Briefing January 2016 The nuclear agreement with The International Atomic Energy Agency referred the issue of Iran's nuclear programme to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2006. The UN gradually adopted restrictive measures against Iran, including an embargo on states exporting materials that could be used for Iran's nuclear programme and placing financial and travel restrictions on certain individuals. Following several years of rather chilly relations between Iran and the E3/EU+3 (, , the , the EU High Representative, , , and the ) the discussions about Iran's nuclear programme gained new impetus with the election of as president in June 2013. Building on a series of contacts between Iran and the E3/EU+3, the Joint Plan of Action was adopted on 24 November 2013. In April 2015, negotiators announced agreement on a set of parameters which provided the framework for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and annexes agreed on 14 July 2015.

CONTEXT: TIMELINE  THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME nuclear nuclear 1980s POLITICS nuclear programme programme programme Iran acquires nuclear begins under Atoms suspended restarted technology from Ahmadinejad EU bans import of for Peace Iran signs under during Pakistani nuclear elected President Iranian petroleum Rouhani elected programme NPT Khomeini Iran- war scientist AQ Khan of Iran products President of Iran

1950 1957 1960 1968 1970 1979 1980 1984 1990 2000 2002 2003 2005 2006 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS discovery of clandestine IAEA: Iran failed to IAEA refers IAEA: Iran Joint Plan of Action Joint nuclear programme meet safeguards Iran case to conducts Comprehensive previously unkown to UN obligations UN Security nuclear test IAEA and Iran Plan of Action Council at Parchin sign Framework for Cooperation

CONTEXT: NONPROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

NPT SIGNATORY The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty came into force in 1970. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IN FORCE Additional Protocols (AP) are optional measures that enhance the IAEA’s veri cation tools in a given country. NUCLEAR WEAPON POSSESSOR Nine countries are known to possess nuclear weapons.

CONTEXT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS WORLDWIDE United States Russia Those countries that exploded a is assumed to have a small nuclear 7 260 7 500 nuclear weapon before 1967 are arsenal. The government insists, however, considered ‘nuclear-weapon states’ that it will not be the rst country 'to under the NPT. introduce nuclear weapons to the region'. United Kingdom France China North Korea Israel NUCLEAR 215 300 260 100 110 7 80 WARHEADS FIRST NUCLEAR TEST 1945 1949 1952 1960 1964 1970 1974 1998 2006 date NPT unkown

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Authors: Christian Dietrich, Patryk Pawlak Members’ Research Service PE 572.820 EPRS The nuclear agreement with Iran

