Smuggling of Migrants 2018 Africa

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Smuggling of Migrants 2018 Africa Global overview I GLOBAL STUDY ON SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS 2018 AFRICA 1 CHAPTER II REGIONAL OVERVIEWS PATTERNS AND TRENDS OF Africa range from highly structured networks with several MIGRANT SMUGGLING IN AFRICA contact points along the route to local smugglers living in border areas. Migrant smuggling has been documented along at least The year 2015 saw a large outflow of migrants and refu- five major and several smaller routes in Africa. The first gees along the northward route from the Horn of Africa three major routes originate from the same subregion, to North Africa. The numbers of citizens of countries in namely the Horn of Africa. Movements within that sub- the Horn of Africa arriving in Europe on the Central region are mainly irregular as there are limited options for Mediterranean route decreased in 2016. Arrivals in Egypt, regular movement.1 Smugglers facilitate many of these however, appear to be high, with the trend in the number irregular movements. The northward route connects the of asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa increasing. Horn of Africa via land to North Africa. Upon arrival in North Africa, some of the migrants smuggled along this With regard to the eastward route, arrivals in Yemen were route continue to Europe along the Central Mediterranean record high in 2016, with some 117,000 arrivals.2 The route. The eastward route connects the Horn of Africa to high level appears to be continuing into 2017. Uniquely, Yemen, crossing the Red Sea or the Arabian Sea. Many of this route also has a significant flow moving in the oppo- these migrants are then smuggled north to Saudi Arabia site direction, from Yemen into the Horn of Africa. or further afield. The southward route heads primarily The magnitude of migrant smuggling along the migration overland to Southern Africa. routes heading to Southern Africa is even more difficult There are also sizable migrant smuggling routes from West to estimate. Migrants and refugees are certainly smuggled and Central Africa to South Africa and neighbouring from the Horn of Africa and other parts of Sub-Saharan countries, and from West Africa to North Africa. While Africa to South Africa. The number of newly arrived many of the latter migrants move seasonally or stay in asylum seekers in South Africa has declined sharply since North Africa, some also join the Central Mediterranean 2010, but not all migrants apply for asylum, and some route to Europe. There are also some smaller, though still migrants and refugees may not be smuggled. A recent substantial flows of migrant smuggling in Africa. For estimate of the number of irregular arrivals from the Horn example, migrants are smuggled by sea from Madagascar of Africa in South Africa is 13,400-14,050 persons per and the Comoros to the French island of Mayotte, in the year, most of whom are smuggled at least for some parts 3 Indian Ocean. Moreover, migrant smuggling by air – for of the journey. example, from South Asia via various African airports to Europe, Australia or the United States of America – has also been documented. In the last few years, smuggling from the Horn of Africa towards Southern Africa appears to have declined some- what. Smuggling along the eastward route to Yemen is at a high level, though trends started to decline in late 2016. Flows from the Horn of Africa towards North Africa were particularly large in 2015 but have been declining since then. The available information for many of these flows is scat- tered and anecdotal, and there is very little specific migrant smuggling data. Smugglers seem to operate at most bor- ders along the overland African routes. Migrants and refu- gees resort to their services for a number of reasons, including border restrictions, misinformation about avail- able legal migration pathways, and the hardships of the journey. Migrant smuggling organizations operating in 71 2018 THE HORN OF AFRICA LIBYA EGYPT Aswan SAUDI OMAN Kufra ARABIA US$ 1,500-3,000 SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS US$ 1,500-3,000 Kassala Khartoum YEMEN ERITREA US$ 200-500 Taiz/Lahij SUDAN US$ 50-200 Humera US$ 60-200 GLOBAL STUDY ON US$ 120-150 Metemma Obock DJIBOUTI Bossaso Hargeisa Addis Ababa ETHIOPIA Dollo 0 1,000 2,000 km Ado Hub SOMALIA Sea ETHIOPIA SOMALIA 0 1,000 2,000 km Land The designations employed and theMoyale presentation of material on this mapProfile do not ofimply migrants: the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, Kakuma Mogadishu or concerning the delimitation of KENYAits frontiersLiboi or boundaries. