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DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN , AND ,

ARGENTINA: AIMS AND BENEFITS OF A TRANSLATIONAL COALITION

A dissertation submitted to State University in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of of Philosophy

By

Kathryn L. Hannum

August 2020

©Copyright

All rights reserved

Except for previously published materia

Dissertation written by

Kathryn L. Hannum

B.A., San Jose State University 2011

M.A., Kent State University, 2016

Ph.D., Kent State University, 2020

Approved by

Dr. David H. Kaplan , Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Dr. Sarah Smiley , Members, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Dr. Amoaba Gooden ,

Dr. V. Kelly Turner ,

Dr. Landon Hancock ,

Accepted by

Dr. Scott Sheridan , Chair, Department of Geography

Dr. Mandy Munro-Stasiuk , Interim Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... III

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ...... VIII

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... XII

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW: FRAMING NATIONAL IDENTITY, MIGRATION, &

DIASPORA ...... 10

NATIONAL IDENTITY ...... 10

MIGRATION PROCESSES ...... 15

Macro- Migration Processes ...... 16

Micro-Level Migration Processes ...... 19

Migrant Networks...... 21

Transnationalism...... 22

Translocalism ...... 26

DIASPORA ...... 28

DIASPORIC NATIONAL IDENTITY ...... 30

INSTITUTIONS ...... 31

Diaspora Institutions ...... 32

CHPATER 3 - METHODOLOGY ...... 37

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 38

States of Spain & ...... 39

Regions of Galicia and Buenos Aires...... 40

iii

INSTITUTIONAL CONTENT ANALYSIS ...... 42

INSTITUTIONAL INTERVIEWS ...... 43

PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION ...... 44

INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS ...... 45

ANALYSIS ...... 46

CONCLUSION ...... 49

CHPATER 4 – CASE & ...... 50

SUB-STATE IN SPAIN ...... 51

THE GALICIAN ...... 52

BUILDING AN ARGENTINIAN NATION ...... 54

Galician Emigration to Argentina ...... 57

TODAY’S GALICIAN DIASPORA IN BUENOS AIRES...... 61

GALICIAN DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT ...... 64

CHAPTER 5 – THE & REGIONAL DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT ...... 66

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE FOR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN GALICIA ...... 67

Emigration Strategy 2020 ...... 69

Return Strategy 2020...... 81

ASSESSING THE STATE OF THE STRATEGIES ...... 87

Cost/benefit ...... 92

Bureaucratic Organization ...... 95

Unemployment...... 98

Returnees vs. Immigrants ...... 100

CONCLUSION ...... 102

CHPATER 6 – BUENOS AIRES FOSTERING THE COLLECTIVE & PROMOTING DIVERSITY

...... 105

THE NATIONAL FRAMING OF ...... 107

DIVERSITY PROMOTION IN BUENOS AIRES ...... 110 iv

Youth Programs ...... 111

Festivals and Events ...... 113

Digital Presence ...... 115

URBAN POLICIES AND THE COLLECTIVES ...... 117

Participation ...... 119

Upkeep of Association Buildings ...... 122

Exclusive Inclusivity ...... 125

CHPATER 7 – “SOMOS COMO UNA PLAGA” – GALICIAN LIFE & LANDSCAPE IN BUENOS

AIRES ...... 130

SYMBOLIC LANDSCAPE ...... 132

LATIN AMERICAN URBANISM & BUENOS AIRES ...... 133

ENDURING GALICIAN LANDSCAPES OF BUENOS AIRES ...... 138

Corporate Symbology...... 138

Religious symbology...... 147

Public Art ...... 150

TEMPORARY & PERFORMATIVE GALICIAN LANDSCAPES ...... 154

CONCLUSION ...... 158

CHAPTER 8 – MINIFUNDISMO, & THE STRUCTURE OF THE GALICIAN COLLECTIVE .. 160

ESTABLISHMENT OF MICRO-TERRITORIAL ASSOCIATIONS IN BUENOS AIRES ...... 161

GALICIAN ASSOCIATIONS IN BUENOS AIRES TODAY...... 163

Collective vs. Community ...... 164

BAXCOLECTIVIDADES...... 169

FRAGMENTATION AND THE NEED TO UNITE ...... 172

Micro Case: Mos ...... 175

CONCLUSION ...... 178

CHAPTER 9 – MANAGING THE COLLECTIVE: THE UNION OF GALICIAN ASSOCIATIONS

& THE OF GALICIAN ASSOCIATIONS ...... 180

v

HISTORY OF THE TWO ...... 181

Federation of Galician Associations ...... 181

Union of Galician Associations ...... 185

CURRENT ACTIVITIES ...... 187

Federation Today ...... 188

The Union Today ...... 193

CONCLUSIONS ...... 195

CHAPTER 10 – IDENTITY & INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE AMONG GALICIAN DIASPORA IN

BUENOS AIRES ...... 198

NATIONAL IDENTITY ...... 199

NATIONAL IDENTITY ...... 200

#OF RESPONDENTS ...... 200

Argentinian Identity ...... 200

Combo Identity ...... 202

Galician ...... 205

MORRIÑA: LONGING FOR GALICIA ...... 207

THE QUESTION OF RETURN ...... 210

CONCLUSION ...... 214

CHAPTER 11 – OVERVIEW & ANALYSIS...... 217

ARGENTINIAN & BUENOS AIRES FRAMING ...... 221

Regional level: Buenos Aires (boxes C1-C4) ...... 221

Individual level: Galician Collective (boxes G1-G4) ...... 222

SPANISH & GALICIAN FRAMING ...... 226

Regional Level: Galicia (boxes D1-D4) ...... 226

Local Level: Galician Diasporic ‘Returnees’ (Boxes H1-H4) ...... 227

OUTCOMES (BOX K1) ...... 230

CHAPTER 12 – CONCLUSION ...... 235

vi

WORKS CITED ...... 240

APPENDIX A ...... 258

PREGUNTAS INSTITUCIONALES (GALICIA) ...... 258

PREGUNTAS INSTITUCIONALES (BA) ...... 259

APPENDIX B ...... 260

PREGUNTAS INDIVIDUALES (BUENOS AIRES) ...... 260

PREGUNTAS INDIVIDUALES (RETORNOS ) ...... 261

APPENDIX C ...... 262

vii

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

FIGURE 3.1 -EXTENDED IAD FRAMEWORK ...... 48

TABLE 5.1 - APPLICATION OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE EXTERIOR ...... 70

TABLE 5.1 (CONTINUED) - APPLICATION OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE EXTERIOR ...... 71

TABLE 5.1 (CONTINUED) - APPLICATION OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE EXTERIOR ...... 72

TABLE 5.1 (CONTINUED) - APPLICATION OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE EXTERIOR ...... 74

FIGURE 5.1 - ASSOCIATION OF FRIENDS OF THE CAMINO DE (AACS.COM) ...... 77

FIGURE 5.2 - THE INAUGURATION OF THE BRAZILIAN CAMINO (INSTAGRAM, OFFICE OF EMIGRATION @GALICIAABERITA) .... 77

FIGURE 5.3. PARTICIPANTS OF REINCONTROS NA TERRA ARRIVING IN SANTIAGO. SECRETARY OF EMIGRATION MIRANDA IN THE

BACK RIGHT...... 78

FIGURE 5.4. PARTICIPANTS OF ESCOLAS ABIERTAS. (INSTAGRAM @GALICIAABERITA) ...... 79

TABLE 5.2 - RETURN STRATEGY 2020 ...... 81

TABLE 5.2 (CONTINUED) - RETURN STRATEGY 2020 ...... 84

TABLE 5.2 (CONTINUED) - RETURN STRATEGY 2020 ...... 86

FIGURE 5.5. RETURN STRATEGY ROAD MAP – TRANSLATED IN ORDER - RETURN, DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMISM, BUSINESS

CREATION, INVESTMENT, INNOVATION, EMPLOYMENT, GLOBAL KNOW-HOW, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, COSMOPOLITAN

AND ADVANCED SOCIETY. (GALICIA ABERTA.COM 2020) ...... 88

FIGURE 6.2 - PHOTO OF GALICIAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE ARGENTINE HOTEL OF IMMIGRANTS MUSEUM. PHOTO BY AUTHOR 110

FIGURE 6.1 - BOOK IN THE ARGENTINE HOTEL OF IMMIGRANTS MUSEUM. PHOTO BY AUTHOR ...... 110

FIGURE 6.3 - YOUTH “MINI CUP” OF THE COLLECTIVES. SOURCE: GOBIERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES (2019)

...... 112

FIGURE 6.4 – IMMIGRATION TIMELINE TUNNEL. SOURCE: GOBIERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES (2019) ...... 114

FIGURE 6.5 - COLLECTIVE LEADERS AT THE UNVEILING OF THE BAXCOLECTIVIDADES DIGITAL PLATFORM. PHOTO BY AUTHOR.

...... 117

FIGURE 6.6 – CENTRO GALICIA. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 123

FIGURE 6.7 – FRENCH . PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 123

viii

FIGURE 6.8 – PELOPONNESE UNION. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 123

FIGURE 6.9 – CASA DE GALICIA. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 124

FIGURE 7.1 – BOARD ADVERTISING USING BANCO GALICIA’S DEBIT CARD. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 139

FIGURE 7.2 – BANCO GALICIA’S DOWNTOWN BUENOS AIRES BUILDING (CENTER WITH NEON RED WRITING) SEEN FROM SAN

TELMO NEIGHBORHOOD. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 140

FIGURE 7.3 – SPANISH-GALICIAN RESTAURANT IN SAN TELMO. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 141

FIGURE 7.4 – BREOGHAN BAR IN SAN TELMO. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 142

FIGURE 7.5 – LA CORUNA RESTAURANT IN SAN TELMO. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 142

FIGURE 7.6 – ‘GALLEGO’ BAR IN CHACARITA. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 143

FIGURE 7.7 – HOTEL CORUÑA. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 143

FIGURE 7.8 – RESTAURANT MIRAMAR IN SAN CHRISTOBAL. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 144

FIGURE 7.9 – SPANISH RESTAURANT PLAZA IN MONSERRAT. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 145

FIGURE 7.10 – GALICIAN FIGURINES ( & WHITE) SOLD AT FERIA DE SAN TELMO. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 146

FIGURE 7.11 – GALICIAN STONE CROSS OUTSIDE OF THE CHURCH OF ST. IGNACIO DE LOYOLA. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 148

FIGURE 7.12 – TEXT DEPICTING THE CROSS AS A STOP ON THE ‘WHITE ROUTE’ OF THE WAY OF SAINT JAMES, DONATED BY THE

XUNTA. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 148

FIGURE 7.13 – “WHITE ROUTE” OF ST. JAMES. (AICA.COM) ...... 148

FIGURE 7.14 – GALICIAN CROSS IN LEMAZA . PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 149

FIGURE 7.15 – MENTION OF GALICIA IN THE IMMIGRANT HOTEL NATIONAL IMMIGRATION MUSEUM. PHOTO BY AUTHOR. .. 149

FIGURE 7.16 – DEPICTED IN MORENO . PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 150

FIGURE 7.17 – MURAL BY GALICIAN ARTIST MANUEL COLMIERO IN GALERÍAS PACIFICOS . PHOTO BY

AUTHOR...... 151

FIGURE 7.18 – MURAL INSTALLATION BY GALICIAN ARTIST LUIS SEOANE IN GALERIAS LARRETAS. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 152

FIGURE 7.19 – CENTRO GALICIA (RIGHT) THE XUNTA CONSULATE (CENTER) AND XIMNACIO KELTIA (LEFT) IN .

PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 153

FIGURE 7.20 – PERFORMANCE OF THE ROYAL BAGPIPE GROUP AT TEATRO AVENEDA. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 154

FIGURE 7.21 – PERFORMANCE OF AT THE COMMUNITY CENTER. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 155 ix

FIGURE 7.22 – ARGENTINIAN ‘CAMINO’ WALKERS. PHOTO COURTESY OF INES MARTINEZ...... 156

FIGURE 7.24 – OSPAÑIA WORKER HANDING OUT GALICIAN FLAGS, BAGS, AND CHOCOLATES IN CELEBRATION OF DÍA DE GALICIA.

PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 157

FIGURE 7.25 – INTERGENERATIONAL MEMBERS OF THE COLLECTIVE AT DÍA DE GALICIA. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 157

FIGURE 7.23 – GALICIAN COLLECTIVE GATHERED AT THE OBELISK FOR DÍA DE GALICIA. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 158

FIGURE 8.1 – CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF THE GALICIAN COLLECTIVE STRUCTURE...... 164

FIGURE 8.2 – GALICIAN COMMUNITY VS. GALICIAN COLLECTIVE ...... 165

FIGURE 8.3 – MAP OF COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN BAXCOLECTIVIDADES PLATFORM. SOURCE: BAX.COLECTIVIDADES

(2019) ...... 170

FIGURE 8.4 – LOCATION OF MOS IN GALICIA. SOURCE: GALIPEDEA.COM ...... 175

FIGURE 8.5 – OF THE PARISH OF MOS. SOURCE:GALEPEDIA.COM ...... 175

FIGURE 8.6 – MEMBER OF ASSOCIATION PF MOS SHOWING HIS TATTOO OF THE CREST. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 175

FIGURE 9.1 – THE FEDERATION OF GALICIAN ASSOCIATIONS BUILDING IN SAN TELMO, BUENOS AIRES. PHOTO BY AUTHOR. 182

FIGURE 9.2 – STREET PLAQUE DEDICATED TO GALICIAN ‘DISAPPEARED’ DURING THE . PHOTO BY AUTHOR ...... 184

FIGURE 9.3 – MUSEUM OF GALICIAN IMMIGRATION DEDICATION PLAQUE. PHOTO BY AUTHOR ...... 184

FIGURE 9.4 – HISTORICAL REENACTMENT AT NOCHE DE LOS MUSEOS, NOVEMBER 2018, AT THE FEDERATION. PHOTO BY

AUTHOR ...... 185

FIGURE 9.5 – PERFORMANCE AND ONLOOKERS AT NOCHE DE LOS MUSEOS, NOVEMBER 2018, AT THE FEDERATION. PHOTO BY

AUTHOR ...... 185

FIGURE 9.6 – BANNER OF THE UNION OF GALICIAN ASSOCIATIONS. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 187

FIGURE 9.7 – BULLETIN BOARD OF ACTIVITIES AT THE FEDERATION IN DECEMBER OF 2018. PHOTO BY AUTHOR...... 188

FIGURE 9.8 – PANEL ON FRANCOISM IN MODERN SPAIN WITH GALICIAN EU REPRESENTATIVE ANA MIRANDA PAZ (FAR LEFT),

THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATION (CENTER LEFT), ANA PONTON, CURRENT LEADER OF THE GALICIAN NATIONALIST

BLOC (CENTER RIGHT), AND JUAN LOPEZ PAEZ FROM THE ARGENTINE PARTY (RIGHT). PHOTO BY AUTHOR.

...... 189

FIGURE 9.9 – FLYER FOR GATHERING OF GALEGAS NA DIASPORA AT THE FEDERATION. ART BY ROSA CARBIA. SHARED WITH

AUTHOR VIA WHATSAPP...... 190 x

TABLE 10.1 – NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG GALICIAN DIASPORA SAMPLE GROUP ...... 200

. 200

FIGURE 10.1 – TATTOO OF GALICIAN FLAG. PHOTO BY AUTHOR ...... 206

FIGURE 3.1 – EXTENDED IAD FRAMEWORK ...... 218

FIGURE 11.1 – UPDATED & ANNOTATED IAD FRAMEWORK ...... 219

FIGURE 11.2 – DETAIL OF ARGENTINA/BUENOS AIRES SIDE OF IAD FRAMEWORK ...... 220

FIGURE 11.3 – DETAIL OF SPAIN/GALICIA SIDE OF IAD FRAMEWORK...... 225

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is dedicated to my parents Mark and Karen, and to my brother Olin, all of whom have provided me with unwavering support and encouragement for my entire life. My family continues to foster three key values: the freedom to explore, the confidence to speak up, and a responsibility to commitments. It is only armed with these core values that I have been able to accomplish this degree.

This accomplishment would have also been impossible without the support and guidance from my wonderful advisor, Dave Kaplan. I want to thank Dave for seeing potential in me and valuing traits and skills other than those traditionally expected of academics. Thank you to my wonderful committee members, Dr. Amoaba Gooden, Dr.

Sarah Smiley, Dr. Kelly Turner, and Dr. Landon Hancock for the critical insight and thoroughness that helped me produce a polished final product. I want to thank Doug

Robinson, Beth Harberts, and, although he is no longer with us, Lou Tully, for helping to foster those non-traditional skills and teaching me how to accept criticism. Finally, I want to thank Dr. Kate Davis, who inspired me at San Jose to pursue geography as a career.

I want to thank the AAG and the Ethnic Geography SG, for the help and support.

A special thanks to the Society of Women Geographers for their tremendous vote of confidence in this project and in my abilities. I also want to thank P.E.O. and my chapter

DG sisters for their support.

To my partner, Mark, thank you for inspiring me, being there for me, and believing in my abilities. To Anna, Chris, Visal, Chun Li, Alex, Hanieh, Michael, Rafiq,

Tom, and Xin, thank you for all the feedback, comradery, and fun over the years in Kent.

xii

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

Migrants create unique networks, ties, and community identities both in the places they leave and in places of arrival. Such networks take many forms, manifesting as ethnic enclaves in host countries, emigrant voting blocs, communities reliant on remittances, or as perpetuation of chain migration. First wave migrant networks are often established between countries due to , warfare, occupation, geographical proximity, and/or similarity of culture and language (Massey et. al 1998; Skeldon 1997). Second and third wave migrants utilize the connections of these migrant networks, growing and solidifying the migrant presence abroad, and the absence at home (Portes & Bach 1985).

