CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE

Mexico’s Policy Cycles:

Similarities and Differences in Policy Cycles of President Enrique Peña Nieto’s Neoliberal

Model with President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s Neostructural Model

A graduate project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Master of Political Science

By Francisco Magaña-Huanosto

August 2020 The graduate project of Francisco Magaña-Huanosto is approved:

______

Dr. Linda Alvarez Date

______

Dr. Boris Ricks Date

______

Dr. Maria R Garcia-Acevedo Chair Date

California State University Northridge

ii Dedication

Dedico esta tesis y todo mi esfuerzo para mi familia, quienes me han apoyado hoy y siempre.

Los quiero mucho.

This thesis and everything I do is dedicated to my family, who have supported me today and for- ever. I love you.

iii Table of Content

Signature Page ii

Dedication iii

Table of Content iv

Abstract v

Section 1: Introduction 1

Section 2: Literature Review 5

- 5

- Neostructuralism 9

- Policy Cycles 11

Section 3: EPN: Neoliberal Model and the PRI Regime 2012-2018 17

Section 4: AMLO: Neostructual Model and the Regime:

- The First Two Years 28

Conclusion 38

Bibliography 42

iv Abstract

Mexico’s Policy Cycles:

Similarities and Differences in Policy Cycles of President Enrique Peña Nieto’s Neoliberal

Model with President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s Neostructural Model

By Francisco Magaña-Huanosto

Master of Political Science

Like the sun rises and sets to signify a new day and the end of the night, policy cycles, follow the same pattern. One cycle will rise as the leading and dominating factor but will end when a new cycle begins. In the case of Mexico, the regime of ex-President Enrique Peña Nieto’s (EPN) term came to an end December 2018 and a new one rose after the inauguration of President Andres

Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) as its leader. This new cycle allows President AMLO (or any other democratic leader) to change any previous work from the last administration and introduce his own agenda. This paper will discuss the neostructuralist stand of President AMLO in light of the review of certain policies on: free trade, investment, government involvement in the econo- my and social welfare policies implemented during the first twenty months of his regime (De- cember 2018 - July 2020). As a comparison, the same set of policies will be reviewed during the neoliberal administration of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). As President AMLO only encom- passed twenty months of his presidential term.

v INTRODUCTION

In political science, presidential terms in democratic countries are crucial puzzles. They may also be a perfect time for elected officials to accomplish promises, and design and imple- ment specific policies that they elected officials consider right for the country. After the electoral process, and the inauguration of a presidential term, the sitting president has the opportunity to continue what their predecessor started or opt to commence a new route. Frequently, successors from the same share similar ideologies as their predecessor, thus facilitating the shift. But a policy cycle gets more complex when a new president, from a different political party is elected. In this scenario, a new president can keep certain tendencies from the predecessor or pursue different ideologies and agendas.

Latin America experienced one of the most iconic and memorable changes in presidential power two years ago. It took place in Mexico, in the summer of 2018. On July 1st, 2018, history was made when the results of the election became official. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador

(AMLO) was declared president elect with 30.11 million votes, a 53.19% of the votes (Navarro,

2018).

It is important to note that in Mexico, there exists a single term presidency that lasts for six years (sexenio) and the president is ineligible for re-election, as explicitly stated by the Mexi- can Constitution. The votes are casted on the first Sunday of July every six years, but the inaugu- ration takes place until the first of December, four months later. Also, it is pertinent to remember

1 that Mexico has experienced different series of events that may repeat themselves throughout time. For instance, the election of the presidential candidates of the PRI was a pattern that seemed unbreakable for about seventy years. A reoccurring event that has been noted in Mexico for at least thirty years, is the practice of neoliberalism. Since the late 1980s, Mexico has adopted a neoliberal economic model (that will be defined in the following section). Interestingly, in the political canning of 2018 AMLO challenged it. He did make clear his rejection to neoliberalism announcing a different approach to lead.

In 2018, Mexico shifted the power from the leading, traditional political party, Partido

Revolucionario Institucional, (PRI) to the young political party, Movimiento Regeneracion Na- cional (MORENA). Before that, the PRI was the dominant political party from 1929 to 2000 at the time, and then it was defeated by the Partido Accion Nacional, (PAN) that was in power for the following twelve years (2000-2012) The PRI regained the presidency in 2012 to 2018, with the election of Enrique Peña Nieto.

Now that Peña Nieto has left the office, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, (AMLO) has consolidated his power with new ideas and a novel constituency to drive the country forward.

During his campaign trail, AMLO announced a different approach to lead. He did make clear his rejection to neoliberalism, a model practiced in Mexico for about thirty years (since the late

1980s). Although AMLO has not truly defined the name of the new model that he has sponsored, it is argued that this project may be connected to neostructuralism which will be defined in the

2 project.

This paper will research the presidencies of Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) and Andres

Manuel Lopez Obrador (December 2018 to the present). The main purpose is to connect their similarities and differences in light of neoliberalism and neostructuralism, in order to assess whether or not President AMLO has, in fact, implemented a new political agenda different from neoliberalism or has he begun new policies? For this purpose, it will be useful to examine key policies, including free trade, government interventions and particularly, social welfare policies.

Then, the continuities and changes that have characterized President AMLO’s administration in comparison to EPN’s regime, (regarding the previous mentioned policies) will be reviewed. A final reflection will be related to the novel challenges of his administration, including the negative impact of COVID-19.

The hypothesis posed in this paper is:

President AMLO has supported an alternative agenda to the neoliberal policies implemented by the previous administration EPN. He has a new approach in the areas of free trade government participation, and social welfare policies that can be labeled as neostructuralism. His success in fulfilling his promises is linked: (a) to the capacity of his government to overcome the burden of the unstable economy he inherited and (b) the success of his administration to implement novel (neostructrualist) policies in regards to free trade, government participation, and socioeconomic policies.

3 In the first section, this project will explore literature related to neoliberalism, the

President Peña Nieto administration’s implementation of neoliberalism in Mexico. It also will review the key premises of neostructuralism as the new alternative proposed by President

AMLO. Also, it will study critical literature on the importance of policy cycles in order to compare and contrast the administrations of EPN and AMLO. The second section concentrates on the certain traits of neoliberalism in Mexico, focusing on Enrique Peña Nieto’s term

(2012-2018) specifically on the areas of free trade, government participation in the economy and social welfare policies. The third section will examine President AMLO neostructuralist agenda, focusing on the same areas in order to be able to generate a comparison between the regimes of

EPN and AMLO. In conclusion, the hypothesis will be revised and the differences between the two presidencies will be highlighted along with the future challenges of the young presidency of

President AMLO that will certainly require future studies.

4 LITERATURE REVIEW

Neoliberalism

The review of literature refers to the fundamental traits of neoliberalism, neostructuralism and policy cycles. For Torres and Schugurensky, free markets would be fundamental for human and economic growth. They said that neoliberalism is the response to globalization, since global- ization has been defined as the intensification of world social relations which links other locali- ties many miles away (Torres & Schugurensky, 2002). Neoliberalism changes the dynamics of globalization. This ideology and set of policies hold less regulation, privatization, and flexible and free trade agreements (Torres & Schugurensky, 2002). Along the same lines, Kotz notes that neoliberalism has been adopted because the global economy has become much more open than it had been in the regulated capitalist era. At the end, neoliberalism has been presented as a path to growth for developing countries.

Edmond-Poli and Shirk consider that the practice of neoliberalism concentrates in pro- moting free markets in order to achieve economic development (Edmonds-Poli & Shirk, 2012).

According to Kotz, neoliberalism or free market (Kotz, 2015) means that the states role in regu- lating economic activity is limited, leaving market relations as the main regulators of economic activity by operating within the framework of the state (Kotz, 2015). Other scholars, such as

Gwynne and Kay (2004), add that neoliberal reforms normally emphasize more actions in the economy. This neoliberal economic reform package focuses on five main areas: fiscal manage- ment, macroeconomics, stability, privatization of state firms, labor markets and trade

5 liberalization (Gwynne & Kay, 2004). Also, according to these authors, neoliberalism is frequently in opposition of social policies and certain political reforms (Gwynne & Kay, 2004).

Edmonds, Shirk and Campbell, argue that the three prongs to neoliberalism: stabilization, structural adjustment and trade liberalization, (Edmonds - Poli & Shirk, 2012), (Campbell,

2005), will advocate for economic growth and democratic development. They support stabiliza- tion that refers to the tightening of money supply: structural adjustment understood as the lack of involvement from the government with the economy and trade liberalization as the final step, in which, it brings in foreign investment (Edmonds - Poli & Shirk, 2012).

