ISA GLOBAL SOUTH CAUCUS CONFERENCE 2015 Voices from Outside: Re-shaping International Relations Theory and Practice in an Era of Global Transformation 9-10 January 2015, Singapore

Deconstructing the Uniform Understanding of Regional Powers’ Foreign Policy: Who Wants to Live Forever as a ‘Client State’?

Mi-yeon (Miriam) Hur University of Bradford

1. Introduction If the outcome of the Second World War enabled the United States to lay a foundation for its permanent presence in the Northeast Asian region and transformed Japan into a key ally, the Korean War granted America an unequivocal status of South Korea’s closest ally. For decades, Japan and South Korea deliberately chose to submit their foreign policy to the US’ in the sense of the exchange of fidelity for protection against the threats from the Soviet Union and the newly communist China. Though the collapse of the Soviet Union eased the tension around Northeast Asia and to some extent undermined the US influence, the Cold War residues have never been completely removed from the region, leaving the Korean peninsula as a flashpoint with nuclear-armed North Korea. As South Korea and Japan have continued to largely defer to the United States on their own security and defense in face of evolving threats from North Korea, traditional bilateral alliances in the region remained intact, if not reinforced, keeping the US as a pivotal factor for Japanese and South Korean security. Given this backdrop, both Tokyo and Seoul, regardless of their series of independent foreign policy decisions, are often depicted as client states of America, and their foreign policies are regarded subservient to Washington’s regional policy. This partly becomes ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 a reason both governments’ foreign policy makings in the nuclear disarmament process, alternatively known as the Six-Party Talks (SPT), in the Korean peninsula are often muted, while being discounted as intelligibly passive and reactive. The paper is to challenge this uniform understanding of the foreign policy of the regional powers in Northeast Asia – South Korea and Japan. The author found conventional theoretical frameworks that predominantly focus on systemic structures and rational deterrence are not sufficient enough to trace the dynamic and proactive moves by Seoul and Tokyo. Adopting Interactionist Role Theory (IRT) perspectives which give an emphasis on a state’s capacity to learn (change its foreign policy direction) through interactions with others, the cases of the Japanese administrations and the Roh Moo-hyun government of South Korea explicitly show how they actively pursued their foreign policy to change or reinforce the social structure of the SPT with either default containment or default engagement. For Japan, Japanese leaders kept their political radar on the abduction issue over the North Korean nuclear program, which eventually made them progressively harder to converge with international strategy toward North Korea. On the other hand, the Roh government whose priority appeared to be in inter-Korean reconciliation expedited its North-South auxiliary engine to consolidate the social structure of the SPT which inflamed suspicion and distrust of conservatives in Washington. Without disregarding the systemic influence on both countries’ foreign policy, the study attempts to shed lights on those long neglected independent moves by the US allies in Northeast Asia by employing newly developed middle-ground theory, IRT. The paper will first briefly introduce the key concepts of Interactionist Role Theory, followed by the short overview of the February 13 Action Plan as to which Japan and South Korea took distinctively different counter-roles. The paper then analyzes how the role conceptions of the Japanese administrations and the Roh government interacted with institutional role expectations generated by the February 13 Action Plan; how successful their role-makings were; and what structural effects of their foreign policy implementation had on the overall SPT process. The study is expected to give insightful messages to conventional foreign policy readings that predominantly

2 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 view the nuclear drama in the Northeast Asian region from a binary focus of US- DPRK mutual deterrence while muting activities of the Northeast Asian middle powers.

2. Interactionist Role Theory (IRT) “Role theorists have long recognized the shortcomings of the purely material and/or structural explanations of the realist paradigm, and also readily understand that norms and identity do not straightforwardly guide foreign policy behaviour.”1 They have searched for a theoretical framework which goes beyond the realist argument of states’ adapting themselves to the environment where preferences and outcomes are predetermined as well as enables them to integrate cognitive factors into a systemic analysis. Inspired by sociological theories, role theorists introduced the concept of ‘role’ in international relations and explained that, as individuals find suitable social behaviour with the sense of identity, the state endowed with “national role conception” would be able to find its appropriate orientations or functions towards the international system.2 National role conceptions are defined as foreign policy actors’ perceptions of their state’s possible and desirable roles within the international system on the basis of both their understanding of the state’s identity, cultural heritage, and the physical capabilities or material characteristics of the state.3 Operationally, the leadership’s perceptions of national roles are investigated as they are arguably more salient to foreign policy decision.4 Statesmen and political leaders who usually assess and decide on a proper role for a state to play become those who link the domestic and international milieu by emanating national role conceptions on the international stage through their foreign policy. Role theorists acknowledge that roles are determined not only by the state’s own conceptions about appropriate behaviour but also by shared norms and others’

1 Breuning, 2012: 26. 2 Benes, 2011: 4. 3 Thies, 2009. 4 Hudson, 2014.

3 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 expectations towards the state. While a national role conception usually refers to the ‘ego’ part of state’s perception about its position and function, role expectations are used to iterate the ‘alter’ expectations of other actors. This concept of role expectations becomes an important analytical source to understand the structural dimension of the role theory since it constitutes the (social) structure of the regional/international system. Role theorists also adopt the multiple-role assumption that “decision makers hold multiple national role conceptions that guide the foreign policy behaviour of the state.”5 With multiple role conceptions exist, decision makers rebalance the relative prominence of role conceptions if necessary. Role theorists demonstrate that multiple national role conceptions may coexist comfortably, but when they do not, tensions between role conceptions – role conflicts – may arise and induce a shift in role conceptions as well as foreign policy behaviour. Incorporating both material and ideational aspects into ‘national role conceptions’ and accommodates both domestic and international sources, the role theory has been seen as a promising conceptual tool for the foreign policy analysis. However, the pertinent agent and structure dilemma still remains to be resolved, and this shortfall of traditional and contemporary foreign policy role theories has contributed to the lack of literature on the processes of foreign policy changes and their respective effects on the social structure of international relations. A German scholar, Sebastian Harnisch, integrates George Herbert Mead’s interactionist framework of ‘learning’ into FPA (foreign policy analysis), 6 so the ‘process’ of foreign policy shifts can be systematically examined.

2.1. Role-Taking and Role-Making While traditional foreign policy role theory assumes the role conceptions are ontologically prior to interactions, Interactionist Role Theory (IRT) proposes that states’ role conceptions and their preferences are mutually constituted in the process of ‘role-making’ and ‘role-taking’.

5 Breuning, 2012: 32. 6 Harnisch, 2011: 37.

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Role-taking simply put is to understand “what I would do if I were in the other’s position”. It requires to interpret the conventional norms and rules of ‘generalized others’ and to assume their perspectives and likely courses of action that would meet the expectations of others.7 Here, the generalized other is an important causal variable which provides general perspectives or a set of attitudes about what are the appropriate behaviours in interactions and how the state should respond in a given situation.8 States engaging in formal and informal social institutions are expected to learn and adopt the international values through socialization processes. In this vein, role-taking is assuming the role from ‘alter-oriented perspectives’, integrating its own behaviour with others. The critical point is that the state does not merely take up the role that is defined and imputed by organized or generalized others but also actively shape their own roles to act upon their own perceived national interests.9 To address these creative or more self-oriented aspects of role-taking, IRT purposefully borrows the concept of ‘role- making’ coined by Ralph H. Turner to emphasize the converse of alter-oriented role- taking. Turner construes that: “In all encounters, individuals orchestrate, both consciously and unconsciously, their behavioural outputs and gestures to assert a role for themselves in the situation. To some degree, role-making is constrained by status, situational ecology, and culture of corporate and categoric units, but individuals always have some latitude in how they make a role for themselves, even under relatively high degrees of constraint.”10 IRT gives a great emphasis on a structural effect of this role-making, as it gives power to a state to act against structural constraints, which possibly contributes to inducing changes in various levels of social structures. In the context of role-making, the interactionist approach also gives considerable attention to the ‘domestic institutional roles’ which may be reshaped through the interactions between domestic actors. While

7 Turner, 1988: 75. 8 Turner, 1988: 83. 9 Turner, 1988: 235. 10 Turner, 1988: 235.

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IRT continues to subscribe to role theory as an orienting framework, its emphasis on states’ role-making genuinely coalesces domestic (internal, agent-level) and international (external, structural) factors in states’ foreign policy behaviours.

