Linköping University | Department of Management and Engineering Master’s thesis, 30 credits| Master’s in International and European Relations Spring/ autumn 2020| LIU-IEI-FIL-A--20/03504—SE

Norms in Foreign Policy – Institutionalization and the road to a feminist foreign policy in

Kamilla Petersen

Supervisor: Per Jansson Examiner: Mikael Blomdahl

Linköping University SE-581 83 Linköping, Sweden +46 013 28 10 00, www.liu.se Abstract

In 2015 the Swedish Foreign Minister announced that the foreign policy would be feminist. This thesis aims to advance an understanding of the process of institutionalizing in the Swedish foreign policy statements and the effects this has had on Swedish foreign policy priorities. Through a combined approach of constructivist and , it is argued that while areas related to feminism, such as women, gender, and equality, have been institutionalizing over the last two decades, the introduction of overt feminism has increased resistance. By drawing on institutionalization theory, , and hegemonic masculinity it is revealed how ‘adding women’ has been the main approach but that the use of ‘feminism’ has challenged the hegemonic masculinity embedded in foreign policy. The thesis concludes that aspects of feminism have been institutionalized, however, feminism as a structure is still at its emerging stage internationally. Moreover, it is discussed how the relationship between national and international political spheres affect the institutionalization process of norms cyclically.

Word count: 23685

1 Acknowledgments Throughout the process of writing this thesis, I have enjoyed much assistance and support.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Per Janson, for encouraging me to think outside the box, look into the Swedish foreign policy statements, and inspiring me to use constructivism and feminism. Your perceptive feedback pushed me to pursue a more complex understanding of the issue.

A special thanks should also go to Rickard Montgomery-Bjurhult and Ove Bjurhult for the great help with search words when linguistics was getting in the way. Without your help, I would not have dared to focus on the Swedish statements.

I would like to thank my fellow students Rickard, Mahika, and Johannes for their feedback, long discussions, cups of coffee, and fun moments throughout this process. Without it, this would have been a lonely journey. A thank you also goes to my mom for always lending an ear and having a great deal of patience.

And lastly, a thank you to Covid-19 for keeping me focused and making sure I never lost sight of what was most important.

2 Table of Contents Abstract ...... 1 Acknowledgments ...... 2 Introduction ...... 5 Methodology ...... 7 Constructivism ...... 7 Institutionalization ...... 8 Feminism ...... 13 Hegemonic masculinity ...... 13 Power relations ...... 14 Gender mainstreaming ...... 15 A feminist-constructivist approach ...... 18 Research design ...... 20 Limitations ...... 21 Materials ...... 21 Literature review ...... 23 Feminist foreign policy ...... 23 Domestic vs international explanations ...... 23 Adding Women ...... 24 Feminist enough or Defining feminist foreign policy ...... 25 External relations ...... 26 UN resolution 1325 ...... 27 Analysis ...... 28 2000 ...... 28 2001 ...... 29 2002 ...... 30 2003 ...... 31 2004 ...... 32 2005 ...... 33 2006/2007 ...... 34 2008 ...... 35 2009 ...... 37 2010 ...... 37 2011 ...... 38

3 2012 ...... 39 2013 ...... 41 2014 ...... 42 2015 ...... 43 2016 ...... 46 2017 ...... 47 2018 ...... 48 2019 ...... 50 2020 ...... 52 Discussion ...... 53 Conclusion ...... 57 Works Cited ...... 60

4 Introduction “In 2014, the Swedish red-green coalition government adopted a feminist foreign policy, which [signaled] a substantial change in its external conduct. Its pronounced ambition was to become the ‘strongest global voice for and full employment of human rights by all women and ’” (Aggestam et al., 2019). The move of including feminism so overtly in the entire foreign policy triggered a wave of research into what such a foreign policy might entail (Aggestam et al., 2019; Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016; Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019; Alwan & Weldon, 2017; Egnell, 2017; Irwin, 2019; Mazurana & Maxwell, 2016; Robinson, 2019; Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019). This interest in the concept of feminist foreign policy (FFP), whether that be the implications, the concrete policy changes, or the theoretical developments necessary for academia to follow suit with policy developments has led many feminist researchers to consider explicitly as well as implicitly the relationship with and power of international organization and national governments in a globalized world. However, the question of how the feminist foreign policy came into being has as many answers as there are research papers. The influence of international organizations on national policy and that of national policy on international actors is well known, but how did it enable this ‘radical’ change to happen (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). When Swedish foreign minister Margot Wallström declared her intention to pursue a feminist foreign policy it was a surprise to many and was met with ‘giggles’ internationally (Alwan & Weldon, 2017). Much of the recent literature on feminist foreign policy starts at this very moment in time and looks back at other foreign policies that contained feminist ideas to different degrees. Some point to Hillary Clintons time as Secretary of State of the USA where she pledged that women would be at the core of policy, and her focus on women’s inclusion, others to the Trudeau government of Canada whose development aid policies are based on feminist ideals (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 2). Further examples include the French implementation of feminist diplomacy and the Norwegian National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of the UN security council resolution 1325 from 2000 (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 20; Thompson & Clement, 2019, p. 1). That particular resolution, 1325, on Women, Peace, and Security is throughout the literature considered the starting point of the implementation of feminism into foreign policy in all these cases (Aggestam et al., 2019; Alwan & Weldon, 2017; Thompson & Clement, 2019).

5 Thompson and Clement (2019) argue that the new-found interest in feminist policies should be seen as a second wave of feminism in foreign policy, where earlier it has been implemented as just one of many variables with often underfunded projects to improve the lives of women and through development policy (Thompson & Clement, 2019). The new turn, they argue, is including a much broader spectrum of actions, including using feminism as a guiding principle in the comprehensive foreign policy (Thompson & Clement, 2019). To understand the developments that made it possible for Wallström to declare the Swedish foreign policy feminist it is necessary to look back at what the Swedish state has presented as its foreign policy priorities over the last two decades, since October 31st, 2000 when the Landmark resolution on Women, Peace, and Security by the United Nations Security Council was signed (Security Council resolution 1325, 2000).

This thesis will, therefore, explore how feminism has been institutionalized in the Swedish foreign policy statements since the year 2000, and how this has affected the priorities of Swedish foreign policy?

To answer these questions, this paper will employ a single case study to investigate the specific institutionalization of feminism in the Swedish foreign policy by analyzing the annual foreign policy statements. The choice of the Swedish case is based on it being the first country to introduce a feminist foreign policy, that it encompasses the entire foreign policy and is explicitly feminist (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). Furthermore, Sweden is widely considered a best-case scenario when it comes to institutionalizing feminism in foreign policy because of a historical leaning towards feminist values and a history of implementing a gendered perspective since the 1960s (Rosamond, 2020, p. 223). By using a constructivist approach it is possible to investigate “how and why … certain collective expressions of human understanding, neither valid nor true a priori, develop into social practices, become firmly established within social and political systems, spread around the world and become reified or taken for granted” (Adler, 1997, p. 337) Or as Björkdahl puts it “[by] [a]dopting a social constructivist perspective this study explores the link between ideas, norms, interests and practices.” (Bjorkdahl, 2002, p. 16) This paper will begin with a methodological discussion particularly relating to the constructivist and feminist approaches this paper will utilize as well as a discussion on materials and research design. This will be complemented by a theoretical discussion of the operationalization of these approaches. The following section will go through the literature on

6 the subject of feminist foreign policy to establish the theoretical work and concepts which have already been considered in the field. Then UN Security Council Resolution 1325 will be shortly discussed for clarity which leads to the analysis of the Swedish foreign policy statements from 2000-2020. Finally, there will be a discussion of the findings made in this paper and a conclusion.

Methodology

This section will contain a discussion of the approaches, methods, theory, and limitations of this thesis. To make it as clear as possible it will start with a discussion of constructivism both as an approach and a theory, and the constructivist methods that will be used throughout this paper, followed by a similar section on feminism. At the end of the section, there will be a discussion on how the two can function together, the purpose and restrictions of this combination as well as the limitations it imposes on the thesis.

Constructivism

Constructivism is a broad spectrum of scientific inquiry; it is an approach but can also, within specific fields, be a rather specific theory (Björkdahl, 2007). This section will discuss how the constructivist approach will be used in this thesis and which part of the constructivist spectrum will be used as well as the specific theories and the operationalization of these. Firstly, the thesis will examine constructivism as an approach. As the name indicates, constructivism is based on the assumption that the world is constructed, the degree to which this construction is relevant depends on which branch of constructivism one is working with. Some lean towards the rationalist approaches by assuming that this construction is one of many factors that need to be taken into account to explain the international world, while the other end of the spectrum leans towards the postmodernist and Frankfurt School critical theories that believe the world is fully constructed through discourse and that this is the most important variable of analysis (Locher & Prugl, 2001). This paper will be employing the type of constructivism that, as Adler (1997) described it, is rather middle of the road, both within the constructivist approach, but also because it places itself as a middle theory between rationalist and postmodernist schools of thought within the field of IR (Björkdahl, 2007; Locher & Prugl, 2001). As Björkdahl explains: “[a]s a middle road approach, social constructivism claims that

7 reality is socially constructed, and ideas give meaning to the material world” (Björkdahl, 2007). This thesis, therefore, places itself within a constructivist approach that accepts that there is an interplay between the material world and the intersubjectivity that gives it meaning. The choice of this specific type of constructivism is based on multiple factors. First, the need to consider the interplay between structures and actors to understand the development of an international norm necessitates a constructivist approach that allows investigation of the interplay between the physical and discursive construction (Bjorkdahl, 2002, p. 22). Second, this thesis seeks to understand how a feminist norm in foreign policy has been constructed and constructs the way foreign policy is conducted, this necessitates a constructivist approach that acknowledges the discursive construct as well as structural constraints that affects this on both a domestic and international level (Adler, 1997, p. 322). As this paper asks the questions of how feminism has been institutionalized in foreign policy, constructivism is an ideal approach as it is the investigation of the social construction of feminism and the effects of this that are at the center of the thesis (Browning, 2008, p. 22). Because of the constructivist base assumption that the material world matters but does not have any meaning before it has been socially constructed it is important to understand how these structures have been constructed to understand the meaning that they give to the material structures (Browning, 2008, p. 22). The changes of meaning will depend on the feminist framework and the theory of gender mainstreaming as much as on the theory of institutionalization of norms. Institutionalization. To identify how this paper will employ constructivism as a theory it is necessary to consider the different options for analysis. The intersubjectivity between actors and structures is central to the creation of identities through the establishment of norms, meanings, ideologies, and rules that guide the actions of individuals and states alike (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 8). When these norms or meanings become stable and widely accepted to the point where they dictate the social order they have become structures or institutions (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 8). This process of evolving from a meaning, into a norm that is widely accepted and guides actors, through dictating the social order, is what is at the center of this thesis. It is often assumed that structure is continuous, and actors are the drivers for change, however, change is created in the interaction between structures and actors (Björkdahl, 2013). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) explains that “[t]here is general agreement on the definition of a norm as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”

8 (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891) By using these criteria we can identify emerging norms beyond the point when they are introduced into the foreign policy statement. Furthermore, a norm in the sociological sense is a single standard of behavior while an institution is a collection of interrelated behaviors and rules (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). The importance of this distinction is that when talking about a system such as feminism it will consist of multiple norms that interrelate and affect each other which is why institutionalization as a process is then the interrelation between these norms creating the institution of ex. feminism (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). By looking at norms as individual actions and rules we can look inside social structures and institutions to understand what they are made up of and how they are renegotiated over time (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). Because of this, the continuous change of intersubjectivity and the changes in structures are important to study to understand what has allowed feminism to become integrated into foreign policy, and specifically do so in the limited context of Sweden. This will allow this thesis to understand the specific circumstances that form the basis for the FFP (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 8). Furthermore, norms are not openly stated, rather, they are indirectly underlying in the texts which will be analyzed in this thesis, their evidence being indirect (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). The indirect evidence will consist of justification for action, among other statements, that reveal the “oughtness” which is at the heart of a norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). These justifications, arguments, or even remarks will appear as indications of the knowledge that a norm is emerging against something or to convince others to follow a new norm – it is both a defense of and a sales pitch for actions. As this paper will be conducting a document analysis of 20 years of Swedish foreign policy statements the focus will be on the existence and strength of the norms rather than on the changed behavior, or lack thereof, it might lead to (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). As with any norm, feminism can manifest varyingly across time and space depending on the circumstances and structures with which it co-exists (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 9). Therefore, evaluating whether feminism has been institutionalized in the Swedish foreign policy is dependent on the contemporary context. Another important aspect of institutionalization is that norms exist in a continuum, not as dichotomous entities, one norm might be emerging in a space where another already resides without necessarily pushing the existing norm out (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892). Furthermore, norms can exist in one space while not in another, which occurs in national vs international spheres as much as between policy areas inside the foreign policy statement (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 892).

