Preventing Runway Incursions Airports’ Top Safety Hazard
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Preventing Runway Incursions Airports’ Top Safety Hazard ADB Airfield SolutionsI www.adb-air.com Background Runway Incursion Detection The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines Runway Incursion as: Any occurrence at an The detection of a runway incur- runway holding position towards sues are detected simultaneously aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area sion is a sum of two aspects - the the runway and the detection of it can be concluded that a run- of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft. That runway incursions are deadly is detection of a crossing of the an illuminated stopbar. If both is- way incursion has occurred. evidenced by the large number of airport disasters that have occurred as a result of them. In fact one of aviation history’s worst accidents was the result of a runway incursion at Tenerife Airport in 1977. Specifically, a KLM Flight 4805 initiated takeoff before it was supposed to and collided with another Crossing towards the runway detection aircraft, Pan Am Flight 1736 leading to the loss of 583 lives. The incursion detection is plane in direction towards the rection towards the runway can for a go-around to safely land 15 achieved by using two sensor runway. However, the sensors be detected by the sensor sets minutes later. While investiga- sets at the runway holding posi- will not be able to determine but not if this crossing has taken tions into this episode are un- tion. The combined detection of whether the runway holding place over an illuminated stop- derway and there appears to be these sensor sets will allow the position has been crossed with bar or not. The figures below il- some confusion into the active system to determine whether clearance from the ATC or not. lustrate roughly the functioning or inactive use of that particu- the runway holding position has In other words, the crossing of of this detection. lar runway, it has also surfaced been crossed by a vehicle or a a runway holding position in di- that when the Airbus noticed the A B C illuminated stopbars and ques- tioned the ground crew, these were subsequently turned off. Spain’s Aviation Accident and In- cident Investigation Commission Through the ensuing years run- the example of a very recent (CIAAIC) has rated this as a seri- way incursions have emerged as near miss runway incursion that ous incident that brings to light one of the leading safety con- occurred at the Barcelona Airport how human error along with less cerns at airports. As airports this summer between Aerolineas than full proof systems can pose have become busier, airfields Argentinas Airbus A340-300 get- potential runway incursion dis- Figure 1. Runway holding position crossing towards the runway have made various provisions ting ready for take-off and UTAir asters on the airfield. Indeed, including Stopbars, RGL, Mark- Boeing 767-300 looking to land. overran stopbars/indicators has The moment sensor 1 detects a process illustrated in figure 1 If sensor 1 detects a passing ob- ings etc to help detect runway Both aircrafts had received the been identified as one of the Top passing object it concludes that above. ject inside that time, it can be incursions and standardize these go ahead from the ATC when 5 types of incursion for Catego- the runway holding position has concluded that the runway hold- as far as possible. Yet, till date UTAir spotted the Airbus cross- rized Airports. been crossed in direction to- On the other hand, if sensor ing position has been crossed runway incursions continue to ing the runway near the runway wards the runway unless sensor 2 detects a vehicle or aircraft but not in direction towards the remain a safety hazard. Take midpoint. The UTAir pilots opted 2 had detected a passing object passing it shall invalidate any runway. This is the process illus- previously within a predefined detection of sensor 1 during the trated in figure 2 below. An Introduction to a Sensor Controlled Incursion Prevention System (SCIPS) detection time (td). This is the predefined detection time (td). One of the more prominent new preventing an actual calamity. The SCIPS response to the incur- A B C Runway Incursion Prevention Additionally, an alert message is ring aircraft or vehicle consists Technologies being proposed to- simultaneously provided to the of the illumination of a number day is ADB’s Sensor Controlled Air Traffic Control (ATC) to assist of red flashing lights beyond the Incursion Prevention System in the resolution of the conflict. stopbar known as Fast Reaction (SCIPS). SCIPS is an autonomous This is in comparison to some Lights (FRLs). These lights are alerting system designed to de- existing systems (Stopbar, RGL, activated to alert the pilot of tect a runway incursion as soon Markings, etc.) that only indicate the incursion and encourage him as it occurs and directly provide to a pilot that it is not safe to to bring the aircraft to a stand- a targeted answer to the incur- proceed, but that do not provide still as soon as possible. Figure 2. Runway holding position crossing leaving the runway ring aircraft or vehicle thereby a warning of an actual hazard. 