Migrants often seek out the easiest access to necessities such as housing and employment by tapping into the established migrant network and/or settling the same areas were others in the network reside, thus growing and strengthening international connections

(Lee 1966; Peterson 1958). Over time, migrant networks and enclaves grow from necessities to include comforts such as ethnic cuisine, music, and cultural spaces. Migrant networks thus generate place specific social capital that are used to gain access to resources in other locations (Bourdieu 1985; Massey et.al. 1998). Whereas financial capital is associated with spending power, and human capital with labor, social capital is trust and reciprocity built between individuals in a network over time. In addition to financial and human capital, social capital is crucial to migration processes and immigrant success. This dissertation how a socially embedded multi- generational diaspora group expresses national identity and how sending and receiving

(origin and émigré) contribute to these identities through political policies. 1

The state itself is an important actor in migrant networks. The state apparatus is what defines individuals as “emigrants” and “immigrants,” yet most social theories approach migration through a statist lens while not critically analyzing the role of the state (Wimmer & Glick-Schiller, 2002). A new paradigm suggests that of three salient parties in migration networks: the sending state, the receiving state, and the migrants themselves. Sending state institutions now function to unite migrants as diaspora by tapping migrant skills and embracing lost citizens through a variety of strategies and policies broadly termed diaspora engagement (Gemlen, 2014). Over half of all United

Nations member states now have diaspora engagement institutions, and it is generally agreed upon that the state remains the focus of diaspora engagement studies, yet the sub- state and individual effects of these policies are little understood. Over the course of the last three decades, scholars have come to realize that multiplicity of actors working in the diaspora engagement space correspond to various scales and professions beyond the state, constituting what Delano & Mylonas (2019) term the microfoundations of diaspora engagement. Due to the push-pull of migration, states are unevenly affected, and regional, sub-state localities experience disproportionate amounts of emigration from the origin state and immigration in the émigré state. This often creates a vested interest in diaspora engagement at the regional and local, rather than state level (Fauser &

Nijenhuis, 2016), necessitating a multi-scale approach to the study of diaspora engagement (Delano, 2011).

Individual connection to a territory is often strongest at the most local scale. Be that village, city, , or , people connect personal experiences and cultural practice to territory in a nested and scalar manner (Herb & Kaplan, 1999). While

2 emigrant groups are lumped into categories of state of origin, personal connection be much stronger based on the locality from which they hail. This is certainly the case in sub-state . Nations connect people due to a shared sense of cultural, ethnic, historical identity in a traditionally bounded territorial space (Triandafyllidou, 1998).

Today, many sub-state nations also serve in official governmental capacity as political regions. Building on an awareness of the inadequacy of state-centric diaspora and migration research, this dissertation aims to investigate diaspora engagement and its microfoundations at the sub-state scale. How do origin and émigré regions utilize diaspora institutions to their benefit, and how do these institutions affect national identity both in points of origin and in points of arrival? This central issue is explored through the relationship between the sub-state regions of Galicia, Spain and the of Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Much like the , Argentina is a country of immigrants. From 1870 to

1941, Argentina received millions of immigrants, 80% of which were from Spain or

(Rock, 1987). Just as Argentina was opening its doors, Spain was experiencing massive emigration. This emigration was incited to an extent by the political changes and economic depression occurring in the country as it lost its and underwent several regime changes. Yet poverty and political disenfranchisement alone do not explain this exodus. Uneven development and overpopulation were the primary causes of the emigration phenomenon in Spain. Of this mass migration, the bulk of movement took place between two : from the agricultural north of Spain to the River Plate in

Argentina. In northern Spain most people worked in the primary sector, usually in . In some of these regions, like and Basque Country, industrialization

3 opened new opportunities for workers, pulling migrants to new job opportunities in nearby urban settings. In other regions, like the northwestern of Galicia, the population ran out of to work. With no centers of industry in the region and no prospects of development, massive numbers emigrated from Galicia.

Overpopulation, lack of arable land, and a lack of diverse industries pushed the first wave of over one million to migrate across the Atlantic (Máiz, 2010).

Galicians migrated to many places, including , , and , but the majority chose Argentina. Once Galicians settled in Argentina, a chain migration was established that drew thousands upon thousands to the River Plate or Rio de .

Buenos Aires was the largest and , and became the place where most immigrants settled. Later, would push a second wave of Galicians to America.

This second wave consisted of Galician republicans, intellectuals, politicians, and others fleeing the Franco regime and the post-war depression. From this wave came some of the most influential Galician nationalist writings, such as the book Sempre en Galiza, by

Alfonso . Castelao (2014) in 1944. These writings from the emigrant point of view were incorporated into Galician popular culture to the extent that emotions like longing and homesickness are now commonly cited characteristics of Galician national identity

(Sanchez-Conejero, 2004; Nuñez-Seixas, 2002).

Looking at Spanish emigration overall, it seems obvious that the state may wish to engage with diaspora. However, most Spanish emigrants hail from Galicia (INE, 2017), suggesting both a stronger individual connection to the sub-state region and a greater vested interest in diaspora engagement from the Galician regional government. As a historic nation that functions as an autonomous sub-state region, Galicia can directly

4 coordinate with diaspora institutions at home and abroad. While Galicians have a strong tradition of diaspora associations, clubs, and mutual-aid centers, the official integration of these entities into the Galician regional governmental is relatively new. Since gaining autonomy in the late , the government of Galicia, (Xunta de Galicia, henceforth referred to as the Xunta), has worked to utilize these existing institutions to recover some of its lost citizenry. Laws were passed authenticating Galician emigrants’ rights to information and participation in Galician social and political life, which includes the right to vote in Galician and Spanish elections (Diaro de Galicia, n.d). Contact between the

Council of Galician communities abroad and the Xunta, initiated a long-term relationship. The two institutions formalized an agreement requiring a meeting between the two groups every three years to keep those abroad in mind when law making in

Galicia (Diario de Galicia, n.d). This has resulted in a strong regional emigration office, official diaspora engagement networks, and direct transnational cooperation between

Galicia and émigré regions.

The link between Galicia and its outside communities has only grown since the

1990s, and become political. The number of diaspora who are registered to vote in

Galician elections grew from 237,000 in 1997 to 446,260 in 2016 (, 2016).

Considering that the population of Galicia is only 2.5 million, that number of Galician voters abroad constituted 16% of the total Galician electorate. The increase in outside voters has less to do with ongoing emigration (which is still occurring to an extent), and more to do with the nationalism reform process implemented by the Zapatero administration in 2010, which extended Galician voting rights to children and grandchildren of emigrants and (Taboada, 2016). Since 2016 controversial new

5 voting laws have diminished the number of outside votes, but not the number of registered voters.

In addition to political presence, the physical act of return has been growing in popularity among Galician diaspora. Youth trips, Escolas Abiertas (open schools), and many return migration subsidies now exist to try and facilitate return visits to the Galician homeland (Galicia Abierta, n.d). The Galician government has implemented youth trips so that children and grandchildren of Galician emigrants and exiles can come and see the ancestral country, averaging 400 visitors a year since 1990 (Núnas Seixas, 2002). The regional government has also been subsidizing return migration visits, especially for old age migrants who have never been able to make the trip back.

The governmental investment in Galician institutions abroad strengthens the ties between the diaspora and the homeland. The diasporic vote in popular elections is in some cases of huge consequence to local politicians. Therefore, it is critical to maintain good standing with this influential group through utilization of the transnational and translocal networks in place. In the case of the Galician diaspora in Buenos Aires, it is the network of long-standing associations that has bolstered multi-scalar Galician coalitions abroad. The retention of the Galician diaspora into the 21st century speaks to the strength of the organizations and their continued importance in the social, political, and ideological story of Galicia.

In cases of regional transnational network building, such as between Galicia and

Buenos Aires, the costs and benefits of establishing and maintaining such networks are different than those operating at the state scale, and they are likely to have different effects at the regional scale and among Galician individuals. Through utilization of

6

Galicia as my case study, I aim to discover the regional benefits of diaspora engagement and how the increasing strength and number of diaspora engagement institutions affects national identity among Galician individuals in Buenos Aires, and among returnees in

Galicia.

In order to understand aims and benefits of diaspora engagement on the regional scale, It was necessary to critique patterns in landscape, group participation, and motivations of individual participants in my case study. Over the course of prepping and conducting this study I was faced with the complexity of this transnational relationship, evident in urban diversity promotion, cultural and national landscape, the structure of the

Galician collective, contradictions from leaders, motivations of individual participation, strategies of diaspora engagement, and motivations and experiences of diasporic return.

Over the course of four and a half months, I conducted fieldwork in Buenos Aires and Galicia, collecting interviews with individuals from the Galician community and government officials from each region, as well as conducting participatory analysis of the events and gatherings that took place while I was in each region. All interviews were translated and transcribed, then coded in NVivo along a pre-established code-book. The accumulation of interview analysis, participant observation data, as well as content analysis from policy documents and social media accounts results in a multi-scalar transnational study, the results of which offer both nuanced stories of individual diasporic and diaspora returnee experiences, as well as a broad overview of the aims and benefits of regional diaspora engagement taking place between Buenos Aires and Galicia.

This dissertation is organized in an attempt to illustrate the scalar nature of the diaspora networks in each region, culminating with an overview and analysis of the entire

7 diaspora engagement system in this particular trans-regional case, as well as its effects on

Galician individuals in both regions. Chapter 2 provides the literature review and Chapter

3 is a detailed methodology. Chapter 4 will outline the case history, giving the reader pertinent background on the migratory and political phenomenon at play in Galicia and

Buenos Aires up to the present day. Chapter 5 analyzes the Xunta de Galicia and its various forms of diaspora engagement while hearing from individual returnees. Chapter 6 looks at the efforts of the city of Buenos Aires to boost diversity acceptance and the celebration of ethnic collectives within the organizations of the office of , and the city . Chapter 7 looks at the presence of Galician symbology on the landscape in Buenos Aires and considers how the Galician collective is used to further national and regional narratives. Chapter 8 maps the network of Galician micro- associations in the city, exploring their functions and robustness, how they are and are not interconnected to one another and to the city. Chapter 9 looks at the differing political atmospheres of the two Galician umbrella organizations in Argentina: the Federation of

Galician Associations, and the Union of Galician Associations, and how they operate on the meso-scale, helping to organize the micro-associations into political corners as well as how they plug the micro-associations into social and political activities in Buenos

Aires and Galicia. Chapter 10 delves into the individual experiences of Galician migrants and descendants in Buenos Aires who participate in the network at various scales.

Chapter 11 will zoom out to link up the networks of micro, meso, and macro institutions in Buenos Aires and Galicia and their connections to one another and to their respective states, providing analysis, a conceptual diagram, and major findings of the project.

8

9

CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW: FRAMING NATIONAL IDENTITY, MIGRATION, & DIASPORA

The nation, and the linked concepts of nationalism and national identity have a myriad of definitions across the social sciences. The fact that it has such contested definitions and conceptualizations across so many disciplines and decades speaks to its importance as a major shaper of socio-economics, cultural society, local politics, global geopolitics, and individual identity. From the concept of the nation and national sovereignty comes the idea of migration, which encompasses immigration and emigration, and the movement of ‘aliens’ or ‘foreign nationals’ across . Once we grapple with migrants, we must the theories of diaspora, , trans- localism, and diasporic and trans-national/local networks in the 21st century. All of these theories stem from the foundational theories of the nation.

National Identity

Anthony Smith (1992) defines nation as a group with a shared (historical) territory, shared memories, shared myths, common culture, common economy, and legal rights and duties. Casselini (1969) defines a nation as a group that is secular, egalitarian, and has a political destiny of its own. Minogue (1967) says the nation is a political movement in defense of group interests against outsiders. Breulliy (1982) defines it as a political movement using the doctrine of self-determination as justifications for aims.

Others say it is a cultural group (Koter, 1993) or a set of symbols (Veredy, 1993). These definitions overlap with generally agreed upon specifications of cultural and ethnic groups, which are defined by their continuity of memories and shared destiny (Smith,

10

1992), their core values like language, religion, and heritage (Smolicz, 1998), and a general collective consciousness and ability to recognize sameness within and difference without the group. Yet it stands to reason that a nation is different than a cultural or , otherwise we would not need a separate name for it. Nations are distinctly important for the geographical component implicated in their definition. The difference between a nation and a cultural or ethnic group is a territory, or ‘homeland’ of their own.

Cultural/ethnic groups are endowed with the importance of a nation when they bind themselves to territory and seek autonomy within the territorial space.

The importance of the nation stems from the ideal of the ‘nation-state’ which holds that each person within a given state will be of the same cultural and/or ethnic identity. This homogeneity theoretically ensures peace and well-being within the borders of the nation-state as everyone has a similar world-view and can be reached through similar ideological means. Yet this ideal is rarely the case in the real world, where many groups occupy distinct territories, and borders often divide or subsume distinct groups.

The doctrine of self-determination ensures the right of each distinct group to their own state, so that the ideal of a world of nation-states might be fulfilled. The doctrine, which is UN recognized, states the following: 1. That each group has the right to self- determination 2. Each people has the right to exclude members of other groups in respect to their territory 3. Each territorial state is sovereign 4. People lacking a state have the right to struggle for autonomy 5. Others have the obligation to honor such struggles 6.

New nation-state regimes must be recognized by others. This doctrine assumes a world of stable and pre-determined nations just waiting to secure their own states (Tilly, 1993).

The validity of this doctrine depends on where nations come from, how they are formed,

11 and whether they are stable entities. There are two major bodies of nationalism theory, the first of which, primordialism, posits that nations are in fact stable and fixed.

Primordialism is the older of the two major nationalism theories. This body of thought posits that nations emerged out of solidified historic identities, groups which shared a territory and a culture. The emergence of the nation is the last step in a natural progression from the tribe to the village to the and so on. In this theory, the world is naturally and fatally divided into nations, it is just a matter of when these nations will emerge. These scholars assume that nations evolve in harmony with the local environment, and therefore have a command of it that naturally precludes their autonomy within that space.

The more recent and robust academic theory of nations is that they emerge due to distinct modern processes and are constructed by economics, power, discourse, performance, and the Westphalian state system itself. This body of theory is known as . Scholars such as Gellner (1983), Nairn (1981), Detsch (1966), and

Anderson (2006), have written about nations as products of the structural changes brought about by industrialization. Industry transformed formerly isolated communities into class-stratified societies in competition with one another. This created the need for solidarity among a larger group than the immediate community. Institutions such as state education, uneven economic diffusion, and print served to bring populations into “nations.”

The role of elite power has also been proponed as a major reason for the emergence of nations, especially in those nations that pre-date the industrial revolution.

Scholars such as Hroch (1985), Bruilly (1993), and Hobsbawm and Kertzer (1992)

12 looked at the role of elite networks in late-agrarian societies as these became powerful nation-states. Others such as Chatterjee (1986), Jayawardena (1986), McClintock (1993),

Sapiro (1993), and Radcliffe and Westwood (1996) connected the role of the nation to imperialism, , and gender roles in discourses of domination which value the status quo. Feminist scholars of this vein highlighted that the role of men holds real power in the nation, whereas the role of women is one of symbolic and literal reproduction. Some posit that the role of elites and power offers a bridge between primordial and constructivism, since national myths emerged out of primordial ethnic penned at the hands of elites (Smith, 1986; Gat, 2012).

Other scholars paid special attention to social and political boundaries and the exclusionary nature of the system itself as a key factor in the creation of nations. Nations themselves are bounded groups of exclusion and opposition, wherein social boundaries such as language, religion, and skin color are just as, if not more important than political boundaries. Conversi (1997), and Triandafyllidou (1998) advanced the idea that nations are only as strong as the nature of their content in relation to others. This introduces the notion of hybridity, that all groups, national included, have the ability to morph and change and co-exist and multiply. Therefore, these boundaries are always in flux

(Yazdiha 2010).

The nation is recognized and defined by distinct symbols and practices, literally embodied by members in their daily lives. Judith Butler (1993) advanced the idea of embodiment as a way of expressing group identity, and soon scholars of nationalism came to understand performance as a key in understanding the nation and nationalism.

Scholars like Tsang and Woods (2013), and Billig (1995) understood that the banal

13 practices of everyday life add up to construct the everyday reality of the nation, quietly reinforcing itself upon the landscape and upon bodies. The idea of banal nationalism was presented in contrast to more visible, or ‘hot’ forms nationalism, like war, parades, riots, etc. Jones and Merriman (2009) and Passi (2016) contest that these are false binaries, and that hot may become banal, and banal may become hot given the spatial/temporal context.

While scholars of many disciplines have worked on concepts of nationalism, geographers are particularly well poised to think through the issues at play in nationalism and national identity formation. The difference between a cultural or ethnic group and a nation is an attachment to territory. The very concept of nationalism requires spatial thinking and a realization that place matters greatly in the development of social phenomenon. The development of our global political map was and still is influenced by nationalism. The study of geopolitics, , , and supra-state entities all hinge on the understanding of nationalism as a phenomenon of spatial identities in search of power (Kaplan 1994). Borders change, territories melt away and are created anew, yet the inextricable spatial concept of the nation remains key to socio-political ideology.

Territoriality is the key to defining nations and their relations to one another

(Ruggie, 1993). While territorial boundaries as they exist on the map seem solid and stable, they are ill-defined and fluid. To maintain a topological conception of the world would be to fall into a “territorial trap” (Agnew, 2015). Because territoriality is a constant discursive and iterative process, territorialities and conceptions of territories are always changing. While the struggle of nationalism is the struggle for autonomous group

14 territory, territory is a theoretical concept that has and continues to shift across time and space.

Migration processes

Migration is a part of a larger process of development, social transformation and globalization rather than an independent phenomenon to be analyzed on its own. The processes that effect migration are often categorized by impetus, such as forced or voluntary or , family, or political and economic migration. Yet motives for migration are often complex and overlap categorizations. It is helpful to approach these manifold motives by parsing apart the macro, meso, and micro level structures that influence migrations. At the macro level, state relationships, institutions and organizations, economies, political climates, and world markets interact on a large scale to influence migratory movements. Meso level structures, such as migrant networks aided by technology, immigrant communities, and migration industries, influence the continuation of migrations. On the micro level, practices, interpersonal ties, and beliefs of the migrants themselves are embraced and enacted on a personal and family unit scale.