9 The discourse and practice play a key part in both maintaining and challenging existing norms and the development of those as well as in the introduction and establishment of new norms (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 10). The power that is exerted through discourse and practice, e.g. the power of processes, means that the constructivist understanding of power rests on the ability to construct and deconstruct discourse thereby altering the normative structures (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 11). Because this study seeks to understand the process of feminism becoming an institutionalized norm in Swedish foreign policy it is of significant importance to understand the role of the norm in the identity of Sweden. The way this will be done is through text analysis, specifically the foreign policy statements, to demonstrate a continuous pattern (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 18). This can be done as actors express shared expectations which give them normative power which therefore can substantiate claims of these norms increasing their influence and thereby power (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 18). The other important relationship that affects the institutionalization of norms is the relationship between norms in the national and international spheres which is highly intertwined (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893). Some norms originate domestically and are transferred to the international level by actors while international norms are transferred into the domestic sphere either by actors or by legislation such as directives or international agreements or resolutions (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893). These transfers mean that norms must be adaptable into greatly differing structures and institutions to gain any level of power which produces a great variation in norms that originate from the same idea but are institutionalized in different contexts (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893). One of these contexts is the interrelationship created with other existing norms in the system within which the norm is being introduced. Furthermore, this challenges the influence and ownership of a norm when it transcends to another area or level of policy (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 893). By looking for repetitions in discourse that could be supporting the norm of feminism as relevant in foreign policy it will be possible to determine the level of institutionalization the norm is at in that area - these types of repetition can be interpreted as an indication of the norm becoming a structure (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 24). As Klotz and Lynch argue “meanings stabilize into rules; sets of rules constitute institutions; clusters of institutions constitute structures, which in turn are the building blocks of systems.” (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 25) meaning that structures are not necessarily stable as the process of becoming a structure is constantly moving, though not in a linear manner.

10 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) uses stages of institutionalization to describe this process. They argue that norms exist at three main stages: emergence, acceptance or cascade, and internalization or stabilization (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). The acceptance stage is of particular importance in this paper as the cascading or acceptance of norms across the foreign policy statement is central to this thesis because of the “tipping point” where the gender has reached a critical mass in the foreign policy statement to become commonly accepted across different policy areas (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). As this tipping point is the area between norm emergence and acceptance it is of particular interest. The norm emergence stage involves norm entrepreneurs convincing other actors to accept the norm by justifying and arguing for its presence, while the norm acceptance stage is when the norm is moving more smoothly into other policy areas because it is being imitated in these areas, here there will be less justification and persuasion, and more focus on imitating the norm as it is in other areas (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). The last stage of internalization is when the norm has settled to be stable and has acquired a taken-for-granted quality to its presence, at this stage it is unlikely to be justified heavily why the norm is present (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). This process is, however, not necessarily linear. A norm might disappear, only to return in a different form later at any of the first two stages, while an internalized norm might be challenged by other emerging norms and lose its position and power (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). On the other hand, a norm might become internalized to a degree where it will be the standard other norms are measured against (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). The framework created by structures plays a key role in the actions of actors in that they frame the meaning within which individuals act and think. However, this relationship between structures and actors is co-constitutive in the sense that the action of an actor can change the meanings of the structure, this can be done through a change of discourse, interpretation, or context. Depending on the persuasiveness of the change made by the actor this can then alter the structure to different degrees and ultimately change the actions of other actors when they replicate the change (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007, p. 44). The actors who introduce and advocate for a norm and are the support that creates norm emergence and ensure the convergence to norm acceptance, or in the words of Finnemore and Sikkink “Norm cascade,” are also known as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 898). As can be seen in the table below, Finnemore and Sikkink simplify the process down to a relationship between actors, their motives, and the dominant mechanisms at each stage:

11

(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 898)

Because of the “taken for granted”-ness of stabilized norms they will often be considered good norms, however, throughout the competition between norms to become established one main issue is the competition to be seen as good which will be argued by its proponents (Björkdahl, 2013). This is a factor that can be examined in so far as to whether actors are still arguing that the norm is good or if it is at a stage where this is implicitly understood. This paper is particularly concerned with the occurrence of change which correlates with one of the main interests in the field of international norm research. It is important to understand how norms change and evolve, however, the concrete evolution of the norms concerning feminism in foreign policy will not be the main focus but rather the process of institutionalization across the spectrum of different areas of policy that make up the foreign policy statement. The way in which norms constrain and govern behavior and action between the national and international sphere is where this theory connects with the methodological framework of constructivism. To operationalize this constructivist framework the analysis will, therefore, focus on identifying instances of actors, while also looking for discursive repetitions over time and

12 indications of the dominant mechanisms as shown in the table above to determine the stage the norm is at. These steps will be further elaborated in the final section of this chapter.

Feminism Much like constructivism, feminism is both an approach and a range of specific theories. As an approach feminism uncovers gendered aspects of international relations that have otherwise been taken for granted. The work of feminist scholars, such as J. A. Tickner, opened up the possibilities to understand not just how women were affected by the international system but also how masculine ideas shaped the institutions that dominated the mainstream (Locher & Prugl, 2001; Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993). The concept of hegemonic masculinity became particularly prominent in explaining how these structures were formed and maintained through the opposition to the feminine and subordinate masculinities such as members of the LGBTQ communities (Locher & Prugl, 2001). Traits such as toughness, bravery, strength, and power are at the core of the hegemonic masculinity both in general but also specifically in the spheres that concern international relations (Locher & Prugl, 2001). It is a useful way in which to describe the underlying assumptions that the international structures are built on as well as the space in which foreign policy is formed. Especially, when considering the dichotomous relationship between masculine and feminine, which is often assumed in feminist research, it becomes clear that this relationship is similar to the framing of the relationship between states in foreign policy. The framing of countries as inherently feminine, in need of protection, weak, barbarian are all ways in which this dichotomous relationship manifests which lends itself very well to analysis in order to understand the feminist traits of a foreign policy (Agius & Edenborg, 2019; Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993). The theoretical framework from a feminist perspective must therefore assume two main factors as the basis of foreign policy: Hegemonic masculinity can be defined as “a type of culturally dominant masculinity that … distinguishes from other subordinated masculinities, is a socially constructed cultural ideal that, while it does not correspond to the actual personality of the majority of men, sustains patriarchal authority and legitimizes a patriarchal political and social order” (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, p. 9) – Important here is the distinction between other subordinate masculinities and , and hegemonic masculinity as hegemonic masculinity is understood as

13 specific ideals and norms that are reinforced through the opposition to subordinate identities (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, pp. 3–4). An important aspect of this approach to feminism in IR is the emphasis on the social construction of gender as well as the recognition of the importance of the context within which the observed gendered structures exist as these can vary in time and space (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, p. 10). The prevalent normative assumption of binary gender relations structures the way in which the power dynamics function in much of the western world (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993). According to Tickner, the gender binary can be found in most norms where there are binary distinctions such as public vs private, reason vs emotion, self vs other, which further means that by challenging these binary constructs and investigating their engendered nature it is possible to challenge the power of these norms that have been socially constructed (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, p. 10). The point of doing a feminist analysis of international relations and foreign policy alike is to not only explain the construction and reproduction of gender in these areas but also to understand how they can be removed in order to construct a fully equal/non-gendered approach to international issues (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, p. 19). By being aware of the hegemonic masculinity underlying foreign policy it will be possible to enlighten the unequal relationship between genders in the foreign policy statement. This is important to understand that the androgynous portrayal of gender is only surface level and indicates that the norm in foreign policy is one of hegemonic masculinity (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993). This can be seen by the explicit mention of women/LGBT+ or the complete absence of the male gender. Power relations. The importance of using a feminist approach is to shine a light on the power relations that are created in foreign policy. When adding an explicitly feminist focus to foreign policy it is based on the idea that the world is not only a social construction but a construction happening through the negotiation of super and subordinated relations, or simply put, through the struggle for power (Locher & Prugl, 2001). Power in this sense is understood as a part of the formation of identities whether that of a state or an individual, but arguably also as part of the struggle for one norm to establish over another (Locher & Prugl, 2001). Power, and in extension identity, is therefore socially constructed through the relationship to ‘others’ of different kinds. Identity thereby is created as a negative definition of what it is not, rather than a positive definition of what it is (Locher & Prugl, 2001). The gendered identity is here understood as a particularly strong mode of identification as it is socially constructed on assumptions of biological sex which can explain why gendered relationships are prevalent in spheres that do not obviously interact with gender (Locher & Prugl, 2001). To be able to

14 understand how this all relates to international relations and foreign policy the slogan of the second wave : ‘the personal is political and the political is personal’ can be adapted so that not only power politics is relevant in foreign policy but that we must ask security for whom, and include the personal and domestic issues onto an international scale (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). An indication of this approach can be seen through an extended focus on individuals or groups of individuals rather than states being the target of the policy. As there are multiple approaches to feminism in IR, much like with constructivism it will be necessary to decide on one specific branch for this study that is simultaneously compatible with the chosen constructivism on an ontological and epistemological level to avoid issues with internal validity from these very abstract but in the end deciding factors (Bjorkdahl, 2002). It is important here to stress that the feminist approach used in this paper should and will not be used as an addition subordinated to the constructivist framework but rather as an independent and equal part of the approach (Bjorkdahl, 2002). This means that the constructivist and feminist approaches are to complement each other with the knowledge and variables of analysis they allow for, rather than one dominating the other. The strand of feminism used in this thesis assumes ever-evolving relations of power that is not just within structures and actors but also, and this is key, between genders (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993).

When adding these two base understandings to the theory of gender mainstreaming a theoretical framework is created which will be the basis of the feminist exploration in this paper. Gender mainstreaming was introduced into Swedish policy in the 1990s as a way of ensuring a gendered perspective and gender analysis of all areas of policy, it is, therefore, important to understand what gender mainstreaming entails when analyzing the Swedish foreign policies of the last two decades (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). Gender mainstreaming as a policy approach has been sponsored in particular by the EU and the Council of Europe, however, Sweden has been an important constant pressure on the EU to do so which adds an additional layer which will be discussed later in this paper (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). For practitioners within the field of gender equality policy, gender mainstreaming is ”…a strategy towards realising gender equality. [That] involves the integration of a gender perspective into the preparation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, regulatory measures

15 and spending programmes, with a view to promoting equality between women and men, and combating discrimination.” (What is gender mainstreaming, 2020)

Another definition is that of the Council of Europe, “gender mainstreaming is the (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making.” (Council of Europe, 2004) Which is often used in earlier works on gender mainstreaming such as Daly, and Sainsbury and Bergquist (Daly, 2005; Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). It is, however, not only a practical approach within policy that promotes gender equality through different processes, but it is also a theoretical approach that allows the researcher to understand the gendered nature of key concepts present in the structures of policy process (Walby, 2005, p. 321). Both of these definitions make it clear that gender mainstreaming is an approach to gender equality that focuses on the making of policy, however, they both lack the theoretical implications concerning structural inequalities and power imbalances. A theoretical definition is used by Daly (2005) which states that the “gender mainstreaming approach is [one] that seeks to institutionalize equality by embedding gender- sensitive practices and norms in the structures, processes, and environment of public policy.” (Daly, 2005) This definition takes into account the effect of both practice and norms which makes it broader and allows for the analysis of, not simply how gender mainstreaming is done in practice but also how norms affect and are changed by gender mainstreaming. The competition of norms to become institutionalized means that gender must compete with a multitude of other issues for prioritization (Walby, 2005, p. 322). One way in which this has been done is through gender mainstreaming where the issue of gender has been integrated into institutional processes. This integration entails a dedication to some form of analytical tools being used in relation to different decisions. However, the implementation of gender mainstreaming does not mean that gender is considered in all areas and aspects of policy but rather that in some areas gender has been deemed enough of a priority to require a consideration of the gendered effects of the structures, processes or policy that is being worked on (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). An example of how gender mainstreaming affects norms is when the use of gender analysis in the state spreads and becomes the norm in other institutions on multiple levels of society, including voluntary organizations, corporations, etc. (Daly, 2005).

16 The transformative aspect of gender mainstreaming is highly debated, however, the theoretical aspect of transformation in gender mainstreaming should be understood as a new and positive form of gender-equal relations within the mainstream which has come about through gender mainstreaming (Walby, 2005, p. 323). When considering how this transformation should come about there are two strands of thought; ‘integration’ and ‘agenda-setting’, which can be argued to either be opposite and thereby mutually exclusive, or complementary and thereby paving the way for each other. Agenda setting is the way in which transformation can happen by reorientation of structural processes (Walby, 2005, p. 323). Whereas integration is when gender becomes part of the mainstream without necessarily changing it (True, 2003, p. 370). When working with a theory that is so closely tied with practice it is important to consider what constitutes success. Here is it helpful to consider the continuously changing environment in which policy happens. Because of the socially constructed nature of policy, the goal of gender mainstreaming needs to change according to the structures within which it operates (Walby, 2005, pp. 234–235). The social construction of gender in policy should be considered not from a perspective of linear progress but rather as a process with dynamic and changing priorities. The continuously changing nature of structures, norms, systems, and processes entails an approach to gender mainstreaming that responds to these changes (Daly, 2005). This is particularly important to keep in mind when considering what is possible now, in the past, and the future. These opportunity structures can be affected positively by gender mainstreaming meaning that over time gendered issues can become better integrated into the structures and become agenda setting on their own. Gender mainstreaming theory focuses on two types of action. First, structural inequality is analyzed which allows for determining how it is embedded in the system (Daly, 2005). Second, this analysis allows for the development of tools that make it possible to dismantle these structural issues (Daly, 2005). Thus, by drawing on feminist analysis combined with an interest in understanding the structural framework which reproduces , gender mainstreaming is able to uncover the ways in which norms and constructed gender relations are embedded in social structures and suggest approaches to dismantle these (Daly, 2005). Through the institutionalization of gender, it should be possible to see changes in decision-making processes, structures, policy objectives, strategies of implementation of policy, and a general prioritization of gender issues and perspectives among both men and women (Daly, 2005). It is important to underline that gender mainstreaming aims at gender equality and therefore is not an approach that should mainly target women (Daly, 2005).