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Ethiopians, Eritreans and Somalis in different proportions Nairobi Kismayo according to the specific flow. Most are young males. Human cost: UNITED A minimum of 1,700 deaths in 2016. A range of other Mombasa REPUBLIC risks, including extortion, kidnapping, trafficking in per- OF TANZANIA sons, sexual violence, arbitrary arrest. Profile of smugglers: Mtwara ZAMBIA Mostly citizens of countries in the Horn of Africa, plus Sudanese on some routes. Dzaleka Lusaka MALAWI Organization: Tete A few large, well-organized operations and thousands of MOZAMBIQUE ZIMBABWE smuggler ‘service providers’ who may be informally networked. Beitbridge Ressano Garcia SOUTH AFRICA Sea Land TheThe designations designations employed employed and and the the presentation presentation of of material material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on theon part this of map the doSecretariat not imply of the the expression United Nations of any concerning opinion the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or whatsoeverconcerning onthe the delimitation part of the of Secretariat its frontiers of or the boundaries. United Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South SudanNations has concerningnot yet been the determined. legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. 72 Regional overviews - Africa II The northward route: from the Horn FIG. 23: Number of newly registered asylum of Africa to North Africa seekers in Egypt from countries in the broader Horn of Africa region, 12,000 The main smuggling hubs, departure and 2010-2016 arrival points 10,000 12,000 8,000 The northward route departs from Eritrea, Ethiopia and 10,000 Somalia, passes through Khartoum, Sudan and arrives in 6,000 8,000 Libya or Egypt. Most migrants from the Horn of Africa 4,000 6,000 choose the land route via Addis Ababa to Khartoum, but 2,000 4 some also travel via Nairobi and South Sudan. Large cities 4,000 along this route play the role of major smuggling hubs. 0 2,000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 The area around Metemma, on the border between Ethio- pia and Sudan, is a hub where many migrants make 0 Eritrea 2010 2011 2012 2013Ethiopia 2014 2015 2016 arrangements for travel to Khartoum, or even all the way Sudan to Italy.5 Once they have arrived in North Africa, many Eritrea Somalia Ethiopia South SudanSudan migrants and refugees continue their journeys along the Sudan Central Mediterranean route. Somalia Source: UNHCR. South Sudan The magnitude of migrant smuggling along the northward route migrant smugglers only in Khartoum to facilitate the The number of migrants who were smuggled from the onward journey.13 Horn of Africa to North Africa (and then to Europe) was In Egypt, the total number of refugees, asylum seekers large in 2015, but decreased in 2016. Frontex reported and returned refugees has remained largely constant at that more than 50,000 migrants and refugees from the some 250,000-260,000 over the 2013-2016 period.14 Horn of Africa were smuggled to Europe via the Central Most are refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic. But Mediterranean route in 2015. This decreased to less than UNHCR statistics suggest an increased flow of citizens of 30,000 in 2016.6 countries in the broader Horn of Africa region, particularly Looking more specifically at the countries concerned, the Sudan, in recent years. Although there are no data about available information is scattered and in some cases dated. migrant smuggling to Egypt, the available information Much of the information is published by UNHCR, which about travel arrangements across the Sahara suggest that may focus on specific populations such as refugees and almost all asylum seekers from those countries have their asylum seekers. This means that the estimates represent entire journey or part of it facilitated by smugglers.15 the minimum size of migrant smuggling flows. Libya was an important destination and transit country For the Eritrea-Sudan crossing, a minimum of 1,350 for smuggled migrants from the Horn of Africa, but people per month crossed the border near Kassala from recently, this flow has drastically diminished. Before the Eritrea to Sudan and registered with UNHCR in 2015.7 deterioration of the security situation in Kufra district in This border crossing is generally facilitated by smugglers, Libya in 2012, the Kufra governor estimated the flows although a few also attempt the passage on their own.8 from Sudan into the district at 10,000-12,000 people per month, whereas in 2013, a significant reduction of the It is difficult to assess the dimension of the smuggling flow flow was recorded and only 300-1,000 migrants were esti- from Eritrea to Ethiopia.9 Virtually all Eritreans migrating mated to enter Libya from Sudan per month.16 Although irregularly to Ethiopia reportedly do so with the assistance many of these arrivals may not apply for asylum, data on of smugglers.10 Flows of Eritreans, or persons claiming to asylum applications in Libya also reflect the decreasing be Eritreans, might have decreased, as suggested by the flow from countries in the Horn of Africa into Libya.
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