It is generally held that migrations occur out of states with poor economies, war, or adverse political climates and into wealthy and stable states. While logical, this is a narrow understanding of migratory processes. Wealthy states experience relatively stable rates of high of immigration, emigration, and internal migration (Castels et al., 2005), and as states develop, the volume and complexities of migration increase. In developed states people’s capabilities to migrate increase as education, social capital, and financial resources increase. Ravenstien (1885; 1889) saw migration as an intrinsic part of development, asserting that economics were the primary reason for migration. Later

15 geographers came up with ‘gravity’ models and utilized ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ factors in determining migrant paths (Lee, 1966). These came to be known as push-pull models

(Passaris, 1989). These push-pull models identify economic, environmental, and demographic factors that incentivize people to be pushed out of one area and be pulled to another. While push-pull models incorporate many factors associated with migration

(Bauer and Zimmerman, 1998), they have been criticized for their arbitrariness and difficulties in explaining return migration and simultaneous immigration and emigration, and their deterministic assumptions (Skeldon, 1990).

Macro-Level Migration Processes

A structural view of migration tends to view it as a primarily macro-scale phenomenon. From this angle, people are not assumed to be rational actors, and they are not assumed to have enough information about labor markets and wage levels in other countries in order to make such rational investment choices. Rather, migration is seen as part of a larger system in which constraints, connections, and information are uneven and unequal among groups of people, which determine migration patterns outside of individual control. Therefore, individuals do not have a free choice of whether or not to migrate due to structural forces that constrain them.

Historical ties, family and community dynamics, as well as generational wealth are crucial determination factors of migration (Portes & Böröcz, 1989) and help to explain why neo-classical models often fail. Migration patterns have been studied as legacies of colonialism and as the result of war and its effects (Cohen, 1987).

Development has gone hand in hand with an undermining of traditional economies and social systems. From the structural viewpoint, this transition is a primary reason for the

16 migrations that have occurred over the past two hundred years. Rural populations were the first to experience these structural forces as agriculture was mechanized and landownership concentration forced a rural to urban migration where new labor markets could be filled. Migration is therefore a way of mobilizing cheap labor for capitol by re- enforcing inequalities between groups and states (Castels & Kosack, 1973; Cohen, 1987)

As states begin to develop, labor gets reshuffled and people get uprooted, resulting in migration to new labor markets. Development, however, is a ladder or relative process in which post-colonial states are always playing catch up with super- developed ones. Within the structuralist view, dependency theory holds that wealthy states depend on the relative underdevelopment of other countries as a source of labor, which includes migration from these places. In the post-colonial period, this exploitation continues through agreements which capitalize upon cheap urban labor in less developed countries (Baek, 1993; Frank, 1969). Andre Gunder Frank (1966; 1967) argued that migration is a cause of underdevelopment in and of itself, because global capitalism extracts workers and fills them into new and ever-expanding labor pools.

World systems theory similarly groups developed and undeveloped regions into a core-periphery model (Amin, 1974; Wallerstien, 1974; 1984). The extension of multinational corporations from the core into undeveloped regions on the periphery accelerated the change of economic systems and concomitant migration from these areas.

Both dependency and world systems theories modeled internal rural to urban migration, but later became more concerned with international migration as the role of migrant workers became more central in a speeding globalized economy (Held et al., 1999). As states become highly developed, they demand not just highly skilled labor, but a

17 segmented labor market of both high and low skilled workers (Piore, 1979). International migration helps to satisfy this built in demand of globalization, pulling both highly skilled and unskilled workers to new labor segments in highly developed countries. While both these labor segments are drawn to migrate, they often settle in very different spaces in host cities (Sassen, 2001). High skilled workers are welcomed contingent upon majority racial membership, male gender, and legal immigrant status. Conversely, low skilled workers are at a disadvantage, not only due to lack of education, but are also subject to discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and inconsistent legal status. This pattern of segmented migration is indicative of the widening gap between wealthy high skilled workers and poor low skilled workers.

Globalization is indicated by an increase in transnational flows, be that of goods, information, finance, or people. While globalization has led to a worldwide social transformation, it has left uneven effects (Castells, 1996). Increasingly liberal political processes, which allow and encourage international movements has widened the international division of labor (Petras & Veltmayer, 2000). While globalization has introduced new transport and communication technologies to the world that have greatly facilitated in migration, globalization has also penetrated new economic spaces and unsettled groups upon inclusion into the world system. Even as globalization widens the scope of international markets and envelops more and more communities, the number of international migrants has not changed since the end of World War II (Zlotnik, 1999), while non-migrant mobility in the form of commuting, telecommuting, business trips, and has skyrocketed (Castels et al., 2005). One the one hand, new technologies unsettle some ways of life that can force migration, while on the other hand new

18 technologies can also replace migration as outsourcing and telecommuting become more prevalent (De Haas, 2009; Skeldon, 2012; Zelinsky, 1971).

Focusing on the causes of migration at the macro-scale tends to place a heavy emphasis on the disruptive effects of globalization and a romanticized view of pre- industrial life (Skeldon, 1997). Many structuralist migration theories assume that pre- industrial societies were stable and immobile. The view that these societies were uprooted and wrecked by globalization ignore substantial evidence that these communities were already mobile, as well as ridden with disease, unemployment, conflict, famine, and inequality in which minorities were denied even basic human rights

(De Haan, 1999; Moch, 1992; Velcoli, 1964). When analyzed from a micro-scale, migration is described as an active choice and a huge opportunity for individuals and families. These people have permeated borders and crossed cultures in their quest for better life opportunities and, in the process, they have reorganized whole societies, birthed new cultures and communities, and created new international connections.

Micro-Level Migration Processes

Theories focusing on the micro level processes of migration take human agency into account, focusing on the migrants’ roles themselves and the communities that they shape both in home and host countries. One way of approaching the causes of migration is simply the geographic differences of supply and demand. A neoclassical framework can be utilized to study the movement of people through a lens of economic rationality.

People are assumed to be rational actors; therefore, they will go where work is plentiful, labor is scarce, and wages are good (Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). In this macro-level international immigration market, choices are made by individuals and families using

19 cost-benefit analysis to determine point of departure and settlement (Borjas, 1989; 1990).

The importance of labor markets, skills, and income distributions in sending and receiving countries must be taken into account to help explain why select portions of society choose to migrate. The portion of a population that migrates sees the movement as an investment that is unavailable where they currently reside. This investment of migration is a gamble to increase social capital such as knowledge and skills (Sjaastad,

1962) that will hopefully result in life benefits that are greater than the costs incurred through migration (Chriswick, 1999). Differences in returns on the investment of migration might help explain why younger and more highly skilled populations tend to migrate more readily (Bauer & Zimmerman, 1998).

An increasing body of work emphasizes he variety of ways in which migrants build new homes and communities while maintaining ties with home and other migrants abroad. The mechanisms that migrants build to survive movements often reflect the need to combat racism, legal restrictions, social exclusion, poverty, and insecurity. By looking at how migrants perceive their surroundings and how they conceive of their own identities, motivations become clearer and actions are better understood. The new economics of labor migration (Massey et al., 1993; Stark & Bloom, 1985) began to grapple with the details of migrants’ identities and how those affect migration patterns and outcomes. By analyzing factors other than monetary maximization as an influence of migration decisions, scholars began to see these movements as primarily familial decisions. What becomes clear is that the risk of migration is shared between family members rather than burdened by just one individual. A risk-spreading strategy in which multiple family members migrate in order to spread income over many markets and

20 geographies may not increase overall income, but adds income insurance for the household through multiple source remittances (Stark & Levhari, 1982). These collective decisions can also maximize resources for investment in activities to improve family (Stark, 1980; Stark & Bloom, 1985; Stark & Levhari, 1982; Taylor, 1999; Taylor

& Wyatt, 1966). Importantly, family and household decisions to migrate are not motivated by attainment of absolute wealth, but relative success within sending communities. These theories are closely related to livelihood approaches, which observe that the poor cannot be viewed as merely passive victims of neo-.

Migrant Networks

Theories of migrant communities view migrant agency as central to the creation of social and economic networks. These networks create pathways that can perpetuate migration processes. By utilizing individual community agency in the creation of strong networks, migrants can challenge the assumed logic of markets and structural forces.

Connections between home and host countries are known broadly as migrant networks. These migrant networks take many forms, manifesting as ethnic enclaves in host countries, communities reliant on remittances, and perpetuation of chain migration.

First wave migrant networks can be spurred between countries through colonialism, warfare, occupation, geographical proximity, and/or similarity of culture and language

(Massey et al., 1998; Skeldon, 1997). Latter waves of migrants utilize the networks put in place by pioneering groups to gain citizenship (Portes & Bach, 1985), housing, and employment by settling in areas were others previous waves of migrants reside, thus growing and strengthening the international network (Lee, 1966; Peterson, 1958).

Migrant networks often generate place-specific social capital that can be used to gain

21 access to resources in other locations (Bourdieu, 1985; Massey et al., 1998). In addition to financial and human capital, social capital is crucial to migration processes and immigrant success.

Transnationalism

In the early 1990s, groups of researchers began to discern a new pattern in migration studies, wherein subjects displayed multi-stranded social and political relations cutting across borders of culture, polity, and nation, greatly aided by globalization and advances in technology. This focus on migrant connections between home and host country was a shift away from most migrant research at the time, which tended to privilege how migrants adapted to their new settings. What emerged from these observations and subsequent shift is the concept of transnationalism. Transnational migration entails international resettlement with maintained connections to the place of origin. Transnationalism focuses on the way in which globalization allows immigrants to maintain, build, and reinforce multiple linkages with their countries of origin (Glick-

Schiller, Basch & Blanc, 1995). People who migrate while maintaining social, religious, economic, and/or political connections to home are termed transmigrants (Glick-Schiller

& Fouron, 1999). Transnationalism emphasizes the multiplicity of connections within a broad and boundary-leaping social field in which the transmigrant utilizes resources from both home and host states (Glick-Schiller et al., 1992), affecting both “those who leave” and “those who stay” (Gardner & Grillo, 2002; Trotz, 2006). Transnationalism is a very broad idea, which refers to any ties or interactions linking people or institutions between nation-states (Vertovec, 2009). These movements are anchored in spaces that transcend borders and boundaries aided by technology, remittances, and liberalized policies.

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Glick-Shiller (1995) and Guillén (2001) suggest that the explosion of interest in transnationalism coincided with a rising interest in globalization. Transnational movements are greatly facilitated by improvements in transportation, telecommunications, virtual banking, and technology in general that has improved global connectedness on a scale never seen before the 1990s. Along with technology, changing aspects of global labor have encouraged the migratory movements of some populations while outsourcing has tapped into others. The expansion of non-governmental organizations, supra-state structures, free trade agreements, and social media networks have drastically changed the way that migrants are conceptualized (Robertson, 1992;

Castells, 2011; Held et al., 1999; Cohen & Kennedy, 2000). Therefore, transnationalism can be seen as a manifestation of globalization.

In what Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) describe as “methodological nationalism,” scholars have tended to privilege the view that nation-states are concrete objects, and that people, including migrants, are “naturally” contained within the state.

Transnationalism breaks that methodology, suggesting a de-territorialized state and a reconceptualization of the nation, as migrants escape nation-state hegemony by moving outside official borders into new spaces of their own creation (Chavez, 2012; Kearney,

1991; Rouse, 1991; 1992). Transnationals are sometimes seen as a major driver of national breakdown and porosity due to their constant movements of ideas, money, and humans from state to state. Their ethnic difference in host states was also seen as a harbinger of the end of the nation-state since more movement signaled more diversity within states. Globalization and transnationalism have brought a re-scaling of economic and political life to include transnational entities outside of the nation-state

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(Brenner, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2004). This has lead researchers to focus on local urban contexts of migration (Ellis, 2006; Schiller et al., 2010; Smith, 2000), and downplaying the “national” significance in transnational (Antonsich & Matejskova, 2015). At the end of the 20th century, the nation state was thought to be in crisis, due to globalization forces which seemed to be breaking down borders and building cosmopolitan identities. The very idea of trans-national breaks down popularly held notions of states, nations, and peoplehood.

On the other hand, Basch et al. (1994) have argued that state hegemony is extended to many transnational communities though inclusion in a broadened socio- political consensus. For example, in the U.S are considered to be the “tenth province” of , just as Grenadians in , and Italian and Spanish descendants in Argentina are considered to be valuable constituencies in their countries of origin.

Keeping ties to the homeland while creating new communities in host states maintains the idea of a loyal citizenry of a nation-state, albeit expanded transnationally. Once largely viewed as defectors, emigrants are now celebrated in the home state as national heroes (-Saldaña, 2003), and often granted special outside citizenship that carries over in some cases for generations, granting political participation from afar

(Bauböck, 2009, Collyer, 2013). Transnationals, by keeping a vested interest in homeland politics and social welfare, essentially lobby for the solidity of the home nation-state.

Efforts to affect the goings-on of politics at home can manifest in informal ways such as remittances, sponsorship, or circulation of ideas and news, or they can lead to very formal institution building, including political lobbies and fundraising. These transnational efforts can have drastic effects on state-building thousands of miles away from where

24 migrants are settled. This new ideology fosters transnationalism by encouraging maintenance of ties between host and home states. In some ways, this conceptualization of transnationalism contrasts with the notion of diaspora, whereby people see themselves as a group floating outside of the nation-state homeland. Transnationalism re- conceptualizes these groups as still being a part of the nation-state wherever they may be

(Basch et al., 1994).

State sponsored immigration now encourages movement for the purpose of cheap labor and economic growth within states, yet limits citizenship of migrants (Willis &

Yeoh, 2000). These migration policies are explicitly designed to benefit the host state, as well as maintain the idea of national homogeneity. While host states with high labor demands are building policies to benefit from migrants while keeping them at bay, home states are also crafting policies to protect their nationals and maintain a national identity even among a far-flung populace. Transnational policies are built on the concepts of identity, roots, and lineage (Glick-Schiller & Fouron 1999) and most states now have diaspora engagement institutions (Gamlen, 2014). The home state policies of expanded citizenship are put in place as restitution for displaced populations, to achieve democratic continuity, or to achieve ethno-national solidarity (Waterbury, 2010). Through these policies and practices, transnationals build social, political, and economic currency at multiple scales that can be used both locally and globally. The local and the global, the national and the cosmopolitan are bifocal and constitutive.

Notions of a cultural boundary have been changed by the development of transnationalism in the era of globalization. The concept of culture grew out of romantic ideals that conceptualized characteristics of people rooted in and generated by specific

25 places (Malkki, 1992). Yet since mass migration has become possible, and in some cases necessary, hundreds of millions of peoples have relocated to new places and spaces outside of their original cultural heaths (King, 1991). Cultures have followed these movements, greatly aided by technology and the forces of globalization. Cultural identities have assimilated, acculturated, trans-cultrated, and become hybridized through these migration movements (Ribeiro, 1978). Cultural identity is of course closely tied to national identity. The two are bound up and often performed together by transnational groups. The performativity of nationalism affirms and questions the stability of not only cultural identity but also national identity, and re-affirms the ties to an imagined community of citizens (Anderson, 2006).

Translocalism

Within the large body of work on transnationalism there has been an increased focus on the concept of translocalism in geographical work (Cartier, 2001; Freitag & von

Oppen, 2010; Castree, 2004; Katz, 2001; McFarlane, 2009; Oaks & Schein, 2006; Smart

& Lin, 2007). While transnationalism tends to focus on migrant networks, fields, and economic exchanges within spatially unbounded communities (Appadurai, 2003;

Castells, 2000; Hannerz, 1996), translocality approaches migration from an agency- oriented perspective to emphasize the continued importance of local places in migrants’ lives (Oakes & Schein, 2006). Looking at local-to-local migrations puts concern for localized phenomena at the forefront (Ley, 2004). Migrants are not exclusively uprooted, mobile, or without belonging, nor are they moving between exclusively national scales.

Rather, they move from locale to locale, sustaining connections between places along the way. Translocalism emphasizes these local-to-local movements within migrants’ lives,

26 and analyzes the ways in which those local ties are maintained (Conradon & McKay,

2007; Gielis, 2009; Smith, 2001; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Mandaville, 1999;

Velayutham & Wise, 2005).

While concentrating on local-to-local embeddedness of migrants, it is important to note that locales still operate within state, regional, and national boundaries; therefore, migration studies tend to maintain emphases on such boundaries. However, translocality has been applied to non-state spaces as well ( & Datta, 2011; Wimmer and Glick-

Schiller, 2002), dispelling the assumption that all translocal movement simultaneously takes place within a transnational framework. Translocal scholarship points to the neglect of internal migration, which is where most migratory movement happens (Trager, 2005).

Yet, international migration still receives the bulk of attention. International migration is more visible than internal migration as it often places different groups of people into stark contrast with one another. When moving internationally, places become heightened due to the differences accentuated between cultures and countries. The establishment of local institutions is one of the clearest manifestations of translocalism. Establishing secure place-based connections can help to ease some of the discomfort associated with migration.

The shift to more localized expressions of transnationalism has led to studies of transnational urbanism (Smith, 2000), cultural sites (Olwig, 1997), and transnational villagers (Levitt, 2001), which focus on cities, neighborhoods, and homes as localized or

‘rooted’ articulations of transnationalism. Studies such as these accentuate the transnational situations of mobile actors, showing the continued importance of local context in a globalized world. The everyday activities and cultural practices of migrants

27 are played out in both the sending and receiving places on a local scale. Migrant activities can refer to the movement of people, such as with the establishment of a local-to-local chain migration, or it can refer to communication of ideas and knowledge, political influence, or remittances between locales (Lange and Büttner, 2010; Ma, 2002; Reetz,

2010; Long, 2008). These focuses inspire further research that uses translocal movements to investigate identities, narratives, histories, images, and representations (Freitag and von Oppen, 2010; Hall and Datta, 2010; Lambek, 2011; Verne, 2012).