17 Gender mainstreaming is a state-centric approach assuming rationality from actors which have led to criticism from both feminists and other researchers who find it important to consider the state inherently gendered as well as the importance of civil society and the family realm (Daly, 2005). Gender mainstreaming as a theory and practice has received much criticism both for being too broad and policy-focused and thereby resembling an approach (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). But also, for its inability to deliver transformative results when implemented (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). Both of these points of criticism are worth considering when using the theory, however, the latter one opens up considerations of the time the process of gender mainstreaming should take for transformative results to show. This is interesting considering some of the empirical evidence collected for these studies on the effect of gender mainstreaming has only considered or been carried out over a short period of time, often with the assumption that gender equality should soon be done or close to implemented. However, most major changes to societal structures do not happen overnight, rather it is an often-lengthy process of undoing, integrating, and changing existing structures to accommodate the new ideas (True, 2003). The need to consider the changes over time opens up for how far back such a study should look. In the case of this thesis, it is most relevant to consider changes since the year 2000 as this was the time when gender equality in Sweden spread from being a self-contained issue to being implemented into a broader spectrum of policy (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009). Meaning that at this point there is more focus on the individual ministries’ being able to carry out and implement a gender perspective on their work (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009).

By having an understanding of the effect of hegemonic masculinity, which is embedded in foreign policy, together with the importance of power relations, and, a practical understanding of implementing gender in policy from gender mainstreaming, it enables this thesis to discover the gendered aspects of the foreign policy statements.

A feminist-constructivist approach

Now that both constructivism and feminism have been considered it is possible to look at how these two approaches can be combined in this thesis to create a different perspective on feminism in the Swedish foreign policy.

18 Firstly, if we were to only use a constructivist approach, we would struggle to understand feminism as more than a norm developing in the Swedish foreign policy because of the marginal interest in gender generally held by constructivists (Locher & Prugl, 2001). This would lead to a lack of understanding in terms of how the feminist foreign policy affects gendered constructs and relationships of power in the international sphere – particularly the balancing between masculine and feminine constructs that is necessary. A purely constructivist approach would therefore be insufficient to investigate the full implications of the inclusion of feminism in foreign policy. On the other hand, while feminism on its own would allow this thesis to focus on the gendered implications of feminism in foreign policy it would not allow for a wider picture that includes the development of feminism as a norm in the international sphere (Locher & Prugl, 2001). Feminism’s focus on power as a social construct is of particular importance in this thesis as it allows for a deeper analysis of how feminism in foreign policy challenges and maintains power structures, however, the structures themselves are part of a constant negotiation which a constructivist approach gives us a better picture of. By combining a feminist and constructivist approach we, therefore, limit both approaches to specific aspects they excel at while letting them interact in a way that will be able to give a highly nuanced picture of the effect of feminism in foreign policy in the specific case of Sweden (Locher & Prugl, 2001). As both approaches appreciate the importance of complex understandings over-generalizations this should be a strength of the thesis (Locher & Prugl, 2001). In more concrete terms the combination of constructivism and feminism means that a constructivist understanding of agent and structure, not as dichotomous but as co-constitutive will allow for a complex understanding of how feminism has developed as a norm in international relations in general and Swedish foreign policy in specific (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This should allow us to understand how and, potentially even, why feminism is seen as compatible with foreign policy in Sweden. The feminist approach will simultaneously allow us to look at the changes or lack thereof which has occurred in the gendered power relations (Ackerly et al., 2006). This will be done by looking at discursive framing, changes in participation or action related to gender/equality focused work. When combining these findings, we should be left with a detailed and complex understanding of the process which has led to feminism being a part of the Swedish foreign policy and how feminism is part of it. In practice this means that the constructivist theory of institutionalization will be operationalized to look for:

19 • Instances of actorness, either by Sweden or International Organizations such as the EU or UN • Discursive repetitions over time to indicate stabilization of a norm • Indications of any of the actors, motives, or dominant mechanisms shown in table one

This will be done through indexing areas in the 19 foreign policy statements that relate to feminism and identifying keywords. These sections will then be reexamined to reveal the underlying messages. Then the feminist theoretical framework will be applied to understand: • The gendered understanding in the text • Changing meanings of terms relating to gender • Underlying power struggles • The level to which gender has been institutionalized/mainstreamed in the text

Research design As this thesis aims to understand how feminism as a norm has developed and influenced Swedish foreign policy a single case study is considered to be appropriate. As a case study does not aim at determining universal ‘laws’ but rather to describe in detail the specific case in its contemporary context, with a potential to suggest areas where generalization could be an option it is fitting with the combination of constructivist and feminist approaches that will be used (Bjorkdahl, 2002). As both constructivism and feminism value studies of complexity within a specific context, and further, argue that changes are context-specific it will not be the objective of this paper to make broad generalizations or find universal ‘laws’, this case study will, therefore, fall in the descriptive, interpretivist end of the spectrum of case studies (Locher & Prugl, 2001). It will be an intrinsic case study to enable a complex understanding of the specific case of Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy (Punch, 2005, p. 121). One of the main reasons for choosing an intrinsic case study, where generalizability is not the main objective, is that for generalizability to be an option it is necessary to work at a level of abstraction that disregards a varying amount of detail - as the details of the case are what makes it interesting this would be problematic (Punch, 2005, p. 123). The case study will therefore focus on the development of feminism in the foreign policy statements of Sweden. This has been chosen as the Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy of 2014/15 is considered the first explicitly feminist foreign policy in the world and it could,

20 therefore, be seen as a new step in the development of feminism in foreign policy (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). It will be seen in the light of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 as this is considered the common starting point for the contemporary feminist foreign policies and it is therefore of interest to investigate how close the Swedish foreign policy lies to it (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). Furthermore, the effect of gender mainstreaming on the institutionalization process will be considered both on an internal level in the Swedish foreign policy statement and in relation to the pressure imposed from a European side. This study will, therefore, be able to contribute to our understanding of how Sweden’s feminist foreign policy became what it is, it will, however, not be compared to other countries with aspects of their foreign policies being feminist as the domestic and perceived differences between the cases and the limits to this thesis would force the analysis onto a more abstract level for that to be possible.

Limitations One limitation of this study is that it disregards the role of individual actors such as bureaucrats and the foreign minister, it thereby falls short of exploring the dynamic that these actors create in the process of institutionalization of feminism in the Swedish foreign policy statement (Bjorkdahl, 2002, p. 184). It should be stated that the scope of this study is limited to the study of the Swedish foreign policy statement and can therefore not be generalized to the everyday work at the ministry of foreign affairs or the inner workings of the foreign policy (Bjorkdahl, 2002, p. 17). Furthermore, it is not the intention of this study to generalize the institutionalization of feminism in foreign policy but rather to uncover how this process has transpired in the Swedish case. The data will be collected from the Swedish Governments web site as well as other relevant databases with access to official government and UN documents, this will be further discussed in the materials section.

Materials In this section, the choice of materials for this thesis will be discussed. As the thesis will be based on official government documents published by the Swedish state in their online database and on their web site it will have limitations specific to the use of official documents published by governments themselves. The documents will be the annual foreign policy

21 statements from 2000-2020. Furthermore, the Security Council Resolution 1325 will be used as a reference point to understand the commonalities between it and the Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy. By using the government documents as primary sources of data this paper will analyze the content of them, rather than using them as a secondary source of opinions (Punch, 2005, p. 159; Sapsford et al., 2012). The goal is to learn from a text analysis how the norm of feminism has become integrated into Swedish foreign policy, therefore the documents published by the Swedish government should be an ideal primary data source. The objective of the text analysis will not be to understand the impact of the specific policies on their targets. The documents used will exclude documents relating to questions of domestic policy as the scope of this paper does not involve the relationship between domestic and foreign policy. The thesis will be analyzing the foreign policy statements held by the Swedish foreign minister at the beginning of each year. More specifically the analysis will be of the written documents that are published by the foreign ministry as this thesis will be relying purely on text analysis. If this had been a discourse analysis of the whole speech it would have been relevant to examine the visual recordings of the speech as well, however, the emphasis here is focused on the institutionalization of a norm within the text, not the person delivering it. As the foreign policy statement is the official, annual statement of the Swedish priorities in the foreign policy this is a relevant document to examine. For the purpose of understanding the institutionalization of a norm in the Swedish foreign policy, it is useful that the prioritization of topics included in the foreign policy statement is high. Only topics that are seen as important to Sweden will be included in this statement. The intended audience of the foreign policy statement is primarily the Swedish parliament and foreign states, though naturally the Swedish public also has an interest in this. It is a government's way of informing the parliament of their priorities, while also being a way for the state to inform other states and international actors what they will be prioritizing in the coming year. Lastly, it is a way for the Swedish public to learn the government's foreign policy priorities. A choice has been made to work with the Swedish language texts for multiple reasons. First to avoid translation bias, by using the Swedish language document the text is a transcript of the speech and therefore expresses as closely as possible the intent of the speaker. Second, there is an inconsistency in the translations available, the first years used there are no translations available, while later years either include French, Spanish, or mostly English – this makes it difficult to justify using the translated documents as they require a fluent knowledge of multiple languages, furthermore, the biases inherent with translations of this type of

22 document is that the target of these texts will be a foreign audience specifically. Lastly, as digitalization has increased, platforms and formats have changed which has led to the Swedish language version being the most continuous versions. The limitations of using the foreign policy statements as the only primary source of analysis are that it only shows the institutionalization of the norm in the statement and not necessarily provides a generalized view of the institutionalization of the norm in the Swedish foreign policy or the practices within them. Further, as a foreign policy statement is targeted at other states as well as the parliament, the projection of a specific image is an important part of the statement. This leads to bias in regard to the statement portraying the desired institutionalization instead of actual institutionalization. The use of these statements, therefore, means that it will not be possible to conclude how institutionalized these norms are in the foreign policy as such or the foreign ministry’s work, only how it is institutionalized in the foreign policy statement.

Literature review Feminist foreign policy In this section, the context of research in the field of feminist foreign policy will be elaborated upon. The literature in this area will be divided into four sections which provide the structure for this chapter.

Domestic vs international explanations Rosamond (2020) argues that the Swedish feminist foreign policy is a result of the social-democratic legacy, particularly its friendliness towards gendered issues (Rosamond, 2020, p. 218). This domestic view on the development of the Swedish FFP allows her to trace the developments back to the 1960s (Rosamond, 2020, p. 223). She echoes Kronsell’s opinion that “[t]he externalization of the Swedish pro-gender norm beyond its borders is a cosmopolitan response to global calls for states to support the UN Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda” (Rosamond, 2020). This portrayal that the UN WPS agenda related to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is the main reasoning for including feminism or a gender-sensitive approach in the Swedish foreign policy is repeated across the research on the topic, however, it does not account for the reciprocal relationship of

23 international and domestic norms as it is concerned more with the feminist and domestic factors contributing to the FFP’s development. In the work of Aggestam and Rosamond (2020) they argue that Sweden’s “commitment to the advancement of global gender equality and mainstreaming is closely linked to its support for UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), adopted in 2000” (Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020, p. 38). Which then adds the Swedish FFP onto an international agenda. Alwan and Weldon (2017) similarly argue that Sweden’s adoption of the FFP is “embedded in the broader global efforts to promote gender equality in the international arena, which we have seen evolving over the past few decades in the aftermath of the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325” (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 323). The focus on the domestic vs international factors in the development of the Swedish FFP takes center stage in a majority of the research on the Swedish FFP (Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020; Alwan & Weldon, 2017; Rosamond, 2020).

Adding Women Rosamond (2020) argues that the focus of gender as meaning women is reproducing gendering and reinforces gender roles (Rosamond, 2020). This is echoed by Scheyer and Kumskova’s (2019) review of the existing feminist foreign policies “[m]any of these policies are focusing disproportionately on the rights and experiences of women.” (2019, p. 64) They elaborate that “every single policy from this list focuses disproportionately on the situation of women, their rights, and needs, instead of addressing gendered power structures, identifying silenced groups, building empathic communities, and rethinking important concepts, such as sovereignty, militarism, and nationalism.”(Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019, pp. 64–65) Thompson and Clement (2019) add to this point by highlighting the general criticism of the “binary focus on women rather than gender” when it comes to rights (Thompson & Clement, 2019, p. 2). They further justify this by concluding that “use[ing] the word feminist when they mean “women and girls” … reinforces the binary and undermines work to overcome white, ethnocentric, and western-centric, cis feminism’s historical (and current) sins.” (Thompson & Clement, 2019, p. 5) Aggestam and Rosamond (2020) argue that the reasoning for Sweden’s pursuit of FFP is that its “adoption of a feminist foreign policy is an attempt to push the gender-security nexus to the very center of global politics” (Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020, p. 38). This stands in

24 contrast to the former article by Scheyer and Kumskova (2019) where they argue that “governments continue to pursue power by traditional means and only attempt to embed women into the system rather than adopting a comprehensive feminist policy” (Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019, p. 69). Aggestam and Rosamond counter this idea by arguing that “feminist foreign policy is both an expression of ethical conduct and pragmatism, which at times may trigger policy contradictions and tensions.”(Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020, p. 38). They further argue that the guiding principle of the FFP is ethical in combination with seeking concrete results which justifies the lack of “obliterating national interests”, furthermore, this is justified according to Aggestam and Rosamond by the targeting of women and marginalized groups in the Swedish FFP (Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020, pp. 45–46).

