Canadian International Council

Human Security: East versus West Author(s): Amitav Acharya Source: International Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer, 2001), pp. 442-460 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. on behalf of the Canadian International Council Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40203577 Accessed: 20-08-2015 10:32 UTC

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This content downloaded from 14.139.45.242 on Thu, 20 Aug 2015 10:32:39 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AMITAV ACHARYA

Human Security East versusWest

Weneed tofashion a new conceptof human securitythat is reflectedin the livesof ourpeople, not in the weaponsof our country. Mahbub ul Haq1

HE IDEAOF 'HUMAN SECURITY' has rekindled the debate over what 'security*means and how best to achieve it. Much of the debate con- cernsthe differentways in which the concept has been defined and pursued by its variousnational and transnationaladvocates. Although it is presentedas a global template on which to recastthe securityphiloso- phies and policies of countries fundamentallyto reflect the changing conditions and principlesof world order,human securityhas also been an instrument of national strategic priorities that often have strong domestic roots.As such, human securityhas been presentedvariously as a means of reducingthe human costs of violent conflict, as a strategyto enable governments to address basic human needs and offset the inequitiesof globalization,and as a frameworkfor providingsocial safety nets to people impoverishedand marginalizedby sudden and severe economic crises. The different interpretationsof human security are not necessarily incompatible, but they do createground for controversyand suspicion

Professorand Deputy Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang TechnologicalUniversity Singapore; onleave as Professor ofPolitical Science at YorkUniversity Toronto.This article is basedon a paperpresented at the 15th Asia Pacific RoundtabU, Kuala Lumpur,4-7 'June, 2001. Theauthor would like to thank two anonymous referees for their valu- ablecomments on an earlierdraft of the article. i Citedin KantiBajpai, 'Human Security: Concept and Measurement/ manuscript, Schoolof InternationalStudies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2000.

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in multilateral settings. Reconciling the different meanings of, and approachesto, human securityis thus crucialto any meaningfuleffort to operationalizethe concept and make it into a potent instrumentof a just and secureworld. For the advocatesof human security in the West, a powerful challenge to the idea comes from the 'East' (Asia), a challenge that draws upon the East'straditional understandings of security,claims of cul- turalspecificity, and relativeabundance of illiberalpolities. To be sure, Asia hosts some of the strongestadvocates of the human securityidea. But the understandingof human security now prevalentin much of Asia differs in important respects from its meaning in Canada and other Western countries. Some Asian governments and analysts see human securityas yet anotherattempt by the West to impose its liberal values and political institutions on non-Western societies. Others question the 'newness'of the concept, claiming that the emphasis of the human securityidea on a broad rangeof non-militarythreats mir- rorsearlier, home-grown notions of 'comprehensivesecurity' formulat- ed by many regionalgovernments. I argue that human securityis a distinctive notion, which goes well beyond all earlier attempts by Asian governments to 'redefine' and broadentheir own traditionalunderstanding of securityas protection of sovereigntyand territorialintegrity against military threats.At the same time, the developmentof this notion has strong roots within the region,which could providean importantfoundation for promoting a collective human security agenda.To identify a common conceptual groundbetween the Eastand the West remainsa challengefor scholars and policy-makersconcerned with the promotion of human security in both arenas. In the first part of this article,an examinationof the variousunder- standingsof human security,especially the perceivedtension between 'freedomfrom want' and 'freedomfrom fear'is followed by an analysis of the similaritiesand differencesbetween human securityand existing security concepts in the region, specifically comprehensive security and co-operativesecurity. The extent to which a new idea like human security could find acceptance in the region depends very much on how it resonateswith existing ideas and practicesconcerning security. Here, human security does pose some challenges to existing notions that need to be understood and reconciled if human security is to advancethrough nationaland regionalchannels in the region. Finally,

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the article looks at the relationship between human security and humanitarianintervention with a view to assessingthe kind of multi- lateralaction that might be feasibleto promote human securityin the region in the event of most serious dangers to regional order. I con- clude that promoting human security as freedom from want, which seems to be the current emphasis of regional governments, must be supplementedwith more effort to develop human securityas freedom from fear.