A political understanding by the parties concerned, the JCPOA aims to ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be OBLIGATIONS & ROLE OF THE IAEA exclusively peaceful, in exchange for the termination of . The signatories of the agreement envisage that its implementation will allow Iran to move forward with 'an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear The IAEA's verification process focuses on a number of key issues, including removing centrifuges at the and programme' and for the rest of the international community to progressively 'gain confidence' in the peaceful nature Fordow facilities, redesigning the heavy water research reactor in Arak and shipping out excess uranium stockpiles. The of Iran's programme. IAEA is also expected to implement several transparency measures, such as installing active electronic seals for online enrichment monitoring purposes and improving monitoring at uranium mills. KEY STIPULATIONS OF THE JCPOA CONTEXT: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE NON PROLIFERATION RELATED before 12t before 19 000 The nuclear fuel cycle describes the life cycle of the main radioactive materials in the SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN fabrication, consumption and disposal of nuclear reactor fuel. It is referred to as ‘closed’ when components of spent fuel are reused for the production of new fuel; Non-proliferation-related sanctions were rst levelled against Iran by the United after 0.3t after 6 000 and as ‘open’ when spent fuel is mainly destined for disposal. States in 1992. Sanctions adopted by the UN and the EU followed from 2006 onwards, URANIUM NO EXPORT CAP ON FULL IAEA ACCESS JOINT COMMISSION SANCTIONS after the IAEA referred the Iranian nuclear programme to the UN Security Council. WEAPONS OPTION STOCKPILE ENRICHMENT of spent nuclear CENTRIFUGES to Iran’s declared and monitors procurement & RELIEF AND While Iran has also become the target of sanctions triggered by allegations of human Highly enriched uranium rights abuses, supporting terrorism and others, only non-proliferation-related reduction of 98% of uranium fuel and by number & type suspected nuclear sites settles disputes SNAPBACK ENRICHMENT FUEL FABRICATION above 3.67% heavy water phased sanctions are a ected by the JCPOA. The agreement foresees extensive monitoring by the termination During the 15-year period, Iran will only enrich uranium to up to 3.67% (substantially below the 90% International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an and snapback threshold required for the production of a nuclear bomb) and it will reduce its stockpile of low-enriched inquiry into evidence of past work on nuclear-warhead in case of ELECTRICITY uranium from 10 000 kg today to a maximum 300 kg for 15 years. Iran's research and development and design. Iran also committed to fully implementing the non-compliance GENERATION Target of sanction Author of sanction testing capacities for enrichment will also be limited. Enrichment will be further restricted to a single 'Roadmap for Clarication of Past and Present Arms site, where only Iran’s oldest, least ecient centrifuges will be operating for a duration of 10 years. In Outstanding Issues' agreed with the IAEA. The High The deal also Nuclear/Missiles United Nations addition, Iran agreed that it will not seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. Representative of the European Union for Foreign A airs includes provisions and Security Policy – or her designated representative – for the reintroduction UF6 Financial United States will serve as the coordinator of the Joint Commission CONVERSION POWER PLANT Energy of sanctions in case g n i established to monitor the implementation of the Iran is found to be in l Travel c y g agreement and resolve related disputes. non-compliance. c in Assets EXISTING FACILITIES & MODIFICATION e s r es Trade oc HIGH LEVEL epr Bonab Atomic WASTE r Other Energy Research STORAGE WEAPONS OPTION Center Tehran Parchin Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant MINING & MILLING Plutonium Research Military 696 2 014 enriching SPENT FUEL Reactor Complex BEFORE installed, FINAL DISPOSAL STORAGE AFTER not enriching Arak Heavy Water 348 1 044 centrifuges engaged in stable isotope separation Research Reactor Key proliferation concerns are associated with uranium enrichment, where levels Fordow can hold 2 976 centrifuges. It will be beyond those needed for nuclear fuel can yield weapons-grade, highly enriched The Arak heavy water Esfahan Uranium converted from a fuel enrichment plant into a uranium; and spent fuel reprocessing, where weapons-grade plutonium is extracted research reactor will be Conversion Facility nuclear, physics, and technology centre. from spent fuel to be recycled back into reactor fuel. redesigned by Iran so as to Bushehr Natanz Nuclear Facility minimise the production Nuclear Power Plant of plutonium and limit its 9 156 7 272 enriching power to 20 MW thermal. Bandar Abbas BEFORE installed, Uranium Production enrichment/energy AFTER not enriching Plant 5 060 Stored IR-1 centrifuges will be used to research military mining/milling replace failed or damaged centrifuges. Natanz enrichment plant can hold 1990 1 2 3 4 1995 6 7 8 9 2000 1 2 3 4 2005 6 7 8 9 2010 1 2 3 4 2015 CONTEXT: NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDE almost 50 000 centrifuges. It will be Iran’s only location for uranium IAEA and Iran sign enrichment for 15 years. YEAR OF ADOPTION OF SANCTIONS IAEA refers Iran case IAEA: Iran conducts The Nuclear Materials Security Index Overall score Armenia Libya to UN Security Council nuclear test at Parchin Framework for Cooperation assesses the security of nuclear NUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY INDEX Brazil Mexico materials in countries. The index only 81100 6180 4160 040 Bulgaria Libya DISPUTE SETTLEMENT lists countries in possession of at least Czech Republic Romania one kilogramme of weapons-usable Types of facilities Egypt Slovakia Sweden nuclear materials. energy research military Finland Slovenia Taiwan The Joint Commission comprises representatives of Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US and the High Hungary South Korea 20 COUNTRIES Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). The HR/VP or her designated representative will Indonesia Spain Ukraine <1kg weapons-usable serve as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission, and she will serve as coordinator of a Working Group on procurement nuclear material Norway and a Working Group on the implementation of sanctions. The objectives of these working groups are, respectively, to Belarus Russia review and decide proposals by states seeking to engage in nuclear-related transfers to, or activities with, Iran, and to Poland Kazakhstan review and consult on issues related to the implementation of sanctions lifting. United Kingdom Uzbekistan Netherlands North Korea 9 COUNTRIES known military 15 15 5 30 United States Belgium Japan nuclear programmes days days days days France China Switzerland India Germany Pakistan Advisory Board cessation of performance no Resolution, Italy Iran ‘snapback’ unless Israel 25 COUNTRIES UNSC decides >1kg weapons-usable otherwise Australia nuclear material Complaining Joint unresolved Ministers of unresolved Joint unresolved UN Security participant Commission Foreign A airs Commission Council Argentina South Africa Resolution to resolved resolved resolved continue sanctions lifting

