvauceli duvauceli Cuvier) in the Sukla Phanta Wildlife Reserve of Nepal. Michigan State University, Michigan.

13. Harald O. Skar. (Becoming Rana: identity and regional self-ascription in lowland Nepal.)

“All action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which like a fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.”

- Karl von Clausewitz

102 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* Development and Prosperity of Asia Pacifi c in the 21st Century

- Pilot Lt Col Man Bahadur Karki 1. 21st century is the Asia Pacifi c century. World’s attention and cooperation will be increasing more than ever before. It is said that China and India will be more powerful and rise to the respected positions. “During the visit of President Barack Obama to India in 2010, he said that the relationship between the United States and India-bound by our shared interests and values-will be one of the defi ning partnerships of the 21st century. This is the partnership I have come here to build. This is the vision that our nations can realize together.”1 The Secretary of the States, Hillary Clinton said, thriving United States of America (USA) is good for China and thriving China is good for the USA. In her Asia Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting she said that the United States is renewing its focus on the Asia-Pacifi c region as the world's economic and strategic center shifting eastward. These statements of top US political leadership elucidate, how important is India, China and Asia as a whole for the US and the world in coming days of 21st century. 2. From 14th to 19th century, Europe dominated the course of history in Asia. Portuguese as a fi rst European country raised its fl ag over Goa and Macao in the 16th century. The Dutch showed its presence in Indonesia, the British in India and Spanish in the Philippines. Likewise, the French moved into Indo-China region, Russia in the Northern China, Manchuria and Korea and the United States of America in the Pacifi c and the Philippines in the later half of 19th century.2 It is said that the nineteenth century was the century of Europe during the industrialization period and the twentieth century became the American century. 3. When two great leaders from China, Deng Xiaoping and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met in 1988, on their bilateral discussion the phrase of Asian Century originated. Prior to this meeting it was believed that this term was discussed at US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing process. Now, term of Asian century is quite frequently used by the media and diplomats at the regional and international signifi cant areas of diplomacy, military forum, technology and economics. More recently, the President of Indonesia Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the APEC summit in November 2011 reiterated that 21st century belongs to the Asia Pacifi c region.3 Given the scope and signifi cance of the Asia Pacifi c region, it must identify the roles and way to diversify the economic growth through sustainable, balanced and inclusive development. 4. To become a major power, country must have economic, infrastructure, political, social, cultural, technology and military might so that it can able to show signifi cant diplomatic presence in the world politics. In terms of the total population, Asia Pacifi c has the highest population in the World. In the beginning of 21st century, Asian population was around four billion which is expected to increase to more than fi ve billion by 2050. However, world population growth is

1 President Barack Obama`s address to Indian Parliament on 8 November 2010 2 Dr Theo Summer, Is the 21st Century is Going to Be Asian Century, Asian, July 2006, p. 70-78 3 http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/11/13/the-21st-century-belongs-asia-pacifi c-region-sby.html

103 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf likely to be reduced in other region. North American and European population is expected to decline. It means, human resource which is the one factor of production in marketing is more in Asia than other region. Likewise, technology and capital investment are likely to widen. 5. East Asian nations like Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia have encouraging progress, development and economic expansion which have already shown infl uencing roles in the world arena. Moreover, after the USA, China is the second and Japan the world’s third largest economies, whereas, India is the sixth in purchasing-power parity terms.4 These three Asian nations are progressing more and taking a leap in economic growth by overtaking USA before the middle of 21st century. According to Yao of Nottingham University, China will overtake the USA to become the world’s largest economy by 2038 and the Indian economy will overtake the USA by 2043 as per the Goldman Sachs report.5 6. By 2050, the East Asian and South Asian economies will be increased by many folds and subsequently the index to measure the standards of living, Human Development Index (HDI) will be also increased.6 India's HDI will be approached to 0.8 and East Asia's countries will be approached to 0.94 which is close to the European and the US living standards. This fact foretells the level of progress and living standard in East Asia and India. In terms of religion, culture, language and social factors, Asian value is also likely to boom. In spite of English regarded as universal language, Asian languages such as Chinese, Japanese, Indian and Korean are also likely to rise. Chinese language has been rated as the second most used language on the internet, Japanese was fourth, and Korean as the tenth as of 2010. Likewise, the same report says, China is the country that host the most users, Japan the third, India the fourth and the South Korea as the tenth as of 2008. India has the largest fi lm industry which produces more fi lms than Hollywood. Annual growth of Bollywood’s fi lm is at 12.6% higher than Hollywood’s 5.6%.7 7. South Korea, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam have strong economic infl uence and can be regarded as East Asian economic hubs. These countries engagement and more economic cooperation with potential Asian economic power houses Japan, India and China at one front and big economies like USA, European Union, Russia, Brazil and South Africa on the other front will yield shared development and prosperity in the region. These three great economic powers of India, China and Japan will inevitably pose political and strategic competition and likely to create power shift from the West to the East. Nevertheless, Asia Pacifi c region has some challenges of unresolved territorial issues stand between India and Pakistan, India and China, Vietnam and China, China and Russia, Russia and Japan and South China issue. In addition, development on the Korean peninsula and six party talks, nuclear issues of Iran, war on terror, human rights, good governance, transparency, climate change and natural disaster are other key areas to shape future prosperity and peaceful rise of the small and big nations in the region. 8. The relationship of Asian powers with European Union, USA and Russia should be

4 http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4001&Itemid=206 5 http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/updates/blog_posts/20_04_2009.php 6 http://www.cap-lmu.de/publikationen/1999/asias_future_globalization.php 7 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asian_Century

104 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* troubled free and it should not be a constant fi ght for the resources, taking a lion shares in the region and should prevent the situation to become an adversary. The confrontation or adversary in the region cannot create confi dence and investment friendly environment. Even if there is confl ict, convergence is the better option to correct and march onto the road of Asia Pacifi c stability and prosperity. 9. Trade and investment, democracy, human rights, military engagement, strategic partnership, and participation on humanitarian and disaster response are likely common areas of cooperation which cement the relations much stronger. Asian nations and international powers can best utilize this option to shape their relations and interact to create more business opportunity and resilient Asia Pacifi c. Presently, Asia Pacifi c region has various different regional organizations consisting member country from within and outside the region. The regional organizations are not limited to the geographical proximity but it has mainly focused on the free trade, economic cooperation, investment opportunity and shared prosperity. ASEAN which consists of nations of South East Asian such as Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, East Timor, the Philippines and Brunei. This regional organization also includes Japan, USA and South Korea as ASEAN plus Three. Similarly SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation) is the forum of eight countries namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Major military and economic power such as the United States of America, China, Japan, Australia, European Union and Russia are also involved as a partner and observer. In addition to those organization few other organization, namely Asia Pacifi c Economic Forum (APEC), Shangai Cooperation Organization, Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC, Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)8, economic organization of big four countries Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and so on. This type of alliance actually strengthens the country to country contact and provides a platform to engage for common benefi ts. 10. To conclude, the 21st century is the century of business, trade, investment, technology and strategic competition in Asia Pacifi c region. Every country in the world aspires to grow and prosper through peace, stability and development. Given the dynamism and signifi cant level of economic progress of small, powerful and emerging nations, the Asia Pacifi c region is likely to grow further and infl uence the world activities. However, the level of stability, development and prosperity of the Asia Pacifi c nations are likely to vary.

8 BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand Economic Cooperation was established in 1997. Nepal and Bhutan got full membership in 2003.

“He who whets his steel, whets his courage.”

- Steven Pressfi eld

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#= åGådf/;z:q d'7e]8x?df pleP/ h:tfnfO{ To:t} Aojxf/ (Tit for Tat) sf] l;4fGt cjnDjg tyf dfgjLo sfg"gsf] k"0f{?kdf kfngf u/L k|ltsf/df ;xh 9+un] plqP/ s'g} klg xfntdf Ps sbd kl5 gxl6 ;kmntd?kdf st{Aolgi7 eO{ cl3 a9\b5 . To:t} p;n] s7f]/eGbf s7f]/ / g/deGbf g/d k]z]j/ rfn cyf{t\ Aojxf/ ug{ klg hfg]sf] x'G5 . p;nfO{ x]g]{ b[li6sf]0fdf dfq km/s x'g' h?/L 5, ;a} ;dodf Ps?ktf ePsf] 7fGg'x'Gg, o;f] ubf{ ;fpgdf cf“vf km'6]sf] l8+uf]n] ;w}“ xl/of] b]Vb5 eg]h:tf] pvfgsf] rl/tfy{ x'g cfp“b5 . $= nfdf] ;do;Dd ljb]zdf zflGt :yfkgf sfo{sf] nflu ljleGg o'=Pg= ldzgx?df t}gfy /x“bf;d]t zflGt :yfkgfy{ w]/} g]kfnL jL/ ;k'tx?n] cfkm\gf] /ut / kl;gfn] ljb]zL e"ld l;l~rt u/L åGå ;dfwfgsf] nflu cxd e"ldsf v]n]sf] xfdL ;a}sf] dfemdf k|i6 5 . cem g]kfnL zflGt :yfkgfy{ 6f]nLx?sf] pTs[i6 sfo{x?nfO{ ljZj ;d'bfon] v'n]/} k|z+;f u/]sf] klg xfdL ;a}nfO{ 1ft g} 5 . %= zflGtsf] cj:yfdf b]zsf] ljsf; tyf hgtfnfO{ k|ToIf nfeflGjt x'g] lx;fasf ljleGg ;}lgs gful/s ;DaGw ;'b[9 ug]{ sfo{x? ;d]t ug{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf sd{7 l;kfxLx?sf] hdft ;Ifd 5g\ . ljkbsf] cj:yfdf /fxt tyf p4f/ sfo{df First Responder sf] lx;fjn] cl3 a9\g logLx? ;w}“ tof/ tyf tTk/ /xG5g\ eg] ljsf; lgdf{0fdf ljleGg lsl;dsf ;8s, af6f3f6f], k'n-k'n];f, vfg]kfgL h:tf lgdf{0f sfo{x?df dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]ln/x]sf] 5 . To:t} cfk"m;“u ePsf] ;Lldt ;|f]t / ;fwgx?af6 d]l8sn SofDk tyf cf}ifwL ljt/0f, ljleGg lsl;dsf ;'/Iff ;Da4 hgr]tgfx? km}nfpg], jg tyf jGohGt'x?sf] ;'/Iff ug]{ h:tf sfo{x? ;d]t u/L k|ToIf jf k/f]If?kdf nfeflGjt u/fpg;d]t ;Ifd /x]sf] 5 . ^= To;}n] @)$% ;fnsf] e"sDkdf xf];\ jf @)%) ;fnsf] af9LkLl8tsf] p4f/ tyf /fxt ;fdfu|L ljt/0fdf xf];\ of] /ftlbg vl6O/xG5 eg] ljsf; lgdf{0fsf] qmddf kmfi6 6««Øfs vf]Ng], a]gL-hf]d;f]ª, lxn]-ef]hk'/, s6f/L-cf]vn9'“uf, l5Gr'-hfh/sf]6 h:tf ;8s v08x? vf]nL b]znfO{ ljsf;sf] kfOnfx?df 6]jf k'¥ofpg klg st{Aolgi7 l;kfxLx?n] el/Psf] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] 7"nf] of]ubfg /x]sf] 5 . To:t} @)%* ;fnb]lv @)^@ ;fn;Dd b]znfO{ cfGtl/s åGåaf6 pGd'lQm lbg klg cfkm\gf] hLpHofgsf] kjf{x gu/L st{Aokydf lsdfy{ ljrlnt geO{ cfkm\gf] s'g} cfzf, OR5f, rfxgf g/fvL cxf]/fq nflu k/]sf] lyof] / eljiosf lbgx?df klg nflu kl//xg] k"0f{ ljZjf;sf ;fy eGg ;lsG5 . o;df s]jn cf8e/f];f, pTk|]/0ff / ;fGTjgf ldl;Psf] xf};nfsf] dfq vf“rf] /x]sf] 5 . 106 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

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— l8s]Ghf] P08 /ljG;

107 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

Panauti & Its Nostalgic Cultural Sites

- Lecturer Poonam R L Rana

Distance from Kathmandu

1. Panauti is 32 Km away from Kathmandu and lies on the South Eastern side of the valley. It is also known as ‘Asmapur’ resting on a single rock, like the city of Kirtipur. As the saying goes, it is a city of temples; here images of deities are found more than the local populace, where one can see more temples than houses.

The History & Evidence

2. Mr Uddav an officer of Department of Archaeology reveals that there are in total 54 inscriptions including the one at Gorakhnath hill. The oldest images can be dated up to 12th and 13th century AD. All these inscriptions belongs to the Medieval period. Beside this there are 988 ‘Tamrapatra’ copper plates belonging to 1000 BS. Licchhavi inscriptions found here mention of the settlement at Panauti.

3. Inscriptions reveal that King Harashima Deva of Simraungargh escaped and came here and established his rule. History also reveals that Vardhana Dynasty was residing near the valley of Planchowk Bhagawati area. It lies very near to Panauti. Hence lot of development and progress took place during this era.

Origin of the Name

4. There are numerous myths, legends, local emic views related to the origin of the name Panauti such as: It is said that in Satya Yuga and Treta Yuga it was known by the name of ‘Padmawati’. In the Dwapar yug it was called ‘Punyawati’ then ‘Pallawati’ and ‘Panwati’ and finally during ‘Kaliyug’ the name underwent change and it became known as ‘Panauti’. 108 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

This region is as religious as ‘Uttar Prayag’ of India. From religious point of view it is known as ‘Pabitra Bhumi’ or ‘Region of Purity’

Panauti Chhetra

Ancient Belief & Panauti

5. Belief exist that earlier Royalties or Shah vamsis would never set foot on Panauti, as the saying goes that since the city is situated on a single rock, if any ruler set his foot on this city, the rock would crack and the people would suffer from natural calamities.

6. Another belief is that one of the Shah rulers dreamt that Lord Indreswar Mahadeva appeared in his dream and forbade him to come to Pasnauti. It was since then they never set foot on this region. However recently, during the 12 years mela, former King Gynendra not only visited the place but also provided donations to different temples. This is what the locals told us.

7. Interesting belief persists that, there was a holy ruler by the name of Satyabara. During his rule a terrible drought occurred. It is said that he offered flower of gold and silver to ‘Pulchowki Mai’ and prayed for water. It is believed that rain fell.

Temples around Panauti

8. Panauti is an area full of temples, culturally rich in medieval heritages and festivities. Nearly each and every nook and corner of this city has religious importance attached to it. Along the four side of this region are the ‘Dikpalas’ or ‘gurdians, Astamatrikas, Gorakhnath as well as holy rivers and its confluences with great religious values attached to it.

9. Holy ‘Lilawati river’ flows from the highest peak Phulchowki region lying on the southern side of Panauti. From the western side via Nala quietly flows the holy ‘Punyawati river’. Another myth supports of an invisible river ‘Guptawati’ known as ‘Rudrawati’ is said to flow here only after every 12 years, belief also exist, that one can burn fire on this water. The confluence of these holy rivers is considered as ‘Triveni’. This area is known as “Sachi Tirtha’ It is believed that if people bathe here it is as bathing in the holy Prayag of India. Some term this confluence as ‘Uttar Gaya’ ‘North Gaya’.

109 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

10. Some important temples around this area are Gorakh Nath, Guheshwari, Bhadrakali, near the confluence of the river is the Brahmayani, Shree Krisna and Indreshwor and within its premises are the temple of Unmat Bhairab and Tula Narayan etc.

Gorakhnath Temple

Hillock behind is the ‘Gorakhnath Hill’ Gorakhnath New Gorakhnath image

11. On the North West of the ‘Triveni’ lies a hillock. On the top of it is the temple of Guru Gorakhnath; the hillock is named after him. From here one can see Khopasi bazzar towards the East, cultivated fields towards West and Banepa, Dhulikhel, and Himalayan range on the North. After climbing more than 389 steps we can reach the top.

12. Myth exist that in ‘Treta yuga’ while fighting with Ravana, Laxman fainted and it was Shree Hanuman who went to bring the medicinal herbs, since he lacked knowledge he carried the ‘Dronachal Parbat’. On the way, a piece that fell is said to be Goraknath hillock. Dharmaguru are of the view that around this hillock one can find numerous medicinal herbs. Belief exist that if an individual carries the water from the confluence within the palm of his hand and is able to offer it at the temple of Guru Gorakhnath, all his wishes is said to be fulfilled.

Brahmayani temple

Brahmayani Pith Brahmayani images

13. On the confluence of the holy rivers is this temple of Brahmayani. As mentioned in the inscription it was made by Shree Ranjeet Malla. Lord Brahma is the creator and his shakti is Brahmayani. Brahmayani is a roop of parvati. It is said as required she took different roopas to overcome the evil.The symbolic form of worship had been prevalent in Nepal since times unknown. The Brahmayani images are merely placement of stones.

110 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

Bhairab Pith

Bhairab temple Bhairab pith with ‘Chepu’ on Toran

14. Pith is a symbolic place where instead of image usually symbols are placed. In this case the image of Bhairab is brought to the temple only on ‘Jatra or festival. On the Torana one can see ‘Chepu’ which shows Tibetan influence in Nepalese art. Chepu has been regarded as a guardian. In many temple premises one can see Chepu at the doorway.

Kedareswar Temple

Kedareswar Mukha Linga Cloth tied around ‘Mukhalinga 15. Kedareswar temple comprises of ‘Pancha Mukhalinga’. The mukhalinga have five faces with a moustache. The unique feature of this image is that it has animal figures on its ‘brahma bhaga’. On all four sides there are images of lion, tiger, nag, and ox engraved on it.

Ganesh Temple near Triveni

Pillars on the side of Ganesh temple Navagraha icon Narayana (Assumed to be of Licchhavi phase. Images of Surya, Naga etc.) 16. Ganesh temple is an ordinary temple but the extraordinary aspect is that the stone pillars placed on three sides have been assumed to belong to the Licchhavi period. Scholars are of the view that it was brought here from elsewhere and placed here. The four sides of 111 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf the temple house four different deities. On the other side of Ganesh temple is the icon of ‘Navagraha’ on the other two sides are Narayan and Suryanarayana.

Vansagopal Shree Radha Krisna Temple

Radha Krisna Image Krisna Radha Temple

17. This temple lies very near to Shree Ganesh Temple. It was constructed in the year 1784. Interesting point to note is that this temple was not constructed by dwellers of Panauti. It is said that this temple was constructed by a trader from Lalitpur.

Shree Thampa Bhairab

Thampa Bhairab Outside the Temple The Wooden Tundal

18. On the way to Indreswar Mahadeva temple, just in front of the main gate lies the ‘Thampa Bhairab pith’ This temple does not possess any ornamented image but a symbolic stone representing as Bhairab is placed at the sanctum.

Indreswar Mahadeva

Indreswar Mahadeva Tula Narayan Matrika temple Strut

19. The most famous temple of Panauti is Indreswar Mahadeva. Majority of the images around the temple are based on ‘Panchayan Marg’ It is believed that Lord Indra did tapashya and installed this temple. The inscription however reveals that this temple was constructed

112 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* by Ram Vardhana in between 12th to 13th century. It is an exquisite temple in pagoda style. The Struts are constructed at 45 degree angle; its major function was to support the roof.

20. Towards the northern side the Struts are of Matrikas and on the southern side the struts depicts characters of Mahabharata. Towards the west the struts depict Ramayana characters. On the southern side of the temple lies a huge rock known as ‘Ahilya Sattal’ Story reveals of Gautam rishi who cursed his wife Ahilya and she turned into a rock. It was only when Lord Ram stepped on her she regained her ‘swaroopa’ and attained mokshya.

21. Tula Narayana image is a famous image of this premisces. It is approximately 9 ft in height made up of black stone. It is said that Jaya Verma did ‘tula daan’. He measured himself with gold, silver and rice-grains and gave it to the people; and installed ‘Tula Narayana’ image. The image is shown standing on a double- petal lotus. There is also a temple for the Matrikas. It is a noteworthy fact that on the southern side of Siva temple one can always see a Bhairab temple.

(Siva Linga within Indreswar premises) Recent Excavations & Findings & note-worthy monuments 22. For those interested in the archaeological excavations, this is an interesting site. Seven years ago excavation had been carried but it was covered. Now again re-excavations is being carried out. Excavation has revealed ancient structural remains of the gate, palace walls and other artifacts and coins. This has slowly proved the historical legends associated with “Vardhana Vamsi’ is true. Hence archaeological excavations are back bone of our history.

Excavated site Excavation on the way 113 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

Excavated structural remain The wall Wall section

The Excavated artifacts, coin object.

Interesting Monument 23. In course of your visit to Panauti an interesting monumental structure may catch your eyes. It seems to stand out among the barren space.

Stupa like remain Back view Monumental Remain

24. Emic or indigenous view reveals that earlier there were priests or Brahmins known as “Dakshin Brahmin’ or Brahmins from the south. They were known as ‘Jangam’ they were responsible for conducting ritualistic worships or pooja, jatra or festivities. When these holy priests died they were buried and over their dead body such monumental structures were constructed. Recently there are no more ‘Jangams’ nor does this system of burying of the priest exist.

25. Panuati is certainly an interesting historical & cultural site worth visiting . For those interested in the study of medieval art, architecture, and ancient excavated site, Panauti is the place. The only drawback is that this area does not possess posh hotel to house the tourist however, there are neat and clean Newari café to drink a cup of coffee, tea or cold drinks. There is a regular bus services joining Kathmandu with Panuauti. Panauti always welcomes visitors. We must be proud of such heritage that build a nostalgic past. 114 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* a8fdxf/fhflw/fh k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] ;'/Iff gLlt

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!! P]hg . !@ P]hg k[= %$ . !# P]hg, k[= %& . !$ P]hg, k[= $% . !% xg'dfgl;+x a:Goft tyf k"0f{dfgl;+x a:Goft, >LkfnL a:Goft kl/ro -sf7df8f}+ M>LkfnL a:Goft ;dfh lj=;+= @)%*_, k[= @@ . !^ afa'/fd cfrfo{, k"j{jt, k[= $% . !& P]hg, k[= $( . !* P]hg, k[= ^) . !( P]hg, k[= #) .

116 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] cWoog, dxTj tyf pkfb]otf

– dxf ;]gfgL -c=k|f=_ /ltGb| vqL != ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] 1fglagf s'g} klg ;}lgs JolQm kl/kSj x'g ;Sb}g . lsgls, ;}lgs k]zfut 1fgsf] clej[l4df ;}lgs Oltxf;n] dxTjk"0f{ :yfg cf]uf]6]sf] x'G5 . ;}lgs o'4snfsf] qmlds ljsf; (Evolution of Military Warfare) n] ljZjnfO{ 9'Ë] xltof/sf] o'uaf6 cfhsf] cTofw'lgs xftxltof/n] ;';lHht eP/ ax'cfoflds 9+un] n8fO F nl8g] cj:yfdf NofO{ k'¥ofPsf]] 5 . of] ljsf;sf] qmdnfO{ bzf{pg] d'Vo dfWod g} ;}lgs Oltxf; xf] . To;}n] ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] 1fgn] ;}lgs o'4snf, xftxltof/, ;]gfdf k|ljlw cflb ljifosf] ljsf;sf] s|lds?kdf hfgsf/L lbO{ To;sf] ;lx?kdf k|of]u ug{sf] nflu dfu{ lgb]{zg ub{5 . o;} dxTjsf sf/0f klg ljsl;t d'n'sx?df ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ ljz]if dxTjsf;fy tof/ kfg]{ ul/G5 . o; ;Gbe{df jL/tfn] el/Psf] g]kfnsf] Oltxf;af6 vf]hd"ns 9Ën] jf:tljs ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ s|lds?kdf ljsf; ub}{ n}hfg kg]{ cfjZostf xfdL ;fd' /x]sf] 5 . @= ljZjsf] Oltxf;df k|foM h;f] ;a} d'n'sx?sf] Oltxf;df ;}lgs Oltxf;n] g} k|d'v :yfg cf]u6]sf] x'G5 . s'g} klg b]zsf] /fi6« lgdf{0f (Nation Building) k"0f{?kdf zflGtdo jftfj/0fdf zfob} ePsf] xf]nf < s'g} g s'g} sfn v08df cfP/ cfGtl/s jf afXo sf/0fn] o'4sf] ;fdgf u/L ;}lgs Oltxf; /Rg kg]{ cj:yf kf/ u/]/ cl3 a9]sf] b]lvG5 . rfx] Tof] ljZj o'4 xf];\ jf l5d]sL /fHo;Fusf] n8fOF pklgj]zsf] n8fOF xf];\ jf :jtGqtfsf] o'4 cyjf cfGtl/s u[x o'4 g} lsg gxf];\ ;}lgs k|of]hgsf] cfjZostf clxn]sf :jtGq /fHox?n] ef]u]/ g} cfhsf] l:yltdf cfO{ k'u]sf x'g\ . #= k/fk"j{sfndf dfgjLo lqmofsnfksf] j0f{g ug]{ s|ddf Oltxf;sf] z'?jft ePsf] lyof] . ;flxTosf wgL lu|s tyf lrgLofx?af6 g} lnlvt Oltxf;sf] z'? ePsf] Oltxf;df kfOG5 . Ozfk"j{ sfndf ld> ;Eotfaf6 Oltxf; z'?jft ePsf] t b]lvG5, t/ klg vf;u/L lu|s, /f]dg ;Eotf x'F'b} dWosfnLg o'u;Dd cfOk'Ubf Oltxf;sf] /fd|};“u ljsf; eO;s]sf] lyof] . ;f] ;dodf Oltxf;sf] juL{{s/0f u/]/ ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ cnu?kdf st} cleJoQm u/]sf] b]lv+b}g . cfw'lgs o'udf cfP/ Oltxf;sf] (Historiography) ljsf; x'Fb} uPkl5 Oltxf;sf] pNn]vgLo?kdf ljsf; x'Fb} uof] . o; ;do;Dd cfOk'Ubf hd{gL, k|mfG;]nL, a]nfotL, cd]l/sL, ?;L, lrgLof tyf d'l:nd Oltxf;sf/ x?n] Oltxf;sf] ljsf;df 7"nf] of]ubfg k'¥ofPsf] b]lvG5 .! oxL sddf| ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] klg cfkmg}\ klxrfgsf;fy ljsf; x'Fb} uPsf] lyof] . g]kfndf klg g]kfnL ;]gfsf] kxntfdf ljåfg Oltxf;sf/x?sf] ;xof]udf tyf s]xL cGo Oltxf;sf/x?n] ;d]t ;}lgs Oltxf; tof/ kfg]{ sf]lzz ePsf] 5 . $= låtLo ljZjo'4;Dd ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ o'4 ;DaGwL l;nl;n]jf/ ljZn]if0f xf] eGg] ul/GYof] . To:t} o;nfO{ ;}lgs sfjf{xLsf] 36gfs|dsf] Joj;flos ljZn]if0f klg elgg] u/]sf] kfOG5 . To;sf] ;fy} ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ k|of]uzfnf r/0fsf] ;}lgs lj1fgsf] ;+1f klg lbOPsf] b]lvG5 .@ k|l;4 a]nfotL ;}lgs ljrf/s h]=Pkm=;L km'n/n] bf];f]| dxfo'4sf] Ps bzs cl3 g} ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ o'4snfs} ;}lgs lj1fgsf] ljsf;sf] ?kdf JofVof u/]sf lyP .# o;/L ljleGg ljrf/x? a9\g] s|ddf cfw'lgs ;dodf cfP/ cd]l/sL ;]gfn] cflwsfl/s ?kdf ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ æ;]gfsf] o'4 tyf zflGt b'j} cj:yfsf] p2]Zod"ns (Objective), b'?:t (Accurate), j0f{gfTds (Descriptive), tyf JofVofg (Interpretive) sf] clen]v (Record) g} ;}lgs Oltxf; xf]Æ eg]/ kl/eflift u/]sf] 5 .$ xfn}sf] lbgdf

! d'hdbf/ cf/=s] / >Le:tf P=Pg, df]8{g lx:6f]l/of]u|fkmL, lx:6f]l/of]u|fkmL, k[i7 *# b]lv @() . @ h];k hf]g / SjfSn] /f]a6{, P kz{k\lS6e ckm ldnL6/L lx:6«L, P ufO{8 6' o'h ldnL6/L lx:6«L, jfl;Ë6g l8=;L=, ;]G6/ ckm ldnL6/L lx:6«L k[i6 @( . # km'n/ h]=Pkm=;L, kmfp08]zg ckm lb ;fO{G; ckm jf/, n08g, x6ls;g, !(@*, k[i7 !( . $ h];k hf]g / SjfSn] /f]a6{, P kz{k\lS6e ckm ldnL6/L lx:6«L, P ufO{8 6' o'h ldnL6/L lx:6«L, jfl;Ë6g l8=;L=, ;]G6/ ckm ldnL6/L lx:6«L k[i6 #! .