Translocal approaches to migration help in understanding the socio-spatial organization of places within a local-to-local migration network. Migrants influence places when they arrive in new locations, often recreating spatial and social configurations that they are familiar with. Migrants utilize translocal connections and networks in the production of these local spaces and places. These processes not only affect receiving locales, but often sending locales as well. As an actor-oriented approach, translocalism aids in understanding migrant choices and outcomes at a micro scale, considering the nuance of place specific networks, groups, and institutions.

Diaspora

While diaspora has come to be used in reference of almost any migrant community, many scholars that it has a more specific meaning. While older than transnationalism, the concept of diaspora is narrower, and is best placed within the wide umbrella of transnational migrant networks. The particular features of a diaspora community are: 1) Dispersal from an original homeland by force or in search of work into two or more regions 2) a collective memory and myth about the homeland 3) a strong ethnic consciousness 4) exclusion from the host society fostering strong solidarity

28 that helps maintain and strengthen links with co-ethnic members abroad 5) belief that they should be committed to the maintenance or of the homeland and 6) a collective desire for return to the homeland (Cohen, 1997; Safran, 1991). While the definition of diaspora continues to change, a key factor of diaspora communities is the sense of loyalty that group members maintain with their homeland and ethnic kin above that of a host nation-state. These displaced diaspora groups were often met with hostility in their new locales, making it near impossible to assimilate. This generally results in geographical and social distance from mainstream society, reinforcing the shared sense of identity as a people apart. Diaspora populations maintain their traditions by grouping together for survival and comfort. Togetherness is fostered through institution building at the local, regional, and, in some cases, the state level in both host and home countries

(Gamlen, 2014). Institutions, in addition to immigrant and ethnic entrepreneurs, operate within existing opportunity structures, at times necessitating a mixture of embedding practices for immigrant groups (Kloosterman & Rath, 2001; Price & Chacko, 2009).

Institutions reproduce cultural cohesion among expatriated populations, maintain collective identity, and demarcate the immigrant group as staunchly diasporic in nature.

The original diaspora were , carrying myths and memories of the holy land

(homeland) with them throughout as they dispersed over time (Safan, 2005). The concept has been widened to include a host of other populations, most notably the Armenian,

Palestinian, Greek, Ethiopian, , Kurdish, Parsi, and Sikh, all of which are groups that have experienced massive expatriation and resettlement. Diasporas are seen as profoundly shaping places and maintaining links and juxtapositions between homeland and host nations, or ‘roots and routes’ (Clifford, 1997), a process that creates both tension

29 and opportunity. These processes affect identity and belonging (Dwyer, 1999; Yeoh &

Huang, 2000; Blunt, 2005; Yeh, 2007; Mavroudi, 2007) in both host and home countries.

Diasporic National Identity

Diaspora maintain strong links to their home nation which results in a preserved sense of national identity. Nations can be conceived of as an imagined community

(Anderson, 2006), an ethnic grouping (Smith, 1986), a recognition of group symbols and signs (Billig, 1995), or as a thoroughly modern result of nationalism itself (Connor, 1978;

1990; Gellner, 1983). Nations are fabricated and brought into being by the representations and collective ideas of a group being heterogeneous and inextricably linked to a territory. The making of nations does not preclude those outside the boundaries of a given territory from adding to the mixture. John Agnew (1994) pointed out the tendency for geographers to fall into a territorial trap by thinking of political territories as ultimate delineations of global phenomena. The territorial trap is aptly applied to diaspora consciousness, as diaspora are both citizens of a host country, and ambassadors of a home country. Identity is not black and white, and one can have multiple and fluid national identities within a nested hierarchy that crosses territorial boundaries (Herb & Kaplan, 1999). This results in hybrid identities (Bhabha, 1994).

Hybridity can mean a blending or segmenting of old and new cultures depending on the migrant group and context (Papastergiadis, 2013, Zelinsky & Lee, 1998).

Connection with the old and contact with the new inevitably forges new cultural practices of survival and, over time, identities. The hybrid identities that migrants supply shape place by changing cultural customs, tastes, and landscapes, allowing cultural hybridity to be experienced beyond the first generation (Kaplan, 2015). In this intercultural arena,

30 new generations of diasporic migrants can maintain connections to the homeland, but may segment assimilation depending on context, therefore changing conceptions of diasporic national identity over time (Portes & Zhou, 1993).

While nationalism has been characterized as an excessive description of diaspora consciousness (Clifford 1994), due to their multiple and wavering connections, many diaspora groups experience national identity or nationalism as a product of circumstantial emigration (Shakya, 1999; Yeh & Lama, 2006). General Consensus is that diasporas are not only connected, but deeply involved in national projects in the homeland (Werbner,

2000). , Liberia, Eritrea, Tibet, , Cuba, Palestine, and offer a few examples of national consciousness fostered through significant assistance from diaspora.

Diaspora are defined by a homeland national identity that differs in its spatial organization. Stuart Hall (1990) describes diasporic identity as a constant “doubleness of similarity and difference” in which diaspora simultaneously recognize and do not recognize national cues in both home and host country. An ever-increasing global connectivity creates channels through which national identity can be fostered, and international relations affected (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007).

Institutions

When common goals achieve sufficient complexity as to necessitate a structured organization of cooperation, an institution is created. Many interested parties may contribute to these institutions, and institutions may multiply or divide as perspectives on sharing of common resources change over time. Institutions are embedded in government structures in ways that reflect their role in providing incentives for cooperation (North,

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1990; Ostrom, 1990; Scharpf, 1997). Institutional structures in place operate at many scales, from the state, to the region, to the local community. Among these, some institutions are formal, such as government agencies, and some are informal, such as community norms regulating social interaction. Institutional actors with similar beliefs will combine to form advocacy coalition frameworks (Sabatier & Jenkins, 1993), resulting in the bonding and bridging of social capital (Larsen et al., 2004). Complex interactions among formal and informal institutions create networks of interaction that reflect the opportunities for groups and individuals to engage in social interaction, both bonding and bridging relationships (Putnam, 2000). Such networks have historically displayed geographic constraint, wherein actors within a particular region were more likely to participate in the same institutions governing a local resource, increasing incentives for social linkages at a local scale (Bodin & Tengö, 2012). While geographic constraint generally holds true for local resources, transnational resources necessitate a broader institutional network spanning multiple states, regions, and localities.

Diaspora Institutions

Diaspora populations are held together with strong multi-scalar organizations. As migrants leave the borders of the nation, they are forced to re-think what those boundaries mean (Ashcroft, 2009). Does leaving mean escaping nation-ness or national identity, or does it trigger a double down of national identity as migrants move into a new arena of heightened difference? Diasporas have chosen the double down route and are very slow to assimilate, if at all. Diasporas extend national borders beyond the homeland and re-shape the spatiality of states beyond strict bounded territories while, at the same time, staying within the imagined borders of the state system.

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While diaspora populations have always coalesced around informal organizations, in recent years states have institutionalized diaspora networks governed by broad diaspora engagement institutions, tapping into the existing infrastructure of migrant networks, adding complexity and an element of state politics and economics. Diaspora engagement is a construct which encompasses state-led strategies and policies aimed at strengthening ties with diaspora. The number of states with offices specifically geared towards diaspora engagement has greatly expanded in the last decade (Aguinas, 2009;

Gamlen, Cummings & Vaaler, 2017), signaling an international shift in migration policy that parallels trends of supra-state governance. Over half of all UN member states have diaspora engagement institutions (Gamlen, 2014). The growing co-ordination of diaspora institutions across scales has targeted migrants and their children in a variety of ways.

Labor ministries, banks, foreign services, social security ministries, internal affairs departments, and tourism and trade promoters have all widened their scope to include support for diaspora communities (Gamlen, 2006; Resende-Santos, 2015).

Institutionalized organizations where informal networks once existed can be understood as a method of combating brain drain and encouraging return investment between migrants and home countries (, 2009; Larner, 2007; Mohan, 2008; Ho,

2011; Gamlen, 2013). Global remittance networks have grown with the expanding technological infrastructure available to migrants. Remittances and return migration can contribute in many ways to the development of homelands (Saxenien, 2005; Davies,

2012; Brinkerhoff, 2012). Home countries can be profoundly shaped through remittance and information networks supplied by diasporas with an eye on eventual return to a thriving and peaceful place.

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Diaspora institutions influence international politics, economics, and social structures. They influence migrants’ sense of selves and national identity, and create overlap between citizen and sovereign realms. The expansion of diaspora institutions arguably changes the definition of the term diaspora altogether; now a dispersed belonging defined by, rather than despite, the nation-state (Cohen, 1996; Dumbrava,

2014; Waterbury, 2014). In this new conception, all migrant groups coming from a state with coordinated diaspora institutions would be included in a diaspora. Case studies have proliferated along with diaspora institutions, looking at emigrant policy dynamics of New

Zealand (Gamlen, 2015), (Brinkerhoff, 2017), (Pogonyi, 2017),

(Okyay, 2016), and Armenia (Cavoukian, 2016).

The recent explosion of diaspora engagement institutions can be classified into two motivating mechanisms; tapping and embracing (Gamlen, 2008; 2014). Tapping constitutes efforts by the origin state to reap the monetary or intellectual capital of emigrants by combating “brain drain” and encouraging return investment or remittances

(Gamlen, 2013; Hugo, 2009; Larner, 2007; Mohan, 2008; Ho, 2011). Remittances and return investment can contribute in many ways to the development of homelands

(Saxenien, 2005; Davies, 2012; Brinkerhoff, 2012). Diaspora also aid origin states by forming ethnic lobbies, consular groups, combatting brain drain, strengthening diplomatic ties and peace building networks in host countries (Séguin et al., 2006; Chocerine et al.,

2009; Singh, 2012).

Origin states also embrace “lost members” by focusing on state identity through external citizenship (Bauböck, 2009; 2015). Extending citizenship rights across borders and generations acts to preserve linguistic and cultural heritage, and shore up extra

34 territorial nationalism (Csergõ & Goldgeier, 2004; Waterbury, 2014). By embracing members of an ethnic diaspora, tools and resources may be disseminated to further histories, messages, and aims of the origin state abroad. Embracing diaspora may also help origin states gain membership in a supra-state organization, as coordinated efforts of migration are being pursued more vigorously by entities such as the and the World Bank.

The studies, topologies, and frameworks that surround the phenomenon of diaspora institution building tend to focus only on the state scale (Gamlen, 2008;

Ragazzi, 2014; Délano & Gamlen, 2014; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2016; Pedroza & Palop-

García, 2017). Yet these diasporic tapping and embracing strategies are often coordinated and operated by regions and cities. Migration pushes people from one region and pulls them into a specific region abroad. This creates a regional population makeup among diaspora groups, as well as regional interest in diaspora engagement among origin states.

Regional diaspora engagement fits into a new strand of literature which examines the “microfoundations” of diaspora politics (Delano & Myonas, 2019). This body of research examines diaspora engagement efforts at scales within or beyond the state

(Adamson and Demetriou, 2007). Topics such as inconsistent regional voting rights

(Arrighi & LaFleur, 2019), the success of non-state actors like the church in diaspora engagement (Brinkerhoff, 2019), the role of diasporic elites in homeland politics

(Paarlberg, 2019), instances of non-existent or contradictory diaspora policies

(Klekowski von Koppenfels, 2019), sub-population specific engagement (Mylonas

& Žilović, 2019), competing homeland allegiances (Han, 2019), and the role of diasporic individuals themselves (Abramson, 2019; Zeveleva, 2019; Mahieu, 2019), all illustrate

35 the various ways in which the broad phenomenon of diaspora engagement can be construed and altered. This new category of diaspora study shows the many gaps in this area of research, and that the field needs much more rounding out before typologies can be established, or certainly, before we can declare the state to be the main actor and the ultimate subject of study in the field of diaspora engagement. As a Geographer, I find that approaching these microfoundations through a scalar organizational structure to be most helpful.

Each scale is presumed to have differing goals surrounding the use of diaspora as a resource. Actors participating in each institution are assumed to be participating of their own benefit (Long, 2004), and learning from observation within their network at all times

(Lubell, Robins, & Wang, 2014). Diaspora themselves are important actors in this story, seeing that they are willingly participating in these institutions for some gain of their own. Therefore, diaspora are also self-serving actors in this network which revolves around them as a resource.

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CHPATER 3 - METHODOLOGY

My research operates on two levels: institutional and individual. Therefore, I have used content analysis, participant observation, and both institutional representative and individual interviews to analyze the different components within my own extended institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework. The benefit of qualitative research is achieving an adequate depth of understanding of a phenomenon, including the context in which the phenomenon occurs and the mechanisms that converge to create said phenomenon (Hay, 2010). Qualitative research is especially valuable in social science, where subjectivity is inherent in the creation and perception of social phenomenon. In order to understand the perspectives of people in social situations, qualitative methods such as interviews, document analysis, and participant observation are vital tools.

A unique set of qualitative methods were utilized to answer questions of diaspora engagement techniques and effects in Buenos Aires and Galicia, measuring the subjective components of attachment, identity, and participation for a rigorous study of a social phenomenon (Denzin, 1970). Attachment was evaluated though secondary observation, identity was measured through interviews, and participation was measured through primary participatory observation. While these components have been measured through individual methods, the sum of the data is used to understand the entire question with depth and precision. The corroboration of data across sets will ensure a minimization of bias and guard the credibility of the research (Patton, 1990).

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Analytical framework

The analytical framework I am using was developed taking cues from Clement’s

(2010) extended institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework (Figure 3.1).

The extended framework allows for an analytical linking of multiple governance levels within a social and historical context. The framework is organized as a hierarchy, wherein structural context and information form organizational and social “rules” passed from institutions to groups of individuals (Clement, 2010; Ostrom, 2011; Ostrom &

Basurto, 2011). This framework was originally developed for analysis of common environmental resource management, but it has value expanded to non-environmental resources since the focus is on human networking potential, and the decision-making processes surrounding management in a given context.

In the context of Galician migrant network management, migrants themselves constitute a limited resource in the eyes of both sending and receiving regional governments. A key difference between environmental commons and social/human resources is the malleability and governability of the resource in question. Environmental resources are not actors, whereas people as resources have varying degrees of free will in various contexts and will thus influence governance of themselves. Another key difference is the universality of many environmental resources vs. the contingent desirability of human groups as resources. Different groups are useful in different ways to different entities and different scales, making the application of an IAD framework for non-environmental resources more complex. The expansion of the IAD framework that I have used here necessitates a tailored approach by building the institutional analysis out of the specific context of this case. This results in an analytical framework for my case

38 study and also a model for usage of the IAD framework in similar non-environmental resource studies.

The framework is organized in two rows and two columns creating a quadrant scheme. The columns represent the regions of Galicia and Buenos Aires, and the rows represent levels of analysis, institutional (governmental) or individual. The main components of analysis include attributes, rules in use, and action arenas. Attributes consist of the shared values of the community and the resulting culture, the size of the group, and the demographics (Cleaver, 2000; Agrawal & Goyal, 2001; Olson, 1965;

Hong & Page, 2004). Rules in use refer to the formal and informal policies or prescriptions that determine actions by governments or individuals (McGinnis, 2011).

The action arena is where actors come together to negotiate situations given the rules, attributes, and external variables previously established. Interactions within the action arena lead to outcomes which then feed back into variables of the case (Clement, 2010).

In the following paragraphs, I will outline the key institutions and actors at each scale, and comment on their possible motives for and goals of diaspora engagement.

States of Spain & Argentina While the state retains ultimate authority, the states in question do not assign themselves rules of much power in facilitating diaspora engagement. In this case, the chief role of the state government is to incentivize self-sufficiency of regional governments and green light projects related to regional well-being. The states of Spain and Argentina are understandably concerned with the economic prosperity of their regions for overall stability and taxation redistribution, yet they face different socio- economic landscapes when dealing with Galicia and Buenos Aires. In Spain, the devolved structure of the state means that regional governments are largely responsible 39 for their own programs and initiatives. As one of Spain’s poorest and most primary-sector dependent regions, Galicia must come up with creative ways to bolster an aging population, increase productivity and economic growth, and incentivize investment.

Argentina, on the other hand, depends greatly on the social welfare and economic stability of its most prominent and wealthy region of Buenos Aires. Assuring that the citizenry of the capital city is happy and productive gives the regional government of

Buenos Aires power in establishing new policies to foster an inclusive environment in the city.

Regions of Galicia and Buenos Aires At a base level the regional governments of Galicia and Buenos Aires are interested in tapping into their populations in order to maintain political status quo, and to grow economically. Third and Fourth generation Galicians abroad are permitted to vote in regional Galician elections. At the same time, the Galician electorate makes up a significant portion of the local Buenos Aires voting base. Therefore, the residents of both regions are important actors in the Galician diaspora engagement network. The duties and beliefs that constitute their roles as actors revolve around maintaining power and relative peace.

The regional governments of Buenos Aires and Galicia have created several nested institutions with which to manage diaspora engagement. In Galicia, the Office of

Emigration has spearheaded programs such as Galicia Abierta (Open Galicia) which incentivizes Galician decedents to return for visits, open businesses in Galicia, and to earn degrees in Galician universities. The key actor at this scale in Galicia is the office of the Secretary of Emigration. In Buenos Aires, the regional and city governments have been working closely to facilitate an atmosphere of vibrancy and diversity. One of the 40 key nested institutions in Buenos Aires is the office of the Secretary of Human Rights.

This organization is responsible for coordinating city festivals and events related to diaspora, of which Galicians are a prominent percentage.

Also operating on the regional level are private sector institutions. Institutions such as Galician tourism companies, Galician banks, and regional chain businesses participate in this network for economic self-interest. These institutions and their actors may enter or exit the network at the regional governments’ choosing. They seem to be present at events like festivals and rallies, and are seen as sponsors of political tours and outreach programs. The scope of their participation in the network is limited in that they do not necessarily specify outcomes or give information, rather, they help facilitate concrete cross-community investment and reap the benefits of an engaged diaspora.