THE ASIAN ROOTSOF HUMANSECURITY Most understandingsof human security trace it to the 1994 Human Development Reportof the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).2But its roots can be found in debates about the meaning of securitythat predatethe end of the cold war,including the debateover the disarmament-developmentnexus that took place in variousUnited Nations forums in response to the cold war arms race.3The work of several independent commissions, such as the Brandt Commission, the Bruntland Commission, and, later, the Commission on Global Governance,helped shift the focus of securityanalysis from national and state security to security for the people.4This was followed by a growing recognitionof non-militarythreats in global securitydebates. The UNDPapproach to human development synthesized the earlier representationsof human security.Although it adopted a people oriented notion of security,it also invoked the 'gunsversus butter* debate in criticizingstates such as India and Pakistanfor spending too much on the militarysector at the expenseof developmentefforts. The UNDPs work was the result of innovative scholarship by an Asian scholar,Mahbub ul Haq. It listed seven separatecomponents of

2 United Nations, HumanDevelopment Report 1994 (New York:United Nations Development Programme1994). 3 An important multilateralmeeting that focused on human security was the United Nations InternationalConference on the Relationship Between Disarmamentand Development, held from 15 Julyto 2 August 1986 in Paris. See Douglas Roche, 'Balance out of kilter in arms/society needs/ FinancialPost (Toronto),18 January 1986, 8. The concept of human security was also invoked in a XinhuaNews Agency report of a world disarmament conference in Beijing in June 1988 at which the president of the Conference, Zhou Peiyuan, who was also president of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament,stressed 'growing concern from the international community for disarmament, which is connected with world peace and human security.' ('Beijing hosts disarmament conference/ XinhuaGeneral Overseas News Service, 14 June 1988.) 4 K. Bajpai, 'Humansecurity: concept and measurement/

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human security:economic security(assured basic income), food security (physical and economic access to food), health security (relative freedomfrom diseaseand infection), environmentalsecurity (access to sanitarywater supply, clean air and a non-degradedland system), personal security(security from physicalviolence and threats),community security(security of culturalidentity), and politicalsecurity (protection of basic human rightsand freedoms).5 One of the obvious criticismsof the UNDPdefinition was that it was too broad.Defenders of the report,however, believe that a broad definition is both necessaryand desirable,given the wider constituencyof the United Nations. Other definitionsof human securitylinked it even more explicidyto human rightsand humanitarianlaw. This reflecteda new internationalclimate markedby changing norms of state sovereignty with particularregard to human rightsprotection. One critic of the UNDPreport was the Canadiangovernment and its ministerof foreignaffairs, Lloyd Axworthy.6 While acknowledgingthe reportas the sourceof the 'specificphrase* human security,Canada cri- tiqued it for focusing too much on threatsassociated with underdevel- opment at the expense of 'human insecurity resulting from violent conflict.' In the Canadianview, human securityis 'securityof the people,' and the United Nations charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the GenevaConventions arethe 'coreelements' of the doctrine of human security.'The concept of human security has increasinglycentered on the human costs of violent conflict.'7This understandingof human securitywas sharedby a few other like-minded middle powers,such as Norway,which joined handswith Ottawa in establishinga Human SecurityPartnership. The partnershipidentified a nine-point agenda of human security:landmines, formation of an InternationalCriminal Court, human rights, international humani-

5 United Nations, HumanDevelopment Report 1994; Sverre Lodgaard,'Human security: concept and operationalization,' Paper presented to the ExpertSeminar on HumanRights and Peace 2000, Palais Wilson, Geneva 8-9 December 2000, pd/hr/u.1, United Nations/Naciones Unidas, Universityof Peace, UniversidadPara La Paz. 6 On the origins of the Canadianuse of human security, see JenniferRoss, 'Is Canada'shuman security policy really the "Axworthy*1doctrine?' Canadian Foreign Policy 8(winter 2001), 75-93- 7 Departmentof ForeignAffairs and InternationalTrade (dfait), Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World(Ottawa: dfait, April 1999).

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tarianlaw, women and childrenin armedconflict, small armsprolifer- ation, child soldiers,child labour,and northernco-operation.8 A different understanding of human security, predating the Canadian formulation, was developed by Tokyo. In a speech to the 50th anniversary special session of the United Nations General Assemblyin October 1995, PrimeMinister Tomiichi Murayamaadvo- cated human security as a new strategy for the United Nations. Although he providedfew specificsas to how it might be implement- ed, one Japanesereport viewed the concept as 'a new approachintend- ed to redefinethe concept of security,which so farhas been understood largelyin terms of individualstates, as a way of furtherprotecting the securityand rightsof each person.'In a tone similarto the subsequent Canadian formulation, the editorialviewed human securityas a conceptual tool for addressing the growing incidence of civil conflicts around the world and the human costs, such as starvationand genocide, associatedwith it.9 But official statements by Japan on human security eventually revealedimportant areas of disagreementwith the Canadianformula- tion. While acknowledgingthat therewere Wo basicaspects to human security - freedom from fear and freedom from want,' the Japanese Foreign Ministry criticizedthose who 'focus solely' on the first aspect and on relatedinitiatives such as control of small armsand prosecution of war crimes. 'In Japan'sview, however, human security is a much broaderconcept. We believe that freedomfrom want is no less critical than freedom from fear.So long as its objectivesare to ensurethe survival and dignity of individualsas human beings, it is necessaryto go beyond thinking of human security solely in terms of protecting human life in conflict situations.'10 It is tempting to see the divergentperspectives on human security, such as those held by Japanand Canada,as symptomaticof a familiar schism between Westernliberalism and 'Asianvalues.' But this would be misleading. Disagreements about human security are as much West-West and East-East as East-West.They reflect genuine differ-

8 'Canada, Norwaychange their ways: new approach bases foreign policy on human issues/ Ottawa Citizen, 28 May 1998, A18. 9 'Premier'sU.N. speech out of focus,' editorial, Daily Yomiuri,24 October 1995, 7. 10 Statement by Director-General(of the ForeignMinistry of Japan)in the InternationalConference on HumanSecurity in a GlobalizedWorld, Ulan Bator,8 May 2000, available at www.un-mongolia.mn/undp.