117 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

;+o'Qm /fHo cd]l/sfdf ;}lgs Oltxf;nfO{ hlt dxTj lbPsf] b]lvG5, zfob} cGt st} lbOPsf] xf]nf < %= Pp6f Oltxf;sf] cWoogstf{sf] nflu Oltxf; lzIffk|b ljifo x'g ;Sb5 eg] Pp6f l;kfxLsf] nfuL ;}lgs Oltxf; pkfbo]tfsf] b[li6sf]0fn] dxTjk"0f{ x'G5 . ;}lgs Oltxf; / c? Oltxf;sf cg';Gwfg tyf vf]h k|lqmofdf s'g} tflTjs cGt/ x'Fb}g . ;a} d"No, dfGotf, k|fylds tyf ;xfos ;|f]tx? pxL g} xf] . ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] nflu ;|f]tx?sf] k|flKt ;xh Pjd\ s]xL km/s x'g ;Snf, t/, w]/} xb;Dd Ps csf{sf k"/ssf] ?kdf /x]sf x'G5g\ . ^= ;}lgs Oltxf; tof/ ubf{ syfut ?kdf j0f{g ul/Psf ljifox?n] vf;} dxTj /fVb}g . g]kfndf ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] cWoog cWofkg ug]{ s|ddf ;fwf/0f Oltxf;s} n8fOFsf] k|;ËnfO{{ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] ?kdf k|:t't ug{] ul/G5 . Toltdfqn] ;}lgs Oltxf; k"/f ePsf] dfGg ;lsb}g . k|;Ëj; ul/g] P]ltxfl;s o'4sf] a0f{gnfO{ t cfd Oltxf;s} ;+1f lb+bf km/s kb}{g . t/, oy]i6 k|df0fx?sf] cfwf/df ;}lgs dxTjsf] ljifox?sf] ljj]rgf ul/G5 eg] Tof] jf:tljs ;}lgs Oltxf; sxnfpg ;Sb5 . s'g} JolQmaf6 p;Fu ;Da4 36gf / lgsfosf] af/]df Oltxf; ;+sng ul/G5 eg] p;n] lbPsf] oyfy{ ;k|df0f pknJw x'g h?/L x'G5 . cGoyf To;df sldsdhf]/Lx? n'Sg] / /fd|f kIfx? a9fO{ r9fO{ n]lvg ;Sg] cj:yf l;h{gf x'g ;Sb5 . k|df0f ljgfsf] Oltxf; History geO{ His Story aGg hfg] ;+efjgf a9L x'G5, To; cj:yfdf To:tf] ljifonfO{ Oltxf; egL xfNg ldNb}g . t/ klg To:tf] aofgnfO{ kl5 Oltxf;sf] ;|f]tsf] ?kdf pNn]v ug{ ;Sg] cj:yf eg] /xG5 . &= k|l;4 ;}lgs ljrf/s ln8n xf6{ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf af/]df eG5g\ æ;}lgs Oltxf;sf ljBfyL{x?n] ;j{k|yd t ;To tYo kQf nufpg ;Sg' kb{5 . clgdfq To;sf] ;dfnf]rgfTds 9+un] dfkg (Critical Judgment) ug]{ sf]lzz ug{' kb{5 . ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] cWoog ubf{ ;dfnf]rgfsf] ;fy} p2]Zod"ns b[li6sf]0fn] cWoog ul/Psf] x'g' kb{5 .Æ% *= ;}}lgs Oltxf; tof/ ubf{ ;}lgs 1fg / l;Sg ;Sg] kf7x? bzf{pg] u/L tof/ ul/Psf] x'g' kb{5 . To;} k[i7e"dLdf ;}lgs Oltxf; tof/ ubf{ lgDg kIfx?sf] ;TotYosf] n]vfhf]vf ug]{ u/]sf] b]lvG5 M -s_ ;}lgs k]zfulto kIf Pp6f cgle1 JolQmnfO{ ljlzi6 snfn] kf/Ët agfpg] sfd k]zfut 1fgn] ub{5 . o;df lgk"0f{tf xfl;n ugf{n] åGå Joj:yfkg ug{ kf]Vt agfpFb5 / ;fy;fy} cfkmgf]\ ;:yf+ / l;Ëf] d'n'skltsf]| lhDd]jf/LkgnfO{ cfTd;fy ug{ ;Ifd agfpFb5 . t;y{, ;}lgs Oltxf;n] ljutsf ljleGg cj:yfsf k]zfut 1fgsf] ljsf; / o;sf] k|of]unfO{ ;lx ?kdf lrq0f ug{ ;Sg' kb{5 . -v_ hg]{nlzk pRr:t/Lo ;}lgs g]t[Tjsf] cg'kd ?k eg]s} hg]{nlzk xf] . o;df g]t[Tj ug{ ;Sg] Ifdtf / Joj:yfkg ug{ ;Sg] v'jLsf] ;ld>0f /x]sf] x'G5 . vf;u/L o'4sfnLg tof/L, ;'k/Lj]If0f, cfjZolso aGbf]a:tL kIfsf] lg/Gt/tfsf] ;'lglZrttfdf lge{/ ub{5 . ;}lgs Oltxf; ljutsf o'4df axfb'/L b]vfO{ pbfx/0fLo of]ubfg lbg ;kmn gfosx?sf] hg]{nlzknfO{ k|:t't ug{ ;kmn x'g' kb{5 . c;kmn pbfx/0fx? klg kf7 l;Sgsf] nflu cWoogsf] ljifo eg] aGg ;Sb5g\ . -u_ /0fgLlt d'n'ssf] /fli6«o ;'/Iff;Fu hf]l8Psf r'gf}tLx? lg/fs/0f ug]{ tof/Lsf] ;fy} ;+efljt ;}lgs sfjf{xLsf] /0fgLltnfO{ ;lx k|of]usf b[i6fGtx? ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] cWoogsf nflu dxTjk"0f{ ljifo x'g ;Sb5g\ . o;df vf; u/L /fli6«o /0fgLlt (Grand Strategy) tyf ;}lgs /0fgLlt (Military Strategy) x? ;do, sfn tyf kl/l:yltdf k|of]u / ljsf;nfO{ ;}lgs Oltxf;n] ;d]6\g ;s]sf] x'g' kb{5 . -3_ o'4snf o'4snfsf] ;kmn k|of]u÷c;kmn k|of]u, o;sf] cj:yf / ljsf;sf] n]vfhf]vf ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] dxTjk"0f{ kIf x'g\ . s'g} klg ;}lgs cleofg ;kmn x'gdf o'4snfsf] 7"nf] e"ldsf /x]sf] x'G5 . o'4snfsf] j:t'ut tyf Jojxfl/s kIfnfO{ ljleGg kl/l:ylt tyf :yfg ljz]ifsf] nflu ;'xfpFbf]?kdf k|:t't ePsf] jf x'g g;s]sf] tYon] ;}lgs Oltxf;df dxTjk"0f{ :yfg cf]u6\g] s'/fdf s'g} z+sf x'Fb}g .

% ln8]n xf6{, x\jfO{ 8f]G6 lj ng{ k|md lx:6«L, k[i7 !%

118 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

-ª_ aGbf]a:tL s'g} klg o'4sf] tof/Lsf] ;Gbe{df xf];\ jf o'4sfndf g} lsg gxf];, aGbf]j:tL kIfsf] oyfy{ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] nflu dxTjk"0f{ kIfsf] ?kdf /x]sf] x'G5 . lsgls, ;lx aGbf]a:tL tyf To;sf] lg/Gt/tfdf g} ;}lgs sfjf{xLsf] ;kmntf lge{/ x'G5 . -r_ k|ljlw ;]gfdf k|ljlw eGgfn] o'4sfnLg cj:yfsf] dfu k"/f u/fpg cfjZos k|ljlw eg]/ a'em\g kg]{ x'G5 . h'g s'/f k|fljlws pkfo tyf k|fljlws ;fdu|Ldfq geO{ To;sf] ;lx / cfjZosLo k|of]u klg xf] . t;y{, o;sf] ;lx ?k k|:t't ug{ ;s]sf] cj:yfdf dfq ;}lgs Oltxf; aGbf]a:tL ljifodf pknlJwd"ns ;flat x'g ;Sb5 . -5_ /fhgLlts kIf b]zsf] /fhgLlts cj:yf / To;sf] ;]gfdf k|efj tyf o'4sfnLg cj:yfdf ePsf] ;sf/fTds jf gsf/fTds jftfj/0fsf] ljj]rgf ;}lgs b[li6sf]0fn] a8f] dxTj /fVg] xF'bf of] klg ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] Pp6f k|d'v cWoogsf] ljifo x'g ;Sb5 . -h_ ;fdflhs kIf ;fdflhs kIfsf] ;Gbe{df eGgkbf{ P]ltxfl;s sfnv08df dfgjLo kIfsf] e"ldsf, o;sf] k|efj / kl/0ftL xf] h;n] ;]gfsf] k|efjsfl/tfdf 7"nf] e"ldsf v]n]sf] x'G5 . To;}n] ;}lgs Oltxf; klg o; kIfdf cIf'00f /xg ;Sb}g . -em_ cfly{s kIf b]zsf] ;|f]t ;fwgx?sf] pTkfbsTj, ljt/0f tyf vkt ug{ ;Sg] Ifdtf ;b}j d'n'ssf] cfly{s ljifosf dxTjk"0f{ kIfsf ?kdf /x]sf] x'G5 . h;sf] glthfdf ;]gfsf] dfq xf]Og ls ;f] d'n'ssf] ;d]t ;kmntf clg c;kmntf lge{/ ub{5 . t;y{, xfdLn] of] hfGg h?/L x'G5 ls s'g} klg ;}lgs Oltxf; tof/ ubf{ Tof];+u ;DalGwt cfly{s ljifosf] jf:tljstf phfu/ x'g h?/L x'G5 . (= g]kfnsf Oltxf;sf/x?n] ljleGg sfnv08x?sf] dxTjk"0f{ 36gfs|d pknJw ;|f]tx?sf] cfwf/df ljj]rgf u/]/ Oltxf; tof/ kf/]sf] b]lvG5 . t/ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf/x?af6 k"/f ul/g' kg]{ bfloTj eg] cem} ck'/f] cj:yfdf /x]sf] 5 . w]/} o:tf ;}lgs dxTjsf] P]ltxfl;s tYox? Oltxf;s} uj{df n's]/ /x]sf] 5 . !)= g]kfnsf] Oltxf;df hg]{nlzksf wgL JolQmTjx?sf] sdL 5}g . k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] hg]{nlzk pgs} ;dsIfL cd]l/sfsf hh{ jf;LË6g / k|lzofsf k|m]l8«s lb u|]6sf] hg]{nlzk;Fu bfFh]/ x]g{ ;lsG5 . Oltxf;sf/ jfnrGb| zdf{sf] egfO{df æk[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] ;Dk"0f{ hLjg o'4 / ljhosf] aLr g} laTof] . pgL :jo+ ;fx;L of]4f lyP . cfkm\gf] ;dosf clwsf+z dxTjk"0f{ / lg0f{ofTds o'4df pgL :jod o'4—If]qdf pkl:yt lyP . o'4—If]qsf] vt/f pgnfO{ lk|o lyof] . pgsf] b[li6df jL/tfsf] 7"nf] cfb/ lyof] — rfx] Tof] cfkm\gf dflg;df xf];\ rfx] zq'df .Æ^ o;af6 k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxdf hg]{nlzksf] cg'kd pbfx/0f ePsf] b]lvG5 t/ o;nfO{ phfu/ ug]{ ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] xfdLsxFf sdL 5 . hals hh{ jf;LË6g / k|m]l8«s lb u|]6sf] ;Gbe{df ;f]xL cj:yfdf cfkm}+åf/f jf cflwsfl/s ;}lgs Oltxf;sf/x?åf/f tof/ kfl/Psf k':tsx? k|z:t ePsf] kfOG5 . axfb'/ zfx, aneb| s'Fj/, cd/ l;+x yfkf, elQm yfkf, lzj/fdl;+x yfkf, aVtfj/ l;+x yfkf, sfn' kfF8], bfdf]b/ kfF8,] jL/eb| ;fksf]6f h:tf cgluGtL ;}lgs jL/ of]4fx?sf] jL/tfsf] ufyf s'g} ljb]zL hg]{nx?sf]eGbf sd 5}g . !!= g]kfnsf] Oltxf;df g t P]ltxfl;s ;}lgs cleofgx?sf] sdL 5 g t ;}lgs jL/ of]4fx? g} . ;}lgs o'4snf tyf /0fgLltx?sf] ;kmn k|of]un] g} g]kfnsf] cl:tTj hf]lug ;s]sf] jf:tljstf g} cfhsf] l;Ëf], ;fj{ef}d g]kfn xf] . t/, o;sf] uf}/jdo Oltxf;nfO{ ;}lgs cGbfhdf ;lx tl/sfn] phfu/ x'g g;s]sf] sf/0f g} cf]em]ndf k/]sf] x'g ;Sg] cg'dfg nufpg ;lsG5 . !@= cfw'lgs jt{dfg o'udf Oltxf;sf] dxTj g/fVg] ;f]rsf] klg ljsf; ePsf] b]lvG5 . Oltxf;nfO{ ;f]xL a]nfsf] gh/af6 gx]/L jt{dfg ;f]raf6 x]bf{ c;fGble{s tyf cJojxfl/s nfUg'sf] ;fy} ck|hftflGqs Pjd\ cdfgjLo ePsf]

^ zdf{, jfnrGb, k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] JolQmTj / dxTj, g]kfnsf] P]ltxfl;s ?k/]vf, t]>f] ;+:s/0f, jf/0ff;L, s[i0f s'df/L b]jL, la=;+= @)##, k[i7 @## .

119 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf eGb} lt/:s[t gh/af6 x]/]/ sd dxTj lbPsf] klg b]lvG5 . cfw'lgs ;}lgs g]t[Tjdf k'/ftg z}nLdf cfk"mnfO{ pEofpg grfxg] ;+:sf/ b]lvg' klg goFf s'/f xf]Og . t/ ljsf;sf] s|d, 1fgsf] cfwf/ tyf k|ult ;a} Oltxf;b]lv g} s|lds ljsf; eP/ cfPsf] / cem} xfd|f] o'4snf tyf 8S6«Lg klg P]ltxfl;s cg'ejs} hudf plePsf] s'/f xfdLn] la;{g ;Sb}gf}+ . !#= ;lx t/Lsfsf] ;}lgs Oltxf;sf] cWoog u/]sf] cj:yfdf To;af6 jt{dfg cj:yfsf ;d;fdlos ;d:ofsf] nflu dxTjk"0f{ b[li6sf]0fx? xfl;n ug{ ;lsG5 . h;n] ubf{ clxn]s} ;dodf klg ldNbf]h'Nbf] kl/l:yltdf of]hgf tyf sfof{Gjog ug{ ;xh x'g hfG5 . ;}lgs Oltxf;n] ;sf/fTds tyf gsf/fTds b'j} kIfnfO{ k|:t't ug{ ;Sg' kb{5 . tf ls c;kmn kIfsf] cg'z/0f gu/L ;kmn kIfsf] k|of]uaf6 efjL lkF9Ln] kmfObf p7fpg ;Sb5g\ . x'g t Oltxf; Pp6f dfu{ bz{gdfq xf] To;sf ;sn kIfnfO{ jt{dfg cj:yfdf x'jx' gSsn u/]/ ;kmn cjZo klg x'g ;ls+b}g . Oltxf;nfO{ ;dofg's"n?kdf kl/dflh{t?kdf ljsl;t kl/j]z;Fu d]n vfg] u/L k|of]u x'g h?/L x'G5 gq c;fGble{s aGg k'uL c;kmn x'g] 8/ a9L x'g hfg ;Sb5 . h] xf];\ g]kfnsf] uf}/jdo ;}lgs Oltxf; ;lx?kdf lnlka4 ePsf] cj:yfdf g]kfnsf] nfludfq geO{ ljZjsf] cGo d'n'ssf cWoogstf{sf] nflu;d]t dxTjk"0f{ ljifo ;flat x'g hfg] lglZrt 5 . ;Gbe{ ;fdu|L != cfrfo{, o1/fh, g]kfnsf] ;+lIfKt Oltxf;, sf7df08f}+, Pstf a'S;, @)%! . @= Sofg6f]/, gf]d{g / :gfO{8/ l/r8{, xfp 6' :68L lx:6«L, Go'of]s{, yf]d; s|f]j]n, !(^& . #= h];k hf]g h'lgo/ / SjfSn] /f]a6{, P ufO{8 6' :68L P08 o'h ldnL6/L lx:6«L, jf;LË6g, ;]G6/ ckm ldnL6/L lx:6«L, !(** . $= d'hdbf/ cf/=s] / >Le:tf P=Pg, lx:6f]l/of]u|fkmL, 5}6f}+ ;+:s/0f, lbNnL, ;'/lht a's l8kf], @))! . %= /fO{6, 8fgLon, lx:6« ckm g]kfn, gofF lbNnL, ?kf P08 sDkgL, !*&& . ^= xf6{, ln8n, :6«of6]hL, Go'of]s{, k|]ou/ kJnL;/ OGs, !(&$ . &= zdf{, jfnrGb, k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf] JolQmTj / dxTj, g]kfnsf] P]ltxfl;s ?k/]vf, t];|f] ;+:s/0f, jf/0ff;L, s[i0f s'df/L b]jL, lj=;+= @)## . *= XofldN6g, kmfG;| L; a'sfgg,\ Pg Psfp06 ckm b ls+Ë8d ckm g]kfn, gof F lbNnL, ?kf P08 sDkgL, @))& . (= Oef]No';g ckm ldln6/L jf/km]o/,n]egcf]y{, o'=o;=cfdL{ l;=hL=o;=;L= !(&& .

l;+uf] /fi6«n] b'Mv kfpg' eGbf Pp6f JolQmn] si6 p7fpg' /fd|f] xf] .

— :jfdL ljj]sfgGb

120 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* National Army, Regime Change and the Question of Sovereign Monopoly

- Pitambar Bhandari

1. The decade of 1920's in which realism theory was dominant in the international relation and the interstate armed confl ict prior to 1990, have been replaced by the issues of individual security and the intrastate confl ict in this era after the establishment of various liberal institutions and ideological debates. Since the ancient period in the fi eld of political anthropology different systems of social control, access to power and the sources of legitimate domination are practiced. With the ultimate objective of control over the territory, expansionism for the assurance of essential commodities and power orientation, the formation and development of both political institutions and political communities led to the establishment of modern states and the nation-states. 2. Based upon the nature, desire and decisive cognitive factors of the leadership, innovative ideological debates introduced contesting the system of production & distribution of economic, social & cultural values, quest for power to exercise, the mounted position for the exertion of monopoly over the physical force, all gave birth to various ways to governing- democratic, fascism, communism, anarchy, dictatorship when constricted to the governing dimension. The ways of governing the human communities structured on the basis of backingof citizens/ subjectsand the survival of authority in support of external power are not observed to be consistent phenomena. Thus, creating different phases of governance within a single political territory termed as the 'Regime change'. In this paper, the military organization as an institution of the state and its dichotomous relationship with civilian authority during the situations of regime changes will be analyzed. 3. Considering democracy as a political regime, Dahl (1971) has emphasized competition referring to the expression of effective preferences about alternative policies at the national level & inclusiveness assuring the result of the participation in selecting national leaders as essential ingredients. The political regimes that do not meet the requirement of competition and inclusiveness as Non-democratic Regimes which is again divided by 'closed hegemonies', 'inclusive hegemonies' and 'competitive hegemonies'1. On the other hand, Doorenspleet (2006) has realized communist, fascists and nationalist Regimes, one-party systems, totalitarian dictatorship, authoritarian government and sultanistic regimes. 4. Regime change is the shift in one of the regimes from another as a technical neologism used by social scientists to signify the alteration of countries fundamental political institution.2 Refl ecting the trend of external infl uence and political zest Owen (2010) in 'The clash of ideas

1 Robert Dahl (1971)in his contribution Polyarchy: participation and opposition, states that Nondemocratic Regimes failing to meet the requirements of competition and inclusiveness as 'Closed hegemonies', those meeting only the inclusiveness as 'Inclusive hegemonies' and those failing to meet the requirement of inclusiveness as 'Competitive Oligarchies'. 2 J.M. Owen.(2010).The clash of ideas in world politics.New Jersy: Princeton University Press

121 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf in world politics' argue regime change as a political term and polarizing one since the verb 'change' has come to imply the coercion of outside powers, regime instability and great power wars being the triggering events in forcible regime promotions. The factors contributing for regime change range from the domestic turmoil to the international security interest including political, military cultural and economic factors all being the dimensions of national security. Development as a modern discourse, Dorenspleet (2006), concludes a positive relationship between development and the probability that a state makes a transition to democracy3. But the New modernization theory encompasses Human Development Index and external infl uenceas additionalfactors, besides economic development and explores the signifi cance of democratic diffusion, in the regime changes4. 5. Under the radical dependency theory of Frank, the middle classes and the military benefi t from the model of associated dependent development and they protect the existing economic and political situation. In this situation, the regime is non-democratic and its mode of organization is military bureaucratic5. 6. Guillermo O'Donnel (1979) taking the instances of several Latin American States, Argentina, Brazil & Uruguay during the 1960s turned to non-democratic regimes emphasized that the dependency created pressure towards non-democratic rule and the regimes as bureaucratic authoritarian, as a product of economic & political crises. Boniface (2004) has identifi ed dictatorship, WMD proliferation, genocide or state sponsored or condoned terrorism as the scenarios where regime change has been considered in the last fi fteen years. National Army: Institution and Profession 7. National army as an instrument for the accessibleauthority of legitimate monopoly over the use of physical force has varying roles with the motive of broader notion of peace ranging from domestic security to the international peace and security with the chained form of organization. National security priority, safeguarding the vital national interests and meeting the challenges of new security threats emerged at the advent of modernity along with the management of national economy and extended government services to all citizens demand the involvement of military organization6. 8. In Realism, the central dialect of military profession is refl ected as on one hand military profession rests in its notions of duty, honor, and country committed to the ultimate sacrifi ce and prepared to give one's life for the state, state being the sole client. On the other hand, the primary purpose is to win wars. The profession constraint, as argued by Sarkesian,Williams and Cimbala (2008) exist as 'military cannot publicly or formally engage in political partnership

3 There is an indirect relationship between development and the probability that a state makes a transition to democracy, with class structure being the intervening variable, development increases the size of the middle class, and the middle class increases the probability that a state undergoes a transition to democracy as concluded by Doorenspleet. 4 RenskeDoorespleet,( 2006), concludes the direct positive infl uence of democratic neighbors on the probability that a state becomes democratic. A nondemocratic regime surrounded by democratic neighbor will be more likely to make a transition to democracy than a nondemocratic regime surrounded by nondemocratic neighbors. 5 RenskeDoorespleet.(2006).Democratic Transitions. New Delhi: Viva Books. 6 Thomas C. Brunean and Scott D. Tollefson,(2006) , In Who Guards the Guardians and How have noted U.S. Army having a considerable role in setting American west and deciding infrastructure during the nineteenth century.

122 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* to secure better wages, conditions of employment or operational commitments. It must comply with policy and decision of civilian offi cials even if it does not agree with them7. Huntington has expressed the notion of subjective & objective civilian control of the military8, the subjective being loyal to the individual leader and objective respecting and maintaining the professionalism. Some authors even argue that the military profession cannot function "as a silent order of monks"9and 'The military profession must adopt the doctrine of constructive political engagement, framing and building a judicious and artful involvement in the policy arena"10. 9. Shemella, (2006) have identifi ed the roles of military operating both at macro & micro levels11. Fenema P.C. (2010) focuses the contribution of military organization in the response of national crises resulting from natural disasters and or manmade disasters or non-notice events such as the terrorist act. Regarding the goal oriented rationality in the case of involvement of military in the regime change, Boniface (2004) opines that military action to change regime must be implemented with a minimum of force and have a reasonable chance of attaining its goals. Indicating the case of Iraq, he argues, although disarmament could have been perceived to be possible through diplomatic means, regime change - to liberate Iraqi people from an oppressive dictator and a stifl ing economic & social structure was a more effi cient way to settle war to a reluctant international audience, justifying the military involvement in Iraq war. The phases of Regime Change & Military Role 10. The regional upheavals and the system of governance in reference to the specifi c interval of time calibrated by the world's great incidents provide the ground for identifying the phases of the regimes. As Owen (2010) in 'The Clash of the Ideas in politics' clearly put it: "Three long waves of forcible regime promotion is depicted, and these roughly correspond to three long transnational contest over the best regime. The fi rst wave took place in Central and Western Europe between the 1520s and early eighteenth century and pitted established Catholicism against various forms of Protestantism. The second took place in Europe and the Americas between the 1770s and late nineteenth century; the regimes in questions were republicanism, constitutional monarchy, and absolute monarchy. The third took place over most of the world between the late 1910s and 1980s, and the antagonists were, communism, liberalism and (Until 1945) fascism. Today, a fourth struggle runs through the Muslim world, a struggle pitting secularism against various forms of Islamism. It is that struggle that helped Bush administration into using force in Iraq and Afghanistan."

7 Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams and Stephen J. Cimbala. (2008). US National Security.New Delhi: Viva Books 8 Samuel P. Huntington.(1957).The soldier and The State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 9 Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor .(2006).The US Military Professional into the 21st Century: War, Peace and politics. New York: Routledge. 10 Sam C.Sakesian, John Allen Williams, and Fred B.Bryant.(1995). Soldiers, Society and national Security.Boulder: LynneRienner publishers 11 Paul Shemella(2006) in Thoms C. Bruneau and Scott. D Tollefson edited'Who Guards the Guardians and How,' justify collective armed forces and relative to nonmilitary instruments so governmental power as macro roles and micro roles determines national security organizations will be used relative to one another. 123 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

11. Doorenspleet (2006) considering the democracy as the major variable has explored the six temporal phases of regime change with the demarcation of each phase as wave: Table: 1. Waves of Democratization in reference to Regime Change Time Phases /Waves Major changes period Australia, Canada, Denmark, Poland, New Zealand 1893-1924 First Wave of democratization introduced democratic political system. First Reverse Wave (the Rise of ideologies of communism and Democratic institutions in Poland, Latvia, and 1924-1944 fascism and Regime changes to Estonia overthrown by military coups. authoritarianism) Second Wave of Democratization (Installation of democratic Latin American States of Costa Rica, Chile and 1944-1957 institutions in west Germany Uruguay adopted democratic system , Japan and Finland by allied power in world war II) Chilean democracy overthrown by a military group Intermezzo(No consolidation led in 1973 by General Augusto Pinochet followed of second reverse wave and no by seventeen years repressive rule by a rightist 1957-1976 clear group of transitions from military regime; military coup ended democracy democratic to non-democratic in Uruguay in 1973; A military coup toppled the regimes) government in Argentina in 1976. Military withdrawal and elections in 1979 produced 1976-1989 Third wave of democratization a civilian government in Ecuador; Civilian president was elected in Peru in 1980. Hungary moved to democracy in 1990. In 1990s, Emergence of more than dozen democracies in 1989-2001 Fourth wave of democratization Africa, but eighteen transitions back to nondemocratic regimes including military coup in Gambia in 1994. Nepal, towards democracy in 1990 Source: Compiled based on Doorenspleet(2006) and Huntington (1957) 12. In, South Asia, Pakistan, few years after its formation, experienced the regime change and the ripple effect exists till today. In 1958, IskandarMirza introduced martial Law in the country dissolving assemblies. Due to the general election followed by bloody civil war in 1970 and the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. The military was discredited and Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto with democratic features came into power. 13. The Middle East that seemed immune to change and the fourth democratic wave did not engulfIraq, Iran, Kuwait and Libya, has experienced a great debacle in the year2011.The professional duty of unifi ed army in the cases of regime change is appreciated if the army is 'in the regime' but not 'of the regime' as the armies of Tunisia and Egypt in the Arab Uprising of 2011. Objecting the politico-economic motive behind the military quest for power, Shasank Joshi, an associate in Royal United Service Institute in London, says-"it's impossible to predict how an army will react in a revolutionary situation based on its role in the economy. Money alone might not be enough motivation to dump a ruler; Tunisia's army did not have a large independent stake in the economy.12

12 See, "want regime Change? Win over the Military" by Alan Greenblatt 2011, available at www.npr.org.

124 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

Regime Changes in Nepal 14. State is not a constant phenomenon but is ready to accept potential challenges at any time. Social integration and creation of disruptive force, construction of new identities and contradictions, frictions, confl ict are experienced in the history of the state formation process followed by political transitions. 15. During the period of 1769 to 1951, Monarchy and Rana Regime prevailed in Nepal, with now and then contradictions in acquiring the legitimate authorities, the period ranging from prior to the fi rst wave of democratization to the just before the emergence of second wave of democratization. The internal tension within the monarch as an institution was evident after 1816, and the 'very power of monarchy as a military leader had been curbed'13 and RanaFamily became the hereditary prime ministers and de facto head of the state. Control over the military, religious sanction to support military oligarchy through caste system, contiguity to the British- Indian authority, were the important factors for the survivals of Rana Regime which ended in 1951 due to elite rebellion, military support and a compromise between monarchy and the emerging political apparatus14. 16. In the transition from democracy to Panchayat regime the national army as a source of political power was again the opportunity instrument for King Mahendra who took the advantage over Congress Regime15. 17. The rise of parliamentary democracy in opposition to thePanchayatSystem in 1990, has an international infl uence during which the upsurge in Philippines to topple Marcos in 1986, death of Zia UlHaq in Pakistan, and struggle against General Ershad were the major incidents that fostered the concept of democratic diffusion beside the peoples quest for civil, political and socio-economic rights. 18. Many argue that the supremacy of king over the control of army as supreme commander in chief, fuelled rise of absolute monarchy after the Royal coup of 1st February 2005. But after 1990's the rise of political violence (Especially after the launch of armed confl ict by CPN (Maoist) in February, 1996) and legitimacy gap were deepening, which became the conducive environment for the royal coup. 19. The comprehensive Peace Accord signed between the government of Nepal and CPN (Maoist) in Nov 21, 2006, institutionalized the transitional phase towards Federal Republic of Nepal, with the series of events - April movement in 2005, suspension of the Monarch by the reinstated parliament and the declaration of end of monarchy by the fi rst meeting of constituent assembly in June 2008. During these periods, however wide and skeptically anticipated suspect of the use of military force for the atrocities were limited. 20. After the declaration of Federal Republic, in the transitional phase, Nepal experienced a huge change in all the sectors, however, religious disharmony, ethnic resentment, rise of regional sentiments, political criminalization of youths, rise of impunity,degrading confi dence

13 AliRiaz and SubhoBasu.(2010).Paradize Lost? New Delhi: Adarsha Books. 14 Regarding the military role in the regime change in 1951 in Nepal, Ali Riaz and SubhoBasu in 'Paradise Lost? (2010)'state "military confrontations sparked off political uprising in hills. Political toll took its toll on the army. Local commanders opposed the government moves.A series of regions slipped out of government control.Low level military offi cials resigned their commissions in the protest and troops were beginning to surrender to the rebels." 15 Nepali Congress secured 74 seats out of 109- member parliament in the parliamentary election of 1959 and led the government.