At the local level, longstanding community institutions which cater to diasporic individuals are being incorporated into the larger network by the aforementioned government institutions at higher levels. In Galicia the local emigrant family collectives, which historically communicated with locally based clubs in Buenos Aires, are now serving as returnee help groups, hosting and sponsoring Galician returnees in the local community. In Buenos Aires the list of Galician collectives is too long to list here, ranging from region-wide associations to associations of migrants descended from specific villages. Each of these local associations or clubs has a president and board, actors who have specific duties within the community, communicate entry and exit of members, and network to build social capital with the regional institutions in Buenos

Aires and Galicia.

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This framework allows me to organize the diaspora network between levels of analysis and prescribe questions for each group. The institutional research phase is framed within an historical institutional analysis, and participant observation and individual interviews within a linked institutional analysis and development framework

(Ostrom, 2009). This allows me to grapple with the complexities of transnational policy and connect it to nebulous ideas of national identity. The individual outcomes on national identity are operating as a system within the larger system of regional diaspora institutions, which in turn are operating within the system of the Spanish and Argentinian state.

Each phase was undertaken in both Galicia (origin pole) and Buenos Aires

(émigré pole). I am fluent in Spanish and have a working proficiency of Galician, which allowed me to conduct all research in the preferred language of my subjects. This comprehensive methods approach required full immersion into the environments of my subjects, and a time commitment of several months conducting on-the-ground research in each region.

Institutional Content Analysis

I conducted a content analysis to begin discerning aims and benefits to groups of diaspora engagement institutions using publications found online. Analysis of the curation and representation that each group of institutions puts forward reveals aims, messages, and ethos (Rose, 2016). I searched for content related to aims and benefits of the engagement institutions, and placed them into one of the following thematic areas established in the literature: 1.

Internal maintenance 2. Trans-sovereign nationalism 3. Symbolic politics 4. Restitution 5.

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Democratic continuity (Gamlen, 2006; Barry, 2006; Waterbury, 2014; Baubock, 2015;

Dubruvna, 2014). Within the diaspora institution network operating under the regional governments of Buenos Aires Ciudad and the Xunta de Galicia, I pulled as many published items as I could find and placed them into the pre-determined thematic categories. By organizing institutional texts into thematic categories, I was able to begin outlining the overall rules in use across institutions, as well as thematic outliers. Units of analysis are entire published texts. Texts include, but are not limited to: documents, webpages, , artwork, pictures, and affiliated advertisements. I organized over one hundred of these materials in NVivo for secure storage and analysis.

Institutional Interviews

To supplement my content analysis findings, I set up interviews with institutional stakeholders in both Galicia and Buenos Aires by reaching out to institutions via email. I attempted to set up as many interviews with key informants before leaving for fieldwork as possible. Key informants included the Galician Secretary of Emigration, the Council of

Galician culture, director of the Centro Galicia of Buenos Aires, the director of the Union of Galician Associations, director of the Federation of Galician Associations in

Argentina, and the Buenos Aires City Legislature. These interviews inform the regional level of my framework, giving insight into political context, rules in use, and regional framing of diaspora engagement. I utilized a semi-structured interview set when speaking with institutional officials (see Appendix A). The goal of these interviews was to glean information unattainable through public document analysis, namely how institutions work together to form diaspora engagement networks and what rules they use to formulate policy. Speaking with stakeholders reveals what aims are being actively

43 pursued, how aims may have changed, what information is siphoned from the state to the regional level, how information is formulated into aims, and how aims are formed into policy for potential regional benefit. I also probed into interregional cooperation, as well as local and diasporic policy effects. Interview themes include institutional aims, bureaucratic oversight, decision-making processes, and interregional cooperation.

Participant observation

Attachment is often portrayed by the actions of individuals in their everyday lives.

The spaces that people create for themselves and their notions of community and connectivity actively relate attachments to other people, places, and ideas. In order to observe the level of attachment to Galicia that diaspora retain, I went into both private and public spaces to observe the banal interactions between one another and between people and their space to determine emotional attachment. I tried to attune myself not only to what I saw, but to the aural and sonic dimensions of the spaces I inhabited during fieldwork. Usage of the , cooking of Galician food, and display of

Galician symbology on the body, in the home, community centers, and in the city writ large help indicate attachment levels among this diaspora community.

I attended many diaspora engagement events sponsored by diaspora institutions such as language meet-ups, performances, and festivals. Participant observation informs how the institutional and individual levels of my framework are bridged, and how regional policy decisions effect local attributes and rules in use. An event example is the yearly festival Buenos Aires Celebra Galicia. This festival is hosted by the City of

Buenos Aires with the aim of celebrating Galicians in Argentina and connecting them to diasporic resources. I assumed the role of observer-as-participant (Hay, 2005) at these

44 events. Being there in person, I observed diasporic tapping and embracing techniques, diaspora-institution engagement, and institutional cooperation play out at the city scale. I was also be able to get a sense of how generations of diaspora publicly engage with their heritage and with each other.

Participation with diaspora engagement institutions helped to gauge overall return investment in Galicia. The time an individual invests in participation with a group indicates the amount of overall investment that person is willing to make to the structure that facilitates their participation. By attending events and stepping into diaspora spaces I was conducting primary participatory observation research and using my experience alongside diaspora to measure their participation in Galician institutions. This method allowed me to understand the impetuous and effect of participation through being a part of the spontaneity (or lack thereof) of everyday events (Kesby, Kindon, & Pain, 2004).

Conscious participation in the events taking place allowed for more “natural” interactions to transpire.

Individual Interviews

Identity is inextricably linked experience, and is subjective in nature. There is arguably no better indication of strong human investment than a strong identity. The complexity of identity is necessarily measured through interviews (Krueger, 1994;

Valentine, 1997). While attachment can be seen at a cursory level through objects and temporal actions, identity can only be discovered by uncovering layers of experience and emotionality though conversation. Interviewing provides subjective data that helps fill gaps in the use of observation or collection of quantitative data (Dunn, 2005).

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I conducted interviews with diaspora in Buenos Aires and returnees in Galicia.

Individual interviews inform local rues in use, socio-political and economic context attributes of local groups within my framework. Interviews are the only way I was be able to uncover the complex motivations for institutional engagement and nuance of national identity across generations (Valentine, 1997). Utilizing connections that I established during my institution analysis and participant observation phases, I gathered purposeful samples of self-identified Galicians for interviews. I utilized the connections I created to recruit Galicians participants on an opportunity basis, gathering 31 individual interviewees in Buenos Aires and 9 returnee interviewees in Galicia. I aimed to add more interviews depending on the level of information saturation acquired (Guest et al., 2006).

A semi-structured question set was used to guide the interviews (see Appendix B).

Interview themes included perception of institutional benefits, personal networks, national identity, and cultural practices. All individual interviewees were given pseudonyms to protect anonymity. Any images where interviewees appear were taken with permission for use in publication.

Analysis

All data sets were analyzed thematically and then conceptually organized in the extended IAD framework. Interviews and content were stored and coded in NVivo. The

NVivo program allows coding data into themes for organized and comprehensive comparison and cross-tabulation. I kept data grouped by institutional and individual, and then sub-grouped by region and data gathering method. I developed a code book for the institutional group, themed by network building, diaspora engagement, aims, and benefits. The individual data code book was themed by engagement, national identity,

46 performing national identity, family ties, community ties, and diasporic belonging. I coded all data along sentence units of text so as not to misrepresent informant contextually. Coding these data sets allows me to easily pull out themes articulated between the two regions as well as between the overall institutional structure and individuals in the diaspora and analyze them within my framework (Figure 3.1).

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Figure 3.1 Figure

- Extended IAD framework Extended

Utilizing the extended institutional framework, I arranged the coded groups into networks of interaction to find linkages, rules, and outcomes (Figure 3.1). Institutions working within and between regions employ tapping and embracing techniques to effect outcomes at the institutional level. These outcomes determine the rules of action by which individuals connect and perform national identity inside or outside of the institutional structures. This hierarchical framework makes clear the connections between institutions and individuals, in developing the national identity of Galicians at home and abroad.

Conclusion

Diaspora engagement institutions are essentially embarking on transnational nation building, tapping and/or embracing lost members of the nation to once again serve as citizen investors. Analyzing the interests of participation in such projects from both an institutional and individual point of view allows for testing of multiple aims, interactions, and outcomes of each group involved. With diaspora engagement institutions proliferating around the world, understanding the benefits and consequences of these arrangements at multiple scales will only grow more pertinent and help reveal the complexities of transnational social, political, and economic processes.

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CHPATER 4 – CASE HISTORY & CONTEXT

Galicians have been migrating to Buenos Aires since the 1850s, when a wave of mostly male, small plot farmers struck out seeking new markets and opportunities. Liberal immigration policies pulled many European migrants to Argentina, where a young country was looking to expand agriculturally and develop a Europeanized populace. Galicians settled the capital city of

Buenos Aires and established organizations ranging from large, regional mutual aid societies to micro-territorial groups consisting of villagers hailing from the same area. In the aftermath of the

Spanish civil war, thousands of Galician nationalists and war fled in to the strong

Galician support communities that had been established by the first wave of migrants in Buenos

Aires. The budding Galician nationalist movement continued from Argentina as influential figures shaped diasporic thought with some of the most important literature in Galician history.

These waves of immigration profoundly shaped the societies in both Galicia and Buenos Aires.

In Galicia, the remaining population was shocked by the exit of their compatriots, wherein virtually every family had seen a member sail overseas. However, emigration had opened labor opportunities in Galicia and eased their economic stress allowing for the eventual convergence of the region. In Buenos Aires, immigrants were arriving from all over the world, but no sub-state region represented as many newcomers to the city as Galicians did. Over the course of a few generations, Galicians left their imprint on the city’s culture and landscape, developing from culture-shocked farmers into businessmen, academics, and government officials within a few generations.

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Sub-state nationalism in Spain

Galicia is one of the three ‘historic nations’ in Spain. The other historic nations are

Basque Country and . This official categorization gives it special autonomy as a region and recognition as a distinct national culture group within the state of Spain. Why do these three regions get special designation when other regions in Spain occupy similarly unique cultural territorialities? While most of the regions in Spain have unique characteristics and landscape attachments that may predispose them to ‘national’ status, the cultural and/or economic repression that Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia have felt while under the Spanish flag have solidified them into nations which set them distinctly apart from the rest of Spain.

Spain is a country composed of various historic territories, tribes, and regions. It has been stitched together primarily through royal where amorphous kingdoms existed before.

Regions developed independently, creating their own cultures, economies, and languages. In a display of imperialism now seen as internal colonization, the Spanish crown moved to consolidate all the peripheral regions of the under one flag, achieving success in the late . Some regions maintained their own culture and language, like Catalonia and Basque Country, which were wealthy enough to protect themselves from full colonization.

Galicia, while not wealthy, was extremely isolated in the northwest of the peninsula, with most the population living in the mountainous interior or on the treacherous peninsulas of the coasts.

In the late 19th-early 20th century, Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia all experienced a cultural renaissance. Capitalizing upon democratizing education and the rise of a regional elite, these peripheral regions developed for themselves a mythic history distinct from the rest of

Spain. The renaissance was short lived though, for in 1939 a decades-long imposition of authoritarian fascism came at the hands of . The regime concentrated special

51 attention on the three most distinctly “un-Spanish” regions: Catalonia, Basque Country, and

Galicia. Franco’s special repression worked counterintuitively to solidify a national solidarity among these regions. When democracy was again achieved in 1978, Galicia, Catalonia, and

Basque country were given special rights as “historic nations” in part due to the turmoil they had unequally endured.

Corresponding to the granting of “national” status to these three regions, Spain began a devolution project that granted more cultural, political, and economic autonomy to all regions.

This “nested decentralization” came at the risk of spurring more singular regional allegiance, but at the benefit of bringing disenfranchised regions into the state apparatus (Martinez-Herrera,

2000). Each region of Spain now had the ability to build more distinct regional identities, but none had quite the catalogue of history and symbols to draw from as Galicia, Catalonia, and

Basque Country. These regions contain more than strong regional identities, (which is true of all regions of Spain) they contain cultural, ethnic, and territorial identities as well.

The three national regions of Spain each continued to build out a unique mythos of national identity which drew upon work done by pre-war nationalists. Using the cornerstones of ethnicity, language, and landscape, the three embarked upon separate projects which occurred at different scales with varying results (Etherington, 2010; Conversi, 1997).

While Catalonia welcomed anyone who could speak Catalan, and Basque Country only welcomed ethnic Basque speaking , Galicia had an ethnic and linguistic identity that needed to be reconciled.

The Galician Nation Galicia saw its ethnicity as pre-Roman, rooted in its Celtic fringe membership. The ancient Celtic settlements that dot the coasts are linked to the folklore of Celtic-Galician settlement of the island of Ireland by boat in the years before the British Isles were inhabited by 52

Romans. Those who stayed in Northern Iberia continued to be , but eventually evolved into

Galician-speaking as they meshed with the -speaking Romans. The resulting

Galician language then has a tricky place in the national mythos, because unlike Basque, it is not necessarily indicative of historic Galician ethnicity. So, Galicia turns to for linguistic support, claiming a cultural comradery with their ‘brother nation’ to the .

Just as Basque Country spans the border of , and Catalonian culture creeps into of France (Castells, 1997), Galician identity does not stop at the River Miño between Portugal and Galicia (Palmeiro & Pinheiro, 2009). Trans-border identity and networking is another distinct trait of Spanish regions. These three regions refuse to be culturally contained within the borders that Spain has assigned them. Territorial struggle is a marker of nationalism. In these cases, the struggle has manifested in various forms, from lyrical poetry and storytelling in Galicia, to extreme irredentist violence in Basque Country.

Perhaps more than any other symbol, however, Galicia clings to its landscape as a marker of national differentiation. While most of Spain is stereotypically hot and dry, sitting as it does on a giant plateau which slowly slants towards the Mediterranean Sea, Galicia exists along a rugged and dangerous Atlantic coast, in a patch of green made possible by the rain shadow of the

Picos De Europa mountain range. In this isolated corner of Iberia, Galicians find their home. The

Galician landscape is popularly imagined and portrayed as one of lush verdant farms, misty , running creeks and streams, and impressive seaside cliffs. This landscape is known as the homeland to Galicians everywhere (Warf and Ferras, 2015), and evokes a clear sense of belonging (Clifford & King, 1993). The landscape described here is not the same thing as the

Galician territory, which encompasses far more than these idyllic pictures. The ideal, pastoral, and rural image of the Galician landscape is the one nationals hold on to. The territory is an

53 object of national strategy, a geographical expression of power, only given life and meaning though the conception of landscape contained within it (Nogue and Vicente, 2004).

The Galician landscape is actively produced to display the cultural symbols of Galicia, including food found in the sea and on the farm, the shell symbol that marks the Camino de

Santiago, the language found in signage and place names, and the Celtic fringe markers seen in the green hills, rocky coast, and ancient settlements. As Galicia enters the global market as its own economic entity, separate identity becomes even more potent as a potential economic driver

(Keating, 1998; Storper, 1998; Bristow, 2010; Paasi, 2013). While not having to construct a

“new” regional identity (Antonsich, 2010), Galicia is taking part in new by exploiting their regional national identity as an economic platform. There is conscious planning and marketing of their unique identity as not just a region, but as a nation (Zimmerbaur, 2011).

Tourism is being promoted by bolstering the image of a unique Galician national landscape.

Galician agricultural products are being sold by fostering the idea of a pure, fertile, and exotic land. Galicia projects the image of itself to those beyond the nation, and beyond the state of

Spain, in the hopes of becoming a region-state (Ohmae, 1995), connected to the global economy and known for its distinct “Galicianness” apart from Spain, as Catalonia has arguably already done. These aspects of Galicia, symbols of culture, history, and identity are enshrined in the mythology of the landscape and give Galicia its own distinct space within Spain.

Building an Argentinian Nation

Much like the United States, Argentina has always been a country of immigrants. From

1870 to 1941, Argentina received millions of immigrants, 80% of which were from Spain and

Italy (Rock, 1987). While a good economic run in the late 1800s certainly attracted immigrants to Argentina, what sustained the influx of people were the simultaneous push-pull factors

54 occurring on either side of the Atlantic: policies put in place by the Argentinian government aimed at populating the country, primarily with Europeans, and an industrializing and overpopulated looking for new spaces of opportunity.

When independence came in 1810, Argentina was sparsely populated. With a country of one million square miles and less than half a million people to work it, the new government desperately needed bodies (Moya, 1998). Europe’s growing urban population generated a demand for agriculture, allowing Argentina to enter the Atlantic trade system.

The demand for food in Europe opened a vast labor market in , where Argentina was at a spatial advantage. The , one of the three most fertile land belts in the world, spread out north of the capitol Buenos Aires beckoning to be cultivated. Argentina then set out to acquire farmers by “breaking the destructive dams that prevent(ed) foreigners from settling” the deserted lands (Jose de San Martin as quoted by Zorilla, 1978: 44). It was decreed that the Portuguese, English, and others not at war with Argentina could freely settle the country and be granted citizenship and government protection (Moya, 1998). With the changing of the guard in the new Argentinian , a liberal immigration agenda was moved to the top of the priority list and welcome was opened to all western Europeans.

Argentine leaders were strongly influenced by political theorist Juan Bautista Alberdi’s

(2012 [1852]) writings, in which he claimed “to govern is to populate.” With this concept in mind, the new 1853 Argentinian constitution emphasized the importance of immigration to the development of a modern country (Rock, 1987). European immigration was specifically encouraged. For Alberdi and his cohort, the ‘civilized races’ of were seen as the best stock with which to build industry, agriculture, and urban affairs in the new Argentina

(Hines, 1999; Stach, 1916). English, Welsh, Scottish, and other northern European immigrants

55 were incentivized with free passage, a land grant, and start-up money (Soneira, 1981, Johnson

2009). In order to realize the goal of population and protection of new citizens, the Argentinian government formed an immigration committee in Buenos Aires in 1862 (Moya, 1998). The

Argentinian immigration committee went on to establish offices in several European capitals, promoting Argentinian migration and assisting with travel plans (Moya, 1998). In 1876, the

Avellaneda Act was passed, an open door policy specifically for European immigrants (Hines,

1999). Between 1869 and 1914, Argentina’s population grew by six million people, with an average yearly growth rate of 134% (de la Funte 1872; Otero 1998).