Feminist enough or Defining feminist foreign policy One of Rosamond’s (2020) main conclusions are the call for an intersectional approach in the Swedish FFP. Scheyer and Kumskova (2019) suggest that “ and attempts to make women visible in international relations are not enough to realize a comprehensive feminist foreign policy.” Robinson (Robinson, 2019) argues, that the liberal cosmopolitan approach to an FFP is not feminist enough as it, according to her research, reproduces existing power structures, including gendered power relations and western domination (Robinson, 2019). She further argues that the ethical aspect of this approach, mainly proposed by Aggestam and Rosamond, undermines a truly feminist foreign policy (Robinson, 2019). Her alternative approach is to use a concept known as ‘ethics of care’ within the framework of echoing other authors who are calling for a more transformative and intersectional FFP (Robinson, 2019; Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019). Aggestam and Rosamond instead argue for an ethical component to be incorporated through a theoretical framework of English School analysis with an emphasis on justice over order (Aggestam & Bergman- Rosamond, 2016). This, they argue, would create a way of better measuring if an FFP is feminist enough (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). Thompson and Clement (2019) instead suggest that FFP can be improved upon by focusing on “pushing countries to increase their commitments to gender equality as a principle and funded goal and adopting a more rigorous and independent practice for monitoring, evaluation, research and learning tied to policies’ intended outcomes.”

25 Overlapping with the previous section is the papers working on defining what an FFP entails. These papers are particularly concerned with developing frameworks and definitions to measure how feminist a feminist foreign policy is or should be. Scheyer and Kumskova (2019) argues that “Feminist foreign policy is one that includes whole populations, appreciates diversity, inspires comprehensive analysis, and leaves no one behind.” (Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019, p. 58). They advocate for an FFP that “should be about looking into the structures, addressing gendered power relations, building gender-inclusive institutions, and pursuing policies that incorporate the interests of and seek to benefit all.” Instead of the current focus on adding women as discussed in the previous section. Their further argument goes that much like other IR theories “[f]eminist analysis represents another component of an alternative view on global politics, not an idealistic departure from it.” (Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019, p. 58). They thereby oppose the concept of an FFP to that of neo-realist or neo-liberalist approaches to foreign policy and advocate for an intersectional, anti-capitalist approach to feminism in foreign policy (Scheyer & Kumskova, 2019). Egnell echoes a similar idea when he states that FFP is a fundamentally wider and new approach to issues of what security entails (Egnell, 2017, p. 584). Alwan and Weldon take this point even further by assuming that “[t]he declaration of a distinct feminist foreign policy signals a departure from traditional elite-oriented foreign policy practices and discourses toward a policy framework that is guided by normative and ethical principles” (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 327). Another contented point is whether an FFP should be pacifist or not, Aggestam and Rosamond argue that “a feminist foreign policy is not as closely associated with pacifism as is often assumed, but encourages pragmatism in the alternation between the use of soft and hard power as the most appropriate diplomatic and military strategy to manage security threats” (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). Alwan and Weldon instead argue for including pacifism as a necessary indicator of a truly feminist foreign policy but encourages that this goes beyond just abstinence from military activity to include issues of domestic violence as well (Alwan & Weldon, 2017, p. 25). Meanwhile, Egnell classifies the contention between liberal and pacifist feminism as a catch 22 situation in the FFP (Egnell, 2017, p. 570).

External relations Rosén Sundström and Elgström (2019) argues that the role Sweden plays as a norm entrepreneur within the EU while not being considered a powerful state has a disadvantage in

26 that other states are less likely to follow suit and adopt an FFP (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019, p. 430). Furthermore, they argue that against the backdrop of rising nationalism and populism, the FFP is in danger of becoming just another -ism in the EU (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019, p. 430). Their study found that the norm of feminism in the EU is highly contested and therefore less likely to reach internalization internationally (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019, p. 430). This risk together with the slow spread of FFP in the global space leads them to conclude that FFP as a norm is in its infant stage of norm emergence (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019, p. 430). What is in favor of the FFP being promoted by Sweden is that Sweden is already perceived as a norm entrepreneur for gender in international relations (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019, p. 430). In opposition to the view that Rosén Sundström and Elgström presents, Egnell (2017) finds that the FFP has a greater capacity for international power than many commentators expected and that it should, therefore, be used mindfully (Egnell, 2017, p. 584).

UN resolution 1325 On October 31st, 2000 the Landmark resolution on Women, Peace, and Security was adopted by the United Nations Security Council (Security Council resolution 1325, 2000). This resolution meant that the parties recognized women as integral to peace and security including, among other things, as participants in peacebuilding. Furthermore, it committed the UN to consider issues of gender in aspects of peace and security issues and encouraged all parties in conflict to not use gendered violence including rape as a means of warfare. However, it also involved a new focus on women as fully participating soldiers in peacekeeping missions, national armies, and international intervention (Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019, p. 31). The idea of the WPS was to start a process of gender mainstreaming on a global scale (Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019, p. 31). To implement resolution 1325 a number of countries adopted National Action Plans (NAP) that clarified the concrete measures the individual states would be taking to fulfill their commitment (Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019, p. 31). The overall concept of the WPS resolution was that through the inclusion of women in the processes of peace and conflict it would be possible to create long and stable peace (Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019, p. 32). The adoption of the WPS was in itself build on the efforts of civil society organizations and ambassadors of countries in favor of the resolution, particularly through finding a common language in already existing UN

27 resolutions to negotiate an agreement framed as already agreed upon but in a new wrapping (Basu, 2016). It being a security council resolution has meant that the UN has been working with WPS continuously since the year 2000, compared to UN conferences for example that set a time-specific goal for the work with the topic in question. This continuous focus on women’s role in peace and security through resolution 1325 has encouraged participating states to continuously work with women’s inclusion through developing NAPs. The UN security council, however, has also agreed on further resolutions on women such as resolution 1960 from 2010 which focused on sexual violence in conflict and resolution 2122 from 2013 which concerned the integration of women at all stages of conflict, building on top of these as well as other goals set at UN conferences and through security council resolutions (Aggestam & Bergman Rosamond, 2019, p. 33).

Analysis This section will go through how women are presented in Swedish foreign policy as well as how this has developed over time. By starting in 2000 we will be able to see how women are presented from the year when the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was adopted. This is of importance as 1325 is considered to be the first push to implement feminism or women’s issues into foreign policy in much of the literature (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016; Alwan & Weldon, 2017; Egnell, 2017; Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019).

2000 (Utrikesfrågor, 2000), Anna Lindh (S) In the year 2000, the main focus of the foreign policy is security and human rights. When listing the priorities of the Swedish EU presidency, equality is stated as the main concern that should be all-encompassing in the EU's work (Line 92, line 106). The Swedish EU presidency prioritizing equality is an indication that equality is a somewhat established norm inside Sweden, but that it still needs attention in the EU where Sweden as an actor or norm entrepreneur appears to push for its institutionalization, thereby being aware of the contested state of equality in the EU. The push for all-encompassing equality in the work of the EU is furthermore interesting from the perspective of gender mainstreaming as Sweden here is pushing for its interpretation of the EU's push for gender mainstreaming (True, 2003). Women and equality are mentioned both as a topic to be pursued in the EU and as part of human and children’s rights on a global level. Particularly the lack of equality when it comes to gender

28 discrimination, this is the first explicit mention of gender as an independent issue (line 142- 143). The issues related to gender discrimination and oppression of women are elaborated upon in line 142-143 where the issue of the majority of poor people in the world at the time are women as well as the issue of women not having appropriate access or power to demand respect for their rights are mentioned (line 142-143). The intersection between equality and children’s rights in the Swedish approach to aid is shown through the example of the forced closing of schools for girls in Afghanistan because of unrest, while another is opened in Mozambique because of increasing stability (line 262- 263). The varying contexts within which gender appears in the foreign policy statement of the year 2000 shows that the broad implantation of gender mainstreaming appears to broaden the range of relevant areas and the depth of concrete examples of work that involved a gender- sensitive angle. Equality has gained the added institutionalization by gender being mentioned explicitly and with a focus on strengthening equality in an EU framework shows how internally it has been accepted as an acceptable foreign policy element in this area. Furthermore, the aspect of Swedish foreign policy done through the UN has gotten a distinct gender and equality angle both indirectly and in relation to the rights of education for girls in both Afghanistan and Mozambique.

2001 (Riksdagens Protokoll, 2001) Anna Lindh (S) The 2001 foreign policy has a strong focus on human and individual rights. It is a Swedish priority to strengthen the rights of people who experience discrimination based on gender, ethnicity, etc. (lines 10-11). The presentation of gender as a category on the same footing as ethnicity, political, and religious belonging is a new angle compared to the year earlier where gender is mentioned under human rights but as a completely separate issue from these. It shows clearly how gender and equality are competing with other norms and is under continuous pressure to find the right belonging within the foreign policy. Since this is expressed in the foreign policy statement, it is clear that the increased attention to gender shows a level of institutionalization as a foreign policy statement is the Swedish governments moment to inform the Swedish parliament, as well as foreign government and international organization what their priorities are for the forthcoming year. The gender-related goals are in 2001 presented as a part of the pressure on the UN which Sweden considered a vital international player (line 10-16). The goal of the 2001 foreign policy is to be present in more places whether that be conflict, crisis, or through diplomatic postings and civilian cooperation. In this text,

29 gender is mentioned as an independent area of priority under the umbrella of human rights work. Voting rights for women is a concrete example given for strengthening human rights. It is considered a point of priority to ensure that women across the world gain the right to vote and have their voices and opinions heard (line 40-42). Voting rights are presented within the framework of already signed treaties that other countries are not living up to, this is a well- known tactic of framing for gaining support for a potentially controversial line of policy (Adler, 1997, p. 336; Joachim, 2003, p. 250). Generally, there is a call to strengthen women’s rights, which is highlighted along with the rights of children and disabled persons, as a Swedish priority as a member of the UN human rights council (line 43-45). This adds another area in which Sweden is pursuing priorities of gender issues internationally. This extension shows how gender focus is becoming more mainstreamed in Swedish foreign policy. One of the Swedish priorities in the work with hindering terrorism is to create contact with Muslim women and women’s groups in the Middle East and Asia (line 184-185). This aim is interesting as it singles out contact to women and women’s groups as a way of strengthening the dialog between the EU and Muslim countries. This shows a consideration of gender that is unusual in that rather than having an explicit equality focus it singles out the importance of work with one gender but not the other. As these foreign policies otherwise do not refer to gendered groups and are written in a way indicating an androgynes assumption this emphasis on women is interesting. The conflict in Afghanistan is another area of priority, where women and children are seen as the main victims of the conflict and are therefore granted special attention (line 196- 197). Furthermore, there is a specific point against circumcision of girls showing the extension into an openly gender specific issue within health. The exclusive focus on girls in this section indicates that there is only an issue with the circumcision of girls and not a question for both genders.

2002 (Riksdagens Protokoll, 2002) Anna Lindh (S) In 2002 there was a significant focus on terrorism, human rights, and the prevention of conflicts. Particularly the need to respect human rights in all of these circumstances. The end and prevention of the trade of human beings, particularly of women and children as victims of human trafficking was presented as a priority (lines 11-12, line 52-53). In 2002 the priorities are listed as bullet points making it clear that this priority of human rights for women and children to not be victims of trafficking is the main concern. In this context, one of the most concrete examples of actions is highlighted in the collaboration of the Swedish Institute and

30 the director of the film “Lilja 4-ever” to ensure it is spread to create awareness of human trafficking. This goes to show the multi-faceted approach that is taken by the Swedish government within the subcategory of human trafficking on an international scale (line 52-52). Once again, the portrayal of women as victims equal to children is the first encounter of gendered considerations, men are as a category completely absent. The institutionalization of gender appears to have developed; however, women’s agency is still not a main concern, rather it is a question of rescuing women. In line 67 women are once again portrayed in the classic “women and children” rhetoric where the Swedish state as an actor is fighting for their rights in other states (line 67). Women’s and children’s rights were considered a continued priority. As we can see in the 2002 foreign policy statement, the focus on gendered aspects has been limited to areas of women’s and children’s rights where the Swedish state is presented as an actor that protects them against abuse. Considerations of the relationship between the trafficking of women (and children) but not men, and the financing of terrorist groups in a new area of priority, however, it is also the only gendered area of concern in the 2002 statement. The 2002 statement is concerned with conflict, terrorism, and nuclear disarmament within the framework of the EU and UN; however, the institutionalization of gender appears to be stagnating or even weakening at this point considering that it is not listed as a priority compared to the year before.