Members’ Research Service Page 2 of 4 EPRS The nuclear agreement with Iran

A political understanding by the parties concerned, the JCPOA aims to ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be OBLIGATIONS & ROLE OF THE IAEA exclusively peaceful, in exchange for the termination of sanctions against Iran. The signatories of the agreement envisage that its implementation will allow Iran to move forward with 'an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear The IAEA's verification process focuses on a number of key issues, including removing centrifuges at the Natanz and programme' and for the rest of the international community to progressively 'gain confidence' in the peaceful nature Fordow facilities, redesigning the heavy water research reactor in Arak and shipping out excess uranium stockpiles. The of Iran's programme. IAEA is also expected to implement several transparency measures, such as installing active electronic seals for online enrichment monitoring purposes and improving monitoring at uranium mills. KEY STIPULATIONS OF THE JCPOA CONTEXT: THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE NON PROLIFERATION RELATED before 12t before 19 000 The nuclear fuel cycle describes the life cycle of the main radioactive materials in the SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN fabrication, consumption and disposal of nuclear reactor fuel. It is referred to as ‘closed’ when components of spent fuel are reused for the production of new fuel; Non-proliferation-related sanctions were rst levelled against Iran by the United after 0.3t after 6 000 and as ‘open’ when spent fuel is mainly destined for disposal. States in 1992. Sanctions adopted by the UN and the EU followed from 2006 onwards, URANIUM NO EXPORT CAP ON FULL IAEA ACCESS JOINT COMMISSION SANCTIONS after the IAEA referred the Iranian nuclear programme to the UN Security Council. WEAPONS OPTION STOCKPILE ENRICHMENT of spent nuclear CENTRIFUGES to Iran’s declared and monitors procurement & RELIEF AND While Iran has also become the target of sanctions triggered by allegations of human Highly enriched uranium rights abuses, supporting terrorism and others, only non-proliferation-related reduction of 98% of uranium fuel and by number & type suspected nuclear sites settles disputes SNAPBACK ENRICHMENT FUEL FABRICATION above 3.67% heavy water phased sanctions are a ected by the JCPOA. The agreement foresees extensive monitoring by the termination During the 15-year period, Iran will only enrich uranium to up to 3.67% (substantially below the 90% International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an and snapback threshold required for the production of a nuclear bomb) and it will reduce its stockpile of low-enriched inquiry into evidence of past work on nuclear-warhead in case of ELECTRICITY uranium from 10 000 kg today to a maximum 300 kg for 15 years. Iran's research and development and design. Iran also committed to fully implementing the non-compliance GENERATION Target of sanction Author of sanction testing capacities for enrichment will also be limited. Enrichment will be further restricted to a single 'Roadmap for Clarication of Past and Present Arms European Union site, where only Iran’s oldest, least ecient centrifuges will be operating for a duration of 10 years. In Outstanding Issues' agreed with the IAEA. The High The deal also Nuclear/Missiles United Nations addition, Iran agreed that it will not seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons. Representative of the European Union for Foreign A airs includes provisions and Security Policy – or her designated representative – for the reintroduction UF6 Financial United States will serve as the coordinator of the Joint Commission CONVERSION POWER PLANT Energy of sanctions in case g n i established to monitor the implementation of the Iran is found to be in l Travel c y g agreement and resolve related disputes. non-compliance. c in Assets EXISTING FACILITIES & MODIFICATION e s r es Trade oc HIGH LEVEL epr Bonab Atomic WASTE r Other Energy Research STORAGE WEAPONS OPTION Center Tehran Parchin Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant MINING & MILLING Plutonium Research Military 696 2 014 enriching SPENT FUEL Reactor Complex BEFORE installed, FINAL DISPOSAL STORAGE AFTER not enriching Arak Heavy Water 348 1 044 centrifuges engaged in stable isotope separation Research Reactor Key proliferation concerns are associated with uranium enrichment, where levels Fordow can hold 2 976 centrifuges. It will be beyond those needed for nuclear fuel can yield weapons-grade, highly enriched The Arak heavy water Esfahan Uranium converted from a fuel enrichment plant into a uranium; and spent fuel reprocessing, where weapons-grade plutonium is extracted research reactor will be Conversion Facility nuclear, physics, and technology centre. from spent fuel to be recycled back into reactor fuel. redesigned by Iran so as to Bushehr Natanz Nuclear Facility minimise the production Nuclear Power Plant of plutonium and limit its 9 156 7 272 enriching power to 20 MW thermal. Bandar Abbas BEFORE installed, Uranium Production enrichment/energy AFTER not enriching Plant 5 060 Stored IR-1 centrifuges will be used to research military mining/milling replace failed or damaged centrifuges. Natanz enrichment plant can hold 1990 1 2 3 4 1995 6 7 8 9 2000 1 2 3 4 2005 6 7 8 9 2010 1 2 3 4 2015 CONTEXT: NUCLEAR PROGRAMMES WORLDWIDE almost 50 000 centrifuges. It will be Iran’s only location for uranium IAEA and Iran sign enrichment for 15 years. YEAR OF ADOPTION OF SANCTIONS IAEA refers Iran case IAEA: Iran conducts The Nuclear Materials Security Index Overall score Armenia Libya to UN Security Council nuclear test at Parchin Framework for Cooperation assesses the security of nuclear NUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY INDEX Brazil Mexico materials in countries. The index only 81100 6180 4160 040 Bulgaria Libya DISPUTE SETTLEMENT lists countries in possession of at least Czech Republic Romania one kilogramme of weapons-usable Types of facilities Egypt Slovakia Sweden nuclear materials. energy research military Finland Slovenia Taiwan The Joint Commission comprises representatives of Iran, China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US and the High Hungary South Korea Turkey 20 COUNTRIES Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). The HR/VP or her designated representative will Indonesia Spain Ukraine <1kg weapons-usable serve as the Coordinator of the Joint Commission, and she will serve as coordinator of a Working Group on procurement nuclear material Norway and a Working Group on the implementation of sanctions. The objectives of these working groups are, respectively, to Belarus Russia review and decide proposals by states seeking to engage in nuclear-related transfers to, or activities with, Iran, and to Poland Kazakhstan review and consult on issues related to the implementation of sanctions lifting. Canada United Kingdom Uzbekistan Netherlands North Korea 9 COUNTRIES known military 15 15 5 30 United States Belgium Japan nuclear programmes days days days days France China Switzerland India Germany Pakistan Advisory Board cessation of performance no Resolution, Italy Iran ‘snapback’ unless Israel 25 COUNTRIES UNSC decides >1kg weapons-usable otherwise Australia nuclear material Complaining Joint unresolved Ministers of unresolved Joint unresolved UN Security participant Commission Foreign A airs Commission Council Argentina South Africa Resolution to resolved resolved resolved continue sanctions lifting

