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WELLS, TATIANA JOSEPHINE E- AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN POSTWAR GERMANY: 1944-1949.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, M.A., 198 1

COPR. 1981 WELLS, TATIANA JOSEPHINE E. Universify MiCTpfilms lflt)0rn cltlO n cil 300 N. ZEEB RD„ ANN a r b o r . Ml 48106

© 1981

TATIANA JOSEPHINE E. WELLS

All Rights Reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN

POSTWAR GERMANY; 1944-1949

by

Tatiana J. E. Wells

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

in

International Studies

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman: C Z • ÙJhJ' Dean of the College—W " ^Ar. f. Date

1981

The American University Washington, D.C. 20016

THE AMERICM UKIVERSIT? LIBRAHY ^ ^

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S ROLE

IN POSTWAR GERMANY: 1944-1949

by

Tatiana J. E. Wells

ABSTRACT

This study demonstrates the extent of American Military Govern­

ment participation in creating the West German "Basic Law."

The problems of research were the unavailability of many written

records located in Germany and living people who played a direct role in

Military Government.

The method of research consisted of examining the political,

economic, and social forces which molded the West German government,

i.e., wartime conferences; the Allied influence; Military Government

programs, directives, and documents.

The results show that the American occupation of Germany influ­

enced the future political and economic development of West Germany.

American foreign policy shifted from post-World War I isolation­

ism to Post-World War II active involvement in Western Europe. The

American Military Government's elaborate program of economic, political,

and social reconstruction in its zone of occupation nurtured the seeds

of democracy and economic prosperity visible in the Federal Republic of

Germany today.

11

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For my parents, John and Caleria Wells.

My gratitude to Drs. William Cromwell and F. G. Eyck for their

guidance and attention.

Special thanks to Andrew K. Kimball whose inspiration and help

contributed so much.

I l l

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...... Ax

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... m

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Chapter I. THE ALLIES DELIBERATE ...... 2

The Major Conferences European Advisory Commission

II. ALLIED OCCUPATION MACHINERY ...... 9

Allied Control Council The Allied Control Council Totters Rationale for American Military Government

III. EVOLUTION OF AMG FOR GERMANY...... 14

Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067

IV. AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S TASKS ...... 26

Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism Denazification Tribunals Denazification in the British, French, and Soviet Zones Re-education in the American Zone Information Control in the U.S. Zone Newspapers Books, Radio, and Film

V. ECONOMIC REFORMS ...... 47

Black Market Currency Reforms Bizonal Economic Merger Marshall Plan JCS 1779

VI. THE WAY TO DEMOCRACY...... 62

Secretary of State Byrnes' Stuttgart Speech The Laenderrat's Role Local and State Constitutions Foreign Ministers' Conferences

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. VII. REFLECTIONS...... 89 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......

V

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION

Even before the end of World War II, the Allies began deliber­

ating over what to do with the soon-to-be-defeated Nazi Germany. From

Germany's defeat in 1945 to the end of its occupation status in 1955,

the goals of America's German policy changed with the evolution of its

perceptions of global security. Throughout this dynamic occupation, the

United States sought to administer its policies through the vehicle of

American Military Government (AMG). The success of the AMG in achieving

its policy goals was closely linked to the impact on Germany of its

three major programs: denazification, reeducation, and democratization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I

THE ALLIES DELIBERATE

The Major Conferences

The question of what to do with Germany after the war had been

discussed several times at numerous wartime conferences. At the Moscow

Conference in October 1943, representatives of the United States, the

United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union met to discuss the treatment of

Germany after its defeat. They decided that those responsible for the

atrocities would be punished and that Austria would be detached from the

Reich. Otherwise, no other agreement regarding Germany was reached.

The emphasis had been put on invasion strategy at this conference, not

the occupation problem.

At Teheran in December 1943, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister

Churchill, and Marshall Stalin met again to discuss Germany. Stalin

spoke out in favor of a harsh treatment of Germany. The Big Three dis­

cussed the issue of dismemberment, but reached no decision.

While preparations were being made for the Quebec conference in

September 1944, the mood that prevailed in Washington favored a "hard"

peace. President Roosevelt's attitude toward Germany toughened as the

end of the war grew closer. The President, at this time, was particu­

larly influenced by the thinking of his close adviser and friend, Henry

Morgenthau. As Secretary of the Treasury, Morgenthau favored treating

Germany harshly. His plan was to convert Germany into a primarily

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. agricultural country by stripping her of all her industry. By elimina­

ting its industrial resources and factories, Germany could be effectively

prevented from waging another war. Roosevelt agreed with many of

Morgenthau's ideas, especially the idea that it was a fallacy that Europe

needed a strong, industrial Germany.^

The State Department also favored the plan. Secretary Morgenthau

wrote in his diary that he and Secretary of State Cordell Hull thought

along similar lines. Morgenthau wrote:

I came away with a very clear picture that Hull . . . is approach­ ing this thing with the same viewpoint that I have. . . . He said: "This Nazism is down in the German People a thousand miles deep and you have just got to uproot it, and you can't do it by just shooting a few people." . . . Stimson [Secretary of War] . . . went into a long legal discussion of how you would have to have legal proceedings before you shot the people .... Well, Hull doesn't want to wait; he just wants to shoot them all at dawn.^

In addition to the legal implications of executing Germans, Stimson was

afraid that destroying German industry would be the same as forcing

thirty million people into starvation.^

The United States was expected to present its statement of policy

toward Germany at Quebec, but the President delayed in approving any

specific policy. He still favored Morgenthau's proposals and asked the

Secretary of the Treasury to be present at the conference to discuss the

details of his plans with the British.

George Barry Percival, "Post-war Policy for Germany: Zones of Occupation and Dismemberment," unpublished research paper. School of International Service, The American University, May 1978, p. 139. 2 John Morton Blum, The Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941- 1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), p. 360.

^Ibid., p. 359.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. When Hull pressed the President to define America's position

toward Germany, the President answered in September 1944:

I think it is all very well for us to make all kinds of prepara­ tions for the treatment of Germany but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe that speed on these matters is not an essential at the present moment. It may be in a week, or it may be several months hence. I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.^

The outcome of the Quebec conference was that Churchill and

Roosevelt accepted Morgenthau's plan. The President had urged Churchill

to accept the proposal because the Treasury Department had linked post­

war aid to Britain with acceptance of the Morgenthau Plan.

When the news of the Quebec conference leaked to the press,

Roosevelt qualified his acceptance of the Morgenthau Plan in the face of

hostile American public opinion. He said that "no one wanted complete

eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr and 2 Saar." Eventually the plan was discarded, though some of its features

were embodied in early U.S. occupation policy for Germany.

Meanwhile, a detailed directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff

was in the drafting stages which would appear as the official American

policy statement toward Germany in April 1945. More concerning this

directive will be discussed in the following chapter.

European Advisory Commission

It is now important to address the subject of the European Ad­

visory Commission because its recommendations affected the decisions

arrived at during the Yalta conference in February 1945.

^U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 158.

^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The idea behind the EAC was that the Allies recognized the need for a

commission that would study postwar questions of a political nature af­

fecting Europe in general. Pre-surrender planning prior to the creation

of the EAC had been the responsibility of the Anglo-American German

Country Unit, a strictly military agency under the command of General

Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Allies hoped that the EAC would serve as a

forum where all three powers could discuss political issues and recommend

solutions. The EAC was an advisory body not capable of enacting policy,

but recommending it. That did not mean, however, that its recommenda­

tions were not inconsequential. At Yalta, for example, three of its

agreements were incorporated into the decisions made at that conference.

Officially established in London in January 1944, the tripartite

commission's major duties were to study certain European questions and

to construct surrender terms for Germany. The commission was comprised of

John Winant, the United States representative; Sir William Strang, the

British representative; and F. T. Gustav, the Soviet representative.

Each representative had a political adviser at his disposal and a staff

to assist him. Late in 1944 France was invited to join the commission.

The EAC's role concerning Germany was significant because it was

able to reach agreement on three major issues which determined the nature

and shape of the occupation. First, the commission recommended that

four zones be set up in Germany. Under four-power administration the

Allies would be given unlimited control in financial, military, and

economic matters in their respective zones.

The EAC's second recommendation regarding Germany was to empower

the zonal commanders with supreme authority in their respective zones.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The zonal commanders' authority, however, would be subject to unanimous

agreement regarding decisions which would affect Germany as a whole.

The representatives also recommended the boundaries of the zones

and suggested that Berlin come under quadripartite administration. The

three recommendations listed above would be discussed later and approved

by the Allies at Yalta as mentioned previously.

The EAC, however, failed to reach agreement on more issues re­

garding Germany because of the conflicting views proposed and the delay

in reconciling those views. President Roosevelt, placed little confi­

dence in the commission's role. In October 1944 he told Hull:

. . . we must emphasize the fact that the European Advisory Com­ mission is "advisory" and that you and I are not bound by this advice. This is something which is sometimes overlooked and if we do not remember that word "advisory" they may go ahead and execute some of the advice, which, when the time comes, we may not like at all.l

Thus, in October, when the commission was called upon to suggest

the zones of occupation, Winant had to delay stating the United States'

view because Washington had not yet equipped him with an official state­

ment. When Winant cabled Washington to ask for instructions, he received

mixed replies.

The problem was that the War, State, and Navy departments were all

in the process of formulating a policy for Winant to present to the com­

mission. Any forthcoming policy, however, had to be approved by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Final approval rested with the President, who,

in the meantime, had outlined his version of the zones of occupation on

the back of an envelope. Somehow this sketch was transmitted to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, who forwarded it to the State Department, which

^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. sent it to Winant as "self-explanatory." Upon receipt of the Presi­

dent's outline, Winant was faced with further delays in the EAC because

the proposal differed from the British and Soviet proposals in that it

restricted the size of the proposed Soviet zone. Quite frustrated by

the whole incident, Winant's counselor, George Kennan, remarked that he

"was concerned that the new body [EAC] should at some point and by some

mischance actually do something."^

The EAC, then, was limited in its policy-making ability. Its

efforts were often hampered by President Roosevelt, who did not want to

be bound by the commission's decisions. Because of the variety of Allied

interests in Germany, the EAC was able to agree only on three major pol­

icy decisions regarding Germany. The amount of time expended on reach­

ing agreements resulted in its dissolution by the Allies at Potsdam.

They obviously agreed that the slowness in reaching agreements was a

handicap to them in light of the pressing need to solve problems more

rapidly. Following the dissolution of the EAC, policy decisions regard­

ing Germany were made through conferences by the occupation powers'

heads of government and the separate meetings of their foreign ministers.

The Allies expressed their greatest unity at Potsdam in July

1945. The directive that resulted from the conference permitted the

establishment of political parties in Germany; promised restoration of

local governments; the organization of representative and elective

principles into regional, provincial, and state administrations; and

^Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 33.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the freedom of speech, the press, and religion.^ Agreement was also

reached on the uniformity of treatment of the German population. The

four-power Allied Control Council was instructed to supervise German

administrative departments headed by state secretaries. The Potsdam

Protocol specified that "Germany shall be treated as an economic unit

and to that end common policies should be established in certain key

areas." The Potsdam Protocol was perhaps "the most important document 2 bearing on the German Problem."

^Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1950), p. 40.

^Ibid., p. 39.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER II

ALLIED OCCUPATION MACHINERY

At Yalta, as noted before, the occupation powers each decided to

occupy a separate zone in Germany. They believed that partitioning Ger­

many into zones of occupation would facilitate military government duties

in Germany after the war. The British would occupy the northwest zone;

the Russians, the east; the French, the southwest; and the Americans,

Bavaria (the southeast). The city of Berlin would be placed under joint

administration comprised of a quadripartite governing authority, the

Kommandatura, which consisted of four commandants, each of whom would

rotate in turn as Chief Commandant.

Allied Control Council

Since there was no central German government operating in Germany

when the Allies entered, a control network had to be set up in order to

coordinate policies among the zones. The decision to create occupation

machinery for the Allies had been recommended first by the EAC and then

accepted by the Allies at Yalta. The Allied Control Council (ACC) was

established in the summer of 1945 with a main concern to establish

central German governmental agencies.

The organization of the ACC consisted of representatives of the

four Allies. The Allies usually designated their top military commanders

in Germany to these posts. Each member was assisted by his State Depart­

ment or Foreign Office to handle political matters. The council was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10

concerned basically with overall policies affecting Germany and supervis­

ing Allied occupation procedures. Below the council sat the quadripari-

partite Coordinating Committee and the deputy military governors, who

dealt with the immediate problems of the occupation.^ Under them was

the Secretariat, which consisted of representatives from the four powers

who rotated to serve as secretary general. The Secretariat was respon­

sible chiefly for maintaining records and administrative details. Twelve

directorates, or working committees, were directly below the Secretariat. 2 They dealt with various functional aspects of the occupation.

The Allied Control Council Totters

The Control Council worked well together on common themes such

as demilitarizing Germany, but disagreed on how to build a new government

for it. The fact that each member of the council had the right to veto

helped kill the council's effectiveness. One aim of the Potsdam Con­

ference had been to re-establish German central administrative depart­

ments to deal with the important economic and technological problems

that would emerge after the war.

The French did not feel bound by the decisions made at Potsdam

because they had not been invited to attend. Therefore, they often exer­

cised their veto opposting the idea of all-German Departments in key

areas. They frequently blocked agreements, insisting that the Ruhr and

Rhineland had to be put under international control before they would

cooperate. From August 1945 well into 1945, the French blocked the

^Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York; Macmillan Co., 1947), p. 58.

^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11

establishment of central German agencies by the ACC. The result was that

neither the office of Military Government, U.S. Zone (OMGUS) nor the

Allied Control Council could calculate the peacetime level of industry

or reparations without decision on the status of the Saar, Ruhr, and the

Rhineland.

In the ACC there was disagreement on the amount of reparations

to which the Soviet Union would be entitled. At Potsdam it had been

decided that 25 percent of the usable surplus capital equipment, not

needed to support minimum German subsistence, would be transferred from

the Western zones to the Soviet Union. The Western zones, in exchange,

were to receive 15 percent of the value of such transfers to be shipped

to the Western zones in the form of raw materials and agricultural com­

modities. The West sent its agreed deliveries to the Soviet Union, but

received nothing in return. Failure of the ACC to reach agreement re­

garding treatment of Germany as a single economic unit prompted Stalin

to strip the Soviet zone and begin transferring equipment from its zone

to the Soviet Union.

The ACC thus began to break up when major agreements could no

longer be reached. Professor Carl J. Friedrich summed up the council's

fate :

That a quadripartite condominium could not successfully govern a country in such a state of disorganization and exhaustion as Ger­ many was in during 1945-1946 was a foregone conclusion. Even if the four occupying powers had been united in general outlook and ideology, their divergent interests would have prevented such an enterprise from being a complete success.^

Carl J. Friedrich, American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1948), p. 201.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12

In the absence of ACC agreement, each zonal commander retained full

authority within his zone of occupation.

