A Response to John Frame's Presuppositional Approach to Faith

Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 356–376

brill.com/jrt

A Response to John Frame’s Presuppositional Approach to Faith and Reason

Andrew Ter Ern Loke Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong [email protected]

Abstract

Presuppositionalism is popular among certain groups of Reformed Christians today, and John Frame is one of its leading proponents. In contrast with the Evidential Approach concerning faith and reason, which affirms experiences and reason as starting points, Presuppositionalists assume the truth of scripture as starting point in their assessment of the truth-claims of Christianity. They appeal to Christians by emphasizing the authority of scripture, by criticizing autonomous human reason, and by highlighting the noetic effects of sin. I address these considerations, show that Frame’s approach is self-defeating and unacceptably circular, and answer his objections to the Evidential Approach.

Keywords theological presuppositions – Presuppositionalism – faith and reason – authority of scripture – noetic effects of sin

1 Introduction

Presuppositionalism is popular among certain groups of Reformed Christians today, and it raises interesting and important issues concerning what Christian theological presuppositions ought to be, as well as the relationship between faith and reason. In contrast with the Evidential Approach, which uses experiences (including experiences of others, such as their testimonies) and reason as starting points, Presuppositionalists assume the truth of the Christian scripture as their starting point in their assessment of the truth-claims of Christianity.

They acknowledge their use of circular argument, that is, a form of argument that presupposes the conclusion of what is to be proved. They distinguish between two types of circular argument.The narrow circular argument presupposes the Bible as the Word of God to prove that the Bible is the Word of God. The broader circular argument uses the Bible to determine what evidences and method of reasoning are in accordance with the Bible, and then uses these to prove the Bible. This argument is still circular in a sense, because the propo- nent chooses, evaluates, and formulates these evidences in ways controlled by the Bible, which is presupposed to be the Word of God.1 Presuppositionalists claim that circular argument cannot be avoided in any form of worldview. Nev- ertheless, they claim that the Christian circular argument is better than that of others, because it can provide a compelling account of morality, rationality, and meaning.2 The main proponents of Presuppositionalism, such as Cornelius Van Til, Gordon Clark, Greg Bahnsen, and John Frame, differ among themselves with regard to the finer points of their methods. In this article, I shall focus on the Presuppositionalism of John Frame, because he is one of the leading proponents and his method is widely regarded as an improvement of that of Van Til and others.3 While many theologians have dismissed Presuppositionalism for using circular arguments, Frame makes Presuppositionalism appeal to Chris- tians by emphasizing the authority of scripture and the Lordship of Christ, by criticizing autonomous human reason, by highlighting the noetic effects of sin, and by citing numerous scriptural passages in support of the above. Indeed, a significant number of Christians in the Majority World take Presupposition- alism seriously. To illustrate, Dr. Stephen Tong, a highly influential theologian and evangelist who has successfully promoted Reformed theology among mil- lions of Chinese Christians worldwide,4 is known to advocate such a position. Likewise, the highly influential Young Earth Creationist organization Answers in Genesis, which partners with creationist organizations in countries such as

1 John Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God: An Introduction (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1994), 9–17. 2 John Frame, The Doctrine of the Word of God (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub- lishing, 2010), 24–25. 3 See the endorsements by Frame’s dialogue partners in Steven Cowan ed., Five Views on Apolo- getics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000). 4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Tong.TheWestminsterTheological Seminary has recognized his contributions to Reformed Christianity by awarding him an honorary Doctor of Divinity degree in 2008 and establishing The Stephen Tong Chair of Reformed Theology in 2011.

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Indonesia, Philippines, Japan, and Korea,5 is also known to promote Presup- positional Apologetics. As they state on their website, “When explaining their beliefs, Christians often feel they must first prove the Bible or prove the existence of God. This approach reveals that they do not yet understand the Bible’s approach, known as presuppositional apologetics.”6 They go on to explain that Christians should use the Bible as their axiom, which “is not susceptible to proof or disproof.”7 Given the influence of Presuppositionalism internationally, those theologians who disregard the reasons why Presuppositionalism appeal to these Christians may justifiably be accused of cultural myopia and ivory tower mentality. Moreover, Frame has claimed that his methods have been mis- understood and that his objections with respect to the Evidential approach have not been adequately answered.8 (It is interesting to note that a number of postmodern theologians have also agreed with the Presuppositionalists’ criticisms by claiming that the Evidential Approach is insufficiently theological and unbiblical).9 For the above reasons, a detailed response to Frame is warranted. In this article, I shall evaluate Frame’s Presuppositionalism on the basis of theological and philosophical considerations. I shall show that Frame’s approach is self-defeating and unacceptably circular, and that his objections—including those not previously addressed in literature—can be adequately addressed by the Evidential Approach even when a large number of his conservative theological emphases (including his emphasis on following what the scripture affirms) are accepted. I shall offer a series of arguments against Frame’s position concerning the authority of scripture, the Lordship of Christ, autonomous human reason, common ground, the noetic effects of sin, and circular reasoning.

5 https://answersingenesis.org/international/contact/. 6 https://answersingenesis.org/presuppositions/what‑is‑presuppositional‑apologetics/. 7 https://answersingenesis.org/presuppositions/what‑is‑presuppositional‑apologetics/. 8 John Frame, “Closing Remarks,” in Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics, 354. 9 See the comments of John Franke and James Smith in Myron Penner, ed., Christianity and the Postmodern Turn: Six Views (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005), 211, 218; James Smith, Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault to Church (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 48–49. Their criticisms are addressed below.