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ences on philosophical and practical grounds. Broadly stated, the debate about human securityconcerns the separationof direct physical violence from 'structuralviolence/ Astrid Suhrkehas advocateda notion of human securitythat stresses'vulnerability' as its defining fea- ture, which in turn is understoodwith referenceto three categoriesof victims:those of war and internalconflict, those living at or below sub- sistencelevels, and victims of naturaldisaster.11 Sverre Lodgaard of the Norwegian Institute of InternationalAffairs, on the other hand, has pleaded for a narrowerdefinition. In his view, human securityshould not be mixed with human development. Nor should it be about nat- uraldisasters or 'precarioushuman conditions'such as hunger,disease, and environmentalcontamination. The key defining criteriaof human securityis 'vulnerabilityto physicalviolence duringconflict.' His ratio- nale for a narrowerdefinition is importantto note. Securityconcerns arisewhen the threatof violence is present, but not all cases of socio- economic disaster lead to violent action; hence they should not be placed under the rubricof human security.Second, securityquestions are always'political' in the sense that they involve a degree of human agency and control. Natural disasters are rarely preventable; they remainoutside human control. Humanitarianaid, on the other hand, is best pursued in a 'depoliticised'manner, 'cutting clear of political objectives and security concerns,' and offered 'under the banner of impartialityand neutrality'In this sense, 'the concept of human security had better be confined to freedom from fear of man-made physical violence, also referredto as direct, personal violence.' A broader understandingof human securityas freedom from structuralviolence would undermine the clarity of the notion and make it difficult to develop prioritiesand devise effectivepolicy responses.12 Many countries in Asia have embraced a broader conception of human security13in accord with existing conceptions of comprehen-

11Astrid Suhrke, 'Humansecurity and the interests of states/ Security Dialogue 3o(September 1999), 265-76. 12 Lodgaard,'Human security: concept and operationalization.' 13 On human security in an Asian context, see TatsuroMatsumae and LincolnChen, eds, CommonSecurity in Asia: The New Concept of HumanSecurity (Tokyo:Tokai UniversityPress 1995); WilliamT. Tow, Ramesh Thakur,and In-TaekHyun, eds, Asia's EmergingRegional Order:Reconciling Traditionaland HumanSecurity (Tokyoand New York: United Nations UniversityPress 2000); Pranee Thiparat,ed, The Quest for HumanSecurity: The Next Phase ofASEAN?(Bangkok: Institute of Security and InternationalStudies 2001).

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sive securityin the region,although there are, as will be seen later,some important differences between human security and comprehensive security.The Japaneseformulation also rendersthe concept of human security less controversialfor Asia Pacific governmentssuspicious of, and uncomfortablewith, the close associationbetween human security and human rightspromotion and humanitarianintervention. Indeed, the 'human need' aspect of human securityhas been especially salient in the Asia Pacificcontext in the aftermathof the regional economic crisis. The crisis dramaticallyincreased the incidence of poverty, undermined the fruits of decades of development, caused widespreadpolitical instability (most dramaticallyin Indonesia), and aggravatedeconomic competition and interstatetensions over refugees and illegalmigration. It also underscoredthe need for good governance (to the extent that corruption, nepotism, and cronyism were blamed for the crisis) and environmentallysustainable development (especially in the wake of the forest fires in the region attributed to reckless development and corruption). Moreover,the crisis underscoredthe crucial need for social safety nets for the poor, something ignored in the heady days of growth. In fact, Surin Pitsun, a major advocate of human securityin Asia and a formerforeign minister of Thailand, has explicidy linked the concept to the need for social safety nets in the wake of the regionaleconomic downturn.14 Although Asian governments generally prefer a need-oriented human securityapproach, differences remain over the extent to which human securityshould be defined primarilyas such, without incorpo- rating those rights-protective elements that speak to freedom from fear.Countries such asJapan and Thailanddo not see the two as mutually exclusive;in feet Thailand has made a dear attempt in its domestic arena to reconcile freedom from want (its stresson social safety nets) with freedom from fear (developinga more rights-protectivepolitical system). While human security must be gearedfirst and foremost to human need, the Thai approach under the government of Chuan

14 Surin Pitsuan, 'Keynote address: aseanVision 2020. Strengthening human security in the aftermath of the economic crisis/ in Pranee Thiparat,ed, The Quest for HumanSecurity. See also, TheAsian Crisisand HumanSecurity: An Intellectual Dialogue on BuildingAsia's Tomorrow(Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange 1999); Sustainable Development and HumanSecurity: Second Intellectual Dialogue on BuildingAsia's Tomorrow(Tokyo and Singapore: Japan Centre for InternationalExchange/Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1999).