2.2. Foreign Policy Role Learning When multiple roles are elicited by competing or conflicting role expectations and conceptions, various cases of inter-role conflicts and intra-role conflicts can happen, which become preliminary sources to instigate foreign policy shifts (learning). To explain how foreign policy role learning may occur, Harnisch conceptualizes a set of changes in three criteria: direction of role segments, a shift between the primary addressees of role-taking, and the degree of role commitment. Role learning is defined as a ‘substantial shift’ along these three dimensions. First, role learning may involve a change from an ego-dominated role conceptualization to an alter-oriented one or vice versa. On the basis of Mead’s understanding of the two different aspects of the ‘self’, foreign policy learning is conceived as a ‘transformation’ of the constitutive parts of the self.11 In routine situations, the alter-oriented self, ‘Me’, conforms to social norms and practices, but in problematic situations, the ego-dominated self, ‘I’ becomes more prevalent, because prior initiatives and established routines appear unreliable to achieve the anticipated effects or resume the equilibrium of the situation.12 The second dimension where foreign policy shifts can be manifested is the scope of social organization. Role-taking can oscillate between a few ‘significant others’ and one or more ‘generalized others’. Broadly speaking, when the state is preoccupied with an ego-dominated role conception, it inclines more toward particular individual state(s) than an organized or a social group as a whole to which it belongs. The last dimension regarding foreign policy learning is the degree of states’ commitment towards regional, international, or supranational organizations. The state is expected to internalize its role by actively supporting the institutionalized values and priority if the commitment is strong.

11 Herborth, 2004 in Harnisch, 2011: 41. 12 Harnisch, 2012: 56.

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It is imperative to note that foreign policy learning is defined by its structural commodities (ontological status of self, scope of role-taking, intensity of role commitment). It necessitates the emergence of corresponding practices by others assuming counter roles and thus social order. “In this conceptualization, foreign policy learning has a ‘transformative ontology’, because when actors acquire a new role and act according to what they hold to be appropriate role behaviour, they recreate the counter-roles around them, rather than adapting to the latter.”13 Based on these premises, the paper will investigate how Japanese leaders and the South Korean leadership under Roh Moo-hyun actively sought to reshuffle or reinforce the social structure of the SPT through their role-makings, which were regarded as ‘deviant’ in nature.

3. February 13 Action Plan In 2007, the six states engaging in disarmament talks in the Korean peninsula witnessed a ‘transformative event’ for security relations in Northeast Asia by reaching an agreement on the Denuclearization Action Plan.14 For it to happen, it is particularly noteworthy that the United States became pragmatic enough to pursue bilateral contacts with the North, departing from previous adherence to multilateral contacts. Before achieving consensus on the initial provision of energy assistance to Pyongyang, prior bilateral meeting between US and North Korea showed a marked shift in the attitude of the Bush administration toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.15 The first serious bilateral negotiations between the US and North Korea held in Berlin from 16 to 18 January 2007 which was not directly under the auspices of the SPT but the topic and outcome were six-party related.16 On 13 February 2007, after intensive US-North Korea bilateral discussion, a very specific agreement (in writing) was reached that would become the Six-Party Talk’s February 13 ‘Initial Actions for the

13 Harnisch, 2011:12. 14 Rozman, 2007c: 33. 15 Though Bush could find no enthusiasm for tough action in China and South Korea, he was successfully passed “the toughest sanctions on North Korea since the end of the Korean War” (Chinoy, 2010). However, it did not take too long for Bush to allow Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill to engage in bilateral talks with North Korea. 16 Pritchard, 2008: 68.

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Implementation of the Joint Statement’. The scope and significance of February 13 Action Plan was immense. Under the agreement, at the initial phase, North Korea must shut down and seal its main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days. In return, North Korea will get immediate energy aid worth 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. At the second phase, when North Korea disables all existing nuclear facilities and present its detailed inventory of nuclear programs and facilities to be dismantled, other parties agree to grant the DPRK either 950,000 tons of heavy oil or the equivalent in the form of economic or humanitarian aid. Details were to be addressed in working group discussions. The prominent feature of the February 13 Agreement was the fact that working groups were formed. Five independent working groups incorporated governmental officials and experts to discuss and supervise the suitable measures to successfully finish the disarmament of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. The working groups comprised of five areas include: denuclearization of the Korean peninsula; Economic and Energy Collaboration; Normalization of US-DPRK Relations; Normalization of Japan-DPRK relations; and Peace and Security in the Northeast Asia region. To establish working groups heightened the perceived probability about institutionalizing the multilateral security cooperation.17 In IRT terms, it can be interpreted as a process of building a sound ‘organized others’ for reducing tension and changing a volatile social structure in the Northeast Asian region by assigning each member state ‘a clear and constructive role’ to contribute to transforming the troubled region into a zone of peace. The issue was if the each member state would persistently and diligently perform the given role by the agreed Action Plan. The South Korean government was the chair of Economic and Energy Collaboration working group and was the first to take action. On 27 February, Inter-Korea Cabinet talks were held between South and North Korea for 4 days to discuss over 50,000 tons of fuel which must be provided to North Korea in sync with its implementation of disabling the Yongbyon reactor and subsequent inspections by the IAEA. The Roh government was not simply fulfilling its role following the agreement but was ready

17 Challenge and Response in Northeast Asia: Fulfilling the Jeju Process. (2008) Jeju Peace Institute Joint Workshop. Chapter 2: The Prospect for the Institution of Multilateral Conflict Prevention in Northeast Asia.

8 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 to proceed its original policy for ‘peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula’ with the newly emerged environment with the Action Plan. At the last Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee meeting in April, an agreement was made to aid North Korea with 40,000 tons of rice and a loan of 80 million dollars of raw materials for its light industry. South Korea’s chief negotiator to the SPT, Chun Young-woo, also revealed that “irrelevant of whether or not North Korea made any progress in disabling its nuclear facilities, the South Korean government finalized proposals that resumed sending 30,000 tons of fertilizer to North Korea until June.”18 This role-making of the Roh government will discussed further in the later part of this paper. Contrary to South Korea’s ardent move, in the working group meeting regarding the normalization of Japan-North Korea relations, Japan was rigid. As Japanese officials display a position that no energy would be supported unless the abductees issue is resolved, it was very likely that the issue would become the forefront obstacle to normalizing relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang. With the abduction issue relegated to the working group on normalization with the North, Japan was resisting the role expectations generated by the SPT, more specifically by the February 13 Action Plan and was gradually being marginalized from the momentum generated by the other working groups.19 The Japanese and the South Korean approaches regarding the February 13 Action Plan were not what the US government expected to see from its ‘client states’. Given the fact that the US regional security objective was altered to reach a nuclear deal with North Korea but never prepared to normalize the relations with the North unless the reclusive regime would commit itself to a fully verifiable denuclearization process, both Tokyo and Seoul were not deferring to US preferences and needs. This looming transition in Japan’s and South Korea’s foreign policy is often missed and sometimes harshly rebuked if noticed, due to an essentially static view of the realist template adopted by most scholars and policy analysts.

18 Yang Jung-a. “100 Days after Feb 13 Agreement, Has the U.S. Fallen into a Ditch?” Daily NK, (23 May 2007). 19 Shulong, 2007: 53.

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The following sections elucidate the role-makings by the Japanese administrations and the Roh Moo-hyun government, though they were not forceful enough to transform the social structure of the SPT, to show there are more diverse factors involved in foreign policy of the US powerful allies in Northeast Asia who were presumed to automatically accommodate to Washington’s policy goals but did not in reality.

4. Japan’s Unilateral Foreign Policy To understand Japan’s role-making and its role conceptions, the section begins with Japan’s embedded aspiration for normal statehood, which is to a great extent in congruence with the relationship with the U.S. The section then briefly outlines the Japan-North Korea normalization process to introduce how the abduction issues became dominating factors in Japan’s foreign policy. Finally, Japanese government’s dominant role conception is identified to analyze how Japan managed to stick to its containment policy toward North Korea while facing conflicting role expectations from the US government and other member states of the SPT.