Campbell states that there are three consistencies that correspond to neoliberalism. The first refers to the specific restrictions on certain behaviors of capital; the second to the macro- economic intervention policies to stimulate the economy; and the third to labour and other low profiled policies (Campbell, 2005). For Campbell, neoliberalism works by the deregulation and privatization that would allow the free market to strive. He also stressed that in the neoliberal ideology, markets and the environment can operate freely, with the persistence of government regulations (Campbell, 2005).

In Latin American countries, neoliberalism has been presented as the answer to combat poor economic growth throughout the years. For Gwynne and Kay, certain Latin American lead- ers (including Mexican) saw that neoliberalism may deliver results and have adopted it as an economic model. (Gwynne & Kay, 2000). However, Petras notes that neoliberalism in Latin

6 America can be associated with military regimes and the use of terror. For example, the Pinochet regime in the 1970s; although in other Latin American countries, neoliberal presidential candi- dates have prevailed by either being elected or reelected (Petras, 1997).

According to Petras, those Latin American countries who practice neoliberalism engage in privatization, global change and class structure like in Mexico (Petras, 1997). Petras and other scholars concur that there has not been a true development like neoliberals argue (Petras, 1997).

Since the late 1970s, most Latin American countries have adopted neoliberalism. The ideology passes through every president since the commencement of the regime, at times until mass revolt movements reject partially, or totally, the neoliberal political agenda the presidents have implemented in their country (Petras, 1997). In Gwynne and Kay (2004), discuss how neoliberal policies provide a framework to extricate Latin American economies (Gwynne & Kay, 2004).

Neoliberalism in Latin America, specifically in Mexico, has been practiced for about thirty years, and yet there has not been true development as proponents of neoliberalism argue. The institutions that derived from neoliberalism failed to broaden popular participation that halted development and economic growth (Gwynne & Kay, 2000).

Furthermore, they discussed, that their new leaders that have risen to power are against neoliberalism, arguing that this economic model has “ripped the heart out of democratization, turning what could have been an economic boom to a low intensity participation” (Gwynne &

Kay, 2000). In the same line, Kotz specifically states that in certain Latin American countries that adopted neoliberalism, nowadays there exist new leaders that would like to debunk it

7 (Kotz, 2015). President AMLO, for example, since his political campaign, has proposed to ignore the previous pattern of the neoliberal economic model and to begin a new phase for economic expansion. Essentially, Petras piece, also examines alternatives for neoliberalism in Latin

American states. One of them is neostructuralism that will be discussed in the next section.

In Mexico’s case, the literature has stated how the ideology of neoliberalism played a role in the continuous election of candidates from the PRI in Mexico at least from the 1980s to the

2000 and then from 2012 to 2018 (Camp, 2014). Neoliberalism, however, has been a major point of contention in Mexico. Those who oppose neoliberalism highlights the failed results of it, since it hinder on the poor in Mexico.

According to Petras, those Latin American countries who practice neoliberalism engage in privatization, global change and class structure like in Mexico (Petras, 1997). This ideology has been of importance to Mexico in terms of the election of presidential candidates from the

PRI party at least from the 1980s, to the 2000. Moreover, neoliberalism has prevailed in the era when two presidents from the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), Vicente Fox (2000-2006) and Fe- lipe Calderon (2006-2012) were elected (2000-2012). Yet, Mexico has struggled to grow by fol- lowing the neoliberal economic model. Levia mentions that the execution of neoliberalism has been the fundamental issue in explaining the Mexican crisis of the mid 1990s (Levia, 2008).

Scholars have also made the strongest criticism of neoliberalism as being unable to tackle the issue of poverty (Gwynne & Kay, 2000).

8 Neostructuralism

Neostructuralism has been seen by scholars and new leaders as a response to societal flows of the neoliberal economic model the country has implemented. It dates back to the debate and publications of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC) in the 1990s. Caldentay (2015), Bielschowsky (2008), and Levia (2008), all argue that neostruc- turalism opposes neoliberal thought in terms of its key features; stabilization, privatization and liberalization (Caldentay, 2015), as well as the fact that the state is the primary player for devel- opment and growth (Bielschowsky, 2008), and challenging the poor market-centric approach of neoliberalism (Levia, 2008). According to Caldentay (2015), the key premises of neostructural- ism are (i) acknowledgement of the power relation between the center and the periphery, (ii) economic development at every level, (iii) advocacy of regional and international development and structural change, and (iv) maintaining a strong state to improve the capabilities and well being of a society (Caldentay, 2015). In addition, according to Bielschowsky (2008), to achieve true development, there must be a change in production patterns with equity (Bielschowsky,

2008). This new ideology was meant to abandon neoliberalism and enter a new path of develop- ment (Bielschowsky, 2008). Finally, according to Levia (2008), by changing the social equity, development and aspiration of economic growth will follow (Levia, 2008). President AMLO has referenced neostructural ideas but has not fully claimed it as the true replacement for the neolib- eral economic model Mexico has had for the past thirty years. These overpowering themes of neostructuralism give more importance to the state rather than the government, and give more importance to the market force by giving the state governance of the market with strong

9 regulatory bodies (Gwynne & Kay, 2004). This ideology has been surfacing subtly with new presidents in Latin America who want change for their country by challenging the patterns with equity (Bielschowsky, 2008). It is meant for the state to have a greater concern for equity and property reduction (Gwynne & Kay, 2004). In the case of Mexico where President AMLO has challenged the previous model by hinting at aspects of neostructuralism to which he wishes to use to guide Mexico and replace the weak current model.

The literature on neostructuralism and Mexico is scarce. However, President AMLO con- tinuously reported, during his campaign, that he despises neoliberalism and alludes to neostruc- turalism. The hypothesis of this project is that President AMLO has referenced neostructual ideas in his agenda. He will reject or at least avoid the neoliberal economic model and lean more to- wards neostructuralism since it places more importance on the market, private enterprises, and foreign investment, all lead by the state (Gwynne & Kay, 2000). Levia has stressed that Latin

American neostructuralism can play the historical role of contributing to emplace a more effec- tive forms of stabilizing, legitimizing and regulating the status quo (Levia, 2008). Neoliberalism has been a part of Latin America for about thirty years but neostructuralist argue that their method is what would bring actual results and growth, believing that neostructuralism is the re- sponse to the way a country can solve their development problems (Caldentay, 2015). It may be difficult at first since President AMLO received a horrible economy (high unemployment rate, no economic growth, high corruption levels) but President AMLO believes that the practice of ne- oliberalism did not reach or fully encloses every one since the state is the true player for the

10 promotion of development. According to Bielschowsky (2008), for true results from neostructuralism, the state must be the strongest performer or else there will be low levels of investment in physics capital (Bielschowsky, 2008). Those promises along with others President

AMLO proposed, granted him the presidency. The Mexican citizens revolting, conducting strikes, saw President AMLO as the beacon of growth, therefore, claiming loyalty to him, from the campaign trail to the voting booth. President AMLO ensures Mexico that with a strong state and govern- ment are essential to improve the capabilities of the society (Caldentay, 2015).

There has been an unequal distribution of wealth and poverty throughout Mexico. Presi- dent AMLO has proposed different ways to tackle the economic issue. By following neostructu- alistic manners, the distribution wave can be maintained if the state production gains access to technology, education, labor and structural heterogeneity (Bielschowsky, 2008). Again, President

AMLO has not claimed that he subscribes to neostructuralism as his response to the previous model but has taken a different aspect. Neostructuralism has not been officially labeled by Presi- dent AMLO but his manner of governance implies it.

Policy Cycles

The policy cycles approach has been examined by many scholars who emphasize distinct traits. This theory is useful to better understand the transition between the administration of En- rique Peña Nieto from the PRI and the one of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador of MORENA in

2018. It has been examined by many scholars on how a presidential term or legislator’s term can execute effectively their agenda. The elected officials have different proposals and promises that

11 are on a time schedule if they wish to complete it. Such proposals and promises have the purpose of securing voters as they prefer a competent policy maker to an incompetent policy maker (Van

Dalen, & Swank, 1996). Van Dalen, and Swank, state that policy cycles are phases or stages, im- plemented during a legislative or presidential term in regards to economic issues such as: the na- tional output on growth, unemployment, inflation and money (Van Dalen, & Swank, 1996). In other words, during policy cycles, is that different political parties have different preferences over economic goals, so that the alternation of parties in office leads to political cycles (Van

Dalen, & Swank, 1996). Nieto Parra and Santiso affirm that, the economy should be the focus point of every presidency regardless of incumbency or new successor (Nieto Parra, S & Santiso,

J, 2009). When one cycle is approaching its final phase, the advocates and participants of that cycle must end their reign and the new participants will raise with a new cycle. Each policy cycle can tackle down large issues and prioritize their government spending as they see fit (Van Dalen,

& Swank, 1996). As the issues are being handled, the electoral clock is ticking.