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Leekpaiat least did not see a contradictionbetween this and the safety and dignity of the individual protected through a political system gearedto human rightsand democracy. A good deal of the controversyabout human security today arises from a perceptionthat the notion, at least in its Westernusage, reflects the individualisticethos of liberal democracy.Thus, in some understandings of human security it is integral to the Wests campaign for human rights and liberal democracy.This, at least to a certain Asian mindset, conflictswith the old 'Asianapproach to human rights'developed in the heyday of the 'universalismversus cultural relativism' debatesabout human rightsin Asia. In the early 1990s, in responseto a perceivedWestern onslaught on human rights and democratization,some Asian governmentsargued that the definition and promotion of human rightsshould be subject- ed to the differentcultural contexts and historicalexperiences of Asia. Moreover,they championed the principle of 'non-selectivity,'that is that human rightsshould not selectivelyfocus on political rights, and maintained that the promotion of human rights should respect the communitarian ethos of Asian societies, founded upon an allegedly 'society-before-the-selftradition.15 Does the contemporarynotion of human security undermine 'non-selectivity' and 'communitarian ethic'? Stricdy speaking,human securitycalls for a shift in security thinking from state securityto securityof the people, which includes both individuals and communities. The distinction between 'people' and 'individual'is not unimportant.A quick reviewof recent responsesby the internationalcommunity to human securitychallenges shows that they have addressedcrisis situations in which the survival and well- being of entire societies or communities have been at risk. Human securityprotects the existence of entire social groups (including chil- dren, civiliansin a war zone, ethnic minorities,and so on) from perse- cution and violence. This understanding of human security is emi- nently compatible with the alleged communitarian ethos of certain non-Westernsocieties. Governmentsthat seriouslybelieve in the society-above-the-selfprinciple should have good reason to welcome the

15 AmitavAcharya, Human Rights in Southeast Asia: Dilemmas for Foreign Policy, EasternAsia Policy Papers no 11 (Toronto:University of Toronto/York University JointCentre for Asia PacificStudies 1995).

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notion of human security as a prop to their cause, rather than as a threatto their belief and approach. Neither is human securityWestern in the sense that it ignores the issue of economic rights, or the 'right to development'that was once stressedby some governmentsin EastAsia as a counter to the Western emphasison political rights. The 'developmentas freedom'perspective of AmartyaSen, a Nobel Laureatein economics and a member of the International Commission on Human Security,further underscores the cruciallink between freedomfrom fearand freedomfrom want.16 While it does not ignore the rights of societies and non-political rights, human security does place a premium on human dignity. No seriousadvocate of human securitywould condone the pursuitof economic and communitarianapproaches at the expenseof the safetyand dignity of individualsand peoples.The toleranceof human rightsvio- lations for the sake of economic developmentor social stabilityhas no place in the human securityparadigm. This emphasis on human dignity should not be surprising;it owes much to four major developments that have converged behind the emergence of the human security idea: (1) the growing incidence of civil wars and intrastateconflicts, which now far outnumber conventional interstateconflicts (with the formermore likely to causecivilian sufferingthan the latter);(2) the spreadof democratization(democra- cies constitute a majority of state actors in the international system today); (3) the advent of humanitarianintervention, or the principle that the international community is justified in intervening in the internalaffairs of statesaccused of grossviolation of human rights;and (4) the widespread poverty, unemployment, and social dislocation caused by the economic crisesof the 1990s that have been blamed on the dynamics of globalization. Indeed, appreciating these developments as four relatedbut differentsources of the human securityidea helps our understandingof the existingvariations in the interpretation of the concept. For example, the Canadiannotion is inspiredby, and pays more attention to, the first and the second developments,while the fourth development motivates Japan and Thailand in their approachto human security.These approachesshould thus not be seen as mutuallyexclusive, but as complimentaryand evolving understandings of a complex and largerparadigm of human securityin response

16 AmartyaSen, Development as Freedom(New York:Knopf 1999).

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to emerging challenges, responses that collectively shift the focus of security analysis from national, state, and regime security to the society and the individual. In short, although differences in the understanding of human security and the relative emphasis on its key principles persist, they are not totally irreconcilable. The extent of reconciliation, and the prospects for human security becoming the dominant security paradigm in the Asia Pacific region, depend substantially on how human security as an emerging norm interacts with and impacts on existing beliefs and practices concerning security in the region. The acceptance and institu- tionalization of emerging norms depend very much on how they res- onate with existing norms and social identities. Thus, any considera- tion of human security in the Asia Pacific must examine its relationship with two prior ideas that have had a considerable impact on security beliefs and practices in the region: comprehensive security and cooperative security.