125 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf of peoples towards the political institutions all of which are the national security threats are the exposed challenges for the national stability. In this very time the professional national army, (changed from Royal Nepal Army to Nepal Army now) has experienced the great institutional shock due to the political interference, especially after the CPN (Maoist) led the government. The attempt of the Prime ministerPushpa Kamal Dahal, to dismiss army chief RukmagatKatuwal in 2009, became the historic incident in the 'Pseudo-Civilian control'16 in the history of regime changes since scholars often focus the role of military as an actor, but in this case military as the 'sufferer'. 21. The Nepal Army, passing through the critical situation in the post confl ict transition phase, has a long history which was massively restructured in 1955, after the political transformation of 1950, brought the change in the system of control, mobilization and management of Nepal army17. The reinstated parliament replaced the army act 1959, with New Army Act 2006 which has provisioned the army to be controlled, mobilized and managed under the representatives of the people. 22. The regime change is followed by the replacement of one established legitimate authority and always the replacing one possessesthe quest to get the legitimacy. On the Weberian concept of authority the sovereign authority rests upon the three major grounds 1) the traditional, resting on belief in the sanctity of custom and inheritance, 2) based on the charismatic principles, resting on devotion to the heroic leader or 3) it can be based on rational grounds, resting on a belief in the authorities of those who have risen to power through tested competence18. In the Nepalese Context, all the legitimizing ways are found to be practiced with military the consistent force not a constant just as a technical instrument but rather a techno-political body. It's not the base of legitimizing authority that triggered the replacement of one regime since the sovereign monopoly is valid. And at each time the role and duty of national army became to obey the order of legitimate authority based on the Webarian authority. Moreover, the authorities share the common socio-political pool including the security tools of the state such as military. 23. The notion of sovereign states emerged in the mid fourteenth century followed by the assumption on the equality of every state after a hundred years of time, now, has become a question of preference due to the military, economic, political and cultural dimensions of globalism. And, also the state affairs prioritized for human security play the crucial role. The military occupation in the cold war era, compelled to pursue the interest of polarizing powers, indulged in the promotion of regime changes in the satellite countries posing the question to the sovereign monopoly. After the end of cold war, a number of underdeveloped countries experienced civil strife, creating a challenging environment for the national armies, to combat the rise of internal instability-either to back the ruler manipulating the sovereign monopoly or to support the various interest groups opposing the established regime.In these two dimensions, National Army, confessing sovereign monopoly as a moral power, especially in the weak states, is often expected to be the keen observer and professional actor during the period of regime changes for the consolidation of civil-military relation.

16 since, CPN (Moist) as a political party with its simple majority in the constituent assembly held maoist combatants as its own "Maoist Army" while Pushma Kamal Dahal, Maoist Supremo, was elected as prime minister of Nepal, the situation can be compared to the gray zone somewhere in between the subjective and objective control of Huntington. 17 NarahariAcharya.(2009)."The Nepalese Army". In Bishnusapkota (ed.), The Nepal Security Sector: An Almanac. Hungary: Brambeur. 18 Max Weber. (1947)"The Theory of Social and Economic organization", Talcott Parson (ed,), A.M. Hendersor and Talcott Parsons (trans.). Free Press, Glencor, III

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References 1. Acharya, N. (2009). "The Nepalese Army". In Bishnusapkota (ed.), The Nepal Security Sector: An almanac. Hungary: Brambuer. 2. Boniface, P.(2004). "What Justifi es Regime Change?" In Alexander T J Lennon and Camille Eiss (eds.), Reshaping Rouge States. London: The MIT Press. 3. Dahl, R. A.(1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Oppposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Doorenspleet, R.(2006). Democratic Transitions. New Delhi: Viva Books. 5. Fenema, P.C.(2010). "Military organizations and National Crisis Response." In Joseph Soeters, Paul C. van Fenema and Robert Beeres (eds.), Managing Military organizations. New York: Routledge. 6. Greenblatt, A.(2011). "Want Regime Change? Win Over the Military".Available at www.npr.org. 7. Huntington, S.(1957). The Soldier and The State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 8. Murray, W. (2011). War Strategy and Military Effectiveness. New York: Cambridge University press. 9. O' Donnel. (1979). Modernization and Bureacratic-Authoritarianism-Studies in the South American Politics.Berkely: Institute of International Studies, University of California. 10. Owen, J.M.(2010). The Clash of Ideas in World Politics. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 11. Poud, E.(2006). End Game in the Balkans. Washington: the Brookings Institution. 12. Rawal, P.(2011)."Upholding Civil Military Relation: An analytical Study in Nepalese Context," M.A. Dissertation, Tribhuvan University Nepal. 13. Riaz, A. and Basu, S.(2010). Paradise Lost?New Delhi: Adarsha Books. 14. Sarkesian, Williams and Cimbala.(2008). US National Security. New Delhi: Viva Books. 15. Shemella, P. (2006). "The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces."In Thomas C. Bruneau and S.D. Tollefson (eds.), Who Guards the Guardians and How. Austin: University of Texas Press. 16. Uprety, B.R. and Vanhoutte, P. (2009). "Security Sector Reform in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunuties." In Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), Security sector Reform in Challenging Environments. USA: Transaction Publishers. 17. Williams, W.C.andPiotrowsky, H. (2009). The World since 1945. New Delhi: Viva books.

“It is fatal to enter a war without the will to win it.”

- General Douglas MacArthur

127 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf Mahashivaratri

- Kumari Dikshya Gurung Shree Maa-Guru Naari Samuha "Janani Nanma Bhumishcha Swarga Dapi Gari Yashi" 1. The Motherland is better than even Heaven confi rms Bhagwan Ramchandra, and Nepal being our motherland we defi nitely think it is better than the Heaven. Loving one's motherland isn't enough, it doesn't clear the debt owed to her by an individual. Once an individual is born he or she breathes the air, drinks the water and eats the food grown in its soil thus this debt towards the motherland has to be cleared before one's death. 2. One sure way of clearing the debt to the motherland is reciting the following shloka at least once a day, "Om Mahitale Dushkritaam Raasthra Mewa Rakshaka Chhaya Namaha". It means protect the Nation from the evil and bad thoughts. This solely doesn't apply to Nepal but to other countries also. Nepal is a land of many temples, stupas, customs, culture, traditions and many festivals of both Hindus and Buddhists. Nepal is renowned over the world by Mount Everest, the brave Gurkhas, birthplace of Lord Buddha and of course Shre Pashupatinath. Pashupatinath is the temple of Lord Shiva, the Destroyer of evil and the protector of good. Maha Shivaratri the day of birth of Lord Shiva is one of the main festivals of the year. 3. Pashupatinath the temple of Lord Shiva is one of the four holiest shrines for the millions of Hindus in the world, Many Hindus visit Pashupatinath during Maha Shivaratri. Pashupatinath is considered as the Head and Kedarnath as the lower potation of the body. And rightfully the Nepali Army celebrates Maha Shivaratri as the Army day by holding a parade of conducting fue-de-joi at Tundikhel, centre of Kathmandu. 4. Lord Shiva, one of the triumvirates of the Hindus was worshipped in these areas even before the advent of the Hindus in the region. He was worshipped by the locals as the God of the Animals. And now all the Nepalese and the Hindus believe that Lord Shiva is the destructor and he specially destroys all the evil, hatred, jealousy, anger etc from the society and from the person as well. People set fi re to logs hoping to wipe off the evil in them as DHUNI and celebrate Lord Shiva's birthday whole night. 5. Nepal is defi nitely a land of many temples, culture and festivals. Festivals of other religions too are celebrated along with the Hindus and their shrines are placed side by side without any confl ict. The Buddhists visit Hindu temples and the Hindus too light lamps at the Buddhist monasteries. All the important temples of Nepal are represented within the premises of Pashupatinath Temple which is located at the bank of river Bagmati near the international Airport of Kathmandu, the Capital of Nepal. 6. The Shiva Linga of Pashupatinath has fi ve faces representing the fi ve elements constituting this universe. The Southern face known as Aghor face of Guru-Mukh is also decorated as Lord Buddha and the Buddhists worship it once a year. Unfortunately our society is changing so much that the newer generation is slowly forgetting old customs, culture and

128 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* traditions. Nepalese are forgetting the meaning of Ekadashi, Aunshi and even Satya Narayan Puja. So much so that even making of Selroti is being forgotten. And Panch Bali is fast disappearing to the delight of the animal lovers. 7. Culture, customs, traditions etc are the identity of any nation. And the Nepali Army is not only preserving the sovereignty, independence and integrity of the nation but also preserve its traditions, culture and customs. Kaalratri is fast disappearing from the society but is followed strictly by the military. Satya Narayan Puja and Ekadashi are strictly observed by the Army. 8. Dashain and Maha-Shivaratri are two important festivals of the millions of Nepalese and the Nepalese Army celebrates both in a big way. Maha-Shivaratri is celebrated as the day of birth of Lora Shiva and he is considered as the preserver of the faith and the destroyer of all evils. Similarly the Nepalese Army is considered as the preserver of the independence of the nation and its culture and customs too. 9. Thus it seems just appropriate that the Nepalese Army adopt Maha-Shivaratri as the Army Day and celebrate it in a big way. Along with preserving the sovereignty, integrity and the independence of the nation the army is also the protector of traditions, customs and the culture of the country. And the reciting of the above shloka will also defi nitely help in making the motherland a heaven.

“The art of concentrating strength at one point, forcing a breakthrough, rolling up and securing the fl anks on either side, and then penetrating like lightning deep into his rear, before the enemy has time to react.”

- FM Erwin Rommel

129 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel (1891–1944)

- Maj Pawan Khatri Introduction

1. Rommel stands out amongst the World War II generals as a tremendous personality, possibly the greatest of them all. Sir Winston Churchill while paying tributes to him in the house of common at the beginning of disastrous moments of 1942 said, “We have a very daring sharp opponent against us in Africa and may I say, across the havoc of war, a great general”. Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, in his book on the German Generals of World War -II, says, “They were the best fi nished products of their profession anywhere. They could have been better if their outlook had been wider and their understanding deeper. But if they have had become philosophers they would have ceased to be soldiers”. These words of Sir Basil Liddell-Hart in which he opines about them as “excellent products of their profession”, and at the same time lacking wisdom, are understandable. The problem with German generals, of lacking wider horizons does not stem from any absence of mental ability or inadequate education, but far more than from their training in accordance with certain traditions and conditions prevailing at that time in Germany. The great Rommel can be termed, one out of many, an exception that was marvelous warrior and man of vision. But at the same time, the aftermath of the wars, he fought challenges both his being “excellent product of profession” and possessing wider horizon.

2. Prevalent Environment of the Era (Military and Political Aspects) Great Wars. The era primarily witnessed mass transformation of both tactical and technical. Transition to third generation of warfare was hallmark of the era. Trench warfare was replaced by maneuver warfare. Greater emphasis was laid on the combine employment of various echelon i.e. tanks, arty and air etc.

3. Contributions to the Art of War (a) Blitzkrieg, (German, "lightning war") An anglicized word describing all- mechanize force concentration of tanks, infantry, arty and air power, concentrating overwhelming force and rapid speed to break through enemies lines, and once the latter is broken, proceeding without regard to its fl ank. (b) ‘Attack’ by Erwin Rommel. (c) ‘The Rommel Papers’ (Da Capo Paperback) by Erwin Rommel. 4. Displayed Leadership Attributes and Skills His sense of valor and chivalry were the stuff of King Arthur's knights, but it was his "boldness, use of surprise, readiness to accept risks" and above all his "intuitive sense of the Battle fi eld" that made Rommel one of the greatest generals in military history. "Brilliantly successful in attack and remarkably resourceful in defense, "the" Desert Fox raced his armies through France in 1940 and then repeatedly outwitted the British in North Africa.

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5. Decisive Military Achievements or Failures (a) World War I (i) First Battle of the Argonne (1915) (ii) Carpathian Offensive (1915) (iii) Battle of Caporetto (1917) (b) World War II (i) Fall of France (ii) Battle of Arras (1940) (iii) North African Campaign (aa) Siege of Tobruk (1941) (ab) Operation Crusader (1941) (ac) Battle of Gazala (1942) (ad) Battle of Bir Hakeim (1942) (ae) First Battle of El Alamein (1942) (af) Battle of Alam Halfa (1942) (ag) Second Battle of El Alamein (1942) (ah) Battle of Medenine (1943) (iv) Battle of the Kasserine Pass (1943) (iv) Battle of Normandy (1944) 6. Signifi cant Strengths and Weaknesses of Personality (a) Chivalrous A man’s action and omissions spring fi rst and foremost from his char and to a lesser degree, from his origins, his upbringing, and his training. Rommel, who belonged to a middle class family which had no military background and at the same time no military aspirations. The way he fought battles starting from his early military life till his death is full of such events where he exhibited symptoms of gallantry. As a platoon Commander in 1914, he assaulted twenty French troops with three persons from his platoon, which he found barring their way. He was repulsed, but this instant reaction to fi nding himself in the tight corner was one, which he demonstrated time and again. The campaigns thereafter are full of examples with his being brave. Some of the examples are: - (i) World War-1 Battle of Caporetto ‘Pour le Merite’. (ii) World War-II French Campaign –1940. (iii) Battle of Gazala. (v) Retreat of German Army from Al-Alemin.

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(b) Enjoyed Zealous Cooperation from his Under command The “perfect fi ghting animal” described by Desmoned Young in his biography, enjoyed a willing execution of his orders from his subordinates. He was not at all a Commander who due to some reconciliation on professional matters would earn the repute. Basic reason why he enjoyed willing cooperation was his being always with his troops and that too in front. Although there were occasions when he was away from the front, when his troops were fi ghting (celebrating marriage anniversary with his wife in Italy). Another reason is that he used to take same food as his troops. Even a great critic Wolf Heckman acknowledged in his preface to book ‘Rommel’s War in Africa’ writes “certainly, he had unusual qualities, from personal courage and toughness to a gift for inspiring utterly spent troops to perform unbelievable feats, (But that was not the whole Rommel)”. Even in his own article on the rules of Desert Warfare writes “The Commander -in-chief must have contact with his troops. He must be able to feed and think with them. The soldier must have confi dence in him. In this connection there is one cardinal principle to remember: one must never simulate a feeling for the troops which in fact one does not have. The ordinary soldier has a surprisingly good nose for what is genuine and what is fake”. At another place Liddle Hart writes, “Exasperating to his Staff Offi cers, he was worshipped by his fi ghting troops”. (c) Loyalty Here I will not pronounce that he was loyal to objective every time ordained by his superior, but if I say that what so ever he conceived to be true, pursued very vividly without any hesitation. He himself writes in his paper ‘the Rules of Desert Warfare’ that “Normally, there is no ideal solution to military problem, every course has its advantages and disadvantages. One must select that which seems best from the most varied aspects and then pursue it resolutely and accept the consequences. Any compromise is bad”. North African campaign is full of such examples such as: - (i) Offensive 1941. (ii) Advance after capture of Tobruk. (d) Sincerity to German Cause He was always, very sincere to Germany, his Fatherland. He always had the national objective in mind and acted to his best ability. His plan to cross Suez and through Persia reach Soviet Union can be termed as sincerity towards German nation. His wisdom, ambitions can be questioned but sincerity to country cannot. He chose, Germany against his master i.e. Hitler, when he came to know that Hitler’s ambitions and Planning will end up in harming the Germany instead of benefi ting, due to this he had to commit suicide and forced to do that. Liddle Hart in his book the German generals talk in chapter ‘Soldier in the Sun’ writes, “when Rommel came to see that Hitler’s survival and Germany’s survival were in compatible he put his country fi rst and turned against his Pattern”. (e) How Enemy Viewed Him Letter of Gen Auchinleck to his subordinate commanders is an evident, of what type of general, Rommel was: - To: All Commanders and Chiefs of Staff From: Headquarter, British Troops in Egypt and Middle East, Force. There exists a real danger that our friend Rommel is becoming a kind of magician or bogeyman to our troops, who are talking far too much about him. He is by no means

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a superman, although he is undoubtedly very energetic and able. Even if he were a superman, it would still be highly undesirable that our men should not credit him with supernatural powers. I wish you to dispel by all possible means the idea that Rommel represents something more than an ordinary German general. The important thing now is to see it that we do not always talk of Rommel when we mean the enemy in Libya we must refer to “the German” or “the axis powers” or “the enemy” and not always keep harping on Rommel. Please ensure that this order is put into immediate effect, and impress upon all commanders that, from a psychological point of view, it is a matter of the highest importance. 7. Relevance of Concepts/Principles/Techniques of Warfare in Current Environment Blitzkrieg is still relevant and was adopted by many countries. For instance, India had adopted Blitzkrieg as the main strategy for fi ghting a conventional war with Pakistan before they introduced strategy of Pro-Active Operation (PAO). In short Rommel's boldness and aggressive attitude regarding the trait(s) of personality that still inspire the present soldiers. References 1. Wikipedia. 2. Encyclopedia Encarta. 3. Encyclopedia Britannica 4. Fraser, David (1994). Knight's Cross: A Life of FM Erwin Rommel. New York, NY: HarperCollins. ISBN 0-06-092597-3. 5. Lewin, Ronald (1998) [1968]. Rommel as Mil Comd. New York: B&N Books. ISBN 0- 7607-0861-4.

“Discipline is simply the art of making the soldiers fear their offi cers more than the enemy.”

- Helvetius

133 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf The Relation between Information Warfare and Insurgency

- Lt Col Lalit Bahadur Kunwar "The conventional army losses if it does not win. The Guerilla wins if he does not loose." - Henry Kissinger Introduction 1. The emergence of war in the information spectrum quantitatively adds new means for destroying adversary target systems as well as disrupting any kind of operation. Future Information Warfare (IW) could encompass cyber war (planting of viruses into computer system), media warfare and electronic warfare (electric destruction of electromagnetic systems). Information combat could be waged against an adversary's leadership. Likewise, Information Warfare admits of the concept of Superiority. One side in a confl ict may have better access to information than the other. The former is likely to have more sensors in better places, more powerful collection and analytical machines and a more reliable process for turning data into information and information into decisions.1 2. Thomas Rona, an early proponent of Information Warfare, offered the following defi nition on Information Warfare: The strategic, operational, and tactical level competition across the spectrum of peace, crisis, crisis escalation, confl ict, war, war termination, and reconstitution/ restoration, waged between competitors, adversaries or enemies using information means to achieve their objectives.2 Information Warfare, in its largest tense, is simply the use of information to achieve our national objectives. Like diplomacy, economic competition, or the use of military force, information in itself is a key aspect of national power and more importantly, is becoming an increasingly vital national resources that supports diplomacy, economic competition and the effective employment of military forces. IW in this sense can be seen as societal-level or nation to nation confl ict waged, in part, through the worldwide intermitted and interconnected means of information and communication.3 3. The present day confl ict is more of an asymmetric in nature and heavily relies on information dimension. The insurgents use information as a major tool to achieve their ends and quite aptly update themselves with the latest updates in the innovations in the fi eld of information technology and use it in the best possible manner to serve their interests. This article intends to focus on the relationship between the Information Warfare and Insurgency. The Importance of Information Warfare 4. The term Information Warfare is primarily an American concept involving the use and management of information technology in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. Information warfare may involve collection of tactical information, assurance(s) that one's own information is valid, spreading of propaganda or disinformation to demoralize or manipulate the enemy and the public, undermining the quality of opposing force information and denial of information-collection opportunities to opposing forces. In addition, IW can take many forms:

1 Martin C. LIbicki ;What is information Warfare?; August 1995, p.94

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(a) Television and radio transmission(s) can be jammed. (b) Television and radio transmission(s) can be hijacked for a disinformation campaign. (c) Logistics networks can be disabled. (d) Enemy communications networks can be disabled or spoofed. (e) Stock exchange transactions can be sabotaged, either with electronic intervention, leaking sensitive information or placing disinformation. 5. The signifi cance of IW cannot be undermined both in conventional and unconventional forms of war. Electronic means of combat in IW potentially will enable a sophisticated power to effectively neutralize an opponent without necessarily infl icting physical destruction upon the opponent s forces, infrastructure and population.4 The insurgents can use this technique of IW in the 21st century. The IW can provide insurgents with substantively enlarged options for waging their confl ict for the following reasons:- (a) IW attacks can occur across globe and can originate from almost any location of the world (possibility from sky also) by using satellite. (b) The IW capabilities are inherently mobile due to advent of increasing powerful laptop computers, modems and personal satellite communications services. (c) The IW attacks are diffi cult to detect. Targets of information warfare attacks may not be aware of identity of their adversary or even that they are under attack. Technological Trends in IW 7. Several new technological trends, insofar as IW is concerned, are emerging. The knowledge on these technologies are relevant for the study of their possible impact, when used by the security forces or by insurgents, these may be; (a) Internet (b) Remote securing from space (c) Predator, Drones and UAV (d) Sensors

(e) Robotics (f) Other new technology Internet 8. The development of the Internet has dramatically increased global access to information. Internet access is now available in most of the countries and the number of individual users has reached several hundred millions. Now a days, it is possible to link into the internet from

2 Martin C. LIbicki ;What is information Warfare?; p.4 3 Gorge J.stoin; cyber war: Security, strategy and confl ict in the information age; August 1995 , p.4 4 Gorge J.stoin; cyber warfare: Security, strategy and confl ict in the information age. August 1995; p.282

135 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf anywhere in the world with laptop, modem, mobile phone and other equipments. The Internet has already played a key role in rallying international condemnation of Tiename Square Massacre in China, international attention on alleged Serbian Military atrocities in former Yugoslavia and also focusing international attention on Sudan, Egypt, and Tunisia, similarly now on Syria, Afghanisthan, Yemen,Pakistan and Libya. The internet can be benefi cial for the government in the following ways:- (a) Intelligence Gathering and Sharing Analysis of internet messages traffi c could reveal valuable indicators. The government authority can be alerted about the emerging crises. States can also share information about insurgent group operating across their national boundaries. (b) Psychological Operators The Internet could be used by government as an additional medium for conducting psychological operators and propaganda campaign as required by the nations. (c) Gaining International Support for the State Internet could be used to help generate international support for the states if the latter can make its case strong during the crises. Such as, 657 Bangladeshi border guards who challenged the government in a deadly 2009 mutiny ( 74 people killed most of them were commanding offi cers) have been sentenced to up to seven years in prison. (d) Communication Connecting to Security Forces Military Forces can greatly benefi t from the ability to download and upload important information or encrypted internet pathway. 9. However, the benefi ts that are accrued by the insurgent group or any agitating mass from the IT are also signifi cant. There are a number of reasons to believe that the internet could bring about a revolutionary shift in power, away from the authority of the state, as has been seen in the Arab countries recently. The following reasons make the IT fully exploited by the insurgent groups. (a) User Friendly Icon-based "point and click" interfaces allow the internet to be used by every individual with the little technical training. Insurgent group will face a relatively small learning curve in becoming sophisticated exploiters of the internet if they are not sharing knowledge with IT people. Likewise, state bureaucracies doing business may have a diffi cult time adapting to the new era of computer age. (b) Easy access to specialized information The internet contains a wealth of information on almost any topics which any individual can access to. This includes the knowledge on making Improvised Explosive Devices, chemical and biological weapon and capabilities of different weapon system. (c) Easy access to a mass audience With commercially available bulk electronic mailboxes around the world at the punch of single button, a leader of an ideological insurgency for instance, can draft manifests and sends them to millions of potential sympathizers on the internet. (d) Immediacy of mobilization Insurgents are able to spread their words and mobilize popular support now a days by the mean of internet for instance, in the midst of confl ict vides footage of a state military operations could be captured by hand held cameras-operated by non-state actors, then transformed into digital data fi les and then uploaded into the global information fl ow, reaching millions of people in a matter of 136 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

seconds. Public opinion and calls for action may be formed before national leaders have a chance to react to the situation. (e) Minimum Infrastructure One needs a laptop computer or mobile set and an account with an Internet provider to operate in cyber space from any corner of building. (f) The message always gets through With literally millions of point of entry and even more transmission paths, it will be very diffi cult for states to interdict communication on the internet. Even if the state cut off the phone and mail services of whole civilian doing that time also few individual with internet access will be able to use electronic mail to communicate with the outside world. Remote Serving from Spaces 10. The ability to conduct Remote Serving of Military- relevant terrestrial objects from space was essentially the exclusive preserve of the USA and former USSR from the early 1960s to early 1980s. Slowly, other states recognized the value of space-based remote- serving and developed indigenous programs. In 1968, France offered to sell medium-to high resolution image on the open market from its satellite "Pour 1", observation de la Terra, or "Spot" satellite program. Since that time a number of other commercial providers of space- based Remote sensing products have entered the industry. It is estimated that more than 30 nations have indigenous Remote sensing industries including India, Pakistan, Japan, Canada, Brazil, Israel, Italy, South Korea, Spain, Germany, Britain, USA, China, Russia, France, and the UAE. Every developed country is heading towards to produce such Remote sensors technologies in a very innovative way. In addition to the burgeoning number of suppliers of satellite imaginary services, market forces have also resulted in a trend toward progressively higher resolution and more timely imagery and products being offered for sale. Powerful laptop computer will be able to access the internet to download, store, process and interpret satellite imagery. Access to high-resolution imagery will benefi t insurgent by making it easier to locate and attack high pay-off targets such as state-controlled communication nodes, critical state-owned infrastructure or military installation. Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 11. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are aircrafts that can be fl own remotely by specially trained operators or pre-programmed to fl y missions autonomously. Owing partly to their relatively small sizes and in some cases, high attitude, UAVs can loiter over specifi ed areas for extended period of time and provide contemnors, real time, high resolution imagery from a wide range of on-board sensors. NATO forces especially American are using UAVs in Afghanistan destroying targets of military values. Insurgents could gain access to range of UAVs capabilities. Loitering UAVs would provide a valuable complement to space based- remote sensing in locating, tracking and attacking security forces operating in the specifi c area. 12. United States intelligence offi cials call unmanned aerial vehicles, often referred to as drones, their most effective weapon against Al Qaeda. The remotely piloted planes are used to transmit live video from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan to American forces, and to carry out air strikes. More C.I.A. drone attacks have been conducted under President Obama than under President George W. Bush. One of Washington's worst-kept secrets, the drone program is quietly hailed by counterterrorism offi cials as a resounding success, eliminating key terrorists and throwing their operations into disarray. But despite close cooperation from Pakistani

137 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf intelligence, the program has generated public anger in Pakistan, and some counterinsurgency experts wonder whether it does more harm than good. The UAVs are mostly used by NATO forces to destroy insurgents hide outs on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Sensors 13. A number of technological development in area such as sensor effectiveness, artifi cial intelligence, robotics, micro-electromagnetical system, light weight composites, high intensity energy storage have enabled the development of a broad range of sensor systems which are likely to have important implications for insurgency operation, as they reach operational maturity in the coming years. They include: 5 (a) “Pocket sized" UAVs (about 15cm) Carried by individual soldiers for tactical surveillance (eg- identifying that is over the next hill or next building or next block or next city etc), communication and possibly even destroying target, also. (b) Air dropped, inexpressive unattended grounded sensor net races These are designed to monitor friendly territory for adversary locations (physical or electronics) as well as detect, identify and track any vehicles or personnel. (c) Man Portable synthetic aperture radar system These are able to "see-through wall and characterize objects and peoples inside any type of buildings. (d) Autonomous micro-robots These are capable of disguised as common insects or debris (eg bottle cap, cob, web etc) and also capable of providing reconnaissance and surveillance within closed structures, attacking electronic equipments and killing humans which match their pre-programmed attack profi le. (e) Robotics Now emerging as a military technology of great importance for the coming decades is robotics. On land, robotics can create an unsleeping sentry with an infi nite attention span, perfect night vision and no interest in military payer benefi ts. Robotic vehicles can be sent on suicide missions behind enemy lines, and lie indefi nitely in undetectable ambush they will be far smaller than manned vehicles. Also their small size will make the army more mobile. In the nearer term; robotics can provide an effi cient autoloader for a future tank’s gun.