Let us now turn to the creation of military government for Ger­

many and examine the people, agencies, and structure of the American

Military Government which constituted the administrative instrument by

which the United States realized its occupation purpose in Germany.

Rationale for American Military Government

A return to conditions even remotely labeled "normal" in Europe

depended to a great extent on Germany. Germany is located directly in

the heart of Central Europe. Her economy has traditionally been geared

closely to Europe. More than one-half of Europe's steel and much of its

coal came from Germany before the war. German soil, moreover, has been

the scene of many feudal wars as well as World Wars I and II. The secur­

ity and economic prosperity of the world as a whole were tied up with

Europe. The United States felt it was in her interest and that of the

world to "establish a climate of world peace, stability and prosperous

economic conditions rather than face, perhaps again, political, social,

and economic chaos.

American military government was not a totally new experience

after World War II. For example, during the war civilians had to be

kept out of the combat troops' paths, and supply lines and communications 2 had to be preserved. The most important function of military govern­

ment, perhaps, was making provisions for administering occupied territory

until Congress and the President decided what should be done.^

1 2 Zink, p. 5. Ibid., p. 1.

^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13

Military government organization in Germany "surpassed any other

in size, scope and elaborateness."^ The need for military government to

administer Germany was recognized because a semblance of political,

economic, and social order had to be maintained even before hostilities

ended. The organizational and functional aspects of its role, however,

often were subject to disagreement. It is now important to this study

to examine the evolution of AMG in Germany.

^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER III

EVOLUTION OF AMG FOR GERMANY

While the war was still in progress, the Office of the Provost

Marshal General and a Civil Affairs Division were set up in the War De­

partment to prepare for military government in the field. It was obvious

that military government organization in the field had to be staffed by

persons not in the army at that time, but some authorities in Washington

became concerned about preparing soldiers for civil administration.

After the War Department had made the decision to place the responsi­

bility for civil affairs in the Provost Marshal General's Office (PMGO),

various authorities interested in the problem began to express doubts

about preparing soldiers for civil administration.^

President Roosevelt, at first, believed that military control of 2 civil affairs was inexpedient and theoretically wrong. He felt that a

democracy's army had no right entering into another nation's political 3 sphere. Arguments against entrusting soldiers with civil administration

included the following: (a) the Army wasn't qualified to conduct civil

affairs efficiently; or (b) despite success, the Army would be unable to

deal with the job with enough humanity, democracy, or political'economic

enlightenment; or (c) though the Army, on occasion, governed foreign

Albert K. Weinberg and Harry L. Coles, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, in United States Army in World War II: Special Studies (Office of the Chief of Military History, Departme,.of the Army, Wash­ ington, D.C., 1964), Vol. 8, p. 4.

^Ibid. ^Ibid.

14

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15

territory efficiently, the taste of civil power might give some military

leader ambitions for political power at home; and (3) it was irretriev­

ably wrong in principle for a democracy to make soldiers governors in

any place and at any time.^

Secretary of War Stimson argued that "it was impossible to entrust

civil affairs to anyone but soldiers while certain military conditions 2 prevailed and that the precise duration of conditions could not be known."

Military occupation, in some cases, had been brief and at other times

long because of "tactical and logistical relationships between an area

where combat had ceased and an adjacent area where fighting was still in

progress."^ Stimson assured the President that civil affairs within the

Army would be conducted by persons commissioned on the merit of their

skills in civilian life.

In 1942 the need was felt to establish a school to train civil­

ians for military government service. A civilian consultant to the War

Department, Jessie Miller, expressed his ideas on what a military govern­

ment school should teach:

The ideal type of military government is one which integrates the local laws, institutions, customs, psychology and economics of the occupied area and a superimposed military control with a minimum of change in the former and a maximum of control by the latter.^

The first School of Military Government was established at

Charlottesville, Virginia, in 1942. Several hundred officers recruited

from Army units and many civilians were also sent to Fort Custer,

Michigan, for one month's training. These officers were then sent to

Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 5.

^Ibid. “^Ibid., p. 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16

Civil Affairs Training Schools on various campuses across the country

including Harvard, Yale, Pittsburgh, Boston, Michigan, Northwestern,

Western Reserve, Wisconsin, and Stanford.^ Training lasted for a period

of two months, after which the officers were shipped overseas to Japan,

Italy, Germany, and England. The Civil Affairs Training Schools program

lasted until September 1943.

While the war was still in progress. Army and Navy training

schools had produced thousands of military government specialists.

There were public health officers, social workers, forestry experts,

policemen, firemen, postal authorities, transportation directors, teach- 2 ers, lawyers, wholesalers, and retailers. The army had also organized

a network of country units, missions, G-5 staffs, and field detachments

throughout the world to take care of military government needs.

The commanding General of the United States Forces in the Euro­

pean Theater, Dwight D. Eisenhower, commented on the superior job mili­

tary government specialists had done relieving combat forces "by taking

care of problems often more effectively than tactical officers detailed 3 for that purpose." On the basis of the work performed in the Mediter­

ranean and in North Africa, military government programs were organized

for France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and Germany.

Military government in Germany "was not a simple matter as in

Japan where American officers decided what to do and the Japanese of- 4 ficials carried out the orders." The occupation in Germany was the

responsibility of the United States and her three allies, the Soviet

^Ibid., p. 15. ^Zink, p. 32.

^Ibid., p. 3. ^Ibid., p. 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17

Union, the United Kingdom, and France. The administrative programs of

the occupation had to be coordinated between the four nations' military

government specialists. Building a new government in Germany also proved

to be a difficult and novel task.

The responsibility for drafting occupation plans and policies

became divided between Washington and the ETO (European Theater of Opera­

tions) when it was realized that Washington was unable to formulate

clear-cut policies resulting from broad agreements reached at the Allied

wartime conferences.

Detailed planning for the occupation began taking place in the

ETO under General Eisenhower, who had been issued SHAEF (Supreme Head­

quarters Allied Expeditionary Force) directives by the Combined Chiefs

of Staff early in 1944. While preparing for the invasion of Western

Europe, General Eisenhower had set up country units within the SHAEF

organizations to plan civil affairs operations in liberated and defeated

countries.

Early in 1944 most of the military government officers who had

trained for service in Germany were sent to Shrivenham, England, where a

German Country Unit had been set up, in the absence of firm directives

from Washington, to deal with planning matters. More than 2,000 Ameri­

can officers underwent additional training and awaited further develop­

ments there.^ Three boards were organized at Shrivenham to interview

the officers and assign them to various detachments and staffs. In the

spring of 1944 many officers were moved to Eastbourne and Manchester,

^Ibid., p. 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18

where they were organized into detachments, received their equipment, and

were assigned to the field.

The major responsibility of the German Country Unit was to serve

as special staff to Supreme Headquarters. It was also responsible for

preparing a series of Handbooks for Military Government, which served as

guides for military officers in the field. Various manuals, handbooks,

instructions, forms, reports, and reference materials were also provided

to military government by the Civil Affairs Division of the War Depart­

ment, the Office of Strategic Services, The British Combined Intelli­

gence Department, and the State Department.^ The German Country Unit,

comprised of about 150 British and American staff officers, worked pri­

marily on drafting plans for the control of various Reich ministries.

The German Country Unit dissolved in August 1944 when Washington decided

that military government planning should come under national, rather

than allied, control. The U.S. Group Control Council for Germany took

its place.

The U.S. Group Control Council for Germany began work in October

1944 and took over the U.S. personnel who had been assigned to the Ger­

man Country Unit. It also took over the unit's major duties. The U.S.

Group CC was given the responsibility for military government planning,

and it grew to almost 2,000 officers and more than 4,000 enlisted men in 2 June of 1945, when it moved to Hoechst, near Frankfurt.

Military government in Germany was undergoing a lot of changes

in the immediate postwar days and a new group, G-5 of USFET (United

States Forces, European Theater), was given the go-ahead to take over

^Ibid., p. 17. ^Ibid., p. 44.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19

much of the planning and drafting for the U.S. zone of occupation.

After a lot of "jockeying of various brass hats for power," the U.S.

Group CC regained its authority to continue planning after its name was

changed to OMGUS (Office of Military Government for the U.S. Zone)

Early in 1946 Berlin was picked as the new American military

government's headquarters in Germany. OMGUS served as the staff of the

American military governor, McNarney, who was also the United States

representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany. OMGUS was

directly responsible to the deputy military governor. General Lucius

Clay, who represented the United States on the Coordinating Committee.

The Berlin office of OMGUS had full responsibility for represen­

tation on the Allied Control Council and was responsible for issuing all

policy directives pertaining to financial, economic, reparations, resti- 2 tution, and manpower matters. The Frankfurt office controlled the

legal and administrative matters and public health, welfare, and safety

concerns until it was abolished in March 1946.^

Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 - 4 JCS 1067 guided AMG policy during the early stages of the occu­

pation. Prior to September 1944 AMG officials had followed SHAEF direc­

tives which were issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. JCS 1067,

named after its file number, instructed General Eisenhower to "take

1 2 Ibid. Clay, p. 55.

^Ibid. 4 American military government, AMG, and Office of Military Gov­ ernment, OMGUS, are synonymous and will be used interchangeably through­ out this text.

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actions only of short and military character in order not to prejudice

whatever ultimate policies may be later determined upon."^ Eisenhower

hoped that the Control Council would adopt the directive's policies, but

each member of the ACC decided to continue following its respective

government's instructions.

JCS 1067 was the result of the War Department's decision to de­

fine its position on the occupation as victory in Germany drew closer.

Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy came out strongly in favor of the

directive because General Eisenhower needed instructions urgently. Thus,

JCS 1067, or the "Directive to SCAEF Regarding the Military Government of

Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized

Resistance (Post-Defeat)," appeared on September 22, 1944. The State

Department hesitated to approve the directive at first because of the

directive's strong similarity to the Morgenthau Plan. It accepted the

final version of the directive. May 11, 1945, which eliminated the plan

to destroy the German economy.

Harry Truman succeeded Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. He was

particularly admired for his decisiveness and no-nonsense attitude exem­

plified by his desk plate aphorism "the buck stops here." He took a

tougher stance vis-à-vis the Russians than had his predecessor. Truman

essentially followed Roosevelt's policy regarding Germany though, be­

cause he was relatively inexperienced in foreign policy decision making

and, also, the sudden death of the President gave him little time to

define his own ideas on the occupation of Germany. Roosevelt, however.

^John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 122,

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seemed to have grown tougher toward Germany shortly before he died; and

when the initial JCS 1067 was presented to him, he said "he was still in

a tough mood and that he was determined to be tough with Germany."^ He

decided that the directive was sufficiently rigorous and what he really

liked about it was that "it did not dot all the i's and cross all the 2 t's."

Because Eisenhower needed guidelines to instruct him on the

course of the occupation, JCS 1067 became effective in the fall of 1944

even though revisions eliminating unduly harsh elements of the directive

continued through the spring of 1945.

An example of JCS 1067's harshness is seen in the non­

fraternization policy. The directive instructed General Eisenhower that:

Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied ob­ jectives. In the conduct of your occupation and administration you should be just, firm and aloof. You will strongly discourage frat­ ernization with the German officials and population.^

The directive was unpopular among the soldiers and difficult to enforce.

American soldiers in Germany frequently dated German girls and did not

hesitate to give small German children candy bars whenever they could.

In an attempt to control fraternization, the Allied Forces Net­

work broadcast heavily in the spring and summer of 1945 discouraging

fraternization. The theme of one particular broadcast went like this:

"If in a German town you bow to a pretty girl or pat a blond child . . .

^U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, pp. 409-10.

^Ibid.

^Arthur Settel, ed.. This is Germany (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1956), p. 142.

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you bow to Hitler and his reign of blood , . . you caress the ideology

that means death and persecution. Don't fraternize."^ Even if a soldier

deliberately tried to avoid contact with a German, he could not be guar­

anteed success. Many GI's lived in German households, and there were

frequent social gatherings and sporting events where contact with Germans

was unavoidable. The non-fraternization policy was so strict that it

even forbade GI's from talking to Germans on the street or even shaking

hands with them. If a soldier were caught fraternizing with a German,

he was subject to reprimand; withdrawal of privileges; or, in extreme

cases, court-martial. To complicate matters further, hundreds of thou­

sands of displaced persons were present in Germany right after the war. 2 How was a soldier to know who was German and who was not? OMGUS remedied

that dilemma by requiring DP's to wear armbands designating them as such.

To get around this minor inconvenience, soldiers often would give DP

women candy, cigarettes, or stockings in return for their armbands,

which they later wrapped around the arms of their German girl friends.

Gradually modifications in the non-fraternization rule were

introduced. The first change came on June 8, 1945, when General Eisen­

hower said that the rule obviously was not meant to apply to "very small

children."^ In July conversation with German adults in public places

was allowed; and in August it was announced that members of Eisenhower's

command could have normal contacts with Germans.^ In September the ban

^Ibid. 2 Soldiers were allowed to fraternize with DP's.

^Settel, p. 145. '^Ibid.

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was lifted completely, except for the prohibition against American- 1 German marriages.

As discussed in Chapter I, JCS 1067 was the directive the Joint

Chiefs of Staff were preparing early in 1944 while Washington was still

in a tough mood toward Germany and favored the provisions of the

Morgenthau Plan. The punitive character of the document is clearly

visible from the following excerpt which President Roosevelt added to the

final draft. Section 4, paragraph (a), reads:

It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany's ruthless warfare and fanatical resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves.%

The most punitive aspect of JCS 1067, however, lay in its eco­

nomic provisions toward Germany, which reflected the Morgenthau Plan to

a great extent and provided that reparations would be obtained by dis­

mantling industry or from forced labor. General Clay complained, early

in 1945 before the Potsdam conference had taken place, that the economic

provisions of JCS 1067 were unrealistic because "the progress of the war

in Germany had accomplished more destruction than the people at home

realized."^ He believed that increased production, not economic de­

struction, was necessary for the welfare of Germany and Europe in the

long run. JCS 1067 had aimed at destroying German war potential by

restricting German industry. Clay realized the consequences of

^Ibid. 2 U.S. Department of State, Germany, 1947-1949, The Story in Documents, Department of State Publication No. 3556, 1950, p. 23. 3 Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Germany, 1945-49, Vol. I (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 12.

