Factors Affecting the Weatment of Kenyan- and Somali Refugees in : A Historical Overview Ogenga Otunnu

This paper is an attempt to explain the andthe white settlersin the highlands on the region of Ethiopia and in Kenyan authorities' inhumane treat- the other"; 2) to deter the Ethiopian British S~maliland.~However, in ment of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali imperial power from annexing Boran keeping with the colonialresponse to the refugees in terms of long-standing and Gabro; and 3) to check "the Somali development of African nationalism in conflicts between Kenya and , south-westward expansion." the country, political parties were and the Kenyan authorities' reaction to To effect some of these policies and banned in the NFD and the leadership of what they perceived as a "credible minimize ethnic and clan conflicts, SYL was exiled between 1948 and 1960. threat" from the North-Eastern Rovince. administrative borders were redrawn, With the lifting of proscription on This long history of conflict and tension and in 1909 Somalis were not allowed Somali parties in the area in 1960 and the has created a distorted and hostile image beyond the Somali-Galla line. However, unity between Somali and British of the Somalis as "enemies" of the these policies caused Somaliresistanceto Somaliland on July 1, 1960 to form the Kenyan state. The image, real or British colonialism to es~alate.~The Somali Republic, the struggle for self- imaginary, has continued to influence colonial regime responded by declaring determination intensified in the NF'D. the Kenyan authorities' behaviour (through its Outlying District Ordi- The Northern Province People's towards the Somalis, which has led to nance) the Northern Frontier District Progressive Party, the Northern gross violations of human rights.' This, (NF'D) a closed district in 1926. By this Province Democratic Party, the People's however, is not an exhaustive expla- draconian ordinance, colonial admini- National League, and the National nation for the treatment of the two strators were given sweeping powers to Political Movement () were groups. Other variables, not directly deal with any form of dissent or organized to champion the cause for the examined here include the nature of the NFD's unification with the Somali postcolonial state, the broader question This long history of conflict Republic. On the other hand, the of political legitimacy, the nature of the Northern Province People's National ruling class and the role of violence as a and tension has created a Union, the Galla Political Union response to state repression. distorted and hostile image (Nairobi)and the United Ogaden Somali In order to understand the devel- of the Somalis as "enemies" Association (Nairobi and ) were opment of this image andits implications organized to oppose any union with for Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees of the Kenyan state. Somali Republic. The former were better in Kenya, it is .imperative to highlight organized and represented the some of the critical elements of the resistance. This was followed by the aspirations of the majority of the people conflicts between the Kenyan gov- Special District Ordinance, which in the area.5 ernment and the inhabitants of the imposed severe restriction on movement The development of modern North-Eastern Rovince of Kenya (which to or from the "Special Di~trict."~With nationalist politics reflected the nature of is the major part of what was formerly this administrative control mechanism, the relations between the larger colonial the Northern Frontier District), and Somalis were required to obtain special state and the region; furthermore, the between the Kenyan government and approval or passes to enter other minority faction in the area that opposed the government of Somalia. The conflict provinces. It is clear, therefore, that this unification with Somalia would not only has its origins in the colonial era. At the region did not generally share the same become reliable agents of central turn of the century, Britain extended her colonial experience with the rest of the government but would also influence control over this semiarid area. One of country. To be precise, no serious administrative policies in their own the foremost scholars on the region, A.A. attempt was madeby the colonial regime interest and to preserve the status quo. Castagno, cites three reasons for this to foster the socio-economicand political As agents of the central government, action: 1) to "provide a buffer between integration of this area into the rest of the these "collaborators" took upon Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia on the country. themselves the delicate taskof balancing one side, and the East African railway In a relentless attempt to address the the conflictinginterestsbetweenthestate grievances of the inhabitants of the area and "their limited constituency." and revitalize the quest for Somali unity Whether or not it was by their own Ogenga Otunnu is a doctoral candidate in the in eastern Africa, the Somali Youth volition, this group was promoted as the Department ofHistoty at York University and a League (SYL), founded in 1943 in "legitimate" voice of the Somali Researcher in the Centrefor Refugee Studies. Muqdisho, established itselfin the NFD, population in the country.

Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 5 (November-December 1992) 21 During the Lancaster House Regional Boundaries Commission. The less explicit was the resolution on Constitutional Conference on Kenya's latter report deliberately recommended Somaliland, which stated that "the independence (~ebruary-~~rill962), the keeping the area within Kenya by simply Conference supports the struggle of the thorny issue of Somali self- redrawing regional borders? According Somali people for their independence and recognizes their right to self- determination was raisedby members of to the Somali government, Britain's determination." The omission of any the NFD and Somali delegations. The reversal of policy on this matter was due reference to Somaliunityissignificant,but NFD delegation and the Somali to pressure from Ethiopia against the reference to "the right to self- government, the latter not officially a reunification and the concession both determination " was ambiguous,andcould party to the conference, demanded that Britain and the Kenya African National be interpreted as implying support for the NFD question be addressed before Union (KANU)made over the question secession as an expression of self- Kenyan independence. As Castagno of white settlers in Kenya? Betrayed by determination.1° points out, the NFD and Somali Britain's move, the Somali government government severed diplomatic relations with the The Conference of Independent U.K. on March 18, 1963. Similarly, the African States in April 1958 was far less insisted that the responsibility for majority of the inhabitants of the area compromising on the general questions settlement was exclusively Britain's and rejected the new border policy and of boundary and the reunification of that the Somali claims should by no means intensifiedits armed struggle against the national groups divided by colonialism. be used by Britain to retard thegrantingof colonial regime. To counter the In his summary of the conclusions of the Kenyan independence.KANUandKADU categorically rejected the secessionist heightened insurgency activities in the conference, President Nkrumah of proposal, and some members of KANU area, a state of emergency was declared Ghana pointed out that: "Our conference rejoined that the Somalis in the NFD could emipte to Somalia ifthey did not want to accept Kenyan administration. KADU's To counter the heightened insurgency activities in the area, membersalleged that thedominant view in a state of emergency was declared as Kenya obtained the NFD favoured a Kenyan regional government of the type advocated by independence.In short, Kenya's independence did not mean KADU's leaders. Ethiopia also interposed freedom from subjugation and harassment in the area. her views. She supported the Kenyan leaders and exerted pressure on the British gowmment to reject the Somali claim, on the ground that acquiescence to Somali as Kenya obtained indeeendence. In came to the conclusion that in the expansionism would lead to short, Kenya's independence did not interests of that Peace which is so "baUianizution" of the area. Thereafter, mean freedom from subjugation and essential, we should respect the vitriolic exchanges between Somalia and harassment in the area. independence, sovereignty and Ethiopia and intermittent border clashes The struggle for the unification of a territorial integrity of one another....'Ill increased the tension that had long marked Somali nation was also pursued through The All-African Peoples Conference in the Somali-Ethiopian border question.... regional and continental bodies. As a December 1958 sounded another President Aden Abdullah Osman of Somalia presented his government's view matter of fact, Somalia attempted to conflicting position: that selfdetermination-when employed identify its quest for unity through the to unify andenlargean existingstate (as in broader quest for pan-Africanism. The Be it resolved and it is hereby resolved that the Somali case)-could not be regarded as Somali question, however, received All-African Peoples Conference that the balkanization.6 mixed support, partly reflecting the Conference: (a) denounces artificial ideological divide between the radicals frontiers drawn by imperialist Powers to divide the peoples of Africa, particularly British Colonial Secretary Reginald and the moderate camps among those which cut across ethnic groups and Maudlingresponded to the NFD-Somali nationalist politicians. Saadia Touval divide people of the same stock; (b) callfor request by announcing on April 6,1962 made the following observation on the the abolition or adjustment of such that a commission would be appointed First Afro-Asian Peoples Solidaiity frontiers at an early ddte; (c)calls upon the to inquire into the state of public opinion Conference in Cairo, December 1957: lndependent States of