5 Christy Campbell; Understanding Military Technology,1985; p.24,25

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Other new technology 14. Electromagnetic Spectrum, Laser, Radio Receiver, Direction Finder, Radar, Tracking Radar, Radar Guided Missile, Fully Active Missile, Semi-active Missile, Laser Guidance, Infrared Imaging Guided weapons, Digital Scene Matching, Gyroscopic Guidance, Scud Guidance, Terrain Contour Matching, Spread Spectrum Technique6 are other new advanced technologies that are likely to emerge prominently in the fi eld of IW by developed nations in the days to come. To be precise, there is no limitation in the technological advancement. Cyber warfare 15. Cyber warfare has been defi ned by government security expert Richard A. Clarke, in his book Cyber War (May 2010), as "actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption." The Economist describes cyber warfare as "the fi fth domain of warfare," and William J. Lynn, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, states that "as a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain in warfare . . . (which) has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space." In 2009, President Barack Obama declared America’s digital infrastructure to be a "strategic national asset," and in May 2010 the Pentagon set up its new U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), headed by General Keith B. Alexander, director of the National Security Agency (NSA), to defend American military networks and attack other countries’ systems. The United Kingdom has also set up a cyber-security and "operations centre" based in Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British equivalent of the NSA. In the U.S. however, Cyber Command is only set up to protect the military, whereas the government and corporate infrastructures are primarily the responsibility respectively of the Department of Homeland Security and private companies.

The changing Battle space 16. The oldest guided weapons, developed soon after the Second World War to attack aircraft, relied on a radar beam transmitted from a ground-based control unit on which they could ride towards the target. The latest missiles carry their own active radar transmitter with which to seek and fi nd the target. A more advanced technology involves guidance by television.7

6 Air Vice Marshal Vishwa Mohan Tiwari(retd.),Dr.Rajani Kant Tewari; THE HIGH-TECH WAR OF TWENTY CENTURY; p.268-286 7 David shukman; Tomorrow’s war;1995;p.149

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17. Changing information technologies are having a profouned effect on the nature of battle space. One way to look at the battle space is through the lens of time, of force and of space .Using this technique we fi nd that traditional notion of time, space and force have changed forever. Time has been compressed, space has been distorted and expanded, and our notion of force will have to change8. 18. The elite US Navy SEALs team used top secret stealth helicopters to swoop down on an unsuspecting al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in his Abbottabad safe heaven and shoot him dead on May 2, 2011. The live telecast of the raid on building of Osama bin Laden was observed by US President Barak Obama and other members of security advisor at White House, USA. Before carrying out raid, CIA has kept continuous surveillance to the Laden building of Abbottabad (Pakistan) from August 2010 by using infra red equipment, sophisticated camera, listening system including 36 satellites.

Conclusion 19. In future insurgency, insurgents or any revolutionary groups is likely to exploit many of the emerging technologies of 21st century which are already introduced by the developed nations. If this becomes true then it is certain that future counterinsurgency operations will increase substantially in intensity and lethality. The insurgents have become resolute, skillful and tenacious. Acquisitions of remote control for activities of IEDs, sophisticated weapons and modem communication systems used by insurgents have added a new dimension in the counter insurgency operation. 20. However, state will not have exclusive access to these technologies. Many sophisticated means of information warfare are likely to become available in either the open or black market of any corner of the world. Information warfare can reach to combatant across great distances and over large population. We stand today at the new technological edge of information revolution involving the Military for a challenging and uncertain future. The demand of the new era for any army of the world is acquire information of insurgents, apply advanced information warfare technology in their respective military organization, make a sound IW policy and ultimately destroy the insurgents. 21. We, as a security forces¸ therefore need to continuously review our tactics, drills, techniques, information technology system and design of our battle to fi rst, counter the insurgents modes operation and secondly, to be proactive to keep them guessing of our objectives and intentions for this result, As security forces, we need to have knowledge of new techniques, apply appropriate means of information systems, train our people in this regard and implement new technology in the security forces. The security forces of 21st century need to look at solutions and not the problem.

8 Michael L. brown ; Cyber Warfare: Security, Strategy and Confl ict in the Information Age; p.33

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References Books 1. Christy Campbell; Understanding Military Technology, 1985. Hamlyn Publishing, London. 2. Gorge J.stoin; cyber warfare: Security, strategy and confl ict in the information age, August 1995. 3. Martin C. LIbicki; what is information Warfare? August 1995. National Defense University. Washington DC. 4. David shukman; Tomorrow’s war;1995. Harcourt Brace & Company, New York. Michael L. brown ; cyber war: Security, strategy and confl ict in the information age. 5. Air Vice Marshal Vishwa Mohan Tiwari(retd.),Dr.Rajani Kant Tewari; THE HIGH- TECH WAR OF TWENTY CENTURY. 1996. Vikas Publishing house, New Delhi Newspapers 1. The kathmandu post, June 29,2011, p.5 Websites 1. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_ vehicles/ index. html 2. http://www.bing.com/search?/Information_warfare 3. http://www.bing.com/search?Cyberwarfare 4. http://www.bing.com/search?Cyberwarfare#Cyberwarfare_limitation_treaty 5. http://www.bing.com/search?q=Military+Cyber+Warfare&FORM=QSRE3

“For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fi ghting is the acme of skill.”

- Sun Tzu

141 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf Theories of Clausewitz in the Analysis of Current War in Afghanistan

- Maj Ranjit Thapa “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adopts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity–composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.” – Carl Von Clausewitz1 Background 1. The idea of prominent theorists, such as Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz, has helped to understand and analyze the nature and conduct of war. The idea of Clausewitz gained wide currency, after his work On War was fi rst published in 1832.2 Clausewitz’s many dictum and rules for winning various types of engagements and battles, are valid and remarkably similar to those found in the tactical manuals of contemporary armies around the World.3 In the analysis of the current war in Afghanistan, the idea of Clausewitz has provided a sound underpinning to truly understand the nature and conduct of war. Drawing extensively on the various literatures available on Clausewitz, scholarly articles and literatures on the US Army’s current involvement in Afghanistan, this paper attempts to analyze the relevancy of theories of Clausewitz, especially on means and ways, and friction in war, in the analysis of current war in Afghanistan. What is War? 2. Clausewitz's idea on what is war is very useful because it has helped to understand the true nature of war in Afghanistan. “War is a continuation of policy, carried on with other means.”4 The United States Army’s involvement in Afghanistan is a means of the Government’s policy on Global War on Terror (GWOT), to maintain global peace. “Policy will permeate all military operations.”5 To attain the policy objective, military means are employed to conduct GWOT. “The political leadership should ultimately control and direct the conduct of war. That it is not to say that it should displace soldiers in the planning and conduct of operations. It should take care not to ask impossible, and collaborate with the senior commanders in developing overall

1 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1976), 89. 2 Ibid. xi. 3 Stephen L. Melton, The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Zenith Press: Minneapolis, 2009), 11. 4 Clausewitz, On War, trans. Colonel J.J Graham (Barnes and Nobel: New York, 2004), 3-4. 5 M.L.R Smith, “Rethinking Nature of War,” ed. Duyvesteyn Isabelle and Jan Angstrom (Frank Cass: New York), 33. Online at (accessed 18 Aug 2010).

142 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* policy.”6 The top-level political decision is vital, in terms of timely formulating policies and strategies, providing clear military objectives, and resources to sustain the war. … the fi rst, the supreme, the most far–reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish… The kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into. Something that is alien to its nature. This is the fi rst of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.7 3. The civilian offi cials are responsible to infl uence other than the objective condition on battlefi eld. The very valid fact is that, military not the transient occupants of high offi ce, generally bears the heaviest burden during the armed confl ict.8 Nevertheless, managing appropriate resources, funding, and integration of Department of State and other civilian agencies, to support overall military effort in Afghanistan could be considered as an appropriate political interest, which validates the idea of Clausewitz–"continuation of national policies by other means." Means and Ways in War 4. The ideas of Clausewitz amply resemble in the analysis of the current war in Afghanistan, because the judgment, to use the military means was carried out by the legitimate political authority to attain the political objective. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, President George W. Bush declared a “War on Terror” in his September 20, 2001 address to a Joint Session of Congress and American People: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”9 Since 7 October 2001, military means has been employed, extensively, to fi ght and destroy the terrorists operating and getting support from its base in Afghanistan. 5. The political decision on invasion could be considered correct, and the conduct of war in Afghanistan has been observed very relevant. According to Clausewitz, one of the peculiar ways of directly increasing the waste of the enemy’s force is the ‘invasion,’ which is the occupation of the enemy’s territory not with a view to keeping it, but in order to levy contribution upon it. The immediate object in such cases is not the conquest of the enemy’s territory, nor the defeat of his armed forces, but merely to do him damage in a general way.10 Military Forces in Afghanistan are operating not with the aim of holding territory for a long time, but taking advantage from those to destroy terrorists' network and bases, which facilitates in achieving the objective of GWOT.

6 Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1986), 200. 7 Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford University Press: New York, 2007), 30. 8 David H. Petraeus, “Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam,” in H300 Roots of Today’s Operational Environment Syllabus and Book of Readings, (Fort Leavenworth, KS USACGSC, December 2009),H305RC-271. 9 Hall Garner, A Companion to American Military History Volume I, ed. James C. Bradford (Wiley–Blackwell: MA, USA, 2010), 298. 10 Clausewitz, On War, Barnes and Nobel Library of Essential Reading, 26. 143 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

6. Another idea of Clausewitz on means and ways in war is very useful because it has helped to understand the conduct of war, and its relevancy in Afghanistan. “War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfi ll our will.”11 The use of force is vital to destroy the terrorists, their network, and to create an environment non-conducive for terrorists’ acts. “Violence, a physical force, is therefore the means; the compulsory submission of the enemy will is the ultimate object. To attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate object of hostilities in theory.”12 Clausewitz greatly emphasizes on making enemy defenseless by the optimum use of force. Jan Willem Honig, a senior lecturer in the department of War Studies at Kings College London, writes: All soldiers, before and after the war, accepted Clausewitz’s logic that defense does not win wars; if anything, it could invite defeat by leaving the initiative to the enemy. Today, the same idea inspires the American military doctrine of “overwhelming force.” Irrespective of political aims, the US armed forces’ main strategic preoccupation is with making their enemies defenseless. The war against Iraq over Kuwait, the war against Serbia over Kosovo, the fi nal war against Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the war against Afghanistan, were all fought with the intent to destroy the enemy capacity to resist.13 7. Ali Ahmad Jalali, a distinguished Professor at the US National Defense University, writes in a journal of the complex operations, Prism, “The new US policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan aims at disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda in both countries and preventing its return.”14 Due to the extensive military operations in the past 11 years, numbers of terrorist activity have been reduced, not only in Afghanistan, but also in the other parts of the World. Statistically, the gradual increase of the boots on ground in Afghanistan from 4,100 in January 2002 to 87,600 in April 2010 is a clear indication of the importance of the use of force.15 Hence, it validates one of the principles of war of Clausewitz–“the concentration of troops at the decisive point.”16 The employment of military to destroy Al Qaeda leader Bin Laden in May 2011, rather than using other means amply demonstrate the importance of the use of force, which validates the idea of Clausewitz–to destroy the armed power and sources of strength of the enemy.17 The New York Time writes, “The death of Bin Laden marks the most signifi cant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat Al Qaeda, and is a defi ning moment in the American-led fi ght against terrorism.18

11 Clausewitz, On War, Oxford World’s Classics, xxvi. 12 Ibid. 36. 13 Jan Willem Honig, Introduction, On War, Carl Von Clausewitz, trans. Colonel J.J Graham (Barnes and Noble: New York, 2004), xxi. 14 Ali Ahmad Jalali, “Afghanistan: Long-term Solutions and Perilous Shortcuts.” Prism, Vol.1, No. 4, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2010), 57-66. 15 Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11,” Prepared for Members and Committee of Congress (Congressional Research Service 7-5700: US), 38-39. Online at (accessed 19 August 2010). 16Colonel Ardant du Picq, Roots of Strategy, trans. Colonel John N. Greely and Major Rober C. Cotton (Stackpole Books: PA, 1987), 350 & 354. 17 Ibid, 349. 18 Peter Baker, Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, Bin Laden Is Dead, Obama Says. The New York Times, http://www. nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html?Pagewanted=all (accessed 26 Jan 2012). 144 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

8. While using the force, the duration of the use of force is also important. “One of the peculiar ways of directly increasing the waste of the enemy’s force is the ‘wearing down’ of the enemy. The ‘wearing down’ in a confl ict means using the duration of the war to bring a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance.”19 By realizing the fact that the ongoing effort only inside Afghanistan may not suffi ce, the use of force have been extended even inside Pakistan, areas bordering Afghanistan, in the hot pursuit of terrorists, which appears as extending the duration of war. The National Security Strategy of the United States–2010, states “Going forward, there should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global security–through our commitments to allies, partners, and institutions; our focus on defeating Al Qaeda and its affi liates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the globe.”20 9. In the recent years, close to the successful killing of Al Qaeda leader Bin Laden, the intensity of the military operation was increased and the focus in Afghanistan was widened. Ashraf Ghani, a former Finance Minister and presidential candidate for Afghanistan, writes in Prism, “President Barrack Obama’s engagement with Afghanistan has made it a global foreign policy issue. The resulting commitment of forces and resources has given International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) the means to launch its counteroffensive.”21 In the recent past, NATO Special Operations Forces were engaged in an intensely lethal war. In the past 90 days as of August 2010, these units have captured or killed 365 militant leaders, detained 1,335 insurgent foot soldiers and killed another 1,031 insurgents on top of that.22 Ghani, further writes, “The ISAF, armed with a new counterinsurgency doctrine and resources to conduct a forceful campaign, is engaging in a counteroffensive against the insurgency.”23 Given the modus operandi of terrorist, capabilities and their activities in the recent past, if appropriate means and ways were [are] not employed in a timely manner, terrorists would [will] even dare to snatch the weapons of mass destruction and assault on the US and allies forces deployed overseas, the US homeland, and peace loving countries of the world. We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms.24

19 Clausewitz, On War, Barnes and Nobel Library of Essential Reading, 26-27. 20 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 1. (Washington DC, May 2010). Online at (accessed 9 Jun 2010). 21 Ashraf Ghani, “Afghanistan: Opportunities and Risks.” Prism, Vol.1, No. 4, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2010), 15-24. 22 Spencer Ackerman, “Drones Surge, Special Ops Strike in Petraeus Campaign Plan” Wired News, 18 August 2010. Online at (accessed 19 Aug 2010). 23 Ghani, 15. 24 Clausewitz, On War, Oxford World’s Classics, ix.

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Friction in War 10. Clausewitz’s idea of ‘friction in war’ is very useful to understand the growing complexities of the war in Afghanistan. Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.25 The current condition in Afghanistan is such that the situation is very unpredictable, and enemy patterns of operation are completely unorthodox. “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is diffi cult.”26 Friction refers to uncertainties, errors, accidents, technical diffi culties, the unforeseen, and their effect on decisions, morale, and actions.27 The complexities of Afghanistan; uncertainties, complex terrain, extended deployment, and adverse weather conditions, coupled with psychological factors, has put heavy demand on professionally sound, adoptive, agile, resilient, and motivated leaders, with strong moral courage, to sustain all frictions, and operate even for an extended durations. Clausewitz argues, “If one has never personally experienced war, one cannot understand it what the diffi culties really consists, or why a commander should need any brilliance and exceptional ability.”28 11. Most of the personnel of the United States military have already had or doing multiple tours of duty in Afghanistan, or Iraq, since 2001 and 2003. Moreover, most of the top-level military commanders today, have the past war experience, which had helped to nurture soldiers to encounter friction in war. The US Army has been laying optimum importance upon leader development, and has prepared leaders to negotiate situations arising from complexities. The US Army’s Field Manual on Army Leadership states, “Modern organizational leaders are multi-skilled and multi-purpose leaders, who have developed backgrounds in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedure, as well as an appreciation for the geopolitical consequences of their application. From their personal experience and refi ned skill at the operational and tactical levels, they have grown the instincts, intuition, and knowledge, which allow them to operate across the spectrum of confl icts.”29 Furthermore, such ability would enhance to anticipate and overcome the situation arising from friction in war. Conclusion 12. In the analysis of the current war in Afghanistan, the ideas of Clausewitz are very relevant, because the recognition of the military as an instrument of national policy, purpose and means in war, and the friction in war, all falls under the current realm of the US and the Western policy of GWOT. Furthermore, the preparedness of the military to defeat terrorists and to encounter all complexities in war in Afghanistan also validates his idea. His ideas are deeply explored, widely accepted, and extensively applied by the modern militaries. The Americans, Germans, French, British, Russians–Imperials and Communists–and the Chinese under Mao studied On War in search of useful lesson, to be applied in wars seen retrospectively

25 Paret, 202. 26 Clausewitz, On War, Oxford World’s Classics, 65. 27 Ibid. 28 Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University Press, 119. 29 Department of the Army, FM 6-22, Leading at Organizational and Strategic Levels, in Army Leadership (Washington, DC: Government Printing Offi ce, October 2006), 11-1.

146 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* in many different guises: as just wars or imperialist wars, wars to impose Germen nationalist and racist aims upon the world, war against Nazi Germany, wars of liberation, or wars of colonial expansion.30 However, during the early period of cold war, his ideas were dismissed. Many argued, Clausewitz’s dictum that “war is the continuation of politics by military means” was inapplicable because irrational in the nuclear age.31 13. Since the 1980, the US military has placed great emphasis on the theories and concepts of Clausewitz.32 Military means has been employed not only in destroying terrorists but also for the purpose of nation-building in Afghanistan. John Arquilla, writes in Prism, “to date, the American response has been to “double down” on its big net in Afghanistan, sending more troops and rebuilding more roads in pursuit of nation-building.”33 “Whether peacekeeping or nation-building operations require continued presence of military forces for decades or generations is not an issue of military expertise. However, it is a political and strategic issue as to whether the benefi ts to national interests and international security are worth the costs, literal and professional, of tying up military assets for such purposes,” argues Martin L. Cook.34 In Afghanistan, involvement of military in “nation-building” with civilian agencies does not fall under the threshold of the Clausewitz’s principles; however, it has opened up a new paradigm in the employment of military means to fulfi ll the policy objective under the strategic environment of 21st century. Above all, the current military effort in Afghanistan to support overall effort on GWOT will continue to truly hold the theories of Clausewitz.

30 Clausewitz, On War, Oxford World’s Classics, viii 31 Ibid., ix. 32 Rudolph M. Janiczek, A Concept at the Crossroads: Rethinking the Center of Gravity (US Army War College: Carlisle, PA, 2007), v. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pdffi les/PUB805.pdf> (accessed 18 Aug 2010). 33 John Arquilla, “A “Net Shift” for Afghanistan?” Prism, Vol.1, No. 4, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2010), 25-40. 34 Martin L. Cook, Moral Warrior: Ethics and Services in the US Military (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 82. Bibliography 1. Arquilla John, “A “Net Shift” for Afghanistan?” Prism, Vol.1, No. 4, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2010. 2. Ackerman Spencer, “Drones Surge, Special Ops Strike in Petraeus Campaign Plan” Wired News, 18 August 2010. Online athttp://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/08/petraeus- campaign-plan/#more-29588>; (accessed 19 Aug 2010). 3. Baker Peter, Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, Bin Laden Is Dead, Obama Says. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed. html?Pagewanted=all (accessed 26 Jan 2012). 4. Belasco Amy, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Prepared for Members and Committee of Congress, Congressional 147 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

Research Service, 7-5700: US. Online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf>; (accessed 19 August 2010). 5. Cook Martin L., The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the US Military, State University Press of New York: Albany, 2004. 6. Clausewitz Carl Von, Carl. On War. Translated by Colonel J.J Graham. The Barnes and Nobel Library of Essential Reading: New York, 2004. 7. Clausewitz Carl Von. On War. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1976. 8. Clausewitz Carl Von. On War. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford University Press: New York, 2007. 9. Department of Army, FM 6-22, Leading at Organizational and Strategic Levels, in Army Leadership (Washington, DC: Government Printing Offi ce, October 2006), 11-1. 10. Ghani Ashraf, “Afghanistan: Opportunities and Risks.” Prism, Vol.1, No. 4, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2010. 11. Jalali Ali Ahmad, “Afghanistan: Long-term Solutions and Perilous Shortcuts.” Prism, Vol.1, No. 4, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2010. 12. Janiczek Rudolph M. A Concept at the Crossroads: Rethinking the Center of Gravity, US Army War College: Carlisle, PA, 2007. Online at ; (accessed 18 Aug 2010) 13. Melton Stephen L, The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Zenith Press: Minneapolis, 2009. 14. Petraeus David H, “Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam.” Department of Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, H300 Roots of Today’s Operational Environment, Fort Leavenworth, KS USACGSC, December 2009. 15. Paret Peter, Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Edited by Peter Paret, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1986. 16. Smith M.L.R, “Rethinking Nature of War, ed. Duyvesteyn Isabelle and Jan Angstrom, CGSC CARL Net Library: Leavenworth, KS. Online at ; (accessed 18 Aug 2010). 17. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, May 2010.1 Online at ; (accessed 9 Jun 2010).

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– 8f= e"kxl/ kf}8]n ljifok|j]z != …g]kfnL ;]gfÚ /fi6«;]js dWo] d'n'ssf] …;'/Iff ;d"xÚ xf] . cfGtl/s ;'/Iffdf g]kfn k|x/L Pj+ o; dftxtsf] ;fd'bflos k|x/L, bª\uf k|x/L, 6«flkms k|x/L / ;z:q k|x/L h'6]sf x'G5g\ eg] l5d]sL d'n's;Fusf] ;Ldf;'/Iff, cGt/f{li6«o o'4 / cfGtl/s cltjfbLx?sf] ljb|f]x bafpg ;]gfsf] ;jf]{kl/ e"ldsf /x]sf] x'G5 . To;}n] ;]gfsf] b/aGbL, /f;g, kf];fs cnUu} x'G5 . zf/Ll/s ;'u7g, ;ts{tf, kf];fssf] /ª / cnUu} lsl;dsf] …8\o'6LÚ sf cfwf/df ;]gfsf] klxrfg x'g] u5{ . …g]kfnL ;]gfÚ g]kfnsf] ljlzi6 ;'/Iff ;d"x xf] . o; ;d"xdf ;]jf/t /x]/ g]kfnsf a|fx\d0f, IfqL, du/, lnDa", /fO{ cflb x/]s hfltsf dflg;x¿n] cfˆgf] zf/Ll/s alni7tf, o'4sf}zntf, ;]gf;Da4 k|zf;lgs bIftf, snfsfl/tf cflb cg]sf}+ kIfdf /fli6«o e"ldsf lgjf{x ul/cfPsf 5g\ . o; ;d"xdf a|fx\d0f, IfqL afx]s cGo hfltsf] hfltut dft[efiff eP klg ;f´f efiffsf ¿kdf g]kfnL efiffsf] k|of]u u5{g\ . @= efiff / dfgjLo Jojxf/ tyf lqmofsnfksf aLr cGof]Gofl>t ;DaGw /x]sf] x'G5 . lsgeg] efiff dfgjLo Jojxf/ / lqmofsnfkaf6 ljsf; x'g] ljifo xf] . s'g} klg dflg; cfˆgf b}lgs Jojxf/ / ;fyLefO;Fusf] p7a;df r'k al;/x\of] eg] efiff klg r'k eP/ /xG5 . n's]sf] cyjf r'k /x]sf] efiff dfgjLo lqmofsnfkdf km}lng kfpFb}g . To;sf/0f hlt w]/} af]Ng] cEof; u¥of] plt g} sYoefiffsf] ljsf; x'G5 . sYo efiff g} n]Vo efiffsf] hggL xf] . g]kfnL ;]gfdf sYoefiffsf] k|of]u #= g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;f´f efiffsf ¿kdf g]kfnL sYoefiffsf] k|of]u x'g] u5{ eg] hftLo ldqx¿sf] cfGtl/s ldngdf dft[efiffsf] klg k|of]u ePsf] kfOPsf] 5 . kLkfsf] bhf{b]lv k|wfg;]gfklt;Dd sYoefiffsf] k|of]udf hf]8 lbOPsf] kfOG5 . o; egfOsf] clek|fo g]kfnL ;]gfdf k|of]u ePsf] ;f´f sYoefiff g]kfnL sYoLo efiffj+zdf gf}nf] k|of]u eg] cjZo xf]Og . pgLx¿n] k|of]u ug]{ u/]sf] sYo g]kfnL efiffsf j0f{ljGof;, kbfjnL, jfSo;d"x, cg'R5]b cflb ;a}df g]kfnL ;f´f k|of]ukIfLo ;dfg ¿kljGof; e]l6G5 . eflifs gjLgtf / ;'Gb/tf, snfTdstf / k|of]uwld{tf gkfPnf . t/ g]kfnL ;]gfn] k|of]u ug]{ u/]sf] g]kfnL sYoefiffdf /fi6«;]jLo ;d"xut k[ystf eg] lgZro g} kfpg ;lsG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u $= g]kfnL ;]gfdf k|of]u x'g] sYoefiffsf] rrf{ ubf{ To; ;]jf–;d"xdf n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u x'Fb}g t < eGg] s'/f] klg p7\g;S5 . olb of] cfzª\sf ul/of] cyjf o:tf] ts{ p7fOof] eg] To;nfO{ cGoyf gdfg] klg x'G5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u lGfDg ljifout If]qdf x'g] u5{ . -s_ gkfnL] ;]gf;Da4 /fli6«o÷cGt/f{li6«o ;lGw–;D´f}tfkq, -v_ gkfnL] ;]gfsf] tflnd÷;]ldgf/÷uf]i7L, -u_ ;}lgs k|zf;g / cfly{s k|zf;g, -3_ ;}lgs sfg'g, -ª_ dflyNnf] bhf{sf ;}lgs clws[taf6 lbOg] gLltlgb{]zg, -r_ ljz]if u/L ;}lgs clws[taf6 cGtu{tsf ljljw sfo{qmd, tflnd, uf]i7L, ljljw sfo{qmd, ;]gf– lbj;df lbOg] lnlvt dGtJo, -5_ ;]gfsf ;sn bhf{dWo]sf s]xL pT;fxL ;|i6f, cGj]ifs, n]vssf sljtf, n]v /rgf,