Grier, R, and Grier, K, point out that there exists, however, loopholes to policy cycles like reelections of the same administration for a second term, or the presence of a new face but hav- ing the same political agenda (Grier, R, and Grier, K, 2000). This can be applicable to Mexico.

Although the reelection of the sitting president is not permitted by the Constitution, the same po- litical party was in power from 1929 to 2000. Even when fresh political faces from a different political party managed to winch election: Vicente Fox form the PAN in 2000 and Enrique Peña

Nieto from the PRI in 2012, all of them subscribed to the same model that their

12 predecessors; neoliberalism.

When one president hands over the office to the successor, and the successor is part or affiliated with the same party or ideology the cycle may stay the same or follow similar patterns.

This particular statement from Grier R, and Grier K, is pertinent to this paper since the ongoing reelection of presidents from the PRI throughout the years made possible a 70 year cycle. They also studied Mexico and the sexenio, and state that during the six years as president it is difficult to pass legislations, or promote economic policies. If the incumbent is affiliated with the same party the policy cycle may start from where it was left off (Grier, R., & Grier, K. 2000). But when there is the start of a new policy cycle that the new president is from a different party, there should be a peaceful transfer of power for the country to experience a new form of governance, different from the previous administration (Grier, R., & Grier, K, 2000). The fact that if presi- dents came from the same party signals that there will be continuity in the party’s agenda.

Policy cycles and changes in Mexico has been on a deceleration path since there has been little to no significant growth over the past three decades. There are two aspects of the state of

Mexico in modern times in terms of policy cycles, (i) the historical distrust of capitalism and (ii) the lack of transparency of the government to regulate economic affairs (Grier, R., & Grier, K,

2000). The PRI controlled Mexico after the revolution in the 1920s, untill they lost the presiden- cy in the turn of the century thus the continuous PRI incumbents would have no issue starting where their predecessor left off given that they share similar view points (Grier, R., & Grier, K,

2000). Critics have commented that since all the Mexican presidents (PRI) from 1920 till 2000

13 were from the same party, there is little policy continuity and changes (Grier, R., & Grier, K,

2000). The PAN took control of the government of Mexico, from 2000 to 2012, until they hand- ed over the presidential sash back to the PRI. According to Story, President Calderon (PAN,

2006-2012) left Mexico at a stable economic level, then his cycle ended and left the country to

Peña Nieto in 2012, and as a new president he can significantly alter the policies of their prede- cessor (Story, 1985). Mexico and other countries who experience presidential transitions, must leave their work and legacy to the new president entering office.

Unfortunately, in Mexico the economy is the area in which has little change during the sexenio (six year presidential term) (Grier, R., & Grier, K, 2000). Once President AMLO term is over, it will be fully visible how the two administrations (Peña Nieto and AMLO) approached and handled policies. President AMLO inherited a broken economy, while Peña Nieto was in of- fice. Peña Nieto had received an economy from Calderon with significant, stable numbers, Mex- ico has ever seen before. Further discussion on the ending cycle of the mentioned administrations will be presented later in the paper. The transition of a different political view of a presidential successor can have repercussions on the economy and policies (Story, 1985). Regardless of how the economy is left by the end of a presidential term, major changes are made and results will vary as the new president enters office. It is also a strategy the successor can use to gain approval rating. By claiming that the previous administration left a broken state, new presidents can offer unique and personal take on policy solutions to override the previous (Story, 1985). President

AMLO, during his campaign trail, proposed several ideas for economic expansion and promised

14 a four percent increase by his sixth year in office. This type of commitment, allows new ideas and proposals that want to rally voters. It is a preview of a new policy cycle.

A political leader has the responsibility to lead their country and flag to greatness. They are given a certain time frame according to their constitution and must execute their plays as they see fit. When that time frame is up, the leader will hand over the executive power to the president elect. The president elect will inherit all the fallacies or outstanding acts from the previous presi- dent. Ideally, it is best to hand over power to a president who corresponds with the same political party thus having the same ideology just a different face. Petras, refers that the transition of pow- er, regardless, has a negative effect towards the country if the acting president or leader does not know how to govern (Petras, 1997). It can lead the country to turmoil, halt economic growth, or become authoritarian. In Mexico, a recent transition of power occurred where one president left the country in such economic disturbance that the new president will have to recover the state, sidetracking himself from the economic goals he promised. Ironically, the presiding president was affiliated with the dominated political party of Mexico, the PRI, but lost to an infant political party, MORENA.

From the literature of policy cycles, we can conclude that if there is a continuity of simi- lar party affiliation then the transition and previous political agenda will have a smooth flow moving into a new cycle. In the case of Mexico, the reelection of a PRI candidate back in the late

1920s, to the 2000s, was no issue since the same party ruled as one big policy cycle. Things turn different when there is a complete change or transition (PAN electoral win in 2000 and in 2006

15 and the recent win of MORENA in 2018). The PRI policy cycle came to an end in 2000, ending the political agenda and future for Mexico under a PRI governance. PAN continued their cycle with the reelection in 2006, but ended with the PRI regaining the presidency. In 2018 however, a fresh, young, new cycle has taken control of Mexico and has executed their own, different politi- cal agenda for the better of the country. The policy cycle approach is useful to better understand the transition between the administration of Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI and the one of Andres

Manuel Lopez Obrador of MORENa in 2018. It also may permit to compare and contrast poli- cies when a policy cycle ends and another begins. Such as during the transition between EPN and AMLO regimes, that is a major question in this project.

16 EPN: NEOLIBERAL MODEL AND THE PRI REGIME (2012-2018)

This section examines the policy cycle of the PRI leading to the EPN regime. Followed by key aspects of the political agenda of ex-President Enrique Peña Nieto's (EPN) regime con- nected to neoliberalism. As well as a review of his administration that were conducive to a new policy cycle in Mexico.

Since its founding, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary

Party), or PRI, dominated Mexico through its leaders from the late 1920s to the 21st century. Its founder, Plutarco Elias Calles led the party at the starting point of 1929, after the Mexican Revo- lution. According to Morris, the PRI controlled the political arena in Mexico for about 70 years, as one hegemonic party, able to elect president with almost unlimited power (Morris, 2010).

Along the same line, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) state that he PRI ruled the country with an iron fist, labeling the party as “a monopolistic political grouping infamous for imposing a clientelist and patronage based social order” (COHA, 2011).

During the decades that the PRI stayed in power (1929-2000), Mexico could not experi- ence a political transition. The PRI became the ruling party, making all the decisions their own for the fate of Mexico. However, this rule was like a veil to the world, hiding behind the idea of a wholesome hierarchy. The PRI held a democratic disguise, showing a facade to the Mexican people and the world that the country was a democratic one, at least until 1968 when the student movement ended up in a massacre in downtown and the authoritarian phase of the regime was unveiled. The series of protests and manifestations were taken into effect in 1968,

17 caused major discomfort in then President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (PRI, 1964-1970) (Harris,

2005).Writers like Elena Poniatowska, documented the horrid events the president enacted mak- ing the world and Mexico see the true colors of the PRI (Harris, 20005).

Certain other political parties tried to dethrone the leading party from Mexico’s presi- dency but they were unable to do so (until 2000, when the Partido Accion Nacional, PAN found- ed in 1939). Yet in 2012, the PRI would quickly regain control of the presidency. In the year

2000, the political system of Mexico made an iconic transition. The PRI was defeated by another political party, Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), led by President Vicente Fox. The PRI handed over the presidential sash to President Fox and with that Fox succeeded to the fallacies and at- tributes the PRI committed. Fox’s Mexico was just recovering from the Peso Crisis back in 1994-

1995, and foreign investment was unstable (Pastor & Wise, 2005). His plan as president was to tackle corruption and drug trafficking, and bring Mexico to a better state (Pastor & Wise, 2005).

Breaking the winning streak of the PRI, the PAN along with Fox, entered the presidency creating and strengthening more professional agencies within their administration (Morris, 2010). After

Fox got inaugurated, he and his administration started implementing their methods and their forms of governing a country. Another six years of PAN with the election of President Calderon, who in his term helped Mexico reach new limits that have not been done before.