Africa to support in the NFD.' In December 1962, the, permanent solution to this problem commission's report was conclusive. It Most explicit in its endorsement of founded upon the true wishes of the stated that the majority of the people irredentist claims was the resolution on people ....I2 overwhelmingly supported the Morocco, which stated that "the However, with the founding of the unification of the area with Somalia. Conference strongly supports the demand Organization of African Unity (OAU) in of Morocco for the return of areas still However, the British government dominated by imperialism in order to 1963, the pendulum finally swung in acrobatically violated the spirit and the ensure the unity and complete favour of the commitment to territorial findings of the commission; it quickly independence of Morocco" .... Somewhat integrity and respect for existingnational rushed through its own Report of the borders.13 Thus, contrary to previous

22 Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 5 (November-December 1992) rhetoric about the illegitimacy and of emergency in the North-Eastern were aggravated by superpower artificialityof colonial borders, the OAU Province. In contrast with this, Prime involvement and rivalry in the region. To showed that African leaders were not Minister ~~al!speaking to the majority be sure, border clashes based on the willing to relinquish their territorial political party in Mogadishu on October Somali question had been sporadic and possessions. To be sure, the OAU agreed 14, said that his Government's policy was to 'stand on one leg readyfor war and with all previous engagements had been won that borders of postindependence the other readyfor peace. l7 by Ethiopia. After the overthrow of the African states were artificial. However, civilian regime of Prime Minister at the same time it maintained that the Pressure for the unification was kept Ebrahim Egal in October 1969, the new survival of the borders is preferable to aliveby various Somali groupsin eastern military regime in Somalia moved the endless problems that would come Africa. In mid-1974 the United swiftly to reorganize its military up once they are critically questioned.14 Liberation Front of Western Somali capability to surpass that of its opponent, This position, which supports the status handed a memorandum to delegates at Ethiopia. In 1974, Somalia signed a quo, is part of the larger commitment in the OAU Summit in Muqdisho, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation theory tothe principle of noninterference demanding the return of the disputed with the Soviet Union, which also in the domestic affairs of other African territory to Somalia. The response to the allowed the Soviet Union to build states. In this context, self-determination memorandum by the attorney general of extensive military facilities at Berbera on by Somalis in Kenya (North-Eastern Kenya, Charles Njonjo, summarized the the Red Sea coast. The treaty alarmed the Province), Ethiopia (Ogaden and familiar official view of the government: West-"conservative Arab regimes" sections of the Haud and Bale) and "Kenya could never agree to surrender across the Red Sea and Kenya. The threat Djibouti (Afar and Issa regions of the former French Somaliland) or by any other group is regarded as illegitimate Tensions between Kenya and Somalia, however, were soon and illusionary. ovemhadowed by a more profound conjlkt between Ethiopia In postcolonial Kenya, armed encounters continued between the and Kenya, the Ogaden war. ThH war was a result of both Kenyan security forces and loosely internal and external contradictions. organized Somali groups (referred to as Shiftas or "bandits" by the Kenyan government). The latter were supported part of her territory. Kenyans, be they this treaty created was aptly directly and indirectly by the Somali Borans or Somalis, who did not support summarized by the U.S.: "the strategic government. It is reported that between Kenya 'should pack their camels and go Gulf to Cape route had now fallen under 1964 and 1967, some 2,000 Somalis were to Somalia'."18 While the message and the Soviet threat."19 massacred by Kenyan security forces.15 the tone were not new, the implications Ethiopia, which had granted the Accordingly, the OAU intervened to for the inhabitants of the area, however, United States facilities at the Kagnew negotiate what it preferred to consider were si&ruficant. Expelling inhabitants Base outside Asmara and had benefited exclusively as.a border dispute between of the area to Somalia became a strategy from enormous U.S. military assistance Kenya and Somalia. After the OAU for resolving the question of self- since the 1950s, faced a serious socio- summit in Kinshasa, a negotiated determination. Even peaceful and politicalcrisis followingtheOctober 1974 armistice between the two states was democratic dissent to government military coup 1revol~tion.