Kent Academic Repository Full text document (pdf)
Citation for published version Moser, Shelby (2017) Digitally Interactive Works and Video Games: A Philosophical Exploration. Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University of Kent,.
DOI
Link to record in KAR http://kar.kent.ac.uk/66616/
Document Version UNSPECIFIED
Copyright & reuse Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder.
Versions of research The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record.
Enquiries For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: [email protected] If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Digitally Interactive Works and Video Games: A Philosophical Exploration
Shelby Moser
A thesis submitted to the University of Kent for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of History and Philosophy of Art September 2017
79,372 words
1
Table of Contents Acknowledgements ...... 4 Abstract ...... 5 Introduction ...... 6 SECTION 1: DIGITALLY INTERACTIVE WORKS ...... 9
Computer Art ...... 10 Chapter Perceiving Digital )nteractivity Applying Kendall Walton s Categories of Art to 1.1 Categories of Art ...... 10 1.2 The Perceptual Features of Computer Art ...... 14 1.3 Implications ...... 21 Chapter 2: Classifying Interactivity ...... 25 ...... 25 2.2 Categorising Interactive Art ...... 26 A Brief Characterisation of the Term )nteractive 2.3 Engagement ...... 27 2.4 Participatory Works ...... 28 2.5 Interactive Works ...... 31 Chapter 3: The Digital Medium: Specificity and Appreciation ...... 36 3.1 The Evolution of the Digital Category ...... 36 3.2 Digital Versus Analogue ...... 37 3.3 Transmissibility and Reproduction ...... 44 3.4 Conclusion ...... 49 Chapter 4: Ontological Bastards: The Problem of Digitally Interactive Works for Theories of Art ...... 50 4.1 The Autographic-Allographic Distinction...... 50 4.2. The Type-Token Distinction ...... 55 SECTION 2: VIDEO GAMES ...... 61 Chapter 5: Video Games, Art Games, and Players ...... 62 5.1 What (Video) Games Are ...... 62 5.2 Game Art and Art Games ...... 67 5.3 Art Games ...... 70 5.4 Stages of Video Game Development ...... 73 5.5 Art or Aesthetic ...... 78 5.6 Player Types ...... 81 Chapter 6: The Ontology of Interactivity and Player Engagement ...... 84 6.1 On the Ontologies of Interactivity ...... 84 6.2 Clarifying Display Variability ...... 87 6.3 Interactivity and Player Engagement ...... 90
2
6.4 Performances Versus Performance Works ...... 94 6.5 Conclusion ...... 96 Chapter 7: An Algorithmic Ontology: Video Games and Rules ...... 97 7.1 Games and Rules ...... 98 7.2 An Algorithmic Ontology ...... 100 7.3 Some Initial Problems...... 105 7.4 In Search of a Unified Theory ...... 107 Chapter 8: Some Ontology of How to Destroy a Video Game ...... 112 8.1 Abstract or Concrete? ...... 112 8.2 Abstract Ontology Candidates ...... 113 8.3 The Components of a Video Game ...... 116 8.4 How to Destroy Video Games ...... 118 Chapter 9: Me, Myself & My Avatar: Virtual Reality and Empathy ...... 121 9.1 VR Games ...... 122 9.2 Empathy ...... 124 9.3 VR Games and Empathy ...... 128 9.4 Empathy and Prosocial Behavior ...... 132 9.5 Objections ...... 134 9.6 Conclusion ...... 137 Chapter 10: Games: Failure, Competition, Selfish Punishers, and Why We Need Them ...... 138 10. 1 The Paradox of Failure ...... 138 10.2 The Paradox of Competition ...... 141 10.3 The Paradox of Selfish Punishers ...... 144 10.4 Conclusion...... 152 Concluding remarks ...... 154 Bibliography ...... 159
3
Acknowledgements
I have so many people to thank for their involvement with this dissertation. I am grateful to the many comments and discussions from various conference organisers and audiences. The European Society of Aesthetics (2013) for their helpful discussion on an early draft Chapter 1; the British Society of Aesthetics (2014) for feedback on portions of Chapter 2; the American Society for Aesthetics (2015) for their useful discussion on an early draft of Chapter 6; the Just A Game? conference (2015) for comments on a draft of Chapter 9; the Philosophy of Games Conference (2016) for an in-depth discussion of an early draft of Chapter 7; the American Society for Aesthetics conference (2016) after I presented an earlier draft of Chapter 9; finally, the Eastern American Society of Aesthetics (2017) for helpful comments on portions of Chapter 10. More specifically, I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Hans Maes and Michael Newall for having the confidence in me to pursue a doctorate in philosophy in the first place, for their support, comments, and for showing me that philosophers can be fun (and all around nice) people. To my amazing colleagues and friends, Mark Windsor and Eleen M. Deprez, for their philosophical insight on chapter drafts, unfailing encouragement, laughter, and exquisite beer. I owe Mark an extra thank you for offering a keen eye on later drafts of this dissertation. Also, thanks to Brock Rough who willingly accepted regular Skype calls and window chats to discuss the philosophy of games, even in the midst of becoming a new parent and starting a new career. I also thank my examiners, Aaron Meskin and Johnathan Friday, for their helpful discussions and comments. Many other conference colleagues, whom I am happy to call my friends, have also been very helpful and supportive along the way. Any mistakes that remain in this dissertation are my own. Finally, I must thank my family and friends who, over the years, have put up with my stress, helped me through failures, and celebrated my small victories. Special thanks to Steven, Julian, and Finn Moser, because I could never have done any of this without them anyone has listened to me discuss and obsess over my dissertation more than Steven. and their love for video games Since this dissertation process began ) don t think Thank you all.