By the 1900’s Argentina had succeeded in the creation of a primarily white population.

At a time when race was pointed to as the cause of many of ’s problems (Helg

1990), Argentina, with its successful economy and largely white society was interpreted as proof of successful racial policies in action. But a critical mass of began to shift immigrant perception from positive to negative, as the population began to appear far from the Nordic ideal imagined by Alberti and others (Sanhueza, 2003). Much like in the U.S., Argentina began to fear its immigrants from southern Europe, and created new legislation to discriminate and deport them (Delaney, 1999). The racist ideology of elite Argentina created a structure in which northern, Anglo looking Italians and were welcomed, yet southern Italians and

Spaniards with darker skin tones were treated with caution and outright xenophobia (Sanhueza,

2003; Stach, 1916). After the First World War, Argentina gradually began restricting immigration policies, especially towards Italians. Immigration was further tightened as people began to flow in from other Latin American countries as well (Grimson & Kessler, 2014). An increasingly unstable economy and a string of dictatorships from the 1950’s to 1970’s also worked to tighten Argentina’s borders.

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Galician Emigration to Argentina

The 19th and 20th centuries saw massive emigration from Spain to Latin America. Spain experienced a huge emigration in the mid to late 19th century and continuing through to the mid

20th century. This emigration was incited to an extent by the obvious political changes and economic depression occurring in the country as it shifted power multiple times and struggled to find its social cohesion. Yet poverty and political disenfranchisement alone do not explain this exodus. Uneven development and overpopulation were the primary causes of the emigration phenomenon in Spain. Of this mass migration, the bulk of the movement took place between two places: from the agricultural north of Spain to the River Plate in Argentina. In this part of Spain, most people worked in the primary sector, usually in agriculture. In some of these regions, like

Asturias and Basque Country, industrialization opened new opportunities for workers, pulling migrants to new job opportunities in urban settings or in other countries. In other parts of Galicia, the population ran out of arable land to work. With no centers of industry in the region, and no prospects of development, massive numbers emigrated from the region.

Galicia was a heavily agricultural and undeveloped region in the northwestern periphery of Spain. Overpopulation, lack of arable land, and a lack of diverse industries pushed the first wave of Galicians to migrate across the Atlantic. Later, civil war and political exile would push a second wave of Galicians to America. Galicia accounted for the majority of Spaniards coming into Argentina between 1850 and 1970. Gallego became a synonym, often a demeaning one, for any Spanish immigrant in Argentina and later throughout Latin America (Prado, 1973). Much has been written about the other groups who populated Argentina, such as Italians (Baily, 1999),

Welsh (Johnson, 2009; Williams, 1991) and Scottish (Stewart, 1997; 2000), but less has been written about Spaniards or Galicians in Argentina. This may be because Spaniards were not

57 perceived as different from the population that that had colonized South America. They were able to blend in as “invisible immigrants” (Erickson, 1972) in a country where Spanish society had shaped and normalized Argentina to begin with. But Spaniards were not Argentinian, they were immigrants, and were simultaneously welcomed and looked down upon as immigrant groups often are. Galicians went to Argentina for compelling reasons and maintained transnational ties between homeland and host country over the years. Over 100 years later, the

Galician population in Buenos Aires is still referred to as the fifth province of Galicia.

In Galicia the tradition of split land inheritance known as minifundismo had divided the landscape into tiny plots, rendering it almost impossible to yield sufficient crops for market or subsistence. Facing the prospect of inheriting a plot of unworkable land that had been divided between siblings for generations, many decided to sell their land and use the money to migrate.

Travel was becoming more economical and safer, incentivizing more people to take longer journeys. Between 1860 and 1930, over one million people left Galicia in what can be considered the first wave, consisting of those seeking better economic opportunities (Máiz,

2010). Galician migrants went many places; some to other parts of Europe, some to North

America, but the majority saw opportunity in the former colonies of Latin America.

Latin America was the most attractive prospect for Galicians and other Spaniards due primarily to the language similarity. Large numbers of Galicians settled in Cuba, , ,

Uruguay, and Argentina. Argentina was a particularly attractive place to settle due to the incentives put in place through liberal immigration policies there. Once Galicians settled in

Argentina, a chain migration was established that drew thousands upon thousands to the Rio de la Plata area. Buenos Aires was the largest port city, and became the place where most immigrants settled. The Galician community in Buenos Aires began to grow rapidly, dominating

58 neighborhoods and establishing institutions, both local and regional, to help acclimate new

Galician immigrants to the country.

El Centro Gallego de Buenos Aires is the most obvious example of institution building in

Buenos Aires’ Galician communities. Founded as a modest mutual aid society in 1907, by 1938 it had grown by 57,000 members into a fully-fledged fraternal organization and working hospital

(Moya, 1998). El Centro Gallego, along with many other large societies in Buenos Aires at the time, were viewed with mixed feelings. On the one hand, these were philanthropic organizations that helped new immigrants with housing, healthcare, and job placement. On the other hand, they were increasingly seen as cold elite institutions, which in essence delivered over-priced healthcare for members (Moya, 1998). In response, immigrants began to establish hyper-local micro-territorial organizations to satisfy the desire for participation and fraternity (Iglesias &

Louro, 2010). Immigrants hailing from the same town or village moved their coffee house gatherings to formal rented spaces that were deemed homes: Casa de Tuy, and Associación de

Montevideo for instance. Most immigrants came through chains established by these local clubs and associations in Buenos Aires, recruiting from specific villages and towns back in Galicia.

These associations encouraged settlement of Galicians into specific Argentine districts, concentrating Galician localisms (Paz & Santiago, 1996; Vázquez, 2000; Núñez Seixas, 2016).

The network of Galician mutual aid societies in Buenos Aires and elsewhere strongly linked the diaspora community with the homeland. This had a significant impact on local socioeconomic dynamics in Galicia. Emigrant societies worked for land reform movements aimed at breaking munifundismo and the power of rural patrons back home. Remittance money sent back to Galicia primarily went to property attainment and consolidation (Núñes Seixas,

2000). In addition to remittances, emigrants sent ideas, publications, and pamphlets on the value

59 of education and the need for mutual cooperation to reform the agricultural system in Galicia

(Núñez Seixas, 2002). It is important to note that almost 50% of first wave immigrants returned to Galicia (Núñez Seixas, 2002). Return migrants helped to institute rural changes in their local communities as well as spread anti-Castilian ideas. Slow urbanization and modernization followed agricultural reform, and set the stage for activism in Galicia (Farías 2011). Galicia had realized many of these changes by the lead up to the civil war in 1936, which contributed to social mobilization on a regional scale and a shift towards .

Galician nationalist movements fomented in the diaspora communities of Cuba and

Argentina, precursors to the nationalist party that would later form in Galicia. Organizations for

Galician independence, such as the Comité Revoluzonareo Arredista Galego (Galician

Revolutionary Secessionist Committee) of and the Sociedade Nazonalista (Nationalist

Society) in Buenos Aires were the first to rally around the idea of Galleguismo ( or

Galicianness) with an undercurrent ideology of national independence for Galicia (Núñez Seixas,

1991; 1993). In the and 30s, a greater number of Galicians were seeking education and being influenced by transatlantic ideas, as well as by Catalonian and Basque independence models. In 1936, Galicia declared itself an autonomous nation by a 98% vote of approval. The year, the erupted, kicking off a second wave of emigration from Galicia to the . This wave of emigrants, which largely identified as political exiles and republican refugees (Ortuño, 2011), lasted from the beginning of the civil war until the 1950s.

Among those who emigrated in this second wave were the core of Galician nationalist thinkers and politicians (Farías, 2010). This group wasted no time in setting up new nationalist institutions in Buenos Aires, including the Partido Galleguista, (Galicianist party) Irmande

Galega (Galician Brotherhood) and the Consello de Galiza (Council of Galicia). With Spain

60 enveloped in fascist dictatorship, Buenos Aires was now the capitol of the Galician nationalist movement. Nationalist organizations in Buenos Aires produced books, , journals, poetry, and movies that were circulated throughout the Galician diaspora (Cristóforis, 2016).

These works remain the cornerstones of Galician nationalist thought and form the core of

Galician national literature to this day.

Today’s Galician Diaspora in Buenos Aires

Since the end of the Franco dictatorship in 1978, Galicia has been conscious in its efforts to re-integrate the large Galician diaspora community. The Galician government (Xunta de

Galicia) has successfully fostered a sense of a nation without boundaries by utilizing existing

Galician diaspora institutions abroad to politically and culturally incorporate second and third generation emigrants. Since the 1980s, one of the initiatives of the Spanish state has been the recovery of regional culture and history (Núnas Seixas, 2002). The social exodus in Galicia was the largest of any Spanish region both before and after the civil war, so in order to recover its regional history and culture, Galicia turned to its diaspora community. Migration studies became a financed subject in Galicia and new journals were produced in order to study the Galician diaspora. A large exhibit on Galicia and America was organized by the institute and traveled the world, achieving particular success in Latin American cities with high numbers of Galician decedents. Laws were passed authenticating Galician emigrants rights to information and participation in Galician social and political life, which includes the right to vote in Galician elections (Diaro de Galicia, n.d). Contact between the Council of Galician communities abroad and the Xunta de Galicia initiated a long-term relationship. The two institutions formalized an agreement requiring a meeting between the two every three years in order to keep those on the

“outside” in mind when law making in Galicia (Diario de Galicia, n.d).

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In the 1990s, became the president of Galicia, himself minister of tourism during the Franco Dictatorship, but also of a returned Galician migrant to Cuba (Fraga

Iribarne, 1992). As president, Fraga displayed particular interest in promoting Galician history and culture. Fraga established a formal relationship between Galicians on both sides of the

Atlantic, solidifying the incorporation of Galician diaspora into the national imagination (Núnas

Seixas, 2002). In a speech on the 25th of 1990, Fraga stated that Galicia extended “beyond its physical borders. The best Galicians are living outside of the land where they were born. For this reason, the migrant Galician will forever be present in our minds and hearts” (Fraga Iribarne as cited by Núnas Seixas, 2002, p. 237).

The symbolic link between Galicia and its outside communities has only grown since the

1990s, and become more political. The 2005 presidential elections changed the nature of the

Galician vote abroad from a symbolic gesture to an important piece of the electorate. The election of 2005 was so close that the exterior vote ended up deciding the winner, ejecting Fraga from office. Since then, politicians have made yearly campaign tours to Latin America a priority.

The number of diaspora who are registered to vote in Galician elections has grown from 237,000 in 1997 to 446,260 in 2016 (Taboada, 2016). Considering that the population of Galicia is only

2.5 million, that number of Galician voters abroad constitutes 16% of the total Galician electorate. This increase in outside voters has less to do with ongoing emigration (which is still occurring to a small extent), and more to do with the nationalism reform process implemented by the Zapatero administration in 2010, which extended Galician citizenship rights to children and grandchildren of emigrants and exiles (Taboada, 2016). The growing Galician diaspora vote has become an important portion of the Galician electorate as overseas institutions strengthen

62 connections with the Galician government and Galician politicians broaden their appeal to overseas communities.

In addition to an increased political presence, the physical act of return has been growing in popularity among Galician diaspora. Youth exchanges, “Outside Galicia Days,” and a number of return migration subsidies now exist to try and facilitate return visits to the Galician homeland

(Galicia Abierta, n.d). The Galician government has implemented youth exchanges so that children and grandchildren of Galician emigrants and exiles can come and see the ancestral country, averaging 400 visitants a year since 1990 (Núnas Seixas, 2002). “Outside Galicia Days” was a program instituted in 1993, where once a year around 8,000 Galician migrants would assemble in the capitol of Santiago de Compostela. The regional government has also been subsidizing return migration visits, especially for old age migrants who have never been able to make the trip back. Thousands of elderly people, mostly from Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have benefited from this program.

A growing component of Galician diaspora has been the virtual presence; whether through TV, online newspapers and journals, or social media groups, the Galician diaspora are able to get connected more easily than ever before. The regional Galician television channel,

TVG, has had several programs dedicated to migrant communities. Galeguide ran from the mid-

90s, and was replaced by Encontros in 2001. Another program from Spanish Television

International, Desde Galicia al Mundo, has been running since 1993, focusing on reports, interviews, and culture form Galicia. The Spanish Television International website states that the purpose of their show is to bring communities of Galicians “on the outside” closer to Galicia

(TVE, 2016). TVG and Spanish Television International are offered as part of a special package in many countries of Latin America and elsewhere, reaching an audience of more than 100,000

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(Núñez Seixas, 2002). The long running journal of Galicians in exile, (Our [Home]

Land), was discontinued in 2011 after running for over 100 years (Rodríguez, 2013). Galician diaspora now rely on the online publication Gallegos en El Exterior (Galicians in the Exterior) for news about the Galician homeland and diaspora.

These transnational connections have been imitated on a local scale as well. Since the

1990s, provincial, town, and village institutions began devoting attention to corresponding local institutions abroad. Local associations in Latin America, Europe, and other parts of Spain produce materials for local consumption by Galicians in the area. The hundreds of Galician magazines and newspapers that are produced by local institutions are perhaps the most visible example of such materials (Galicia Aberta, n.d). Maintenance of these translocal links has meant the representation of specific interest groups at a local political level, as well as a yearly subsidy for groups abroad (Núñez Seixas, 2016). Local exhibits and fairs often blend Galician migrant history and local culture, and employ local scholars to write publications and histories about the locality in question (Núñez Seixas, 2002), solidifying the trans-local nature of these places for generations to come. These trans-local links have maintained connection to the homeland on a personal level, and have facilitated local interest and investment among Galician diaspora.

Galician Diaspora Engagement

Galician diaspora are an incredibly important component of modern Galicia. The

Galician diaspora maintain transnational links to both each other and the home nation through a network of multi-generational organizations scattered throughout Latin America, Europe and other parts of Spain. These are expressions of a transnational as well as trans-local nature between Galicians abroad and the localities in the Galician nation as a whole. The diaspora exercise expanded political rights and significant leeway in Galicia, constituting 17% of the

64 regional electorate as of 2020 according to the Census of Spanish residents abroad (CERA,

2020). Of the registered Galicians abroad, 35.7% reside in Argentina (CERA, 2020), most of whom are concentrated in Buenos Aires. The number of Galicians in Buenos Aires is so large that it is said to be the third largest Galician city, after and A Coruña. The large numbers of

Galicians in Buenos Aires is due to a long, historical connection with the city and the surrounding Rio de la Plata region.

These connections continue to this day, facilitated by corresponding subsidies given by the Xunta de Galicia and local governments. It is this network of organizations that keeps

Galician diaspora connected and informed and invested in each other and in Galicia. Since 2005,

Xunta support for Galician diasporic institutions has risen. The registered number of “outside” voters has increased, return visits are on the rise, diaspora literature is multiplying, Galician television programs are thriving, and membership in Galician associations is popular.

The investment in Galician institutions abroad strengthens the ties between the diaspora and the homeland. The diasporic vote in popular elections is of huge consequence to regional politicians. Therefore, it is critical to maintain good standing with this influential group through utilization of the transnational and translocal network in place. In the case of the Galician diaspora in Buenos Aires, it is the network of long-standing associationist institutions that has bolstered multi-scalar Galician coalitions abroad. The retention of the Galician diaspora into the

21st century speaks to the strength of the institutions and their continued importance in the social, political, and ideological story of Galicia.

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CHAPTER 5 – THE XUNTA DE GALICIA & REGIONAL DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

Since the 1980s, Galicia has been formalizing connections to its diaspora. The quote below is from my interview with the Secretary of Emigration, head of the Office of Emigration inside of the Galician government known as the Xunta de Galicia, henceforth referred to as the

Xunta. This quote highlights the importance of the emigration period in Galicia today, as well as the legal mandate that not only aims at offering the rights and benefits promised to citizens of

Spain, but also the indefinite return of Galician diaspora to the region:

Galicia considers the emigration to be a part of its identity, and Galicia, as an

autonomous community should do this work. We do this because we think it is a

moral obligation, a promise, and also a legal promise. To stay by their side

abroad, and to also pursue their return. (Antonio R. Miranda, Secretary of

Galician Emigration)

The Xunta, as the macro-scale institutional power in Galicia, has created various subsidiary organizations to create policies and develop relationships directed at diaspora engagement. Over the past four decades, these policies have evolved from re-establishment and registration of citizenry and voters in the diaspora, to the physical recruitment of Galician

“returnees” from the diaspora. Galicia is a example of a sub-state, regional entity pioneering its own diaspora engagement plan. This chapter will outline the policy structure that the Xunta has created to embrace and tap into (Gamlen, 2014) its massive diasporic resource abroad, as well as assess the outcomes of the strategy from the perspectives of lawmakers, the diaspora, and returnees themselves.

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In order to find out about the legal history of Galician diaspora engagement, I visited the emigration archive in Galicia’s Cidade da Cultura, a monumental, if not controversial, museum, library, and workspace, which overlooks the capital city of Santiago de Compostela (Dempsey

,2012). The emigration archive is run by the Council of Culture, a semi-autonomous nonprofit that works in conjunction with the Xunta to document, archive, and celebrate Galician culture globally. One of the major projects of the team at the Council of Culture is to record the history of Galician emigration. This primarily manifests in historical documents such as photographs, letters, and other ephemera from the time of peak emigration in the early 1900s. In addition to this material, they have a limited number of documents outlining yearly policy changes and action plans as they pertain to diaspora relations.