4.1. Aspiration for Normal State Conventional wisdom that the Koizumi administration sought a diplomatic relationship with North Korea in early 2000 based on its role conception to be a ‘protector’ of its own security20 or to be a possible ‘peace-maker’ for the region seems only partly plausible. The set of contradictions in Koizumi’s foreign policy behaviour where he pursued the assertive policy of visiting North Korea, which deviated from Washington’s approach, but supported the US-led Iraq war which appeared to be submissive to Washington’s demand, have never been clearly answered. It is only when they are seen in light of Japan’s ‘wishful state identity’ shared by majority of

20 North Korea missiles launches have been Japan’s grave concern, especially because most of the time, missiles fired by the DPRK flew over Japan’s territory. Japan tends to overreact to North Korea’s long-range missile technology which does not pose a significant increase in risk to Japan unless a war erupts, but the real threat to Japan is North Korea’s inventory of short-range and medium-range missiles that can strike both South Korean and Japanese territories. For further detail, see International Crisis Group’s Policy Briefing, “North Korea’s Missile Launch: The Risks of Overreaction,” (31 March 2009).

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Japanese leaders,21 the common theme can be found: a long-held aspiration for a ‘normal state’. The experience of the Gulf crisis in 1991 was a central driving force behind the demand for Japan’s new role conception as a ‘normal state’ instead of ‘peace state’. The Japanese government, which failed to send its Self Defence Force (SDF) to the Gulf to support the US-led multilateral forces but made a financial contribution of 13 billion dollars, received no credit. Harsh evaluation regarding Japan’s Gulf war policy was not only coming from Japan’s political constraints and limitations, but also from the fact that Japan did not get proper recognition of the contribution that Japan made. It was striking for Japanese leaders that Japan was not even listed in a public letter of gratitude from the Kuwaiti government. 22 Being degraded as ‘chequebook diplomacy’, Gulf crisis was inscribed as the absolute humiliation of Japan’s foreign policy in the memory of most Japanese political leaders as well as Japanese public, which rekindled Japan’s ambition for ‘normal state’. In the wake of new realities of post Cold War security in general, and its inability to respond to the Gulf War in particular, former Secretary-General of LDP Ichiro Ozawa defined ‘normal state’ in early 1990s, emphasizing Japan’s effort to contribute to world peace by dispatching its SDF to peacekeeping operations. However, what most Japanese leaders have fundamentally quested for is the ‘autonomous and sovereign’ state of Japan. Though theoretically Japan fully regained its independence in 1952 by signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan in fact has been a ‘client-like’ state of the United States.23 By denouncing any war efforts, Japan had opportunities to concentrate on economic development and was able to deflect U.S. demand for greater burden sharing in international affairs, but it was done in exchange for subordinating its foreign policy to that of its patron.24 Liberal nationalist Junichiro Koizumi had a deep desire to transform Japan to a ‘true’

21 The author found out almost every Japanese interviewee mentioned Japan’s eagerness to be a ‘normal state’. 22 Yuzawa, 2007: 35. 23 Asahi Shimbun, “Interview: Ex-diplomat Magosaki Reveals Japan’s Postwar Taboo,” (29 August 2012). A former diplomat Ukeru Magosaki revealed in his bestseller “Sengoshi no shotai” (secrets behind the postwar history) that Japan has been acting like “a client state of the United States as Washington has ‘embedded’ personnel channels to exert influence on Tokyo since the occupation.” 24 Author’s interview with Masaru Tamamoto (December 2013).

11 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 sovereign state which could make its foreign policy decisions by its own terms.25 Hideaki Kaneda, a former Vice Admiral of Japan’s Defense Forces, notes it should have been no surprise that Koizumi strived to reform the peace constitution.26 Kaneda explains that the Koizumi administration’s slogan was ‘reform with no sacred cows’, and there was nothing more sacred than ‘peace constitution’ which he regarded as structural restraints for Japan’s proactive diplomacy.27 Koizumi’s bold summitry in North Korea appeared to be pursued with this compelling ambition to become diplomatically independent actor at least in the regional community, if not global.

4.2. Japan’s Normalization with North Korea The normalization talks between Japan and the DPRK date back to the early 1990’s. During the Cold War, Japan made little effort to normalize ties with North Korea. There was negligible political or economic gain by establishing official diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, and Japan did not want to upset the US alliance structure in East Asia by pursuing relations with the communist DPRK.28 However, when the confluence of the Gorbachev revolution in Soviet foreign policy, Seoul’s Nordpolitik and Beijing-Moscow renormalization began to undermine the deep structure of Cold War politics in Northeast Asia in general and on the Korean peninsula in particular, Japan found it increasingly difficult to be a bystander.29 Unfortunately, several rounds of government-level talks made little progress mainly because of North Korea’s refusal to discuss ‘kidnapping allegations’ (ICG, 2005: 3). In 2001, North Korea who was preparing to launch a number of comprehensive economic reforms made back-channel overtures to Japan on restarting the talks. Tanaka Hitoshi, then Director General of the Foreign Ministry’s Bureau of East Asian Affairs, sensed that North Korea recognised the need for Japanese aid to revive its

25 With the collapse of Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the slow decline of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) after the end of the Cold War, a spirit of nationalism was encouraged. 26 Author’s interview with Hideaki Kaneda, (September 2013). 27 Author’s interview with Hideaki Kaneda, (September 2013). Kaneda himself insists the fundamental change in Article 9 is indispensible, because current interpretations of the constitution which pledges that Japan will never maintain offensive armed forces, have consistently undermined Japan’s security and defence policies. 28 Kim, Samuel, 2007: 35. 29 Kim, Samuel, 2007: 35.

12 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 economy. Tanaka who wanted to re-orient Japanese diplomacy to play a larger regional role more independent of the U.S. 30 thought the time was ripe and encouraged Koizumi to take the initiative.31 On 17 September 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi visited Pyongyang to hold the first Japan-DPRK summit. The main rationale behind his trips to Pyongyang was to normalize the bilateral relations and resolve the outstanding issues including the abductions.32 This audacious visit by PM Koizumi substantially changed the whole arrangement of Japan’s foreign policy. With a desperate need of foreign economic assistance and full diplomatic relations for internal reform, 33 Kim Jong-il, during the first Japan-DPRK summit in 2002, acknowledged North Korea’s responsibility for kidnapping Japanese nationals, offering sincere apology, and pledging not to repeat such crimes.34 The North Korean government additionally delivered the news that six out of eleven Japanese, identified by the Japanese government as abductees, and two others who were not included in the Japanese list were dead. The Japanese delegation and Koizumi himself who expected positive news from North Korean counter partners were clearly shocked by the high number of dead abductees of which the North had not informed the Japanese side until the summit.35 Koizumi, however, was still content to have Kim Jong-il’s confession and apology for kidnapping Japanese nationals, with a promise in preventing recurrence. At the same time, the Japanese delegation was greatly encouraged by Pyongyang’s willingness to extend self-imposed moratorium on missile testing and to settle the compensation issue through economic assistance rather than as ‘reparations’.36 In return Japan also voiced “deep regrets and a heartfelt apology” for suffering Koreans by Japan’s colonial rule.37 The DPRK additionally accepted Japan’s fact-finding mission for the

30 ICG, 2005: 3. 31 Author’s interview with Hitoshi Tanaka (September 2013). 32 Kenji, 2003: 7. 33 Haruki, 2012. 34 Junko Takahashi, “Kim admits abductions: Four Japanese alive, six dead; normalization talks to resume,” Japan Times, (18 September 2002). 35 Kim, Hong-nak, 2006. 36 Kim, Hong-nak, 2006: 8. 37 Junko Takahashi, “Kim admits abductions: Four Japanese alive, six dead; normalization talks to resume,” Japan Times, (18 September 2002).