HUMAN SECURITY, COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY, AND CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY At least in terms of a wider spectrum of security threats, the concept that comes closest to human security is comprehensive security, which can claim even stronger Asian roots because it was developed by Japan. During the cold war, several Southeast Asian governments also formu- lated their own versions of comprehensive security. Comprehensive security in Japan reflected a concern with economic issues, including the supply of international energy and food.17 It also reflected Japans vulnerability to 'major threats to economic livelihood and standard of living of the Japanese people from the denial of access to markets for Japanese goods, the expropriation of Japanese property and exclusion of Japanese investment projects abroad, and from a withholding of vital supplies of goods, materials and services to Japanese enterprises at home and abroad/18 In the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN),comprehensive security doctrines similarly focused on economic insecurities but added important political dimensions related to domestic stability and regime survival.

17 YukioSatoh, TheEvolution of Japan's Security Policy Adelphi Paper no 178 (London:International Institute for Strategic Studies 1982), 7. 18 J.W.M.Chapman, R. Drifte,and I.T.M.Gow, Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security (London:Frances Pinter 1983), 149.

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For comparison, economic and food security are the first two elements of the UNDPsseven elements of human security.Ironically, few doctrines of comprehensivesecurity in Asia have been more comprehensive than the UNDP'sseven elements. Asian formulations of the concept during the cold war period accordedlittle space to personal, community, and political security,the last in the sense of protectionof basic human rights and freedom. This underscores a key variation between comprehensivesecurity and human security. Comprehensivesecurity in Asia Pacificwas a fundamentallystatist notion despite its claims to proffer an alternative to conventional nationalsecurity. Moreover, while it went beyond militarythreats, military defence remaineda core component of comprehensivesecurity. The Japaneseidea of comprehensivesecurity was widely criticizedfor rationalizingdefence spending. Its strategic rationalewas clear from the official Report on ComprehensiveNational Securitysubmitted to PrimeMinister Zenko Suzukiin July 1980. The reportenumerated six objectives of comprehensivesecurity: (1) closer military and general co-operation with the United States; (2) an increased capacity to defend Japaneseterritory; (3) improvement in relationswith China and the USSR;(4) attainment of energy security; (5) achievement of food security;and (6) measuresfor coping with major earthquakes.19 Similarly,comprehensive security in variousASEAN member states put a premiumon state security.A key variation,as hinted earlier,was that, unlike in Japan,state securityin many ASEANcountries masked a concern with regimesurvival and legitimation,which reflecteddifferences in their domestic political systems. Thus, national resilience in Indonesia represented,among other things, its 'military-dominated... regimes quest for legitimacyand survivalin the face of domestic competition for political power.'20Though comprehensivesecurity was not used by ASEANgovernments to justify higher defence spending in the manner of Japan, military strength remained a core priority.Thus, Malaysia'sdefence ministerproclaimed in 1992 that a comprehensive- ly securecountry had 'to be politicallystable, economically strong and

i9/6/d,xvii. 20 MuthiahAlagappa, 'Comprehensivesecurity: interpretations in aseancountries/ in RobertA. Scalapino, et a/, eds, Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley: Universityof California,Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988), 58.

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resilient ... and last, but not the least ... militarily sufficient.'21 Singapore developed its own doctrine of Total Defence,' in which several non-military instruments, such as psychological defence, aug- mented military deterrence and defensive capabilities as part of the overall national security strategy. In Indonesia, national resilience con- sisted of 'ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural and security- cum-defence aspects.'22 In an important sense, the existence of a prior notion of comprehensive security facilitates the acceptance of the emerging idea of human security in Asia. Comprehensive security has laid the ground- work for a security concept that goes beyond defending against external military threats. But human security is certainly not new wine in an old bottle (see Figure 1). Comprehensive security answered the ques-

Attention to threat

/ \ Physical violence Physical violence + non-military

__, Individual _ . n u c Personal Human ^^T Security Security Attention to unit National Security Comprehensive •^^^^^ State Security

Figure 1 Four images of security

tion: which threats to state security? Human security answers 'whose security'? The political element of comprehensive security focused on 'order' and 'stability.' Human security, on the other hand, is geared

21 NajibTunRazak, Address to the Chiefof Staff Conference, Darwin,Australia, 1992. 22 MuthiahAlagappa, 'Comprehensivesecurity/ 62.