Institutional Structure for Diaspora Engagement in Galicia

Spanish law mandates the recognition and care for its citizens in the diaspora. 43 of the Spanish constitution, written in 1978 and ratified in 1983, mandates the valorization and safeguarding of “economic and social rights of Spanish workers living abroad” (Senado de

España, 2019). Within this framework, the state set about on a course of diaspora engagement, working to create policies to further these goals. In 2006, the Spanish state amended this law to include the decedents of original Spanish emigrants into the protections afforded domestic citizens. Beyond the safeguarding of the diaspora themselves, the 2006 law includes language referring to the diaspora as a valuable resource to be tapped by the aging state:

Spain should consider its emigrant community to be authentic social capital: their

promise to their land of origin translates into a fundamental resource for the

projection of Spain to the exterior. A fundamental part of this social capital is

made up of the thousands of Spaniards that were not born in Spain who reside all

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over the world, they too are a part of the country today and we should consider

them indispensable actors in the of the future. (Article II, Law

40/2006 14th of December – Statute of External Spanish Citizens)

This language makes plain Spain’s move from embracing the diaspora as external citizens in need of protection, as evident in the language from the 1983 law, to a resource-oriented mentality aimed at tapping into the potential of this large human capital abroad.

Of the 2.5 million Spanish citizens living in the exterior, nearly a quarter of them are of

Galician decent (I.G.E., 2019). Galicia, as the autonomous region in Spain with the most historic emigration, also crafted their own diaspora engagement policy specific to the and pursuit for return of Galician diaspora. Following the Spanish state’s model of starting with policies aimed at embracing the diaspora, Galicia also began with an embrace, and later moved to a tapping-oriented policy structure:

The autonomous communities do not have to work on these matters, being the

responsibility of the Spanish state, but in Galicia, we feel that we should work on

this because of the historical legacy of emigration that we have had in the 20th

century. (Antonio R. Miranda, Secretary of Emigration)

The Xunta has been pursuing diaspora engagement since the re-establishment of democracy in Spain. The diaspora engagement policy plan was created in 1983, appearing as the law of Reconocimiento de la Galiguidade (Recognition of Galicianess), which is baked into the

Galician statute of autonomy in Article 7, Law 4 (BOE.es, 2019). This law created the Office of

Galician Community Relations and a corresponding secretarial position. This office later became the Office of Emigration, with corresponding secretarial title change. The Office of Emigration remains the key organization associated with the creation and maintenance of diaspora

68 engagement policy in the region. Other important organizations within the Xunta’s diaspora engagement network include the Council of Culture and two foreign consulate offices.

The Council of Culture is a semi-independent organization, which works on cultural affairs both within Galicia and in the diaspora communities all around the world. Their main lines of work pertain to maintenance of the Galician language, sites and objects of Galician heritage, and to act as a cultural consultant for the Xunta and the Galician

(concellodacultura.com, 2019). The council of culture is often present at international exhibitions celebrating the achievements of Galicians in the diaspora.

The Xunta’s consulate offices are the only permanent and official Galician presence abroad. The Xunta created consulate offices to better serve the needs of the Galician community in the exterior, and located the offices in areas of high Galician population concentration. The only two Galician consulate offices in the Americas are both located on the banks of the River

Plate; one in Monteviedo, Uruguay, established in 2008, and one in Buenos Aires, Argentina, established in 2007. Both consulate offices share one director, who travels between the two locations. The Secretary of Emigration works with both consulate offices to funnel information from the Xunta to the local levels where Galicia has a presence abroad. Over the course of my fieldwork I interviewed officials at each of these organizations to ascertain the aims of benefits of establishing a transnational Galician presence.

Emigration Strategy 2020

Enshrined in the Galician constitution, the law of Galiguidade offers a diaspora engagement roadmap for the region, within which all activity of the Office of Emigration, the consulate offices, and the Council of Culture operate. The main points of the law mandate several lines of external action. These include an assistance plan that offers economic help to

69 various entities and individuals abroad, a work training plan aimed at young people entering the workforce, and a cultural plan offering Galician music, , language, history, and literature courses. By 1995, they had added two more areas of concentration: a plan for youth engagement, and a plan specifically for helping the cultural centers in diaspora communities function. These action plans contain specific “lines of help” within each theme.

Today, these action plans and the lines of help that they contain are still in effect, acting as the bones of the overall policy structure which has branched out since the 1990s. Overall,

Galicia’s diaspora engagement policy has moved from an embracing to a tapping strategy, seeing the diaspora as a valuable resource for Galicia. Below is an outline of the overall office of emigration strategy from 2010 to 2020. This strategy has undergone several changes since 2010, but the following is a compilation of the most recent documents about the strategy made available by the Office of Emigration. Several of the programs/policies below have been identified through content analysis and interviews to be high profile, impactful, and successful.

These are starred below and will be discussed later in more depth.

Table 5.1 - Application of the regulatory framework in the exterior

Aims: Follow and apply the law of Galiguidade

o Promote understanding of the law in communities in the exterior

Encourage the merging of entities in the exterior*

Encourage entity compliance with the rules and regulations set by community councils

Through economic aid to the entities, promote general improvement of services,

inclusion of youth and women, and modernization of buildings and communications

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Table 5.1 (continued) - Application of the regulatory framework in the exterior

Diffuse the legal rights and duties of the diaspora

o Create legal guides

o Create an in-person campaign in collaboration with the entities

o Revise the regulations that grant distinction to people and entities in the exterior

Action Plans:

Assistance Plan

o Social

Direct emergency economic lines

Social security for elderly

Medical coverage supplement

Disability coverage supplement

Unemployment coverage supplement

Special economic help for circumstances in remote areas

Urgent humanitarian help/gaps in country of residence safety net

Supplemental coverage for home loss

Delivery of medical coverage through entities

Homeland travel for elderly to stay with family in Galicia or to visit

independently (Reencontros na Casa/Reencontros na Terra)*

Medical coverage during trips to Galicia (Galicia Saúde Exterior)

Room and board during visits to Galicia

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Table 5.1 (continued) - Application of the regulatory framework in the exterior

Political platform for women’s issues in the exterior*

Promotion of spaces of representation

Large scale study of the social, economic, and cultural situation of

Galician women in the exterior

Culture Plan

o Cultural maintenance and promotion

Subsidy for Language classes

Support for training of language teachers in the entities

Promotion and support for getting official Galician language

certifications remotely

Promotion of the *

Improvement of information infrastructure between Galicia and the

exterior through Publications, Radio G, TVG

Encouragement of Youth participation in the entities

Promotion and economic help with entity anniversary events of 25, 50,

75 or 100 years

Protection of Galician patrimony in the exterior (Protección del

Patrimonio de las Comunidades Gallegas en el Exterior)*

Catalog and digitize items of cultural significance held at entities

Economic help for equipment used to digitize and preserve art,

documents, or items

Creation of a living emigration memory database

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Table 5.1 (continued) - Application of the regulatory framework in the exterior

Creation of an emigration and law of Galiguidade reference center

Launch of ‘Galician Tunes’ an open source Galician, Castilian and

English language music platform.

Field school (Escolas Abiertas)* in Galicia for teachers and

practitioners of:

• Galician Bagpipe, , drum, flute

• Galician popular music & choir

• Galician traditional dance

• Traditional Galician dress

Develop the resources of existing experts in the areas of Gastronomy,

costume, folklore, and culture in the exterior

Promote and develop the archive of Galician emigration

Promote the Cidade da Cultura as a space of diaspora artist in

residence. (Encontro de Artistas Novos Cidade da Cultura)

Encourage the use of Galician in the entities and in all administrative

communication

Promotion of Galician language study in Universities in the exterior

Summer language immersion courses in Galicia

Special scholarships for Humanities students engaging in Galician

language research

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Table 5.1 (continued) - Application of the regulatory framework in the exterior

Involve all Galicians in a contest to design promotional posters for Dia

das letras Gallegas

Implement a curriculum to familiarize the youth of

Galicia with the history and current status of the emigration and

diaspora communities

Improve and promote the function of the Consello de Comunidades

Galegas

Youth engagement plan

o Youth programs

Nature and culture camp in Galicia (Connecta con Galicia)

Sports and nature camp in Galicia (Aventúrate con Galicia)

Sports programs in the entities of the exterior

Volunteer programs in the collective

Discounts at participating partners in Galicia and Spain (Tarjeta de

Xuventude Exterior)

o Training Plan

Computer training courses

Leadership courses

Online history and language courses

Participation in Galician world youth meetings and

Plan for maintenance of Galician entities

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Table 5.1 (continued) - Application of the regulatory framework in the exterior

o Help for clubs, associations, hospitals, and centers in the exterior

Building costs

Technology updates

Economic assistance for gatherings

Collaboration with country of origin to protect buildings

Strategizing resources for aging clubs

Merging of small and aging clubs

Promotion of entities where none exist

Coordination with federations of entities

Initiate federation/unionization process in collectives

Open the entities up to the community outside the collective

Economic help for members in need

Finding and enrolling in continuing education and training courses

Electronic communication hookup for all entities

o Youth in the entities

Creation of spaces for youth

o Women in the entities

Promotion of women in leadership

o Business and labor network

Coordination with the Galician business owner’s association in the

exterior

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Table 5.1 (continued) - Application of the regulatory framework in the exterior

Promotion of Galician businesses in the exterior*

Forge collaborations and connections with businesses inside of and

outside of Galicia

Promotion of Galician gastronomy

Economic help with events having to do with Galicia/the Galician

collective

Promotion of Galician tourism information

The Galician Office of Emigration has allocated 26 million euros to finance these projects until 2020. This official emigration strategy shows the ways in which the embrace of

Galician diaspora has manifested in concrete regional diaspora engagement policies that have multiplied over the years. Through combing documents and social media posts relating to

Galician diaspora engagement, as well as through my interviews with members of the diaspora and institutional leaders, I have identified several of the above programs as the highest profile, most successful, and/or impactful for the overall strategy and starred them in the above outline.

The following paragraphs will speak to four of these areas in more detail.

Promotion of the Camino de Santiago

As Galicia’s number one tourist draw and most high-profile piece of cultural heritage, the

Camino de Santiago poses an opportunity to draw more of the Galician diaspora back to Galicia for a visit. Several associations and have been created expressly for the promotion of the Camino de Santiago. Building off an existing network of non-profits named “Friends of the Camino de

Santiago,” more of these non-profits emerged in 2015 for a total of 16 in only Argentina, 76

Uruguay, and Brazil. The Argentinian Friends of the Camino de Santiago (Figure 5.2) group has been very active both on social media and in the community, putting on mini in the

Figure 5.1 - Association of Friends of Figure 5.2 - The inauguration of the Brazilian Camino the Camino de Santiago (AACS.com) (Instagram, Office of Emigration @GaliciaAberita)

city of Buenos Aires, and promoting group trips to walk the Camino (discussed in Chapter 10).

In , the Xunta inaugurated a new “Brazilian Camino” which starts in

(Figure 5.2)

Reincontros na Casa/Terra These two programs are aimed at Galician emigrants who are over 65 years old and who have never had the opportunity to visit Galicia since leaving. Reincontros na casa (revisit the home) stipulates that the traveler have family in Galicia that are willing to host them for the duration of the 15-day visit. Reincontros na terra (evisit the land) does not stipulate that the traveler have family lodging for the 15-day visit, and covers the cost of room and board. These programs have been successful in their high participation rates among diaspora from America.

Photos of emotional family members greeting emigrants at the airport are social media mainstays on the official handle of the Secretary of Emigration (Figure 5.3).

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Figure 5.3. Participants of Reincontros na Terra arriving in Santiago. Secretary of Emigration Miranda in the back right.

Escolas Abiertas The Escolas (schools) are for young people (ages 15 – 40) from the collectives in the diaspora with interest in learning or teaching one of the traditional Galician performing arts or crafts. These include bagpipe, tambourine, flute, drums, singing, dancing, and costume making.

Not only does this program engage young people who are interested in participating in Galician culture, but it also connects Galicians in the region to those abroad in a knowledge sharing environment (Figure 5.4). Domestic Galicians learn more about traditional performance and crafts and Galicians from the diaspora are able to refresh themselves on the living culture of

Galicia today:

A very important thing that the Xunta does for us is the Escolas Abiertas (…).

I was in a costume course in a few years ago. What they learn there, the

students have the obligation of teaching over here. That is part of the agreement.

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All of the songs, all of the music and costumes, you have to bring it back.

(Alberto, Ass. Mos)

Figure 5.4. Participants of Escolas Abiertas. (Instagram @GaliciaAberita)

Promotion of Galician businesses abroad This area of work is far less publicized via the Xunta, but in interviewing the Secretary of

Emigration I came to understand it as a key strategy in achieving the goal of a cosmopolitan and connected Galician diaspora. The promotion of Galician businesses abroad entails the identification of Galician-owned businesses and the opening of lines of communication between those businesses abroad, the government, and domestic companies that have interest in international expansion. As Antonio Miranda puts it:

These connections represent an economic opportunity and a competitive

advantage for Galician companies to insert themselves rapidly into new markets.

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when our businesses expand abroad, they go to countries where there is an

established Galician presence who can give support, who can provide contacts,

can help with entrance, and more than anything, they give them recognition. We

are living in a modern and cosmopolitan society and more than anything a

globalized society. So, when the time comes to confront the outside world and

compete beyond our borders, we will have a society that is well prepared because

we have incorporated our people from all over the world. (Antonio R. Miranda,

Secretary of Emigration)

While the emigration strategy outlines goals and actions which are at first glance about embracing and caring for the diaspora through such perks as economic help, trips to the homeland, and developmental courses, the language in these policies also clearly states the underlying motivations of tapping an enormous resource in the diaspora, both as an economic resource and as a human resource to potentially combat the demographic shift in Galicia.

According to the latest figures, Galicia’s rate of natural increase of -13.35% (European

Commission, 2017) posing a major problem for the economic future of the region. The return strategy, which accompanies the emigration strategy, is presented as a solution. For example, the first pages of the Emigrant Strategy 2020 document give figures about the number of Galician living in the exterior, the number of decedents vs. emigrants, and the percentage of youth in the diaspora. To the side of these figures, a caption reads that Galicia has a responsibility to help and protect these Galicians, and that these people are an opportunity to “overcome the demographic challenge by getting them to return” (Secretaria Xerial da Emigracion, 2019). In other cases, objectives of the emigration strategy are stated as necessary precursors to a smooth return. The emigration strategy is just one half—the “embracing” half—of the overall diaspora engagement

80 plan that Galicia has released. The other half of the plan concentrates explicitly on tapping diaspora for return.

Return Strategy 2020

The objective of return is a clear one for the Department of Emigration. Accompanying the Emigration Strategy 2020, the Secretary of Emigration also released a Return Strategy 2020.

Whereas the emigration strategy is about caring for the diaspora, building good relations with communities abroad, and seeping youth in the culture and history of Galicia, the return strategy is packed with initiatives to incentivize diaspora to make the decision to return to live in their ancestral home. The cover of the return strategy document states that return is a right for all

Galicians, and again states the opportunity that diaspora return represents in overcoming

Galicia’s demographic situation. While the Emigration Strategy 2020 is consistent with the laws on the books as outlined in the 1983 law of Galguidade, the Return Strategy 2020 is something new for Galicia. Due to the negative effects of the accelerated in the region, Galicia has decided to tap into its diaspora as a human resource in a new way. The following outlines the Return Strategy 2020, which consists of entirely new programs (below in black), as well as the incorporation of existing programs, many of which have been modified to be applied to returnees. Pre-existing programs are designated in blue.

Table 5.2 - Return Strategy 2020

Return Strategy 2020 Council and Security

o Creation of the Office of Council and Security for Returnees

o Creation of the Virtual Platform of Return

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Table 5.2 (continued) - Return Strategy 2020

o Creation of a toll free help number for returnees

o Information sessions in the exterior

o Creation of programs run through Galician associations aimed at integration of

returnees

Social

o Ayudas Extrordianarias: grants available from Spain, Galicia, and

up to 3,900 euros to cover initial expenses

o Ayudas Sociales: grants available from Spain, Galicia, and municipalities

o Subsidized loan opportunities

o Disability coverage

o Medical Coverage

o Retirement and social security transference

o Grants for returnee families with children under 18

$1,000 euros per child

o Grants for families with more than 2 children under 18

$1,500 euros per child

25% increase in the monetary amount if family is to reside in a rural

municipality

o Grant package for families with newborns

1,200 euros per year,

Returnees able to apply up to three years after newborn birth

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Table 5.2 (continued) - Return Strategy 2020

o Seamless enrolment in daycares and schools for children

Includes special line jumping privileges

o Special help for returnees without Spanish citizenship

o Help with and ID paperwork

Work and Business

o Public employment service

o Labor integration program

o Creation of a virtual database of work seeking returnees

Shared with local employers

o Grants for returnees moving a business to Galicia

o Information about founding a business and ‘new means of self-sufficiency’

Lending programs

Subsidies

Tax breaks

o Grant for returnees who found businesses in Galicia.

Up to 10,000 euros.

Preference given to businesses founded in rural municipalities

o Creation of governmental line of support specifically for returnees

o Investment platform for returnee businesses looking to expand

o Labor force integration program for underemployed/unemployed returnees

Up to 8,000 euros over 12 months

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Table 5.2 (continued) - Return Strategy 2020

o Subsidy for small and medium sized enterprises increases 25% with the hiring

of a returnee

Up to 8,000 euros

Preference given to rural enterprises

o Subsidy program for self the employed increases 25% for self-employed

returnees

Up to $8,000 euros

o Galicia Rural Emprende: funding for the creation of non- agricultural

businesses in rural zones

Up to 70,000 euros

Additional 20,000 euros if permanent employment positions are created

5,000 additional euros if located in zone of limited resources

o Access to guaranteed business loans

Between 3,000 and 150,000 euros

7 year amortization

o Funding for new businesses in the area of research and innovation

25% increase for returnees

up to 24,000 euros

o Guidance and assistance on how to become certified “Galicia Calidade”

(Galician Quality, regional certificate of a product of excellence)

o Subsidized loans for small and medium sized enterprises in the areas of

innovation, business, and industry

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Table 5.2 (continued) - Return Strategy 2020

Up to 1,000,000 euros

o Guidance and help for small and medium sized enterprises in securing

investment and loans from the European Investment Bank

Investments of up to 25,000,000 euros

Loans of up to 12,500,000 euros

o Help for enterprises in accessing regional action funds from the EU

Research, Development, and Information

o Oportunius: Program aimed at the return of researchers up to 35 years of age

o ERC grants for researchers in the diaspora

o Grants aimed at incentivizing Galician researchers to present and research

internationally

o Grants for businesses to create positions for young technical and research staff.