~ Specifically, reached under the chairmanship of policies in the area would now be the struggles between the Ethiopian left President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in lumped with other forms of dissent, so and the Dergue from 1975 to 1978 led to a October 1967?6Although the negotiated that anyone partaking in any form of reign of terror in the country.The crisis in settlement scaled down hostilities dissent in the region wouldbe seen as an Ethiopia, therefore, provided the regime between the two states and halted the "enemy" of the state. This reinforced the in Somalia with a somewhat false four-year revolt in northeastern Kenya, image of the inhabitants of the area as opportunity to attempt a military the question of Somali unification, which "aliens," whose loyalty to Kenya was solution to the Somali question by was the root of the crisis in the Horn of always questionable. annexing the OgadenZ1 Africa, was left unresolved. According Tensions between Kenya and As it is now well known, the to Africa Contemporary Record, the Somalia, however, were soon over- superpowers dramatically changed settlement also meant different things to shadowed by a more profound conflict client states-the U.S. backed Somalia Kenya and Somalia: between Ethiopia and Kenya, the and the Soviet Union backed Ethiopia. Ogaden war. This war was a result of With one of the largest armament airlifts In a public speech on October20, President both internal and external contra- in contemporary African history, the Kenyatta rejibred to the dispute as "a little dictions. Localconflicts arisingfrom long Soviet Union and Cuba made it possible quarrel" which had been reconciled, and and uncompromising territorial for Ethiopian troops to route the announced a relaxation of the 5-year state disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia Somalian military in the Ogaden in

Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 5 (November-December1992) 23 1978." When the war ended in July 1979, easternKenya.Convincedthat there was Kenyan policemen were killed, four President Moi of Kenya visited Ethiopia a real and potential threat there, the other people were injured and some and, in turn, President Mengistu of Kenyan government increased its policemen were captured, following an EthiopiavisitedKenyainDecember 1980 coercive military presence in the area." attack on the small town of Garissa by in a move to strengthen the defence While the growth of superpower Somalia armedf~rces.~~Kenya'ssecurity cooperation between the two states. The involvement in the region (including in forces reacted to these incidentsby using fact that the Kenyan government was at Egypt and the Sudan) from the 1970s force totally out of proportion with the that time promoting a fervent anti- until the demise of the Soviet Union may level of threat that the Somali dissidents Mar>cist,anticommunist ideology, while have been primarily attributable to the posed to the security of the area. Violence the Ethiopian government was using region's strategic position in relation to was employed arbitrarily,unpredictably Marxist dogma to purge government the oil-producing Middle East, client- and brutally against people who were bureaucrats and opponents who were states faced with enormous internal deemed "enemies" of the state. Perhaps branded as "capitalist roaders," did not problems encouraged the superpowers the Kenyan government's strategy was appear to deter the two governments toexpand their rolein the region. Writing to deter future disturbances in the area. from strengthening relations. In fact, in 1984, Peter Woodward pointed out By 1989 the political situation in their mutual opposition to the Somali that: Somalia was leading to civil war, social government's territorial claims and to disintegration and the collapse of the Somali nationalism within their Troubled client-states may expect help state. In response, the Kenyan gov- respective territories were clearly major from their extml patrons to deal with ernment shifted its focus from "troubles points of agreement around which forms political and economic difficulties: indeed, of cooperation could be worked out. This these may be presented in such a light as to actively encourage the involvement of the should not come as much of a surprise, super-powers. Allegations that subversive Vwlence was employed however, for anti-Marxist dogma in activities in the domestic arena are being arbitmdy, unpredictubly Kenya and anticapitalist dogma in organised by "communists and Ethiopia were used respectively as revolutionaries" on the one hand, or and brutally against people ideological weapons for silencing or "feudalists and capitalist lockeys" on the who were deemed "enemies" bludgeoning political opposition. One