149 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

-h_ sjfot k'l:tsf, g]kfn ;/sf/sf dGqfno tyf cGt/f{li6«o ;}lgs k|lti7fg;Fu ul/g] dxTjk"0f{ kqJojxf/, -´_ Od]n cflb . %= dfly pNn]v ul/Psf k|d'v ljifout If]qx¿df g]kfnL ;]gfn] n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u ug]{ u/]sf] kfOPsf] 5 . ^= g]kfnL ;]gfdf sYoefiffsf] k|of]u x'g] k|d'v ljifout If]qx¿ lgDg 5g\ M -s_ 3/fo;L / ;}lgs ;]jf;Da4 cfk;L s'/fsfgL, -v_ ;]gf / ljleGg bhf{sf Joltm;Fu ul/g] 6]lnkmf]g, df]afOn kmf]g cflbsf dfWodaf6 ljrf/ cfbfgk|bfg, -u_ ;]gf;Da4 k|zf;lgs, cfly{s / cGo b}lgs ¿kdf e}kl/cfpg] gLltlgb{]zg / cGo s'/fsfgL, -3_ ;sn bhf{sf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] aLrdf ul/g] df}lvs gLltlgb]{zg, -ª_ ljleGg bhf{sf g]kfnL ;]gf;Fu e]63f6 x'Fbf ul/g] ;Daf]wg, If]ds'zn / cGo s'/fsfgL cflb . &= g]kfnL ;]gfdf n]Voefiffsf] t'ngfdf sYoefiffsf] ljifout If]q Jofks / dxTjk"0f{ /x]sf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfn] af]Ng / n]Vg gx'g] efiff *= …g]kfnL ;]gfÚ eGg] ljlQs} d'n'ssf] ;+j]bgzLn ;'/Iff;d"x xf] eGg] a'l´G5 . To;}n] g]kfnL ;]gf cfkm"eGbf dflyNnf] lgsfosf] cfb]z cyjf lgb]{zg kfngf ug{ k|oTg/t /x]sf] x'G5 eg] p;sf] OdfGbfl/tf / st{Jok/fo0ftf, ;]jf;d"xut ljlzi6Ls/0f cflbn] ;fdfGo hg;d'bfob]lv /fi6«k|d'v;Dd ;ts{ x'g] u5{g\ . lsgeg] g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfˆgf] lhDd]jf/Lsf] If]q ;DxfNg;Sg] /fli6«o kl/l:ylt klts"n| eof] eg] d'n'sjf;L ;a}sf] dgdl:tis ulnt x'gk'U5 . ToxLsf/0f d'n'ssf ;a} kIfn] g]kfnL ;]gfsf] dgf]an lug]{ lsl;dsf] sYo / n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u ub}{gg\÷ug'{x'Fb}g . g]kfnL ;]gfn] cfˆgf] kbLo bfloTjn] af]Ng / n]Vg gldNg] ljifosf] efiffut k|d'v k|of]uIf]q lgDg a'Fbfdf k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5 M -s_ /fi6«, /fli6«otf / /fi6«jf;Lk|lt Joª\Uo ul/Psf], -v_ cfˆgf] kbLo bfloTj / dof{bfeGbf aflx/sf ljifodf s]Gb|Lt eP/, -u_ k/d;]gflwklt, k|wfg;]gfklt, nufot ljleGg txsf k|d'v JolQmx?sf] cfnf]rgf, -3_ cfkm"eGbf dflysf] kbsf] cfb]zljk/Lt s'/fsfgL / dGtJosf] ;Dk|]if0f cyf{t\ cfb]zsf] pNnª\3g x'g]u/L af]lnPsf :jsLo ljrf/, -ª_ /fi6« / /fi6«af;LnfO{ k|lts"n c;/ kg{;Sg] cleJolQm, -r_ s'g} klg /fhgLlts kf6L{nfO{ k|ToIf / ck|ToIf¿kdf ;xof]u k'Ug] lsl;dsf] ljrf/, dGtJo k|s6 cflb . (= …g]kfnL ;]gfÚ g]kfnsf] dxTjk"0f{ /fli6«o ;'/Iff ;d"x ePsf] x'gfn] p;n] cfˆgf] kbLo cg'zf;g / st{Jokfngdf afwf k'Ug;Sg] s'g} klg ljrf/ k|s6 ug{' dgfl;a 7xb}{g . k|:6 ¿kdf eGg'kbf{ d'n'ssf] cg'zfl;t / st{Jolgi7 /fi6«;]jssf] rrf{ ubf{ ;]gfnfO{ cu|kª\lQmdf /fVg ;lsG5 . To;}n] g]kfnL ;]gfdf sfo{/t JolQmn] kbLo bfloTjsf] sf/0f cfkm"n] k|of]u ug{ ldNg] / gldNg] efiffsf] cWoogdf ljz]if rgfvf] x'g'kg]{ b]lvG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;d"xut sYoefiff !)= g]kfndf ljleGg k];f / Joj;fodf nfu]sf JolQmx¿sf] 7"n} ;d"x /x]sf] kfOG5 eg] :jtGq ¿kdf hLjgofkg ul//x]sf dflg; klg w]/} 5g\ . h:t}– s[lif, ljleGg Jofkf/–Joj;fo, hflu/, ljZjljBfno:t/Lo k|fWofkg / ljBfno

150 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* txsf] cWofkg, cflbdf k|of]u x'g] efiffsf] k|of]uut :j¿k cnu–cnu ePh:t} ;]gfn] cfˆgf] kbLo bfloTjcg';f/ k|of]u ug'{kg]{ efiff klg leGg x'g] u5{ . jf:tjdf eGg] xf] eg] efiffn] g} s'g} klg JolQmsf] kb, k];f, cfr/0f, ljj]s cflbsf] klxrfg u/fpF5 . sYoefiffsf] k|of]udf ;do / k|;ª\ucg';f/ b[li6 k'¥ofpg ;lsPg eg] 7"nf–7"nf b'3{6gf x'g] ;Defjgf /xG5 . To;}n] dL7f] sYoefiffsf] k|of]un] dflg; ljj]szLn / cg'zfl;t b]lvG5 . tLtf], 6/f]{ / cfnf]rgfTds sYoefiffn] eg] dflg;sf] ul/df / OHht lu/fpg ;xof]u k'¥ofpF5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf kbLo bfloTjcg';f/ sYoefiffsf] k|of]u x'g]u5{ . o;nfO{ klg lgDg a'Fbfdf k|sfz kfg{ ;lsG5 M -s_ g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;]jfk|j]zsf ljleGg kb xF'b} ;]gf;Da4 lgodfjnL cg';f/ kbf]Gglt eP/ k|wfg;]gfklt ;Dd kbu|x0f ug{ kfpg] l:ylt b]lvG5 . k/d;]gflwkltsf] kb eg] ;}lgs ;]jf–;d"xaf6 kbf]Gglt eP/ xf]Og, /fi6«k|d'vsf x}l;otn] k|fKt ug]{ ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr kb xf] eGg] a'l´G5, -v_ k/d;]gflwkltn] cfjZostf cg';f/ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] pRrkb:y JolQm;Fu d'n'ssf] ;'/IffgLltsf af/]df k/fdz{ / gLltlgb]{zg ug{;S5g\ . pgn] k|of]u ug]{ efiff zfnLg, ;Eo / lzi6 x'g] u5{ . To;df cfg'eljstf -cg'ej_ / cWoogsf] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf x'g] u5{, -u_ k|wfg;]gfklt nufotsf hg]{n, sg]{nb]lv ;]s]G8 nK6g;Ddsf clws[t Pj+ klbs ;d"xn] k|of]u ug]{ sYoefiff gLlt–lgb]{zg / cfb]zsf] k|s[lt cg';f/ ˆm/s–ˆm/s x'g;S5, -3_ g]kfnL ;]gfdf kLkfb]lv ;'j]bf/;Dd sfo{/t ;d"x k|foM sd lzlIft x'g;S5 . -casf] k':tf k"/} clzlIft gx'g ;S5_ . To;}n] Tof] ;d"xn] clws[t bhf{sf ;]gfn] k|of]u u/]h:tf] cfb]zfTds zfnLg / lzi6 sYoefiffsf] kof]u| gu/] klg ljj]s, cg'zf;g, lzi6tf / dof{bfsf] pNnª\3g u/]/ s'g} klg zAbx¿sf] pRrf/0f ug{ ldNb}g . csf]{ s'/f, kLkf;d"xb]lv ;'j]bf/;Dd kbLo bfloTjsf sf/0fn] xLGftf af]wLo sYoefiffsf zAbx¿ k|foM ;'Gg] ul/G5 . To;}n] pgLx¿ cf}krfl/s¿kdf cfˆm"–cfˆm"df cfqmfds efiff klg k|of]u ug{;S5g\ . cf}krfl/s¿kdf eg] cfˆm"eGbf dflyNnf] bHof{gL lrGx nufPsf JolQm;uF ;ts{tf / cf1fsfl/tfsf] cj:yfdf k|of]u ul/g] efiffsf] k|of]u u5{g, -ª_ g]kfnL ;]gfdf sfo{/t JolQm s]xL 306fsf lglDt …cfp6Ú uPdf cyjf nfdf] ;do;Dd labfdf a;]sf a]nf klg ;]gf;Da4 sYoefiffsf] k|of]u ug{ la;{+b}gg\ . g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;fj{gflds kbsf] k|of]u !!= Jofs/0fcg';f/ gfdsf] ;§fdf k|of]u x'g] kbnfO{ ;j{gfd elgG5 . Jofs/0fsf ljleGg sf]6LdWo] …;fj{gflds kbÚ sf] dxTjk"0f{ :yfg /x]sf] x'G5 . o; ;fj{gflds kbfjnLn] s'g} klg gfdjfrL ¿knfO{ csf]{ zAb cyjf kbfjnLaf6 a'´fpg] sfd u5{ . efiffdf cy{k"0f{tfsf tLg kbfjnL x'G5g\ . h:t} M stf{ sd{ lqmof -gfdkb_ /fd eft vfG5 !@= dfly lbOPsf tLgj6f kbfjnLn] jQmfsf] ljifo cyjf cfzo k"0f{ u/fpg ;xof]u k'¥ofPsf 5g\ . To;}n] pko{'Qm tLgj6f kb Ps– csf{;uF ;DalGwt 5g \ . Jofs/0fsf cGo sf]6Lx¿ stf{, sd{ / lqmofkbLo :j¿ksf lj:tf/ dfq x'g\ . g]kfnL efiffdf ;fj{gflds kbx¿ lgDg 5g\ M d'Vo ;fj{gflds kb M d, tF, ltdL, tkfO{+, xfdL, xh'/ ;xof]uL ;fj{gflds kb M pm, hf], sf], ToxfF, oxfF, sxfF, hxfF cfTdsyg M d l;kfxLnfO{ sjfh v]nfpF5' . cfb]zfTds jfSo M tF nfOgdf ldn]/ a;\ . cfb]zsf] kfngf M tkfO{{+sf] cfb]z kv]{/ a;]sf 5f}F . cfTdf]Gglt M xfdL ;}lgs tflnd ln+b}5f}+ . 151 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

cg'/f]w M xh'/ oxL+ /fhxf];\ -/fhxf]OalS;of];\_ . !#= dfly lbOPsf 5cf]6f jfSox¿ ;fj{gflds kbsf ;fdfGo k|of]ufTds ¿k x'g\ . pko'{Qm jfSodf cfb]z cyjf lgb]{zg / To;sf] kfngfsf] cfzo ;fdfGo¿kdf k|:t't ePsf] b]lvG5 . To;df hf]8tf]8sf] efj b]lv+b}g . hf]8sf] cfTdsyg M d l;kfxLnfO{ sjfh v]nfpF5' ÛÛÛ hf]8sf] cfb]z M ltdL 3/labfdf uOxfn ÛÛÛ tF nfOgdf ldn]/ a;\ ÛÛÛ cfTdf]Gglt M xfdL ;}lgs tflnd lnG5f}F ÛÛÛ ljz]if cg'/f]w M xh'/ oxLF /fh xf]OalS;of];\ t ÛÛÛ ;xof]uL ;fj{gflds kbsf] k|of]u !$= g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;xof]uL ;fj{gflds kbfjnLsf] k|of]udf ljz]if Wofg lbg] u/]sf] kfOG5 . h:t}, pm M pmM /fdaxfb'/ -l;kfxL, kLkf_ cfof] . hf] M of] aLrdf xl/, Zofd, 6+sk|;fbdWo] hf] cfP/ a;] klg x'G5 . sf] M /ftL–/ftL gaf]nLsg cfpg] sf] xf] < -8\o'6Ldf a;]sf] l;kfxL g]kfnL ;]gfsf] SofDk glhs} cfPsf] ckl/lrt JolQmnfO{ cfqmfds efiffdf xsfl//x]sf x'G5g\ ._ ToxfF M ltdLx¿ krf; hgf ToxfF ´'?Kk eP/ a; . oxFf M clxn] oxfF s;sf] 8\o'6L 5 < sxFf M ltdL sxfF k'u]/ cfof} < hxFf M 8\o'6L rflxF /fd|f];Fu u/\ . To;kl5 tF hxfF uP klg d vf]lHbg . csf]{ z}nLaf6 k|:t'lt !%= dfly lbOPsf ;fj{gflds kbx¿nfO{ cfb/fyL{ gfd / ;j{gfd kbfjnL;Fu hf]8]/ klg eGg ;lsG5 . h:t}, pm M /ljnfO{ xh'/n] plxn] af]nfOaS;]sf] lyof] . pm eg] e/v/ kf] cf]Nofª\–6f]Nofª\ ub}{ cfOk'Uof] . hf] M h/;fx]a Û o;kfnfsf] zflGt;]gfdf lgoldt k|lqmofaf6 o; sfnLk|;fb u0faf6 hf];'s} JolQm k¿g\ cyjf 5flgo'g\ . -xfdL cfˆm"v';L zflGt;]gfdf dgf]gog x'g] hjfgsf] rog gu/f}+ . _ sf] M rLˆm;fx]a Û xh'/nfO{ e]6\g aflx/ sf] cfof] < ToxfF M ToxfF -6'Fl8v]ndf_ pkTosfsf ;a} u'Ndsf hjfg k/]8 tflnd lnO/x]sf 5g\ . oxfF M h;f{x]a Û xh'/ oxfF /fhxf]OalS;of];\ . sxfF M xh'/n] xl/axfb'/nfO{ sxfF k7fOaS;]sf] < hxfF M h;f{x]asf] hxfF ;jf/L x'G5, dnfO{ klg pxLF nlualS;of];\ . !^= g]kfnL Jofs/0fdf k|o'Qm ;xof]uL ;fj{gflds kbfjnLsf] k|of]u u/]/ c¿ w]/} sf]6Lsf jfSox¿sf] /rgf ug{ ;lsG5 . To:t}, ;fj{gflds kbfjnLsf] k|of]u u/]/ cg'R5]bsf] klg lgdf{0f ug{ ;lsG5 . h:t},

152 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

kßs'df/ u'/fufO{+sf] 3/ /fd]5fk xf] . pm l;kfxLdf egf{ eP/ gf]s/L ug{ nfu]sf] b; jif{ eof] . kßs'df/ d]xgtL l;kfxL xf] . gf]s/Ldf k|j]z u/]b]lv g} pm Ps lbg klg labf lnP/ 3/ uPsf] 5}g . Ps 306f …cfp6Ú uPsf] klg /]s8 { 5}g . 8\o'6L k/]sf] a]nf ;ts{ eP/ kf]:6df a;]sf] b]lvG5 . n];gfosb]lv rLˆm;fx]a;Ddsf] ;jf/Ldf klg pm st{Jok/fo0ftfdf g} hf]8 lbO/x]sf] x'G5 . To;}n] p;nfO{ g]kfnL ;]gf–;d"xdf Odfgbf/ l;kfxL eg]/ lrlgG5 . sYoefiffsf] ljifout k[ystf !&= efiffsf] d"n ¿k g} sYoefiff xf] . ;+;f/df clwsf+z dflg;x¿ b}lgs Jojxf/df sYoefiffsf] k|of]u u5{g\ eg] ljZjsf] s'n hg;ª\VofdWo] ;fdfGotM Ps ltxfOn] n]Voefiffsf] k|of]u unf{g\ . To;sf/0f ;+;f/df efiffkl/jf/sf] ljsf; k|ydtM sYo efiffaf6} ePsf] a'l´G5 . sYoefiffsf k|d'v k|of]u If]qnfO{ lgDg tflnsfdf k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5 gf]s/L aGbJofkf/ ofqf v]tL ls;fgL z}lIfs If]q ;+:sf/ut k/Dk/f 3/Jojxf/ dgf]/~hg wfld{s :t/ut gftf;DaGw ;fdflhs ;f+:s[lts, hfqf / cGo !*= g]kfnL ;]gfdWo] cg'dfgtM b'O–ltxfO{ -;ª\Vof_ df sYoefiffs} k|of]u x'g] u/]sf] kfOPsf] 5 . jf:tjdf efiffn] dgsf] cd"t{ ljifonfO{ d"t{¿kdf k|:t't ug{ ;xof]u u5{ . To;}n] efiffnfO{ ljrf/ ljlgdosf] cleGg ;fwgsf ¿kdf lnOPsf] xf] . g]kfnL ;]gfdf klxn]sf] t'ngfdf k9]n]v]sf hjfgx¿sf] ;ª\Vof al9/x]sf] 5 . z}lIfs of]Uotf cfh{g u/] klg j}olQms cg'ej / sfo{Ifdtfn] kl5 k/]sf / ;]s]G8nK6gsf] v'nf k|ltof]lutfdf ;ˆmn x'g g;s]sfx¿ l;kfxLdf egf{ ePsf kfOPsf 5g\ . pgLx¿sf dgdf txut ¿kdf xLgtfaf]w eP klg ;]gfdf clgjfo{ ¿kdf kfngf ug'{kg]{ cg'zf;g / st{Jok/fo0ftftˆm{ eg] ljz]if ;hu b]lvG5g\ . To;}n] l;kfxLnfO{ sDd/df v's'/L / Ao"g]6 le/]sf / bflxg] xftdf aGb's af]s]/ Ps} gf;sf] ;}lgs kf];fsdf ;lhPsf JolQmsf ¿kdfdfq x]g'{ plrt xF'b}g . cbDo ;fx;, zf}o{, k/fqmd ePsf / cg'zf;g kfng ug{ tTk/ /fi6«;]jssf ¿kdf d"Nofª\sg ug'{ plrt x'G5 . g]kfnL ;]gfsf] kbLo dof{bfkfng / cfqmfds efiffsf] k|of]u !(= zflGt;'/Iffsf If]qdf sfo{/t g]kfnL ;]gf, g]kfn k|x/L, ;z:q k|x/Ln] kbLo bfloTj kfng ug{ ljz]if ¿kdf pT;flxt b]lvG5g\ . cGo ;]jfdf sfd ug]{ g]kfnsf /fi6«;]jsx¿df cg'zf;g x/fpFb} uPsf] a'l´Psf] 5 . pgLx¿df st{Jok/fo0ftfsf] cefj 5 . t/, g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;]jf–;d"xdf eg] l;kfxLb]lv k|wfg;]gfklt;Ddsf kbflwsf/L /fi6«;]jsx¿n] ;do / k|;ª\ucg';f/ cfqmfds efiffsf] klg k|of]u u/]sf] ;'lgG5 . t/, To;nfO{ pgLx¿n] cfˆg} kbLo st{Jo kfngsf lglDt xf] eGg] dx;'; u5{g\ . /fi6«sf s'g} klg ;]jf;d"xdf 8/, s/ / cg'zf;g ePg eg] kbLo dof{bf sfod /xFb}g . csf]{ s'/f], dflg; crDdsf] k|f0fL xf] . /fd|f] af]nLn] ;D´fpg vf]Hof] eg] dflQG5 . 7"nf] :j/n] xKsfof] eg] 8/fP/ p;sf] dfgl;s cj:yf sdhf]/ aGg;Sg] l:ylt x'g;S5 . To;}n] g]kfnL ;]gfdf pko'{Qm b'j} lsl;dsf] Jojxf/nfO{ ;Gt'ngdf /fv]/ cfb]z cyjf lgb]{zg ug]{ k/fDk/f /x]sf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf Psn sYoefiff @)= g]kfnL ;]gfdf sYoefiffsf] k|of]u;Fu} ljrf/sf] cg'R5]bfTds k|jfx x'g] u5{ . cfjZostf / ;do ;Gbe{cg';f/ j0f{gfTds sYoefiff / ;+o'Qm j0f{gfTds sYoefiffsf] k|of]udf ljz]if hf]8 lbg] ul/G5 . ;fy}, sYo–zAbfTds k|of]u;Fu} cg'R5]bfTds sYo ljrf/x¿ klg k|:t't ul/G5 . h:t}, Psn d cfPF . d 3/ uPF . d < of pm <

153 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

;+o'Qm g]kfnL ;]gfdf z"/f JolQmdfq gf]s/L ug{ kfpF5g\ . of] s:sf] aGb's xf] < el/;So ef]ln g} u'Nddf xflh/ x'g' . lah'nL aQLn] 3/ pHofnf] x'G5 . cg'R5]bfTds k|:t'lt M d]/f] ljrf/df ;}lgs ;]jf g} ;a}eGbf pQd ;]jf xf] . lsgeg] of] ;]jfdf sfo{/t kLkfb]lv k|wfg;]gfklt;Dd sfo{/t ;sn bhf{sf ;}lgsn] 3';, sld;gsf] hfnf]df k/]/ ckdflgt x'g'kb}{g . kljq dft[e"ldsf] ;]jf ub}{ g'gsf] ;f]´f] lrtfP/ rf]vf] dfl;s tnadf ;Gtf]if u/]/ afFRg] cEof; u/]sf] x'G5 . To;}n] sd{7, of]Uo / OdfGfbf/ g]kfnL gful/sn] lgle{stfk"j{s ;]jf ug]{ If]q g} ;}lgs ;]jf xf] . of] ;]jfdf ;]jfsflns kbLo tflndsf ;fy} zflGt;]gfdf efu lng kfpg] cj;/, z}lIfs of]Uotf cfh{g ug]{ / ;flxTo l;h{gfsf ;fy} k|fl1s cg';GwfgfTds lqmofsnfkdf ;d]t ;xeflutfsf] cj;/ k|fKt x'g] u5{ . To;}n] gf]s/L ubf{ cGo ;]jfdfeGbf ;}lgs ;]jfdf g} /dfOnf] x'G5 . ;}lgs ;]jfsflns tflndsf] efiff @!= g]kfnL ;]gfdf gf]s/L ug]{ p2]Zon] v'nf k|ltof]lutfåf/f l;kfxL / ;]s]G8 nK6gdf egf{ ePsfx¿n] clgjfo{ ¿kdf kbLo ;]jfsfnLg tflnd lng'kg]{ x'G5 . cfkm";Fu zfl/l/s tGb'?:tL / z}lIfs of]Uotf eP/dfq x'Fb}g . g]kfnL ;]gfdf gj;]jfk|j]zLx¿n] clgjfo{¿kdf ;}Go tflnd lng'kg]{ x'G5 . tflndn] kbLo bfloTj lgjf{x ub}{ cg'zfl;t hLjg latfpg ;xof]u k'¥ofpF5 . @@= g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{ tflnd lb+bf s] s:tf] efiffsf] k|of]u x'G5 eGg] s'/f ;]gfsf] cfGtl/s ljifo eP klg 6'Fl8v]n / kN6gsf] v'nf k6fª\lugLdf tflnd lbOg] ePsf] x'gfn] ;}Go tflnddf k|of]u ul/g] ;ª\s]tfTds / zAbfTds efiff uf]Ko /x]sf] b]lv+b}g . @#= ;}Go tflndsf] nflu g]kfnL efiffdf ;/bf/ 5ljnfn pkfWofo …;"l/Ú n] …sjfotÚ eGg] k':ts n]v]sf lyP . of] k':ts clxn];Dd 5flkPsf] 5 eGg] hfgsf/Ldf cfPsf] 5}g . ;}Go ;ª\u|xfnosf] clen]v zfvfdf ;f] tflnd k':ts ;'/lIft /x]sf] 5 eGg] s'/f] ;}Go clen]vx¿sf] ljj/0ffTds ;"rLkqsf] k|sflzt k|ltsf] cWoogaf6 k|:6 x'G5 . @$= ;}lgs ;]jfsflns tflnd ljleGg r/0fdf ;~rfng x'g] u5{ . ;}Go kf];fsdf ;lhP/ bflxg] xftdf aGb's lnPsf / sDd/df v's'/L / Ao"g]6 le/]sf ;}Gox¿nfO{ kª\lQma4 eP/ pleg] tflndb]lv b'Zdgsf] cfqmd0faf6 aRg] / k|Tofqmd0f ug]{ h:tf s7f]/ tflnd;d]t lbOG5 . @%= ;ts{ eP/ pleg], uf]8f km6\ofpg] -uf]8f kmf6\_, ;nfdLsf] nflu tof/L x'g] / ;nfdL ck{0f ug]{ -;nfdL ck{0f sjfh_, a9fOFsf lglDt kf]lh;gdf /xg], a9fO{F ug]{ cflb ljifodf tflnd u/fpg] ;}Go clws[tn] tflnddf ;xefuLx¿nfO{ ;}Go;ª\s]t / ;}Goefiffdf cjut u/fpF5g\ . ;}Go tflnd ljleGg txsf] x'G5 . ;]jfk|j]zsf] tflnd, ljifo lj1sf] tflnd, u'Nd, cGtu'{Nd, If]qLo cyjf k[tgf :t/Lo, cGtk[{tgf, cGt/f{li6«o ldq/fi6«sf s'g} d'n'sdf lnOg] pRr:t/Lo ;]jfsfnLg tflnd cflbdf kof]u| x'g] efiffsf] tflTjs cyjf ljifout / txut leGgtf x'g;S5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;Gbe{ut eflifs ljljwtf @^= g]kfnL ;]gfdf ;do / ljifout ;Gbe{ cyjf k|;ª\ucg';f/ efiffk|of]udf leGgkg kfOG5 . k|d'v ljifo / ;Gbe{nfO{ tnsf a'Fbfdf k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5 M -s_ ;]gfsf] cf}krfl/s sfof{noLo hg;Dks{sf] efiff -;fdfGo_, -v_ ;]gfsf] cgf}krfl/s 3/fo;L k|of]hgsf] efiff, -u_ ;}Go;]jf;Fu ;DalGwt lgb{]zgfTds efiff,

154 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

-3_ ;}Go tflnd, ;?jf, a9'jf, zflGt;]gf, cfGtl/s lab|f]x, ;LdfIf]qsf] ;'/Iff, cGt/f{li6«o o'4, ;}Go ;fdu|Lx¿sf] cfk"lt{ / e08f/0f–;'/Iff, -ª_ ;}Go ;]jf;Fu ;DalGwt df}lvs cfb]zsf] efiff, cflb . @&= cfkm"eGbf dflyNnf] txdf sfo{/t xflsdx¿sf] sYo efiffsf] k|of]un] ;}Go;]jfsf hjfgx¿nfO{ /fxt cyjf k|f]T;fxg ldNg;S5 . ;]gf;Fu ;DalGwt ;a} lnvtsf] cfzo ;}Go;]jfsf ;a} txsf hjfgn] tTsfn k9]/ yfxf kfpF5g\ eGg] lglZrt x'Fb}g . ;/f]sf/jfnfO{ lnlvtkq yDofP, s;}n] lnlvt kqsf] a]xf]/f ;'gfPdf yfxf x'g] s'/f xf] . w]/}h;f] hjfgx¿n] df}lvs cfZjf;g / hjfgx¿ aLr rn]sf] xNnfnfO{ ljZjf; dfGg' kg]{ l:ylt x'g;S5 . ;}Go;]jfdf ‘sfnLkf]s]’ efiffsf] k|of]u @*= …sfnLkf]s]Ú efiffsf ljifodf efiff lj1fgsf] Oltxf;df st} pNn]v ePsf] kfOFb}g . t/, ;dfhdf sltko ljifd kl/l:ylt pTkGg eP/ ;Dxflng g;s]sf] / cfkm"eGbf dflysf] JolQm;Fu v'n]/ cfˆgf s'/f eGg;d]t g;Sg] l:yltdf …sfnLkf]s]Ú efiffsf] k|of]u x'G5 . …sfnLkf]s]Ú eg]sf] ds}sf] 3f]uf nfUg g;s]/ j}slNks ds}sf] 3f]ufsf ¿kdf nfu]sf] P]+h]?h:t} sfnf] 3f]uf] xf] . …sfnLkf]s]Ú df u]8f eGbf klg k|foM sfnf] w"nf] x'G5 . of] w"nf] ePsf] 3f]uf] g} …sfnLkf]s]Ú xf] . of] 3f]uf] sdnf] x'G5 . htg u/]/ e'ª\u|fdf kf]Nof] eg] vfg ldN5 . dL7} x'G5 . of] …sfnLkf]s]Ú e'6]/ vfg, l9+8f] agfP/ vfg ldNb}g . To;}n] …sfnLkf]s]Ú ds}sf] kl/jf/df clNkN6f], Psnsf6] / c:jfefljs 3f]uf] ePh:t} ;}Go kl/jf/ cyjf ;}Go ;]jfsf] sYoefiff kl/jf/df …sfnLkf]s]Ú efiffnfO{ af]Ng / ;'Gg gldNg] cyjf c:jfefljs njhsf ¿kdf lng ;lsG5 . ;}Go ;]jfdf hLjgsf x/]s If]qdf ljifdkl/l:ylt ef]lu/x]sf] JolQm cyjf hjfgn] af]Ng] efiff ds}kl/jf/sf] c:jfefljs 3f]uf] …sfnLkf]s]Ú h:t} c:jfefljs g} x'g] u5{ . …sfnLkf]s]Ú efiffsf] k|of]u ug'{kg]{ cj:yf a'Fbfut¿kdf lgDgcg';f/ lrq0f ug{ ;lsG5 . -s_ w]/} jif{;Dd ;}Go;]jfdf /x]/ klg kbf]Gglt cyjf a9'jf gx'Fbf, -v_ zflGt ;]gfdf hfg dgf]gog gx'Fbf, -u_ 3/fo;L kl/l:ylt lau|Fbf, -3_ ;xsdL{ ;fyLx¿;Fu af]nL–Jojxf/ lau|Fbf, -ª_ xflsdx¿ cfkm"k|lt ?i6 x'Fbf, cflb @(= dflysf] dfgl;s cj:yfdf /x]sf ;}Go ;]jf cGtu{t sfo{/t /fi6«;]jsx¿n] k|of]u ug]{ efiff …sfnLkf]s]Ú xf] . dfgl;s cj:yf ;Gt'lnt gePsf] JolQmn] af]Ng] dgf]jfbfTds sYoefiffnfO{ klg …sfnLkf]s]Ú g} elgG5 . ;}Go;]jf cg'zfl;t / st{Jolgi7 ;]jf;d"x ePsf] x'gfn] cfkm"eGbf dflyNnf] bhf{sf xflsd;Fu cfˆgf] dfgl;s ;Gt'ng lalu|Psf] cj:yfdf k|of]u x'g] …sfnLkf]s]Ú efiff af]lnxfNb}gg\ . oyf;Dej ;+oldt x'G5g\ . ;Dxflng] k|of; u5{g\ . ;Dxflng g;s]/ …sfnLkf]s]Ú efiff af]lnxfn] eg] To:tf] efiff af]Ng] /fi6«;]js ;}Go hjfgnfO{ c:ktfndf pkrf/fy{ k7fOG5 cyjf ;}lgs sfg'g cg';f/ sfo{jfxL ul/G5 . o;/L ;}Go ;]jfdf sfo{/t JolQmn] k|of]u ug]{ efiffsf] gd'gf k|:t't ug'{ plrt b]lv+b}g t/, pgLx¿n] k|of]u ug]{ sYoefiffsf] ;ª\s]t eg] k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5 M -s_ cg'xf/df dnLgtf b]lvg', -v_ af]nLdf c:ki6tf / cJofjxfl/stfsf] cfef; kfOg', -u_ vfg, a:g, 8\o'6L ug{ / lx+88'n ug{ klg dg gnfu]h:tf] b]lvg', -3_ hLjgk|lt g} lg/fz b]lvg', -ª_ cfkm"nfO{ ;DxfNg;Sg] sf]xL klg gePsf] dx;'; ug'{ cflb . #)= o;/L ;fdflhs Jojxf/ / s'g} klg kbLo bfloTj lgjf{x u/]sf JolQmn] k|of]u ug]{ …sfnLkf]s] efiffÚ sf] cg';Gwfg / cWoog cfjZos 5 .