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2 Theological Evaluation

2.1 Concerning the Authority of Scripture, the Lordship of Christ, and Autonomous Human Reasoning I shall begin with a set of arguments concerning the authority of scripture, the Lordship of Christ, and autonomous human reason. One of the main motivations of Presuppositionalists is to uphold the authority of scripture. They are concerned that to assess the truth-claims of Chris- tianity in a nonpresuppositional way would be to judge scripture by another, more ultimate standard.10 Frame thinks that God speaks with absolute authority throughout the scripture, and his words cannot be subjected to proof and disproof.11 He thus concludes that “in the final analysis we must believe Scrip- ture on its own say-so.”12 The problem with Frame’s argument is that it is self-defeating, for, as Gary Habermas observes, the evidential method of judging claims of divine revelation is actually taught in scripture itself. To cite a few examples, in the Old Testament, potential prophets are to be tested according to their own predic- tions.13 Additionally, God is said to have challenged other gods to predict the future the way he could.14 These passages portray a God who allows himself to be tested in such a way that his words could be disproved (that is, if the prophesized message does not come true), and who passes the tests, such that Israel is called to be his witness of these mighty historical acts of confirma- tion.15 Likewise, 1Kings 18:20–45 portrays Elijah challenging the people to view an awesome miracle as God’s vindication of his prophet status and message. The New Testament portrays Jesus citing his miracles as evidence that he is the promised Messiah,16 and both Peter17 and Paul18 proclaim Jesus’s resurrection as the validation of his teachings. These passages affirm that both believers and unbelievers are told to examine history using their reason and their senses in order to ascertain God’s truth. But there is no hint in these passages that such

10 John Frame, “Presuppositional Apologetics,” in Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics, 218– 219. 11 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 135. 12 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 12–14. 13 Deut. 18:21–22. 14 Isa. 41:21–29; 44:7, 24–28; 46:10; 48:5, 14. 15 Isa. 44:6–8; 52:6. 16 Luke 7:18–23. 17 Acts 2:22–24. 18 Acts 16:30–31.

Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 356–376 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 01:49:26AM via free access 360 loke evidential challenges displease God. On the contrary, God is said to have made the challenge himself.19 Frame replies by agreeing that there are provisions in scripture for testing God’s Word empirically and rationally, but he argues that testing scripture by standards endorsed by scripture does not involve judging scripture by a higher standard. He calls this procedure a ‘broadly circular argument,’ an argument in which scripture is verified by scripture’s own standards, and he states that he has never opposed the process of verifying scripture by scriptural standards.20 Frame believes that the word of God should set the rules for thinking and knowing, and for the use of evidence and reason.21 In his other writings, Frame acknowledges that the scripture itself directs us to consider evidences outside itself, such as the five hundred eyewitness in the case of Jesus’s resurrection,22 but he emphasizes that the witnesses’ testimony is to be evaluated by way of a biblical view of evidence—not by theories such as those of Hume and Bultmann, which reject all supernatural claims from the onset.23 When challenged by Hume’s objection, for example, Frame confesses that the circularity of his argument would become evident; he would fall back to his presupposition of a Christian epistemology.24 He thinks that the Christian needs to presuppose a Christian epistemology—a view of knowledge, testimony, witness, appearance, and fact that is subject to scripture, and by doing that he is using scriptural standards to prove scriptural conclusions.25 In his more recent writings, Frame “surprises readers” by acknowledging that “Christians, too, ought to believe in the ultimate authority of reason,” and that it is fitting to identify and evaluate God’s revelation. He goes on to say, however, that he is taking reason in the normative sense, which for him is to presuppose the reality of God and to subject itself to the premises of God’s revelation to us. In other words, this is still a circular argument no different from what he has written before, and Frame acknowledges this by going on to say that “there is a certain circularity in saying that we should base our reasoning on God’s Word,

19 Gary Habermas, “An Evidentialist’s Response to Presuppositional Apologetics,” in Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics, 245–246. 20 Frame, “Closing Remarks,” 357. 21 John Frame, “A Presuppositionalist’s response to Classical Apologetics,” in Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics, 76–77. 22 1Cor. 15:6. 23 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 60. 24 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 9–10; see also John Frame, “A Presuppositionalist’s response to Evidential Apologetics,” in Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics, 136–137. 25 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 9–11.

Journal of Reformed TheologyDownloaded 12from (2018) Brill.com09/27/2021 356–376 01:49:26AM via free access a response to john frame's presuppositional approach 361 while evaluating God’s Word.”26 Hence, while Frame advocates the use of reason and evidence, his approach is still different from the Evidential Approach in that the latter does not advocate arguing from reason and evidence circularly. In reply, it is indeed important to examine presuppositions, and many non- Presuppositionalists recognize that as well. However, the problem with Frame’s view is that his circular approach is nowhere endorsed in the Christian scripture itself. Scriptural passages that advocate the testing of claims of divine reve- lation27 and that issue the challenge to other gods28 do not affirm that scripture should determine what views of reasoning, evidences and epistemology are to be adopted in order to prove scripture. On the contrary, these scriptural passages presuppose that logical inferences from experiences are ways by which people can know whether prophecies have been fulfilled and whether miracles have occurred. These passages also presuppose that logical inferences from fulfilled prophecies, miracles, and so forth are ways by which pagans can come to know who the true God is, without first having to presuppose that any scripture should control the way in which a person chooses, evaluates, and formulates these evidences. It is interesting to note that, while Presuppositionalists pride themselves for upholding scripture, their approach is not found in scripture. No servant of God is ever portrayed in the scripture to have presented a circular argument or resorted to circular argument when challenged by an objection from pagans, as Frame would do. On the contrary, the Presuppositionist’s method is different from that used by these servants. In addition to the examples that Habermas cites, other examples may be given: When addressing the skeptics in Corinth who doubted the resurrection,29 Paul appealed to the sensory experiences of eyewitnesses to prove his point: he asked the Corinthians to check out those who had seen Jesus. The statement that Jesus “appeared to more than five hundred brethren at one time, most of whom remain until now”30 is clearly intended as testimonial evidence that is verifiable by his audience so that they might also know that the resurrection occurred. As Richard Bauckham observes, Paul is saying in effect that “if any- one wants to check this tradition, a very large number of the eyewitnesses are still alive and can be seen and heard,” and this is provided to address the prob-

26 Frame, The Doctrine of the Word of God, 23–24. 27 E.g., Deut. 18:21–22. 28 Isa. 41:21–29 and other instances. 29 1Cor. 15:12. 30 1Cor. 15:6.

Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 356–376 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 01:49:26AM via free access 362 loke lem that the Corinthians found resurrection incredible.31, 32 Likewise, Theissen and Merz observe that “the references to appearances in chronological order and the accessibility in the present of many witnesses, only some of whom have died, supports the understanding of 1Cor.15:3–11 as an attempt to prove the resurrection of Christ.”33 Paul did not argue for his view of evidence in a circular manner. In another passage, Luke portrays Paul as questioning the reasonable- ness of the skeptics’ presupposition by asking, “Why should any of you consider it incredible that God raises the dead?”34 Following the scriptural example of Paul (to which Frame would be committed) would imply that, when facing skeptics who reject all supernatural claims from the onset (such as Bultmann and Hume), the Christian should not argue for their view in a circular manner. Rather, they should show the unreasonableness of their rejection without circularity. Other examples of noncircular arguments based on sensory experiences can be seen from the writings of Luke, who emphasizes that the resurrected Jesus was seen, heard, and touched, and that he ate fish.35 Similarly, the author of the Epistles of John emphasizes that the incarnate Word was “what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our hands, concerning the Word of Life—and the life was manifested, and we have seen and testify and proclaim to you the eternal life, which was with the Father and was manifested to us.”36 It is true that Paul, Luke, and John37 affirm that Jesus’s resurrection fulfilled the prophecies of the Old Testament (this is what the phrase ‘according to the Scriptures’ in 1Cor. 15:4 meant).38 Neverthe- less, the question of how they knew it was Jesus of Nazareth and not another person who fulfilled the prophecies is answered by them on the basis of what were claimed to be the experiences of the eyewitnesses (“he appeared to me” [1Cor. 15:8], “touched him,” “saw him eat fish,” and so forth), rather than argued circularly. While concluding that the resurrection occurred requires interpre-

31 1Cor. 15:12. 32 Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 308. 33 Gerd Theissen and Annette Merz, The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide (Minneapo- lis: Fortress Press, 1998), 489. 34 Acts 26:8, NIV. 35 E.g., Acts 1:3; cf. Luke 24:39–43. 36 1John 1:1–2. 37 The authorships of Luke-Acts and the Epistles of John have been challenged as well as defended in historical-critical scholarship; in this article I shall simply assume that Luke is the author of Luke-Acts and John is the author of 1John, as this is the conservative position that Frame himself would hold. 38 Theissen and Merz, The Historical Jesus, 489.

Journal of Reformed TheologyDownloaded 12from (2018) Brill.com09/27/2021 356–376 01:49:26AM via free access a response to john frame's presuppositional approach 363 tation conditioned by the particularities of one’s horizon of perception,39 the New Testament authors took care to portray details that would serve to exclude alternative interpretations in a noncircular way (such as the touching of Jesus’s hands and feet, which excludes a nonphysical interpretation in Luke 24:36–39). Following their example would mean that Christians should do the same.40 Additionally, while the belief in the divine inspiration of the Old Testament was also part of the New Testament authors’ pre-understanding, this does not imply that they reasoned like Presuppositionalists. On the contrary, it should be noted that the Jewish belief in the Old Testament was also claimed to be based on logical inferences from evidences (such as fulfilled prophecies and miracles, as noted above) rather than argued circularly. Therefore the New Testament authors would probably think that the resurrection of Jesus would also have to be consistent with Old Testament prophecies and mode of inference as well. Frame’s view leads him to the extreme conclusion that, even if scripture fails to agree with all extrabiblical data, the scripture must still be considered as God’s word. He writes that “we may use extrabiblical data in apologetics, but not as independent criteria to which Scripture must measure up.”41 This is inconsistent with scripture itself, which affirms the use of extrabiblical data to test claims of divine revelation (such as to determine if a prophet’s prophecies fail to come to pass) in order to recognize genuine divine revelation.42 Now if a particular historical source (Josephus, for example) is apparently in conflict with the scripture, it might be that that source is in error or that there is no real conflict, but these points should also be argued for by methods of historical reasoning and exegesis43 rather than merely presupposed. Endorsing the Presuppositionalists’ approach would lead to absurdity, for believers of various creation tales (such as those Chinese who believe in the legend of the personal creator Pan Gu; here I use an example familiar to Chinese Christians among whom Presuppositionalism is quite influential) could likewise argue that, even if these stories fail to agree with all external data, they must still be considered as divinely revealed.

39 Cf. James Smith’s comments in Penner, ed., Christianity and the Postmodern Turn, 218. Smith thinks that Presuppositionalists such asVanTil rejects classical apologetics because they agree with the postfoundationalist claim that everything is interpretation. 40 For a recent example, see Andrew Loke, “The Resurrection of the Son of God: A Reduction of the Naturalistic Alternatives,” Journal of Theological Studies 60 (2009): 570–584. 41 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 21. 42 See Deut. 18:21–22, Isa. 44:6–8. 43 For example, the Christian should ask questions such as, “Are there other plausible interpretations of the Bible? Are there other evidences to think that that particular historical source is correct?”