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more to justice and emancipation.23Thus, an importantchallenge for regional policy-makersis to redefinecomprehensive security in ways that go beyond a simple horizontalbroadening of the threatspectrum, or 'what the state should be protectedfrom.' To securegreater synergy with human security,the comprehensivesecurity framework also has to be reworked and extended vertically - 'who should be protected againstsuch threats'- with individualsand communities placed at the heart of this extended framework. Indeed, recent attempts by some of the Asian think tanks to refor- mulate comprehensive security have sought to dilute its statist bias. The Council for SecurityCooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP),a non- governmental group that includes both Asian and Western policy think tanks, says that 'a problem may be regardedas a comprehensive security problem when it is perceived as threatening, or having the potential to threaten,the securityof the vital interestsor core valuesof the person, the community, or the state.'24But this effort still falls short, and important ambiguities remain. If the values of the person conflict with the values of the state, which prevail?And who defines what the valuesof the community are?25

23 AmitavAcharya and ArabindaAcharya, 'Human security in the Asia Pacific:puz- zle, panacea or peril?'Cancaps Bulletin (CanadianConsortium for Asia Pacific Security) (December 2000). 24 Councilfor Security Cooperationin Asia Pacific, TheConcepts of Comprehensive and CooperativeSecurity, cscapMemorandum no 3 (KualaLumpur, cscap Secretariat at the Institute of Startegic and InternationalStudies 1996). See also Mohamed JawharHassan, 'The concept of comprehensive security,' in Mohamed Jawhar Hassan andThangam Rmnath,eds, ConceptualisingAsia-Pacific Security (Kuala Lumpur:Institute of Strategic and InternationalStudies 1996). 25 The cscap Memorandumdefines comprehensive security as 'pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military, environmental) in both the domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means.' The inclusion of 'personal security' notwithstanding, it is hard to accept that even this reformulationof comprehensive security captures the post- statist, if not anti-statist, orientation of the human security idea. While 'security of person' is placed alongside security of 'community'and 'state,' with all three elements seen as 'multifaceted and multidimensional,'there is little question as to the relative salience of the three. A notion of comprehensive security is warranted 'because ... the vital interests or core values of states are varied and comprehensive, as are the instruments and processes used to protect them and the capabilities requiredto assure them' (p 3). This hardlyappears to be a people-oriented notion of security. Tosay that individual,community, and state each matter and have their place in the security paradigmis not the same as saying that people matter most • which is the essence of human security.

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Similarly,the human security idea differs from the doctrine of co- operativesecurity that lies at the core of recentefforts to develop a mul- tilateralsecurity institution in Asia (see Figure2). Unlike comprehensive security,the idea of co-operativesecurity emerged from the ashes

Decreasing ^v^ ^S^ Emphasison ^^^^ Deterrence ^^ ^s^

L^CmpS CopNl Low ^ns HS^^

Low High IncreasingEmphasis on Civil Society

NS:National Security; CmpS: Comprehensive Security; CopS: CooperativeSecurity; HS: Human Security In co-operativesecurity, civil societyis representedby transnational knowledge-basedepistemic communities. In humansecurity, civil society is representedchiefly by humanrights and humanitarianassistance NGOS.

Figure2 The Evolutionof HumanSecurity of the cold war. It was an adaptationof the notion of common security developed in Europe through the institutional mechanism of the Conference on Securityand Co-operation in Europe (CSCE,later the Organizationfor Securityand Co-operationin Europeor OSCE).26

26 On the concepts of common and co-operative security in the Asia Pacific context, see GeoffreyWiseman, 'Commonsecurity in the Asia-Pacificregion/ Pacific Review 5 (no 1, 1992), 42-59; David B, Dewitt, 'Common,comprehensive, and cooperative security,1ibid 7(no 1, 1994), 1-15;Pauline Kerr,Andrew Mack, and Paul Evans,'The evolving security discourse in Asia-Pacific,'in AndrewMack and John Ravenhill,eds, Pacific Cooperation:Building Economicand Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (St Leonardsnsw: Allen and UnwinAustralia 1994), 233-55; David Dickens, No Better Alternative:Towards Comprehensive and CooperativeSecurity in the Asia- Pacific (Wellington,Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand, for the Councilon Security Cooperationin the Asia Pacific1997).