155 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf g]kfnL ;]gfdf ’;'Tn] cyjf kfN;] efiff’ sf] k|of]u #!= …;'Tn] efiffÚ sf] gfd klg efifflj1fgsf] Oltxf;df sxLF pNn]v ePsf] e]l6+b}g . t/ ;dfhsf ljleGg kIf / /fi6«;]jfsf ljleGg txdf sfo{/t JolQmn] k|of]u ug]{ u/]sf] efiffsf] cg';Gwfg / cWoogsf qmddf k|fof]lus efiffsf] Ps ¿knfO{ …;'Tn] efiffÚ sf] gfd lbg ;lsg] l:ylt b]vfk/]sf] xf] . k|f/lDes cWoogcg';f/ ;'tnLsf] cfsf/h:tf] efiffsf] ;+lIfKt ¿k g} …;'Tn] efiffÚ xf] eGg ;lsG5 . of] efiff ;}Go;]jfsf JolQmn] dfq geP/ ;dfhdf ;fdfGo ¿kdf hLjg u'hf/f u/]sf JolQmn] ;d]t k|of]u ug'{ pko'Qm x'Fb}g . …;'Tn] efiffÚ sf] k|of]u ug]{ cj:yf lgDg a'Fbfdf k|:t't 5 M -s_ s'g} k'/fgf] cyjf gofF ljifosf] ;Gbe{ut 1fg 5 t/, kfN;] efiff cyjf ;'Tn] efiffsf] k|of]u u/]/ csf]{ JolQmsf] dfgl;s cj:yf vnanlng] u/L eoeLt jftfj/0f tof/ ug'{, -v_ ;j{;fwf/0f dflg;n] s]xL uNtL u/]sf] b]lv+b}g . t/ p;sf] dgsf] efj a'‰g] lgotn] cgfjZos k|Zgx¿ ;f]w]/ p;nfO{ x}/fg kfg'{, -u_ g;fsf] ;'/df ;j{;fwf/0fnfO{ b'Mv lbg] lgot /fVg', -3_ 8\o'6Ldf /xFbf, xflsdn] sfd lj/fPjfkt xKsfpFbf, 3/3/fo;L ´u8f kbf{, s'g} 6]G;g cyjf kL/ k/]/ /GylgPsf] cj:yf, cflb . #@= …;'Tn] cyjf kfN;L efiffÚ sf] k|of]unfO{ klg lgDg a'Fbfdf k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5 M -s_ af6fdf ;j{;fwf/0f dflg;sf] cfjthfjt eO/x]sf] 5 . ToxL a]nf ;}Go kf];fs nufPsf cyjf cfp6 8«];df b]lvPsf ;}lgs hjfg c;fGble{s k|Zg ug{ ;'? u5{g\ M …cF ;fFlRr, of] s] sf] ¿v c/] . ef]u6]sf] ¿v xf] < -Tof] ljzfn d;nfsf] ¿v xf] . yfxf kfP/ hfg]/ klg yfxf gkfPsf] / ghfg]sf] cj:yf l;h{gf ug]{ ._ /fli6«o r'gfj glhs} cfPsf] 5 x}g < ef]6 sxfF 5flk+b} 5 < hgs lzIff ;fdu|L s]Gb|df l;kfxLsf] kf]i6 a;]h:tf] 5lg Û lsg xF <Ú dflysf k|Zgsf] hafkm ;j{;fwf/0fn] lbg] cj:yf lyPg . t/, obfsbf o:tf] cj:yf klg l;h{gf x'g] u5{ . To; cj:yfdf s] pQ/ lbg] < o;f] x]bf{ cfkm";Fu k|Zg ug]{ JolQm l;kfxL h:tf] klg b]lv+b}g t/ p;sf] lqmofsnfkn] l;kfxL xf] eGg] dx;'; x'G5 . -v_ w]/} ;do klxn]sf] s'/f xf] . xl/k|;fb kf}8]n xn];L dxfb]jsf] bz{g u/]/ sf7df8f}+tkm{ kmls{b} lyof] . To;a]nf :yn oftfoftsf] ;'ljwf lyPg . xjfO{ oftfoftsf] pkof]u ug]{ p;sf] cfly{s x}l;ot lyPg . To;}n] k}bn ofqfs} qmddf pm cf]vN9'ª\uf ahf/df af; a:of] . /ftL ;]gfsf] u:tL lyof] . asfObf;Fu 3/j]6L;Fu af; dfu]/ a;]sf], 3/j]6L klg pRr s'n3/lgofF ePsf], a]n'sf pxLF eft vfP/ bnfgsf] vl6ofdf ;'t]sf] k/b]zL;Fu u'Ndaf6 u:tLdf lgl:sPsf] l;kfxL k|Zg u5{ M clxn] /ft k/]sf] 5 . tkfO{F af; a;]/ ;'Tg' eP5 . of] 3/ xf] < of] 3/df dflg; a:5g\ ls ufO{, e}+;L, afv|f a:5g\ < of] 3/df ¿v klg 5g\ . as}gfsf] ¿vdf pHofnf] eP 5 x}g t Û u:tLdf lx+8]sf] l;kfxLnfO{ ;]jf ;DaGwL / 3/3/fo;L lrGtf k/]sf] b]lv+b}g . t/ jf; a;]sf] k/b]zLnfO{ t;f{pg pm kfN;] cyjf ;'Tn] efiffsf] k|of]u ul//x]sf] 5 . ;fob /flq u:tLdf lgl:sPsf ;'/Iff lgsfon] k|of]u ug]{ ;fª\s]lts efiff klg x'g;S5 . o:tf s'/f s]xL ;j{;fwf/0fn] ef]u]sf xf]nfg\ . t/ o:tf ;fgfltgf s'/fdf s;}n] ph'/L ub}{g . ph'/L u/]df ;}Go lgodfjnL cg';f/ sfo{jfxL x'Fbf] xf] . o:tf ljifo ef]ufpg] / ef]Ug] JolQmd} ;Lldt x'G5g\ . g]kfnL ;]gfsf] lzi6 efiff ##= g]kfnL ;]gf cg'zfl;t / lzi6 efiffsf] k|of]u ug]{ /fi6«;]js xf] . p;n] cfˆgf] ;}lgs hLjg / ;]jflgj[Q

156 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* hLjgdf ;d]t cg'zf;g / lzi6tfsf] kof]u| ul//x]sf] x'G5 . ;}Go ;]jfaf6 lgj[Q eP klg p;n] lgj[lQe/0f kfpF5 . To;}n] pm ;}GozlQmsf] cfjZostf k/]sf] a]nfdf xflh/ eP/ 8\o'6L ug{ afWo x'G5 . …g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;]jf /fi6«sf nflu / /fi6«sf] ;xof]u g]kfnL ;]gfnfO{Ú eGg] dxTjk"0f{ egfO k|rlnt 5 . ;fdflhs tyf kbLo bfloTj lgjf{x u/]sf JolQmx¿sf] k|of]ufTds efiff efifflj1fgsf] cg';Gwfg / cWoogk/Dk/fdf cfjZos ljifosf ¿kdf /x]sf] 5 . af:tjdf :j/sf] …cÚ j0f{b]lv Jo~hgsf] …xÚ j0f{;Ddsf] ;+of]hgaf6 k|fof]lus ¿kdf lgikGg x'g] zAbx¿sf] ljsl;t ¿k g} jfSo xf] . jfSosf] ljsl;t ¿k cg'R5]b tyf 7"nf7"nf u|Gysf ¿kx¿ x'g\ . dflg; ;fdflhs k|f0fL ePsf] x'gfn] p;n] k|of]u ug]{ efiff klg ;dfheGbf leGg x'Fb}g . g]kfnL ;]gf klg ;dfhsf cleGg cª\u x'g\ . …;}Go ;]jfÚ d'n'ssf ljleGg ;]jf;d"xdWo] Ps 5'§} ;]jf xf] . o;n] /fi6«sf tkm{af6 ag]sf ;+ljwfg, P]g–sfg'g dfGb5 tfklg o;sf] 5'§} …;}Go lgodfjnLÚ klg x'G5 . ;]gf d'n'sdf cGofo cTofrf/, lyrf]ldrf] ;xb}g . o;lj?4 n8\g] p;sf] cfˆg} an / tfut x'G5 . Tof] 5'§ } tfut slxn] lnlvt¿kdf cleJoQm x'G5 . slxn] sYoefiffsf dfWodaf6 kl:6G5| . slxn] ToxL ;]gfsf] Nofst / tfut ;fª\s]lts lzi6 efiffdf cfPsf] x'G5 . To;}n] ;}lgs ;]jfsf] ljleGg ;Gbe{df k|of]u x'g] sYoefiffsf ljleGg ¿k b]lvG5g\ . lgisif{ #$= ;docg';f/ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] gfd km]l/Psf] 5 . g]kfnsf] Oltxf;df ls/ft sfnb]lv clxn];Dd /fi6«sf] k|d'v ;'/Iffb:tf ;]gfsf ljleGg ;+/rgf, kbLo efiff, kf];fs, ;]jfsflns tflnd, ljleGg klbs ju{sf] l;h{gf x'b}F cfPsf] 5 . d'Vo s'/f] s] 5 eg] g]kfnL ;]gf cg'zfl;t, lzi6 / tflnd k|fKt /fi6« ;]jssf ¿kdf b]vfk/]sf] 5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf k|o'Qm sYoefiffsf ljleGg ¿kdWo] j0f{dflqs, zAbu'lDkmt / jfSo;+of]lht ¿k g} ;jf]{kl/ dxTjsf] /x]sf] 5 . #%= …;}Go ;]jfÚ cGtu{t ljleGg bhf{sf ;]gfx¿n] cfˆgf] ;do / ;Gbe{ cg's"n sYoefiffsf] kof]u| u5{g \ . h:t}M ;}Go tflnd, o'4, ;Ldf;'/Iff, /fi6«k|d'v tyf ;/sf/k|d'vsf] ;'/Iffk|aGw, ;fj{hlgs sfo{qmd cyjf ;ef;df/f]x, /flqef]h, lbjfef]h, cGt/f{li6«o If]qsf ljlzi6 kfx'gfsf] ;Ddfgdf cfof]hgf x'g] sfo{qmd, u0f–u'Ndsf v]ns'b / dgf]/~hgfTds sfo{qmd, gf6\o, ;+uLt, uLt, k|x;g cflb_ df k|of]u ug]{ sYoefiff cltlzi6 / ;Ddflgt x'g] u5{ . jf:tjdf s'g} klg bhf{sf JolQmsf] :t/ut kl/ro p;n] k|of]u ug]{ sYoefiffsf] ¿kaf6 kfpg ;lsG5 . j0f{ljGof;, kbfjnL, jfSof+z / jfSosf] k|of]udf hf]8 lbg] k|j[lQ g]kfnL ;]gfdf /x]sf] kfOG5 . g]kfnL ;]gfdf k|of]u x'g] sYoefiffsf] :j¿k / ljz]iftfnfO{ lgDg a'Fbfdf k|:t't ug{ ;lsG5 M -s_ gkfn]L ;]gfdf t,F tkfO{,F ltdL, xh'/ h:tf ;fj{gflds kbx¿sf] kof]u| k|;ª\u / bhf{cg';f/ ul/G5, -v_ kLkfb]lv ;'j]bf/;Dd k|of]u ePsf] sYoefiffdf :t/Lotfsf] sdL dx';; eP klg ;]s]G8nK6gb]lv k|wfg;]gfklt;Dd axfnjfnf clws[tn] eg] kbLo dof{bf sfod x'g] lzi6 efiffsf] k|of]utkm{ ljz]if hf]8 lbG5g\, -u_ ;}Go ;]jfdf ljleGg ;d"x x'G5g\ . h:t}– lrlsT;f, Ol~hlgol/ª\, Kof/f;'6, b}jLk|sf]ksf] p4f/, k|zf;g, k|fljlws, cflb . ;}Go ;]jf;d"x;Fu ;'xfpFbf] cyjf ljifout sYoefiffsf] k|of]u x'g] u5{, -3_ g]kfnL ;]gfx¿ …8\o'6L ckmÚ ePkl5 :jtGqh:tf b]lvP klg pgLx¿n] kbLo dof{bf pNnª\3g u/]/ sYoefiffsf] k|of]u ub}{gg\ . -ª_ …;}Go ;]jfÚ cg'zfl;t / st{Jolgi7 ;]jf xf] . o; ;]jfdf sfo{/t hjfgx¿sf] efiff klg cg'zfl;t g} x'g'k5{ . x'G5 .

lk|o arg af]Ng]x?sf] sf]xL klg zq' xF'b}g. — rf0fSo

157 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf cd]l/sL ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs æn]hg ckm d]l/6Æ / g]kfn–cd]l/sf s"6gLlts ;DaGwsf] :yfkgf

– pkk|fWofks 8f= ljgf]b yfkf k[i7e"ld != g]kfn / cd]l/sf* ef}uf]lns b[li6n] 6f9f /x]sfn] g]kfnsf] PsLs/0f sfo{ ;DkGg ePkl5 / cd]l/sfn] :jtGqtf k|fKt u/]kl5 tTsfn} b'j} b]zaLr s'g} ;DaGw sfod x'g ;s]sf] lyPg . /f0ff zf;gsfndf klg k|foM /f0ff k|wfgdGqLx¿n] ef/tdf /x]sf cª\u|]hx¿;Fudfq ;DaGw hf]8\g] gLlt lnPsfn] g]kfnsf] cd]l/sfnufot ljZjsf cGo /fi6««x¿;Fu s'g} ;DaGw sfod x'g ;s]sf] lyPg . t/ /f0ffsfnsf bf];|f clGtd k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/n] g]kfnsf] j}b]lzs gLltdf kl/jt{g ub}{ ljZjsf cGo /fi6««x¿;Fu klg g]kfnsf] s"6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8\g] 3f]if0ff u/] . pgsf] of] gLlt;Fu} g]kfn / cd]l/sf tTsfnLg ;dodf ljkl/t /fhgLlts l;4fGt / Joj:yf ePsf /fi6««x¿ klg Ps–cfk;df glhs x'g k'u] . h;cg';f/ ljleGg sf/0fx¿n] ubf{ ;g\ !($& clk|n @% sf lbg b'O{ b]zaLr jfl0fHo tyf d}qL ;lGw ;DkGg eO{ s"6gLlts ;DaGw :yfkgf ePsf] lyof] . t/ g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLr Ps}rf]6L s"6gLlts ;DaGw :yfkgf ePsf] lyPg . of] ;lGwsf] cj:yf;Dd cfOk'Ug ljleGg 36gfx¿n] dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]n]sf lyP . tLdWo]sf] Ps k|d'v / tTsfnLg 36gf lyof]Ù bf];|f] ljZj o'4kl5 cd]l/sL ;/sf/n] cfˆgf] ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs …n]hg ckm d]l/6Ú g]kfnnfO{ x:tfGt/0f ug'{ / To; cj;/df b'j} b]zn] s"6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8\g k|an OR5f JoQm ug'{ . cd]l/sL ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs ‘n]hg ckm d]l/6Ú sf] x:tfGt/0f -;g\ !($^ gf]e]Da/_ @= g]kfnsf] PsLs/0fsf] yfngL;Fu} g]kfnL ;]gfn] ljb]zL ;]gfx¿;Fu klg o'4 ug'{ k/]sf] lyof] . h;cg';f/, /fhf k[YjLgf/fo0f zfxsf lj?4 dsjfgk'/sf /fhf lbUaGwg ;]gsf] ;xof]usf] nflu a+ufnsf gjfa dL/sfl;dn] u'/lug vfFsf] g]t[Tjdf / sflGtk'/sf /fhf hok|sfz dNnsf] ;xof]usf] nflu ef/tdf /x]sf cª\u|]hx¿n] SofK6]g lsgnssf] g]t[Tjdf ;]gf k7fPsfn] g]kfnL ;]gfn] Tolta]nf g} a+ufnL / cª\u|]h ;]gfx¿;Fu o'4 ug'{ k/]sf] lyof] . To:t}, axfb'/ zfxsf] gfoaLsfndf g]kfnL ;]gfn] ltAatL / lrlgofF ;]gf;Fu / eLd;]g yfkfsf] k|wfgdlGqTjsfndf cª\u|]h ;]gf;Fu 7"nf] o'4 g} ug'{ k/]sf] lyof] . tL o'4x¿df g]kfnL ;]gfx¿n] 7"nf] jL/tf k|bz{g u/]sf lyP . To;}u/L ;g\ !*%& df k|wfgdGqL h+uaxfb'/n] ef/tdf ePsf] l;kfxL ljb|f]xdf cª\u|]hx¿nfO{ ;xof]u ug{ k7fPsf] g]kfnL ;]gfx¿n] w]/} 7fpFsf] ljb|f]x bafO{ g]kfnL ;]gfsf] jL/Tj k|bz{g ug{ ;kmn ePsf lyP . To;sf] ( jif{kl5 ;g\ !*^^ df cd]l/sfdf ePsf] u[x o'4 -l;len jf/_ df klg k|wfgdGqL h+uaxfb'/n] cd]l/sL /fi6«klt ca|fxd lnª\sg;dIf g]kfnL ;]gf k7fO{ ;xof]u ug]{ OR5f JoQm u/]sf lyP .1 g]kfnsf] pQm k|:tfjnfO{ /fi6«klt ca|fxd lnª\sgn] ;sf/fTds?kn] lnPklg pgn] To;sf] nflu g]kfnL ;]gfsf] ;xof]u lnPgg\ . olb Tolta]nf g]kfnL ;]gfx¿n] cd]l/sfsf] u[x o'4 bafpg e"ldsf v]Ng] cj;/ kfPsf] eP cGt/f{li6«o hutdf g]kfn / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] uf}/j cem a9\g hfGYof] xf]nf . ;g\ !*%) df a]nfotsf] e|d0fdf hfFbf a]nfotsf nflu cd]l/sL /fhb"t n/]G;;Fu nG8gdf e]6]/ u/]sf] kl/ro cfbfgk|bfg2 af6 k|]l/t eO{ cd]l/sfsf] u[x o'4df ;}lgs ;xof]u u/L b'O{ b]zaLr ldqtf hf]8\g] k|oTg k|wfgdGqL h+uaxfb'/n] u/]sf x'g;S5g\ . ;g\ !()* df k|wfgdGqL rGb|zdz]/ klg a]nfotsf] e|d0fdf hfFbf cd]l/sL /fhb"t;Fu kl/ro cfbfg–k|bfg u/]sf lyP .3 t/ tL s'/fx¿n]dfq g]kfn / cd]l/sfnfO{ glhs agfpg ;s]sf] lyPg .

* oxfF cd]l/sf eGgfn] ;+o'Qm /fHo cd]l/sf eGg] a'‰g'k5{ . 1 jN8{dfs{ OG;fOSnf]k]l8of ckm b g];g M Pl;of PG8 cf]l;ofgf, ef]nd $, 8]l6«cf]6, ldlrug M ufn] l/;r{, gfOGy Ol8;g, !((*, k[= $)^Ù ljho s'df/ dfgGw/, P slDk|x]lG;e lx:6«L ckm g]kfn–rfOgf l/n];G;\ ck 6' !(%% P= 8L=, ef]nd !, -Go' lbNnL M P8«f]O6 klAn;;{, @))$_, kfbl6Kk0fL g++= #!, k[= @#% af6 p4[t . 2 -s_ k'?iff]Qd zdz]/ h=a=/f=, >L # x¿sf] tYo j[QfGt, -sf7df8f}+ M ljBfyL{ k':ts e08f/, @)%(, bf];|f] ;+:s/0f_, k[= ^$ . -v_ kb\d h+uaxfb'/ /f0ff, nfOkm ckm dxf/fhf ;/ h+uaxfb'/, -sf7df8f}+ M /Tg k':ts e08f/, !(*), bf];|f] d'b|0f_, k[= !@( . 3 uf]kfn lzjfsf]6L / /fds'df/ bfxfn, cGt/f{li6«o /fhgLlt, -sf7df8f}+ M /Tg k':ts e08f/, @)^), ;ftf}+ ;+:s/0f_, k[= $!$ .

158 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

#= g]kfn / cd]l/sfnfO{ glhs t'NofO{ s'6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8\g] cj:yf;Dd k'¥ofpg dxTjk"0f{{ e"ldsf v]Ng] sfd bf];|f] ljZjo'4n] u¥of] . bf];|f] ljZjo'4df g]kfnn] ldq/fi6««x¿sf] kIfdf o'4df efu lnPsfn] g]kfnL / cd]l/sL ;]gfx¿n] klxnf] k6s Ps–cfk;df glhs x'g] cj;/ k|fKt u/]] . pQm o'4df g]kfnL ;]gfx¿n] b]vfPsf] axfb'/Laf6 cd]l/sL ;/sf/, ;]gf / hgtf Hofb} k|efljt ePsf lyP . o'4df ldq/fi6««x¿ ljhoL ePkl5 k|wfgdGqL h'4zdz]/n] cd]l/sL /fi6««klt x\of/L P;= 6'«dgnfO{ awfO{ Pj+ z'esfdgf ;Gb]z klg k7fP .4 ;f]xL ;dodf nG8gl:yt g]kfnL ldlg:6/ hg/n l;+xzdz]/ /f0ffn] klg g]kfn ;/sf/sf] tkm{af6 ;g\ !($% sf] cGTolt/ cd]l/sfsf] e|d0f u/] . pQm e|d0fsf] cj;/df pgn] cd]l/sL /fi6«klt x\of/L P;= 6'«dg Pj+ cGo pRr kbflwsf/Lx¿;Fu e]6;d]t u/] .5 o;}qmddf, bf];|f] ljZj o'4kl5 ;g\ !($^ h'nfO{df cd]l/sfsf] ljb]zdGqfno / o'4dGqfnosf] cltlysf¿kdf g]kfnsf] Ps ;b\efjgf d08nn] klg cd]l/sfsf] e|d0f u¥of] .6 pQm ;b\efjgf d08nsf] g]t[Tj tTsfnLg k"jL{ sdflG8ª\ hg/n aa/zdz]/ /f0ffn] u/]sf lyP eg] n]lˆ6g]G6 hg/n Ps/fhzdz]/, d]h/ hg/n ls/0fzdz]/, n]lˆ6g]G6 s0f]{n k|sfzhª\u, d]h/ s0f]{n ;'/]Gb|axfb'/ zfx klg e|d0fdf ;+nUg lyP . o;/L s] b]lvG5 eg] pQm ;b\efjgf d08nsf ;a} ;b:ox¿ ;]gfsf pRr kbflwsf/Lx¿dfq lyP . bz lbg;Dd cd]l/sfdf /x]sf] pQm ;b\efjgf d08nnfO{ cd]l/sL ;/sf/n] ;/sf/L cltlysf¿kdf 7"nf] ;Tsf/ u/L jfl;ª\6g / Go'of]s{nufotsf :yfgx¿sf] b[Zofjnf]sg u/fpg'sf] ;fy} kmf}hL tflndsf] k|bz{g;d]t u/fPsf] lyof] . e]63f6sf] cj;/df cd]l/sL /fi6««klt x\of/L P;= 6«'dgn] o'4df g]kfnn] ldq/fi6x¿«« nfO{ lbPsf] ;}lgs ;xof]usf] ;/fxgf ub}{ g]kfn;uF ldqtfsf] xft cufl8 a9fpg cd]l/sL ;/sf/n] klg Ps ;b\efjgf d08nnfO{ g]kfnsf] e|d0fdf k7fpg] s'/f JoQm u/] . Tolta]nf cd]l/sL /fi6««klt 6«'dgn] lrgf]sf] nflu cfˆgf] Ps tl:j/ klg g]kfnL ;b\efjgf d08nsf] xft k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/nfO{ k7fPsf lyP7 eg] g]kfnL ;b\efjgf d08nn] /fhf lqe'jgsf] tkm{af6 /fi6««klt 6«'dgnfO{ …ç /fd k§Ú lae"if0f;d]t k|bfg u/]sf] lyof] .8 $= cd]l/sL /fi6««klt 6«'dgn] g]kfnL ;b\efjgf d08n;dIf JoQm u/]sf] s'/f cg';f/ g]kfn;Fu ldqtf cufl8 a9fpg Ps ;b\efjgf d08n g]kfn k7fpg] / g]kfnL ;]gfn] bf];|f] ljZjo'4df ldq/fi6«x¿nfO{ u/]sf] ;xof]u / b]vfPsf] axfb'/Lsf] sb/ ug{ cd]l/sL ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs …n]hg ckm d]l/6Ú (Legion of Merit) -l8u|L ckm lrkm sdf08/_ k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/nfO{ x:tfGt/0f ug]{ ljrf/ u/] . To;sf nflu /fi6««klt 6«'dgn] ef/tdf /x]sf cd]l/sL sfo{jfxs /fhb"t hh{ cf/= ld/]nsf] g]t[Tjdf Ps ;b\efjgf d08nnfO{ sf7df8f}+ k7fP . h;cg';f/ ;g\ !($^ gf]e]Da/df ld/]n sf7df8f}+ cfOk'u] / k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/nfO{ cd]l/sL ;/sf/sf] tkm{af6 cd]l/sL ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs …n]hg ckm d]l/6Ú x:tfgfGt/0f u/] .9 %= pQm cj;/df hh{ cf/= ld/]n;Fu} g]kfn cfPsf cd]l/sL ldlg:6/ NjfO{ 8An'= x]G8/;gn] …s'g} ljb]zL /fi6««x¿sf k|d'v JolQmnfO{ ;+o'Qm /fHo cd]l/sfn] lbg] ;Ddfgx¿dWo] of] ;Ddfg ;a}eGbf 7"nf] xf]Ú eGg] s'/f JoQm ub}{ klxnf] / bf];|f] ljZj o'4df ldq/fi6«x¿;Fu ldn]/ g]kfnL ;]gfn] b]vfPsf] axfb'/Lsf] k|z+;f;d]t u/]sf lyP .10 o;/L bf];|f] ljZj o'4kl5 ljZjs} Ps zlQmzfnL b]zsf] ?kdf b]vf k/]sf] cd]l/sfn] g]kfnL ;]gfn] klxnf] / bf];|f] ljZj o'4df b]vfPsf] axfb'/Lsf] k|z+;f / ;Ddfg u/]/ Tolt 7"nf] ;}lgs kbs lbg' g]kfn / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] nflu Hofb} uf}/jsf] s'/f lyof] . cd]l/sfn] cfˆgf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs g]kfnnfO{ k|bfg ug'{n] cd]l/sfn] g]kfnnfO{ dxTjk"0f{{ b[li6sf]0fn] x]/]sf] k|i6 x'G5 . ^= k|foM Oltxf;sf k':tsx¿df klxnf] / bf];|f] ljZj o'4df g]kfnn] ldq/fi6«x¿sf] kIfdf ;}lgs k7fP/ ;xof]u u/]afkt ePsf] kmfObfsf] s'/f p7fpFbf g]kfnn] 7"nf] wg/fzL k|fKt u/]sf] s'/f pNn]v ul/Psf] kfOG5 . t/ wg eGg]

4 ljj]s l3ld/], æg]kfn–cd]l/sf ;DaGwÆ, -sf7df08f}+ M lqe'jg ljZjljBfno, dfgljsL tyf ;fdflhs zf:q ;+sfo, /fhgLltzf:q s]Gb|Lo ljefu, ck|sflzt zf]wkq–:gftsf]Q/ tx, @)^#_, k[= #) . 5 æ!($&–!(*& M g]kfn–cd]l/sf ;DaGwÆ :jtGq ljZj, -jif{ @), c+s !, !(*& clk|n_, k[= $ . oxfFaf6 cufl8 æ!($&–!(*& M g]kfn–cd]l/sf ;DaGwÆ 6 P]hg . 7 uf]/vfkq, -efu $^, ;+Vof %^, ;+jt @))# sflt{s @#+_, k[= ! . 8 Clifs]z zfx, df]8{g g]kfn -P kf]lnl6sn lxli6« !&^(–!(%%_, -Go" lbNnLM dgf]x/ klAn;;{ PG8 l8li6«Ao"6;{, !((^_, k[= !&) . 9 æ!($&–!(*& M g]kfn–cd]l/sf ;DaGwÆ, kfbl6Kk0fL g+= % . 10 uf]/vfkq, -efu $(, ;+Vof (#, ;+jt @))% dfu{ @!_, k[= ! .