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Frame tries to avoid the need for historical evidence by claiming that no religious doctrine other than that of Christianity is compatible with absolute- personality theism, that is, the view that there is a perfect and personal creator, and therefore only Christian doctrine is to be accepted.44 But one can easily propose a modified Pan Gu, by asserting that he is infinite (rather than finite), perfectly moral, and so on, and thus is compatible with absolute-personality theism. If historical evidence is not considered, one would not realize that the modified Pan Gu is different from the original story of Pan Gu and that modifications have been made. Indeed, one can come up with many internally consistent stories, all of which are compatible with absolute-personality theism, but all of which are baseless tales. Frame raises the concern that extrabiblical data would be presented as the counsel of God on the same level as scripture if their role for determining divine revelation is acknowledged.45 However, this conclusion does not follow. It is theoretically possible that there could be several instances of extrabiblical data (concerning evidence of fulfilled prophecy, for example) that serve as evidence that points to the words of scripture as divinely inspired, while there is no evidence for thinking that the data itself is divinely inspired. In that case, Christians are not required to believe that this data has divine authority. Frame thinks that Paul’s emphasis in 1Corinthians 15:1–11 is that one should believe in the resurrection because it is part of the apostolic preaching (that is, the Word of God; Frame highlights verses 1–2, 11). He thinks that while eyewitnesses are important, the ultimate proof, the ultimate evidence is the Word of God.46 In reply, it is true that Paul emphasizes that what he preached was the apostolic word of God, but the fundamental issue here is how the skeptics in Corinth would be able to know that Paul’s message was indeed from God and thus believe in the resurrection. Paul claims that they would be able to know because Jesus rose from the dead and revealed himself to the eyewitnesses, including “more than five hundred brethren at one time, most of whom remain until now.”47 In summary, the scriptural passages cited above endorse a method of argumentation that utilizes experiences and reason as starting points, and not the circular method of Frame. Now the Christian who reasons from experience and reason to the conclusion that scripture is divinely revealed should also seek to ensure that their views on argumentation are in line with what scripture

44 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 135. 45 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 18–19. 46 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 58. 47 1Cor. 15:6.

Journal of Reformed TheologyDownloaded 12from (2018) Brill.com09/27/2021 356–376 01:49:26AM via free access a response to john frame's presuppositional approach 365 affirms for the sake of consistency and obedience to God. But this is different from saying that the justification of his views on argumentation requires the assumption that scripture should set the rules for argumentation. Frame is concerned that not presupposing the truth of Christ’s word would be inconsistent with the scriptural command to honor Christ by setting apart Christ as Lord (quoting 1Pet. 3:15), and not trusting Jesus’s wisdom beyond all other wisdom. He thinks that Jesus and his word should be the ultimate standard of truth, because there could not possibly be a higher and more authorita- tive standard.48 To argue in a nonpresuppositional way would not glorify God (here he cites 1Cor. 10:31).49 It would be to depend on autonomous reasoning, which he defines as reasoning that rejects the authority of God’s revelation in favor of some other ultimate norm by which everything (including scripture) is to be judged. Autonomous reasoning is antagonistic to Christianity in that it denies God the Lordship and authority to command human beliefs and methods of thought and makes humans their own lords.50 Frame supports his views by quoting biblical passages that say that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge,51 and that the wisdom of Christ52 is something that transforms and governs the whole of life; it gives a new “mind”53 and calls Christians to bring every thought captive to Christ.54, 55 In response, it has been shown in the previous paragraphs that those servants of God, such as Paul, who are portrayed in scripture as honoring Christ and his Lordship, fearing God and glorifying him, did not presuppose the truth of the words of Jesus and argue in a circular manner. It is true that various scriptural passages affirm that honoring, fearing, and glorifying God are attitudes that believers should have.56 Nevertheless, how it can be shown that Jesus of Nazareth is truly the Christ, that the God of the Bible is the true God, and that “whatever the Bible says is true”57 is another question. Of course, if the words

48 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 4–9, 21. 49 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 228–229. 50 Frame, “Closing Remarks,” 355–356, see also Frame, The Doctrine of the Word of God, 16, 20. 51 Prov. 1:7. 52 1Cor. 1:30. 53 1Cor. 2:16. 54 2Cor. 10:5. 55 Frame, “Closing Remarks,” 350–351. 56 Prov. 1:7 can be understood as saying that having the fear of God will prevent people from distorting the truths they perceive and therefore it leads to knowledge. 57 This is Frame’s first premise for his argument for the Bible as follows: Premise 1: What- ever the Bible says is true. Premise 2: The Bible says it is the Word of God. Conclusion: Therefore, the Bible is the Word of God. Frame did not provide any justification for why we should think that premise 1 is true, except by saying that “for Christians, the argument

Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 356–376 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 01:49:26AM via free access 366 loke and wisdom of Jesus are from God, then they must be the highest standard for humanity, but how they can be shown to be from God is another issue. Frame’s view on autonomous reasoning seems to assume that one either presupposes God in the argument or rejects God as the final standard of truth, but this is a false dilemma. The correct view is not to beg the question either way in the argument, that is, not to assume that God is not the final standard of truth nor to assume that there is a God who is the final standard of truth in the argument. The reasoning of Paul, Luke, John, and so forth seems to be as follows: to show by noncircular argument (that is, without begging the question) that Jesus of Nazareth was indeed sent from God, based on logical inferences from evidence (miracles, for example, including his resurrection), and then to regard Jesus’s words and wisdom as the highest standard. A distinction between (1) correct attitude (fearing God, humility, and so on) and (2) reasoning based on logic and evidence must therefore be drawn. Number 1 alone is insufficient for showing that God exists, that Jesus is divine, and so on. A Christian may consider number 2 alone to be sufficient for showing that God exists, that Jesus is divine, and so on, but insufficient for bringing people under the bondage of sin into a personal relationship with God; this would require number 1 as well as the work of the Holy Spirit (see further, next section). It should be emphasized that what has been said above does not imply that sound reasoning based on logic and experiences is therefore of a higher standard of truth than scripture. On the contrary, it is theoretically possible for a Christian to argue that the divine origin of scripture can be established by sound reasoning, therefore what scripture affirms must be taken seriously as highest standard of truth.58 He/she might conclude that sound reasoning as well as scripture are both from Christ the Logos,59 whose Lordship is not restricted to biblical language only, and that the ability to argue noncircularly60 for the truth of Christianity is given to humanity so that people can recognize what is genuine revelation from God. The implications of this view are that, if people reason correctly and interpret the scripture correctly, these should be consistent rather than in conflict, for both are equally the highest and ultimate standards of truth.

expresses an important truth. As our supreme standard, Scripture is self attesting. There is nothing higher than God’s word by which God’s word may be validated” (Frame, “Closing Remarks,” 356–357). 58 This attempt is made in Gary Habermas, The Risen Jesus & Future Hope (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003). 59 John 1:1–18. 60 As noted previously, Frame would agree with this sentence if the word ‘noncircularly’ is removed and replaced with ‘circularly,’ that is, presupposing the scriptural standards.

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Frame notes that his critics argue that we cannot make God our supreme standard until we know that he exists, and he replies by saying that this analysis denies the clear teaching of Romans 1 that everyone already knows that God exists.61 In response, Romans 1 does not answer the question of how people know that God exists the way Presuppositionalists do, that is, by presupposing God as our supreme standard. Rather, it affirms that people can know that God exists through understanding the things that are made (no circularity there!). Frame is concerned that the accommodation of Christianity to secular thought has been a fruitful source of heresy, and he thinks that Christians need to be more critical of philosophical and other secular sources.62 While Frame’s warning that Christians should not accept philosophical and secular sources uncritically should be heeded, this does not imply that the project of reasoning noncircularly for the truth of Christianity without ending up in heresy is impossible. Additionally, one has to be wary of labelling a view as heresy based on unwarranted interpretation of the scripture. For example, the error of con- demning a scientific theory as heresy by saying that it is incompatible with the Bible when, in fact, no such incompatibility exists has been committed by Christians over the centuries, often with disastrous consequences when the theory (such as that of Copernicus) is subsequently vindicated by further evidence. Other Christians, such as astronomer Johannes Kepler, one of the key figures of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution, have noted the capa- cious nature of scriptural passages and the hermeneutical freedom that they offer therein, by arguing that passages such as Joshua 10:12–13 can be understood as an accommodative, phenomenological, and common way of expres- sion describing how the movement of the sun appears to people on earth. Kepler writes:

That thoughtless persons pay attention only to the verbal contradiction, “the sun stood still” versus “the earth stood still,” not considering that this contradiction can only arise in an optical and astronomical context, and does not carry over into common usage. Nor are these thoughtless ones willing to see that Joshua was simply praying that the mountains not remove the sunlight from him, which prayer he expressed in words conforming to the sense of sight, as it would be quite inappropriate to think, at that moment, of astronomy and of visual errors. For if someone had admonished him that the sun doesn’t really move against the valley of

61 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 228. 62 Frame, “Closing Remarks,” 362–363.

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Ajalon, but only appears to do so, wouldn’t Joshua have exclaimed that he only asked for the day to be lengthened, however that might be done?63

While one needs to be wary of interpreting scripture (“this passage means …”) in order to harmonize it with current understandings of science, one must also be wary of asserting that scripture must be interpreted in a certain way when in fact other plausible interpretations exist (in which case one should say, “this passage could mean …”). When human reasoning appears to conflict with the words of scripture, a Christian may evaluate the correctness of the reasoning as well as the interpretation of scripture, and the arguments for the correctness of one or the other should be made noncircularly. Presuppositionalists tend to emphasize that the ways of God are higher than the reasoning of finite humans. This emphasis fosters an attitude of humility toward God, which is commendable. Nevertheless, the question of how it can be shown that the God of the Bible is the true God still needs to be addressed. Of course, it is ontologically the case that, if the Christian God exists, then “God is the ultimate standard of meaning, truth, and rationality,”64 as Frame puts it. The question for us, however, is epistemological: How can we know that such a God exists and is the God of Christianity, and that he has revealed his ultimate standard in the Bible? Presuppositionalists reply by presupposing that the Bible is God’s word, but others can ask how we know whether this presupposition is not merely human reasoning as well. It is evident that we are not God, and we have to begin with the human way of reasoning based on logic and evidence. As noted previously, this is what various scriptural passages indicate as well: these passages portray the prophets, apostles, and Jesus himself utilizing evidence in a noncircular manner to demonstrate the truth of their message. These passages imply that humans do not need to have a ‘God’s-eye view’ in order to recognize that supernatural power is at work in calming the storm, raising the dead, and so forth.

63 Johannes Kepler, NewAstronomy, trans.William H. Donahue (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1992), 60–61. Kepler suggests that “God … responded by stopping the motion of the earth, so that the sun might appear to him to stop.” Stopping the earth’s rotation, however, would have caused other effects such as huge tidal waves around the globe that would have required divine intervention to prevent. The alternative suggestion, that God responded by creating a mirage that makes it possible for one to perceive sunlight around a corner or over the horizon under certain conditions (https://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/ 1951/JASA12‑51Butler.html), seems to be better. 64 Frame, “Presuppositional Apologetics,” 217.