other, quickly become the language of regime might find the otheis political describing opposition threats, howarer far of the state. program unpalatable, but the tacit they may be removed from the rep1 agreement demonstratedinthese actions complexities of the political and economic problems faced by most states in the is that it does not matter what ideology region." originating" from Somalia to its local one side or the other is using, as long as it poaching problem. The increasing is meant to achieve the same ends. Although superpower involvement incidence of poaching in Kenya's game The fact that Kenya and Somalia had in local politics led to increased state parks, particularly in Tsavo, was now a common arms supplier (the United repression, increased violations of allegedly linked to the "agitators" in the States) and similar U.S. military bases on human rights and increasing numbers of North-Eastern Province. Indeed, the their soil did not disturb the Kenya- refugees, external support sustained the recent spate of poaching and killings in Ethiopia anti-Somalia alliance. To be regimes of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, the area has been blamed on sure, the U.S. did not support Somalia's each of which were facing a crisis of "indigenous" and "alien" Somalis. border claims and quest for "Greater legitimacy on the domestic front. Ironically, while similar incidents in Somalia." The stated U.S. position was In the 1980s border incidents and other parts of Kenya are treated as that provision of armaments to Somalia general insecurity in the North-Eastem isolated cases of crime, in the North- were "conditional upon a nonaggressive Province provoked severe military Eastern Province or adjacent areas they posture towards Kenya by Somalia." retribution. Kenyan security forces are often treated as part of deliberate Tensions between Kenya and Somalia responded with brutal military political and economic strategies to were thereby reduced.23 The strategic operations in the area, following an destabilize the nation and discourage regional aspirations of the major players ambush in which a Kenyan government tourism. The incident of September 5, in the Cold War had superseded the officer waskilledin June 1981. In another 1988, in which twelve travellers were aspirations of Somalis who were incident in early 1984, the army mas- killed and twenty-nine others injured struggling for unification. As far as sacred some 400 civilians.26On February when three buses were attackedbetween Kenya was concerned, Somalia's failed 20, 1989 the Kenyan government Gartuba and Bangale, is a case in point.29 adventure in the Ogaden was a clear reported that Somalia armed forces in- Accordingly, the government attempted reminder of the determination of the vaded the Sebule border area, wounded to save its troubled tourist industry by regime in Muqdisho to realize its a number of Kenyans and killed six appointing Dr. Richard Leakey to vaulting ambitions through whatever elephantsS2' In September 1989 the implement its nationwide shoot-to-kill means, including infiltrating north- Kenyan government reported that four policy against poachers. However, since

24 Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 5 (November-December 1992) the government had presented Somalis beatings, detention and torture as we21 as refugees in general. Sending refugees to as poachers, this policy was interpreted being levied dgainst entire village overcrowded camps, however, also by some Kenyan-Somalis as an official wmmunitiesasanofFcinlplatfwm tomrry reflects the lack of resources available to strategy to legitimize the massacre of out violent security sweeps. There have provide needed assistance to refugees. been a number of massacres by Kenyan their peo~le.~ security forces in the North Eastern As a matter of fact, the severe ecological, In November 1988the MP for Dujis in Province condemnedas poss violations of political and economic crises the country Garissa District and Minister of State human rights by the international faces have direct implications for Hussein Maalim Mohammed, stated organizations-in Garissa 1980, refugees in the country. With thousands that aliens from a neighbouring country Modgashe 1982, Pokot 1984, Wajir 1984 of internallydisplaced persons (products (Somalia) had infiltrated the country and and Wajir 1987.... In 1987 another of political or "ethnic" violence) and were illegally acquiring citizenship and incident in Wagnla, near Wajir,resultedin hundreds of thousands facing famine engaging in dubious business. In 1989 at least297peoplemassaned, although the due to drought, the government of the Kenyan government began government only acknozoledged 57 daad Kenya does not have the capacityto meet claiming "inter-triilclashes. " The killing screening ethnic Somalis in the country. followed