The 12 year regime of the PAN ended when Enrique Peña Nieto (PRI) became in December of 2012. From the start Peña Nieto tackled important issues as any eager

President but slowly, his approval rating began to fall. One cause for his descent in the polls was

18 the lack of transparency in his administration including a scandal involving the first lady,

Angelica Rivera exemplified this situation, and questioned Peña Nieto’s leadership role in the political arena. She was known to have hired a businessman to purchase a million-dollar home before the final year of the President’s term, claiming something very unlikely: that she purchased the prop- erty with her savings as a Mexican actress. This made the Mexican people rage in anger, spark- ing the hate against Peña Nieto. Thus, at the end, Peña Nieto left the office and the Mexican peo- ple with hope and prosperity but eventually left a bitter taste in their mouths (Morayto, 2018). Even the previous administration, President Calderon, (2006-2012,

PAN) was significantly more popular as compared to Peña Nieto. President Calderon’s approval range was from 44% to 68% (Morayto, 2018), while Peña Nieto started his presidential run with a 55% in 2013 and in a course of just three years, his approval rating had decreased to 25% in

November of 2016 (Morayto, 2018).

During his administration, Peña Nieto continued to follow the neoliberal manners from his predecessors, under the premise that it has contributed to economic growth throughout the country. Mexico’s economy can be attributed to many resources, like oil, agriculture, tourism and the highly controversial trade of drugs, specifically narcotics. Mexico shares similar economies with the other Latin American countries but back in 2006, Mexico had the largest economy com- pared to Brazil’s economy with more than twice the size of Mexico (Ruelas-Gossi, 2012). As

Peña Nieto entered power, there was no motive to change key economic and social policies. We have seen that under Calderon’s Mexico (2006-2012), they were doing decently, but thanks to

19 Peña Nieto (2012-2018) the economy would take longer to recover.

According to the article published in the newspaper, El Heraldo, these numbers are the lowest seen for a Mexican President (El Heraldo, 2020). Peña Nieto (PRI) 2012-2018 averaged a

37% approval and 59% disapproval rating (Abundis, 2018). Upon closing his (Peña Nieto) presi- dential term, another tragic scandal was exposed which lowered his disapproval rating to 74%

(Abundis, 2018). The scandal involved the government trying to conceal the disappearance of 43 student protesters in Ayotzinapa, Guerrero. This scandal fired up the people for Peña Nieto did nothing about it and sublimely covered it.

Ironically, on the day president elect AMLO was sworn in, ex-President Peña Nieto signed new NAFTA, United States Mexico Canada, Agreement (USMCA), benefiting the farmer, ranchers, businesses in an all win situation for North America. Optimism radiated from EPN, as he commented that a trilateral deal will be reached (Solomon, 2018). This agreement was essen- tial to the legacy of Peña Nieto, claiming that it will promote the financial markets, investments and job creations for Mexico (Malkin, 2018). The trilateral agreement was supposed to bring re- lief and close trade barriers between the three nations (Gantz, 2019). In 2015, under Peña Nieto’s regime, U.S. imports from Mexico, added up to $74 billion worth of cars or other vehicles, $63 million in electrical machinery, and $12 billion in medical instruments (Stevenson, 2017). This free trade policy allowed Mexico to export $410 billion worth of goods, accumulating more than

80% of that to the United States and Canada (Malkin, 2018). Positive exportation rations have no impact on the overall poverty rate in Mexico. In the case of Mexico, any alteration or change in

20 NAFTA, it would have an immediate effect on jobs, including those in the traditional economic sector (Stevenson, 2017). There has been a constant lag in economic growth per capita, with an average of 1.2% from 1996 to 2015 under NAFTA (Malkin, 2018). Referring back to the theory of policy cycles, this agreement was made on the last day in office for Peña Nieto, freeing him from foreign negotiations as the presidency starts with AMLO.

Latin America has historically suffered from poor economic growth and when they do seem to have a glimpse of economic progress, it becomes difficult to maintain the strength of that economy. The Mexican region averaged a sad 1.3 % of growth in GDP by the end of 2014, just two years after Peña Nieto was inaugurated and it was said to get lower at the end of his term

(Partlow & Martinez, 2015).

Two entities that stirred up conflict under the rule of Peña Nieto were the Comisión Fed- eral de Electricidad (CFE) and Pemex. One of the main premises of neoliberalism advices gov- ernments to limit their interventions in the economy. Peña Nieto embarked in la reform energeti- ca (the energy reform). This entailed a process of privatization of CFE and Pemex. The theory of who gets to own these entities alarmed the Mexican population when they heard that “they be- long to the State and I (EPN) am the State” (Becerril & Ballinas, 2014). Pemex is the largest en- terprise in Mexico and the CFE is as big as but was made into sub-groups to better manage it

(Becerril & Ballinas, 2014). EPN’s rule on the CFE, granted extra money to the people’s pock- ets, but in reality, it drowned Mexico in more debt (Limon Portillo, 2016). This energy reform was supposed to bring more jobs, “unfathomable” economic growth, and lower light and gas

21 bills as it will be accessible to all (Limon Portillo, 2016). The CFE registered a loss of $28.5 mil- lion pesos, (about $1.4 million dollars) during its first trimester of 2017 (Padierna, 2018).

This failure gave Mexico a 74% increase in debt during the first four years of EPN’s sexenio

(Limon Portillo, 2016).

The intervention of privatizing Pemex, also lead to a major turning point before, during and after the EPN regime. Emilio Lozoya former head of Mexico’s oil company, Pemex, is cur- rently under investigation for bribing politicians, and one of them being Enrique Peña Nieto and is the protagonist of President AMLO’s plan to expose corruption in and the government (Bar- rera, 2020). The investigation into Lozoya began in 2017, and Peña Nieto left office the follow- ing year (Moreno, 2020). Although, Peña Nieto has denied all accusation (Barrera, 2020), Presi- dent AMLO does not want to prosecute the former president unless the people wish upon it

(Moreno, 2020). As of now, the Mexican Government has launch an investigation of corruption to ex-President Peña Nieto. In sum the two enterprises: CFE and Pemex brought nothing but debt and raise in corruption concerns, instead of its intended purpose for economic achievements.

Once his term comes to an end (2018), the successor would have the economic burden to address as well as all the unfulfilled promises made during the campaign. Economists Partlow and Martinez see Mexico’s economy stagnated without an immediate escape, we see a prolonged stagnation (Partlow & Martinez, 2015), a prolonged stagnation where this economic problem is foreseen even if there is a change in president. It would be difficult for Mexico to recover from this financial problem and just like the presidential title is handed over to a new leader, these

22 financial problems are also transferred, greatly hurting the country and its citizens.

Under the neoliberal economic model that Mexico had, under the intentions of President

Peña Nieto, a plan called Momento Mexico, (Mexico Moment), where he planned how to manage the economy. This plan was to create a halt to debt (Rodriguez, 2018). In addition, there was a plan to have the economy grow at least 5% under Peña Nieto’s sexenio (Rodriguez, 2018).

Nev- ertheless, as the end of 2018 neared, there was only a 2.1% increase (Rodriguez, 2018), as the result of the neoliberal economic model not being able deliver results now and thirty years ago (Lopez Obrador, 2019). Enrique Peña Nieto started his term in 2012 and ended in 2018, and dur- ing his term there was a lack of economic growth and poor management of the country.

More- over, Mexican economists agree that there was effort in promoting economic growth but not the type they expected, and believe that the reforms and promotion did not encompass the entire population (Luna, 2018).

Eventually, Peña Nieto’s presidential term came to an end (2018), thus, its government made minimal interventions to the economy and social policies. As projected, his administration left Mexico with more debt, raising it from a third to almost fifty percent of Mexico’s GDP

(O'Neil, 2018). Serving as an example of how a policy cycle can further sink a country into tur- moil, Peña Nieto left Mexico in its worst economic crisis since the 1940s (O'Neil, 2018). In

2018, as Mexico enters its greatest transition of power, AMLO received the presidential sash, allowing MORENA and their leader to demonstrate a new form of governance.

23 At the end of his Peña Nieto’s term 81% of the Mexican people said he did nothing during his presidency and was expected he would do nothing (Abundis, 2018). By the end of Peña Nieto’s term the people wanted to see results and sought refuge in new political party, MORENA and a veteran politician Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. Even before the transition of power oc- curred,

AMLO already had a 63% approval rating by mid 2018 (Monroy, 2019). AMLO’s presidential term is still fresh and would take some time to fully grade his performance as presi- dent. He has been trying to lead the country through his manner of governance and is resulting very well for him since approval rating has not significantly dropped.