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2.2 On Common Ground and the Noetic Effects of Sin I shall now consider the second set of arguments concerning common ground and the noetic effects of sin. Frame thinks that in one sense the unbeliever knows God,65 but in spite of that knowledge the unbeliever intentionally distorts the truth.66 The human ability to judge consistency and logical validity is not always accurate, and can be distorted by sin.67 Frame thinks that the unbeliever, when most self- conscious, opposes the very rational principles to which Evidentialist apologists appeal, and he reasons in ways designed to exclude the theistic conclusion.68 He concludes that there is no neutrality: our witness is either God’s wisdom or the world’s foolishness.69 It is true that human judgment of consistency and logical validity is not always accurate and that unbelievers might oppose the very rational principles to which Evidentialist apologists appeal. This does not imply, however, that such inaccuracies and opposition cannot be demonstrated to be fallacious without having to presuppose Christian doctrines. An unbeliever who is biased against God might refuse to accept this demonstration (assuming it is offered), but one should draw a distinction between producing a proof and persuading a person. As Anthony Flew points out, “A person can be persuaded by an abominable argument and remain unconvinced by one that ought to be accepted.”70 An unbeliever’s refusal to be convinced does not imply that a sound noncircular argument that ought to be accepted cannot be produced. Many non-Presuppositionalist theologians also believe that sin has affected the cognitive equipment of the human race (resulting in a desire to distort the truth about God for selfish reasons, for example). However, they recognize that this does not imply that the human cognitive equipment has been affected to the extent that it is no longer able to arrive at some truth of God by noncircular reasoning. On the contrary, as Feinberg points out, this ability can be seen as a matter of God’s grace as well—his common grace.71 God can speak through whomever or whatever he chooses, such that, while the noetic effects of sin

65 Rom. 1:21. 66 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 8. 67 Frame, The Doctrine of the Word of God, 22–24. 68 Frame, “A Presuppositionalist’s Response to Classical Apologetics,” 80–81. 69 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 21. 70 Antony Flew and Roy Abraham Varghese, There Is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind (New York: HarperOne, 2007), 40–41. 71 Paul Feinberg, “A Cumulative Case Apologist’s Response to Presuppositional Apologetics,” in Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics, 250–251.

Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 356–376 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 01:49:26AM via free access 370 loke may warp how that speech is understood, it cannot make us utterly deaf to it.72 The Canons of Dort state that, despite the fall of humankind, “there is, to be sure, a certain light of nature remaining in man after the fall, by virtue of which he retains some notions about God, natural things, and the difference between what is moral and immoral, and demonstrates a certain eagerness for virtue and for good outward behavior, even though this light of nature is far from enabling man to come to a saving knowledge of god and conversion to him.”73 C. Stephen Evans observes that, though it is fashionable for many theologians today to deny this, the writers of the Gospels, particularly the writer of the Fourth Gospel,74 seem to view faith in Jesus as the Messiah as something that was called for by the evidence of the miraculous signs that Jesus did.75 While Christian theology affirms that the epistemic capacities of creatures are affected by sin and alienated from God, the above-mentioned scriptural passages imply that the epistemic capacities are not affected to such an extent that people are unable to recognize that such evidence point to God. In this view, the unbelief of certain people would be attributed to the stubbornness of their hearts, which refuse to believe even though they have such recogni- tion. It might be asked, if historical evidence by itself can point people to believe that Jesus is Lord, then what role is left for the Holy Spirit in Christian theology, of whom Paul says, “No one can say ‘Jesus is Lord’ except by the Holy Spirit”?76 In reply, however much these are linked in practice, a theoretical distinction between recognizing and accepting something as truth must be made. A rational agent might recognize that something is true on the basis of evidence but refuse to admit or commit to this truth. In the New Testament, the demons are portrayed as recognizing the identity of Jesus and of God but refusing to submit (for example, Mark 1:23–24; James 2:19). Likewise, Paul’s view is that

72 I thank the referee for highlighting this point. 73 Canons of Dort III & IV, article 4. For an analysis of the Reformed theological tradition on this and other points, see Michael Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology (London: Routledge, 2009). 74 See John 2:23, 3:2, 6:2, 11:47–48. 75 C. Stephen Evans, The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith: The Incarnational Narrative as History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 285–286, observing also that “the writer of this Gospel also clearly holds that despite the signs Jesus did, many refused to believe; see John 12:37. Another subsidiary theme is that requiring signs as a condition of faith is not praiseworthy; see John 4:48. Both of these subsidiary themes are quite consistent with the claim that the signs do in fact warrant a believing response.” 76 1Cor. 12:3.

Journal of Reformed TheologyDownloaded 12from (2018) Brill.com09/27/2021 356–376 01:49:26AM via free access a response to john frame's presuppositional approach 371 people’s sinful tendencies cause them to reject God even though they recognize his divine authority,77 but such tendencies can (and need to) be overcome by the work of the Holy Spirit.78 The role of the Holy Spirit in bringing people to submit to Jesus’s lordship can thus be understood by the Christian in this way. This does not contradict the view that historical evidence is given by the grace of God to allow belief in Jesus to be justified in a noncircular way. Frame claims support from the first chapters of 1Corinthians to argue for a sharp opposition between human reasoning and the wisdom of God.79 How- ever, 1Corinthians 1:18–3:23 should be understood in light of 1Corinthians 1:10– 17, which addresses the problem of division in the church at Corinth resulting from the Corinthians’ boasting about leaders such as Apollos, Cephas, and Paul. This context indicates that the wisdom of the flesh that Paul opposes is not noncircular inferences from evidence (as noted previously, Paul himself also uses noncircular arguments for the resurrection in the same epistle, namely, 1Corinthians 15:6), but rather a self-centered wisdom that takes pride in and boasts of its own abilities, denies the need to rely on God for salvation, and causes division in the church.80 Paul does not want this kind of wisdom but, rather, that of the crucified Christ, who, in contrast with the wisdom of the flesh, exemplifies a spiritual wisdom that is humble and selflessly submissive to God. According to Paul, this kind of wisdom cannot be known by the ‘natural man’ but only by people who have received God’s Spirit. Paul does not say that this kind of wisdom excludes noncircular inferences from evidence, a method of reasoning that he uses elsewhere.