2003 (Riksdagens Protokoll, 2003) Laila Freivalds (S) In 2003 the focus of the foreign policy was on human rights, using the UN and other multilateral organizations. Gender is highlighted in the section on child soldiers as both boys and girls (lines 20-23). The 2003 foreign policy statement has a larger number of concrete cases where gender is mentioned by both including boys and girls, this is a new development from the former statements and shows that a new attempt at institutionalizing gender in the foreign policy is putting pressure in a new way, but has not stabilized enough to have a clear and consistent place. Furthermore, schools and the importance of women’s specific healthcare is emphasized multiple times (line 32-33). This new focus on concrete initiatives that affect women and girls, but also boys, show that gender is an active consideration within aid to developing countries. Gendered issues are this time presented as part of the Swedish development policy which should be pursued both bilaterally but also as the Swedish priority within the EU and UN, in this context Sweden is again an actor and norm entrepreneur for gender in the international sphere. The clear agenda setting for the UN and EU work regarding

31 protecting women’s rights, as a main way of ensuring successful development, is a new approach to pressure other international actors to include a gendered perspective. The argument here is in line with the understanding that helping women from oppression will lead to better results in development work in general (Rosenberg & Tickner, 1993, p. 44). Adding a gendered perspective is therefore portrayed as an obvious approach as it is presented as sure to work. Women’s oppression is, therefore, portrayed as an obstacle for successful development. Another aspect of the development policy which has a gendered awareness is the focus on women’s sexual and reproductive health, which is the fourth priority, this is grouped together with issues relating to LGBTQ persons in the development strategy (line 128-132). Including LGBTQ concerns in the foreign policy statement also indicates a broader concern with gender and sexuality in the Swedish development policy. The issues that affect women and LGBTQ persons are presented as intertwined and overlapping, both in regards to oppression but also relating to health, particularly HIV/AIDS (line 128-132). Sweden as an actor is here arguing for a more “progressive” and “effective” approach both in Sweden’s international commitments but also for the EU's work (line 132). Like the years before, the human trafficking of women and children is another area that is prioritized (line 210-2013). This is done within the framework of international organizations, specifically the UN, EU, and OSCE, where Sweden’s agenda is openly stated (line 211). This openness about Sweden’s agenda regarding women is an interesting development in that this could be a controversial issue. In the 2003 foreign policy statement, we see the first direct mention of the UN security council resolution 1325. By including this resolution the importance of women’s role in peacemaking is introduced, further, article 1325 is specifically about giving women agency in peacemaking which not only adds a new area where gender is considered in the Swedish foreign policy but it also opens up for a stronger focus on women’s agency, rather than just seeing women as victims or objects.

2004 (Riksdagens Protokoll, 2004) Laila Freivalds (S) The 2004 foreign policy statement is very focused on developing and improving the UN. From the Swedish perspective here, the UN is portrayed as the most important place for affecting global development, followed by the EU. This affects the role of gender, specifically women, because of UN security council resolution 1325 (line 114-115). The emphasis on this resolution is particularly interesting for two reasons: 1) according to resolution 1325 women should have agency, influence, and access to peace processes which differ significantly from

32 earlier approaches to women’s role in foreign policy where they have been the passive object of a policy rather than directly participating in it, and 2) by using the resolution from the UN security council this agenda is legitimized through the logic that Sweden has already signed and ratified it along with other countries who might be either on the receiving end of the policy or a collaborating organization or state. Once again, we see women portrayed as victims of human trafficking along with children (line 132-135). This time within the framework of EU cooperation which is a slightly different angle from previous years where the focus has been on regional cooperation instead. Targeting the EU as the appropriate place to cooperate on matters relating to women’s issues when it comes to human trafficking is therefore a new arena. Furthermore, the human trafficking of women and children is used as an argument for intensifying the fight against international networks that support drug trafficking and in this case is understood to finance terrorist networks in Afghanistan (line 132-135). In the 2004 foreign policy statement women are at the center of two different issues that belongs within two different international organizations. However, equality, both gender and otherwise is not presented as a priority in this statement, neither is there any gendering of men or children present to widen the focus of the concrete consequences of the foreign policy, it must therefore still be considered as assuming a male experience as being the androgynous generalized experience. Once again, we see that the institutionalization of gender in the foreign policy is taking on other shapes, gender as a norm has therefore not stabilized in any specific area as such – though the continuous repetition of the trafficking of women shows that gender is more stable within this area of the foreign policy.

2005 (Riksdagens Protokoll, 2005) Laila Freivalds (S) In 2005 the Middle East was a priority area, the Muhammed drawing crisis, the Israel- Palestine conflict, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions playing center stage. Generally, crisis management and peaceful transition to democracy was a main goal. The foreign policy statement of 2005 highlights female heads of state, such as the new president of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (line 88-89). However, her presidency is portrayed as a result of Sweden’s and other international actors’ achievements rather than giving the president the agency (line 88-

91). Another female head of state, Eva Morales, the president of Brazil is later mentioned, and this is highlighted as a victory within Sweden’s work for Human rights in Latin America (line

33 248-249). It is important to note that women that have become heads of state in developing countries are mentioned, but not within an equality agenda, rather as a reminder that they have to improve human rights (line 88-94). It shows that while gender is in some areas a consideration in the Swedish foreign policy, it is not the main objective, in the sense that a female head of state is not highlighted for the opportunity this could bring to women or for equality in that country but rather as a celebration of Sweden’s efforts as an actor to affect a country’s development. Another highlight is the equality agenda mentioned within Sweden’s engagement in UN missions. Here it is one of three priorities in the stabilizing work that should come from these UN missions (line 91-94). This is in line with an earlier argument that if women have equality and are involved in peace processes the peace will be more stable. This again should be seen in the light of Sweden’s engagement with the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which Sweden has obliged itself to implement in their international work. The work against human trafficking of women as a group is again portrayed as a priority, but this time the framework within which to pursue it is the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which Sweden was heading in 2005. It appears that the gendered effects of human trafficking are a stabilized norm within the Swedish approach to the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Within the development, policy equality has returned as a main priority. In this area, a National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 is in the works which should guide Sweden’s work with involving women in peace processes (line 186-187). It is becoming clear that tying a gendered perspective with UN resolution 1325 is successful in that this is becoming a stable aspect of the foreign policy statements. Another priority in development work is sexual and reproductive health and rights, again aimed at women specifically, which is highlighted as a priority area (line 186-187). The focus on women’s rights and access to health has been mentioned in earlier foreign policy statements, however, it is emphasized in the 2005 statement together with resolution 1325 which could mean a stronger focus on women’s agency regarding their health.

2006/2007 (Riksdagens Protokoll, 2006) Carl Bildt (M) In 2006/2007 the government had changed from the Social Democrats to Moderaterna (liberal-conservative). This foreign policy statement covers both 2006 and 2007 – in the government's online archives the two appear separately but the content is identical. Therefore,

34 it will be treated as one statement. The foreign policy statement was observed by a Lithuanian delegation including the Lithuanian President. This shows clearly the importance of these statements in Sweden’s relations with the world, the foreign policy statement is the way in which Sweden communicates what other states can expect of its international work in the next year. The focus on the EU was particularly heavy. Generally, the statement is very detailed and concrete. Two sections of the foreign policy statement of 2006/2007 treat the question related to women. First, it restates Sweden’s commitment to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (line 204-205), and second, it portrays women and children as victims of the crisis in Sudan (line 258-259). Regarding Sweden’s work on implementing resolution 1325, the 2006/7 statement is restated as a priority for Sweden to pressure other countries into complying with the resolution rather than making sure Sweden implements it adequately, Sweden is here an actor (line 204-205). It is worth noting how this statement is detailed in general but very abstract when it comes to these two points. Furthermore, gendered issues are not considered beyond women’s role in peace, we, therefore, see a decline in the open focus on gendered issues. Consequently, this could indicate that there is a change inside the government to focus on gender issues beyond what Sweden has committed to in the UN. It is also clear that the commitment to article 1325 and thereby the appropriateness of women being an active part in peacemaking has been institutionalized enough to carry on even with a change of the political parties that form the government. In that sense, a gendered perspective has found a stable place in the Swedish foreign policy. The 2nd point in the statement, where the conflict in Sudan is discussed, women are included as victims who are particularly hard hit by the conflict, together with children. This ‘women and children’ narrative has been a reoccurring theme throughout the foreign policy statements thus far.

2008 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2008) Carl Bildt (M) The 2008 foreign policy statement is divided into 10 points plus an additional point at the end. The topics are the EU as a world power, EU expansion, climate/environment, developing the UN, supporting democracy and human rights, supporting peace and progress in the middle east, Sweden’ engagement in the west Balkans, high-quality development/aid, strengthen trade and competitions, synergy between the different foreign ministry departments work, and Nordic/Baltic cooperation. These priorities though spelled out in a different structure are similar to the priorities we have seen in earlier statements, which indicates that government

35 change has minimal effect on the general priorities of the foreign policy. However, the content relating to equality and women varies depending on the year, both in the amount, the emphasis placed on it, and the topics/areas they are presented within. Equality and women’s rights are mentioned in two different contexts, once as part of the effort to ensure the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is implemented in practice and the other as part of Sweden’s development efforts. At this point it is clear that the UN resolution 1325 is an appropriate sphere for involving women in foreign policy, however, there is a continuous struggle as to whether equality is important enough to be part of the foreign policy statement and where it belongs, though the reoccurring presence in the development agenda indicates that there is some consensus as to its role in this area. As the foreign policy statement is a boiled-down version of all the foreign policies that Sweden pursues, the competition for a norm to be included is particularly hard, but also important as it indicates the importance of the chosen norms over other options. Resolution 1325 is now being framed as a question of practical implementation, not just making sure that other states participate on paper. This is interesting as this suggests that Sweden is pursuing a serious commitment to this resolution. The work for women’s equality is in the next section (line 321-323) highlighted as specifically concerning freedom, independence, and equality. This is a more specific definition than we have seen earlier of what equality means, however, it is still only addressed as an issue for women. Particularly women’s power over their own lives is a priority here in the development work. This indicates an interest in improving women's agency. The emphasis on women and equality is continued in lines 411-414 where it is presented as one of three priorities in the development agenda, it is further justified as a way of living up to the UN millennium goals. Considering the successful framing of women’s role in peacebuilding by using the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the framing of the role of women in other areas should be seen as a reasonable approach to include in this perspective. It is clear that a level of institutional learning has happened on behalf of those pushing for a gender-sensitive or feminist agenda within Swedish foreign policy when it comes to using international framing to legitimize the policy. A change has happened within development in the sense that women are being portrayed as actors in the 2008 statement (431) and not just objects of the policy. Areas such as rights and influence are here of importance as they are framed as securing women more power over their own lives. It is further framed within the understanding that empowering women is the key to successful development, which we have seen in the earlier foreign policy

36 statement. Equality is also given extra weight in the Swedish and EU Africa strategies where fighting poverty is a central concern (line 411-412). Within this topic, HIV/AIDS is prioritized which again draws lines back to other foreign policy statements where women and health have been framed together (line 412-413).

2009 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2009) Carl Bildt (M) In 2009 the foreign policy statement was marked by the beginning of the financial crisis with Sweden insisting on continuing business as usual in its foreign policy to avoid protectionism and trade wars. Sweden self-identifies as a voice for women’s rights internationally in this year’s statement (line 110). This is interesting as it shows a level of institutionalization of women’s rights that affects Sweden’s identity and its self-perceived identity in its relations with the world. “The Government places great importance on the work for increasing equality…” [Authors translation] (line 110-111) expresses that the focus on equality in the foreign policy is supported by the entire Swedish government and not just the foreign ministry which is a new development that it is stated so clearly in the foreign policy statement. The government's support also extends to the work for women’s sexual and reproductive health rights (line 111-112). Both these points of government support are expressed in a positive way to strengthen the image of unity on the subject within the Swedish government. It is interesting how equality and health rights are combined here, and with the extra strength of government support, it could indicate that the Swedish government is aware that it could be a controversial topic outside of Sweden, but at the same time that it constitutes a highly institutionalized norm within Sweden. Once again UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is included in the statement, showing the Swedish commitment to women in peacebuilding, and also showing how institutionalized this norm has become in the foreign policy statement.

2010 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2010) Carl Bildt (M) In 2010 the Swedish government's foreign policy was focused on the issues of climate change, democracy, and human rights and security. The first priority relating to gender is that women should have the same access to participate on an equal footing with men, particularly in relation to spreading and strengthening democracy in the EU's periphery (line 173-174). Here we see another example of including a gender relevant topic into a new sphere, this time the EU and work for democracy. The goal here is to make democracy support from the EU

37 more efficient, which supporting women’s influence is framed as an important aspect of. Furthermore, this section emphasizes how Sweden as an actor is encouraging women’s agency. Issues relating to women’s empowerment is further included through the specific goals of ensuring the implementation of both UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820 through Sweden’s work on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Here the use of sexual violence in conflict is particularly condemned (line 237-240). It further emphasizes women’ participation in peace agreements and negotiations within the WPS framework and the work of eliminating violence (particularly sexual violence) in general, and in crisis, within the framework of Resolution 1820 is an extension of the use of the UN Security Council Resolution(s). This shows that it has gone from an abstract ideal for a policy area to now being a concrete tool in specific conflict prevention interventions. This concretization of when it is appropriate to focus policy on women’s agency in specific areas shows that the norm has institutionalized to a degree where it is appropriate to be openly using it. Lastly, it is a priority for Sweden to work to ensure the implementation of equality measures in the UN millennia goals which is an area conceived as lagging behind, this is justified as important particularly in relation to fighting poverty.

2011 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2011) Carl Bildt (M) In 2011 the focus was on mitigating the negative effects of protectionism, xenophobia, and trade. Globalization and trade in particular played a larger role. The first point where a is mentioned is relating to the freeing of Aung San Sus Kyi in Burma (now Myanmar), which is celebrated but also contrasted with the continued imprisonment of political opponents (line 211-212). Here gender is not openly stated as a relevant factor, but once again, as in earlier foreign policy statements, female leaders are highlighted by name when Sweden frames the situation as a Swedish achievement which is why it is relevant to take into consideration in this analysis. The next section involving a gendered angle is the Swedish concerns regarding the unrest in Congo, specifically the systematic use of sexual (line 230- 235). This is raised as a priority with the justification drawn from the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820 (line 230-235). Considering that resolution 1820 is specifically targeted at ending the use of sexual violence in conflict, this is a good example of drawing on international conventions to underline justify the importance and legitimize the

38 actions that are being taken in another state. The way in which international resolutions can legitimize pursuing otherwise controversial policies is worth noting. Lastly, there is a gendered component in Sweden's approach to the millennial goals, with the issue of child and maternal mortality rates (line 250-251). This is done within the framework of poverty reduction and development in developing countries and has an attached budget, which is important considering issues of financing is often raised in the literature as one of the biggest obstacles for any gendered issues (Thompson & Clement, 2019). Therefore, by not only being institutionalized enough to have a high priority in the foreign policy and thereby appearing in the foreign policy statement, but this issue is also further emphasized by openly pledging to include a budget for the effort.