a systematic operation by the the basic human rights needs of an The Weekly biew(November 17,1989) securityf01ces who confiscated thousands estimated 700,000 refugees now living made this observation: of identity cards and closed all water within Kenya (most of whom are Somali sources in Wajir, a desert region. refugees). The current screening of ethnic Somalis in Eyewitness reports told of people forced to The Kenyan government needs to Kenya may, on the face of it, appear strip, detained in barbed wire enclosure radically change its inhumane treatment unusual, but those anxious for an and depn'wd of food and water. Groups of of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali refugees. explanation probably need not go much people were burnedalivewith petrol; others This will mean that the state should further than the deterioration in recent were shot or beaten to death?2 months of the security situation in North- adhere tointernational humanrightsand Eastern Province and surrounding In its opposition to government refugee covenants it endorsed. Also, it areas.... If the intention of the current repression of Kenyan-Somalis and the should develop a refugee determination screening exercise of ethnic Somalis is to forcible repatriation of Somali refugees, mechanism that will make a clear root out rebels whom Barrecomplains have AhWatch argued that: distinction between Kenyan-Somalis sought sanctuary in the county, then the and Somali refugees. Equally important, Sornaligovemment has every reason to be The Kenyan authorities are also using the Kenya and other OAU member states pleased. As for local Somalis, some of them influx of Somalis seeking sanctuary to must find a democratic way of may find the exercise inconvenient, and impose a discriminatory and repressive addressing the question of the state's probably even a discriminatory one. But &eeningprocess on its &n ethnic Somali political legitimacy. The question of thesecurityfactors involwdaWear to have community, which has sujferedahistory of protecting and meeting minority ethnic led the Kenya government to decide that persecution .... Some 3,000 refugees the movewas imperative. Being a staying in makeshifl shelters in Liboi, groups' aspirations can no longer be neighbourof Somalia andhavinga sireable North Eastern Kenya, received no food or avoided by Kenya and the OAU. There is ethnic Somali population within its assistance from the Kenyan authorities an urgent need for the international borders, Kenya can barely escape some sincearrivhgin Kenyaon~eptember20.... community to address the crisis in consequences of the internal strife in The refugees were harassed and beaten by Somalia to save the loss of human lives Somalia?' Kenyan securityforces, and three arrested and allow for a speedy repatriation of The image of Somalis seen in the for "inciting resistance" against Somali refugees. Assistance to refugees larger historical context of conflicts deportation. All refugees have now inKenyamaybe directed to the UNHCR, reportedly been returned to areas in African Medical and Research between the two states and between the Somalia where hea y fighting persists, or central government and the North- have fled to escape forcible repatriation.... Foundation, Mbdecins San Fronti$res, Eastern Province have blurred the The authorities have increased security All-African Conference of Churches, distinction between Somali refugees and sweeps and identity checks of Kenyans of Church of the Province of Kenya, Kenyan-Somalis. As a matter of fact, the Somalioriginand Somalis livingin Kenya. National Council of Churches of Kenya/ distinctionis often arbitrary, and this has The arrival of the refugees is king used as Refugee Service Unit, International affected the lives of all Somalis in Kenya. an opportunity to impose compulsory Committee of the Red Cross, Kenya Red Africa Watch had this to say: screening on all Kenyan-Somalis, in order Cross Society, Jesuit Refugee Service in to identify "illegal aliens." 33 Africa and Kenya Catholic Secretariat. rn State of emergency laws in the North It is also imperative to indicate that Eastern Province allow security forces to the unstated- policy of "refugee Notes detain anyone for up to 56 days without deterrence," which often means trial. An umbrella charge of "banditry" discouraging refugee influx by forcing 1. U.S. Committee for Refugees, World been has used ubiquitously in the North refugees to go to the overcrowded camps Refugee Survey (1991): 44-45; U.S. Eastern Province to subject a countless Committee for Refugees, World Rejigee number of individuals to harassment, and/or inducing involuntary repatriation, affects the treatment of Survey (1992): 43-45; Africa Watch

