Preventing Incursions ’ Top Safety Hazard

ADB Airfield SolutionsI www.adb-air.com Background Runway Incursion Detection

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines Runway Incursion as: Any occurrence at an The detection of a runway incur- runway holding position towards sues are detected simultaneously aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an , vehicle, or person on the protected area sion is a sum of two aspects - the the runway and the detection of it can be concluded that a run- of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft. That runway incursions are deadly is detection of a crossing of the an illuminated stopbar. If both is- way incursion has occurred. evidenced by the large number of disasters that have occurred as a result of them. In fact one of aviation history’s worst accidents was the result of a runway incursion at Tenerife Airport in 1977. Specifically, a KLM Flight 4805 initiated takeoff before it was supposed to and collided with another Crossing towards the runway detection aircraft, Pan Am Flight 1736 leading to the loss of 583 lives. The incursion detection is plane in direction towards the rection towards the runway can for a go-around to safely land 15 achieved by using two sensor runway. However, the sensors be detected by the sensor sets minutes later. While investiga- sets at the runway holding posi- will not be able to determine but not if this crossing has taken tions into this episode are un- tion. The combined detection of whether the runway holding place over an illuminated stop- derway and there appears to be these sensor sets will allow the position has been crossed with bar or not. The figures below il- some confusion into the active system to determine whether clearance from the ATC or not. lustrate roughly the functioning or inactive use of that particu- the runway holding position has In other words, the crossing of of this detection. lar runway, it has also surfaced been crossed by a vehicle or a a runway holding position in di- that when the Airbus noticed the A B C illuminated stopbars and ques- tioned the ground crew, these were subsequently turned off. Spain’s Aviation Accident and In- cident Investigation Commission Through the ensuing years run- the example of a very recent (CIAAIC) has rated this as a seri- way incursions have emerged as near miss runway incursion that ous incident that brings to light one of the leading safety con- occurred at the Barcelona Airport how human error along with less cerns at airports. As airports this summer between Aerolineas than full proof systems can pose have become busier, airfields Argentinas Airbus A340-300 get- potential runway incursion dis- Figure 1. Runway holding position crossing towards the runway have made various provisions ting ready for take-off and UTAir asters on the airfield. Indeed, including Stopbars, RGL, Mark- Boeing 767-300 looking to land. overran stopbars/indicators has The moment sensor 1 detects a process illustrated in figure 1 If sensor 1 detects a passing ob- ings etc to help detect runway Both aircrafts had received the been identified as one of the Top passing object it concludes that above. ject inside that time, it can be incursions and standardize these go ahead from the ATC when 5 types of incursion for Catego- the runway holding position has concluded that the runway hold- as far as possible. Yet, till date UTAir spotted the Airbus cross- rized Airports. been crossed in direction to- On the other hand, if sensor ing position has been crossed runway incursions continue to ing the runway near the runway wards the runway unless sensor 2 detects a vehicle or aircraft but not in direction towards the remain a safety hazard. Take midpoint. The UTAir pilots opted 2 had detected a passing object passing it shall invalidate any runway. This is the process illus- previously within a predefined detection of sensor 1 during the trated in figure 2 below. An Introduction to a Sensor Controlled Incursion Prevention System (SCIPS) detection time (td). This is the predefined detection time (td).

One of the more prominent new preventing an actual calamity. The SCIPS response to the incur- A B C Runway Incursion Prevention Additionally, an alert message is ring aircraft or vehicle consists Technologies being proposed to- simultaneously provided to the of the illumination of a number day is ADB’s Sensor Controlled (ATC) to assist of red flashing lights beyond the Incursion Prevention System in the resolution of the conflict. stopbar known as Fast Reaction (SCIPS). SCIPS is an autonomous This is in comparison to some Lights (FRLs). These lights are alerting system designed to de- existing systems (Stopbar, RGL, activated to alert the pilot of tect a runway incursion as soon Markings, etc.) that only indicate the incursion and encourage him as it occurs and directly provide to a pilot that it is not safe to to bring the aircraft to a stand- a targeted answer to the incur- proceed, but that do not provide still as soon as possible. Figure 2. Runway holding position crossing leaving the runway ring aircraft or vehicle thereby a warning of an actual hazard.