13 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 deaths of the eight Japanese and allowed the five surviving abductees to temporarily visit home.38 Despite North Korea’s shocking confession, as two major obstacles which had been blocking the progress of normalization – abduction and compensation – seemed to be close to resolution, the Pyongyang Declaration resuscitated the hope for the normalization between two countries. However, in opposition to what both governments expected, the resolution was never achieved. Succinctly, “instead of returning from Pyongyang cradling a diplomatic coup, Koizumi and the Foreign Ministry found themselves buffeted by intense criticism.”39

4.3. Abductions Failed Koizumi’s North Korea Policy Victor Cha contrasted the difference between elite and public opinion about the abduction issues by stating: “The strategic calculus at the government-elite level in resolving abduction issues was to remove the hurdle for normalization. The math on the street, however, was quite different. The domestic-political reaction was one of anger and despair at the deaths – rather than express satisfaction at Kim’s confession.”40 Though the abduction issue had been a persistent impediment on normalization talks, it was always addressed in terms of suspicion and allegations. James Schoff notes “Kim Jong-il’s admission turned these allegations into concrete abduction cases, and the repatriation of some survivors was overwhelmed by the realization of the crimes that were committed and by the volume of unanswered questions.”41 However, Japanese people were not outraged in the first place, though they were evidently shocked and deeply concerned over the abduction news. This fact is proven by the public overwhelming support for Koizumi right after his visit to Pyongyang. According to Asahi Newspaper poll, around 80% of respondents approved Koizumi’s

38 Kaseda, 2009: 217. 39 Lynn, 2006: 490. 40 Cha, 2002. 41 Schoff, 2006: 15.

14 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 diplomatic initiative, and the Koizumi cabinet’s approval rating also climbed to 61%, a 10 point increase from the previous poll conducted about two weeks before his visit.42 Later, a “sense of unity based on a common sense of indignation and fear”43 was fostered, as the audience was exposed to the high frequency and intensity of media messages that framed the abduction issues in the form of ‘vicarious traumas’, together with a strong lobby against North Korea by supporting groups.44 The Japanese news media was frantically competing for intensive coverage of abductions. Not only because the issue was gradually increasing in political salience but also because Koizumi had declared that his primary objective of visiting Pyongyang was to resolve the abduction issue and to achieve normalization rather than to address security issues.45 Saturation coverage became the norm, resulting in a dramatic rise in the number of respondents who cited ‘abductions’ as the most important issue regarding North Korea from 68.6% in 2000 to 90.1% in 2003.46 As the Japanese audiences became acclimatized to obsessive, emotionalized, uncritical coverage of incidents,47 the abductions had become a ‘national tragedy’ that resonated too deeply in Japanese society.48 While the Japanese media’s penchant for competing coverage continuously refreshed public interest in the abduction issue, concerted campaigns by abductees’ families and lobbying groups helped the issue maintain in the public eye. However, the media and public response alone rarely trigger a fundamental shift in foreign policy, until the

42 Funabashi, 2007: 63. 43 Lynn, 2006: 502. 44 Three main lobbies or associations have been directly involved in the abduction issue. One is the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN or Kazokukai) consisting of only the family members of the abductees. The second group is the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NARKN or Sukuukai) made up of conservative politicians and intellectuals. Closely working with Kazokukai, the Sukuukai has been active in disseminating the message through public seminars, publications, demonstrations, and media coverage. The third association is the Diet Members Alliance for the Early Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (Rashi Giren) where high-profile politicians were involved including Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzo. 45 Lynn, 2006: 490. 46 Japanese Cabinet Office Survey 2000, 2002-2005: Most Important Issues in Japan-North Korea Relations. (Lynn, 2006: 496). 47 Arrington, 2013: 129. 48 Weston S. Konishi, “Washington Japanwatch / Japan Stuck on Abduction Issue,” Daily Yomiuri Online, (30 August 2005).

15 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 issue is chosen as a political agenda by the politicians, and there were Japanese Diet members who took full advantage of anti-North Korean public sentiments and attempted to exert their influence over North Korea policy.49 Rachi Giren (Parliamentary League for Early Repatriation of Japanese Citizens Kidnapped by North Korea), comprising a nonpartisan groups of more than 200 Diet members, ensured “the abductions issue remains on the legislative agenda by lobbying their parliamentary colleagues to pass resolutions, issuing declarations,” closely working with other two major organizations, Kazokukai and Sukuukai.50 With serious role conflicts between the Diet and Cabinet, MOFA and Koizumi lost the momentum on North Korea policy, but Koizumi himself and a few politicians were still interested in following through on the agreement of the Pyongyang Declaration.51 The role conception of diplomatically independent state was inevitably hijacked by domestic role expectations which called for the Japanese government to primarily become a ‘problem solver’ of the abduction issues. Japan’s foreign policy vis-à-vis North Korea and consequently its position in the Six-Party Talks showed that Japan was apparently tilting toward ego-based role, oriented toward its domestic population. Though Koizumi, in the midst of the difficult political environment where hard-liners created a powerful political force, managed to coordinate Japan’s stance to bring about the September 19 Agreement in 2005 and pledged the financial support for the denuclearization process on the Korean peninsula,52 he was not able to make further contribution to the talks before his tenure ended in September 2006.

49 Izumikawa (2011) notes that In December 2002, targeting North Korean entity, hardliners “began to discuss introducing a bill to amend the Foreign Exchange and Trade Act (FETA) to enable Japanese government to unilaterally halt financial transactions.” 50 Williams and Mobrand, 2010: 516. Kazokukai is the association of the families of victims kidnapped by North Korea, and Sukuukai is a national association of several local groups throughout Japan with the objective of providing support for Kazokukai through a range of public relations and lobbying activities. Yet, two organizations disliked the way Japanese politicians exploited the abduction issues for their political gains but had no choice but to cooperate with them to expedite the return of the abductees. 51 Schoff, 2006: 18. 52 Weston S. Konishi, “Washington Japanwatch / Japan Stuck on Abduction Issue,” Daily Yomiuri Online, (30 August 2005). Koizumi himself was convinced that North Korea has a true intension to give up its nuclear program, and he was also deferring other states’ requests not to disrupt the SPT (Schoff, 2006: 18). Additionally, around the 4th round of the SPT, Japan was preoccupied with the issue of privatizing the Japan Postal Service Public Corporation over which Koizumi dissolved the House of Representatives and threw out for the general election conducted on 11 September 2005.

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It is important to note Koizumi was the first Prime Minister who was elected not by a factional base but by public support.53 With pledges to expedite political as well as economical reforms, Koizumi’s new Cabinet enjoyed unprecedented levels of public approval rating.54 His exceptional personal public statue allowed him to include in the Cabinet only his trusted followers and to ignore the traditional practice of giving representation to the LDP’s factional balance.55 In other terms, Koizumi’s reform- oriented and pro-engagement approach was only shared by a handful of people inside the Cabinet. Facing resistance from parliamentary majorities and Japanese voters, it was literally impossible for Koizumi to uphold his grand strategy to change the fundamentals of the bilateral relationship with Pyongyang through normalization. Koizumi’s penchant for expanding Japan’s influence over the Korean peninsula through normalizing the relations with Pyongyang eventually ended up curtailing its role.

4.4. Abduction Diplomacy Abe Shinzo who was elected as Prime Minister in September 2006 to succeed Koizumi pursued a decidedly tougher policy towards North Korea. Mr. Abe became popular in 2002 when his uncompromising position on the abduction issue during the Japan-North Korea summit in Pyongyang was known to Japanese public,56 and his assertive stance toward North Korea was well known prior to his assuming office. Abe fundamentally proposed “creating a strong and trusted Japan pursuing assertive diplomacy”, but because public support for his ascension to Prime Minister was mainly garnered by one such issue – North Korean abduction of Japanese citizens,57 inevitably his role conception was heavily coloured by the state’s duty to resolve the abduction issue, which reinforced the existing foreign policy stance already set to move away from the organized others. It was Japanese diplomats directly engaged in the SPT who struggled the most

53 Keizo Nabeshima, “It’s Koizumi vs. the LDP,” Japan Times, (4 May 2001). 54 Keizo Nabeshima, “It’s Koizumi vs. the LDP,” Japan Times, (4 May 2001). 55 Miyagi, 2009: 8. 56 Edstrom, 2007: 26. 57 Edstrom, 2007: 36.

