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Anthropological Contributions to Cognitive Science

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Anthropological Contributions to Cognitive Science Anthropological Contributions to Cognitive Science Organizers Andrea Bender ([email protected] ) & Sieghard Beller ([email protected] ) Department of Psychosocial Science, University of Bergen, Norway Presenters Rita Astuti ([email protected] ) Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics (LSE), London, UK Olivier Le Guen ([email protected] ) Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, CIESAS, Mexico Ciudad, Mexico Karenleigh A. Overmann ([email protected] ) Center for Cognitive Archaeology, University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, US Peter Rácz ([email protected] ) & Fiona Jordan ([email protected] ) Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, University of Bristol, UK Mads Solberg ([email protected] ) Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen, Norway Keywords: anthropology; cognitive science; philosophy of tems as near-universal conceptual tools. With his back- science; cognition; culture; language; materiality. ground in (ethno-)linguistics and cognitive anthropology, Le Guen uses Yucatec Maya sign languages to illustrate the Anthropology was a founding member of cognitive science importance of cultural practices for shaping cognitive be- (Bender et al., 2010; Gardner, 1985), sharing with other havior. Based on Hutchins’ cognitive ecology approach, cognitive disciplines a deep interest in thinking and behav- Solberg speaks to questions at the intersection of anthropol- ior. With its unique expertise in the cultural content, con- ogy and philosophy of science by illuminating the cultural text, and constitution of cognition, it would still be essential framework of science production in a biology lab. And so- to any comprehensive endeavor to explore the human mind cial anthropologist Astuti concludes by taking a bird’s eye (Bloch, 2012), but rather has turned into cognitive science’s view on how efforts to understand the human mind crucially “missing discipline” (Boden, 2006), thus leaving important benefit from acknowledging its historical origins and from questions unanswered or even unasked. Given that substan- taking the specific sociocultural contexts into consideration. tial shares of knowledge are implicit and that cognition is Based on work some of which is published in high-quality situated, distributed, embodied, and grounded in various journals (such as Science , Nature , PNAS , BBS , TiCS, Cur- other ways, anthropological approaches provide privileged rent Anthropology, or Cognition ), these participants will access to investigation: for arriving at reasonable hypothe- offer invaluable contributions to a more diverse, more inclu- ses, ensuring ecological validity, and even for coming up sive, and hence more comprehensive cognitive science. with new research questions and paradigms (Astuti & Bloch, 2012; Hutchins, 2010; Nersessian, 2006). Archaeology and Cognitive Science In line with recent calls for rapprochement in Topics in Karenleigh A. Overmann Cognitive Science (Bender et al., 2012; Beller & Bender, Archaeology contributes to cognitive science in two key 2015), our symposium brings together scholars that repre- areas. First, in understanding human cognitive evolution, sent different branches of contemporary anthropology with archaeology furnishes critical data on the timing and context distinct perspectives—including ‘traditional’ social anthro- of developments (Wynn, 2002). This approach assumes pology, cognitive anthropology and ethno-linguistics, cogni- minds make tools : increasing complexity in material forms tive ecology, evolutionary anthropology, and archaeology— is an effect of, and thus signals, cognitive change related to to present what they consider to be indispensable contribu- neurological developments like encephalization. Second, tions to cognitive science. archaeology provides unique insight into the ways materiali- With our selection of authors, we hope to demonstrate the ty functions within the extended, enacted mind. This invert- value of anthropological approaches for cognitive science as ed approach—tools make minds (Malafouris, 2013)— well as the potential benefits of cross-disciplinary collabora- examines how material forms interact with body and brain tion. Cognitive archaeologist Overmann discusses a theo- to create meaning and experience and potentialize behavior- retical perspective on how mind, behavior, and material al and psychological change. In both contributions, archae- artifacts interact to shape human cognition. Combining their ology negotiates temporalities, centuries to millennia and expertise in linguistics and evolutionary anthropology, Rácz longer, that can be challenging for psychological theories and Jordan investigate the design principles of kinship sys- and methods to assimilate (e.g., Overmann, 2016). 