Members’ Research Service Page 3 of 4 EPRS The nuclear agreement with Iran

On 18 October 2015, the European Union and the United States adopted the legal acts to prepare for the lifting of all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions (Adoption Day). On 16 January 2016, the Director-General of the IAEA presented a report to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the United Nations Security Council which confirms that Iran has completed the necessary steps to start the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Implementation Day). The same day, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/1863 of 18 October 2015 entered into force, confirming the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions. LENGTH OF IMPOSED OBLIGATIONS & RESTRICTIONS

IAEA veri es key restrictions (Annex I) US terminates/ceases application of nuclear-related sanctions aecting non-US companies UN terminates sanctions subject to reimposition (UNSC Resolution 2231 comes into eect) and other sanctions EU asset freezes and SWIFT ban lifted (asset freezes aecting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard remain in force until TRANSITION DAY)

IMPLEMENTATION DAY

2015 2016 17 18 19 2020 21 22 2023 24 2025 26 27 28 29 2030 31 32 33 34 2035 36 37 38 2040 ADOPTION TRANSITION TERMINATION DAY UN sanctions on DAY DAY end of IAEA monitoring of end of IAEA monitoring of conventional arms lifted centrifuge production uranium production UNSC ‘consideration’ of Iranian advanced centrifuge testing & manufacturing nuclear programme ends end of heavy water export obligation UN sanctions on ballistic missiles lifted remaining EU sanctions and end of enrichment caps some EU sanctions lifted (incl. on conventional provisions lifted end of enrichment & arms and ballistic missiles) enrichment & centrifuge caps testing restricted to Natanz Iran rati es IAEA Additional Protocol lifted end of enrichment prohibition at Fordow IAEA deadline to con rm that nuclear material in Iran is for peaceful purposes only The UNSC sanctions on ballistic missiles will be lifted in 2023 (Transition Day) at the latest, and Iran mustseek ratification of the Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards. In 2025, on Termination Day, the UNSC resolution endorsing JCPOA and all heightened scrutiny (‘consideration’) of the Iranian nuclear programme terminate. The EU is obliged to terminate all remaining sanctions on the same day. The remaining constraints on Iran will be gradually phased out by 2040. Parliamentary elections in Iran scheduled for February 2016, and US presidential elections in November 2016 may influence the achievement of further milestones on this timeline.

Main References European External Action Service (2015), Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action & Annex I-V, 14 July 2015. European External Action Service (2015), Restrictive measures (sanctions) in force, 30 September 2015. International Atomic Energy Agency (2015), Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Materials. International Crisis Group (2013), Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions, Middle East Report No 138. J. Lewis (2015), Visualizing the Iran Deal, Armscontrolwonk, 14 July 2015. Nuclear Threat Initiative (2014), 2014 Nuclear Materials Security Index. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2015), Nuclear Forces. World Nuclear Association (2015), Country Profiles.

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