2 | Preventing Runway Incursions 3 | Preventing Runway Incursions Illuminated stopbar detection 2. If the runway holding position is 90 m or less from the runway edge… This signal basically indicates lights. Various alternatives are ADB advises to monitor the whether the ATC has cleared possible - for example monitoring stopbar control signal direct- …the perpendicular line of three the entrance of the aircraft to the status of the lights via a ly from the ATC. There might FRLs should be located on the the runway from that holding remote device (such as those always be other reasons why the runway edge. position (stopbar lights OFF) or used to control the FRLs) or di- lights are not illuminated with- not (stopbar lights ON). rectly monitoring the stopbar out clearance from ATC, e.g. CCR It is considered important to control signal from the ATC. problem. If the control signal is highlight that this proposed The best way to monitor the monitored and used as trigger standard layout of FRLs is appli- stopbar lighting depends on how for the SCIPS, these incursions cable for all runway holding po- each airport controls the stopbar can also be detected. sitions located not less than 60 m from the runway edge. Figure 4. Layout of Fast Reaction Lights with stopbar 90m or less from the runway edge Alerting of a Runway Incursion Regarding the elevated FRLs, these lights should be spaced 5 lar line of 3 FRLS, however in no the runway edge (see Figure 4 The second main functional- simultaneous alerts are provided meters from the taxiway edge event should the elevated FRLs above). ity of the SCIPS is the alerting in this case: activation of the and in line with the perpendicu- be located less than 15 m from system. This alerting function- Fast Reaction Lights (alert to the ality is activated once a runway pilot) and ATC alarm (alert to the incursion has been detected air traffic controllers). ATC Alarm as explained previously. Two Status information of SCIPS is Typical components in SCIPS provided to the ATC via an au- are: Fast Reaction Lights dible alarm that goes off when a runway incursion occurs. An ◊ Sensor Sets If a runway incursion is detected of inset high intensity red flash- The difficulty arises when trying alert acknowledge button is also the Fast Reaction Lights (FRLs) ing lights enhanced with a pair of to pin down this standard SCIPS provided. Sensors’ signals are directly con- are activated to alert the pilot of elevated flashing red lights on the layout at any type of taxiway nected to the Local Intelligence the incursion and encourage him edges of the taxiway. The pattern used to enter a runway. ADB’s In the event a runway incursion Unit (LIU) located in a nearby to bring the aircraft to a stand- is formed by seven FRLs spaced proposal of this pattern is based alert has occurred, then reset- junction box via pairs of copper still as soon as possible. 7.5 m along the taxiway center- on two fixed points: the runway ting is achieved via an input sig- wires. This method guarantees line and three FRLs perpendicu- holding position (stopbar) and nal from the ATC. This resetting fast and reliable processing of The proposed standard SCIPS lar to the taxiway centerline and the runway edge: shall result in the Fast Reaction the information produced by layout consists of a “T” pattern spaced 3 m between each other. Lights being switched off and the sensors. The signal cable is the ATC alarm being stopped. installed in a dedicated pipe and 1. If the runway holding position is more than 90 meters from the runway edge… In addition to this possibility of uses separate dedicated pits. resetting the system from the ATC, the system is also pro- …the perpendicular line formed grammed to automatically reset by the three FRLs should be when the stopbar lighting is located 90 meters from the stop- deactivated. bar. This distance may be re- duced to a minimum of 82.5 m if necessary to avoid the FRLs coinciding with the taxiway cen- terline lights. This layout is illus- trated in adjacent Figure 3. Figure 3. Layout of Fast Reaction Lights with stopbar more than 90m from the runway edge 4 | Preventing Runway Incursions 5 | Preventing Runway Incursions • Compatible with stop bar op- • Sensor B is used to determine ◊ Control Units Aberdeen Trials eration at Aberdeen Interna- when the aircraft/vehicle is tional Airport vacating the runway.