4
Abstract
This dissertation explores the philosophy of digitally interactive works and video games. There are two central questions to this thesis, namely, what is distinctive about computer art, and more specifically, what is distinctive about the interactivity that these kinds of works afford? The latter question is a response to the former, but, as I will articulate in the chapters that follow, this distinctive type of interactivity is not restricted to works that are comprised of digital media. As it turns out, games (especially video games) are paradigmatic examples and so both analytic aesthetics and game theory are relevant to a discussion of interactivity. In what follows, I address topics that pertain to interactivity such as art categories, prescriptions, appreciation, and ontology. This thesis will show that interactive works consist of unique displays and prescriptions and are, therefore, a distinctive category of art. I conclude that interactive works do not belong in a performance ontology, that the prescriptions of interactive art bear player engagement, and, importantly, the distinctive features of digitally interactive works hinge on an algorithmic ontology.
5
Introduction
The broad focus of this dissertation is digitally interactive art and video games with an aim at pinpointing the distinctive features of such works. In order to achieve this aim, I analyse a number of standard conditions of digital works that pertain to their formal features, their ontology, how a viewer responds to them, and some of the potential problems these features raise for philosophical accounts of art. Although the scope of this dissertation pertains to interactive works, in which the computer and digital media drive the foundational research, the primary objective is to discuss the value of video games within analytic evance of video games. I shall argueaesthetics that certain )n other interactive words workswhile )are do distinctiveaddress vide becauseo games of theirand thedisplay art question variability )and am this more type concerned of variability with bears the ontologicalupon user (and and player)aesthetic engagement. rel In short, I argue that interactive works, given some of their distinctive features, are ontologically different than performance works. Of course, no account of video games is complete without experiencing at least some amount of gameplay first hand. Therefore, in order to fully deal with certain philosophical issues entailed by video games in the chapters that follow, I draw on my own gameplay experiences and present them in first person. This dissertation has two sections. Section 1 concerns a philosophy of digitally interactive art, or what we now define as computer art, and Section 2 focuses more specifically on video games. The first section is comprised of four chapters. The reader will notice that I
Although these phrases reference similar works, I have tried to be intentionalinterchangeably about use the the ones phrases I use (and computer when Iart use dig them)itally because, interactive while art computer and digitally art is necessarilyinteractive works art, digitally interactive works are not. I make this distinction in recognition that not all video games are works of art and I would not wish to indicate such a claim or mislead the reader. Chapter 1 examines the perceptual features of computer art, which highlights, in a Waltonian sense, the features that are standard and contra-standard to the category. This chapter introduces the significance of interactivity, the key feature of computer art and primary topic of this dissertation. Chapter 2 offers a summary of the many ways in which the term interactivity is used and understood within the arts. Building from philosophers such as David Novitz and Dominic Lopes, I present categories of interactivity that differentiate works based on what the sense are the focus for the remainder of this dissertation. work prescribes of the viewers Works that are strongly interactive in the Lopesian
6
Chapter 3 focuses on the digital medium. This chapter reflects my initial interest in the distinctive properties of digital media and how digital technologies allow for certain works to be responsive to the users. By the completion of this chapter, it became clear to me that interactivity, rather than digital media, would be the new focus. I should also note that at the time of writing this chapter in 2012, Katherine Thomson-Jones had not published her seminal 2015 article, which addresses many of the issues I tackle here. Chapter 4 concludes Section 1 of this dissertation with a look at the ontological issues that surround digitally interactive art. This chapter has two parts. Part 1 offers a cursory look at the autographic-allographic distinction as it relates to computer art; Part 2 is a detailed account of the type-token distinction and computer art, which is a topic that is referenced in proceeding chapters. Section 2 is comprised of six chapters and begins a narrower focus on video games. It will of course be obvious that, in many of the chapters that follow, I draw upon the instrumental features of games in order to discuss various philosophical issues about them. However, before beginning, I wish to point out that it is my view that games can be important in and of themselves. My statement echoes games philosopher Bernard De .1 In a new The Well-Played Game A Player s Philosophy Eric Zimmerman Kovenwrites awho forward in to the said volume with games with a similar there is sentimen no highert an purpose than play images,edition of or De telling Koven s stories, book engaging in play is what it means to be human. Games do not d says l ike music 2 There creating is a corollary with these views, which I, as someone who regularly playshave togames justify and themselves appreciates by art, appealing am sympathetic to something to. Of course,outside in themselves the pages that follow, I haveclear set art thefor autotelicart s sake nature of games aside to focus on other philosophical aspects of video games, such as their ontology and the prosocial behaviour that we potentially can learn from gameplay. Chapter 5 is an introductory chapter for the reader who is unfamiliar with the many kinds of video games that are available for gameplay; it also addresses how video games might qualify as artworks. I provide an overview of video games to show why some are clearly considered art forms more than others, but also to show that the distinctions between them are hazy. At the end of this chapter, I offer an account of different player types. Chapter 6 is one of the thesis chapters in this dissertation in which I analyse the ontology of interactivity. Although computer art and video games are newer studies within analytic aesthetics, philosophers of art have already made great progress in pinpointing the distinctive features of interactivity. Consequently, I begin with a literature review of the significant ontological accounts of interactivity and work display objects. I then discuss interactivity and player engagement before I conclude with a section on performance versus interactive art. This chapter has been provisionally accepted for the Routledge Handbook to the Philosophy of Games, edited by C. Thi Nguyen and John R. Sageng.