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destroying the Germany economy. Early in 1945 he wrote McCloy the fol­

lowing :

. . . I think that Washington must revise its thinking relative to destruction of Germany's war potential as an immediate problem. The progress of the war has accomplished that and it is my view now (based on general impressions, I must admit) that the industry which remains, with few exceptions, even when restored will suf­ fice barely for a very low minimum living standard in Germany. If this is to be provided, we must have sufficient freedom here to bring industries back into production for that purpose. They cannot be avoided if we are to succeed in establishing rea­ sonable order and meet essential needs of the occupying forces.^

As mentioned earlier, JCS 1067 told General Eisenhower to urge

the ACC to adopt the directive for enforcement throughout Germany.

Before this could be accomplished, however, the Allies met at Potsdam in

July 1945, where they agreed to treat Germany as an economic unit and

set up German central agencies to implement that goal.

Because the economic provisions of Potsdam were more flexible

than those of JCS 1067 by allowing German industry to continue to exist,

OMGUS was told to interpret JCS 1067 "in light of Potsdam." Conditions

in Germany were far worse than the policy makers of JCS 1067 had antici­

pated. For example, the Price Report of November 1945 revealed some

gloomy facts about Germany : exports would have to be developed which

would help Germany pay for heeded imports, and the 1,550 calorie per day

food ration had to be increased. The findings of the Price Report

prompted the State Department to come out in favor of supporting Potsdam

over JCS 1067. On December 12, 1945, echoing the words of the Potsdam

agreement, the statement read:

It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people It is the intention of the Allies that the German

^Ibid.

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people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual re­ construction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world.^

After Potsdam, AMG officials were instructed to interpret JCS

1067 in light of Potsdam. In this respect, Potsdam did represent a formal

revision of JCS 1067 because it allowed for the gradual recovery of the

German economy. The economic provisions of JCS 1067, as modified by

Potsdam, called for increased economic production, not destruction.

Potsdam made possible the eventual establishment of a democratic system

through economic reconstruction.

^U.S. Department of State, Bulletin 13 (December 16 1945): 964-65.

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AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S TASKS

The denazification program that OMGUS carried out exemplified

the punitive character of JCS 1067. Pre-surrender planning for denazi­

fication existed, but did not receive the attention or priority which

JCS 1067 demanded.

Until JCS 1067 went into effect in the early part of 1945, the

German Country Unit of SHAEF conducted most preparation for the occupa­

tion. The Planning Section and the Board of Editors of the German Unit

gave careful attention to denazification because at that time no specific

Washington policy had emerged regarding denazification. The AMG turned

to the Office of Strategic Services for data to incorporate into the

military Handbook. As the war continued in the fall of 1944, the German

Country Unit ended, the U.S. Group CC resumed preparations for the oc­

cupation, and denazification specialists urgently became needed.^ Even

after the war had ended, only one officer worked on denazification in 2 the Office of Political Affairs of the U.S. Group CC. As time passed,

denazification received more attention, and greater emphasis was placed

on it to the extent that its staff grew larger than the staffs of any

Before the German Country Unit was abolished, it transferred the responsibility for coordinating denazification policies to the U.S. Group CC. The CC made up lists of Nazis and suspected Nazis to be ar­ rested or removed from positions. 2 Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton: I), Van Nostrand Co., 1957), p. 158.

26

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other program. When the U.S. Group CC became OMGUS, denazification be­

came the priority of AMG's tasks during the occupation.

The Directive to the Commander in Chief of the United States

Forces of Occupation regarding Germany, April 1945, stated that Germany

was to be treated as a defeated, not liberated, country. Germany also

had to be prevented from threatening world peace again. In the direc­

tive's words; "Essential steps in the accomplishment of this objective

are the elimination of Nazism and militarism in all their forms.The

importance of this goal was demonstrated by the fact than an entire sec­

tion of JCS 1067 dealt exclusively with denazification procedures: "All

members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants

in its activities, all active supporters of Nazism or militarism and all

other persons hostile to Allied purposes will be removed and excluded 2 from positions of importance in quasi-public and private enterprises."

This order applied to (1) civic, economic, and labor organizations;

(2) corporations; (3) industry, commerce, agriculture, and finance; 3 (4) education; and (5) the press and information media.

The dimensions of the task grew enormously. Where was one to

begin in a country where Nazism had touched every phase of German public

life: schools, courts, churches, hospitals, trade and industry, civic 4 administrations, newspapers, radio, entertainment. Eight million people

were suspected of membership in the Nazi party and another four million

U.S. Department of State, The Axis in Defeat: A Collection of Documents on American Policy toward Germany and Japan, publication no. 2423, p. 43,

^Ibid., p. 45. ^Ibid. 4 Julian Bach, Jr., America's Germany : An Account of the Occupa­ tion (New York: Random House, 1946), p. 173.

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of affiliation with Nazi organizations.^ AMG began by first preparing

questionnaires, Fragebogen, which everyone over the age of eighteen seek­

ing employment had to complete. Fragebogen consisted of 131 questions

about affiliations with Nazi organizations, university fraternities, in­

come, ownership of land, and other intimate details of the person's life.

Those who filled out the questionnaires were warned to tell the truth or

face prosecution. Those who wished to keep their jobs, whether in public

office or the neighborhood bakery, had to fill out the Fragebogen. The

answers were reviewed by specially trained staffs of the Public Safety

Division in OMGUS. The Counter Intelligence Corps and Special Branch of

Military Government checked the backgrounds of Germans suspected of Nazi

affiliation. Information about individuals was supplemented by collect­

ing Gestapo files, police records, and party records when available.

The Public Safety Division immediately removed those persons whose removal

was designated "mandatory." Persons labeled "discretionary" were ordered

to appear before denazification tribunals.

Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism

Late in November 1945, preparations began for entrusting Germans

with the process of denazification. The minister-presidents in the

American zone were instructed to prepare drafts on the subject and

drafted a "Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism" in

the Council of States. The law read:

1) For 12 years National Socialism and Militarism ruled Germany with terror and violence, committed most serious crimes against

^A. J. Ryder, Twentieth-Century Germany : From Bismarck to Brandt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 468.

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the German people and the world, plunged Germany into distress and misery and destroyed the German Reich. The liberation from National Socialism and Militarism is an indispensable pre­ requisite to political, economic and cultural reconstruction. 2) American Military Government has, during the past months follow­ ing the surrender, carried out the removal and exclusion of National Socialists and Militarists from public administration and other positions. 3) On January 12, 1946, the Control Council has, in Directive No. 24, issued regulations for all Germany for removal and ex­ clusion which are binding upon the German Governments and the German people. 4) Law No. 8 of Military Government and Regulation No. 1 thereunder extended the liberation to the field of trade and industry and introduced the appeal procedure through German Investigation Boards. 5) American Military Government has now decided that the German people may share the responsibility for liberation from National Socialism and Militarism in all fields. The discharge of the task thus entrusted to the German people will be accomplished by this law, within the framework of Control Council Directive No. 24.1

Handing over the responsibility of denazification to the Germans

constituted one of the most controversial steps taken by AMG. Those who

were in favor of the decision supported the argument that letting the

Germans purge themselves was in step with the best American traditions of

democracy. Opponents argued that AMG had become too bogged down in the 2 program and was using the Germans as scapegoats. The "Law for Libera­

tion from National Socialism and Militarism" was initially rejected by

the AMG because military officials felt it concentrated on rounding up

the major Nazi criminals and paid less attention to the smaller criminals

in civil, professional, and legal fields. After AMG incorporated

Special Branch Office of Military Government, Bavaria, German Denazification Law and All Implementations and American Directives, 2nd ed., ed. Cecil Wood and Curtis Shell, April 1947. 2 Zink, United States, p. 158.

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Law No. 8 and Control Council Directive No. 24 into the law, it was

accepted in March 1946.^

Public Law No. 8, which was included in the "Law for Liberation

from National Socialism and Militarism," extended the field of denazifi­

cation because, previously, Fragebogen had not been filled out by all

Germans, only those over the age of eighteen in the American zone.

Answering questionnaires was not compulsory in the other occupation zones.

Many Germans had fled to the other zones where filling out questionnaires

was not mandatory. Law No. 8 grew out of increased demand to apply more

stringent denazification programs. Public opinion in the United States

pressured AMG to crack down harder on Nazis. Newspapers and magazines

often accused military government of being "too soft" on Nazis. General

Patton, who had likened Nazis to Republicans and Democrats back home,

was dismissed from head of the 3rd Army because of this comparison.

Law No. 8 strengthened the call of JCS 1057 to conduct a thorough

denazification program. That is, it went a step further than JCS 1067

in that it specified who could work, when, and where. Law No. 8 stated:

"However slight the apparent extent of Nazi party participation, a mem- 2 ber's continued employment except in ordinary labor is unlawful." Ex-

Nazis were allowed to do ordinary labor, but were barred from positions

such as directors, managers, or foremen where they could exercise eco­

nomic power over other Germans.^

Law No. 24 called for the "Removal from Office and from Posi­ tions of Responsibility of Nazis and of Persons Hostile to Allied Pur­ poses . " 2 U.S. Department of State, Axis, p. 82.

^This is in particular reference to Law No. 24 which, incor­ porated with Law No. 8, made the "Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism" acceptable to AMG in March 1946.

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A story which became widespread was of two former Berlin bank officials who had become street cleaners in the fall of 1945, one employed within the Military Government grounds in Berlin and the other by the borough of Zehlendorf in which these grounds were located. One day they met while pursuing their street-cleaning activities and recognized each other. Their mutual question was, "What are you doing here?" The Military Government employee spoke up proudly: "I was able to get work and a hot noon meal here as a street cleaner because of my clean record in never having associated with the Nazis." The other replied: "Under the law I am required to work too, so I applied to the borough office where I was told that since I had belonged to the party the only job open to me was to be a street cleaner, so here I am.

A certain amount of inefficiency was implicit in the logic of

this law, but upon signing Law No. 8 Eisenhower said:

I have announced a firm policy of uprooting the whole Nazi organiza­ tion regardless of the fact that we may sometimes suffer from local administration inefficiency. Reduced to its fundamentals, the United States entered this war as a foe of Nazism; victory is not complete until we have eliminated from positions of responsibility and, in appropriate cases, properly punished every active adherent to the Nazi Party.2

The benefits of Law No. 8 were that it transferred the responsi­

bility of denazification to the Germans and avoided a repetition of

Versailles after World War I when the allied powers imposed controls on

the Germans which bred resentment and which Hitler later exploited. AMG

also hoped that the process would be accelerated by the many Germans

working on denazification and AMG would have more time for repairing

buildings, distributing food, and getting transportation facilities

functioning, among many other urgent needs of the early days of the oc­

cupation .

^Clay, p. 82. 2 Bach, p. 184.

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Denazification Tribunals

Under the "Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Mili­

tarism, " 545 German Tribunals were created wherein Germans would denazify

themselves under American military government supervision.^ Five cate­

gories were set up by the law to try offenders: (1) major offenders,

(2) offenders, (3) lesser offenders, (4) followers, and (5) nonoffenders.

Major offenders could receive up to ten years' imprisonment, exclusion

from public office, and property confiscation; offenders could be fined,

imprisoned, and excluded from public office; and lesser offenders could

be subject to a fine. The Laender in the American zone set up denazifi­

cation ministries to oversee the program, and appellate tribunals were

created to which cases from local denazification tribunals could be

brought. General Clay reported that persons staffing the 545 tribunals 2 in the American zone exceeded 22,000.

The problems of denazification were complicated by the fact that

finding judges, prosecutors, investigators, and other staff to carry out

denazification, who themselves had escaped Nazi taint, proved difficult.

Hitler had thoroughly destroyed the Weimar system by dissolving institu­

tions which did not fit in with his plans for the Reich. He reorganized

professional, legal, sporting, and other organizations through his Lea­

dership Principle, which commanded complete obedience and loyalty from

his Party members, the army, the people, the nation itself. The economic

and political crises that prevailed during Weimar aided Hitler in his

policy of destruction. The weak constitution of Weimar and the burden

of the Treaty of Versailles allowed Hitler to appeal to the German

^Clay, p. 259. ^Ibid.

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people for a change in Germany. He promised to reorganize economic,

political, and social institutions in order to build a strong Germany.

He also promised an end to unemployment and to pitfalls of democracy in

which divisive self-interests and individual freedoms prevailed. This

was all accomplished by gearing the German nation to national unity and

national purpose under a strong central authority— Hitler.

The whole of Germany had been caught up on the monolithic struc­

ture of Nazism. It is not surprising, therefore, that plebescites held

under Hitler's rule granted him 95 percent, 98 percent, and 99 percent

of the vote.^ Those persons who believed that future affluence and suc­

cess in Hitler's Germany depended on membership in the Nazi party queued

up at local party headquarters to join. Others who were afraid that by

rejecting Nazism they would incur economic, social, and political ostra­

cism jumped on the bandwagon while they still could. There were others

who voted for Hitler in order to avoid harassment and physical harm.

Military government's search for judges and lawyers who had not

been controlled by the Nazis came up with only a small group of lawyers

who had been anti-Nazi and, therefore, removed from practice. These

lawyers were supplemented by judges and lawyers brought from the United

States to work on denazification in the early stages. Later, as the pro­

cess became more the responsibility of the Germans themselves, other

qualified anti-Nazis were recruited to add to the ranks of the denazifi­

cation personnel.

^Constantine FitzGibbon, Denazification (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 45.

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Under Hitler, "No punishment without the Law" did not exist.

Judges answered to Nazi party officials; and the Gestapo would often ar­

rest, punish, and even execute a defendant after he had been acquitted.

Special courts, like the People's Court invented by the Nazis, were ex­

ceptionally severe and prohibited a defendant from presenting evidence

in his defense and from viewing the charges against him. The denazifi­

cation purges eliminated approximately 80 percent of the judges who had 1 presided over this sytem, most of whom had been Nazi party members.

The German denazification tribunals started off to a relatively

slow beginning. Five months after the tribunals had been in existence

and had examined 583,985 cases, they eliminated 530,907 of them without 2 trial. General Clay warned the Germans in charge of denazification 3 that they had better improve their record in a hurry.

Denazification in the British, French, and Soviet Zones

Each occupying power had a different concept of how to accomplish

denazification in its zone. The divergence in policies was already

visible in the early period of the occupation. In an effort to unify

zonal denazification policies, the United States urged the other occupy­

ing powers to follow the JCS 1057 directive in light of the Potsdam

Declaration.

The French, however, had not been a party to Potsdam and chose

to accept only three of the four agreements reached on denazification at

Potsdam. Paragraph C of the Three-Power Declaration stated: "All

1 2 Bach, p. 145, Zink, United States, p. 163.

^Ibid.

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members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in

its activities [shall be] . . . removed from public and semi-public of­

fice, and from positions of responsibility in important private under­

takings."^ The French responded to this paragraph by instituting an

"Ordinance for Political Cleansing" for South Wuerttemberg, part of the

French zone, as a model to be applied to the remainder of their zone.