Mexico’s economy two years ago (2018) was in a terrible state, that same year it was transferred to AMLO. As stated before, a country experiences negative effects when a policy cy- cle comes to an end, as the results of the president or leader’s manner in ruling the country. Ex-

President Peña Nieto left the presidency in 2018, which left a shattered economy for President

Lopez Obrador demonstrating distinguishable traits of Peña Nieto’s governance and management of the country. Compared to when Peña Nieto entered the office in 2012, when his predecessor, then President Felipe Calderon, left the economy with low inflation and low unemployment (Ru- elas-Gossi, 2012). Under President Calderon, the unemployment rate was lower (5%) than in the

United States (8%) under President Obama (Ruelas-Gossi, 2012). With President Calderon’s vic- tory, it gave the PAN party six more years in office but as soon as his term came to an end, the

PRI regained the seat. Peña Nieto started his presidency with an ideal economy, however, he was still unable to maintain those significantly low numbers (Lopez Obrador, 2019). As the Calderon

24 cycle reaches conclusion, and begins with Peña Nieto, the country felt the hit as they had to ad- just to a new president and readjust to the PRI political cycle.

In social welfare policies primarily dealing with the gap between the rich and poor just keeps growing and growing, like a never-ending problem. “Nearly two decades and Mexico has not be capable of reducing poverty, and will continue to be a country where the economy grows very little” says a Latin American economist Partlow and Martinez (Partlow & Martinez, 2015).

This was seen two decades ago and is currently being seen now even after having many presi- dential leaders to deal with the problem, it is a prolonged stagnation (Partlow & Martinez, 2015).

The poverty rate affected 40% of the population whose salaries were set at $158 per month in

2012 (Partlow & Martinez, 2015). We have discussed how Calderon left the economy in a decent state for Peña Nieto, of which he devastatingly tarnish to the depth where people would not be able to fathom. Midway in his presidency (EPN, in 2015) there was absolutely no economic growth (Partlow & Martinez, 2015). Consequently, Mexican people made aware of the issue and in result changed the future of Mexico by electing President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador.

An educational reform Prospera emerged from Peña Nieto’s administration, yet failed before reaching its true potential. This reform is a facilitator for development in education, poverty, woman rights, and hunger in Mexico (Ortega, 2014). This policy was to strengthen fam- ilies and grant access to scholarships, funds, and others (Ortega, 2014). Ironically, the term pros- pera translates to “prosper” but the policy did not survive as its intentions would benefit the poor by helping the poor, granting scholarships, and providing accessible health care all

25 (Corona, 2018). Prospera was supposed to combat poverty but it has similarities with another failed re- form Oportunidades, enforced thirty years ago (Ortega, 2014). The Cruzada Nacional contra el Hambre (National Cruade against Hunger), but, ultimately failed in reaching its true potential. This crusade targeted 7.4 million people, however even Mexico’s Consejo Nacional de

Evalua- cion de la Politics de Desarrollo Social, CONEVAL (National Social Development

Policy Evalu- ation Council), an independent entity for the evaluation of social programs, stated that these spe- cific projects were “overshowed by corruption and fraud including the fact that the aid has been diverted to electoral campaigns and bribes to vote for Peña Nieto’s ruling.”

Under Prospera, another failed social welfare policy was , La Llamada reforma educati- va (an educational reform). President AMLO has ended that reform and started a new educational policy in which has survived, it has granted scholarships, and differs heavily from

Peña Nieto’s policy. This will be discussed more in depth in the next section. Although, both policies ap- proaches failed or did not pass under his policy cycle. Governmental interventions from EPN made the country fail into more debt and discouraged the Mexican people in their government’s intention in economic and social policies.

It can be seen as fortunate, or unfortunate, that the geographical placement of Mexico is under an economic giant, the United States, which can prove to be an overwhelmingly economic competitor. Mexico’s economy has been drowning with each leader and Peña Nieto not being able to handle the well economic governance of his predecessor makes sense when research shows that the value of the peso has reached record lows against the dollar

26 (Partlow & Martinez, 2015). Mexican pesos are currently valued at one dollar to about 20 pesos

(Mexican currency), this is ideal for American tourists, who wish to get their money’s worth while on vacation, yet, the only thing that is increasing is the poverty rate.

27 AMLO: NEOSTRUCTURAL MODEL AND THE MORENA:

THE FIRST TWO YEARS 2018-2020

The second part of this comparative analysis paper focuses on the first two years of

President AMLO, where we learn how he captured the voters, and how he has implemented his political agenda at the start of his cycle and comparing it to the previous administration of EPN.

At first we will see AMLO on his campaign trail toward election day. Then, a review of his first two years as President of Mexico. The election of President AMLO brought an end to the policy cycle from the previous administration of EPN. Raising two factors from his victory can give an explanation were (a) the failures of neoliberalism and (b) distinguishable political policies of the government of Enrique Peña Nieto. The Economist strategically planned out how AMLO might win Mexico’s election; making it clear that he would be the front runner of the presidential race

(The Economist, 2018) and would start a new policy cycle December 1st, 2018. During his cam- paign, The Economist assumed that a new policy cycle will erupt with the election of AMLO.

Lopez Obrador won the presidency of Mexico in that historical election (July, 2018), which also gave victory to the youngest and newest political party, MORENA to begin their political agen- da. This shift in power from one political party to another would allow the country to handle things through a new approach for the best of Mexico. The political cycle ended for the PRI and rose with MORENA (that also won the control of both legislative chambers and two thirds of the country’s state legislature) giving AMLO almost absolute power in the Mexican political system

(Krauze, 2018). MOREN’s goal focuses on left wing economic policy, a more market based

28 belief.

Since December of 2018, Lopez Obrador’s popularity rating has gone up (63% al- though still high have decreased in present times), (Sheridan, 2019). AMLO promised to shift

Mexico’s security strategy to promote crime prevention, his main argument is that many poor youths get into crime because of a lack of opportunities (Sheridan, 2019). He was captured al- most every young voters’ attention due to the launch of major social programs, such as scholar- ships for young people in poor areas (Sheridan, 2019). Focusing his campaign in truthful promis- es on those who want an education and the government will provide services to achieve every future students needs (Lopez Obrador, 2019). He degrades the thirty year old neoliberal practice and proposes new ideas for a better economy and a better Mexico and does attack the previous administration for inheriting a country in a poor state (Lopez, I, 2019).

In the first one hundred days, President Lopez Obrador and the MORENA party, had the highest popularity rating in Mexican history with 85% approval and 9% disapproval rating

(Sheridan, 2019). His landslide victory with the little known MORENA created a huge impact in

Mexico since taking down the ever-so-powerful PRI. Like all political parties, MORENA and

PRI never see eye to eye; because MORENA is a newly developed party, they have very differ- ent agendas. President Lopez Obrador along with MORENA, work together to bring a new eco- nomic model and bring Mexico to a better stage in a developing democratic country (Lopez

Obrador, 2019).

29 In this section it is essential to examine key points of President AMLO’s agenda specifi- cally looking at free trade, government intervention in the economy and social welfare policies to fully compare it with the previous administration.

Under the eyes of President AMLO, NAFTA, has created a displacement for the farmers, ranchers, and businesses, blaming the government for not incorporating them and stimulating

Mexico’s economy (Malkin, 2018) but once in office his discourse changed. President AMLO and his control of Mexico’s Senate will agree and vote on the new NAFTA: USMCA (Malkin,

2018). Both regimes (EPN and AMLO ) share similarities in free trade policy, as the USMCA (a new form of NAFTA), liked by both regimes believe that it will lead Mexico to great things. In fact, President AMLO visited Washington D.C. in July 2020 for the first time, precisely to cele- brate the implementation of USMCA (Lozano, 2020). President AMLO’s critiques in Mexico however, highlights that the new trade agreement is the symbol of the fact that Mexico is depen- dent on the economic relationship with the United States (Malkin, 2018), expressed in the high concentration of its trade with the U.S. (Roberts, 2020). Peña Nieto signed this treaty, on his last day in office and foreshadowed that true development can be reached with the new administra- tion entering office (Malkin, 2018).

In terms of the economy, Mexico’s economy was projected to grow to a mere 1.8% but economists see Mexico a minimal growth of 1% at the end of AMLO’s first year in office (Mar- tin, 2020). In terms of the perception of the Mexican population regarding AMLO’s administra- tion in 2019, 42% of the people consider the Mexican economy to have little change since

30 AMLO entered the presidency, 34% believe it has gone worse, and 23% believe it has made eco- nomic progress (Monroy, 2019). As of now there is stagnation during his first two years of his presidency. Sadly this is another similarity both of these regimes share. Although President

AMLO has a different methods to improve the economy, he faces unique challenges that impedes him from completing his economic goal.

Two years into AMLO’s presidency (2020), an unprecedented pandemic, COVID-19, the economy is not moving; being in a prolonged stagnation (Partlow & Martinez, 2015) and weak- ening the macroeconomics according to Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLAC).