17 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 between two different role conceptions: a responsible international actor to resolve the imminent security issue in the region versus a state representative to call for global attention on Japan’s domestic concern.58 Yet, none of them dared to publicly go against the role conception of abduction problem solver, due to strong emotions swirling all over Japan attached to abduction issues.59 Showing its determinacy to the Japanese voters, Japan refused to give its portion of heavy fuel oil to North Korea as a part of February 13 Action Plan until the abduction issue would be solved.60 Not to mention, Abe’s abduction policy conflicted with Beijing’s effort to successfully implement the 13 February agreement, Seoul’s Peace and Prosperity policy, and Washington’s engaging stance. Particularly the serious gap between the US and Japan emerged when the US agreed to negotiate a process of removing North Korea from the list of states sponsoring terrorism under the February 13 Action Plan. Since the North Korea’s kidnapping was a key factor in Washington’s designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism,61 the terrorism list was a strong leverage for Japan in its negotiations with North Korea. Japan became increasingly frustrated by the Bush administration’s position to delink the issue of North Korea’s kidnapping of Japanese citizens from that of removing North Korea from the terrorism list.62 When Fukuda replaced Abe as Prime Minister in September 2007, he appeared to direct Japanese foreign policy towards the organized others of the SPT. In his October policy address to the Diet, Fukuda stated: “The resolution of issues related to the Korean Peninsula is indispensable for peace and stability in Asia. For the denuclearization of North Korea, we will further strengthen coordination with the international community, through for such as the SPT. The abduction issue is a serious human rights issue. We will exert our maximum efforts to realize the earliest return of all the abductees, settle the ‘unfortunate past’, and normalize the relations between Japan and

58 Though MOFA people acknowledged North Korea’s abduction of Japanese was not a relevant issue to discuss in the SPT, they had no choice but to raise the abduction problem during the course of the SPT due to domestic pressures. (Interviews with researchers in the Korea Division of MOFA in October 2013). 59 Author’s interview with Masao Okonogi, (October 2013). 60 Haruki, 2009. 61 Niksch, 2007: 5. 62 Niksch, 2007: 2.

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North Korea.”63 Bilateral negotiations were held in 2008 and produced an agreement in which North Korea would reinvestigate the abducted victims while Japan promised to lift the prohibition on visits by North Korean government officials and the ban on charter flights. However, when this agreement was made public in Japan, public reactions was so strong that the government needed to retreat and make the results of North Korea’s re-examination of abducted victims a pre-condition for its fulfilment. The agreement broke down when North Korea noted the changes in Japan’s stance.64 As the abduction narrative, which had been subdued by North Korea’s conventional military threat but swerved by Koizumi’s first visit to Pyongyang in 2002 and reinforced by the Abe administration, prevailed in Japan’s domestic circles, its foreign policy appeared to be held hostage to domestic politics. At every round of the SPT, Japanese delegates included statements about the abductions in their opening statements.65 It was no secret other member states complained anonymously, if not directly, about Japan’s preoccupation with the abduction issue over more serious security threat of North Korean illicit nuclear programs. Yoshihide Soeya at Keio University said: “The abduction issue is of course important for Japan, or for that matter, for any democracy … The problem for Japan is not making the abduction an important issue, but rather is a failure to place the issue in a more comprehensive framework in dealing with North Korea and in the Six-Party Talks.”66 Japan’s abduction issues show, if not explicitly, how the politicians with typical nationalist agenda could constrain and complicate Japan’s diplomacy. By free-riding public anti-North Korea sentiments, the Japanese conservatives even confused Japan’s security profile in the Northeast Asian security landscape. As their role conception basically stems from their frustrations with the lack of ‘assertiveness’ in post-war Japanese diplomacy,67 Koizumi’s diplomatic agenda which was far more liberal than

63 Policy Speech by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda to the 168th Session of the Diet on1 October 2007. 64 Haruki, 2009. 65 Lynn, 2006: 206. 66 Soeya, 2009. 67 Soeya, 2009. New York Times correspondent Norimitsu Onishi summarizes that Japanese nationalist

19 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 that of traditional conservatives in fact generated serious role conflicts.68 Koizumi with his risk-taking and natural charisma buttressed by popularity managed not to be overwhelmed by anti-North Korea agenda by the hardliners, whereas the Abe government flared the nationalist sentiments, which eventually made Japan refuse to fund energy assistance for North Korean denuclearization by making the abductions a top foreign policy priority. Japan’s role-making of objecting to an aid package to North Korea without settlement of the abduction issue indeed ‘held up’ the negotiation process, but unlike conventional wisdom, its attempt was not forceful enough to cause other member states’ foreign policy reorientation and transform the social structure of the SPT. The Roh government of South Korea, while stressing its understanding of Japanese government’s position on the abductions, opposed raising the issue of Japanese abductees in the SPT, staunchly resisted the inclusion of the abduction issues in February 13 Action Plan, asseverating: “The Six-Party Talks should focus on North Korean nuclear issues. The nations concerned with the Six-Party Talks are not looking forward to set the abduction problem as a priority in the negotiations.”69 China was also in fact irritated by Japan’s hampering the SPT process by infuriating North Korea with the abduction issues,70 though it remained calm on the surface saying it understood Japan’s position on the abductions.71 Chinese leaders basically regard the issue of the Japanese abductees as a domestic problem for Japan, which should be dealt in bilateral arrangement not in a multilateral platform of the SPT.72 China made its stance explicit when it voted against the UN resolution which

politicians’ cherished goals have been to jettison the pacifist constitution, instil patriotism and moral values in schools. The title of his article is “Japan Rightists Fan Fury over North Korea Abductions,” (17 December 2006). 68 Yoshihide Soeya (2009) asserts though Koizumi is often misunderstood as a traditional nationalist due to his frequent visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, he is rather a liberal nationalist whose thinking and policy was far more progressive than usually believed. Given the fact that Koizumi had never visited the Yasukuni Shrine before becoming a Prime Minister, some observers interpret that Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was mainly his strategic move to consolidate the conservative support. 69 Xinhua News, “Roh: Japanese Abduction Not Proper to Be Discussed in Six-Party Talks,” (25 January 2007). 70 Author’s interview with a senior researcher in CIIS, Beijing, (February 2014). 71 Xinua News, “Premier expects to ‘melt ice’ during Japan tour, warns against shrine visits,” (4 April 2007). 72 Author’s interview with a senior researcher in CIIS, Beijing, (February 2014).

20 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 specifically addressed the abduction of foreigners within the context of human rights situation in North Korea.73 Though the US showed its support by cosponsoring the resolution with Japan, China and Russia voted against the resolution with South Korea abstaining from voting.74 As other participating members of the SPT all of whom had every reason not to lose the momentum to carve out the plan for resolving the North Korean nuclear issues, were reluctant to accentuate the abduction issues which were likely to undermine the negotiation with the North. The role collaboration between China, South Korea, Russia encouraged by the diplomatic shift in Washington after North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 efficiently blocked Japan’s role-making of internationalizing the abduction issues with its claim that North Korea’s kidnapping of Japanese citizens were acts of ‘terrorism’. Without making any progress, the prominence of the abduction issue gradually diminished from the Japanese domestic political agenda, as consecutive Japanese administrations, after Abe Shinzo’s troubled year-old government, all experienced internal instability with weak leadership, which consequently resulted in weak and ambiguous role conceptions to address not only the abduction issue but also any foreign affairs.

5. Inter-Korean Summit 2007 Contrary to Japan’s backward step, South Korea accelerated its process of engagement with North Korea as the momentum picked up by improved US-DPRK relations. On 2 October 2007, the world once again witnessed the leaders of the two Koreas shaking their hands. It was an event in the continuum of the Roh government’s persistent push for reconciliation with North Korea. As the February 13 Action Plan brings the U.S. incentives of North Korea’s access to international financing and diplomatic relations with the U.S. to the negotiation table, President Roh Moo-hyun was able to “add a strong North-South auxiliary engine to the denuclearization drive.”75 The 2007 inter-

73 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. (19 December 2006). 74 Hisane Masaki, “Japan’s 2006 diplomacy,” World Security Network, (8 January 2006). The resolution was passed by a vote of 88 to 21 with 60 abstentions. 75 Stephen Costello, “2007 Summit to Highlight Smart Engagement Agenda,” Korea Times, (27 September

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Korean summit indicates the resilience of the role conception of the Roh government from the day Roh Moo-hyun took the office under unpropitious domestic conditions and regional challenges.