Refuge, Vol. 12, No. 5 (November-December 1992) 25 (November 17, 1989). See also World Refugee Survey (1987): 38. United Nations University, 1987):-55-86; 2. A.A. Castagno, "The Somali-Kenya Chege, "Conflict in the Horn of Africa," Controversy: Implications for the in Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Future," Iournnl of Modern African Studies Development, edited by Emmanuel CENTRE FOR 2, no. 2 (1964): 165-69. ans sen (London and ~ewJersey: The UnitedNationsUniversity, 1987):87-100; REFUGEE STUDIES 3. Ibid., 70-71. W. Scott Thompson and I. William 4. Ibid. Zarhnan, "The Development of Norms York University 5. Ibid. in the African System," in The 6. Ibid., 176-77. Organization of African Unity After Ten Years, edited by Yassin El-Ayouty (New CRS grants are intended to assist 7. See Somali Government, The lssue of the York Praeger Publishers, 1975): 5-6. and encourage research on Northern Frontier District (Muqdisho: "refugee and development" - Somali Government, 1963): 19. 17. See Africa Contemporary Record (London, 1968-69): 159. ways of understanding and 8. Report of the Northern Frontier District 18. Africa Contempora y Record (London, resolving refugee problems in Commission, presented to Parliament by developing countries. the Secretary of State for the colonies by 197475): B209. command of Her Majesty (London: 19. Chege, "Conflict in the Horn of Africa," This includes support for HMSO, 1962); and 91. research activities on the Protectorate: Report of the Regional 20. Bereket H. Salassie, "The Dilemma on following topics: Boundaries Commission (London: HMSO, the Horn of Africa," Journal of Modern Refugee settlement in less de- 1%2). African Studies 22, no. 2 (1984): 260. veloped countries 9. Somali Government, Frontier Problem 21. Ibid., 272. Planted by Britain between Kenya and Repatriation and development 22. See, for example, Keith Sommerville, in less developed countries Somali Republic (Muqdisho: Somali Foreign Militay Intervention in Africa Government, 1963). (London: St. Martin's Press, 1990): 41-60; Forces affecting refugee gen- 10. See Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics I. William Zartrnan, Ripe for Resolution: eration in less developed of Independent Africa (Cambridge: Conflict andlnterwntion in Afrca (Oxford: countries Harvard University Press, 1972): 52-53. Oxford University Press, 1985): 71-117. Global changes and policies in 11. Ibid., 54. 23. Chege, "Conflict in the Horn of Africa," sending and receiving coun- 12. Ibid., 56-57. 94. tries as well as activities of 13. See Crawford Young, "Self-Deter- 24. For a useful theoretical debate on state internationalagenciesthat will mination, Territorial Integrity, and repression, coercion and terror, see affect refugee generation and African State System," in Conflict David Pion-Berlin, The Ideology of State development efforts. Resolution in Africn, edited by Francis M. Terror (Boulder and London: Lynne Deng and I. William Zartman Reinner Publishers, 1989): 1-7; Ekkart Applications are considered twice (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Zimmermann, Political Violence, Crises, a year. Completed applications Institution, 1991): 327; John Ravenhill, and Revolutions: Theories and Research must be received by November 15 "Redrawing the Map of Africa," in The (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1983). and March 15 for funding de- Precarious Balance: State and Society in 25. Woodward, "Relations Between cisions by January 15 and May 15 Africa, edited by Donald Rothchild and Neighbouring States in North-East respectively. Naomi Chazen (Boulder: Westview Africa," 283. Press, 1988): 282-306; Harvey Stan and 26. Chege, "Conflict in the Horn of Africa," For further details, please contact: Benjamin A. Most, "Contagion and 93. Border Effects on Contemporary African Helen Gross Conflict," ComparativePolitical Studies 16, 27. See Nairobi-basednewspapers, Standard, Student/Faculty Liaison no. 1(April 1983): 92-117. and (February Centre for Refugee Studies 21,1989). 14. See Peter Woodward, "Relations Suite 322, York Lanes Between Neighbouring States in North- 28. See "Terror Reigns in Eastern Kenya," York University ," Journal of Modern African Weekly Review (Nairobi, n.d., 1992):21-22. 4700 Keele Street Studies 22, no. 2 (1984): 280. 29. Weekly Review (Nairobi, November 12, North York, ON 15. Gundrun Dahl, Suffering Grass: 1989): 19-20. Canada M3J 1P3 Subsistence and Society of Waso Borana 30. Personal interview with a Kenyan- (Stockholm: Studies in Social Somali, , June 23,1992. Tel: (416) 736-5663 Anthropology, 1979): 200. 31. Weekly Review (Nairobi, November 17, Fax: (416) 736-5837 16. See Nzongola-Ntalja, "The National 1992). E-mail via BITNET, address: Question and the Crisis of Instability in 32. Africa Watch (November 17,1989):10-11. REFUGE@YORKVMl Africa," in Africa: Perspectives on Peaceand 33. Ibid. Development, edited by Emmanuel

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