The French method of denazification placed great emphasis on handling

nazis as individuals rather than to categorize them in forms such as the

Fragebogen which were in use throughout the U.S. zone. The preamble to

the "Ordinance for Political Cleansing" stated.

Whereas political cleansing demands energetic action against national Socialism and Militarism . . . at the same time a thorough and just consideration of each individual case is also needed. [Denazification] must secure the well-being of all the people.^ 3 French courts distinguished between Will and Müss Nazis.

Constantine FitzGibbon says: "one result of this was that as early as

October 1945, 27 Germans dismissed in the U.S. zone had found official 4 employment with the French."

French prosecution of Nazis was based on denunciations usually

by other Germans. The defense relied more heavily on personal testimony

of past actions than on documentation concerning past membership of con­

demned Nazi organizations.

^FitzGibbon, p. 108. ^Ibid.

^Will Nazis were those people who freely chose to join the Nazi Party. Müss Nazis were those who joined against their personal convic­ tions, but did so because they feared physical harm or even death if they refused. 4 FitzGibbon, p. 114.

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Although Britain had been heavily bombed by the Nazis during the

war, British denazification showed surprisingly no traces of retaliation

or revenge, compared to American denazification, which reflected the

tough mood of JCS 1067. In the British zone, military officials fol­

lowed, more or less, American denazification policy until July 14, 1945,

when Field-Marshal Montgomery no longer received his orders from General

Eisenhower. Thereafter he followed London's policy.

London's policy placed priority on economic reconstruction

rather than political purging in its zone. Richard Brett-Smith described

the practices of British Military Government concerning denazification:

Our Military Government was an unqualified success, on the whole. The chief reason for this, I think, was that we had not in any way been trained for it, nor told how to catch out the gas works manager or check the harbour-master's returns. We knew nothing whatever about Military Government as practised by those who came after us. We relied therefore, upon the rule of thumb and common sense, and left Germans who knew their business to get on with it.^

The British, therefore, exercised caution in punishing businessmen and

professional people who could be valuable to them during the reconstruc­

tion.

In the Soviet zone, denazification played a subordinate role to

dismantling factories, destroying German war materiel, and the destruc- 2 tion of capitalism. No Fragebogen were issued in the Soviet zone; but

Soviet officials punished, imprisoned, and liquidated suspected Nazis as

they chose. Soviet Military Administration order No. 201 specified that

denazification had to end by August 16, 1947, but most denazification

had been completed by the end of 1945. As tension mounted between East

^Brett-Smith cited in FitzGibbon, p. 87.

^Ibid., pp. 100-101.

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and West, the Soviets used denazification as an opportunity to expand

their propaganda. Soviet officials appealed to Germans to capture Nazis

and follow their political system.^

The Allied Control Council issued Directive No. 38 in October

1945 in an attempt to at least harmonize the Western powers' denazifica­

tion policies. The document guided denazification procedures by setting

up five categories of offenders. The American zone was the only zone

which made a serious effort to implement the directive in full.

From all four zones, the American denazification record proved

most successful in terms of numbers. The U.S. zone had more trials than

any other zone: as of January 1, 1947, the British had tried 2,296 per­

sons; the French, 17,353; the Soviets, 18,328; and the Americans,

168,282.^

Re-education in the American Zone

To a great extent the task of re-educating the Germans overlapped

with the denazification process. In order to re-educate, the school sys­

tem, instructors, textbooks, and information media had to be purged from

all traces of Nazism and militarism. Much skepticism was voiced that

Germans could not unlearn what the Nazis had taught them. Others who

were more optimistic expressed hope that Germans could be made into

citizens ready to join the ranks of humanity again.

As early as the spring of 1944, the German Country Unit of SHAEF

had begun planning an educational program to be applied to Germany once

the occupation had begun. The Education Branch of the AMG, created

^Ibid. ^Ibid., pp. 95-118.

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after U.S. Group CC took over the unit's duties and merged with OMGUS,

selected two prominent education authorities to head the Education Divi­

sion in the U.S. zone. Captains John Taylor and Marshall Knappen super­

vised a small but competent group of men who were assigned to the Educa­

tional Branch of military government.^

It was estimated that as many as 80 percent of the teachers in

Germany had belonged to the National Socialist Teachers' League and 100 2 percent of the textbooks used in schools contained Nazi doctrine. Some

of the books that were required reading were : Heroic German Men and Wo­

men, Stories of the World War, Struggle and Victory of the Nazi Movement,

and German Gods and Heroes.^ Students also read works by Hitler, Rosen­

berg, and Streicher, all Nazi war criminals. It was not uncommon for

students to be taught that America had entered the war because it was

envious of German industry, that Negroes were black because God intended 4 to punish them, and that the Jews had started the war. By November

1945, 70 percent of the teachers had been fired and OMGUS set up teacher-

training colleges to prepare teachers who were to staff the schools once

they reopened.

In the early period of the occupation the average was eighty

pupils to one denazified teacher. Teachers who had taught at Nazi schools

were automatically dismissed by OMGUS from teaching in the reopened

Captain Taylor had been trained and served on the staff of Teachers College, Columbia University. Captain Knappen had been a Rhodes Scholar and a professor of modern European history at Chicago and Michigan State Universities. 2 3 Zink, United States, p. 199. Bach, p. 153.

^Ibid., p. 154.

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schools. Only those teachers who were known to have been anti-Nazi, or

whose Frageboge determined that they were eligible to teach, were allowed

to teach.

Children often had to share classrooms and clothing to attend

school. Most schoolhouses had been destroyed during the war, and a

shortage of living quarters already existed throughout Germany. In

Frankfurt, for example, people lived in 520,564 rooms before the war.^

When military.government arrived, the soldiers proceeded to occupy the

most habitable buildings available, and many Germans were left to live

wherever they could find shelter. As of January 1, 1946, there were

only 136,456 rooms available to 365,000 Germans in Frankfurt, and many 2 of these buildings were beyond repair. ' People found shelter in court­

rooms, hospitals, food plants, factories, and public utility buildings

which often lacked windows and ceilings.^

AMG's re-education program was guided by JCS 1067, which in­

structed military government to immediately close down all educational

institutions within the U.S. zone. It also ordered "the establishment

of coordinated system of control over German education and an affirmative

program of reorientation designed to completely eliminate Nazi and mili­

taristic doctrines and to encourage the development of democratic 4 ideas." Once school programs, texts, and personnel were purged of Nazi

doctrine, elementary, middle, and vocational schools were urged to reopen

as soon as possible. Secondary schools and universities were allowed to

reopen after Nazi instructors and material had been eliminated. The

^Ibid., p. 154. ^Ibid.

^Ibid. 4 U.S. Department of State, Germany, p. 26.

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emphasis, however, was placed on reopening lower grade schools first be­

cause the likelihood of success was greater in dealing with younger,

more malleable minds. These were the goals; the methods were left to

AMG.

While military government officials searched for adequate facili­

ties for school children, officers of the Education Branch began going

through textbooks and purged them of militarist, nationalist, and Nazi

doctrine. Printing and binding equipment was requisitioned to begin im­

mediate production within a seventy-five mile radius surrounding Munich.

Two paper mills went to work, despite the paper shortage, to produce

5,328,616 copies of textbooks to give to 1,848,206 children during the

first year.^ When schools reopened in October 1945, OMGUS provided

texts and tuition free of charge to the students and made school atten­

dance obligatory until the age of fifteen.

In September 1946, the basis for school reforms was made by

George F. Zook, the president of the American Council on Education, who

was in charge of OMGUS's Educational Mission in Germany. In accordance

with JCS 1067 to develop "a coordinated system of control over German

education," Mr. Zook formed a ten-member commission which recommended

(1) compulsory schooling below the university level; (2) a six-year ele­

mentary school; (3) emphasis on social and cultural subjects; and

(4) the use of teaching aids, library facilities, and academic exchanges.

In 1947 OMGUS translated Zook's recommendations into directives.

Dr. H. B. Wells of Indiana University was selected to head the

new education subdivision of OMGUS. Under his administration, American

^Zink, United States, p. 199.

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educational authorities proposed a "Basic Principles for Democratization

of Education in Germany" to the ACC which accepted the policy as follows:

1) There should be equal educational opportunity for all. 2) Tuition, textbooks and other necessary scholastic material should be provided free of charge in all educational institutions fully supported by public funds which cater mainly for pupils of com­ pulsory school age; in addition, maintenance grants should be made to those who need aid. In all other educational institu­ tions, including universities, tuition, textbooks, and necessary material should be provided free of charge together with main­ tenance grants for those in need of assistance. 3) Compulsory full-time school attendance should be required for all between the ages of six and at least fifteen— and thereafter, for those pupils not enrolled in full-time educational institutions, at least part-time compulsory attendance up to the completed age of eighteen years. 4) Schools for the compulsory periods should form a comprehensive educational system. The terms "elementary education" and "secon­ dary education" should mean two consecutive levels of instruction, not two types or qualities of instruction which overlap. 5) All schools should lay emphasis upon education for civic responsi­ bility and a democratic way of life by means of the content and by the organization of the school itself. 6) School curricula should aim to promote understanding of and re­ spect for other nations and to this end attraction should be given to the study of modern languages without prejudice to any. 7) Educational and vocational guidance should be provided for all pupils and students. 8) Health supervision and health education should be provided for all pupils and students. Instruction will also be given in hygiene. 9) All teacher education should take place in a university or a pedagogical institution of university rank. 10) Full provision should be made for effective participation of the people in the reform and organizational as well as in the ad­ ministration of the educational system.^

In order to bring military government's educational policies

directly to the people. Educational Service Centers were set up consist­

ing of educational specialist, audio-visual aids, and libraries. Those

who wished to avail themselves of such services could do so. (These

Military Government Regulations, Ch. 24 to Title 23-161, July 1947, cited in E. H. Lichtfield and Associates, Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953), p. 455.

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centers were located in Augsburg, Berlin, Bremen, Bremerhaven, Bruchsal,

Essen, Freiburg, Hamburg, Hanover, Heidelberg, Jugenheim-Bergstrasse,

Kaiserlautern, Karlsruhe, Kassel, Kiel, Koblenz, Mannheim, Munich,

Nuremberg, Regensburg, Stuttgart, Weilburg, and Wiesbaden.)^

OMGUS did not interfere with the original content of German edu­

cation beyond removing Nazi personnel and National Socialist and mili­

tarist materials from schools. This applied to all levels of the educa­

tional system including the secondary schools and universities. OMGUS

also did not interfere with the practice of religious instruction in

the schools.

Information Control in the U.S. Zone

As part of the educational program in Germany, American Military

Government exercised full control over information, funds, property,

equipment, accounts, and records that belonged to the Ministry of Propa­

ganda, which SHAEF order No. 191 closed down in the spring of 1945. All

persons who wished to publish newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books,

posters, pamphlets, printed music, or broadcast television and radio pro­

grams were required to register for a license with the Office of Military

Government.

The only restrictions placed on these media were that they at no

time could criticize OMGUS or its programs or propagate Nazi or militar­

ist doctrine.

^Zink, United States, p. 214.

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Newspapers

When the Allies entered Germany they ordered the shut-down of

all newspapers because, to some degree or another, they had all been

Nazi controlled. In the American zone, under the Information Control

Division of the U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET), military govern­

ment officials began the slow and arduous job of renovating printing

houses in preparation for the newspapers AMG would publish to spread

news and information about its activities under the occupation.

Within months AMG began publishing newspapers in its zone with a

combined circulation of about 3,785,000 copies.^ Soon thereafter Ger­

mans were given the go-ahead to publish their own papers under military

government supervision. In sum, the only stipulations were that AMG

could not be criticized, neither could newspapers spread Nazi or mili­

tarist propaganda.

The only American paper to survive this phase was Die Neue

Zeitung. Some of the German papers that appeared were Frankfurter

Rundschau, Taggesspiegel, Marburger Presse, and Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

The paper and printing equipment were supplied free by the information

controls of AMG. These units also reviewed the publications to check

for any violations in military government policy which could result in

reprimand or revocation of a paper's license. By 1949, licensing came

to an end in the U.S. zone, and fifty-nine newspapers were being pub­

lished by the Germans themselves.

^Ibid.

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Books, Radio, and Film

Licenses were also required for publishing material. Criticism

or disrespect for AMG or the progagation of Nazi or militarist ideolo­

gies, as noted in the previous section, were not allowed. In the Ameri­

can zone, 130 books and 35 pamphlets had been published by January 1946.^

Some of the periodicals in existence as of 1946 were: Heute, Amerikanische

Rundschau, Neue Auslese, and Per Monat.

The Radio Section of the Information Control Division was in

charge of supervising German radio programs. In the early period of the

occupation, radio was used by AMG primarily to make announcements and

broadcast information.

The Laender in the U.S. zone enacted legislation which placed

broadcasting under a council of representatives which included public

interest groups; Land governments; and some educational, economic, and

cultural groups. Gradually, radio programs were developed by Germans

themselves under AMG tutelage. The only programs which were not broad­

cast by the Germans were "Voice of America," which originated in New

York, and the "Armed Forces Network" (AFN), which represented the offi­

cial broadcasting agency to U.S. troops stationed in Germany.

The production of films was likewise banned by the Allies when

they took over Gemnany. The U.S. Information Center under the Psycho­

logical Warfare Branch of the Army screened films in the U.S. zone after

it broke up UFA, the Nazi holding company.

The information control program in the U.S. zone made it possible

for Germans to acquaint themselves with the precepts of American

^Ibid., p. 235.

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democracy. Although JCS 1067 was the guiding instrument in this process,

granting Germans control over their own media represented a departure

from the punitive aspect of JCS 1067 and constituted some of the first

steps toward giving the German people authority for their own affairs.

The denazification process in the U.S. zone, therefore, included

a punitive policy, purging German society of Nazi and militarist doctrine,

and also a constructive process of re-educating the Germans. These two

policies, which were in effect simultaneously, aimed at providing a

fertile soil for the seed of democracy. The thoroughness of both efforts

was directed not only at making sure that democracy in Germany would sur­

vive, but also that democracy would grow swiftly and strongly.

In the context of America's wish to see Germany strengthened to

take its place among the other world nations, the United States' methods

of laying the groundwork for democracy went one step farther. The United

States wanted to make Germany into a strong, democratic power in Europe

to withstand the pressures of nearby communism.

The denazification process, therefore, set the stage for democ­

racy, which began to flourish after 1948. Although the process was not

as successful as hoped by the end of 1947, many of the obstacles were

beyond the immediate control of AMG in Germany. The overwhelming lack

of buildings, equipment, supplies, and denazified personnel slowed down

the process. Amazing achievements were accomplished in certain areas,

e.g., the speed of the textbook revision project and opening the schools.

Denazification was, perhaps, dragged out too long. This was

mostly the result of public opinion in the United States. The American

public called for stricter denazification regulations; and, as noted

earlier. Law No. 8 was passed.