2012 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2012) Carl Bildt (M) In 2012 women’s rights and role in foreign policy has expanded, they are actors who chose what they do (line 32-33), and important actors of the development in Afghanistan (line 233-234), they are still objects of violence (in DRC), they are important actors in development and drivers in promoting democratic freedom and rights, but they are also in need of better healthcare as and better education on and access to sexual and – e.g. their sexual and reproductive status as (potential) mothers is of importance to Sweden’s foreign policy. Equality is expanded to include religious and LGBT rights, as well as a point of priority for women being the developments in post-conflict Afghanistan and developing countries in general. In the 2012 women’s enterprises are mentioned for the first time, within the framework of Northern Future Forum (line 31-33). This move of a gendered focus within business is a new development, it could both be seen as another example of the continuous work for the norm to establish itself and therefore an attempt to find the right context. Another option is to see it as an expansion of gendered awareness within a new area of foreign policy. There is a good argument for this to be a case of both at the same time. It does however show the increasing institutionalization within foreign policy as the trade and business departments are separate entities from development/aid, and peace/conflict. It has become appropriate and potentially even expected to openly discuss gendered effects in most areas of the foreign policy, even within the foreign policy statement, meaning that it is a very conscious and highly prioritized area.

39 As part of this year’s democracy and human rights focus, equality takes priority on the same level as ending the prosecution of journalists, etc. Sweden specifically wants to work towards a more equal world (line 131-132) and wants to position itself as an international actor that protects human rights and promotes every person’s equal rights. The sections on equality have generally been rather vague as to the presence of a gendered agenda and this section is no exception. However, this can also be seen to open the equality agenda to more than just binary gender or women’s rights in particular. In the Swedish strategy on its work in Afghanistan, women’s rights are highly prioritized (line 233-234). Especially, the agency of women in the development of peace and democracy. This time the framework is not explicitly legitimized through Resolution 1325 which indicates a further institutionalization of women’s role in this area as it does not need to be explicitly justified that it related back to this resolution. The conflict in Congo is once again being addressed as a threat to women because of the use of sexual violence (line 259-260). This is very clearly stated and without further justification, it is clear that Sweden’s stance here is that it is unacceptable to use sexual violence in conflict. This is also interesting in relation to the institutionalization of gender in the foreign policy sphere because it suggests that it is taken for granted that sexual violence as a tool in conflict is morally unacceptable despite the year before needing the legitimization of the UN Security Council Resolutions 1820 and 1325. This fast shift could indicate that the process of institutionalization has entered a phase of rapid expansion also known as norm cascade. Within the development agenda equality and women’s role is highly prioritized, which is legitimized through the UN framework of Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820. This is done to ensure democratic freedoms and rights. Women and equality are seen as ways to ensure democratic development, freedom, and rights. This is also highlighted as a factor in the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings. Considering the content of resolution 1325 it is interesting how its inclusion is being extended into the stabilization of democracy also outside of peace negotiations. The millennial goals are used to legitimize or justify the Swedish focus on child and maternal health as well as sexual and reproductive rights and access to health (line 342-350). This is interesting because it is an area where a gendered perspective has been presented multiple times in earlier statements, however, it is still being strongly connected to the millennial goals suggesting that it is still a controversial question either internally or externally.

40 2013 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2013) Carl Bildt (M) In 2013 women’s rights are considered an important factor; the demand for women’s rights is central to providing aid relating to democracy building after the Arab spring (line 177- 178). The Swedish demand for the countries from the Arab world that might get a free trade deal with the EU is that they should increase the rights of women and minorities. This is again an example of gender becoming part of the trade section of the foreign policy, in this case as part of the conditionality connected to free trade agreements with the EU. Including women continues to be a priority in Sweden’s Afghanistan strategy, especially securing women’s rights (line 207-208). Women’s rights are framed as being as important as human rights, anti-corruption, and democracy work in this area which shows how it has been institutionalized here. The institutionalization of gender as a norm appropriate for foreign policy is strengthened through the integration into the military through a Nordic military research center on gender issues – mainly to work on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (line 246-247). This increased integration into military matters is a step further than what has been observed earlier, additionally, it is a new approach to emphasize the importance of research in the foreign policy statement. Once again, the UN security council resolutions are used as a pretext for this further integration, this time it is on the home front in the sense of research rather than specifically aimed at somewhere else. Furthermore, it is done within a Nordic research center for this question, thereby committing more states to pursue this approach. The issues of infant and maternal mortality as well as sexual and reproductive rights are still a priority in development (line 279-280). Here it is combined with the agenda of providing clean water as an add on. The continuous mention of these two topics together indicates that while not taken for granted they are considered appropriate within the development agenda. One of the main stated aims is again that Sweden should work for an equal world where human rights are respected no matter a person’s gender, sexuality, religion, or skin-color (line 302-304). While the phrasing is similar to the one the year before, this year it explicitly lists which minorities Sweden prioritizes equality for.

41 2014 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2014) Carl Bildt (M) In 2014 women are portrayed as potential employees, their human right needs to be respected on an equal basis, they are at risk of dying from having children and need better sexual and reproductive rights. Their rights have improved under the millennium goals but more can be done, women also need to be involved more in peace processes and should be protected against sexual violence as a means of war/conflict or systematic oppression, their rights and equality, in general, should be a priority in future UN goals. To break this down: Women’s employment is presented as a potential to the economy (line 65-66) and the internal market of the EU. From this, we can gather that women’s participation in the labor market should increase to help the economy. This is a first in the foreign policies so far as this explicitly points to women as a potential source of labor. A gendered narrative presence within a trade/business section of the foreign policy has by now occurred for 3 consecutive years, indicating that a gendered perspective is being applied and affecting the priorities within this area. Relating to the institutionalization of gender in the foreign policy it shows that gender is now considered appropriate in the economically focused sections of the foreign policy, but it is still slightly changing character every year, meaning there has not yet been found the right area to stabilize in. The next point relates to the member states of the EU living up to international law (line 194-195). Here Sweden is pursuing equality and specifically pushing for non-discrimination based on issues such as gender, skin color, belief, and sexuality. It is interesting to see Sweden pursue this within the EU as it has otherwise mainly been targeted at third countries, either trading partners, developing countries, or states in crisis. The internal focus here is a new sphere to aim the gender-sensitive understanding at showing the further spread of the norm within the foreign policy statement. The foreign policy statement of 2014 makes it clear that the millennial goals set by the UN need to be met, also within areas that relate to women (line 250-253). The highlighted areas are related to sexual and reproductive health access and rights which have been a recurring theme. The pressure Sweden is putting on other states to live up to the millennial goals is the way in which Sweden approaches the need to push other states to increase women’s rights. As has been the case in the last 10 years, the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is the umbrella used to work for women’s access to peace and security related negotiations (line 254-255). This mention has been stable and is no longer explained or argued for, but rather restated, every year.

42 In 2014 Sweden states its intent towards creating more goals within the UN framework that should have targets including increased equality (line 256-257). It is the first time we have seen the pressure in this direction as the foreign policy statement has normally only used UN resolutions and goals as a justification of the Swedish policy rather than pushing the UN to create new aims in the area. This shows a level of institutionalization of gender as a norm in foreign policy that makes it appropriate to put pressure on an international organization to institutionalize the same norm further. Afghanistan is once again an area where gender is a factor in the Swedish strategy (301- 302). This year the government is expected to present a strategy for furthering equality in Afghanistan – the other priorities in this strategy will be employment, education, and economy. Once again, this foreign policy statement redirects its attention to include internal issues as well. Here it is a question of ensuring equality in the Swedish foreign services. This open statement of internal change indicates that Sweden is aware that to legitimately pursue an equality agenda the ministry and foreign services need to live up to their standards. In the foreign policy statement of 2014, we see an increase not just in sections that consider gendered issues but also a wider variety of perspectives on when and where a gendered perspective is appropriate. The major change is the acknowledgment that Sweden’s foreign services should be equal and the changed perspective that focuses on gender and equality within the EU. This is interesting because it affects the narrative of where gender equality is an issue while also making it clear that pressure is appropriate to put on states Sweden consider equals to live up to this norm. By changing the perspective in this way, it reflects both a further institutionalization of gender in foreign policy but also expands by questioning gendered issues of its peers which has seemingly been inappropriate or simply not considered until this point.

2015 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2015) Margot Wallström (S) In 2015 the new Social Democrat government presents its foreign policy; the focus is on strengthening human rights and improving the lives of individual human beings on a mass scale. As has been observed in earlier years, the focus on sexual and reproductive rights is carried on. Though, here the concrete goal is to ensure that this priority is carried out in the global development strategy. Furthermore, discrimination based on sexuality is added to this agenda. The difference we are seeing here is the addition of action to what has otherwise been a standard sentence repeated throughout the years which indicated an increased focus on this

43 area. Rather than becoming taken for granted the norm here is expanded on to become a global policy goal. Another priority that is carried over from earlier years is the focus on women’s rights and equality as continued priorities in post-conflict Afghanistan. Especially through working with civilian engagement. This continuity shows that it is still needed at this point to explicitly include the gendered consideration in the Swedish Afghanistan strategy. With this continued focus on women’s and girl’s rights, it is indicated that the norm of gendered approach in conflict in other countries is an established norm – at least in Sweden. It is announced that the foreign policy will be feminist in character and priorities, with the main goals of ending discrimination, improve women’s lives, and thereby drive peace and development. Women are described as (future) actors who will solve conflicts and build peace by participating in negotiation and peace processes (line 242-251). For this, strengthening women’s rights will be of importance as well as protecting women from gender-based violence by ensuing appropriate punishments for the offenders. Women’s rights should be improved upon including improving the commitments in the international treaties and agreements on the issues as well as making sure that women are represented, that issues with a gendered effect are funded, and their rights are improved because women’ rights are human rights (line 252- 256). Equality is further highlighted both as a gendered issue and as an international issue. It is announced that Sweden is working on a feminist foreign policy (line 242) that is going to prioritize working against discrimination of women, improve women’s conditions, as well as add to peace and development (line 242-243). This statement is interesting because it announces that feminism is going to underline the Swedish foreign policy in every aspect. The section introducing the FFP explains the basis of the policy by extending the ideas of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 into peacetime goals. The extension into peacetime is justified by an argument for increased sustainability. An argument for the sustainability of women’s involvement in peace is similar to the argument that if women are included in ending conflict and rebuilding the country peace will be more sustainable. What is interesting is that resolution 1325 is not explicitly mentioned in this first section. The next section goes through the importance of securing women’s place and rights in society through EU and UN channels as well as cooperation with civil society. Furthermore, cooperation with other Nordic states inside the EU framework should strengthen the equality aspect of external EU work (line 246-249). The clear statement of which organizations Sweden intends to work with to pursue the feminist agenda is similar to where Sweden has worked with

44 both women’s issues and equality questions in earlier foreign policy statements. Additionally, while civil society has been mentioned before, this statement again emphasizes the need to reach beyond states and international organizations. Here the mention of resolution 1325 comes in, though as a side mention because of its anniversary rather than as a central element. This is followed by a statement of the work against gender-based violence which is covered by resolution 1820 (though only within conflict). The use of the content from both 1325 and 1820 in a section while expanding its reach but without specifying their relation indicates that it is not appropriate to use UN resolutions beyond their specific area of authority and also that while the inspirational source is clear, it is not attributed indicating that this would be inappropriate. The last part of the section is a clarification of Sweden’s call for goal setting in the UN, here the argument of human rights for women as well as economic independence, and the right to one’s own body are the main priorities. This is similar to Sweden’s call the year before of new targets in the UN, however, the specific focus on the rights of women was not specified in the previous statement. The policy for the near abroad includes a consideration of inequality which is described as unfair (line 260). Considering the unmotivated way this sentence appears, it indicates that equality has become a morally correct or good norm in the Swedish foreign policy which shows a high level of institutionalization. The cooperation with Sweden’s neighboring countries is intended to create equality and end poverty (line 264-267). Equality is on its own both in Swedish and English a rather ambiguous term and does not necessarily mean equality between genders, however, in this section’s last sentence it is used explicitly with a gendered meaning, indicating that the former uses should also be seen this way. This can be seen as a diplomatic or inoffensive way of including a gendered or feminist agenda towards Sweden’s neighbors without explicitly stating so. What has changed significantly in the 2015 foreign policy statement is the addition of value-laden language, it has been increasingly politicized (ex. line 260, 275). This is interesting as earlier years have used an ‘objective’ language. The institutionalization of gender in foreign policy has increased in the sense that it is no longer questioned whether it is an appropriate topic, and furthermore, it is deemed appropriate to openly state the intent to spread this norm in the international/global sphere. The changed perspective that was observed the year before where internal and EU actors were put on the agenda for a gender perspective has now been extended to include all actors that Sweden comes into contact with.