5.1. Roh’s Peace and Prosperity Policy As to North Korea policy, Roh Moo-hyun was basically inheriting the precedent Kim Dae-jung government’s Sunshine policy “which sought to lead North Korea down a path towards peace, reform and opening through reconciliation, interaction and cooperation with the South.”76 While maintaining the general framework of the Sunshine policy, Roh outlined his new North Korea policy of Peace and Prosperity to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis and to achieve peace in Northeast Asia: 1) promote regular talks between leaders of two Koreas; 2) expand inter-Korean cooperation; 3) replace the armistice agreement with a declaration of peace. Though the Roh government put inter-Korean policy, regional policy and US-ROK alliance into one basket, it made ‘reconciliation with Pyongyang’ its top priority.77 For President Roh, the disarmament of North Korea was about the survival, peace, and prosperity of the Korean peninsula as a whole.78 He believed it is critical to create an environment of trust and inter-dependence to solve North Korean nuclear problem.79 The Roh government provided 400,000-500,000 tons of rice and 300,000-350,000 tons of fertilizers annually since 2002, while supporting the civilian and non- governmental organizations to give substantial amount of humanitarian assistance to North Korea.80 It reconnected the inter-Korean railway and a daily bus service from Seoul to Kaesong, where the special economic district, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), is located inside North Korea. KIC is an unprecedented inter-Korean

2007). 76 The Guardian, “Kim Dae-jung: South Korean president whose ‘sunshine policy’ tried to lead the North toward reform,” 18 August 2009. In his inaugural address, Roh outlined his new Peace and Prosperity Policy which will maintain the general framework of the Sunshine Policy while aiming at a more widespread national consensus and bipartisan cooperation, two areas that the previous Kim Dae-jung neglected. 77 Kim, Choong-nam, 2005: 13. 78 Stephen Costello, “2007 Summit to Highlight Smart Engagement Agenda,” Korea Times, (27 September 2007). 79 Pastrieich, 2005. 80 Lee, Sang-hyun, 2009: 87; Lee, Jong-moo, 2009: 126.

22 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 cooperation project that combines the capital and technology of South Korea with the land and workforce of North Korea.81 The Mt. Kumgang tour and development project which was launched with cruise ship under Kim Dae-jung government was expanded to the overland tours, being firmly on track with the number of tourists nearly 270,000 in 2004.82 Despite of the nuclear shadow casted on the peninsula, the industrial project expanded considerably and was moving forward more rapidly than expected.83 The Seoul-Shinuiju Line between Dorasan Station (South) and Kaesong (North) was completed in 2003, followed by construction of the East Coast Line from Ongjin (South) and Jeojin (North) in 2004, which became a springboard to boost the number of South Korean tourists visiting Mt. Kumgang.84 The Roh government was determined to further the engagement process, basically eschewing the use of coercive measures to address North Korean issues including the Kim regime’s nuclear weapons program. The US was concerned if North Korea’s revenue from inter-Korean cooperation projects would only sustain the Kim Jong-il regime while failing to achieve denuclearization.85 Though the Roh government acknowledged the friction between Seoul and Washington, Roh Moo-hyun and his Cabinet had strong confidence that inter-Korean economic cooperation would facilitate reform in North Korea.86 This role conception was largely shared by the South Korean public, creating a domestic environment conducive to diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang.

5.1. Public Opinion on Roh’s North Korea Policy The Roh government was persistent in its inter-Korean reconciliation efforts and was

81 White Papers on Korean Unification, 2005, p. 75. http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/index.do?menuCd=DOM_000000204001001000. 82 White Papers on Korean Unification, 2005, p. 69. http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/index.do?menuCd=DOM_000000204001001000. 83 White Papers on Korean Unification (통일백서) in Korean, 2007, p. 121. http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.do?menuCd=DOM_000000105003005002. 84 Kang, 2003: 11. 85 Lim, 2007: 140 86 Lim, 2007: 140

23 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 successful in reducing further the already declining sense of a North Korea threat inside South Korea. The image of North Korea as South Korea’s archenemy shifted into that of a compatriot to be embraced and engaged by the South.87 According to the poll conducted by Korean General Social Survey, the majority of South Korean population consistently saw the North Korea in a positive light during the Roh government and even after the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak.

[Table 1] How do you identify North Korea?

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 One to be helped 20.8 19.9 16.4 18.0 20.5 19.2 One to cooperate with 36.6 38.8 42.8 37.3 39.5 35.2 One to be heeded 29.5 30.0 26.7 31.7 28.5 33.4 One to be antagonized 9.1 8.3 9.1 10.5 9.7 10.5 Do not know 4.0 3.0 5.0 2.5 1.7 1.7 Source: Korean General Social Survey

It was the fruit of the engagement policy toward North Korea, proactively initiated and maintained by two progressive governments. Some Korea observers blamed South Koreans’ security insensitivity, but significant reduction in threat perceptions of South Koreans was rather because of increase in public tolerance based on the “compatriot aspects of the inter-Korean relationship” appealed by both the Kim Dae- jung and the Roh Moo-hyun governments.88 Not to mention, two inter-Korean summits, favorable responses to the tourism projects, along with the new Internet-based liberal media propagating inter-Korean rapprochement and cooperation, encouraged South Korean public to embrace the ‘we’ identity as to North Korea.89 Amid improving inter-Korean relations, the government was even able to delete the term ‘main enemy’ which had been used to define North

87 Kim C.N., 2005: 9. 88 Heo & Woo, 2007: 196 in Roehrig. 89 Son, 2007.

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Korea for many years from its defense white paper.90 Paik Nak-chung, emeritus professor at Seoul National University, asserts that the spirit of June 15 Joint Declaration of the inter-Korean summit in 2000 has fundamentally changed the social structure of South Korea which could not be easily eradicated.91 With the rapid development of inter-Korean relations, South Koreans started to perceive the Bush administration’s uncompromising policy against North Korea undermines South Korean government’s engagement efforts toward Pyongyang.92 President Bush’s harsh rhetoric and unilateral policy against North Korea raised strong anti-American sentiment in South Korea,93 which manifested in an early 2004 poll showing “46% of South Koreans saw the U.S. as the main obstacle to Korean reunification, compared to 27% who name North Korea.”94 Another opinion poll conducted in 2005 showed 45 percent of South Korean citizens believe inter-Korean cooperation must precede U.S.-South Korea alliance, while 39 percent believe the contrary.95 According to Choong-nam Kim, a Korean security specialist: “The Bush administration appears concerned that the improvement in South- North Korean relations might divert international attention from the issue of North Korean weapons of mass destruction. Seoul was providing a life-support system to Pyongyang, which was allegedly supporting the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. Washington tends to believe that the South’s engagement policy toward North Korea undermines whatever leverage the U.S.

90 Pressian, “국방부, 국방백서 ‘주적’ 표현 10년 만에 삭제 (Department of Defence, removed the term ‘main enemy’ from Defence White Paper),” (28 January 2005). 91 Paik Nak-chung, “[백낙청] 천안함 진실규명, 민주주의 회복 – 남북관계 개선의 결정적 고리 (Truth finding of Cheonan warship and recovery of democracy are the key for the improvement of inter-Korean relations),” Pressian, (10 June 2010). 92 Sheen, 2003. 93 The surge of anti-Americanism with increasing public discontent with U.S. Force in South Korea and growing mistrust about the U.S. North Korea policy in fact heavily influenced the presidential election of 2002. The victory of Roh Moo-hyun over more conservative candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, was largely attributed to the fact that Roh vowed to seek more independent and mature relationship with the U.S. 94 Korea Times, “6 in 10 Koreans back U.S. military presence; nearly half say U.S. biggest barrier to Unification,” (23 February 2004). 95 Wolgan Joongang (Monthly Joongang), (April 2005), pp. 8-9.