3 Philosophical Evaluation

I shall now consider a third set of arguments concerning circular reasoning. Frame thinks that a Christian who embraces a circular argument for God will claim that the argument is sound and persuasive, for he devoutly believes that his position is true, and he believes that it can be clearly recognized as such.81 However, devoutness is not an adequate justification for the truth of a belief; there are many people who devoutly believe in what is false.

77 Rom. 1:18–32. 78 Rom. 8:1–13. 79 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 8. 80 Richard Hays, First Corinthians (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997). 81 Frame, The Doctrine of the Word of God, 435.

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Frame claims that “even many non-Christian authors concede that circularity is necessary. It simply is not responsible … to dismiss all circularity as a mere logical fallacy.”82 In reply, while some authors may think that circularity is necessary, this does not imply that circular arguments of the sort that Presup- positionalists use—the sort that presupposes the conclusion as the premise (such as “God exists [presupposition], therefore God exists [conclusion]”83)— are therefore valid. On the contrary, such circular arguments are demonstrably fallacious. Now one should note the distinction between formal and informal fallacy. A circular argument is formally valid (an argument that infers as conclusion some claim implicit or explicit in the premises is always formally valid: from the premise ‘p’ we can always infer ‘p’). However, a circular argument that begs the question is well recognized in the standard philosophy literature as a form of informal fallacy. As the article in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains,84 to limit fallacious arguments to those that are formally invalid would be overly restrictive, for there are arguments that are formally valid but fallacious, and a question begging argument would be one example. If they were to use such arguments, other religions—such as Islam, whose denial of Jesus’s divinity contradicts the teachings of Christianity—can also use their scriptures to determine what principles of reasoning are to be followed so as to prove that their scriptures are the inerrant Word of God the way Frame does. (It hardly needs to be said that many Muslims also devoutly believe that their position is true, and they believe that it can be clearly recognized as such). But the Quran and the Bible cannot both be divinely inspired and inerrant because they contradict each other at various important points. This demonstrates that the begging-the-question type of argumentation is fallacious. Another problem with Frame’s method is that one can come up with a coherent system of doctrine similar to that of Christianity that can also give an equally compelling account of morality, rationality, and so on to what Presuppositionalists claim for their argument—the only difference is that another person (perhaps a legendary figure) is substituted for Jesus of Nazareth. One can then use a circular argument to ‘prove’ that this doctrinal system has divine origins the way Presuppositionalists do. Using such circular arguments (whether narrow or broadly circular), one can ‘prove’ many baseless stories to be divinely inspired. Again, this shows that the type of circular arguments used by Frame are fal-

82 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 230, n. 48. 83 Frame, “Presuppositional Apologetics,” 217. 84 Hans Hansen, “Fallacies,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/fallacies/.

Journal of Reformed TheologyDownloaded 12from (2018) Brill.com09/27/2021 356–376 01:49:26AM via free access a response to john frame's presuppositional approach 373 lacious. Regardless of whether the Christian circular argument is better than other forms of circular argument, as Presuppositionalists claim, it is still a fallacious argument. Frame retorts that everyone else reasons circularly in the sense of using its own standards in proving its conclusions, and he argues that to argue for an ultimate standard by appealing to a different standard would be inconsistent. For example, he thinks that those who believe that human reason and experience are the ultimate authority must presuppose the authority of these in their arguments for these positions, for example by saying, “Reason is the ultimate standard because reason says so.”85 Frame claims that his circle is nevertheless linear in the sense that “God’s rationality is the rational basis for human faith, which is the rational basis for human reasoning.”86 Frame complains that his opponents have not addressed his point that the Presuppositional argument is, in one sense, linear rather than circular, neither have they considered his point that argument for an ultimate standard of truth, whether Christian or non-Christian, must necessarily be circular in one sense.87 In addition, Frame, following some postmodernists, questions whether logic in the tradition of Aristotle is a necessity for human thought, or merely a form of Western linear thinking.88 In reply, Frame’s claims that his argument is linear in a sense, but he does not answer on what basis he thinks that “God’s rationality is the rational basis for human faith.” It seems that, in accordance with his Presuppositionalism, Frame would answer by presupposing the existence of the Christian God, in which case the argument would collapse back into a circle. As for Frame’s claim that an argument for an ultimate standard of truth must necessarily be circular, it should be noted that it need not be circular in the same way Frame’s argument is circular. In response to Frame, Craig asserts, “How do we decide which arguments are worth believing?We see whether they follow the pattern of valid inference forms, are informally valid, and have true premises that are more plausible than their contradictories.”89 On behalf of Craig, it can be argued that the justification for these conditions is not circular in the same sense; rather, it is due to the fact that these conditions are undeniable. This is most evident in the case of the Law of Non-Contradiction: no one (whether Easterner or Westerner) can deny this law without also affirming it.

85 Hansen, “Fallacies.” 86 Hansen, “Fallacies,” 210, 217. 87 Frame, “Closing Remarks,” 354. 88 Frame, “A Presuppositional Apologist’s Response,” 135. 89 William Lane Craig, “Closing Remarks,” in Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics, 315.