President AMLO is approaching two years in his presidency, but it is clear that Mexico had seen no progress during his first year in office, 2019. And now with the magnitude seen by

COVID-19, Mexico and Latin America will heavily depend largely on the structure of each economy, its firms and institutions and existing production capabilities (ECLAC, 2020). He has not even reached 2% of growth in the first nine months of 2019, the current rate of economic growth is at 0% (Lopez, I, 2019). Mexico is expected to contract by 6.5% and through a reduc- tion of remittances from migrants, the country is exposed to more contractions (ECLAC). It was as if Mexico lost the year of 2019 for economic growth and may not even win anything the fol- lowing years (Martin, 2020).

With no economic growth during his first year and with 2020 nearly halfway over, Mexi- co is expected to see a devastating economic impact due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Moy,

2020). Most of President AMLO’s economic relief policies are plummeting down because of this

31 pandemic. Referring to ECLAC, the poverty rate not only in Mexico but Latin America will in- crease to about 4.4% equivalent to almost 29 million individuals more than in 2019 and extreme poverty will increase 2.5%, roughly 16 million individuals (ECLAC, 2020).

The pandemic is a ticking time bomb that may explode, further damaging the Mexican economy. Economists have studied a trend during a pandemic, and argue that President AMLO would have to be creative to find ways to boost the economy or to at least stabilize it (MacKel- lar, 2007). Economist Valerie Moy, calculated in 2019, that the economy contracted 0.1% and

GDP growth at 2.4% (Moy, 2020). As AMLO enters the transition of power, the economy and corruption level, also come with the presidential title and trying to reverse it is difficult. Experts suggest the best way to combat an unexpected pandemic is planning. A well planned attack against the pandemic must be on the agenda of every school board, manufacturing plant, investment form mortuary, state legislature and food distributor (Osterholm, 2005). By the completion of this pa- per, there still would not be a definite answer of whether the pandemic has created an economic burden to President AMLO’s economic agenda.

President AMLO reaffirms that between 1983 to 2018 the neoliberal economic model was ineffective, and insufficient from the lack of leadership Mexico elected (Lopez Obrador,

2019). To reaffirm the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the differences in policies from

EPN who followed a neoliberal model and AMLO who follows a more neostructural model, re- assuring that neostructuralsim will not eradicate neoliberalism but provide a different approach to the policies used before. Presently, Mexico’s debt is about nine hundred million Mexican

32 pesos (about forty million in US dollars) even though they paid off seven hundred million already (about thirty-one million US dollars) (Lopez Obrador, 2019). Even in his presidency he contin- ues to call out the failures of the neoliberal model. Commenting how the model limited job growth and prosperity for the poblacion (people) (Lopez Obrador, 2019). Poverty is inevitable in Mexico and can be seen throughout the republic.

Regarding poverty, President AMLO has documented that according to the Banco

Mundial, about 52,400,000 Mexicans are poor and of those 29,300,000 find themselves in ex- treme poverty (Lopez Obrador, 2019). President AMLO blames the fantasizing of neoliberalism that continued from president to president, even if their cycle ends. An example he uses; on Feb- ruary 3, 1983, established in the constitution, the derecho de la salud (the right for health care) has not established health care for the entire population, not even half in the thirty years (Lopez

Obrador, 2017). This policy implemented in the early 1930s did not reach its full potential as it intended. It has died down or was non existent. President AMLO flexes his strength by complet- ing his campaign promises associates with the reduction of poverty in Mexico. Throughout the establishment of neoliberalism has been practiced, there was no type of growth or development that would benefit the country (Lopez Obrador, 2017). When a new president enters the execu- tive office, a modern, moral neostructrual approach could be seen as a remedy for the thirty year old issue. Even though the economy at this point in time does not suffice President AMLO, there has been zero documentation of any growth in the first two years of his presidency (Lopez, I,

2019). And as the pandemic is still upon Mexico, it may be difficult to achieve economic growth

33 within the policy cycle the sexenio offers.

AMLO entered the presidency when Mexico’s economy was terrible, and it’s been appar- ent that he has not tried to repair it and had to deliver the one hundred promises he made, and now two years later he has completed more than half (Lopez, J, 2019). One example of the role of the state in the economy is that AMLO thought it was appropriate to cancel a $13 billion air- port that was a third of the way built in Mexico City during his first eight months as president

(Martin, 2020). This cancelation of potential employment in the thousands and financial growth opportunity contradicts what AMLO promised during his campaign. But on the other hand, Pres- ident AMLO commissioned the construction to the new Santa Lucia airport in the outskirts of

Mexico City to the military, and has allocated considerable sums to the construction of key in- frastructure projects in the southern of Mexico, including the Tren Maya [the Mayan Train] in the

Yucatan peninsula, and the Ferrocarril Transitsmico, a railroad that will communicate the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean. Both projects are related to the purpose of fostering trade and tourism. (Fuentes 2018).

An article of, The Heraldo, comments, en 2012 la gente salio enardecida a manifestarse, mientras que en 2018 la gente salio, pero para celebrar la victoria de AMLO'' (in 2012 the peo- ple marched enraged while in 2018, the people marched in honor to celebrate AMLO’s victory)

(El Heraldo, 2020). This manifestation for the victory of a president gives off a positive vibe for the new president entering the political cycle. An example on social welfare policies, President

AMLO announced better opportunities for education, something that EPN did not conclude.

34 President AMLO proposed how from 1992 to 2018, for every ten students six students actually finish high school, at the same time three of ten high school students ranging from ages 18 to 26 years, actually finish a higher educational career after high school (Lopez Obrador, 2019). Presi- dent AMLO would like to facilitate the opportunity of getting an education. During AMLO’s campaign he pledged to increase economic growth to 4% (Martin, 2020) but in reality, there has been no form of economic growth.

President AMLO has two main focuses during his campaign. The first was related to social welfare polices, specifically with his faros slogan “abrazos no balazos” which translates to

“hugs not bullets” (Sheridan, 2019), meant for unification, the end of violence or democracy for the people of Mexico. Secondly the explicit rejection of the previous neoliberal model (Lopez

Obrador, 2019). He promised roughly one hundred campaign promises and one of the most cap- tivating promises that basically granted him the presidency is the advocacy for education for all and bringing in better and more facilitations to achieve an education. President AMLO wanted to tackle the education sector of the country as he states that the youth at the age of 15 or higher with basic education (primary and secondary schooling) 31% , about 28.7 million Mexicans and

4% of those are illiterate (Lopez Obrador, 2019). Between 1992 to 2018, for every ten students six students actually finish high school. Moreover, three of ten high school students ranging from

18 to 26 years of age actually finish college level studies after high school (Lopez Obrador,

2019).

Although the previous administration tried to take the education matter in their terms, the

35 La Llamada, was a policy imposed by Enrique Peña Nieto and his administration never resolved the education issue or the lack of education in the country (Lopez Obrador, 2019). It is important to note that President AMLO blames the neoliberal economic model for students or aspiring stu- dents who cannot pay for their education because there is a lack of drive or motivation for an ed- ucation since poverty and hunger haunting over the country (Lopez Obrador, 2019). Colegiat- uras which are like tuitions paid each month of the educational school year by the student(s) to continue their enrollment throughout the year at a rate from $3,000 to $5,000 pesos consequently the 38.4% of the population receive a monthly income of about $4,206 pesos (Lopez Obrador,

2019). The program includes the following types of scholarships: Becas Bienes- tar para las familias (for K-12 students) and Jovenes Escribiendo el Futuro (for college stu- dents), There also exists an internship program, Jovenes Construyendo el Futuro, for young peo- ple interested in hands-on training in the workplace. (Becas Mexico 2020). Nonetheless, Presi- dent AMLO promised, he has helped more than eight million adults and more than ten million high schoolers by receiving scholarships to help them achieve their educational goal (Lopez, I, 2019).

As President AMLO helps the youth stay off the streets and supply more scholarships, he also has reached out to the elderly by granting them financial support. The social policy, El Bien- estar de las Personas Adultas Mayores, (The Well-Being of the Elderly), since February of 2020, has paid 8.52 million pensions, fulfilling 95.5% of the intended goal, encompassing 4.6 million of the elderly people (Lopez Obrador, 2019). This program pays and covers those people who are indigenous adults of ages 65 or higher, and non-indigenous adults of ages 68 or higher by just

36 showing residential documentation and identification to vote (Lope Obrador, 2019). This social welfare policy has succeeded and almost accomplished the intended goal. President AMLO’s social welfare policies have strived to reach completion or satisfaction compared to ex-President

Peña Nieto’s social policies.