2 | Preventing Runway Incursions 3 | Preventing Runway Incursions Illuminated stopbar detection 2. If the runway holding position is 90 m or less from the runway edge…

This signal basically indicates lights. Various alternatives are ADB advises to monitor the whether the ATC has cleared possible - for example monitoring stopbar control signal direct- …the perpendicular line of three the entrance of the aircraft to the status of the lights via a ly from the ATC. There might FRLs should be located on the the runway from that holding remote device (such as those always be other reasons why the runway edge. position (stopbar lights OFF) or used to control the FRLs) or di- lights are not illuminated with- not (stopbar lights ON). rectly monitoring the stopbar out clearance from ATC, e.g. CCR It is considered important to control signal from the ATC. problem. If the control signal is highlight that this proposed The best way to monitor the monitored and used as trigger standard layout of FRLs is appli- stopbar lighting depends on how for the SCIPS, these incursions cable for all runway holding po- each airport controls the stopbar can also be detected. sitions located not less than 60 m from the runway edge. Figure 4. Layout of Fast Reaction Lights with stopbar 90m or less from the runway edge Alerting of a Runway Incursion Regarding the elevated FRLs, these lights should be spaced 5 lar line of 3 FRLS, however in no the runway edge (see Figure 4 The second main functional- simultaneous alerts are provided meters from the taxiway edge event should the elevated FRLs above). ity of the SCIPS is the alerting in this case: activation of the and in line with the perpendicu- be located less than 15 m from system. This alerting function- Fast Reaction Lights (alert to the ality is activated once a runway pilot) and ATC alarm (alert to the incursion has been detected air traffic controllers). ATC Alarm as explained previously. Two Status information of SCIPS is Typical components in SCIPS provided to the ATC via an au- are: Fast Reaction Lights dible alarm that goes off when a runway incursion occurs. An ◊ Sensor Sets If a runway incursion is detected of inset high intensity red flash- The difficulty arises when trying alert acknowledge button is also the Fast Reaction Lights (FRLs) ing lights enhanced with a pair of to pin down this standard SCIPS provided. Sensors’ signals are directly con- are activated to alert the pilot of elevated flashing red lights on the layout at any type of taxiway nected to the Local Intelligence the incursion and encourage him edges of the taxiway. The pattern used to enter a runway. ADB’s In the event a runway incursion Unit (LIU) located in a nearby to bring the aircraft to a stand- is formed by seven FRLs spaced proposal of this pattern is based alert has occurred, then reset- junction box via pairs of copper still as soon as possible. 7.5 m along the taxiway center- on two fixed points: the runway ting is achieved via an input sig- wires. This method guarantees line and three FRLs perpendicu- holding position (stopbar) and nal from the ATC. This resetting fast and reliable processing of The proposed standard SCIPS lar to the taxiway centerline and the runway edge: shall result in the Fast Reaction the information produced by layout consists of a “T” pattern spaced 3 m between each other. Lights being switched off and the sensors. The signal cable is the ATC alarm being stopped. installed in a dedicated pipe and 1. If the runway holding position is more than 90 meters from the runway edge… In addition to this possibility of uses separate dedicated pits. resetting the system from the ATC, the system is also pro- …the perpendicular line formed grammed to automatically reset by the three FRLs should be when the stopbar lighting is located 90 meters from the stop- deactivated. bar. This distance may be re- duced to a minimum of 82.5 m if necessary to avoid the FRLs coinciding with the taxiway cen- terline lights. This layout is illus- trated in adjacent Figure 3. Figure 3. Layout of Fast Reaction Lights with stopbar more than 90m from the runway edge