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Indeed, a violation of the laws of logic would be nonexistent. For example, consider the notion of a ‘shapeless cube’: ‘shapeless’ and ‘cube’ cancel each other out; it is like writing something and then immediately erasing it, so that there is nothing. Frame thinks that “the law of non-contradiction … is a Christian principle, presupposed by Scripture itself.”90 In response, it would be trivially true that, if the Law of Non-Contradiction is undeniable, then it would be presupposed by scripture itself. But one should not think of it as a Christian principle in the sense that its truth is merely based on the fact that it is presupposed by scripture itself rather than on its own inherent undeniability (it also goes without saying that the Law of Non-Contradiction is not only recognized by Christians but also by non-Christians around the world). It should be noted that this undeniability is due to the nature of the law itself; it is not a conclusion that is proved by presupposing the conclusion, and therefore it is not circular in the same way that the Presuppositionalist’s argument is circular. While the conclusion is compatible with the standard used, compatibility is not circularity. Frame complains that the Law of Non-Contradiction is highly abstract and that nothing more concrete can be derived from it alone,91 for sound syllogisms require not only logical validity, but also true premises, and logic alone does not tell us whether our premises are false or true.92 Frame goes on to point out that to derive concrete conclusions one would need additional principles that are philosophically problematic.93 In reply, it is true that philosophers are still working on these issues, but plausible solutions have been offered;94 in any case, our current inability to understand these issues fully does not imply that we have to seriously doubt our beliefs about the external world, or to embrace those types of circular arguments that are clearly fallacious. Frame might argue that I am still begging the question by presupposing the authority of reason to argue for reason. In reply, since reason is an undeniable

90 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 227–228. 91 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 227–228. 92 Frame, The Doctrine of the Word of God, 23. 93 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 227–228. 94 For example, concerning the problem of skepticism with regard to our beliefs about the external world, philosopher David Chalmers replies that “even if I am in a matrix, my world is perfectly real” and that we could still know that we really have ‘hands,’ only that our understanding of the underlying metaphysics needs to be adjusted. For example, instead of understanding the hand as being fundamentally constituted by unobservable quan- tum entities, we understand it as fundamentally constituted by computer inputs. See D. Chalmers, “The Matrix as Metaphysics,” in C. Grau, ed., Philosophers Explore the Matrix (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); see also http://consc.net/papers.html.

Journal of Reformed TheologyDownloaded 12from (2018) Brill.com09/27/2021 356–376 01:49:26AM via free access a response to john frame's presuppositional approach 375 tool for knowing reality (and Frame would agree, for he is also using reason to argue for the need to presuppose God), I must use reason to argue for my position. The Presuppositionalist would also have to presuppose the authority of reason to argue for his position. In this case, the accusation of begging the question is invalid, because

the appeal to reason is implicitly authorized by the challenge itself, so this is really a way of showing that the challenge is unintelligible. The charge of begging the question implies that there is an alternative—namely, to examine the reasons for and against the claim being challenged while sus- pending judgment about it. For the case of reasoning itself, however, no such alternative is available, since any considerations against the objec- tive validity of a type of reasoning are inevitably attempts to offer reasons against it, and these must be rationally assessed. The use of reason in the response is not a gratuitous importation by the defender: it is demanded by the character of the objections offered by the challenger.95

Therefore, a challenge to the authority of reason would itself lead us back to reason. By contrast, a challenge to the authority of God does not itself lead us back to God. Frame notes that Presuppositionalists such as Van Til have argued that God is necessarily for rationality, but he correctly points out that this Tran- scendental Argument for God (TAG) requires premises that in the end make the argument similar to traditional arguments for God (cosmological, teleo- logical, and so forth).96 Various philosophers have laid out these traditional arguments in a noncircular way, which indicates that these arguments do not need to presuppose the existence of God.97 Additionally, to argue that our rationality requires God as a cause is different from arguing that our rationality depends on presupposing God for the justification of our beliefs. While one might argue that one’s ability to know the reality that one is in pain (for example) is dependent on God (in the sense that the ultimate origin of the human

95 Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 24. 96 Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 71–88. 97 Craig and Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. It is interesting to note that on at least one occasion Frame himself also attempts to use logic and experience to refute Hume without having to presuppose his own biblical view. He writes, “Hume argued that one could never accept testimony concerning a miracle, because it will always be outweighed by the evidence that everything behaves naturally and regu- larly. But is there really such evidence? … there is nothing in experience to persuade us that irregularity is impossible” (Frame, Apologetics to the Glory of God, 144).

Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018) 356–376 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 01:49:26AM via free access 376 loke conscious mind depends on a personal creator98), one does not need to depend on God in order to justify the belief that one is in pain (one’s direct experience is enough to justify it!). Since presupposing God is neither necessary nor undeniable for the justification of our beliefs in the same way that presupposing reason is necessary and undeniable, the assumption of God in response to atheists is a gratuitous importation but the assumption of reason is not.

4 Conclusion

It has been shown, on the basis of theological and philosophical considerations, that Frame’s Presuppositionalism is indefensible, and that his concerns with regard to the authority of scripture, the Lordship of Christ, human reasoning, and the noetic effects of sin can all be addressed without embracing the kind of circularity he endorses. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, Presuppositionalism raises interesting and important issues concerning what Christian theological presuppositions ought to be, as well as the relationship between faith and reason. Thus the arguments of this article have wider theological relevance that are independent of Frame’s position.

98 This is the so-called argument from consciousness defended in, e.g., the chapter by J.P. Moreland in Craig and Moreland, eds., The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology.

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