159 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf s'/f 7"nf] x'Fb}g / Tof] ;wF}e/L /xG5 eGg] klg lglZrt x'Gg . h;/L Tolta]nf g]kfnn] kfPsf] wg clxn] 5}g . t/ bf];|f] ljZjo'4kl5 ljZjs} Ps zlQmzfnL b]z cd]l/sfn] cfˆgf] ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs lbP/ g]kfnnfO{ ;Ddfg u/]sfn] Tof] g} g]kfn / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] nflu dxTjk"0f{ pknAwL lyof], h;n] b]z / ;]gfsf] OHht a9fPsf] lyof] . tL s'/fx¿sf] j0f{g cd]l/sL Oltxf;sf k':tsx¿ Pj+ ;ª\u|xfnox¿df dxTjk"0f{ b:tfj]h ag]/ a;]sf 5g \ . t/ b'ef{Uo Û o:tf s'/fx¿k|lt g]kfndf s;}sf] Wofg hfg ;s]sf] b]lvb}g . clxn] o; ljifodf ;]gfsf pRr txsf kbflwsf/Lx¿ klg cgle1 /xsf] kfOG5 . of] tSdf / tSdf;Fu} lbOPsf] k|df0fkq sxfF 5 egL g]kfnL ;]gfn] vf]hL ug'{ h?/L 5 . olb o;nfO{ vf]hL u/L k|sfzdf Nofpg ;s]df g]kfn / g]kfnL ;]gfsf] uf}/j /fli6«o Pj+ cGt/f{li6«o hutdf emg\ a9\g hfg]5 . g]kfn–cd]l/sf s"6gLlts ;DaGwsf] :yfkgf -;g\ !($& clk|n @%_ &= cd]l/sL ;/sf/n] g]kfnnfO{ cfˆgf] ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs …n]hg ckm d]l/6Ú k|bfg u/]sf] kfFr dlxgfkl5 ;g\ !($& clk|n @% df b'O{ b]zaLr s"6gLlts ;DaGw :yfkgf ePsf] lyof] . t/ o;eGbf cufl8 b'O{ b]znfO{ glhs agfpg] cGo kl/l:yltx¿ klg b]vf gk/]sf xf]Ogg\ . h:t}, Oltxf;nfO{ s]nfpFbf s] b]lvG5 eg] cd]l/sL :jtGqtf ;ª\u|fd ;dfKt ePsf] s]xL ;dokl5 g} Ps cd]l/sL Jofkf/L g]kfnsf] l5d]sL b]z ef/tsf] kflG8r]/L / snsQf aGb/ufxdf cfOk'u]sf lyP . To;kl5 cd]l/sL Jofkf/Lx¿n] ef/tdf /x]sf la|l6z / k]|mGr sDkgLx¿;Fu ;Dks{ /fvL Jofkfl/s ;DaGw;d]t hf]8]sf lyP eg] ;g\ !&($ df cd]l/sfn] Ps ;lGw (Jay's Treaty of 1794) g} u/L la|l6z ;/sf/af6 ef/tdf Jofkfl/s 5'6;d]t k|fKt u/]sf] lyof] .11 ;fob of] g} cd]l/sLx¿ g]kfnsf] ef}uf]lns l;dfgf glhs cfOk'u]sf] ;a}eGbf klxnf]k6s lyof] . ;g\ !(!) df snsQfdf /x]sf cd]l/sL sG;n hg/n ljlnod Pr= dfOsnn] g]kfnaf6 cfoft ug{ ;lsg] j:t'x¿nfO{ tTsfnLg cd]l/sL eG;f/ lgodcg';f/ Go"gtd z'Ns nufP/ :jLsf/ ug{ ;lsg] s'/f pNn]v u/]sf lyP .12 o;sf] tfTko{ Tolta]nf cd]l/sL ;/sf/ g]kfn;Fu Jofkfl/s ;DaGw :yfkgf ug{ OR5's /x]sf] / To;sf] nflu g]kfnL j:t'x¿nfO{ Go"gtd eG;f/ z'Nsdfq nufpg tTk/ /x]sf] s'/f :ki6 x'G5 . t/ To; ljifodf la:t[t hfgsf/L yfxf x'g ;s]sf] 5}g . To:t} ;g\ !(#( df nG8gsf nflu g]kfnL ldlg:6/ hg/n s[i0fzdz]/ /f0ffn] cd]l/sfsf] e|d0f u/] . pQm e|d0fnfO{ g} g]kfnsf] tkm{af6 ul/Psf] cd]l/sfsf] klxnf] ;/sf/L e|d0f dflgG5 .13 P6nflG6s dxf;fu/ kf/ u/]/ pgL cd]l/sf s'g p2]Zo lnP/ uPsf lyP eGg] s'/f :ki6 x'g ;s]sf] 5}g . *= k|foM ;a} /f0ff k|wfgdGqLx¿n] ef/tdf /x]sf cª\u|]hx¿;Fudfq g]kfnsf] s"6gLlts ;DaGwnfO{ ;Lldt /fVg] j}b]lzs gLlt ckgfPsfn] cGo b]zsf] cltl/Qm cd]l/sf;uF g]kfnsf] s"6gLlts ;DaGw :yfkgf ePsf] lyPg . t/ /f0ffsfnsf bf];|f clGtd k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/n] ;f] gLlt TofuL ljZjsf cGo /fi6««x¿;Fu klg g]kfnsf] s"6gLlts ;DaGw lj:tf/ ug]{ gLlt lnP . t;y{ ljleGg cGt/f{li6«o ;Dd]ngx¿df klg ;/sf/L k|ltlglwx¿n] ;f]xL cg'¿k g]kfnsf] j}b]lzs gLlt :ki6 kfb}{ uP . h;cg';f/ ;g\ !($^ dfr{ dlxgfdf lbNnLdf ePsf] …ck|mf]–Pl;og ;DaGw ;Dd]ngÚ (Afro–Asian Relations Conference) df g]kfnn] 7"nf] k|ltlglw d08n k7fPsf] lyof] . pQm ;Dd]ng cgf}krfl/s ePklg To;df efu lng @* b]zsf /fhgLlts g]tf tyf ;fdflhs JolQmTjx¿ e]nf ePsf lyP .14 pQm a}7sdf efu lnb} hg/n ljhozdz]/n], g]kfn cfˆgf k'/fgf ldq/fi6««x¿;Fusf] ;DaGwnfO{ alnof] kfb}{ ljZjsf cGo /fi6«x¿;Fu ldqtfsf] xft cufl8 a9fpg rfxG5 eGg] s'/f JoQm u/] .15 pgsf] of] egfOn] cGt/f{li6«o hutn] ;d]t g]kfnn] cfˆgf] k'/fgf] j}b]lzs gLlt TofuL cGo /fi6«x¿;Fu klg s"6gLlts ;DaGw la:tf/ ug{ rfxG5 eGg] s'/f a'‰g ;Sof] .

11 cho l;Gxf, O08f]–o'P; l/n];G;\ -k|md lb Od{h]G;\ ckm lb a+unfb]z 6' lb P;]:g];g ckm OlGb/f ufFGwL !(&!–!(*$_, -k6gf M hfgsL k|sfzg, !(($_, k[= #–$ . 12 o'= P;= OGkm{d];g ;le{;, lkmK6L Po;{ ckm ;S;]; -!($&–!((&_, -sf7df8f}+ M o'= P;= OGkm{d];g ;le{;, k|sfzg ldlt pNn]v gul/Psf]_, k[= ( . 13 dfwj kL= vgfn, æg]kfn o'= P;= l/n];G; M P lxi6f]l/sn cf]e/Eo"Æ, OlG:6Ro"6 ckm km/]g ck]mo;{, g]kfN; l/n];G;\ ljy o'gfO6]8 :6]6\; ckm cd]l/sf, -sf7df8f}+ M cfO{=Pkm=P=, @))$_, k[= ! . 14 uf]/vfkq, -efu $*, @))% j}zfv !$_, k[= ! . 15 P;= 8L= d'gL, km/]g kf]ln;L ckm g]kfn, -lbNnL M g];gn klAnl;Ë xfp;, !(&#_, k[= !& . 160 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

(= g]kfnsf] j}b]lzs ;DaGwnfO{ cGo /fi6««x¿;Fu klg hf]8\g] gLlt cg'¿k /f0ff kbflwsf/Lx¿n] bf];|f] ljZjo'4kZrft ljZjsf] Ps zlQmzfnL /fi6««sf] ¿kdf b]vf k/]sf] cd]l/sftkm{ Wofg lb+b} uP . h;sf qmddf b'j} /fi6«sf aLr klxnf] ;Dks{ ;g\ !($% df gofF lbNnLdf g]kfnL clwsf/Lx¿ Pj+ cd]l/sL ljb]z cfly{s k|zf;gsf k|fljlws ljz]if1x¿sf] cf}krfl/s a}7sdf eof] .16 pQm cj;/df cd]l/sf;Fu ;DaGw lj:tf/ ug]{ p2]Zon] g]kfn ;/sf/n] cd]l/sL k|fljlws ljz]if1x¿nfO{ g]kfnsf] cfly{s ljsf; ug]{ ;DaGwdf 5nkmn ug{ sf7df8f}+ cfpgsf nflu lgdGq0ff lbPsf] lyof] .17 t/ tL cd]l/sL k|fljlws ljz]if1x¿ Tolta]nf g]kfn cfPsf lyP ls lyPgg\ eGg] s'/f yfxf x'g ;s]sf] 5}g . tfklg oL s'/fx¿n] g]kfn / cd]l/sfnfO{ glhs agfpg] jftfj/0f tof/ kfb}{ nUof] . !)= o;}qmddf g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLr s"6gLlts ;DaGw g} :yfkgf u/fpg dxTjk"0f{ e"ldsf v]Ng] sfd …n]hg ckm d]l/6Ú x:tfGt/0fsf] cj;/n] k|bfg u¥of] . …n]hg ckm d]l/6Ú x:tfgfGt/0f ug]{ cj;/df af]Nb} cd]l/sL sfo{jfxs /fhb"t hh{ cf/= ld/]nn] dxTjk"0f{ jQmJo lbPsf lyP . h;sf] d'Vo c+z o; k|sf/ lyof], !!= ;+o'Qm /fi6« -;+o'Qm /fHo cd]l/sf_ em+} g]kfn klg o'/f]ksf] /0fe"ldaf6 3/} kms]]{sf] lyof] . t}klg km]l;i6 -kmfl;i6_ cTofrf/LnfO{ gx6fP;Dd ;+;f/sf zflGtlk|o /fi6«x¿nfO{ eo x6\g] 5}g eGg] lgwf] u/]/ d]/f] d'n's ;+o'Qm /fi6« -;+o'Qm /fHo cd]l/sf_ n] e}+m g]kfnn] klg cfˆgf] 5f]/fx¿nfO{ cfˆg} v'zLn] n8fOFdf k7fof] . cd]l/sf / g]kfnsf] aLrdf ePsf] lgs6 ;DaGw cfufdL zflGtsfndf emg\ emg\ lgs6 / alnof] x'Fb} hfg]5 eGg] dnfO{ k"0f{ ljZjf; 5 . ldqtf / z'esfdgfsf] nflu cd]l/sf g]kfntkm{ clu ;/]sf] 5 .18 !@= pgsf] of] egfOn] cd]l/sf g]kfn;Fu :yfoL¿kdf s"6gLlts ;DaGw ufF:g rfxG5 eGg] s'/f :ki6 kf¥of] . cd]l/sL sfo{jfxs /fhb"t hh{ cf/= ld/]nsf] ;Gb]zsf] k|To'Q/df k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/n] lgDg s'/f JoQm u/]sf lyP, tkfO{+n] xfdL;Fu :jfut of]Uo e]6 lbg'eO{ s[kfk"0f{{ s'/fx¿;d]t ;'gfpg' ePsf]df xfdL ;a} ;Gt'i6 ePsf 5f}+ . gofF b'lgofF -cd]l/sf_ af6 lxGb"x¿sf] k|frLgtd /fHo g]kfndf tkfO+{x¿sf] of] k|yd cfudg Pp6f P]ltxfl;s 36gf xf] . tkfO{+sf] dxfg\ hfltnfO{ xfd|f] ;nfd 5 . d]x/jfgLsf ;fy xfdL kl§ km}nfpg' ePsf] tkfO{+x¿sf] z'e]R5f / ldqtfnfO{ Åbob]lvg} xfdL :jfut ub{5f}+ . n8fOFsf ;dosf] lgs6 / cfgGbbfos ;DaGw zflGt sfndf emg\ lgs6t/ x'g hfg] cfzf 5 .19 !#= k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/sf] of] egfOn] g]kfn klg cd]l/sf;Fu s"6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8\g rfxG5 eGg] s'/f :ki6 kf¥of] . tSdf x:tfGt/0fsf] sfo{qmdsf] ;dfkgdf k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/n] g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLrsf] ldqtfk"0f{{ ;DaGwnfO{ cem alnof] / lgs6 agfpg ;Sbf] k|of; ug]{ s'/f JoQm ub}{ cd]l/sL hgtfsf] pQ/f]Q/ k|ultsf nflu xflb{s z'esfdgf;d]t JoQm u/]sf lyP .20 ;f] cj;/df k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/n] b'j} d'n'saLr s"6gLlts ;DaGw :yfkgf ug{ / jfl0fHo tyf d}qL ;lGw ug{sf nflu Ps ljz]if k|ltlglw d08nnfO{ g]kfn k7fpg cd]l/sL ;/sf/nfO{ cf}krfl/s lgdGq0ff;d]t k7fP . hh{ cf/= ld/]n gf]e]Dj/ !^ b]vL @@ ;Dd sf7df8f}+df a;L g]kfn ;/sf/sf] pQm lgdGq0ff lnO{ cd]l/sf kmls{P .21 !$= tSdf x:tfGt/0fsf] cj;/df b'j} b]zsf k|ltlglwx¿n] JoQm u/]sf cleJolQmx¿n] b'O{ b]zaLrsf] ldqtfnfO{ cem ufF9f / glhs agfof] . pQm cj;/n] klxnf]k6s b'O{ /fi6««sf ;/sf/L k|ltlglwx¿nfO{ k|ToIf¿kdf cfdg];fdg] a;]/ cfk;L larf/ cleJoQm ug]{ cj;/ ldNof] . To;cj;/df g} b'j} b]zsf k|ltlglwx¿n] cf}krfl/s?kn] b'O{ b]zaLr s'6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8\gtkm{ Wofg lbP . To;sf] nflu cd]l/sL /fi6«klt x\of/L P;= 6«'dgn] g]kfn;Fu …jfl0fHo tyf d}qL ;lGwÚ ;DkGg ug{sf nflu hf];]km ;L= :of6/y\j]6nfO{ cfˆgf] ljz]if k|ltlglw agfO{ ;g\ !($& clk|ndf g]kfn

16 æ!($&–!(*& M g]kfn–cd]l/sf ;DaGwÆ, kfbl6Kk0fL g+= %, k[= $ . 17 d'/nLw/ w/dbzfgL, kf]lnl6sn Osf]gf]dL ckm km/]g P8 Og b y8{ jN8{, -j/f0f;L M sf]gf{s klAnl;Ë xfp;, !(*$_, k[= ^% . 18 uf]/vfkq, -efu $^, ;+Vof ^), ;+jt @))# dfu{ &_, k[= !–$ . 19 P]hg . 20 P]hg, -efu $(, ;+Vof (#, ;+jt @))% dfu{ @!_, k[= ! . 21 æ!($&–!(*& M g]kfn–cd]l/sf ;DaGwÆ, kfbl6Kk0fL g+= % .

161 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf k7fP . h;cg';f/ :of6/y\j]6 ;g\ !($& sf] clk|n !# df g]kfn cfOk'u] / clk|n @! sf lbg /fi6««klt 6«'dgsf] kq /fhf lqe'jgnfO{ x:tfGt/0f u/] .22 To;sf] rf/ lbgkl5 clk|n @% sf lbg lbpF;f] @ ah]/ #! ldg]6 hfFbf l;+xb/ af/ Uofn/L a}7sdf g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLr …jfl0fHo tyf d}qL ;lGwÚ eO{ s"6gLlts ;DaGw :yfkgf eof] . ;dfgtf / a/fa/Ldf ul/Psf]23 pQm ;lGw kqdf g]kfnsf tkm{af6 k|wfgdGqL kb\dzdz]/ / cd]l/sfsf] tkm{af6 :of6/y\j]6n] x:tfIf/ u/]sf lyP . pQm x:tfIf/ ;df/f]xdf pRr cf]xbfsf ef/bf/x¿ Pj+ ;}lgs clws[tx¿sf] klg pkl:ylt lyof] . pQm cj;/df /fi6««klt 6«'dgsf] pkl:ylt geP klg pgsf] ;Ddfgdf @! tf]ksf] ;nfdL lbOPsf] lyof]24 eg] /fhf lqe'jgsf] ;Ddfgdf #! tf]ksf] ;nfdL lbg'sf] ;fy} b'j} yl/sf ;nfdLsf] Jof08 klg ahfOPsf] lyof] .25 pQm ;Demf}tf z'qmjf/sf] lbg ul/Psf] lyof] lsgeg] pQm lbgnfO{ g]kfnn] z'e lbg 7fg]sf] lyof] / ;Demf}tf ug]{ lbg tyf ;do Hof]ltifåf/f lgwf{/0f ul/Psf] lyof] .26 ;Demf}tf kqdf x:tfIf/ ;DkGg ePkl5 g]kfnL ;}lgs hg/nx¿n] cd]l/sL kbflwsf/Lx¿;Fu g]kfnsf] cfly{s ;j]{If0f, hnljB't pTkfbgsf] ;DefJotf, t/fO{ k|b]zdf pBf]u :yfkgf cflbsf nflu ;xof]u dfu u/]sf lyP .27 !%= cd]l/sL /fi6««klt 6«'dgn] pQm ;lGw kqdf g]kfnnfO{ ;fj{ef}d;Qf ;DkGg d'n's egL ;Daf]wg u/]sf 5g\ . bf];|f] ljZjo'4kl5 ljZjs} Ps zlQmzfnL /fi6«sf] ¿kdf pbodfg /fi6«« cd]l/sfn] klxnf]k6s lnlvt¿kdf g} g]kfnnfO{ ;fj{ef}d;Qf ;DkGg /fi6« dfGg] sfd u/]sfn] pQm ;Demf}tfn] cGt/f{li6«o hutdf g} g]kfnnfO{ Ps :jtGq Pj+ ;fj{ef}d;Qf ;DkGg b]z eg]/ kl/lrt x'g] df}sf ldNof] . cd]l/sfh:tf] bf];|f] ljZjo'4kZrft ljZjs} Ps zlQmzfnL b]zsf] ¿kdf b]vf k/]sf] /fi6««n] g]kfnsf] :jtGqtf / ;fj{ef}d;QfnfO{ :jLsf/ ub}{ s"6gLlts ;DaGw hf]8\of] . pQm ;lGwn] cGt/f{li6«o hutdf g]kfnsf] cfˆg} :jtGq x}l;ot k|:t't u/]sfn] pQm ;lGwnfO{ Ps dxTjk"0f{{ P]ltxfl;s 36gfsf] ¿kdf lng ;lsG5 . g]kfnn] a]nfotkl5 ljb]zL /fi6«x¿;Fu hf]8]sf] of] bf];|f] s'6gLlts ;DaGw lyof] . To;}n] Ps cGtjf{tf{df g]kfnsf nflu cd]l/sL /fhb"t lncf]g h]= jfOnn] g]kfnnfO{ dfGotf lbg] ljZjsf /fi6«x¿dWo] xfdL bf];|f /fi6« xf}+ eg]sf lyP .28 pgsf] egfOsf] tfTko{ g]kfnnfO{ Ps :jtGq Pj+ ;fj{ef}d;Qf ;DkGg d'n's xf] eg]/ a]nfotkl5 dfGotf lbg] /fi6« cd]l/sf xf] eGg] lyof] . x'g klg of] ;Demf}tf u/]/ cd]l/sfn] g]kfnsf] :jtGqtf / ;fj{ef}d;QfnfO{ dfGotf lbPsf] lyof] . !^= o;/L bf];|f] ljZj o'4df g]kfnL ;]gfn] b]vfPsf] axfb'/L clg cd]l/sL ;/sf/n] cfˆgf] ;]gfsf] ;jf]{Rr ;}lgs kbs …n]hg ckm d]l/6Ú lbP/ g]kfnnfO{ u/]sf] ;Ddfg / To; cj;/df b'j} b]zn] d}qL ;DaGw sfod ug{ b]vfPsf] k|an OR5fsf] sf/0fn] ubf{ g} g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLr s"6gLlts ;DaGw ufFl;Psf] lyof] . g]kfn / cd]l/sfnfO{ Ps cfk;df glhs t'Nofpg] sfd bf];|f] ljZj o'4n] u/]sf] lyof] / bf];|f] ljZj o'4df g]kfnL ;]gfx¿n] b]vfPsf] axfb'/Laf6} cd]l/sL ;/sf/ / hgtfx¿ kefljt| ePsf lyP . olb g]kfnL ;]gfx¿n] 7"nf] jL/tf kbz{g| ug{ g;s]sf] eP cd]l/sL ;/sf/ / hgtfsf] Wofg cd]l/sfaf6 w]/} 6f9f /x]sf] g]kfnh:tf] ;fgf] / sdhf]/ b]ztk{m kSs} hfg] lyPg / b'O{ b]zaLr t'?Gt s"6gLlts ;DaGw gufFl;g klg ;SYof] . s'g} Pp6f 36gfn] csf]{ 36gfsf] hGd u/fpF5 eg] em}+ tSdf x:tfGt/0fsf] qmddf JoQm efjgfaf6} g]kfn / cd]l/sfaLr s"6gLlts ;DaGw ufFl;g uPsf] lyof] .

22 o'= P;= OGkm{d];g ;le{;, kfbl6Kk0fL g+= !@, k[= !) . 23 ljgf]b yfkf, æg]kfn–cd]l/sf ;DaGw -;g\ !($&–;g\ @))&_Æ, -sf7df08f}+ M lqe'jg ljZjljBfno, dfgljsL tyf ;fdflhs zf:q ;+sfo, ck|sflzt ljBfjfl/lw zf]wk|aGw, @)^*_, k[= $* . 24 uf]/vfkq, -jif{ $&, ;+Vof &, ;+jt @))$ a}zfv !%_, k[= ! . 25 P]hg . 26 æ!($&–!(*& M g]kfn–cd]l/sf ;DaGwÆ, kfbl6Kk0fL g+= %, k[= ^ . 27 æu'8jfO{ 6' cn b\of6Æ (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,855659,00htm/ retrived on 2008 June 10) 28 :jtGq ljZj, -jif{ @), ;+Vof $, ;g\ !(** dfr{{_, k[= !@ .

162 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* k"j{ k|wfg ;]gfklt dxf/yL >L tf]/0f zDz]/ /f0ffsf] ;+lIfKt hLjgL – xl/x/ zDz]/ /f0ff != k"j{ k|wfg ;]gfklt dxf/yL >L tf]/0f zDz]/ /f0ffsf] hGd lktf sdfl08Ë s0f]{n OGb| zDz]/ /f0ff tyf dftf b'uf{ lbJo>/L /f0ffaf6 !(^! ;fn dfu{ jfnf rt'b{zLsf lbg klZrd sdfl08Ë hg/n wd{ zDz]/ /f0ffsf] xfFl8ufpF b/af/df ePsf] lyof] . tf]/0f zDz]/ /f0ffn] Dofl6«s kf; u/L cfO{=P;=;L= k6gf, lxGb':yfgdf k9]sf lyP . lktf s=s=OGb| zDz]/ /f0ffsf] #^ jif{sf] pd]/df b]xjzfg ePsf] x'Fbf pxfFsf] pd]/ @! jif{ 6]s]sf] lyof] . 3/–Jojxf/ x]g'{ kg]{ ePkl5 cWoogsf] qmd lg/Gt/tf lbg kfpg' ePg . @= Tolt a]nf hdfgf cs}{ lyof] . rGb| zDz]/ /f0ff >L # dxf/fh k|fOd ldlg:6/ lyP . pgn] sdf08/ Og rLkm eLd zDz]/ /f0ffnfO{ af]nfP/ tf]/0fnfO{ s] lbg] egL ;f]w]sf lyP . hjfkmdf ;d/zDz]/ /f0ffsf 5f]/f b'O{ k'is/ zDz]/ /f0ff Pjd\ afns[i0f zDz]/ /f0ffnfO{ d]h/ lbOPsf] lyof] egL eLdzDz]/n] lgj]bg u/] . k|fOd ldlgi6/sf] gfltnfO{ s] lbg] egL ;f]w]sf] kf] t egL >L # rGb|n] 3'dfP/ k|lt k|Zg u/]kl5 tf]/0f zDz]/nfO{ n]km\l6g]G6 s0f]{nsf] bhf{df lgo'lQm lbOof] . #= ;]gfdf sfo{/t ePkl5 pxfFn] sjfhsf] kf7 a'emfpg] qmddf klxnf x'g' eof] . k6s k6s gub k'/:sf/ ;d]t kfpg' ePsf] lyof] . $= To; ;do lxGb':yfgdf cª\u|]hsf] Ps 5qzf;g a[l6z /fh lyof] . a]nfa]nf a[l6z ;]gfsf hg/nx?sf e|d0f x'g] ub{Yof] . pgLx?sf ;Ddfgdf dfr{kf:6 u/L 6F'l8v]ndf pxfFn] b]vfpg] ub{y] . %= >L # h'4sf] sfof{jlwdf pxfFnfO{ k"j{ bf}8fxdf tyf klZrd bf}8fxdf;d]t xflsd agfO{ v6fOPsf] lyof] . kl5 xh'l/of hg/n axfb'/ zDz]/ /f0ffsf] df]/Ë bf}8fxdf cl;:6]g eO{ vl§O{ uPsf lyP . !(() ;fnsf] dxfe"sDkaf6 Ifltu|:t sf7df08f}sf] p4f/ sfo{ u/]afkt e"sDk kbs k|fKt u/]sf lyP . ^= låtLo dxf;d/ z'? ePkl5 !((^ ;fndf pxfFnfO{ >Lgfy kN6gsf] sdfl08Ë clkm;/df lgo'lQm u/L lxGb':yfg k7fOof] . ToxfF a[l6z ;]gfsf n]km\l6g]G6 sf]nf]g]n /f]h/;\ (Rozers) l;t s'/f gldnL v6k6 x'g k'Uof] . n]=s= /f]h/;\n] ToxfF vl§Psf g]kfnL ;]gfsf] sdfl08Ë hg/n axfb'/ zDz]/ /f0ffnfO{ tf]/0fzDz]/nfO{ x6fpg] ljifo k|ltj]bg n]vL k7fP . >L # h'4nfO{ hg/n axfb'/ zDz]/ /f0ffn] ;f]xL Joxf]/fsf] k|ltj]bg k]z u/L k7fP . &= g]kfndf l;+xb/af/sf] >L # sf] dxlkmndf >L # h'4af6 xfdLsxfF Tof]eGbf nfos dfG5] 5}g / x6fpg ldNb}g eGg] cfb]z eof] . dxf;d/sf] sfo{sfn k"/f u/L ^ jif{ sfo{/t eO{ @))@ ;fndf g]kfnL kmf}hsf ;fy :jb]z kmls{P . km"n s0f]{nsf] kbdf a9'jf eP . *= lxGb':yfg :jtGq x'g] ;dodf a[6]g tyf Ol08ofsf] uf]/vf kN6gx?sf af8kmfF6 u/L Joj:yf ldnfpg] sfo{df pxfFsf] g]t[Tjdf 8]lnu];g lbNnL k7fOPsf] lyof] . (= >L # df]xg zDz]/ /f0ffsf] sfo{sfndf ;]gftkm{sf] sfdsfhsf] ;fy;fy} lghfdtL kl§sf] laGtLkq lgsf;fdf sfd ;≈dfn]sf lyP . !)= >L # df]xgn] d]3/fhzDz]/ /f0ffnfO{ d]h/ hg/ndf kbf]Gglt u/]kl5, cfkm"n] klg hg/n kfpg' kg]{ egL lgj]bg k7fP . t/ >L # sf ] dxlkmndf dxf/fh df]xgn] ;a}sf ;fd' ætf]/0fzDz]/n] hg/n dfu]sf] x]/Æ egL b]vfP . clg To;kl5 tf]/0fzDz]/ labf lnP/ snsQf -lxGb':tfg_ uP . ToxfF ;'j0f{zDz]/ /f0ff;Fu sfªu|]; kf6L{df k|j]z u/] . !!= uf]Ko ld;g lnP/ sf7df08f} n'sLl5kL cfPsf]df kf]n v'Ng uO{ @))& ;fn OGb|hfqfsf] /flt pxfnfO{F lu/km\tf/ u/L l;+xb/af/sf] a/kmafudf y'g] .