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In the American zone the denazification process began winding

down after congressional members visited Germany in the fall of 1947.

C. J. Friedrich, a consultant for the Case Committee, reported the

following :

It seems reasonably clear now that the American denazification policy went too far and tried to include too many. Its categoriza­ tion was too broad and too rapidly applied . . . nevertheless it was something that had to be attempted and would at least demonstrate the sincerity of the Americans in wishing to provide conditions under which democracy would have a chance to grow. . . . In ac­ cordance with the approach adopted in the OMGUS directive on 30 September 1946, IT WOULD NOW BE WISE TO TURN DENAZIFICATION REALLY OVER TO THE GERMANS WITH FREEDOM FOR THEM TO DEVELOP SUCH LEGISLATION AS THEY SEE FIT. . . . The overall control of German Governmental and other key personnel should be sufficient to prevent the appear­ ance of "Nazis" in "positions of influence."^

However, the United States government recognized that before such

political sovereignty could be granted, a sound economic base would have

to be constructed.

OMGUS, Governmental Affairs Adviser, C. J. Friedrich, to Clay, Sub].: Impending Problems Connected with Denazification, April 28, 1948, WWIIRC 110-3/1, cited in John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 171.

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ECONOMIC REFORMS

Black Market

Even before the Allied occupation of Germany a shadow economy,

the black market, had taken over many of the functions that the German

market economy could, in its crumbling state, no longer handle. When

the ban on fraternization was lifted a quick upsurge in black-market

activities occurred. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities

Germans had begun trading jewelry, clothing, food, or anything precious

among themselves. When the soldiers arrived, trading increased because

GI's had PX privileges and could buy anything from food to appliances at

the post exchanges for prices far below those at home. Many soldiers

sold Germans cigarettes for prices many times higher than their original

value. Thus the famous "cigarette economy" one often hears about in

Europe after the war was created. The black market flourished in Ger­

many because there was a shortage of goods and a great demand for goods

by the population; a buyer's and seller's market existed simultaneously.

According to a roving correspondent for Army Talks,^ the official

magazine of the ETO, the largest black-market center was located in Ber­

lin at the Tiergarten. Berlin was the closest point for Russian and

American soldiers to meet. The Russians had plenty of money because

^Army correspondent Julian Bach, whose book America's Germany, I have frequently referred to.

47

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Secretary Morgenthau had given the Soviet Government the engraving plates

for printing the Allied occupation currency. The Russians overprinted,

paying their troops in Occupation marks; and Russian soldiers, loaded

with Occupation currency, paid hundreds of dollars' worth of money to

American GI's for watches, eyeglasses, pens, cameras, etc., which had

cost practically nothing at the post exchanges. On an average day in

Berlin's Tiergarten, 4,000 people gathered to exchange goods despite

military government's warning prohibiting loitering and bartering.^

By the end of 1945, American troops in Berlin were paid a total 2 of $1,000,000 in Occupation marks, but sent home over $3,000,000! The

difference resulted directly from the profits made at the black market.

This meant that the U.S. was redeeming black-market money in U.S. dollars.

The Army Criminal Investigation Division, the law enforcement agency of

U.S. military government, began cracking down on conversion of all Occu­

pation marks to dollars in 1946. Efforts aimed at eliminating the black

market completely failed, so military government compromised and created

swap shops where American could trade goods sent directly from home.

Germans could bring their goods to these swap shops and receive a "point

value" for their possessions and take their coupons to the shelves where

they could trade them in for merchandise of equivalent point value. This,

however, did not stop black-market activities.

Currency Reforms

As black-market activities got out of hand, American military

government authorities recognized the need for a currency reform. German

^Bach, p. 62. ^Ibid.

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Occupation currency had resulted in high inflation. The American tax­

payer bore the ultimate burden of this inflation.

The need for a currency reform in Germany had been discussed by

the ACC as early as 1946 in order to establish a central German finance

agency as stipulated by Potsdam. A solution in the ACC was never reached,

largely the result of French and Soviet non-cooperation. It should be

recalled that the French were not a party to Potsdam and blocked many

proposals toward establishing central German agencies.

The Russians, on the other hand, favored a currency reform, but

along their own lines. They insisted that Leipzig, in their zone, should

be the center in charge of currency production. The Western powers

favored Berlin because of its large printing facility and also because

the plant could be supervised by all four powers.

The United States rejected the Soviet Leipzig proposal. Its main

objection was that the first year of the occupation had produced high in­

flation as a result of Russian over-printing of Occupation marks. The

U.S. zone could not risk another recreation of such economic catastrophe.

Strained relations between the Soviet Union and the United States resulted

in a standstill in the ACC. Faced with a gloomy economic forecast, the

United States maneuvered to alleviate the cost of the occupation by

merging its zone with Britain's.

Bizonal Economic Merger

On May 26, 1946, General Clay had sent the War Department a re­

port on the state of the German economy. In the report he said that

each zone had become economically airtight and the prospect of economic

unity was becoming more remote. He emphasized that the establishment of

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central agencies, as Potsdam called for, was vital to German economic

recovery. He proposed a halt to dismantling in the U.S. zone in the ab­

sence of economic unity because the United States was already spending

$2,000,000 a year supporting its zone.^ John Gimbel explains Clay's

decision;

The decision to stop dismantling was an attempt to force govern­ mental level agreement on the general economic features of the Potsdam decisions— a wedge designed to force economic unity and central administrations rather than a basically anti-Soviet mea­ sure.^

On July 11, 1946, Secretary Byrnes proposed the merger of the

U.S. zone with any of the other zones. Only the British accepted. The

United States proceeded to join its zone with that of the British hoping

that the example of a zonal economic merger would act as a catalyst to

unite all four zones thereafter, thus fulfilling Potsdam's call for eco­

nomic unity and establishing central German administrations, perhaps

followed by a provisional government. Secretary of War Patterson de­

scribed American expectations. On November 18, 1946, he said: "We hope

that France and Russia will be so impressed by the success [of the bi- 3 zonal merger] that they will fall into line and join us."

The first few months of the merger were characterized by dis­

agreements, long delays, and general confusion. In an attempt to avoid

making the U.S./U.K. bizonal administration appear political in nature,

these agencies were scattered among many cities to avoid French and

Soviet accusations that Bizonia was a political fait accompli.

1 2 Clay, pp. 73-78. Gimbel, p. 60. 3 Patterson to Clayton Fritchey, New Orleans Item, November 18, 1946, cited in Gimbel, p. 112.

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Decentralization of the American-British Bizonal administration resulted

in ineffective coordination between joint agencies and complicated the

administrative apparatus of Bizonia. Further complications resulted

because of differing British and American perceptions on how to denazify,

democratize, etc., on a merged zonal basis. Germans in the U.S. zone,

for example, complained that bizonal agencies were employing people who

had originally been named mandatory removals under American denazifica­

tion laws. Questions of procedure under the Bizonal administration were

mediated by consultation between high-ranking British and American mili­

tary government officials. The most important objective behind the zonal

merger, however, was to make the combined zones less of a financial bur­

den to the United States and the United Kingdom as quickly as possible.

The prospects for a four-zonal merger had faded rapidly because

of the ACC's repeated failure to implement the Potsdam Protocol in all

four zones. The American and British governments decided that a planned

economy was needed to accomplish the objective of bizonal economic self-

sufficiency. OMGUS, however, guarded against the prospect of socialism

in Bizonia which the British favored. The German Socialist Party had

already won control of the Executive Committee for Economics, a bizonal

agency in the British zone, by electing Victor Agartz, Kurt Schumacher's

right-hand man. Schumacher was the leader of the SPD, the Social Demo­

cratic Party.

Although the bizonal agencies had no legislative power, OMGUS

feared that political coordination of bizonal agencies, such as through

the Executive Committee for Economics, would constitute the first step

in that direction. The United States was also still leaving the door

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open for the French and Russians to join in the merger. Clay felt it

necessary to define Bizonia's powers in February 1947. He told the

minister-presidents:

My position is: Bizonal agencies may recommend but may not enact or require enactment of legislation. . . . If decisions of bizonal agencies require legislation, the proposed legislation should come as a recommendation to Gen. Robertson and myself. . . . If this is not clear or you do not agree, please see me. Otherwise, please implement as U.S. position.^

Although OMGUS took great care to avoid a fait accompli in the form of a

political unification of the two zones, the Soviet Union charged that

the agreements of Potsdam had been violated. The decentralization of

bizonal administrations and the curbing of legislative powers of Bizonia

did not convince the Russians that political union was not the ultimate

intent. Secretary of State George Marshall, who succeeded Byrnes, de­

fended the merger of the two zones in his report on the Council of For­

eign Ministers' Moscow Session, March 1947. The new Secretary said:

This unwillingness of the Soviet authorities to cooperate in estab­ lishing a balanced economy for Germany as agreed upon at Potsdam has been the most serious check on the development of a self- supporting Germany and a Germany capable of providing coal and other necessities for the neighboring states who have always been depen­ dent on Germany for these items. After long and futile efforts to secure a working accord in this matter, the British and American zones were combined for the improvement of the economic situation, meaning the free movement of excess supplies or produce available in one zone to another where there is a shortage. Our continuing invitation to the French and Soviets to join in the arrangement still exists. This merger is bitterly attacked by the Soviet authorities as a breach of the Potsdam Agreement and as a first step toward the dismemberment of Germany, ignoring the plain fact that their refusal to carry out that agreement was the sole cause of the merger. It is difficult to regard their attacks as anything but propaganda designed to divert attention from the Soviet failure to implement the economic unity agreed at Potsdam. Certainly some progress towards economic unity in Germany is better than none.

^Clay, cited in Gimbel, p. 119. 2 U.S. Department of State, Germany, p. 59.

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This was the essence of American thought toward the obstacles

and progress present in Germany in 1947. The United States could not

continue supporting Germany, and the goal of economic unity was progress­

ing too slowly. The recovery of Europe was linked to German recovery,

and that also was taking too long.

After the Moscow Conference, the bizonal administration was re­

organized in an attempt to make Bizonia self-sufficient without further

delay. OMGUS prepared proposals for economic bizonal revision rather

than allowing the Germans in the Laenderrat to do so. The new bizonal

organization was established by OMGUS and the British military govern­

ment. Procedure #5 created (a) The Economic Council, (b) The Executive

Committee, and (c) the Executive Directors. These agencies' actions

were subject to specific Allied Bipartite Board approval. Military gov­

ernment retained ultimate power in all bizonal affairs, thus stunting

the Laenderrat's efforts to generate political union through increased

economic cooperation. ....

Military government restricted the Laenderrat's power because

Bizonia had quickly taken on the appearance of a political administra­

tion. The Laenderrat in the American zone had begun calling for more

contact with the Laenderrat in the British zone. Their discussions con­

cerning economic issues often ended with discussions regarding the

political future of Bizonia and whether the Russian and French zones

would eventually similarly unite. Washington, however, was concentrating

more on economic, not political, consequences of the merger.

Military government officials could do nothing but emphasize the

economics of the situation and hoped to forestall French suspicions and

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Soviet charges that Bizonia represented a rejection of Potsdam. The

matter was put off until the London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting

which would take place in November 1957. All four occupying powers

hoped that the nature and direction of the occupation would be clarified

at that conference.

In the meantime, Washington had taken a skeptical view of eco­

nomic or political unity coming forth from quadripartite administration.

It confirmed its constructive economic policy toward Germany by replacing

JCS 1057 with JCS 1779 in July 1947. The new directive stated "a stable

and productive Germany" to be the object of American foreign policy. In

the spring of 1947 the Allies had failed to reach uniform decisions re­

garding Germany at Moscow, and Secretary of State George C. Marshall had

said that "the patient was sinking while the doctors were deliberating.

Washington directed OMGUS to go ahead and take whatever steps it viewed

necessary to make Germany self-sufficient, to develop a new level of in- 2 dustry plan, and to revise its reparations list. The President's Com­

mittee on Foreign Aid urged the formation of a West German government

because the delay was too costly. It said that "the start must be made 3 in the West with what we have." For these reasons, the plans for the

creation of a German central Government were viewed as a most construc- 4 tive development.

^Gimbel, p. 5. ^Ibid.

^Ibid., p. 166. 4 OMGUS, CAD, to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, July 31, 1948, WWIIRC 84-3/1, cited in Gimbel, p. 251.

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Reorganization was now the operative word. The positive approach

of the new directive is seen in this following passage:

Whereas on the one hand it has been our policy to divest Military Government of direct responsibility in the interest of turning it over to German agencies, it has, on the other hand, been our parallel plan to guide, assist and influence the German people in the direc­ tion of what democratization and reorientation which constitutes the basic purpose of the occupation. Thus as we are reducing our controls on the one hand, we are expanding our budget and staff and efforts.1

JCS 1779 was backed by increased funds and aid to Germany. The re­

education program, which began to blossom in the late 1940s, was alloted 2 $2,400,000. This figure, however, did not compare to the amount of

money the United States was preparing to offer Europe for its general

economic recovery.

Marshall Plan

The London Conference had been a failure. Secretary Marshall

said, "The basic issue as we saw it before the opening of the London

conference, was whether or not the Allies could agree among themselves

to reunite Germany."^ The Secretary of State elaborated:

It finally became clear that we could make no progress at this time— there was no apparent will to reach a settlement but only an interest in making more and more speeches intended for another audience. So I suggested that we adjourn. No real ground was lost or gained at the meeting, except that the outlines of the problems and obstacles are much clearer. We cannot look forward to a unified Germany at this time. We must do the best we can in the area where our influence can be felt.^

^Gimbel, p. 251. ^Ibid. 3 U.S. Department of State, Germany, p. 64. 4 Ibid., p. 66.

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The Soviet Union, in the meantime, was making known its influ­

ence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. It had prompted the SED in East

Germany to call for a people's congress which excluded the CDU, sponsored

political instability in Rumania after the King had abdicated, was sup­

porting communist revolutionaries in Greece and Turkey, and in February

1948 staged a communist coup d'etat in Prague.

The United Kingdom had given notice to the United States that it

could no longer afford to support democratic elements in Greece and

Turkey, and British withdrawal in those areas would almost certainly

create a vacuum which communism would fill. To make matters worse, a

communist takeover in that part of the world might prompt the Soviet

Union to spread communism to Iran and possibly up through Europe.

President Truman moved to counter Soviet influence in Europe by

declaring that the United States would "support free peoples who were

resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pres­

sure." This became known as the Truman Doctrine. On June 5, 1947,

Marshall offered Europe massive aid. Marshall Plan aid was offered to

every country in Europe including the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

It is, however, doubtful that the American Congress would have agreed to

support communist-backed governments.