21 Cognitive and Adaptive-Historical Explanations conceptual, social, and cultural infrastructures of laborato- for Kinship Diversity ries) set up divisions of cognitive labour and distribute cog- nition through time and space in ways that are critical to this Peter Rácz & Fiona Jordan process. This talk looks at how the alliance between anthro- Kinship systems are semantic systems whose forms can be pology, cognitive science, and adjacent fields like philoso- explained in terms of domain-general cognitive principles; phy and history of science, can contribute to further devel- kinship categories are optimised to be maximally distinct oping this research area. Such collaborations are necessary and as simple as possible. Kinship, then, is similar to other for adequately explaining cultural transmission and cultural universal semantic categories such as colour terms. Howev- evolution in scientific knowledge, and for describing inter- er, whereas colour terms broadly fit into one typological actions between mental representation, epistemic action, and hierarchy, kinship systems comprise a diverse typology. material culture in scientific experimentation. I draw on Alternatively, adaptive-historical explanations emphasise examples from a long-term cognitive-ethnographic case- how cultural traditions and social practices (particularly study in a community of molecular life-scientists. marriage and transfer of resources) place functional pres- sures on the shape of kinship systems (Jordan & Dunn, Anthropology as a Critical Friend 2010). Using a global ethnographic database of over a thou- Rita Astuti sand societies we show that marriage rules and ancestry have a significant influence on the type of kinship system Anthropology is commonly listed as one of the disciplines found in a society. This remains true if we control for the that make up cognitive science. But what exactly is the con- effect of lateral transmission and phylogeny. This, in turn, tribution that anthropology can make to the interdisciplinary means that kinship is best approached by combining cogni- study of human cognition? The paper will argue that an- tive and historic-anthropological explanations. These results thropology must take on the role of critical friend, constant- have broader implications for the understanding of lexical ly reminding other disciplines of the historical origins of all systems in particular and the mechanisms of human cogni- human phenomena and of the theoretical and methodologi- tion in general. cal challenges that come from recognising that all aspects of human cognition develop in specific social and cultural con- How Cultural Settings Frame Spatial Cognition: texts. The Example of Yucatec Maya and Yucatec Maya Sign Language References Olivier Le Guen Astuti, R., & Bloch, M. (2012). Anthropologists as cognitive scien- tists. Topics in Cognitive Science, 4, 453-461. On the Yucatec peninsula, the main native language is spo- Beller, S., & Bender, A. (Eds.) (2015). Exploring cognitive diversi- ken Yucatec Maya (YM). However, in villages where deaf ty: Anthropological perspectives on cognition. Topics in Cogni- people are born, a local sign language (YMSL) was created tive Science, 7(4) . both by deaf and their hearing kin. Although both languages Bender, A., Beller, S., & Medin, D. (Eds.) (2012). Does cognitive science need anthropology? Topics in Cognitive Science, 4(3) . are in intense contact, they are genetically different, and Bender, A., Hutchins, E., & Medin, D. L. (2010). Anthropology in YMSL is not a signed version of YM. In Le Guen (2011), I cognitive science. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2, 374-385. showed how gestures—in addition to linguistic structures Bloch, M. (2012). Anthropology and the cognitive challenge . (Levinson, 2003)—can support a geocentric frame of refer- Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ence. In this paper, I want to elaborate on how deaf signers Boden, M. A. (2006). Mind as Machine . Oxford: Clarendon Press. using YMSL still ‘inherit’ the same conception of space Gardner, H. (1985). The mind’s new science. NY: Basic Books. through cultural practices. Hutchins, E. (2010). Cognitive ecology. Topics in Cognitive Sci- ence, 2, 705-715. Jordan, F. M., & Dunn, M. (2010). Kin term diversity is the result Exploratory Experimentation in Experimental of multilevel, historical processes. Behavioral and Brain Scienc- Systems: Novel Directions for the Cognitive es , 33 , 388. Anthropology of Science Le Guen, O. (2011). Speech and gesture in spatial language and Mads Solberg cognition among the Yucatec Mayas. Cognitive Science, 35, 905-938. It is now widely recognised that progress in many scientific Levinson, S. C. (2003). Space in language and cognition . Cam-
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