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Co-operative security stipulates that security should be pursued multilaterallyon the principle of indusiveness. Indusivity here refers 'both to participants- the non-like-mindedas well as the like-minded - and to subject matter, thereby broadening the security discourse beyond direct and traditionalmilitary threat to encompass non-conventional security challenges such as environmental, ecological, and demographicphenomena that can exacerbateinter-state relations and even promote the application of armed force.'27Security policies should promote reassurancerather than deterrence(which remained central to both national and comprehensivesecurity). Co-operative security also envisagesa broad agenda of co-operation,encompassing military confidence-building, political dialogue, and other forms of functional co-operation. Thus defined, co-operativesecurity repudiates approaches to security that rely exclusivelyor predominandyon balance-of-powermecha- nisms. It emphasizestransparency over secrecyand dialogue over con- frontation.While a balance-of-powerapproach ultimately relies on an ability to wage war, co-operative security relies on techniques and processesof conflict-prevention,management, and resolution.It views security in broader terms than just defence against military threats, although it does not ignore or minimize the importance of military- relatedissues in domestic and interstaterelations. What arethe implicationsof the human securityidea for the pursuit of co-operativesecurity in the Asia Pacific?Unlike co-operativesecurity, human security is not an essentiallymultilateral notion. Although human security can be and has been pursued multilaterally, in the United Nations and potentiallythrough regional groupings like ASEAN and its RegionalForum (ARF)and Asia PacificEconomic Co-operation (APEC),some aspectsof human securitymay underminethe unabashed emphasisof co-operativesecurity on the core multilateralprinciple of 'indusiveness/ Unlike co-operativesecurity, human securityis often a vision of the 'like-minded/ Co-operativesecurity is non-ideological;in certainhands, human securitycould become a potent and divisiveide- ological instrument. The precursorto co-operativesecurity, the common securityidea in Europe, stressedhuman rightsas an importantcondition of interstate

27 David B. Dewitt and AmitavAcharya, Cooperative Security and Development Assistance: The Relationship Between Security and Development with Reference to EasternAsia, EasternAsia Policy Papers noi6 (Toronto:Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies 1996), 9-10.

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confidence within an inclusive multilateralframework. The CSCEto an unprecedentedextent linked the participationof member states in regionalmultilateral security co-operation with their domestic political behaviour.This caused anxietiesin the minds of some Asia Pacific governments about endorsing an OSCE-likemultilateral security arrangementfor Asia, and was thereforedropped when co-operative securitywas adaptedfrom the Europeancommon securityexperience. As a consequence, the ARFhas not developed anything like the CSCE/OCSEs 'human dimension,' which deals with issues related to human rights,democratization, and self-determination.(Despite this, Figure2 puts co-operativesecurity ahead of comprehensivesecurity in terms of relativeemphasis on rightsbecause of the philosophicalroots of the formerin the doctrine of common security.) Thus, a key challenge for Asia Pacific policy-makersis how to reconcile the inclusivenessprinciple of co-operativesecurity and the like- mindedness criteriaevident in the promotion of human security. In the absence of a common ground, attempts to push human security could conflict with the work of institutionswhose ostensible goal has been to achieve'security with the adversary,rather than againstthem/

HUMANSECURITY AND HUMANITARIANINTERVENTION Should the promotion of human security allow for collective action even if such action compromises the doctrine of non-interferencein the internal affairsof states?This has proven to be a most daunting question for Asian governments,who, with a few exceptions,resist any departurefrom the Westphalianview of sovereignty. Most advocatesof human securitydesire and expect it to be pursued through peaceful, diplomatic, non-coercive means, such as the cre- ation of social safety nets or the negotiations and agreement to ban landmines.But recentevents, includingsome in the Asia Pacificregion (EastTimor in particular)have demonstrated that the pursuitof human securityin all its aspectscannot be realisticallyseparated from the question of intervention,especially if our understandingof human security is to emphasizemeasures that reducethe human costs of violent conflict, such as genocide,massive refugee flows, and massacresof the civil- ian populationin the hands of governmentsand armedgroups. Humanitarianintervention redefinesthe old interventionist paradigm in fundamentalways. Old intervention,a majorcharacteristic of the cold war order,was rooted in 'geopoliticalmind-sets' and interests,

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including access to raw materialsand the desireof the superpowersto spreadtheir respectiveideologies and their need to protect their repu- tation and credibility.28Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, repudiatesnarrow geopolitics in favour of more high-minded objectives.29Most interventionsduring the cold war were closely tied to the national interestsof the intervener.Humanitarian intervention as con- ceived today is deemed to be warrantedeven in the absenceof any clear dangersto the national interest. China, Malaysia,and other countries have spoken out against the concept and practice of humanitarianintervention, especially in the context of its recentapplication in Kosovo. But the biggest obstacle to any sort of collective interventionistaction, even in its most diluted, non-coercive,and non-militaryform, is the salienceof state sovereignty in the region. As the East Timor episode demonstrated, regional countriesare too deferentialto the principleof statesovereignty to seri- ously contemplate direct and intrusive multilateral action through regionalinstitutions even in the face of the severesthuman tragedies. Much milder forms of regional intervention in Asia Pacific have been proposed from time to time. Foremost among them were the notions of 'constructiveintervention proposedby Anwar Ibrahim(to deal with internal conflicts in weaker regional states such as Cambodia) and 'flexible engagement' mooted by Surin Pitsuan (to deal with the fallout of the regionaleconomic crisis and the situation in Burma), while they served the governments of Malaysia and Thailand respectively.30The flexible engagement idea, partly inspired by Anwar's 'constructive intervention' proposal, sought to address those security challenges - including non-traditional security issues such as drugsand refugees- that aredomestic in origin but have a clear regionalor transnationalimpact. Both concepts maintaineda healthy respectfor state sovereignty,requiring the regime'sconsent as a prereq- uisite for collective action. But even those limited initiativescould not be institutionalized. Asia Pacific regional institutions, such as ASEAN