Others, notably British Foreign Secretary Bevin, believed that

Marshall's speech was "one of the greatest speeches in world history"

and that it could "throw a bridge to link east and west."^ In subsequent

negotiations with the Soviet Union, Moscow refused the aid on the terms

^F. Roy Willis, Europe in the Global Age, 1939 to the Present (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968), p. 195.

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proposed and instructed its satellites— Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,

Rumania, Bulgaria, Yusoglavia, and Albania— to turn down the invitation.

Marshall was able to convince the American public that aid to

Germany was necessary as well because of Germany's central position in

Europe. By emphasizing German recovery as vital to European recovery,

e.g., the importance of German coal to the European economy, Marshall

convinced the public to allow Germany to partake in the plan. Marshall's

decision had been influenced by General Clay's report of May 1947. Clay

said:

I have tried to point out that Germany is bankrupt and that she cannot reestablish herself on a self-sustaining basis until her debts are once and for all reckoned and fixed in amount and she herself permitted to enter into trade relationships with other countries unhampered by the curse of her past political mistakes. I say this not out of sympathy for Germany and the German people but because of the necessity to reduce the present burden on the U.S. and U.K. economies. We have to recognize that it is not Germany who is paying the penalty today, but rather the taxpayers of the United States and Great Britain and that we can unburden ourselves of this expense only by returning Germans to a satis­ factory trading position or by abandoning her to chaos.^

Secretary Marshall pointed out later that year that the United States

had put $19 billion into Europe since the end of the war, but that 2 Europe was practically no better off. Although this was an exaggeration,

Marshall's point was well taken. Strong measures had to be taken this

time to ensure European recovery. The Secretary stressed that "any as­

sistance that this Government may render in the future should be a cure

rather than a mere palliative."^ Stopping Communism from taking over

^Smith, p. 349. 2 C. P. Trussell, "Interim Aid Funds Required by Dec. 1, Marshall States," New York Times, November 13, 1947, pp. 1 and 3.

^Willis, p. 195.

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Germany and Europe would require a huge amount of capital. Europe had

to be made economically strong to withstand the threat of Soviet ex­

pansion.

On April 2, 1948, Congress appropriated $6.8 billion for the

first fifteen months of the plan and agreed to make three annual grants

thereafter. American aid to Europe would fall somewhere between $12 and

$17 billion over a four-year period.^ The European Recovery Program, as

the plan was known, would be administered on the American side by the

Economic Cooperation Administration and on the European side by the

Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

The European powers, especially France, feared the plan would

lead to an increase in the level of German industry. After agreeing to

the establishment of a new economic order in the Ruhr and Rhineland, the

United States convinced France and Europe that the recovery of Germany

was essential to European recovery. Suddenly, the American occupation

of Germany took on a new appearance. As John Gimbel says: "If all of

Europe was at stake the diligent denazification, decartelization, democ­

ratization, German federalism, school reform, civil service reform and

the many other programs that Americans had wanted in Germany appeared in 2 a new perspective." In December 1947 it was announced that Germany

would be included in the Marshall Plan and that it would also be repre­

sented on the International Ruhr Authority.

Following the events listed above, the three western powers

doubted that the Soviet Union would allow its zone to join in a common

currency reform with theirs. In order to make the Marshall Plan work

^Ibid., p. 197. ^Gimbel, p. 151.

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and set Germany on the road to substantial economic recovery, the three

western powers went ahead with their plan for a currency reform and en­

acted a series of laws through the three Military Governors which took

place between June 8-20, 1948. In February 1948 the three western powers

had agreed to conduct tripartite talks on long-range policies regarding

Germany. Their negotiations resulted in a currency reform which converted

130 billion Reichs marks in currency and bank deposits into 12 billion

to 13 billion Deutsche marks.^ The day before the conversion became

legal, the Soviets introduced their new currency for Berlin. Earlier,

on March 20, they had walked out of the ACC, making it the council's

last session. They proceeded to blockade Berlin, hoping that the western

powers would relinquish their control over it.

JCS 1779

The result of tie economic reforms of 1947-1948 was important

changes in the occupation and for the future of Europe. Because the four

powers could not agree among themselves as to what economic reforms were

necessary for Germany or how to carry out these reforms, the United

States was pressed to move quickly to strengthen the German economy in

order to shift the burden of economic support from the United States to

Germany. The new Joint Chiefs of Staff directive, 1779, issued late in

1947 revealed that Washington already had serious doubts about the

prospect of four-power administration. The failure of the London con­

ference in November demonstrated the extent Soviet-American relations

had deteriorated. Also, the communist activities of 1948 and the

subsequent blockade of Berlin had convinced the United States and many in

^Lichtfield et al., p. 423.

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Europe that the Soviet Union intended to spread communism wherever it

could.

Thus, shortly after President Truman asked Congress for aid to

Greece and Turkey to resist communist pressure in those countries,

emergency aid was extended to Europe as well. The Truman Doctrine, in

effect, was based on the American perception of growing East-West con­

flict and possible confrontation.

When the currency conversion in the three western zones and the

Soviet zone occurred, a real division— an economic division— resulted.

United States' goals in Germany were, however, critized by the Soviet

Union from the start of the occupation. At first, the United States

wanted to see democracy established in Germany as its main goal. When

it realized that democracy in Germany had to be backed by a strong

economy, the United States shifted its policy toward Germany from puni­

tive to constructive. The burden on the American and British taxpayers

had become so great by 1947 that economic unity in Germany became a real

necessity. The result was the United States' offer to merge with any or

all of the other zones. When only the British zone accepted the invita­

tion, the merger of the American with the British zone was interpreted as

a political fait accompli by the Russians and denounced as a violation of

the Potsdam Agreements. The irony of the situation is that, as Secretary

Marshall said, the merger resulted because the Soviet Union refused to

carry out the agreements decided at Potsdam. The United States had no

other alternative. OMGUS continued to place greater emphasis on the

economics of the occupation rather than the politics. The official

American position toward Germany in 1948 stressed economic progress.

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For that reason, Secretary Marshall said that "some economic progress

towards unity was better than none."

The economic reforms which were intended as a step forward, to

unify the western zones of Germany economically, at the same time helped

to consolidate the political division of Germany. American policy makers

were put in the position of damned-if-you-do-and-damned-if-you-don't.

Out of economic necessity, when the American and British zones merged,

the Soviets condemned the merger as a violation of Potsdam. When the

United States offered Marshall Plan aid to the Eastern Bloc as well as

to Western Europe, the Soviet Union accused the United States of trying

to block East-West cooperation by flaunting in its face the capitalist

system. When the western Allies enacted a currency reform for their zones,

the Soviet Union denounced the United States for dividing Germany. Yet,

without these economic reforms, it is doubtful that Germany could exist

as a free state. The United States probably would not have been able to

realize its chief objective, that of establishing democracy in Germany.

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THE WAY TO DEMOCRACY

It is important to examine the turning point in American occupa­

tion policy from treating Germany as a defeated nation to an important

post-war ally. In the spring of 1946 the deepening cleavage in American-

Soviet relations was already visible. At the Paris Council of Foreign

Ministers conference, April-May 1946, Secretary Byrnes proposed a four-

power treaty that would guarantee the demilitarization of Germany for

twenty-five years. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov refused Byrne's

proposal, and the meeting adjourned on May 16. The reason, for the re­

fusal was, perhaps, in response to Churchill's "iron curtain" speech in

Fulton, Missouri, in March. Cold War historians seem to believe that

Molotov's position was related to the growing East-West rift.

Before the Foreign Ministers convened again in June, General

Clay proposed a Bizonal merger with the British in case other efforts

failed. Clay's May 26 report was not released immediately because it

was determined that it was still too soon to speculate on the outcome of

the next conference.

The Paris conference in July, however, failed to resolve impor­

tant issues affecting Germany. Moreover, Molotov read a prepared state­

ment which said that Germany should be demilitarized for a period of

forty years, not twenty-five as Byrnes had suggested. The Soviet repre­

sentative also said that current security measures against German

62

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resurgence were inadquate and that the Allies had not complied with the

Potsdam decisions. The Soviet Union remained firm on her demand for $10

billion in reparations from Germany.

Secretary Byrnes responded to Molotov's statement by accepting

the forty-year demilitarization period, but argued against the reparations

figure. He also said that current security measures against Germany were

adequate. The conference, in effect, raised a whole spectrum of issues

which the United States was not yet prepared to address. The time had

come to re-examine American occupation policy.

Secretary of State Byrnes' Stuttgart Speech

Fashioned after Clay's policy statement of July 19, 1946, Secre­

tary Byrnes called for a bizonal merger, a provisional German government,

and increased German responsibility. These were the main points listed

in his official restatement of U.S. policy toward Germany in Stuttgart,

September 6, 1946.

The Stuttgart speech reaffirmed the promises of Potsdam and told

the German people that the programs of denazification and reeducation

had been directed toward the ultimate goal of German self-government.

Most importantly, it gave Germans a hope for a bright, peaceful, digni­

fied future:

[I]t never was the intention of the American people to deny to the German people the right to manage their own internal affairs as soon as they were able to do so in a democratic way with genuine respect . . . for human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . . It is the view of the American Government that the German people throughout Germany, under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility for the running of their own affairs. More than a year has passed since hostilities ceased. The mil­ lions of German people should not be forced to live in doubt as to their fate. . . . It is our view that the German people should now

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be permitted and helped to make the necessary preparations for set­ ting up of a democratic German Government which can accept and ob­ serve these terms. . . .^

The Laenderrat's Role

It was discussed earlier that before democracy in Germany could

be nurtured, a strong German economy had to exist, preparations for

local elections, a Council of States, and entrusting Germans with the

responsibility of governing themselves had already been underway when

Byrnes delivered his speech.

In 1945 OMGUS had already begun to encounter several obstacles

to establishing democracy in Germany. The state of the German economy

lay behind all of them. OMGUS had not been successful in getting cen­

tral economic administrations established to achieve economic unity.

The Soviet and British zones had established central administrations al­

ready in mid-1945. Deputy Military Governor Clay became increasingly

concerned about creating a smoothly functioning, effective administra­

tion for the U.S. zone because he was afraid the American public would

not support the cost of the occupation after the demobilization process

began.

Another problem which confronted OMGUS was French refusal to co­

operate in establishing central German agencies. Their decision was

based on the status of the Ruhr, Rhineland, and Saar. Before they would

cooperate, these areas would have to come under international controls,

but preferably French. For this reason Clay cabled McCloy in the War

Department to ask permission to coordinate with British and Soviet

'"U.S. Department of State, Germany, p. 77.

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representatives on field level to establish central German agencies in

the absence of quadripartite agreement.

In October 1945 General Clay's staff prepared a study which pro­

posed to bring together the minister-presidents of the American zone to

exchange ideas and experiences and to strengthen their respective govern­

ments. According to John Gimbel, the staff study left no doubt that the

failure to establish central agencies was the primary incentive behind

the action.^ The direction which brought the minister-presidents togeth­

er said that until such agencies were created, Laender governments would

have to supervise the former national administrative services and have a 2 joint coordinating agency.

The three minister-presidents of the American zone, Wilhelm

Hoegner (Bavaria), Karl Geiler (Hesse) , and Reinhold Maier (Württemberg-

Baden) agreed to meet and organize formally on November 6, 1945. On

that date they named their organization the Laenderrat des amerikanischen

Besatzungsgebiets and planned regular monthly meetings. The Laenderrat

would be situated in Stuttgart and would include a permanent secretariat.

The cost of supporting the Laenderrat would be divided equally between

the three Laender. General Clay told the minister-presidents the fol­

lowing :

We propose to return to you as quickly as possible the responsibility for self-government. We propose to return to you a free press and a free radio at the earliest possible date. You now have complete freedom of religious worship. We also propose to remove any ob­ stacles which we may find placed in the way of liberal educational opportunities. We do not wish to establish a zonal German capital.

^Gimbel, p. 36. 2 USFET to CG, Eastern and Western Military Districts, Oct. 1, 1945; Subj: Coordination of German Laender Governments and Special Admin­ istrative Services (Sonderverwaltungen) in the American zone, Oct. 5, 1945, WWIIRC 34-2/11, cited in Gimbel, p. 36.

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Therefore, we propose as an interim measure to establish here in Stuttgart a Council of Minister-Presidents. Since you will in fact develop the measures necessary for full co-ordination between your units, it must be assumed that each of you individually will carry out what you have agreed to collectively. I wish to emphasize that, within United States policy, yours is the responsibility. We will not dictate to you except as you violate expressed policy.^

The real goal behind the creation of the Laenderrat was German

economic recovery. Clay told a meeting of Army commanders on November 7,

1945, that in the absence of central German agencies, "the Laender Presi­

dent conferences will serve as an ad hoc arrangement for obtaining co- 2 ordination between the zones."

The agenda that OMGUS prepared for the minister-presidents con­

firmed Clay's statement. Issues which needed immediate attention were

agriculture; population distribution and refugees; electricity; exports

and imports; industrial production for the U.S. zone and for export ;

prices and subsidies; statistical gathering; food collections, rations,

and distribution; and finances.^ The Regional Government Coordinating

Office (RGCO), which was the American liaison office for the Laenderrat,

listed sixteen meetings which took place in a ten-day period, of which

only one meeting was not devoted to economic problems.^

The Laenderrat's role, according to John Gimbel, showed the eco­

nomic priority of the United States in 1945-1946. He says; "It shows

the American interest in using the Laenderrat as a stepping stone to

^Clay, p. 98. 2 Hgs., Seventh Army, Western Military District, "Fifth Meeting of the Deputy Military Governor with Army Commanders, Minutes," Oct. 18, 145, WWIIRC 364-2/5, cited in Gimbel, p. 38.

^Gimbel, p. 38. '^Ibid.

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broader economic unity. It shows that the American interest in economic

problems assumed precedence over the grass-roots political interests

expressed by Germans and Americans alike.Others, notably C. J.

Friedrich, attribute the creation of the Laenderrat to the need "to se- 2 cure an equivalent to the unified German setup in the Soviet zone."

The US GROUP CC reported that the Soviet-zone administration, established

in July 1945, could "attain sufficient prestige to constitute a threat

. . . by being a de facto functioning national government and the only

one."3

Local and State Constitutions

Clay set up the Laenderrat because he felt the need for adminis­

trative reorganization and efficiency because of the high cost of the

occupation. Clay was also a man whose own beliefs in the American fed­

eral tradition were strong. In one of his letters to McCloy, dated

September 15, 1945, Clay wrote that he had worked out a plan for admin­

istering local elections. He expressed the hope that this would con­

stitute the first step in returning government back to the German people.