45 2016 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2016) Margot Wallström (S) In 2016 the foreign policy statement was focused on women’s rights, representation, and resources to improve women’s lives. This year the foreign policy is focused on the need for a feminist foreign policy (line 67). The strategy is to focus on women’s rights, representation, and resources. By adding this approach, the framework for how the feminist foreign policy should work is clarified. Accomplishments include the creation of a Principal Advisor on Gender in the EU and a network of female mediators. While these are stated goals from the year before, they also show how the process of gendering international policy is top- down by instating advisors and mediators in the work. It does also show that the effect of the institutionalization of gender in Swedish foreign policy is institutionalizing the norm outside of Sweden. A continuation of the work with including women in peace processes is also announced which has been a reoccurring theme since 2004. Though once again, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 has not been given explicitly as the framework, rather this point is contextualized as a Swedish action plan. Lastly, the gender agenda is extended to the conflict in Syria where Sweden prioritizes including women in the peace process in order to create sustainable peace and stabilize society. This extension into the issue of Syria is in line with the earlier focus on other conflicts, especially the conflict in Afghanistan, where the strategy has long been to seek women’s involvement in the peace and rebuilding process. At the Istanbul convention, Sweden’s aim is that the humanitarian international system should be strengthened, and particularly women’s rights and representation should be improved (line 189-190). There is a pattern showing Sweden’s new approach of aiming to include women’s issues into international conventions, which indicates that the relationship between international and national level goes two ways, when a national or international idea supports a norm in the other sphere it can become institutionalized to the point where pressure will be returned to increase the influence of the norm in the sphere that originally gave it legitimacy (Elgstrom, 2000) Another point is that women should have a more prominent role in peace processes and development (line 200-201). This is a continuous aim which has been observed in the earlier foreign policy statements, especially women’s role in peace negotiations has been a reoccurring theme both with and without the justification of Resolution 1325. It can be argued that it has become institutionalized to a degree where women being included in peace and security is seen as both appropriate and morally right.

46 While it was announced in 2015 that the entire foreign policy would have a feminist foundation, the 2016 foreign policy statement does not show this level of immersion, issues relating to gender, equality, and women are still presented in sections rather than included in all areas of policy. The institutionalization of the norm of gender in the foreign policy statement has not expanded significantly to new areas compared to previous years and in the areas where it appears clearly, it is areas where it has been established as appropriate for many years. This shows clearly how the process of institutionalization does not happen fast or easily even when political will is present.

2017 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2017) Margot Wallström In the 2017 foreign policy statement, women’s participation in the Afghan peace processes will continue to be supported (line 152-154). The sustainable development in Afghan society and especially including women in this work has been a Swedish priority since 2000 The continuation of the emphasis on women’s role and the need for women to gain influence has continually been a priority for Sweden. The institutionalization process of a gendered perspective in foreign policy statements has been furthered by this persistence. This appears to be a factor in the long-term resolution for the conflict in Syria as well. In the case of Syria, the emphasis is on giving women ‘a voice in the peace process’ (line 165-166) which is a more concrete version compared to where the Swedish engagement in Afghanistan started. The aim of the feminist foreign policy is that it should show ‘results for women, girls, and society’ (line 183). Rather pointedly, instead of emphasizing gender or equality in the feminist foreign policy, the female gender is considered overtly. It also shows how the institutionalization of a gender-sensitive foreign policy in practice has meant the institutionalization of women and girls as a factor in foreign policy rather than both/all genders. Following the aforementioned sentence comes a list of accomplishments of the feminist foreign policy. These include: ‘20 or so’ countries considering a stronger focus on equality (line 184-185), a decrease in illegal abortions and unwanted pregnancies (line 185-186), more countries creating legislation against Female Genital Mutilation (line 186), as well as more countries and organizations working against gender-based violence. By listing these accomplishments Sweden emphasizes the perceived efficiency of the feminist foreign policy. Considering the usefulness of presenting controversial policies as efficient, much like the discourse surrounding gender mainstreaming as discussed earlier in this paper (Walby, 2005, p. 333), it is a clearly persuasive exercise to list these so bluntly, which could be targeted at

47 both internal (ministry and national) and external (international) audiences. It further indicates that while gender in foreign policy is institutionalized in the Swedish foreign policy statement, it might not be as strongly present in both other policies and in other countries which necessitates the overt persuasive move to claim legitimacy. Sexual and reproductive healthcare and rights are once again a central element of the foreign policy (line 186-188). The continual focus on this area has changed minimally throughout the years, however, in 2017 it is detailed towards specific issues such as abortion, pregnancy prevention, and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). This specification shows that results here are being measured on these specific areas to ensure success which does clarify it more than earlier years. It indicates that not only is the work for sexual and reproductive health and rights for women a norm in the foreign policy but that it is becoming more accepted because it is being specified. A new NAP for UN resolutions on women is being developed in 2017 which should further the work relating to women’s role in peace and security processes (both resolution 1325 and 1820 are part of this framework) (line 189-192). Furthermore, the aim of developing a network for female negotiators continues to be a priority in order to ensure the position and influence of women in peace processes even further. In addition, Sweden is working to reform the UN, including ensuring a more equal international system (line 197-198). This reform process has been mentioned earlier and the change from exclusively using the UN for legitimizing the Swedish position to wanting the UN to implement the Swedish perspective on women and equality shows a strengthening institutionalization in Sweden of women/equality/gender in the foreign policy and an expectation of it being carried out internationally as well.

2018 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2018) Margot Wallström (S) In 2018 the 100th anniversary of equal voting rights for men and is celebrated (line 30). The equality agenda is a main aim and presented as a cornerstone of the Swedish foreign policy (line 47-48). The increased awareness and inclusion of equality shows a high level of institutionalization, to a degree where it is portrayed as one of the most important aspects, it has therefore developed into a norm at a level where it is consciously chosen as important – not just appropriate in specific areas. The Swedish strengthening of the UN’s work on the women, peace, and conflict resolutions is seen as ‘making a difference’ (line 116). Changing the approach to the UN’s

48 work in this area has meant that Sweden now sees itself as pushing the UN to increase its work in the area rather than only using the preexisting UN framework to legitimize Sweden’s work. It suggests a high level of institutionalization of the women, peace, and security agenda in the Swedish foreign policy. It further emphasizes a change in the power relation between Sweden and the UN on this agenda – at least from a Swedish perspective. Sweden portrays itself as the actor who acts upon the UN to further institutionalize a gendered approach in the UN framework. #metoo is portrayed as an important and positive movement, and as an expression of the lack of rights, representation, and resources women are experiencing globally (line 142- 143). It is put into the context of the FFP as working for the same aims (line 144-145). By using this movement to create relevance and legitimacy for the feminist foreign policy it becomes apparent that it is seen as an ongoing task to justify the feminist aspects which need external movements to increase their legitimacy. This suggests that gender, equality, and women as norms are institutionalized to a higher degree than the feminist foreign policy itself as this one requires a higher degree of support and justification. However, it is also clear that the feminist foreign policy has some degree of internal support and thereby a high level of institutionalization since it is being justified. The priorities of the feminist foreign policy differ depending on the target state, such as educating and Saudi Arabia to help them gain increased economic independence, in Rwanda, there is a focus on the role of fathers, and in Syria, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Ukraine the priority is on the female negotiator network (line 146-148). What is remarkable here is the mention of the focus of the father role in Rwanda – this is an extension of the gendered approach that has not been used in earlier foreign policy statements. By including fathers in the section of feminist accomplishments, men are being a gendered category that can be included in the foreign policy statement. However, because of the power relationship between Sweden and Rwanda in that Rwanda is portrayed as a developing state this should also be seen as a way of portraying Rwandan fathers as a subordinate masculinity (Blanchard, 2003). As in earlier years, it is a priority to improve sexual and reproductive health (line 149- 150). The topic is once again being specified as to what areas are prioritized, including contraceptives, abortion, and FGM (line 149-150). The institutionalization of this norm and more generally the appropriateness of a gendered approach in this area has changed only slightly, in that the topics which are mentioned can in general be contentious.

49 It is highlighted how the Swedish efforts of strengthening women’s rights networks internationally improve women’s rights and the lives of people in general (line 152-153). This section indicates a stronger focus on activists and organizations in civil society being involved as a target of the Swedish foreign policy statement. The institutionalization of a gender- sensitive approach is reaching beyond the state system and international organizations. Furthermore, there is a push for educating the general public about women by making Wikipedia more equal and arranging writing sessions to add more women to the platform (line 154-156). Again, there is a clear shift of focus from limiting it to political spheres to broadly targeting the general public, indicating the institutionalization of gender in more layers of the foreign policy statement. As in earlier years, the prioritization of the women’s agenda in the Syria and Afghanistan strategies are highlighted, showing the stabilization of gender as a norm in these specific security related topics (line 191-192, line 194-195). This year the Democratic Republic of Congo is again added to this agenda showing that it is spreading to other conflict areas thereby indicating an increase in the institutionalization. Lastly, the Stockholm Forum on Gender Equality will be opened as an effort to gather participants from grassroots organizations, high profile politicians, cultural institutions, and the Swedish parliament (line 157-160). Once again, showing the institutionalization of gender on all levels of the foreign policy, though not necessarily in every area of foreign policy.

2019 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2019) Margot Wallström (S) In 2019 the aim of the feminist foreign policy is for women to have the same rights, representation, and resources as men. Once again, a repetition of the main mantra of the feminist foreign policy (Aggestam & Rosamond, 2020). Restating the mantra ensures continuity and maintaining the feminist foreign policy (Klotz, Audie; Lynch, 2007). It is afterward again emphasized that the feminist foreign policy will continue to be the Swedish approach in the international arena (line 92-93). It is added that more countries are showing an interest in a feminist foreign policy (line 93). The restating of the intent to continue the feminist foreign policy shows that internally it is still being justified, the feminist aspect appears to need restating and defending. Furthermore, it is presented as an important measure that other countries are also contemplating to follow suit. It indicates a norm that is seeking legitimacy in international support as well as one that is yet to fully institutionalize.

50 The women, peace, and security agenda should, according to Swedish priorities, get more attention within the UN, EU, and OSCE (line 94-95). Sweden’s self-image is as a leading figure within this policy area (line 94). The emphasis on Sweden being a leader in this area shows that the norm here is rather stable and institutionalized to a degree where participating and implementing a gender-sensitive approach is to a degree taken for granted and instead is seen as part of the Swedish international identity. Another aim of the 2019 foreign policy statement is to strengthen the network of female negotiators and spreading the concept to the African Union (line 95-97). This is a slight change in the discourse as we have earlier seen priorities of starting and building the network in general, however, this mainly indicates that the project is being carried out in some parts of the world. The network is a very concrete aim of the foreign policy which is easily measured. The continued support for sexual and reproductive rights and health, including concrete examples is again being emphasized (line 98-100), this area appears to be stable in the foreign policy. The prevention of human trafficking reappears in this year’s statement after having been absent for 13 years and is combined with spreading awareness of the Swedish approach to prostitution and the work to end violence against women (line 101-102). The reintroduction of this topic but in the context of spreading the Swedish approach to prostitution and ending violence against women shows that the norm in this area is still struggling to settle in the foreign policy statement. The aim of strengthening women’s participation in politics and their economic independence is an indication of the continued struggle for this area to institutionalize as it is being slightly rephrased every year (line 103). The equality conference, that was started in Stockholm in 2018 will be repeated in Tunisia for 2019, where Sweden will be involved as well (line 104-105). The moving of the conference could suggest an attempt to make it an international conference rather than a Swedish one which would be supporting the legitimacy of the Swedish efforts, furthermore the continued Swedish support indicates that thus far it has not become a self-contained conference outside of the Swedish foreign policy. In relation to the Swedish priorities in the EU parliament elections of 2019, the main Swedish concern is that the EU should focus more on equality (gender and otherwise) and climate (line 179-180). This shows that Sweden as an actor is continually engaged in supporting the push for a stronger equality agenda in the EU, now including the parliament. The approach to institutionalizing the norm in the EU is still competing among other priorities

51 and has continuously been changing to find an available and, more importantly, appropriate area to settle in. Sweden has worked to raise awareness of and interest in women’s issues in the UN Security Council (line 198-199). This is seen as a success, especially, because Sweden perceives the Security Council as being polarized (line 198-199). The emphasis of Sweden’s role in ensuring equality is on the agenda of the UN security council, along with other Swedish priorities, shows that Sweden sees itself as a champion of equality in the international space. This shows how internalized equality has become in the Swedish UN identity and in the foreign policy statement in general. This is supported in the portrayal of Sweden historically being a lone supporter of equality and women’s issues in the UN security council, creating a narrative of how Sweden has fought for women’s influence in peace and security (line 201-203). This effort is now seen as having paid off in that other members of the security council are now supporting this agenda (line 201-203). This origin story shows how Sweden identifies itself as a champion of women’s influence in peace and security by adding a historical narrative. The conflict in Afghanistan is once again used as an area of importance for women’s rights, this year the crisis in Myanmar is also included (line 254-255, line 262-263). The focus on Myanmar is on the use of sexual violence against women as a tool of war (line 262-263). Furthermore, the issues in DR Congo are repeated as a priority for women’s participation and empowerment (line 273). These priorities can be boiled down to the need for women in conflict to have more say and better protection as well as their offenders seeing justice. These sections regarding peace and security, once again show that this is an area where it is appropriate to consider gender and specifically women in the policy.