Another social welfare policy offered by President AMLO to combat the neoliberal eco- nomic model is confronting corruption. President AMLO refers back to the administration of

Salinas de Gortari (PRI, 1988 to 1994) to imprison or justify the robbery of the people (Lopez

Obrador, 2019). Claiming that there should be legal action to those ex-elected officials who lead with a corrupt manner, even targeting himself or any of his family members, while reassuring that no one is above the law (Lopez Obrador, 2019). President AMLO would like to start clean- ing out the corruption at this level first, showing an example for the people. Reenforcing the Ar- ticle 108 of the Mexican Constitution, to purge out the impurities and flaws, it should start at the executive level (Lopez Obrador, 2019). According to the Barometro Global de la Corrupcion

(BGC), a survey conducted in Mexico September 23, 2019, revealed that 61% of the population are confident that anti corruption measures have been taken place and enforced as compared to the previous administration where 24% of the population surveys believed in anti corruption measures (Lopez Obrador, 2019). Comparing and contrasting the two administrations has demonstrated the different traits and approaches each leader has taken (EPN) or has promised

(AMLO). This comparison is minimal at the time of this paper for President AMLO is at the two term mark and is difficult but interesting what route he will lead Mexico by the end of his sexe- nio.

37 CONCLUSION

There are successes and failures but when the term comes to an end, those successes and failures transition to the new leader coming into power. This policy cycle is the end of a term and raise of a new one. Scholars find it that it is a crucial turning point when the cycle is approaching the final phase(s) (Grier, R & Grier, K, 2000). During the president's time of governing, presi- dents or democratic leaders tend to follow what is on their political agenda. As Grier R, and Gri- er K, (2000) mentions, that political cycles may end but if the incumbent shares the same party affiliation or ideologies, then it is more of political continuity (Grier, R & Grier, K, 2000). This is what occurred in Mexico during the reign of the PRI (between 1929-2000 and during EPN’s ad- ministration 2012-2018). An example of the constant practice of the neoliberal economic model held since the 1980s.

In contemporary times, it is evident that different democratic leaders behave and govern their country, then replaced by another elected leader to govern the country. This area of study allows political scientists to compare and contrast the efficacy of a presidential term by using their policies as comparison.

The following table serves as a visual of the presidencies of Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN) and current President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) in terms of certain policies. The purpose would be to compare and contrast the policies of EPN with the new policies of President

AMLO in which it can illustrate the characteristics of neoliberalism and neostructuralism during their presidential term.

38 Table 1: Differences Between EPN and AMLO

Policies Enrique Peña Nieto AMLO

√ √ Free Trade ————————- ———————

NAFTA USMCA (NAFTA 2)

√ √ ————————- ———————— Govt Intervention in the Anti-public enterprises stand: Govt heavily involved in economy Pemex and the Comision construction and Federal de Electricidad were infrastructure: airport, privatized. educational building.

X √ ————————- ————————- La Llamada (educational Development at every level; Social Welfare Policies reform), Prospera and other equity. Individual grants to anti-poverty institutionalized youth (in schools) the elderly, programs for the poor but did peasants, etc. not survive.

TABLE 1: Table 1 shows if the administration of Presidents Enrique Peña Nieto and Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador adopted (√) or not (X) policies that the literature relates to neoliberalism and neostructuralism.

The table above demonstrates the key differences of the two presidencies of Enrique Peña

Nieto and Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and traits they purse. The column of EPN displays the

39 key policies discussed in the paper on par with the way President AMLO differs with the same policies. The chart illustrates that ex-President Peña Nieto pursued certain social welfare policies

(although ultimately failed). In regards of President AMLO, it is still too early to evaluate the successes or failures of his policies.

This paper's purpose was to compare and contrast the similarities and differences ex-Pres- ident Enrique Peña Nietos policy cycles with those of the premature presidential term of Andres

Manuel Lopez Obrador. We can see how, EPN reintroduced the failures of neoliberalism and the distinguishable traits the administration of EPN had during their regime. President AMLO has started a new political cycle and two years in his presidency, has completed more than half of his campaign promises. This projects hypothesis asserts that President AMLOs proposed a new al- ternating to neoliberalism and neoliberal policies implemented by the previous administration of

EPN; a new approach in the area of free trade, government participation and involvement with the economy and social welfare policies that can be labeled as neostructuralism. Although he has not claimed or labeled the new approach, it is hinting to neostructuralism. EPN’s administration followed the same neoliberal practice from his predecessors. He subscribed to the main thesis of neoliberalism since he continued his support to NAFTA ironically signing it on his last day in office. The governmental participation in the economy and social welfare policies his efforts were limited. Most of his social policies would / did not survive and has been noted that he had the economy at the worst in history.

Compared to the first twenty months of President AMLO, his popularity rate is one of the

40 highest, but he inherited one of the worst economies in Mexican history. President AMLO wrote in his book Hacia una Economia Moral, in 2019, how, in his campaign trial, he will openly run on an anti-neoliberal platform. He agrees with the USMCA to help promote free trade which ac- cording to Edmon-Poli and Shik (2012) is a key premise of neoliberalism. His forte, though, is in social welfare policies. President AMLO wants to promote equity at every societal level, encom- passing segments of the population in a position of disadvantage such as the youth (specifically students), and the elderly. He has also promoted the intervention of the government in projects that should foster regional development. Those are traits that according to Caldentay (2015) are critical elements of neostructuralism: maintaining a strong state to improve the capabilities and wellbeing of a society according to Caldentay (2015) and Bielschowsky (2008). President

AMLO has referenced neostructural ideas but has not fully claimed it as the true replacement for the neoliberal economic model Mexico had / has for the past thirty years. President AMLO did the unthinkable in defeating the political giant of the PRI, by promising a new era of peace and prosperity in Mexico. However, he has confronted new and unexpected challenges that have im- pacted his fulfillment to all of his neostructuralism agendas. Such a unique challenge is the

COVID-19 global pandemic.

In future sight, I hope this paper can serve as a starting point to a comparative analysis of two different Mexican leaders, Enrique Peña Nieto and Andes Manuel Lopez Obrador.

41 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abundis, F. (2018). Peña Nieto vs. AMLO: aprobaciones históricas. Milenio 2020. milenio.com.mx. Web. April 2020.

Barrerra, A. (2020). Returned of Tainted Pemex Boss Spells Trouble for Mexico’s Old Elites. The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles. August, 2020.

Becerril, A. & Ballinas, V. (2014) Pemex y CFE, “Propiedad de Peña Nieto,” dicen Perredistas. La Jornada. Retrieved from jornada.com.mx. August, 2020.

Becas Mexico. (2020). Becas AMLO. Becas MEXICO. Retrieved from https://becasmexico.org/ becas-amlo/. August, 2020.

Bielschowsky, R. (2008). Sixty years of ECLAC: structuralism and neo-structuralism. Cepal Re view.

Camp, R. A. (2014). Politics in Mexico: Democratic consolidation or decline? Oxford, NY: Ox- ford University Press.

Campbell, A. (2005). The Birth of Neoliberalism in the United States: A Reorganisation of Capitalism. In Saad-Filho A. & Johnston D. (Eds.), Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (pp. 187-198). LONDON; ANN ARBOR, MI: Pluto Press.

Caldentay, E. (2015). “Interview on Neo-Structuralism.” World Economics Association, www.worldeconomicsassociation.org/newsletterarticles/neo-structuralism/.

Corona, S. (2018). Mexico Sentencia la Reforma Educativa de Peña Nieto Para Impulsar una Nueva. El Pais. Retrieved from elpais.com.mx. August, 2020.

Council on Hemispheric Affairs, (COHA). “Democracy in Mexico: The Past, Present, and Futrue.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Web. 18 July. 2011.

ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (2020), “Latin America and the Caribbean and the COVID-19 pandemic: economic and social effects”, COVID- 19 Special Report, No. 1, 3 April, Santiago

El Heraldo. (2020). AMLO vs. Peña Nieto: así fue el primer año de ambos mandatarios. Redac - ción Digital El Heraldo de Mexico. Web. April 2020. 42 Edmonds-Poli, E., & Shirk, D. A. (2009). Contemporary Mexican politics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Fuentes, Y. (2018). Tren Maya: Ali es el Ambicioso Proyecto que Propone AMLO y Tiene un Costo de Miles de Millones de Dólares para Mexico. BBC News Mundo. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-45254080. August, 2020.

Gantz, D. (2019). The U.S. - Mexico Trade Relationship Under AMLO: Challenges and Oppor- tunities. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. August, 2020.