4 | Preventing Runway Incursions 5 | Preventing Runway Incursions • Compatible with stop bar op- • Sensor B is used to determine ◊ Control Units Aberdeen Trials eration at Aberdeen Interna- when the aircraft/vehicle is tional Airport vacating the runway. Control Units help to control We are currently conducting a and monitor the Fast Reaction trial project at Aberdeen Inter- • Whether the system would • If the beam at M1 is broken Lights (FRLs). These units can national Airport (UK) to demon- stop an aircraft or vehicle within 20 seconds of Sensor B also be used to monitor the strate the operational perfor- that inadvertently crosses an detecting a movement, the sys- stopbar lighting. mance of SCIPS and to make a illuminated red stop bar tem assumes this is an aircraft/ first attempt at defining a stand- Initial feedback from the trial is vehicle vacating the runway. ◊ Local Intelligence Unit ard for ICAO applications. positive and shows that the sys- At the time of publishing this pa- (LIU) tem does work as expected. Spe- per the trial was still ongoing. Figure 5. Generic SCIPS Electrical Component Block Diagram The trial project is implemented cifically: Once completed, we hope to The LIU is installed in a cabinet at the airport’s M1 runway holding • The system is active when the proceed with commercial imple- nearby the runway holding posi- The in-pavement fixture is a modi- While flashing of the Fast position – a position where the risk Runway Guard Bar at M1 run- mentations of SCIPS at airports tion with power supplied either fied FAA L-852S/RWSL REL fixture. Reaction Lights is controlled in- of runway incursions is higher than way holding position is illumi- around the world. from a separate 230Vac power This fixture already utilizes red ternally within each light, the at others due to the long distance nated. source or via power remotes LEDs. The electronics are modified commands, ‘Start Flashing’ and between the holding position and • An alert is generated if an air- from the AGL primary circuit. such that when all the lights in the ‘Stop Flashing’ are given exter- the runway and also due to the craft or vehicle crosses the il- The intelligence is based on a SCIPS bar are commanded On, all nally by the Local Intelligence glare of the low winter sun on pi- luminated RGB (even if a verbal local Simatic PLC that interfac- fixtures turn On at the same time Unit and executed by the SLOS lots’ visibility. clearance has been issued). es the various input and output and automatically flash twice modules. signals of the local SCIPS. per second. The electronics are The trial had to gauge the following: • Upon receipt of the flashing red light alert, the pilot or also further modified such that • Reliability of the system (in a driver stops immediately to ◊ Fast Reaction Lights the intensity stays at a high level daily testing regime scenario) through all steps of a 4.8A to 6.6A await ATC instructions. (FRLs) • Low number of false or nui- 3-step Constant Current Regulator. sance warnings SCIPS uses two uniquely modified FAA fixtures. • Aerodrome and Air Navigation Service Provider confidence The elevated fixture is a modified • Clear and unambiguous warning FAA L-804 Runway Guard Light. to aircraft or vehicle to STOP Red LEDs are substituted for the yellow LEDs. The electron- ics are modified such that when the unit is commanded On, both light source windows turn On at the same time and automatically flash twice per second. The electronics are further modified such that the light intensity stays at a high level through all steps of a 4.8A to 6.6A 3-step Constant Current Regulator (CCR).

6 | Preventing Runway Incursions 7 | Preventing Runway Incursions About ADB

ADB has led the airfield lighting in- conditions including track and labe- lights that are individually con- dustry worldwide for over 65 years ling functionalities for the ATC, visu- trolled by ADB’s fully automated and is the world’s leading supplier al guidance to pilots with automatic system, this is one of the largest of airfield lighting products. We calculation of taxi routes and alert airport projects in the world. have more ICAO and FAA certified functions (i.e. for the unauthorized products and a larger installed crossing of stopbars). The scope We apply our documented, ISO base than any other airfield lighting manufacturer. As a leader in airfield capacity enhancement and safety research, ADB uses its extensive engineering expertise in the design, development, and manufacture of advanced airfield systems and airfield lighting prod- ucts to ensure customer satisfac- tion.

In addition to being a supplier of LED fixtures, power line car- also included the integration of Certified, and proven Project Life- rier equipment and CCRs for the third party solutions of Cardion, Cycle Management (PLM) process FAA’s RWSL program, ADB has ex- HITT and involved installation work to the project management, de- tensive experience in several sys- from Siemens. The project has been sign, production, and life cycle tem integration projects around an ongoing reference since the first support of our products. the world that have helped pilots installation with constant upgrades benefit from individual visual and improvements. One in two airports worldwide use guidance for each aircraft on the • New Doha International ADB airfield lighting solutions. To entire airside.Some examples Airport, Doha, Qatar support this equipment, ADB has are: an unsurpassed customer sup- • Gardermoen Airport, Oslo, ADB implemented a turnkey port team and we have devel- Norway AGL project at the New Doha oped a reputation of having the International Airport (NDIA) best service in our industry. Our This project included integra- including the full design, instal- service team offers technical tion of an Airfield Lighting Control lation, integration, commission- support for all our products. The System with a Surface Movement ing and servicing of airfield lights ADB Service Department provides Surveillance System. This A-SMGCS and a host of third party air- technical assistance and support provides seamless surveillance of field information and guidance via a 7 day per week / 24 hour per ground traffic under all weather systems. With over 8,000 airfield day support telephone line.

ADB Airfield Solutions Leuvensesteenweg 585 – B-1930 Zaventem, Belgium Phone: 0032 (0)2 722 17 11 Fax: 0032 (0)2 722 17 64 [email protected]| www.adb-air.com