2020 (Regeringens Deklaration, 2020) Ann Linde (S) The first mention of women in the 2020 foreign policy statement is related to the rights of women and girls which Sweden considered under attack by conservative forces, particularly the right to decide over their bodies and life (line 156-157). This is a highly political and controversial declaration for the foreign policy statement demonstrating the level to which women’s issues have become normalized in the foreign policy of Sweden. It being considered appropriate to include such political declarations in the foreign policy statement shows that gender has been institutionalized to a high degree internally. Issues relating to women’s role in peace and security as well as sexual and reproductive rights are a priority as it has been the case in earlier statements (line 158-159). The annual

52 mention of these issues has gone on for 16 years and should be considered as an institutionalized norm in the foreign policy statement. Stating that the feminist foreign policy should deal with all levels, it is further restated that the foreign policy should continue to be considered feminist (line 160-161). The continued focus from previous years on implementing the feminist foreign policy on all levels is interesting and appears to become increasingly institutionalized in the foreign policy statement. Another development is that other countries have gotten different versions of feminist foreign policies (line 162). This indicates that feminism, women, and gender is institutionalizing in the foreign policies of their countries as well as in Sweden. This could potentially indicate the start of a cascade, though that would require further research. The institutionalization of these norms has resulted in Sweden and France pushing the EU to make equality work more efficient and make a feminist trade policy (line 163-164). Considering the spread of the norm internationally on a state level, that is portrayed in the 2020 foreign policy statement, it appears that Sweden perceives that they through the FFP have gained support in the pressure on international organizations to better implement an equality and gender approach. The equality agenda is also a priority in the Swedish Africa policy where the main goal is sustainable development (line 253-255). By bluntly stating the priority of equality in the Swedish Africa policy it indicates that the norm has further institutionalized in the development agenda.

Discussion Throughout the analysis, we have seen how gender, women, equality, and feminism has become part of the Swedish foreign policy to a degree where it has taken a major place in the formation of Sweden’s identity projection. The first thing worth discussing in this regard is what norm is being traced. While it is never explicitly stated in the foreign policy it is reasonable to see this as a process of gender mainstreaming, as the continuous process of including either women, gender, equality or feminism, show that the underlying norm is one of gender (Sainsbury & Bergqvist, 2009; Walby, 2005). However, in the Swedish foreign policy gender is only something that relates to women. Only once are men mentioned is any of the 20 foreign policy statements, in their role of dads within a peace and security/development framework (2018, line 146-148) while boys are specified in 2002-3 This shows how as much as gender is being mainstreamed and

53 institutionalized it has so far only had a one-sided approach that includes women. The almost complete lack of the male gender in any of the foreign policy shows that men are still not seen as a gender in the foreign policy statement, which alludes to a norm of androgynous approach with the male gender as the norm (Ackerly et al., 2006, pp. 53–54). This is as such not surprising in that this has been shown to be the main approach to foreign policy on a global scale (Ackerly et al., 2006, pp. 53–54). The exclusive focus on women is further apparent when looking at the concrete examples of the work with gender and equality where the focus is on empowering women whether that be financially, through rights, or health. The institutionalization of gender in the Swedish foreign policy statement should therefore be understood from what the institution contains but also what it does not. This is a criticism which is being emphasized across the board in research on feminist foreign policy as shown in the literature review as adding women does not make a policy feminist in itself but could instead be reinforcing gender roles and power relations. At the beginning of the foreign policy analysis in the year 2000 it is clear that equality is already a priority and can be placed as an emerging norm internationally (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In the Swedish foreign policy statement, it is being pushed as a priority to ensure that the EU institutionalizes this norm in its work. This work on supporting the emerging norm internationally happens over the 20 years in different frameworks and targeted at different international organizations such as the UN, EU, and OSCE. The process is not linear and often the priorities of this are independently presented in that one year, this does not mean that there are not continuous efforts being made, action-wise, but rather that it is not a priority enough to become part of the foreign policy statement. The interrelationship with the international sphere is also clear when justification is sought through the use of international agreements such as the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 or the EU framework for gender equality. These examples show how the Swedish push for gender as a norm to become institutionalized is then projected back and can become a point of justification for continuing or strengthening the work with gender in new or different ways. This could also explain why there is little difference between the foreign policy statements of differently orientated governments. The interplay between domestic and international appears to be cyclical ensuring a continued focus on and pressure to prioritize the area. The area in which the norm throughout the 20 years is the most stable is within concrete cases in the peace and security policy, especially in the strategy towards Afghanistan which starts in the year 2000 as a new topic and continues to focus on women’s involvement in and

54 influence on stabilizing the country. Here the norm changes minimally but is always presented as a top priority. In later years this spreads to other conflict areas such as Syria, DR Congo, Mozambique, Myanmar/Burma among others. It makes it clear that the norm here becomes accepted and starts to cascade as the topic of women continues to be introduced when new conflicts arise (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This could be because the combination of the support from the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 legitimizes it, but also because the norm is well established in the international system making it less controversial to openly pursue on a national level. What has often been theorized is that the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is one of the main motivators behind the feminist foreign policy that was adopted by Sweden in 2015. However, through the analysis of the foreign policy statements over the last 20 years, it is clear that women in peace and security was an already developing norm without the justification of Resolution 1325. Rather 1325, which was ratified by Sweden in 2000, did not start appearing in the foreign policy statements until 2004 where it is not yet applied to a specific conflict. This shows that the institutionalization of resolution 1325 was done rather smoothly within a context where women were already an appropriate factor. It further emphasizes the dual relationship there is between international and national norms and institutions. In this case, the norm of resolution 1325 was relatively easily institutionalized into the foreign policy statement because it fit into the already existing institutions in the foreign policy statements section on peace and conflict. The gender and equality relevant sections have most continuously been placed within development and aid. While women occur more often as a group in areas of international crime prevention and peace and conflict. It shows rather clearly how different norms have settled in different spaces. It is appropriate to work on women’s inclusion in peace and conflict resolution, showing that often this space is filled by men. While in development it is a question of equality, though empowering women does become more common in later years, it is also clear that when equality is added that it is in reality a question of adding women (Rosamond, 2020). The move from women as objects of the foreign policy to women as actors of the foreign policy happens gradually with a starting point in 2012. The discursive change from mainly ‘women and children’ as victims of human trafficking or conflict to women as having potential to create change both in the world and in their own lives displays a changed view of how women and individuals participate in the international system. This change shows that the process of the norm becoming accepted involved adapting not only to national structures and

55 institutions but also to the changing understandings in society at large about factors such as women’s role in society (Elgstrom, 2000). As the goal of gender mainstreaming is to institutionalize gender in all areas it is interesting how the changes that happened from the years before and after the foreign policy was declared feminist. This action added a section in the following foreign policy statements of the accomplishments of the feminist foreign policy, but it was, however, not integrated into sections such as trade/economy. This lack of including the feminist aspects or even aims within all policy areas of the foreign policy statement made it clear that some areas of the foreign policy are still considered inappropriate for a gender approach (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019). This is particularly interesting because of the mention of women’s potential in the trade/economy section in 2012-2014 where women are portrayed as potential labor who's participating in the labor market could lead to economic growth. Otherwise, women are mentioned in relation to finance in the sense that they should gain increasing independence of their personal finance but never as part of the global financial equation. What making the foreign policy explicitly feminist accomplishes in the foreign policy statement is mainly a change of perspective that involves a focus on specific policies and in particular highlighting accomplishments that have not been seen earlier. This clearly shows that there is an increase in the need to justify the feminist aspects, indicating that the norm at this point is still in the acceptance/cascading stage (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Interestingly, the act of making the foreign policy feminist has led the norm to encounter stronger competition in the foreign policy considering the number of justifications and arguments are used to legitimize it that appears after this. It shows that this is a contested move both internally and externally and that the Swedish foreign ministry or government is aware of this but still insists on supporting this approach. To a degree, there is little change in the areas in which women, gender, or equality has been present before 2015 and the areas in which the foreign policy statement includes as part of the feminist foreign policy. This indicates that while the norms of women, equality and gender have become well established in the foreign policy over time, at the point this analysis begins equality is already an emerging norm, the institution of feminism have not gained or automatically benefitted from this in its introduction into Swedish foreign policy. There is much emphasis on the previous foreign policies being already feminist, and to a degree that is correct in that the same aims are pursued. However, by openly calling the foreign policy feminist Sweden has introduced a new institution very overtly which is rarely done with any type of norm which might be adding to the need for justification (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

56 The introduction of the feminist institution in foreign policy has created a larger emphasis on the Swedish aim of equality, but it might also have been able to put pressure back onto the international system through the Swedish aims of strengthening the focus on gender, equality, and women in the different international organizations. This way it becomes part of the cyclical pressure and implementation of norms in the international and national policies. This could potentially lead to a cascade of other states supporting or implementing a feminist foreign policy which in turn could affect both their internal and international priorities (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The alternative is that the feminist foreign policy as an institution might fade away because of contestation in the international sphere (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019). The implied understanding of women in the foreign policy statements vary from the different areas as well and changes continuously.

Conclusion

This thesis set out to understand whether feminism has been institutionalized in Swedish foreign policy by analyzing the foreign policy statements since the year 2000, and how the priorities of the Swedish foreign policy have been affected by this process. Throughout the analysis, it has been demonstrated that feminism in Sweden is an institution more than simply a norm. It functions as the umbrella for the three main norms: gender, equality, and women. These norms have been part of the foreign policy long before it was declared feminist. They were introduced as part of the gender mainstreaming process, that was called for by the EU, and has meant that the Swedish foreign policy statement has included these norms and that they have integrated (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamond, 2016). Over the 20 years, the 3 main norms have moved from emerging norms to accepted norms. However, none have fully been internalized to a degree of ‘taken for granted’-ness. The area where these norms have been internalized to the highest degree is within peace and conflict where the addition of a focus on women’s inclusion is introduced when new conflicts arise. The meaning of the norms and the general view of women has changed from object to an agent in the foreign policy. Though the existence of both continues, there is an increase in agency in most areas that include women. The importance of this can only be seen because of the use of both feminism and constructivism. Using them together has made it possible to see the changes in the norms and their institutionalization. Particularly the addition of using both

57 have meant sensitivity to changes in the norms as well as a clear framework for tracing the institutionalization of them. One of the findings that were not expected is that the introduction of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 justifies the focus on women in conflict but has not necessarily caused the institutionalization of women in this area of Swedish foreign policy alone. Instead, it is the two-way relationship between the international and national spheres that have done that together. The pressure exerted nationally for the UN to further develop its work to include a ‘women and equality’ perspective together with the use of UN resolutions to justify national policy is how these changes have been sustained. The way in which national and international norms affect each other is cyclical through pressure from both sides, once a norm is accepted in either sphere. The institutionalization of the 3 norms; gender, equality, and women, through gender mainstreaming, has made it possible to introduce feminism openly into Swedish foreign policy, it has, however, at this point not gone beyond an emerging norm in the Swedish foreign policy statement (Rosén Sundström & Elgström, 2019). The feminist foreign policy has affected the Swedish priorities by making the foreign policy statement more focused on women’s issues, by including concrete areas for action, and by changing the focus from general societal level issues to issues of individuals. The methodological choice of combining feminism and constructivism has shown the necessity, in this thesis, of ensuring that the paper has not been blind to the portrayal of gender and that the institutionalization process has been seen as an institutionalization of a norm/structure (Locher & Prugl, 2001). Furthermore, it has made it possible to see the change from object to agent of women in the foreign policy and how it relates to the institutionalization of the three norms because of the way it has affected the focus of the foreign policy - from generalized societal level issues to individuals which have affected how the foreign policy statement has prioritized. It would have been helpful to add a further focus on the norm entrepreneurs in this paper, especially the role which bureaucrats and ministers have played in institutionalizing this specific set of norms. This paper has contributed by tracing the institutionalization process of feminism in the Swedish foreign policy statement which has shown that norms connected with gender mainstreaming were further along in the institutionalization process when ‘feminism’ was introduced as an umbrella for this work. The consequence of this move being a renewed process of institutionalization in the area and increased use of justifications for the policy in the statement. It has further shown that the link often made in research between the introduction

58 of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the development of a feminist foreign policy is more of a two-way relationship when it comes to the foreign policy statement. While international norms affect national policy, national norms are also projected onto the international stage in a way that appears to be cyclical which aids norms in becoming further institutionalized. Hegemonic masculinity is indicated by the approach of ‘adding women’ to the foreign policy statement as it assumes that experiences are androgynous based on the male gender. By ‘adding women’, it is clear that hegemonic masculinity is an internalized, stable norm or even institution in the Swedish foreign policy. This status is being further reaffirmed by accepting the approach of ‘adding women’ and a gendered approach rather than challenging it. The power struggle which is happening because of the introduction of the FFP is showing through the way in which it is necessary to justify the introduction/emergence of feminism as a norm in foreign policy as this challenge the hegemonic masculinity as an institution. While the addition of women does not threaten hegemonic masculinity, feminism does as it challenges the ‘male as default’ status quo of the foreign policy by suggesting the assumption should be one of equality between the gendered experiences. In conclusion, the feminist aspect of the feminist foreign policy can be seen in two ways; 1) as a structure that has been introduced to encompass the norms of gender, equality, and women in the foreign policy, and 2) as a norm which is only at its emerging stage and still in need of norm entrepreneurs to continue promoting its appropriateness in the Swedish foreign policy statement. The effect of introducing the feminist foreign policy has mainly been the need to justify it in the foreign policy statement. This has brought a significant amount of justifications into areas where norms related to feminism have already been accepted, leaning towards internalized. Further research should focus on the importance of changing power structures in Swedish politics and in international institutions to better understand the influence of actors and power structures. This should be done to confirm the interplay between national and international spheres when it comes to the institutionalization of norms in either sphere, but particularly in national politics.

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