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might have had in negotiation with the North.”96 These US concerns were ameliorated by the Roh government’s slowing down its engagement process, in the face of mounting pressure from international community after North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006. Overall, the Roh government managed to implement its North Korea policy without a major impediment prior to North Korea nuclear test in 2006, mainly buttressed by the increasingly positive attitude of South Korean people toward North Korea. However, despite its clear and strong role conception, the Roh government was not truly able to pursue its North Korea policy as much as it wished to. The mistrust from the North Korean government was part of the reason,97 but basically the existing domestic power structure of South Korea did not favour him or his policies.

5.2. Relinquished Role as Balancer In his inaugural speech in 2003, Roh Moo-hyum elucidated the desirable role conception of South Korea as a ‘peace maker’.98 Under the title of “An age of Northeast Asia begins: a new takeoff toward an age of peace and prosperity,” he showed his determination to establish permanent peace on the Korean peninsula and promoting common prosperity in Northeast Asia. He stated, “We have to change the peninsula into a land that sends out messages of peace that connects the Eurasian landmass with the Pacific Ocean.” Roh’s Presidential Transition Team in fact prepared several Silk Road development programs such as linking the trans-Korean railway with the Trans-Siberian Railway and building oil and gas pipelines from Russia through North Korea, expecting the project would promote regional economic development while integrating North Korea to the outside world.99 Having confidence as well as feelings of urgency through the experience of the SPT, his desirable role conception regarding Korean/regional security was more strategically defined as a ‘balancer in the Northeast Asia’. In February 2005, President

96 Kim, Choong-nam, 2005: 10. 97 Norimitsu Onish, “Pledging peace, Koreans agree on economic projects,” New York Times, (4 October 2007). 98 Sheen, 2008: 103 in Rozman. 99 Kim Choong-nam, 2005: 14.

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Roh stated, “Our military should be one with the right to operate independently to serve as a ‘balancer’ in Northeast Asia.” In his speech at the Korea Air Force Academy in March 2005, President Roh elaborated in more details: “South Korea will not allow U.S. troops in Korea to become involved in any dispute in Northeast Asia without the consent of the South Korean government. Our people will not get entangled in regional disputes against our will in the future.” He continued that South Korea would begin to play a ‘balancing role’ in Northeast Asia and added that “the power equation in Northeast Asia will change depending on the choices we make.” Rhyu Si-min, the then Minister of Health and Welfare and one of the closest aides of Roh Moo-hyun, recollects the time when the tension was rapidly mounting between the US and the DPRK around the year of 2003, saying: “At that time, President Roh’s biggest concern was there was not much the president of South Korea could do, even though it was when the situation could have erupted to a war and had tremendous effects on people in the Korean peninsula. Since then, he believed it would be important for Seoul to have a leadership role in safeguarding the peace and stability on the Korean peninsula by constructively managing any undesirable emergencies or crises. The strategic interest for being a ‘balancer’ was how to seize the upper hand regarding the security issues of Korea as well as of the Northeast Asia region.”100 Lee Jong-seok, the Minister of Unification and chairman of the National Security Council under the Roh government, who was directly involved in developing the concept, explains the role conception of a ‘balancer’ in a broader term: “The balancing role did not mean to balance the power between the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia. The core essence of the ‘balancer’ theory was to play the primary role in balancing competing demands and interests of the great powers on the Korean peninsula with great flexibility. It was also about balancing between international values and national interest, alliances and multilateral cooperation, and globalization and national identity. It was rather a diplomatic

100 Pressian, “유시민 “한국이 피난민 정서 벗어나야 남북화해 가능 (Rhyu Si-min: North-South rapprochement is possible when Korea strips off its ‘refugee sentiment’),” (18 November 2013).

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vision to pursue than a foreign policy to be implemented with detailed plans.”101 However, the Roh government never had a chance to properly introduce its role conception to the public, because the majority of South Korean politicians were reluctant to approve Roh’s desired role of a ‘balancer’. The conservative politicians and media harshly criticized the concept by branding it as a ‘pro-China and anti- America’ policy.102 Han Hwa-gap, president of the Millennium Democratic Party, reproved that the Roh government’s vision of playing a balancing role ignored the geopolitical reality of Northeast Asia and urged the government to solely focus on resolving the North Korean nuclear issues.103 Even the ruling party doubted if the South Korea government had the capacity to play the balancing role and advised to replace it with a ‘confidence-builder’ instead.104 Generally the South Korea elites were skeptical whether it would be feasible for South Korea to be an independent actor in the Northeast Asia region. They trusted the strong US-ROK alliance was the only option they could rely on for national defense and security. This attitude was explicitly shown when the issue of the wartime operational control (OPCON) arose, when President Roh Moo-hyun proposed the transfer of OPCON from the US to ROK in 2007. For the Roh government, it was about restoring sovereignty and achieving full autonomy for the ROK military. 105 However, conservative politicians and military generals largely interpreted as South Korea’s abandonment of the United States, accusing President Roh of mishandling of the US- ROK alliance. Washington’s understanding was not too different from South Korean conservatives. Especially, as Washington has pursued a double-edged strategy toward China – a combination of containment and engagement, the Roh government’s strategic move to be a more independent actor was interpreted as the South Korean government’s intent

101 Author’s interview with Lee Jong-seok, (January 2014). 102 Hankyoreh, “‘동북아 균형자론’ 국회서 뭇매 (The Concept of the Balancer Harshly Criticized in the Parliament),” (12 April 2005). 103 Han Hwa-gap, “기로에 선 한반도 (The Korean Peninsula on the Crossroads),” Speech at Chonnam University, (21 April 2005). 104 Hankyoreh, “‘동북아 균형자론’ 국회서 뭇매 (The Concept of the Balancer Harshly Criticized in the Parliament),” (12 April 2005). 105 Su, 2011: 160.

28 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 to undervalue the 60 year-old US-ROK alliance (Lee, 2014: 368).106 Richard Lawless, U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defence, lambasted that: “Korea’s Northeast Asian balancer role is a concept that cannot coexist with the Korea-U.S. alliance. If you would like to change the alliance, say so anytime. We will do as you like.”107 As Roh’s role conception of a balancer touched the complicated dynamics of the US- ROK alliance and appeared to undermine the existing role conception of America’s close ally, it was denied before getting developed into plans. However, the Roh government never gave up its role conception to become a primary actor in solving the North Korean nuclear issues and bringing about the peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The opportunity was created in Roh’s final year in office.

5.4. Inter-Korean Summit 2007 Due to a serious strain in relations between Washington and Pyongyang, which resulted in a series of provocations by the North, it was difficult for the Roh government to advance its cause. Certainly the Bush administration’s decision to commit to diplomacy to resolve the North Korea nuclear impasse and the action plan agreed between the US and the DPRK in February generated a positive momentum for the Roh government to actively pursue the inter-Korean summit. The Blue House started to actively prepare for the inter-Korean summit which was Roh Moo-hyun’s long-held dream since his inauguration.108 The Roh government seized a chance for its first serious role-making to lay out the plans for a lasting peace regime in the Korean peninsula. The outcome of the summit 2007, the October 4th “Declaration on the Advancement

106 In the geopolitical terms employed by American academics, ‘balancer’ refers to an attempt of lesser powers to form alliances to counterbalance American global influence. Thus the Roh government’s intent to play a balancing role was ill-received, since it was interpreted as an attempt to balance against the US by cooperating with China and Russia (Pastrieich, 2005). 107 Chosun Ilbo, “U.S. Keeps Grumbling As Summit Looms,” 9 June 2005. 108 Author’s interview with Lee Jong-suk, the former Minister of Unification and chairman of the National Security Council (NSC), (January 2014). Critics argued that the summit was hastily arranged to give the progressive party an electoral boost, but Roh’s advisers brushed the criticism aside, saying Roh Moo-hyun was eager to fulfil his presidential campaign pledge of reaching a peace pact with the North.