1 De Koven (1978). 2 In the introduction by Zimmerman as found in De Koven (2013).
7
Chapter 7 is one of the significant developments in this dissertation. I defend an algorithmic ontology of video games, which includes significant accounts by Lopes, Berys Gaut, Grant Tavinor, and Dominic Preston. This chapter is important within the philosophy of art and games for two reasons one, because it fills a gap within the current literature regarding what, exactly, an algorithm is and, two, it defends a compatibility between aesthetics and philosophy of games regarding game identity. This chapter has been provisionally accepted for The Aesthetics of Videogames in the Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy series, edited by Grant Tavinor and Jonathan Robson. Chapter 8 continues the algorithmic ontology discussion to address the abstract nature of video games (if they are abstract). Loosely following a Levensonian approach, I conclude this chapter by proposing that video games, although they are abstract-like, are destructible entities. Chapter 9 changes the focus of this dissertation to the phenomenological and epistemic aspects of video games. More specifically, I focus on virtual reality games and discuss how players might empathise with their avatars or their player-characters. Chapter 10 is the final chapter, which takes a closer look at the gaming groups, rather than the games. I first discuss certain paradoxes that arise for players during gameplay, and then turn to an explanation of how those paradoxes help create successful game communities. I conclude with a summary of this thesis and a few brief remarks about future research.
8
SECTION 1: DIGITALLY INTERACTIVE WORKS
9
Chapter 1: Perceiving Digital Interactivity Applying Kendall Walton s Categories of Art to Computer Art
Appreciating an object, of any category, begins with perception. If we see an object that is small, feathered, and beaked, then we normally assess it as a bird. This psychological process, according to Kendall Walton, is also how we categorise things, not only in ordinary life, but with works of art. We perceive some works as paintings and others as music because the former consists of flat surfaces and pigment and the latter consists of tonal sounds and timbre. These features are typical of the works and their respective categories even though we usually take these kinds of features for granted. By now, this is a well-known theory within aesthetics, but in this introduction chapter, I apply to discuss the significant features of the relatively young art category called computer art. 1 Walton s formative essay Categories of Art about how certain features affect how we categorise things, and his view that not every category we perceive a work within is correct.) begin by Second, summarising I describe Walton s two examples key claims of computer art that are typical of both the digital works that we find within the museum and of the works we can access from a networked computer. For both kinds, I consider the perceptual features that we view as standard and unusual to the works. In the final section, I present my view that computer art is not a category that one would normally assess works within (in a Waltonian sense) due to their perceptual features and the history of more institutionalised artworks. As I will explain, the perceptual features of these works would, instead, cue our senses to categorise them as interactive versions of their established parent categories (e.g., interactive literature instead of computer art, and so on). This will also emphasise a signature features, interactivity. I use the word signature rather than necessary because, contraparadox Lopes, between I will Walton s suggest interactivityconception of is standardmerely standard features to and the one category of computer of computer art s art. Interactivity will be the primary focus of this dissertation. 1.1 Categories of Art Categorising art is important because our aesthetic judgements are broadly influenced by the category we are judging a work within. In this respect, our judgements are dependent on the perceived category and, therefore, certain values we place on a specific artwork are also dependent on that perceived category. In other words, if we look at a work of art within one category, its properties can seemingly differ if we were to later perceive it within another category. By now, this Waltonian concept is broadly accepted, but the category of computer art is relatively new, and so this chapter will investigate certain features which we take to be standard to the category and question if those perceived features help us determine that computer art is the correct category. But first, what, according to Walton, is an art category and how do we know if it is the correct one? Categories of art consist of groups of works that are perceptually discernible, meaning, the artwork must have, according to Walton, perceptual features that are distinguishable
1 Walton, K. L. (1970).
10 enough to guide our classification of it. One such category that Walton regularly refers to sed because its constitutive artworks are typically stationary and flat with a pigmented surface. There arein his also essay sub-categories is the category that can of painting