Clay described the process:

In restoring local government, the first job is to provide new municipal codes to determine the local officials and their authority. For this purpose the German authorities of each Land will be directed to prepare promptly a legal code, specifying the structure and powers of units below the Land level and providing for elections. The codes will be required to provide for popularly elected councils with sub­ stantial powers for Gemeinde, Stadtkreis, and Landkreis. . . . The present plan calls for elections in phases, subject to military security. The Gemeinde elections will be held during Jan­ uary 1946; elections for Landkreis councils will be held during

^Ibid., p. 44. ^Ibid.

^Ibid., p. 45.

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March 1946; and the Stadtkreis council elections will be held during May 1946. In each case, the notice of the election will be published as soon as possible to provide the maximum time for preparation. We do not plan to hold any Land elections for at least a year. Some of my advisers urge that these elections should be postponed somewhat longer, but I think we should press for the schedule outlined above. The Potsdam Agreements call for the restoration of democratic local self-government through elective councils as rapidly as consistent with the purposes of the occupation. If the Germans are to learn democratic methods, I think the best way is to start them off quickly at the lower levels. Besides, this will help us reduce substantially the personnel required for military government.^

The first step toward organizing local elections in the American

zone was restoring German county (Landkreis) and city (Stadtkreis) ad­

ministrations as Clay mentioned in his letter to McCloy. German offi­

cials were appointed only after they had been cleared by OMBÜS through

Fragebogen; background checks; and, when necessary, personal interviews.

During preparation for the elections. General Eisenhower had is­

sued Proclamation #2 on September 9, 1945, which authorized the creation

of the three Laender in the American zone. OMGUS issued directives to

the Laender in October which transferred full responsibility and author­

ity for state government to Germans limited only by "such control as

must be exercised by Military Government to accomplish the purposes of

the occupation, and except as the exercise thereof would be in conflict

with actions heretofore or hereafter taken by the Control Council of 2 Germany or any central authority established by it."

In December 1945, the Laenderrat asked OMGUS to postpone the

first local elections. Karl Geiler (Hesse) spoke on behalf of the German

minister-presidents and said that there was not enough time to organize

^Smith, p. 77. 2 J. K. Pollock, James H. Meisel, and H. S. Bretton, Germany under Occupation: Illustrative Materials and Documents, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: Wahr, 1949), p. 144.

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parties, lists of candidates, and to campaign. General Clay refused the

postponement and scheduled the first village elections for January 1946.

Landkreis and Stadtkreis elections followed, then constituent assembly

elections, and finally elections of representatives to the Landtage

(state legislatures).

The constitutional assemblies completed their work by the fall

of 1946 and submitted their work for OMGUS's approval. The three con­

stitutions all represented a high concept of democracy, as OMGUS had set

down as a guideline, but differed in detail. The draft constitutions

called for parliamentary forms of government, independent judiciaries

with judicial review, and contained provisions which sufficiently safe­

guarded the basic rights of the individual. The constitutions contained

some provisions such as proportional representation which OMGUS did not

favor, but could not consider to be in violation of democratic principles

and were, therefore, accepted as representing the wishes of the elec­

torate .

Washington, however, objected to portions of the drafted Laender

constitutions, particularly to Bavaria's mention of "German nationals."

General Clay, however, defended the constitutional drafts and reminded

Washington that OMGUS had supervised the drafting of the constitutions

and had consulted with the drafters, and these represented the best that

military government could get and still expect ratification.^ On Septem­

ber 30, 1946, Clay sent out letters of approval to the minister-presidents

and complimented them on their work. In his letter to Bavaria, Clay

told Erhard, minister-president of Bavaria, of Washington's objection to

^Gimbel, p. 92.

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the phrasing of "German nationals” and said this was not acceptable^

because it implied that a national government for Germany already existed.

The state constitutions, however, were aimed at creating a new German

government.

Regarding all three constitutions, Clay added in his letter that

certain restrictions would apply regarding the civil governments. This

meant that certain powers were to be reserved to the occupying powers 2 "to effectuate the basic policy of the occupation." The relationship

of the states to military government was defined in a directive issued

on September 30, 1946. The directive, "Relationship between Military

and Civil Government (U.S. Zone) Subsequent to Adoption of Land Consti­

tutions ," specified:

While self-government is the object of U.S. Military Government policy, it must nevertheless be understood that there are certain restrictions which will continue to apply to the actions of all levels of civil government in the U.S. Zone. The basic occupation policies announced from time to time, as in the case of the Berlin Protocol and Secretary of State Byrne's Stuttgart speech, will, of course, continue to be enforced by Military Government. Further­ more, the specific restrictions set forth below must be considered as superior to the authority of any German Governmental agency, and to both statutory and constitutional law. Those restrictions are: a. All international agreements regarding Germany which have been or may be concluded b. All present and future quadripartite policy decisions, laws, and regulations c. All basic policy decisions of the U.S.-British Bipartite Board affecting the fields of central agencies d. The rights of an occupying power under international law to maintain an occupying force within the zone, to preserve peace and order, to reassume at any time full occupation powers in the event the purposes of the occupation are jeopardized e. The specific occupation purposes of the U.S. Government which, in addition to those set forth above, shall consist of the fol­ lowing basic tenets: establishment of an independent judiciary, a decentralized government, economic unity, and such elements

1 2 Ibid. Clay, p. 89.

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of democracy as elections, democratic competition between ^ parties, and protection of the basic rights of the individual.

These, then, were the guidelines that the final draft constitutions in­

corporated before OMGUS approved them. Political parties had been autho­

rized one month before, in August, so that "democratic government be 2 given life as quickly as possible."

A few weeks after the September 30th directive was issued, OMGUS

issued two more directives defining the powers of the Laender. They did

not alter the existing political or legal structure, but reduced the po­

tential power of the Laender by providing bizonal agencies with "suffi­

cient power to permit prompt and efficacious conduct of their affairs."^

These directives, effective on January 1, 1946, described that the

Laenderrat's new, more elastic role would be mainly in the "field of 4 transportation, economics, and communication."

Thus, in December 1946, when the Bevin-Byrnes Fusion Agreement

was signed, the Bizonal Economic Committee, the primary economic agency

for the two zones, was granted more power than the Laenderrat. The

economic ministers had more real power than the minister-presidents

because, as political adviser to Clay, William Draper, observed, the

economic ministers had greater power as members of the Executive Com­

mittee for Economics than did the Land ministers because they not only

1 . 2 Lichtfield et al.. Appendix A. Clay, p. 87.

^OMG, Bavaria, to Wilhelm Hoegner, December 26, 1945, Staats- Kanlei, Wiesbaden, Az/3z02, cited in Pollock, p. 145. 4 OMBUS, Subj; Bizonal Unification under Existing Laenderrat Or­ ganizations, Oct. 21, 1946, WWIIRC 147-2/5; OMGUS, Subj; Revision of Military Government Plans and Operations Necessitated by Adoption of German Land Constitutions and Bi-Zonal Agreement with British Military Government, Oct. 25, 1946, cited in Gimbel, p. 96.

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represented their Laender, but also forty million Germans. They repre­

sented their constituents and the general interest.^

The bizonal economic merger, as mentioned previously, was de­

signed to act as an economic magnet which would eventually attract the

other two zones to it. The merger, however, did not have the antici­

pated results. Instead, as discussed earlier, it came under severe at­

tack from both France and the Soviet Union, who called it a political

fait accompli. The situation in the American zone, in the spring of

1946, was such that it was beoming more and more expensive to support

the occupation as discussed before. Also, military government personnel

were being returned home, which meant that Germans would have to assume

more responsibility quickly. Matters were also complicated by the fact

that a food shortage existed in both the American and British zones, and

the situation was not expected to improve in the absence of central Ger­

man agencies to coordinate economic policy throughout all four zones.

Faced with the failure of the four powers to establish such agencies, as

called for by Potsdam, the United States turned to examine its options.

James Pollock, an adviser to General Clay, suggested that German

representatives from the British zone meet with the minister-presidents

of the American zone. Bringing representatives of the two zones together.

Pollock believed, would create an ad hoc committee which could facilitate

economic cooperation between the two zones in the absence of central

agencies. On February 6, 1946, two Oberprasidents from the British zone,

Hinrich Kopf (Hannover) and Robert Lehr (Düsseldorf) visited the

Laenderrat.

^Gimbel, p. 96.

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The British zone representatives, however, quickly turned the

conversation away from economic issues to a discussion favoring the poli­

tical future of Prussia. The American zone minister-presidents, however,

had been instructed by OMGUS to avoid political discussion; and the Fi­

nance Minister of Hesse, Wilhelm Mattes, and Hogner of Bavaria steered

the discussion back on to the economic track.

Visits by the British zone representatives to the Laenderrat

continued until April when the British zone established a Zonal Advisory

Council (Zonenbeirat), which officially represented the British zone at

future meetings with the Laenderrat. German representatives of the

Zonenbeirat took the opportunity to express their desire to establish

some sort of political administration for the two zones in subsequent

meetings with the Laenderrat. British zone representatives had men such

as Kurt Schumacher (SPD) and Konrad Adenauer (CDU) who spoke out in

favor of the bizonal economic program, but also of political unity.

Some representatives of the American zone seem to have had a

similar view. In July 1946, when Clay asked the Laenderrat to study the

possibility of establishing central agencies, Karl Geiler (Hesse) recom­

mended a super-Laenderrat based on participation of all four zones. Clay

objected to the idea because it would mean placing the future political

structure of Bizonia into question when and if it were to come into being.

Clay, however, did have doubts about Bizonia's ability to func­

tion effectively. He noted that the British military government offi­

cials had not entrusted the Germans in their zone with as much power as

OMGUS had given the Germans in its zone. Also, the British zone had al­

ready established its own central administrations which would make it

difficult to coordinate with the American zone's apparatus.

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Foreign Ministers' Conferences

Thus, the United States policy toward Germany was still in flux

at the end of 1945. Strong pressures for economic unity forced the

United States to merge with the British zone. Clay realized the neces­

sity of economic unity, but delayed the creation of a political organiza­

tion in Bizonia because the United States still hoped that matters af­

fecting Germany as a whole would be worked out during the course of the

Foreign Ministers' conferences.

Early in 1947, as the Economic Committee assumed more power,

American minister-presidents questioned Clay about the political coordina­

tion and relations between the Laender and the bizonal agencies. Clay

told them that the upcoming Moscow conference would probably straighten

out many of the minister-presidents' questions. However, he did feel

that the time was right to stress again the relationship of military

government to the German officials.

On March 1, 1947, OMGUS issued Proclamation #4 which simply re­

inforced the September 30, 1945, directive which had defined the powers

reserved to the occupying powers. Article I of the directive stated:

Full legislative, executive, and judicial power exists in the respective States of Hesse, Wurttamberg-Baden and Bavaria in ac­ cordance with their constitutions, subject only to the following reservations stated by the Deputy Military Governor in the respec­ tive letters approving the constitutions: a. International agreements to which the United States is a party, b. Quadripartite legislation, c. Powers reserved to Military Government in order to effectuate basic policies of the occupation.^

This reminder of the powers that had been reserved to the occupying

powers reflected American concern about the high cost of the occupation

^U.S. Department of State, Germany, p. 157.

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and the priority of economic unity above political unification. Ameri­

can policy toward Germany in 1946 had stressed economic progress as a

priority over political development. As John Gimbel observed, "economic

necessity prevailed over democratic idealism."^

The Allies met in Moscow during the spring of 1947 to seek a

common solution regarding the status of Germany. It was hoped that a

four-power agreement would be reached. Despite the "show of good faith"

by designating Moscow as the site for the conference, the conference

failed to solve the basic issues of political coordination and relations

between the Laender and the bizonal agencies. In an attempt to gain for

themselves more public acceptance and, thus, more political leverage,

the minister-presidents moved to form a Deutsches Buro fur Friedensfragen.

To Clay's dismay, then, the self-momentum of the Germans which he had

witnessed in 1946 revived after the Moscow session. Clay waited. Per­

haps the London conference which was scheduled for November 1947 would

shed more light on the problems of the occupation.

The London conference, as mentioned previously, ended on a gloomy

note. Hopes of four-power economic cooperation diminished with the

failure to agree on any issues regarding Germany. Secretary Marshall's

statement that the United States should proceed in an area where its in­

fluence could be felt prompted the AMG to expand the Bi-zonal Economic

Committee's powers.

Meanwhile, the minister-presidents met at Munich and Wiesbaden

to discuss their exact roles within the bizonal administration, but

failed to revive their political momentum because their powers had been

^Gimbel, p. 100.

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eclipsed by the decision to strengthen the bizonal Economic Committee.

Both conferences ended leaving them confused, angry, and frustrated. The

complexity of the bizonal structure and the unclearness of their precise

role resulted in a deterioration of German-American relations. The issue

was complicated by the Economic Council's ineffectiveness to deal success­

fully with the economic problems entrusted to it despite the increase in

powers it received late in 1947.

In January 1948, Johannes Semler, the Bizonal Executive Director

of Economics, spoke out against the occupation powers. He said that the

ACC had failed to enact a currency reform, had restricted German trade

and economic activities, had artifically deflated the price of coal which

had resulted in a substantial loss of foreign credits to Germany. He

also claimed that Germany was heading into the worst food crisis since

the end of the war and that the Americans were only sending grain and

chicken feed ("Huhnerfutter"), for which they expected dollars in return.^

This last remark resulted in Semler's dismissal on January 27, 1948.

Semler's remarks were not without validity. The bizonal admin­

istration had failed to solve the economic problems of the two zones and

had failed to reduce the subsidies to Germany. Furthermore, the bizonal

administration had failed to develop in such a manner that it could con­

tribute significantly to Europe.

On the other hand, AMG had realized the gravity of the economic

situation, but could not move to strengthen the bizonal administration

until the failures of the Moscow and London conferences had required

such action. By strengthening the Economic Committee, the Laenderrat's

^Ibid., p. 192.

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powers had been reduced. By 1948, however. Clay had made the decision

to dissolve the Laenderrat because developments in the ACC and elsewhere

made it necessary to consider the future of Germany on a three-power

basis.

On March 20, 1948, Soviet representative Sokolovsky walked out of

the ACC after having read a prepared statement which repeated familiar

charges of unilateral violation of Potsdam and declared that further dis­

cussions were not possible. The story of how the Russians began block­

ading Berlin has been told elsewhere. What is important to recall, how­

ever, are the events of 1948, particularly the coup d'etat in Czecho­

slovakia and the expansion of communism into Eastern Europe and the

Balkans. These events spurred cooperation between the three Western

powers at an unprecedented pace since the war.

As noted earlier, in the context of increased East-West friction.

Congress approved emergency aid to Europe. Germany was invited into the

Marshall Plan and the Ruhr Authority. The decision to admit Germany to

the Ruhr Authority demonstrates the fact that France finally was willing

to cooperate with the United States and Britain against the threat of

communism. Three other European nations, Luxembourg, Belgium, and the

Netherlands joined Germany, France, and Britain in the Brussels Pact in

March 1948 which bound these nations to a mutual defense pact that was

to last 50 years. These agreements resulted from the London talks of

March 1948. The three Western allies had invited the Benelux countries

to the London talks to discuss the future of Germany and Europe within

the context of growing East-West tension.