29 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 of South-North Korean Relations, Peace, and Prosperity”, showed the desire of the two Koreas to “reduce tensions and increase diplomatic, commercial, and cultural contact.”109 The most successful area of the summit was that two Koreas agreed to establish a Special Peace and Cooperation Zone in the West Sea as a part of peace- building efforts. By designating a joint fishing zone and maritime peace zone, two Koreas attempted to prevent accidental naval clashes and expand economic cooperation in their West Sea adjourning waters. Furthermore, two Koreas planned to create a new special economic zone in the vicinity of Haeju, so civilian vessels could travel directly from the South Korean coast to the North Korean port of Haeju.110 With regard to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, the South and the North have agreed to work together to implement smoothly the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement and the 13 February 2007 Action Plan achieved in the SPT. The Roh government, acutely aware of the uncertainty in the Northeast Asia region due to various contentious bilateral relations between regional actors, believed in détente on the Korean peninsula through the assertive role played by two Koreas could be the linchpin to “move the region as a whole toward stable peace and integration.”111 Aidan Foster-Carter, a long-time North Korea watcher, evaluated 2007 summit declaration as “a ground-breaking and wide-ranging agreement, full of potential long- term mutual benefit”.112 Foster-Carter said the new accord presented a real transition from “one-way aid with little reciprocity” to “genuine cooperation”.113 Despite all these promising elements, the Roh government’s role-making was not well accepted. The discontent from the conservative camp in Seoul complained that the Joint Declaration did not sufficiently raise the key issue of the denuclearization agenda. The US conservatives expressed their uneasiness toward inter-Korean summit, arguing the Roh government was eager to provide concessions when North Korea had not

109 Lee & Quellette, 2007. 110 Korea Herald, “Haeju in N.K. Seems Playing Bigger Role,” 16 October 2007. 111 Lee & Quellette, 2007. 112 Aidan Foster-Carter, “Scrapping the Second Summit: Lee Myung Bak’s Fateful Mis-step,” 38 North, (20 January 2011). 113 Aidan Foster-Carter, “Scrapping the Second Summit: Lee Myung Bak’s Fateful Mis-step,” 38 North, (20 January 2011).

30 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 progressed sufficiently in its denuclearization commitment.114 Nevertheless, President Roh comported himself with the actions. After the summit in October 2007, North-South intercourse became so dense and intensive. On 16 November 2007, two Koreas’ prime ministers met and signed the unprecedented accord with dense specificity: 8 chapters, 4 clauses, and over 20 deadlines to meet again on specific issues.115 On 24 November, 200 tons of graphite under a $10 million North-South joint venture near Haeju arrived by ship at Incheon. 500 tons of zinc followed on 13 December as Pyongyang’s first payment for Seoul’s sending raw materials worth $80 million for Northern light industries under the North-South cooperation projects of the underground resources development.116 Unfortunately, most of the inter-Korean cooperative projects were withheld when Lee Myung-bak was elected on 19 December 2007. Lee’s Transition Committee asked the Ministry of Unification to slow down the inter-Korean projects, like the Haeju peace zone and Anbyon shipyard, pending their review. The newly elected president criticized the 2007 summit and announced that his administration would review their implementation “from the perspective of feasibility, fiscal burdens on the people and the national consensus.”117 With a totally different policy on North Korea, the inter- Korean relations started to stiffen more than ever before.

6. Discussion The unfolding drama in Northeast Asia around the time when the February 13 Action Plan was signed shows how proactively Japan and South Korea, the middle powers, sought to change or reinforce the social structure of the SPT. From their role-makings, we find the Koizumi and the Roh governments shared the similar role conception – a

114 Klingner, 2007. They understood Roh’s proactive North Korea policy as a political manoeuvre to secure a personal legacy and to alter domestic political landscape to benefit the progressive presidential candidate (Klingner, 2007). 115 Aidan Foster-Carter, “Scrapping the Second Summit: Lee Myung Bak’s Fateful Mis-step,” 38 North, (20 January 2011). 116 Minjog21, “개성에서 부산으로 물류혁명 첫 걸음 뗐다 (From Kaesung to Pusan: Revolution in Distribution),” (1 January 2008). 117 Aidan Foster-Carter, “Scrapping the Second Summit: Lee Myung Bak’s Fateful Mis-step,” 38 North, (20 January 2011).

31 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 state with an ability to practice an autonomous diplomacy. However, different domestic constraints – role expectations – limited both governments from implementing their desired role conceptions. The role expectation of a state concerning the welfare of its citizens overrode any other role conceptions in Japan stymied the Japanese leaders to take initiatives to transform the social structure of the SPT for their domestic political prestige. Though the SPT worked as a constraining factor, making Japan drawn to the negotiating table due to commitments in the agreements (September 2005, February 2007), its obstructing stance due to the abduction issue has affected Japan’s ability to act in concert with the other member states of the SPT,118 and more critically made Japan to play a largely circumstantial role in strategic terms.119 The Roh government of South Korea similarly experienced domestic constraints during its term to successfully implement its role conception as a peace maker/balancer. Interestingly the myriads of collateral restraints did not come from the issues directly related to North Korea but more generally from bureaucratic resistance to Roh Moo-hyun’s reform initiatives. The episodes found the Roh government’s role conception was deeply rooted in its desire to be a dominant player regarding the peninsula issues. However, when it was not clearly defined, if not wrongly, and interpreted as a policy direction to undermine the incontestable role – a key American ally, it had to face the barrage of criticism from both the Korean society and Washington. Roh’s another role conception as a successor of the Sunshine policy was resilient enough to survive 2006 North Korea’s nuclear test which in fact generated a positive momentum to resume the SPT. The Roh government went further than leading the working group under the February Action Plan and arranged the inter-Korean summit to expedite the process with ardent desire to start building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula. Both Kim Jong-il and Roh Moo-hyun shared their understanding on peace-building efforts, seeking to reduce mutual mistrust by expanding communication arrangements and to enhance economic integration by promoting

118 Auslin, 2010: 200. 119 Okano-Hijmans, 2008.

32 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 various projects. Despite their little success in changing the social structure of the SPT as they intended, Japan’s and South Korea’s foreign policy practices within the multilateral security arrangement were to a great extent different from what most realists or even liberalists would assume. If following the basic premises of realism, South Korean and Japan being constrained by similar external forces, were supposed to show similar foreign policy patterns regardless of their different national interests and preferences. Under the structural realist paradigm which is most commonly employed to explain Northeast Asian states’ foreign policy, Japan and South Korea, as mere middle powers, are deemed to have no choice but assume the roles that are ascribed by the international system which equilibrium can only be changed through redistribution of power between great powers. Given the overall pictures of Japanese and South Korean approaches toward North Korea within the SPT, it becomes apparent that we cannot treat states as ‘black boxes’. Domestic politics and ideational factors, particularly domestic institutions and elite perceptions of the surrounding environment and national interests, did matter in state leaders’ foreign policy decision making in South Korea and Japan. If the foreign policy practices by South Korea and Japan governments throughout the nuclear disarmament talks were seen passive and reactive, as shown by this study, it was rather because both governments were restrained by domestic factors than international systematic arrangements. However, opening the black boxes is not sufficient to generate convincing foreign policy prescription and possible prediction. It must be able to explain not only what constitutes domestic/international factors that might compete for a state’s foreign policy but also why and how the state changes its course at particular times. For a comprehensive understanding of states’ foreign policy, foreign policy decisions as well as outcomes of the policy and interactions between the states which may generate structural effects must be studied, and it becomes a widely accepted fact that it can hardly be done with any single conventional paradigm of international relations. By effectively synthesizing crucial factors from each paradigm, we can usefully

33 ISA Global South Caucus Conference 2015 understand the states’ foreign policy behaviours and their interactions, and the Interactionist Role Theory shows the possibility of being a more robust tool to analyze the process of states’ foreign policy changes. By identifying the state’s salient role conceptions, the researcher may identify material/ideational elements from domestic/international levels that prove decisive in forming foreign policy decisions; co-constitution of agents and structures can also be defined by tracing the course of the particular government’s role-making and counter roles that counterparts would take to either collaborate or challenge.

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