163 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

!@= ^ ge]Da/ !(%) O=;=sf] kft| Msfn >L % lqe'jg PsfPs /fhkl/jf/sf ;b:ox?;lxt gf/fo0flx6L /fhb/af/ kl/Tofu u/]/ Ol08og b"tfjf; ;jf/L eof] . lxGb':yfgaf6 ljz]if?kn] k7fOPsf] ladfgåf/f !) ge]Da/ !(%) O{=df >L % lqe'jg ;kl/jf/ lbNnLtkm{ ;jf/L eof] . To;kl5 ToxfFsf] k|wfgdGqL hjfx/nfn g]x?sf] ljz]if bafa cfPkl5 @))& ;fn df3 dlxgf /ft ^ ah] u0f]zdfg l;+x nufot tf]/0f zDz]/ tyf ;a}nfO{ d'Qm ul/of] . !#= k|hftGq :yfkgf ePkl5 >L % lqe'jgaf6 kfFr hgf /f0fftkm{sf / % hgf sfªu|]; tkm{sf dGqL d08n aGof] . Soflag]6 ldl6Ëdf /f0fftkm{sf lzIff dGqL g[khË /f0ffn] tf]/0fzDz]/nfO{ k'gM ;]gfdf lgo'lQm ug{ ldNb}g eGg] s'/f p7fPsf]df sfªu|];tkm{sf kfFr}hgfdWo sf]xLn] s]xL gaf]nL df}g /x] . !$= @))& ;fn r}q #) ut] e/tzDz]/ /f0ffsf] uf]/vfbnn] sf7df8fF}sf] ;]G6/ h]n pk/ cfqmd0f u/L cfkm\gf gfosx?nfO{ 5'§fO{ u[xdGqL ljZj]Zj/ k|;fb sf]O/fnf a;]sf] g+= ! aËnfdf ;d]t xdnf ug{ k'u]kl5 ToxL /ft !! ah] tf]/0fzDz]/nfO{ af]nfO{ k'ln;sf] OG;k]S6/ hg/n ckm k'ln; -cfO{=lh=lk=_ df lgo'lQm ul/of] . clg uf]/vfbnsf e/tzDz]/ nufot cGox? klg kqmfp u/L n}grf}/ y'lgP . !%= >L % lqe'jgnfO{ ædnfO{ ;]gf ;DaGwL Toltsf] 1fg gePsf] x'Fbf bfO{ tf]/0fzDz]/nfO{ ;]gfdf aS;L dnfO{ k'ln;df lgufx aS;] x'GYof]Æ egL hg/n g/zDz]/ /f0ffn] laGtL r9fPkl5 tf]/0f zDz]/nfO{ ;]gfdf n]km\l6g]G6 hg/nsf] kb / hg/n g/zDz]/nfO{ k'ln;df cfO{=lh=lk=lgo'lQm alS;of] . @)!# ;fn h]i7 & ut] >L % dx]Gb|af6 pxfFnfO{ dxf/yLdf kbf]Gglt u/L k|wfg;]gfklt lgo'Qm u/L alS;of] . !^= k|wfg ;]gfklt ePkl5 Ol08ofsf] ;]gfWoIf hg/n s]=P;= lyDd}ofsf] lgdGq0ffdf >LdtL;lxt Ol08of e|d0f ug'{ ePsf] lyof] . kl5 a[l6z uf]/vf kN6gsf] lg/LIf0f e|d0f ug{ l;Ëfk'/ hfg' ePsf] lyof] . !&= >L % dx]Gb|sf ;jf/L;fy g]kfnsf &$ lhNnfx? e|d0f ug{' ePsf] lyof] . !*= @)!^ ;fn h]7 & ut] pxfFn] ;}lgs ;]jfaf6 cjsfz kfpg' eof] . @)@@ ;fndf lrlgofF b"tfjf;nfO{ ;ft nfvdf cfkm\gf] 3/ a]rL lj/f6gu/ df]/Ëdf gofF 3/ agfO{ a:g' eof] . clg sf;Ljf; a:g] dg;fo lnO{ >LdtL;fy @)@^ ;fndf agf/; -Ol08of_ hfg' eof] . @)$* ;fndf tTsfnLg k|wfgdGqL s[i0fk|;fb e§/fO{af6 7"nf] cfu|x u/]kl5 @)$* ;fn c;f]hdf sf7df8f}F kms{g' eof] . t/ ljlwsf] n]vf @)$* df3df pxfFsf] >LdtLsf] b]xfGt x'g uof] . !(= @)%^ ;fn r}qfi6dL÷/fdgjdLsf lbg Ps sd{7 ;}lgs JolQmTjsf] hLjg cGt eof] . k|fKt u/]sf] lje"if0fx? M– != pmF/fd k§ -k|yd_ @= ;'kbLKt dfGoj/ g]kfn tf/f -k|yd_ #= Hofltd{o ;'ljVoft lqzlQm k§ -k|yd_ $= k/d ;'k|l;4 k|an uf]/vf blIf0f afx' -k|yd_ %= sdf08/ ckm bL a[l6z ODkfP/ -;+o'Qm clw/fHoaf6_ -t[tLo_

cfgGb cfkm} leq vf]Hg' k5{ . — jfo/g

164 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* “Transitional Pacts” as Determinants of Future Civil Military Relation

- Lt Col Shantosh B Poudyal Introduction 1. The current state of Civil Military Relations (CMR) in Nepal appears stable on the surface but there are too many undercurrents that can destabilize this situation. First and foremost, the environment of consensus among major stakeholders has faltered despite some promising breakthroughs in the process of integration of the Maoist combatants. The combatants are anxious and frustrated about their future while the major political parties are not able to agree on the details. Even the Maoist leadership remains divided over the issue. 2. Similarly, despite the fact that institutions like Ministry of Defense, National Security Council and State Affairs Committee, are maintaining regular oversight over the functions of the Nepalese Army (NA), it has been facing allegation that it is neither transparent nor under effective civilian control. On the other hand, there are serious grievances among the members of the NA about the harsh and one sided provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which they feel have contributed in eroding its professional competencies. They are also anxious and worried over their future and possible politicization of their organization once integration of the Maoist combatants takes place. 3. In this circumstance, it will only be natural if NA and the Maoists combatants contest political decisions if they deem it to be unjust and contrary to their interests. Although it is not uncommon that political forces and institutions try hard to preserve their prerogatives and interests during democratic transitions, but it is during transitions that we can set things on the right course. Since we are in the process of completing the peace process and drafting a new constitution, it provides us with a historic opportunity to ensure that Nepal’s future CMR remains a healthy one and Nepal moves towards democratic consolidation. 1 The future state of CMR will depend upon the nature of current transition, the pacts forged between various forces on power sharing and the institutional mechanisms that they create today. 4. It is in this backdrop that, I argue that political forces should fi rstly craft “transitional pacts” in such a manner that leaves little room for misinterpretation and at the same time also addresses the just interest of all stakeholders especially the military. But they should also be sensitive towards the fact that transitions are fl uid hence pacts they make today may need revisiting and renegotiation tomorrow. To support my hypothesis, I will fi rstly explain the concept and value of a “transitional pact” then demonstrate how ambiguous pacts made in the past have led to unstable CMR through analysis of certain episodes from the recent Nepalese history.

1 For detail on the concept of “democratic consolidation” please read Philippe Schmitter, “The consolidation of political democracies: processes, rhythms, sequence and types,” Transition to Democracy, Ed. G Pridham, (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1995) and Adam prezeworski, “Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America,” Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

165 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

Transitional Pacts Explained 5. A “transitional pact” may be defi ned as a pact between the incumbent and emergent or among the emergent political forces in the context of a transition from authoritarian regime to democratic one. It is expected to address the modalities of management of distribution of political power and can also be called the “political pact.”2 Within this framework the “military pact” or the understanding with or about the military assumes pivotal role because of the crucial contribution of the military in making the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. 6. It is because some form of support or endorsement from the military is invariably required for the transition to begin in the fi rst place. Second, the new regime needs the support of the military to establish and sustain their fragile authority and last they need to establish adequate control over the coercive authority of the state because without such control they will ultimately lack both the legitimacy and authority. This becomes obvious if we refer to Philippe Schmitter’s “visual representation of regime change” diagram where he clearly outlines the negotiation of a “military pact” as a required pre condition for the demise of authoritarian rule and formal transfer of power, similarly, he cites “submission of military to civilian control” as the condition for persistence of democracy. 3 7. Despite control of military being one of the central themes in democratic consolidation, it is important to note the undeniable role of the military even in modern day democracies. It is in this context Samuel Finer states that, since the military possess superior organization and arms their political advantage vis-à-vis civilian groupings are overwhelming, thus, “instead of asking why the military engage in politics we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise.”4 This scenario may become more accentuated in a post confl ict transitional situation like that in Nepal, where contending military forces or the state military and the rebel military coexist in an ill defi ned environment driven by the concerns over preservation of their prerogatives and their future status. This is why a transitional (military) pact assumes greater signifi cance. 8. Strangely, there are hardly any examples of a written military pact prior to democratic transition hence they remain a non -tangible idea which is not observed in terms of actual signing of the pact but is often refl ected in institutions like the constitutions and acts that are promulgated in the post transitional structure. It is usually not “de jure” but a “de facto” arrangement. While a pact with the military or among the elites about the military, can facilitates transition, it may also produce unstable civil military relations. It is because militaries often tend to facilitate democratic transition only if they are ensured preservation and protection of their prerogatives and interests in the post transitional scenarios. Here military prerogatives can be defi ned as “areas where, whether challenged or not, the military assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, or to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus.”5 Although

2 Schmitter, “The consolidation of political democracies,” p.541. 3 Ibid. 4 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics, (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1962), p.5. 5 Alfred C. Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and Southern Cone, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988) p. 125-129. 166 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* the initial military pact usually involves preservation of certain military prerogatives, in reality it is important that they also refl ect the genuine institutional interests of the military. The pact thus needs to be comprehensive, fl exible and just if it is to avoid contestation and survive the fast paced development of transition. 9. Easier said than done, the transitioning democracies are quick to negotiate a military pact in order to facilitate transition but are not careful enough to gauze the possible consequences. Once such arrangements are in place they tend to persist and become diffi cult to abrogate. The militaries will contest if abrupt and arbitrary change to such a pact is made unilaterally leading to problems in CMR. 10. We have noted that military contestations usually center around preservation of agreed upon prerogatives but the nature and mode of transition plays a crucial role in defi ning the prerogatives thus in outlining possible sphere of contestation.6 The military of the state may not enjoy such prerogative if it is defeated by the insurgent / rebel forces hence will be subject to arbitrary treatment or vice versa. In such circumstances spheres of contestations will be less ambiguous. But if the transition takes place as a result of ambiguous compromise then prerogatives tend to persist leading to frequent contestations and ultimately an unstable CMR. Case Study 11. Through some historical examples, I will attempt to highlight the pivotal role of the military as an actor in the transition and demonstrate how nature of transitional pacts and mode of transition can lead to a specifi c trajectory of CMR. I will also highlight how CMR suffers a setback when political elites adopt utilitarian views of the military in their quest for political survival once they realize their position in a changed power equation. The political force emerging stronger usually starts ignoring the pact whereas the weaker ones tend to be extremely defensive. Because of the above mentioned possibilities, the political forces managing the transition must emphasize in executing unambiguous pacts clearly outlining the military prerogatives in the fi rst place. In the case, where this is not practicable they must make an effort to continuously revisit and renegotiate their military pacts in the light of new realities. I will set out the context of the two major democratic transitions in Nepal and some critical events that vindicate the abovementioned arguments. The First Democratic Transition 12. Riding on the “third wave” a popular movement led by a coalition of left and liberal parties forced the King to give up the single party rule and accept the role of a constitutional monarch within a parliamentary democracy in 1990. Unlike some other autocracies the then King clearly refrained from using the Army to suppress the protests. It is also widely believed that he rather took the counsel of the army leadership that advised him not to go against the popular demands and pursued him to facilitate a peaceful democratic transition.7 Until this time the NA was considered a key player that assisted the King in sustaining the single party

6 Schmitter, “The consolidation of political democracies,” pp. 541- 549 and Stepan, “Rethinking Military Politics,” p. 93-97. 7 Unverifi ed reports claim that the then COAS Gen Gadul Shamsher JBR and Gen Satchhit Shamsher JBR had advised the then King Birendra against repression and for facilitation of political transition.

167 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

Panchayat system.8 The mode of transition thus was “consensual” involving the King and the democratic parties. A pact was made certain key issues including the role of the military which later became evident in the new constitution. 13. The provisions in the constitution of 1990 adequately refl ected the nature of the pact reached between the monarchy (incumbent elite) and the democratic parties (emergent elite) about power sharing and especially perseverance of the monarchy – military relationship intact. There were provisions in the new constitution that curtailed the involvement of the army from all domestic affairs. The Army was not given any representation in the various security committees formed at the district, zonal and regional level.9 The new constitution also provided for the establishment of a National Security Council (NSC) however, the King as the Supreme Commander in Chief was provided with the fi nal authority to mobilize the army.10 The new government focused in controlling the army through allocation of a meager defense budget and moved towards other national priorities leaving the army alone with its internal autonomy intact in the hands of the palace.11 The King continued to exercise his control over the army from a Military Secretariat located inside the palace bypassing the Ministry of Defense and the government. 14. This is a good example how the mode of transition (a compromise) can shape military prerogatives and defi ne sphere of contestations. It is also an example of how neglect of the transitional governments of the military in post transitional settings can pave a way for renewed or continued alliance between the elements of the military and the past regime. The full impact of such constitutional ambiguity and isolationist policies of the new government will be realized only later. Dunai and Holeri: Acts of Omission?12 15. The Nepal Communist Party-Maoist began an armed insurgency in Nepal since 1996. The government initially responded to it through the use of police force but, once the Maoist insurgents started getting stronger militarily, the government started to plan on deploying the army to restore the law and order situation. The army however held the opinion that declaration of state of emergency, an all party consensus, and the labeling of the Maoists as terrorists should be the preconditions for its mobilization.13 The preconditions although justifi ed given the situation of political instability because of intra and inter party disputes represented a subtle contestation of the political authority by the military. This led to the development of friction between the government and the NA and subsequently resulted in the establishment of a new para military force, the Armed Police Force (APF). The NA budgets then on refl ected

8 Prakash Nepali and Fanindra subba, “Civil Military Relations and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 16, Issue No. 1, p. 91 9 Ibid. 10 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal: 1990. http://www.vakilno1.com/saarclaw/nepal/consitution/consitutionofnepal. htm (accessed November 19, 2010). 11 Nepali and Subba, 93. 12 For details on the concepts of acts of omission and commission please see “The Man on the Horseback,” by Samuel E Finer. 13 Nepali and Subba, 94.

168 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* a signifi cant cut whereas government priority went to the APF indicating the government’s neglect of the military. 16. As the insurgency progressed, the NA continued to face accusation of insubordination from the government. Two incidents are worthy of analysis here. First, the NA allegedly did not get mobilized to support the police force under attack by the Maoists in the district headquarters of Dolpa in the far West. Second allegation is that of the NA refused to conduct operations against the Maoist combatants gathered in Holeri village of the Rolpa district. There are, however no recorded offi cial communication of the government order or the NA refusal. Whatever the reasons may be, it remains a fact that NA was not mobilized in both the occasions. Furthermore the then Home Minister Govinda Raj Joshi of the Nepali Congress party and the Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala both resigned after the Dunai and the Holeri incident respectively clearly suggests the state of CMR and the level of contestations existing at the moment.14 In these incidents the primary blame has been assigned to the King and the constitutional provisions that allowed him to make a fi nal say in the mobilization of the NA. This presents a clear example of how a pact concerning the control of military can challenge the legitimacy and authority of a transitional government and lead to an unstable CMR. Royal Takeover: an Act of Commission? 17. While Maoist insurgency continued to grow in strength, King Gyanendra came to power and unlike his brother, the late King Birendra, he took a more proactive position in politics of Nepal.15 By the end of the year 2001 it was becoming increasingly clear that the police and the newly formed armed police force would not be able to hold on for long. The government did mobilize the NA but only when Dang barrack was attacked and captured by the Maoists. The government declared state of emergency and implemented the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Ordinance (TADO) to facilitate the mobilization. As the NA begun conducting military operations against the Maoists, the government resorted to a series of negotiations, all resulting in failures. In this context, on October 4, 2002, the King in a bold move, dissolved the House of Representative, dismissed the prime minister and his cabinet, and formed his own government.16 In doing so, the King used article 127 of the constitution which allowed the King to “issue necessary orders” to “remove any diffi culty” in connection with the implementation of the constitution.17 18. But successive governments assigned by the King also failed to produce any desired results in terms of either suppressing the Maoist insurgency or conducting successful negotiation. Then the King once again dismissed the government and assumed all executive powers of the state himself through a proclamation of emergency on February 1, 2005.18 During this intervention by the King, the NA’s involvement appeared more visible as the

14 Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, Paradise Lost: State Failure in Nepal, (New York: Lexington Books, 2010), 61-63 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990. 18 Riaz and Basu, Paradise Lost, 63.

169 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf central authority of the “Unifi ed Command.”19 The joint forces were seen taking control of the telecommunications, media houses, and the international airport.20 Although legality of the constitutional provision (article 127) used by King Gyanendra is a matter of debate, the main point here is that the “the historic compromise of 1990 enabled the monarchy to retain control over the army and to declare emergencies.”21 19. The abovementioned opinion is shared by many who argue, that in fact, the 1990 constitution was a compromise document between the monarchy and the political parties.22 This compromise or transitional pact arguably resulted in the retention of the prerogatives by the King and also contained the illiberal characteristics of the past regime.23 The impact of such a pact circumscribed the government’s ability to wrest control of the coercive authority of the state from the King. The Second Democratic Transition 20. While the above mentioned events describe how a transitional pact can lead to unstable civil military relations and subsequent military contestations of the political authority; the following event contrastingly presents a case where a military pact facilitates a democratic transition. 21. During the second transition from a constitutional monarchy to a federal democratic republic in 2007 the NCP Maoists and seven mainstream democratic parties concluded a CPA. Prior to that, a proclamation of the House of Representative made sweeping changes in the political structure and also redefi ned the relationship between the Nepalese Army and the Nepalese polity.24 The purpose of the proclamation was mainly two fold, fi rst, it severely curtailed the powers of the king and second, it not only severed the link between the monarchy and the military but also attempted to bring the military under civilian control. All the while the armed combatants belonging to the Maoist party were kept in cantonments pending a modality of their rehabilitation and integration. While there were clear articulations on what is to be done with the NA there was ambiguity about the management of these combatants. This ambiguity surrounding the management of combatants has now become the primary cause for the political stalemate. 22. The new transitional government decided to declare Nepal a federal democratic republic at the fi rst meeting of the Constituent Assembly. Given the history of its long term loyal association with the monarchy and the incidents of contestations in the past, there was apprehension about how the military would react to this particular decision. The army

19 Under the Unifi ed Command concept the overall control of all the security forces, The Nepal Police, The Armed Police Force and National Investigation Department was assigned to the Army and all security operations were conducted jointly by the forces under the leadership of the Army. 20 Rita Manchand reporting as “Soldiers went into the offi ce of the country’s leading internet service provider and suspended its services.The Army’s Signal Corps disconnected all the transponder satellite links.” For the Frontline, Vol.22, Issue:4,Feb 12-25, 2005, http://www.hindu.com/fl i ne/fl 2 204/stories/20050225005612700.htm (accessed 7th June 2011) 21 Ibid. 64. 22 Adhikary, “The Context of Confl ict and Human Rights Violation in Nepal,” p. 16. 23 Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Seize: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003, p. 59. 24The Proclamation of the House of Representative of Nepal May 18, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/gazette/2006/05/ nepal-parliament-sovereignty.php 170 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* leadership, contrary to the apprehensions, did not contest in the implementation of the republic bringing an end to the more than 200 year long active alliance with the monarchy. 23. The puzzle here is what could have prevented the army from contesting this particular decision? Again, there may be a range of explanation such as respect for people’s decision and discipline of the NA but a military pact could again be the reason. Although nothing has been expressed formally, the NA retained a key prerogative during this transition, that of succession of command. In a clear demonstration of such pact, the new government retained the Army leadership while it suspended all other heads of security and intelligence agencies of the time. Although the pact facilitated the transition at that particular time, the events in the future will show that transition alone is no guarantee of consolidation and end to contestations. Breach of the Transitional Pact and Consequences 24. Once the monarchy out of the way, the new political elites, particularly the Maoists moved towards consolidating their gains by imposing stricter control mechanisms upon the NA but their inability to institutionalize such mechanism and outright prejudice came in the way of sustained and true defense reform. The parties initially concluded an Arms and Army Management Agreement (AAMA) and subsequently added few more agreements pertaining to the control and restructuring of the NA and management of the Maoist combatants in the interim constitution. But, as the shift in the political power became apparent with the Maoist winning maximum number of seats in the constituent assembly and leading the government, the pact between the political elites became shaky. Furthermore, the bulldozing attitudes of the Maoists once in government gave rise to fear and anxiety within the NA and further entrenchment of the other political parties. This led to realignment in the political equation with the same democratic parties now advocating for the NA and the Maoists going for the complete domination of the NA. 25. The Maoist government under the premiership of Pushpa Kamal Dahal, Prachanda tried to implement policies and took actions that rather indicated a different agenda than that of true defense reforms. These attempts naturally was contested by the NA and supported by other political forces. Three incidents in this regards are crucial in demonstrating the tensions in CMR during the time. 26. Firstly, the NA decided to continue recruitment despite protests from the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the Maoists. Both argued that the recruitment was against the CPA. The process however had already been approved by the defense ministry itself that too under a Maoist minister and was already half way through and was diffi cult to reverse. 25 Second, eight qualifi ed and promising Brigadier Generals of the NA were given abrupt retirement in an unprecedented manner by the Maoist government. This was widely perceived as an attempt by the Maoists to deliberately cripple the future NA leadership. But upon the intervention by the judiciary all eight Brigadier Generals got reinstated. Here again the Maoist government alleged the army leadership of showing insubordination for not awaiting formal communication from the Ministry of defense before recalling them on duty.26 Third, was the withdrawal of the 25 Dr. S. Chandrashekharan, “Nepal: Precipitate Action on Sacking the Army Chief Will Derail the Peace Process,” South Asia Analysis Group update no. 187, April 28, 2009 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/notes6/note510.html (accessed December 2, 2010). 26 Ibid. 171 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

Army sports team from the 5th national games as a response to a last minute entry of the team of the Maoist combatants against the charter of the National Sports Council.27 These incidents demonstrated the environment of growing contestation and the Maoist government on the name of establishing “civilian control” sought a clarifi cation from the Chief of Army Staff, a constitutional provision that allows the government to fi re the Chief if his clarifi cation is found to be unsatisfactory. 27. Finally on 3 May, 2009 the minority cabinet (the coalition partners of the governments walked out of the cabinet meeting in protest thus rendering the cabinet decision incomplete) decided to fi re the army chief. The president, who is also the Supreme Commander of the army, in response to this rash decision, ordered the army chief to continue in his job saying that the government had not completed the required procedure for the Chief’s removal.28 The incident fi nally ended in the army chief continuing in his job while the Maoist prime minister resigned over the issue leading to the collapse of the government.29 28. The incident proves that the military may / will contest political decisions if its institutional interests and prerogatives are threatened abruptly without adequate justifi cation. Additionally, the military may well receive support from other political forces if they feel that the pact between the parties is being breached. Thus it can be concluded that the transitional government’s policies towards the military should refl ect the spirit of the transitional pact between the political elites. Breach of such pact will only lead to contestations by both the military and other political forces. Disregard or misinterpretation of such a pact can result in confrontation between the political elites, which not only results in the further continuation of military prerogatives and unstable CMR but also promotes stalemate of political progress. 29. Here the military pact between the emergent forces (the Maoists and the seven parties) that was meant to address the post transition situation appears to have broken down under the pressure of a fast changing dynamic environment that had dramatically altered the previous power equation. In summary, the pact between the Maoists and the then government could not envision the electoral political strength of the Maoists.30 Similarly, it also failed to foresee the problem that could arise out of an unresolved issue of the status of the militaries in the post confl ict scenario. While there was unanimous agreement on the need to isolate the NA in the name of dismantling the old authoritarian order and severing its link with the Monarchy, the urgency to do the same with the Maoist combatants and their mother party took a back seat. Thus the lingering problem of the management of the Maoist combatants, leading to diminishing political consensus hence diminishing possibilities of a new constitution in time. Conclusion 30. The case study demonstrates how modes of democratic transitions and the nature of transitional pacts impact course of civil military relations. It also reminds political leadership about the need to pay due attention to the genuine concerns of the military. If these facts are not considered then they can pose serious obstacle to the process of democratic consolidation.

27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 The Maoist secured the largest number of seats in the CA assembly elections conducted in 2008. 172 g]kfnL ;]gf l;kfxL jflif{s @)^*

31. The most important point of departure again is the transitional (military) pact. Whether the pact is between the political elites or between them and the military, it must be unambiguous and just. Here, understanding that these pacts are not static but dynamic is very important for the political elites to continue negotiating and re-negotiating the pact both among each other and with the military. The re-negotiation of pacts is also related to another important aspect of civil military relation which is the understanding the genuine concerns of the militaries and their need to be effective for which adequate resource needs to be allocated by the political leaders. 32. Nepal is on the verge of writing a new constitution and this is the perfect time and a historic opportunity to both review military prerogatives and re-negotiate the military pact from a framework that not only addresses the concern of the political forces of controlling the military but also the concern of the military about its effectiveness and institutional interests. This may provide a good opportunity to both create institutions that help consolidate a better CMR. Bibliography 1. Adhikary, Bipin. eds. Confl ict, Human Rights and Peace Challenges Before Nepal. National Human Rights Commission, 2003. 2. Chandrashekharan, S. South Asia Analysis Group update no. 187 (April, 2009). http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/notes6/note510.html (accessed December 2, 2010). 3. Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal: 1990, http://www.vakilno1.com/saarclaw/nepal/consitution/consitutionofnepal.htm (accessed November 19, 2010). 4. Finer, Samuel E. The Man on Horseback: The Role of Military in Politics, London: Pall Mall Press Ltd. 1962. 5. Manchand, Rita, Frontline, Vol.22, Issue:4 (Feb 2005) http://www.hindu.com/fl i ne/fl 2 204/stories/200 50225005612700.htm (accessed 7th June 2011) 6. Kumar, Dhruba and Hari Sharma. Security Sector Reform in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities. Kathmandu: Friends for Peace, 2005. 7. Nepali, Prakash and Phanindra Subba. “Civil Military Relations and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” in Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2004. 8. Riaz, Ali and Subho Basu. Paradise Lost: State Failure in Nepal, New York: Lexington Books, 2010. 9. Schmitter, Philippe, “The consolidation of political democracies: processes, rhythms, sequence and types,” in Transition to Democracy, eds. G Pridham, Dartmouth, Aldershot: 1995. 10. Stepan, Alfred C. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and Southern Cone. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988. 11. The Nepalese Army: A Force with History, Ready for Tomorrow, Kathmandu: Directorate of Public Relations, Nepalese Army, 2008. 12. Thapa Deepak and Bandita Sijapati. A Kingdom Under Seize: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003. Kathmandu: The Printhouse, 2003. 13. Young, Thomas Durell. “Military Professionalism in a Democracy,” in Who Guards the Guardian and How? Democratic Civil Military Relations, Eds. Thomas C Bruneau and Scott D Tollefson. Austin Texas : University of Texas Press, 2006. 14. The Proclamation of the House of Representative of Nepal, May 18, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ gazette/2006/05/nepal-parliament-sovereignty.php

173 l;kfxL jflif{s @)^* g]kfnL ;]gf

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