28 RobertJervis, 'Will the new world be better/ in RobertJervis and Seweryn Bialer, eds, Soviet-AmericanRelations after the Cold War(Durham nc: Duke University Press 1991). 29 Morton H. Halperinand DavidJ. Scheffer, Self-Determinationin the New World Order(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowmentfor InternationalPeace 1992), 107. 30 AmitavAcharya, Constructing a Security Communityin Southeast Asia: asean and the Problem of Regional Order(London and New York:Routledge 2001).

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and ARF,remain divided over the issue, with many of their members refusingto departfrom establishedprinciples and approachesthat put a premiumon the doctrine of non-interference.31 ASEANand the ARFhave moved towardseven more limited forms of collective regional action. Such actions include the provision of a diplomatic troika (as yet untested, despite escalating tensions in Indonesia and on the Thai-Burmeseborder) and a regional financial surveillanceprocess by ASEAN,and the ARFs developmentof a preven- tive diplomacymechanism through the enhanced role of the ARFchair. But, overall, multilateral approaches to human security in the Asia Pacific that requireeven the mildest form of humanitarianintervention appearto enjoy little constituency.

CONCLUSION The foregoingdiscussion has identifiedseveral obstacles to the promotion of human securityin the Asia Pacific region. These include mis- givings that the notion masks a Western' political agenda unsuited, perhapseven detrimental,to the region.A second source of scepticism relatesto a belief that existing concepts of security,such as comprehensive security,have addressedthe same range of challengesthat are highlighted by the human security framework.A third barrieris the - fearthat the pursuitof human security with its perceivedassociation with humanitarianintervention - through regional collective action would undermine state sovereigntyand the doctrine of non-interference, which continues to be the guiding principleof internationalrela- tions in the region. This article has shown that some of these concerns are misplaced. Unlike other securityconcepts of the post- cold war era, human security can claim a significant Asian pedigree. Moreover,the belief that human securityoffers nothing new to a regionthat might have invent- ed the notion of comprehensive security is flawed. Despite sharing some attributeswith existingAsian securityconcepts such as comprehensive and co-operativesecurity, human securityshould be seen as a broadernotion that goes the furthest in stressinghuman freedom as

31 Foran overview of the debate on non-interventionin the Asia Pacific,see Amitav Acharya,Sovereignty, Non-interventionand Regionalism, cancapsPaper no 15 (Toronto:Canadian Consortium for Asia PacificSecurity 1997); David Dickens and GuyWilson Roberts, eds, Non-interventionand State Sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific (Wellington:Centre for Strategic Studies 2000).

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the core element of security.Human security demands a much more people-centredapproach than the old notion of comprehensivesecurity, which privilegedstate and regimesecurity. Whether governments in the region will shift towards such a people-oriented approach will depend very much on their domestic political agenda;greater democratization will make the region more receptive to human security defined as freedomfrom fearas much as freedomfrom want. Not all responsesto human insecurityrequire intervention against the sovereign state. Collective action is more acceptable when it is viewed as a matter of pooling sovereignty rather than diluting it. Concerns with sovereigntyare likely to be strongest, however,when dealing with situations of violent conflict. And it is precisely in this area that the Asian region urgently needs to develop policies and resourcesto respondto threatsto human security. The Canadian approach has fewer adherents in Asia than the Japaneseapproach. But there is now a real need to view them as com- plimentary and mutually reinforcing. Promoting human security through a needs-basedapproach does not negate the case for pursuing human securityas a way of reducingthe costs of violent conflict, especially in a regionwhere the dangerof conflict, both internaland interstate, remainsvery, very real.There has been increasingAsian acceptance of some of the measuresthat amelioratethe human costs of violent conflict, such as the internationalnorms and agreementsconcern- ing landmines,small arms,and child soldiers.But, thus far,in the Asia Pacific freedom from want has outweighed freedom from fear in the understandingand promotion of human security.Some Asian governments and analystswere rightto criticizethe initial Canadianapproach as too narrow,and to stress the understandingof human security as freedom from want. But they should also bear in mind that efforts to pursue the latter dimension could not succeed if violent eruptions in the regions conflict zones were to extracta severehuman cost which could spill over into their own domestic arenasand immediate neigh- bourhoods. Pursuing freedom from want in the absence of freedom from fear is bound to be of limited utility.

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