Gobierno De Mexico. (2020). Pension Universal para Personas Adultas Mayores. Gobierno de MEXICO. Retrieved from https://www.gob.mx/pensionpersonasadultasmayores. August 2020.

Gwynne, R., & Kay, C. (2000). Views from the Periphery: Futures of Neoliberalism in Latin America. Third World Quarterly, 21(1), 141-156. Retrieved May 28, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/3993529

Gwynne, R., & Kay, C. (2014). Latin America Transformed Globalization and Modernity. Lon

don. NY; H Arnold.

Grier, R., & Grier, K, C. (2000). Political Cycles in Nontraditional Settings: Theory and Evi dence from the Case of Mexico. The Journal of Law & Economics, 43(1), 239-264. doi: 10.1086/467454

Harris, C. (2005). Remembering 1968 in Mexico: Elena Poniatowska's "La noche de Tlatelolco" as Documentary Narrative. Bulletin of Latin American Research, 24(4), 481-495

Hernandez Orozco, F. (2018). Estas son las 12 promesas económicas de AMLO. Economía. 100 Dias de AMLO. Retrieved from expansion.mx. Web. April. 2020.

Kotz, D. (2015). What Is Neoliberalism? In The Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capitalism (pp. 8-44). Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press. Retrieved April 28, 2020

43 Laurell, A. (2015). Three Decades of Neoliberalism in Mexico: The Destruction of Society. International Journal of Health Services, 45(2), 246-264.

Leiva, F. (2008). Historicizing Latin American Neostructuralism. In Latin American Neostruc turalism: The Contradictions of Post-Neoliberal Development (pp. 42-63). University of Minnesota Press. Retrieved May 24, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.cttttg1j.8

Gutierrez, R. (2019). Del 4% anual al “el crecimiento no importa”: las promesas económicas de AMLO. Dinero, La Silla Rota. Retrieved from. lasillarota.mx. Web April. 2020.

Leiva, F. (2008). The Future of Latin American Neostructuralism. In Latin American Neostruc turalism: The Contradictions of Post-Neoliberal Development (pp. 234-246). University of Minnesota Press. Retrieved May 24, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/ j.cttttg1j.16

Leiva, F. I. (2008). Toward a critique of Latin American neostructuralism. Latin American Poli tics and Society, 50(4), 1-25.

Limon Portillo, A. (2016). Deuda Externa de CFE Crece 74% Durante Sexenio de Peña Nieto. Forbes Mexico. August, 2020.

Lopez, I. (2019). AMLO presume 89 compromisos cumplidos de 100 a un año de gobierno. Forbes Mexico. Retrieved from forbes.com.mx. Web. April. 2020.

Lopez, J. (2019). De Los 100 Compromisos de AMLO ¿Cuanto ha Cumplido? Presidencia. Re trieved from milenio.com. Web. April. 2020.

Lopez Obrador, A. M. (2017).2018 La salida: Decadencia y renacimiento de México. Ciudad de México: Planeta.

Lopez Obrador, A. M. (2019). Hacia una economía moral. Ciudad de México: Planeta.

Lozano, G. (2020) The Inevitability of AMLO’s Washington Trip. Americas Quarterly. Retrieved from https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/amlo-goes-to-washington/ Au- gust, 2020.

Luna, C. (2018). 2012-2018: La Economia en Tiempos de Enrique Peña Nieto. Retrieved from altonivel.com.mx. Web. April. 2020.

44 MacKellar, L. (2007). Pandemic Influenza: A Review. Population and Development Review, 33(3), 429-451. Retrieved June, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/25434629

Malkin, E. (2018). Mexico's New Leader Once a NAFTA For, Welcomes New Deal. NY: The New York Times.https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/world/americas/nafta-mexi- co.html

Manji, F. (2017). NEOLIBERALISM. In ABUJBARA J., BOYD A., MITCHELL D., & TAMINATO M. (Eds.), Beautiful Rising: Creative Resistance From The Global South (pp. 192-195). New York; London: OR Books.

Mexico: Poll: Mexican Leftist Obrador Leads Ahead of 2018 Election. (2017). Asia News Monitor, p. 20.

Lopez Obrador en la presidencia, el 45% de la gente cree que la corrupción ha disminuido en el gobierno. El Economista. eleconomista.com.mx. Web. April 2020.

Morris, S. (2010). Continuity and Change in Mexican Politic: The Legacies of the Mexican Rev olution. The University of North Carolina Press. The Latin Americanist, Volume 54, Number 4, December 2010, pp.183-199. Web. April 2020.

Moreno, J. (2020). Mexico Launches Probe of Former President Peña Nieto: Report. The Hill. Capital Hill Publication Corps. August. 2020.

Moy, V. (2020). Mexico’s Economic Slump Might Last Years. Here’s Why. Americas Quarterly. americasquarterly.org. Web. April. 2020.

Navarro, M,F. (2018). Computo final: AMLO se lleva 30.11 millones de votos, 53.19%. Forbes Mexico. Retrieved from forbes.com.mx. Web. April 2020.

Nieto Parra, S., & Santiso, J. (2009). Revisiting political budget cycles in Latin America. Ortega, E. (2014). Ante Limitaciones de Oportunidades, Peña Nieto Anuncia Prospera. El Financiero. Retrieved from elfinanciero.com.mx. August, 2020.

Padierna, D. (2018). Pemexy CFE, El Saque deNuestras Empresas. El Financiero. Retrieved from elfinanciero.com.mx. August, 2020. 45 Pastor Jr, M., & Wise, C. (2005). The lost sexenio: Vicente Fox and the new politics of economic reform in Mexico. Latin American Politics and Society, 47(4), 135-160.

Partlow, J., & Martinez, G. (2015). The Americas. Mexico’s economy was supposed to soar. It’s starting to flop. The Washington Post. WP Company. Web. April. 2020.

Petras, J. (1997). Alternatives to Neoliberalism in Latin America. Latin American Perspectives, 24(1), 80-91.

Roberts, K. (2020). Its Official: Mexico is No. 1 U.S. Trade Partner for First Time, Despite Overall U.S. Trade Decline. Forbes Article. Retrieved from kenroberts/2020/02/05/ its- official-mexico-is-no-1-us-trade-partner-for-first-time-despite-overall-us-trade-de cline/ #2ba4ac9e3eab

Rodriguez, I. (2018). Enrique Peña Nieto paso del “Momento Mexico” al desacierto economico. Economía, La Jornba. Retrieved from jornada.com.mx. Web. April. 2020.

Ruelas-Gossi, A. (2012). Peña Nieto’s Plan for Mexico’s Economy. International Business. Har vard Business Review. hbr.org. Web. March 2020.

Stevenson, M (2017). Mexico Exports No Longer just Avocados, Tequila. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Retrieved from jsonline.com. August, 2020.

Saad-Filho, A. (2005). The Political Economy of Neoliberalism in Latin America. In Saad-Filho A. & Johnston D. (Eds.), Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (pp. 222-229). LONDON; ANN ARBOR, MI: Pluto Press.

Shaikh, A. (2005). The Economic Mythology of Neoliberalism. In Saad-Filho A. & Johnston D. (Eds.), Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader (pp. 41-49). LONDON; ANN ARBOR, MI: Pluto Press.

Solomon, D. B. (2018, August 29). Mexico's Pena Nieto 'optimistic' on trilateral NAFTA deal. Retrieved July, 2020, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-penanieto/me- xicos-pena-nieto-optimistic-on-trilateral-nafta-deal-idUSKCN1LE2GC

46 Story, D. (1985). Policy Cycles in Mexican Presidential Politics. Latin American Research Review, 20(3), 139-161

Rodriguez, I. (2018). Enrique Peña Nieto paso del “Momento Mexico” al desacierto economico. Economía, La Jornba. Retrieved from jornada.com.mx. Web. April. 2020.

Ruelas-Gossi, A. (2012). Peña Nieto’s Plan for Mexico’s Economy. International Business. Har vard Business Review. hbr.org. Web. March 2020.

The Economist, (2018). The Victory of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. Mexico City, MEX: The Economist. Retrieved April/May, 2020, from https://www.economist.com/the-americas/ 2018/07/02/the-victory-of-andres-manuel-lopez-obrador-starts-a-new-era-in-mexico.

Torres, C. A., & Schugurensky, D. (2002). The political economy of higher education in the era of neoliberal globalization: Latin America in comparative perspective. Higher Education, 43(4), 429-455.

Van Dalen, H., & Swank, O. (1996). Government Spending Cycles: Ideological or Opportunis tic? Public Choice, 89(1/2), 183-200. Retrieved May 28, 2020, from www.jstor.org/sta ble/3002415

47