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The political outcome of the conference was the six-power recom­

mendation to form a West German government by action of the minister-

presidents of the three zones. France had agreed to join Bizonia after

the United States recognized France's separation of the Saar from Ger­

many. The communique instructed the minister-presidents to convene a

constituent assembly to draft a constitution which would be ratified by

the German people.

The German reaction to the London decisions was not particularly

favorable. Konrad Adenauer said on June 9, during a Zonenbeirat meeting,

that the London agreements were nothing more than a "gilded annexation"

of the Ruhr. By this remark Adenauer meant that the Allies had inter­

nationalized the Ruhr industries when they thought it in their best in­

terests and now similarly detached the Saar thereby placing it in poli­

tical limbo just to appease the French into accepting the London agree­

ments. He charged that the Allies wanted economic control without as­

suming political responsibility.^ The German minister-presidents, in

general, particularly objected to the proposed Occupation Statute, which

intended to define the conditions under which German powers of government

could be exercised. They opposed the plan to internationalize the Ruhr

industries. When the three Military Governors met with the minister-

presidents in Frankfurt during July 1948, the German reaction to the

London decisions was disappointing, especially to Clay, who thought that

they would be happy to form their own government.

^Konrad Adenauer, Errinerungen, 1945-1953, p. 140, cited in Gimbel, p. 208.

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Rheinhold Maier, the minister-presidents' spokesman, said that

the minister-presidents needed to consult with their governments and

Landtage because the issues were so vital. A few days later, while he

addressed the Wiirttemberg-Baden Landtag, he criticized the manner in

which the U.S. had appeased France into accepting the Agreements. Maier

said;

The text of the London Agreements was written to be read in France. The decisions were supposed to be made appealing to the French pub­ lic. The result was an opposite psychological effect in Germany, because we could read only the shadow-side of the decisions. Our job is now to try to translate the communique into German. I do not doubt that Germans will be able to use this advantageous occasion to work out a general counter-proposal at Koblenz and thus to take a considerable step forward.^

Ludwig Erhard (Bavaria) said it was a bitter pill, "sobering and

bitter documentation of the collapse and weakness of Germany. It showed 2 the lot of a conquered nation." Erhard would later resist military

government's pressures to comply with OMGUS's policies. More about that

will be said later.

At Koblenz, July 8-10, 1948, after the three documents had been

read to them by the Military Governors, the minister-presidents an­

nounced that they preferred a provisional arrangement and that they

wanted to postpone a national convention "until a solution for all of

Germany is possible and until German sovereignty has been sufficiently

restored." They proposed that a parliamentary council, not a constituent

assembly would draft a "basic Law," not a constitution. A provisional

^Württemberg-Baden, Landtag, Verhandlungen, 77. Sitzung, July 7, 1948, pp. 1855-58, cited in Gimbel, p. 211. 2 Gimbel, p. 212. By this he meant the internationalization of the Ruhr industries and the detachment of the Saar, which were prerequisites to three-power cooperation on the formation of a West German Government.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80

arrangement would leave the door open for the possibility of an all-

German government in the future.

In a letter explaining the minister-presidents' position at

Koblenz, military government officials were told the following:

The minister-presidents want to repeat on this occasion that in their opinion a German constitution cannot be created until the whole German people finds it possible to constitute itself (as a nation) through free self-determination; until this time comes only provisional organization measures can be taken.^

The minister-presidents were prompted to state their decision because of

the fear about the increasing East-West rift.

Meeting with the minister-presidents in Frankfurt on July 14,

1948, Clay defended the London Agreements and said that the Berlin crisis

had already divided Germany. Focusing specifically on the minister-

presidents' counterproposals, he added that the German officials had

placed their fate in French hands because the Koblenz resolutions dif­

fered from the London Agreements in general tone and spirit. He pre­

dicted possible difficulty with France and long delays because their

position at Koblenz would require renewed government-level discussions.

Clay also said that an economically prosperous West Germany could still

act as an economic magnet to draw the Eastern zone toward it sometime in

the future. Furthermore, the creation of a strong West Germany, he

argued, would constitute a "real government for the people to rally 2 around." Clay's remarks must have convinced the Germans to accept the

London Agreements because after their meeting with him, they said that

^Lichtfield et al., Appendix D. 2 Robert H. Lochner, OMG, Hesse, "Summary of General Clay's meet­ ing with the Minister-Presidents of the American zone, July 14, 1948"; dated July 23, 1948, WWIIRC 177-2/3, cited in Gimbel, p. 223.

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it was one of the most valuable and momentous conferences they had had

with him.^ What the Germans had perceived as a "lot of a conquered na­

tion" during the July negotiations, which linked German participation to

policies and objectives of the Allies, got pushed into the background 2 after the Koblenz meeting. John Gimbel explains:

The entire development shows how effectively the political argu­ ment at Koblenz (East-West rift) which loomed large because of the real crisis in Berlin gradually overshadowed and forced into limbo the legal and constitutional argument which had seemed so basic at first.^

The Germans, then, in the summer of 1948 were faced with a limited

number of choices. They could abide by the status quo or negotiate end­

lessly on the government level to gain more concessions. Their decision

to form a Bonn government, however, reflected their surfeit with the

status quo which was fraught with economic frustrations and insecurities.

Following the leadership of the West would at least constitute an experi­

ment which might offer them some hope for reunification in the future.

Although the minister-presidents agreed to draft a provisional

constitution^ in the summer of 1948, they objected to the Occupation

Statute by which the Western Powers would reserve specific powers to

themselves after the establishment of a West German state. On July 20,

1948, after the minister-presidents had reviewed the proposed Occupation

Statute, General Clay told them that he would sincerely try to alter the

Statute by simplifying it. A Tripartite Occupation Statute Committee

1 2 Ibid. Gimbel, p. 223.

^Ibid., p. 224.

^The City of Bonn was chosen as the new capital because of its neutral political heritage.

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was established by the three Military Governors after the parliamentary

council convened in Bonn to hammer out details of the draft constitution.

Seven major redrafts were worked out by the Committee; and it was not

until April 1949, at the Washington Foreign Ministers meeting, that the

final draft of the Occupation Statute appeared which granted "full

legislative, executive and judicial powers" to the Bonn and state govern­

ments. The powers which were reserved read as follows:

a. disarmament and demilitarization, including related fields of scientific research, prohibitions and restrictions on industry, and civil aviation b. controls in regard to the Ruhr, restitution, reparations, de­ cartelization, déconcentration, nondiscrimination in trade mat­ ters, foreign interests in Germany and claims against Germany c. foreign affairs, including international agreements made by or on behalf of Germany d. displaced persons and the admission of refugees e. protection, prestige, and security of Allied forces, dependents, employees, and representatives, their immunities and satisfaction of occupation costs and their other requirements f. respect for the Basic Law and the Land constitutions g. control over foreign trade and exchange

On the other hand:

3. It is the hope and expectation of the Governments of France, the United States and the United Kingdom that the occupation authorities will not have occasion to take actions in fields other than those specifically reserved above . . . 4. The German Federal Government and the governments of the Lander shall have the power, after due notification to the occupation authorities, to legislate and act in fields reserved to these authorities otherwise specifically direct . . . 5. Any amendment of the Basic Law will require the express ap­ proval of the occupation authorities before becoming effective

Certain German officials, however, chose to fight against the

creation of a West German government until the bitter end. Kurt

Schumacher, SPD party leader, questioned the assumption that the

1 Lichtfield et al.. Occupation Statute, Appendix L.

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minister-presidents represented the true spokesmen for the German people.

He fought the creation of the Basic Law right up until the end. He be­

lieved that the creation of a West German government would permanently

alienate and divide Germany, East from West.

Schumacher, a virulent nationalist, caused the Western Powers

much trouble in the final days. In a letter written to the Department of

the Army on April 19, 1949, Clay complained about the harm Schumacher

was inflicting upon the process:

I must repeat that the issue today is whether or not [Kurt] Schumacher and the small group of party bureaucrats sitting around him in Hannover are to succeed in their policy of defying the oc­ cupation authorities. I must emphasize that my concern is not about the personal issue of losing an issue to Schumacher. I am rather concerned with what I believe to be the very great dangers which will result from permitting any small group to make a success of defiance of the occupation authorities on an issue of major policy particularly as it is done to gain political popularity in the following election.^

Clay is probably referring to the crisis in the Parliamentary Council

during March and April of 1949 when the SPD tried to force a vote on

proposals which provided greater legislative and tax powers which the

Americans and French were on record as opposing.

All states ratified the Basic Law except Bavaria. Erhard refused

to cooperate with OMGUS after it had confiscated all of Bavaria's text­

books because the Bavarian government had failed to establish free tui­

tion and textbooks by the August 1948 deadline. For that reason, rela­

tions between OMGUS and Bavaria were quite shaky when the Basic Law was

given to Bavaria to ratify. Bavaria's decision not to ratify did not

prevent the Basic Law from entering into force on May 23, 1949, because

only two-thirds of the Laender were required to ratify it.

^Smith, p. 1114.

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On September 21, 1949, the United States, Britain, and France

restored the civil administration to German authorities; and military

government in West Germany came to an end. A board of Allied High Com­

missioners remained to supervise the Occupation Statute. By the end of

September the Federal Diet (Bundestag) and the Federal Council

(Bundesrat) had been constituted. Theodor Heuss was elected President,

and Konrad Adenauer (CDU) became Chancellor. At the same time, the

Soviets were in the process of forming a German Democratic Government in

East Germany with Wilhelm Pieck as President and Otto Grotewhol as head

of government.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer gradually regained much of the sover­

eignty that the occupation powers had reserved to themselves. His

strategy was revealed at the first declaration before the Bundestag:

For the German people there is no other way of attaining freedom and equality of rights than . . . in concert with the Allies. There is only one path to freedom. It is the attempt to extend our liberties and prerogatives step by step and in harmony with the Allied High commission.^

Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, September 20, 1949, p. 29, cited in Roy C. Macridis, ed.. Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 122.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VII

REFLECTIONS

America's policy in occupied Germany evolved from treating

Germany as a defeated nation to treating it as an ally. The dynamic

policy process of American military government adapted efficiently to

the changing needs of the occupation.

Following the war, the ultimate objective of the United States

in Germany was the establishment of a peaceful, democratic state, eco­

nomically strong enough to aid the recovery of Europe and to provide

stability to a continent which it had repeatedly ravaged.

In the face of four-power failure to treat Germany as an economic

unit, rising costs of the occupation, and an augmented Soviet threat,

the U.S. shifted its treatment of Germany from punitive to economically

and politically reconstructive.

With this shift in policy came a corresponding shift in AMG's

tools of administration. The denazification process was successful in

removing Nazis and offenders from power and prevented them fron gaining

positions of influence. The denazification process, however, was car­

ried out too long. German resentment increased because of the process's

discrepancies from zone to zone. The punitive nature of early denazifi­

cation attempts was dramatized by the non-fraternization program. This

program was not successful. It discouraged necessary American-German

contact. Eisenhower eventually lifted the fraternization ban; and Clay,

85

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in turn, encouraged the minister-presidents to speak frankly and sin­

cerely with military government officials during Laenderrat meetings.

He knew the value of fraternization within the context of improving

American-German relations which was necessary to the process of democ­

ratization.

The reeducation process succeeded over the first year of the

occupation in opening schools, providing qualified teachers, free tui­

tion, and texts to the German youth. This was vitally important if

democratization efforts were to succeed in the long term.

In 1947, the change in policy accompanying the issuance of

JCS 1779 encouraged a speedy end to denazification and concentrated on

granting Germans more authority. It emphasized swift economic recovery,

which in light of the developing Cold War would lay the groundwork for

democracy in Germany. With the four-power failure to administer Germany

as an economic unit, democratization attempts were put on the back burner.

Economic recovery was not moving as quickly as hoped. The United States

reexamined its options.

To alleviate the high costs of the occupation, the British and

American zones merged. Some economic recovery was better than none.

With the economic merger, however, the rift between East and

West grew larger. The U.S.S.R. increased the intensity of its denuncia­

tions of the West and its occupation policies. During 1948, failure to

reach Four Power agreement on currency reform throughout Germany led to

the Berlin blockade crisis. The West's perceptions in 1947-1948 were

that Germany was already split between the Soviet Union and the three

Western powers. These events contributed to the three Western Powers'

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and the Benelux's decision to go ahead and form a West German government.

West Germany would eventually be incorporated into the Atlantic Alliance

to stand against the threat of Communism.

The ultimate proof of America's success in achieving its goals

in Germany lies in the status of today's Federal Republic. Chancellor

Adenauer hinted in his first address to the Bundestag on September 21,

1949, that Germany would follow the West in an attempt to gain "freedom

and equality of right." Since 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany has

gradually worked toward virtually unsurpassed political independence and

economic prosperity. Following the West has resulted in enormous eco­

nomic and political gains. While hopes of reunification with East Ger­

many have faded, the rewards of an economic strength have been great.

West Germany, today, ranks fourth in GNP.^ Its strength allows it to

grant aid to nations in economic crisis, e.g., Italy and Poland.

Some might argue that the U.S. was a little too successful in

stimulating the growth of a strong sovereign Germany. Chancellor Helmut

Schmidt has repeatedly declared that West Germany is no longer a client

nation to the United States. West Germany pursues an almost independent

foreign policy, as evidenced by Schmidt's vehement criticism of Presi­

dent Carter's foreign and domestic policies. The Federal Republic no

longer toes the American line when its national interests are perceived

to lie in another direction.

U.S. Department of State, The Global 2000 Report to the Presi­ dent, vol, II: The Technical Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­ ing Office, 1980), p. 46. West Germany's GNP in 1975 was $408 billion. Its 1985 GNP has been projected to reach a high of $659 billion.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88

This certainly indicates no failure in American occupation policy

toward Germany. The final goal of the AMG was not so much to create a

German client of the United States, but rather to stimulate the growth

of a sovereign democracy. Though in the short run this may produce the

inevitable frictions of foreign policy disagreements, in the long run a

true independent democracy must always be to America's greatest benefit.

Thirty years after the United States had ended its occupation.

General Clay summed up America's role in post-war Germany: "Fundamentally,

we're an orderly people and an orderly nation, and gradually we bring

order out of whatever chaos there is, as we did there, but it was not ,,1 easy.

Interview with Generaly Clay by Albert Moffett, May 18, 1976, cited in Hans A. Schmitt, ed., U.S. Occupation in Europe after World War II (Lawrence, Kan.: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978), p. 158-

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