10,000 euros per contract

o Talento Sénior: Program aimed at incentivizing external researchers to partner

with Galician firms

o Grants for research and innovation of products from idea to prototype stage, or

from prototype to market stage.

Special concentration of products developed by Galicians in the exterior

o Retención del Talento Emergente de Galicia: Program which aims at

identifying, capturing, and retaining young Galicians that are training in

vocations of high demand

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Table 5.2 (continued) - Return Strategy 2020

Technical Training

o Scholarships for all education levels

available through the state and the region

o Scholarships for continuing education

up to 5,000 euros

o Bolsas de Excelencia: Scholarship coverage to obtain a master’s degree in

Galicia. *

Up to 7,000 euros a year.

Includes job placement in Galicia upon graduation

Living

o Guidance for accessing public housing

o Special assistance for renting

o Grants for rehabilitating and renovating dilapidated family homes

The return strategy aims at incentivizing 50% more returnees than in the previous decade, a total of 20,000 Galician emigrants or decedents. Of that number, the Xunta is hoping that 60% of them will be under the age of 45. The return strategy is the centerpiece of Galicia’s current rejuvenation goals aimed at ameliorating the demographic transition in the region. The Xunta has put 15 million euros into the creation of new programs specifically for returnees, and has dedicated 220 million euros into the maintenance and function of existing programs, of which returnees are encouraged to participate in, and many of which give regional businesses incentives to hire returnees.

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Assessing the state of the strategies

The emigration strategy and the return strategy work in tandem. First, to maintain cultural and political links with Galicia in the exterior through the clubs and association networks, then, to incentivize return. The Xunta outlines the hypothetical domestic effects of the strategy in a succinct image (Figure 5.5). The graphic reads like a maze, beginning with return, which leads to demographic dynamism, then business creation, investment, innovation, employment, global know-how, and a competitive advantage, which results in a cosmopolitan and advanced society.

Although the return strategy is culminating at time of writing, in 2020, the effects of the strategy are yet to be widely felt in Galicia. The first two steps, that of return and demographic dynamism still need to be assessed per the goals in the strategy, and only after that will the other effects hopefully trickle into place.

While the numbers of Galician citizens immigrating and emigrating are available, the numbers of Galician descendants who have taken advantage of these various programs is unattainable. According to the Galician statistical institute, the number of Spanish emigrants and immigrants has remained virtually unchanged since 2010. I interviewed governmental stakeholders, as well as individuals who have participated in various Xunta programs and elected to return to Galicia.

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Figure 5.5. Return Strategy Road Map – translated in order - return, demographic dynamism, business creation, investment, innovation, employment, global know-how, competitive advantage, cosmopolitan and advanced society. (Galicia Aberta.com 2020)

I interviewed two key governmental stakeholders in Galicia’s diaspora engagement offices. One was an informant in the Council of Galician Culture, whose name has been anonymized, and the other was the Secretary General of Emigration, Antonio Miranda. The

Secretary of Emigration largely mirrored the sentiments of optimism present in the language of the two strategies, while the informant in the Council of Galician Culture gave honest opinions about the current diaspora engagement efforts, as well as shared her views on Galician society and the response to immigration in the current demographic shift. I also made sure to ask individual informants in the diaspora about the policies and programs from the Xunta.

Overall, sentiments from the diaspora about the Xunta pointed towards positivity, with many mentioning specific programs from the strategies that they had taken advantage of. One of

88 the most popular programs is the funding to maintain and improve association buildings. Gloria, from the micro-association of Mos, emphasized how many things were bought with this funding line:

The giant air conditioners that we have, the security cameras, these were things

that we applied to the Xunta for money for. They gave us the Ok, and now we

have the improvements. The Xunta is the first place we go if we need money.

(Gloria, Mos)

Other popular programs are those that concern trips to Galicia, like the escolas abiertas and the reencontros na casa/terra. Since I spoke with active individuals in the collective, many of them have participated in those programs themselves and had great experiences which fueled their interest and investment in Galicia:

A very important thing that the Xunta does for us is the escolas abiertas (…)

What they learn over there, the students have the obligation of teaching here. That

is part of the agreement. All of the songs, all of the music and costumes, you have

to bring it back. (Lupe, Mos)

Others spoke more generally about their perceptions of the Xunta’s outreach. The following quote speaks directly to the sentiment shared among many diaspora about the work that Antonio

Miranda’s position as Secretary of Emigration has done in making the emigrant communities more visible:

This year he (Miranda) has come to Buenos Aires many times, and he fights for

the rights of emigrants. I think that the Xunta sees how the world is changing and

is finding how they can adapt and use the emigration to open and propagate

Galician culture. (Jaime, Centro Galicia)

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Some informants were more lukewarm about the Xunta’s participation, as the following quote illustrates:

I think that the Xunta and Galicia in general has done a lot of the community (…)

if they could have done more, or if the aid if effective, that’s another question. I

should say that I don’t think they have abandoned their people. (Martín,

Federation)

While there were sentiments of frustration directed towards the Xunta, these sentiments were not about the emigration or return strategies specifically. These frustrations mainly stem from two things, the first of which is the recent bankruptcy and turnover of the oldest and most important

Galician institution in the diaspora, the Centro Gallego. The second major frustration expressed by informants was the change in the external voting process, known as voto rogado. In the past,

Galician citizens were able to vote in all levels of elections through a ballot which was automatically mailed to their home. Now, at each election, the external citizen must request the ballot ahead of time. This has caused a major drop in the number of voters from the diaspora, and has angered many, especially older, members of the diaspora:

(…) that political weight here is not felt today. Not like it was in the 80s and 90s.

There are some programs to maintain cultural activities, but it’s not the same.

(Mirta, Centro Galicia)

Although many informants mentioned the voto rogado as something negative, most under the age of 50 said they do not have interest in voting in Galician elections anyway, especially not at the municipal scale. The belief among this younger cohort is that voting in local elections in

Galicia is an unjust tampering in issues of daily life over there that do not affect them, and that they should not influence through their vote.

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Engaging and Attracting Youth

One of the first problems facing the engagement and return plan is attracting of the ‘right type’ of diaspora from abroad. Both of my Galician governmental informants mentioned that the elderly have been keen to come back, but that their return negates the goal of the return strategy, which is primarily to inject the Galician populace with young, work ready individuals:

Right now there is a lot of worry about the people who are returning from

Venezuela and also for those who are still there. (…) People think that Galicians

returning from Venezuela is good but a lot of those returning are between 60 and

70 years old or more who don’t add anything, because, well you know how the

(demographic) situation is. (Emma, Council of Galician Culture)

Likewise, Miranda expressed the need for young returnees over elderly returnees:

Even though we welcome older people back with open arms, and that is their right

as well, we are working on incentivizing youth to come back. (Antonio R.

Miranda, Secretary General of Emigration)

Even though the policies and economic subsidies do not ignore the needs of elderly

Galicians in the diaspora, both strategies favor youth engagement and retention in the networks which comprise the diaspora collectives. Youth engagement is a worry in the communities abroad as well. Many of the diaspora associations through which the Xunta communicates its’ positions and polices are overwhelmingly comprised of people above the age of 60. These

Galicians are either emigrants themselves, from the post-war period, or the children of emigrants who still have strong connections to Galicia. The third generation, most of whom are in their mid-thirties, has experienced a drop off in participation:

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The first generation as of one culture. The second generation is of two cultures.

And the third generation is of 30 cultures. A third generation that is more

integrated in the collective (…) is not common. (Pedro, Federation)

In the Galician case, many youth may still be involved in a superficial way, attending larger parties and meals, but little else. Many informants from the diaspora spoke to the problem of youth retention, reiterating the problem that once kids hit adolescence, they leave the associations. Some come back and participate, but many do not. The Xunta’s programs like the escolas abiertas directly engage with youth who have been brought up in the collective learning to play bagpipe or tambourine, for instance, and giving them a trip to Galicia with other people their age. Gustavo counted four recent trips and indicated he would go again:

When I have the possibility to participate in escolas abiertas I go, I went in 2007,

2012, 2013, and 2017. (Gustavo, Centro Galicia)

Fernanda said she has been to Galicia twice, only once through a Xunta program:

I have only been to Galicia two times. The first time on my own , and the

second time, with the dance and music group in the year 2010. Those that had

family there went and stayed with their families, and those that did not stayed in

other houses in the village. And on that trip, we made a lot of friends. (Fernanda,

Vedra)

Cost/benefit

To uproot their lives and move across the ocean, the cost benefit analysis any individual must calculate will compare things like stability, safety, and economic security between the place they live and Galicia. In the case of many relatively stable countries with large numbers of

Galician diaspora, for example , Uruguay, and other EU countries, the cost of moving is

92 simply still too high compared to the benefits. For many Galician diaspora from countries with ongoing crisis, such as Venezuela and Cuba, return is an easier choice. According to the Galician

Statistical Institute (IGE), the clear majority of immigrants with Spanish citizenship are coming from Venezuela (IGE 2019). Argentina is the country with the largest number of Galician diaspora and is therefore a natural target for the strategies. Argentina is also a country on the cusp of crisis. The devaluation of the is a constant worry, as is trust in the government.

During the 2001 crisis, when the Argentinian banks liquidated life savings of families that had been investing in the dollar, and returned the amount in peso form, many understandably lost trust in the government and see no stable future in the country:

(…) it is the theme of insecurity on general. You realize that you cannot plan long

term. (Pablo. Returnee from Argentina. Male, late 30s)

Many in the diaspora indicated that they have their Spanish citizenship in their back pocket if things get bad. The safety net of Galicia is something that is a comforting thought, but for many, it is not yet the time to abandon Argentina:

Every few years when there is economic crisis, there is always the possibility of

going back to Spain, and lamentably many people think of that as the first option,

but for me that is the last option. (Gustavo, Centro Galicia)

As financial insecurity gets worse, so does crime. In the capitol city of Buenos Aires armed robbery is a common occurrence, and people are always vigilant on the streets. The knowledge that most Europeans do not have to deal with constant fear is something that was touched on in multiple interviews:

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The reality of our lives there, it was hectic, it was unsafe. So, after knowing the

quality of life that people and our family have here, it is impossible to not think

about. You think, ‘why not?’ Sometimes they say Galicia, Calidade. It’s that.

Quality of life. (Eva. Returnee from Argentina. Female, late 30s)

Leda, a young returnee with no dependents also expressed concern about safety in Buenos Aires:

The issue of insecurity is getting worse and worse there. When every week one of

your friends gets robbed, every week there is a story an armed robbery. I still tell

my sister she should think about coming here. My niece was held up at gunpoint

while they were robbed! The minute someone points a gun at my child is the

moment that I would leave. (Leda. Returnee from Argentina. Female, early 30s)

The most recent returnees that I spoke with were from Argentina, all young families who had migrated in the past year, or students who were finishing graduate school in Galicia. The families had decided that they wanted to leave Argentina for Europe before making the decision to settle in Galicia, and even after the decision to settle in Galicia was made, they told me that the incentives offered from the Xunta did not factor into the decision, but were merely a perk.

The single students on the other hand did factor in the assistance from the Xunta, because most were in Galicia due to the master’s degree scholarship program. Another young woman I spoke with decided to come to Galicia because she had been involved with the Galician collective and had traveled to Galicia with the escolas abiertas, indicating that the Xunta’s strategy did indeed influence her settlement there. Another group I found to interview in Galicia were older migrants from Cuba, Uruguay, and Argentina. Individuals in this group said they did not receive any help from the Xunta, either because they had migrated before the most recent plan was inaugurated, or, because they felt they were well off enough to settle on their own.

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Bureaucratic Organization

A major issue that arose during my interviews was an apparent lack of organization across government offices regarding the implementation of the strategy. As the Secretary of

Emigration stresses, these policies constitute part of a strategy which implicates all levels of government in the creative assistance of returnees, and therefore cannot be easily monitored based on quantitative assessments:

It is not a plan, it is a strategy. The elements of the strategy are not able to be

submitted to the statistical department. I cannot tell you how many families have

taken advantage of which lines of help. (Antonio R. Miranda, Secretary of

Emigration)

When the policies mentioned in the emigration or return strategy are so broadly based, miscommunication can occur from one office to the next. This was a sentiment shared by informants in the government and repeatedly among returnees. Information flows from the

Office of Emigration to points of contact in each of the offices having anything to do with any part of the strategy policies. Miranda assured me that he has the promise of every department head to disseminate the information needed to facilitate a smooth return, but like any bureaucratic structure, there can be issues:

If I get to a window of some department and ask about something, the response

will be determined by the person sitting across the window. I have the promise of

every department that they have implemented these measures, but I cannot

supervise everyone. (Antonio R. Miranda, Secretary of Emigration)

Emma was more critical of what she sees as a disorganized diaspora engagement effort:

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Here in Galicia, the exterior action is a bit scattered. Other regions, like, for

example, Basque country or Catalonia, they have created secretary generals of

exterior action which concentrate everything that has to do with the exterior in

one building. (Emma, Council of Galician Culture)

One of the most important and pressing issues for any immigrant is the question of where to live. Both of the young families that I interviewed told me that they had experienced problems with finding a permanent place of residency so that they could begin to take advantage of the lines of help offered from the Xunta. To get an ID card and register in the returnee system, you need a permanent address. In order to get a permanent address, you need to be able to demonstrate a salary and put down a security payment, as well as have an ID card. Many returnees are able to depend on the generosity of family and friends in the area for a registered address, but not everyone has such concrete familial connections in the exact city or village that they would like to settle in. In the returnee strategy, the Xunta claims to have eased the way for returnees in matters such as this, but something like renting goes outside the government and involves private citizens. The following quote illustrates that the average Galician landlord is not up to date on the returnee plan:

They told us that we would have an time finding a place to . They said

that they would not ask for domicile or bank statements or any of those things

that, logically, we would not have as returnees. But the truth is that the renters are

not integrated into the program at all. Then when we called the Xunta to tell them

we couldn’t rent, they asked “why not?” well, because when we go to find rental

they ask for the DNI (ID card) we can’t get the DNI without having a registered

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place of residence! It’s a circle. (Xoán & Emilia. Returnee couple from Argentina.

Late 20s.)

The couple that expressed this frustration are young, with two young daughters. Emilia, the mother in the couple said that she had been contacted via by another Argentinian-

Galician woman who was expecting a child and thinking of making the move to Galicia as well.

Emilia told her that the reality of the return plan and the lines of help are not what they had thought. She told me that she discouraged her from coming over with an infant because the economic help would not be coming quickly.

The families that I interviewed were most critical of the bureaucratic glitches in the return plan. While both families stressed that they did not come because of the lines of help offered in the return plan, they said they felt that false promises had been made. The main issue stems from misinformation between Galician offices, which hinders delivery of returnee aid. One interviewee said that no one in the Vigo office, which is the city she and her family have settled in, knew what the returnee plan even was:

They don’t have people dedicated to understanding how to help returnees, and

they don’t make it clear that the amounts they say you will get are estimates based

on last year. (Leda. Returnee, from Argentina. Female, early 30s)

Interviewees also stressed miscommunication between the Xunta in Galicia and the Xunta in

Buenos Aires which acts as delegate to the diaspora. The returnees that I interviewed had been given information from the Xunta in Buenos Aires before making the move:

We had been told that there was a financial line for helping with rentals as well. If

you were a certain age, living in a certain zone of Galicia, they would finance

50% up to some amount. So we came here and thought we would be able to get

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that help, but they told us it doesn’t exist anymore. But clearly, the Xunta in BA

did not know that. Well, to be clear, it still exists, but only for cities of less than

20,000 inhabitants. But over there all they say is “there is a help to rent!” so there

is a lot of misinformation between the Xunta here and the Xunta there. (Xoán &

Emilia. Returnee couple from Argentina. Late 20s.)

Unemployment

The students that I interviewed, as well as older returnees, did not talk about specific issues in the plan, but seemed to agree that the plan is well intentioned yet fundamentally flawed in its aim of attracting young workers. The students were able to speak to the difficulties of finding skilled work in the region. Galicia still has high youth unemployment, over 30% for people age 16-30, which is the main reason why young people continue to emigrate from Galicia today (IGE, 2019). The following quotes are from two different students who both took advantage of the bolsas da excelencia, a scholarship which pays for the Galician emigrant or descendant’s master’s degree at the University of Santiago de Compostela. Implicit in the program is the expectation that the students will stay and find work in Galicia:

We come here with expectations but those are pretty quickly dashed. Graduates

either go back home or go to other places in Europe for work. The majority of my

classmates who were on the scholarship have returned to Latin America. I can

count on one hand the people who have stayed. And I think that most people who

come want to stay, but it’s that last step (of finding work) that is impossible.

(Esteban. Student, male, mid 20s. Argentina)

Clara, a recent sociology major, expressed similar frustration:

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(…) they want to incentivize some young person to come back for graduate

school with great big scholarship, but then once they complete the degree there is

no way to insert themselves into the labor force here. It seems to me to be an

incomplete strategy. (Clara, Student, female, mid 20s. Argentina)

These two students had finished their master’s degrees within a year of when we spoke in

June of 2019, and they were both trying to find jobs to stay in Galicia, or in Europe, yet both were having difficulty in the pursuit.

The older returnees voiced general positivity about the strategy, citing again the need for more youth and the worrying demographic situation. Even though most of these returnees did not receive help themselves when they came, they vouch for the intentions of the Xunta, and maintain that the quality of life in Galicia may be worth having to settle for a lower skill job:

Galicia is a very good place to raise children, it is a great place for young families

to live. So, I think if people come here they will try and stay. There is a lot to do

here, even though skilled work is lacking. (Isabella. Returnee from Uruguay.

Female, mid 50s).

The issues raised by these interviewees are mirrored by the migratory data from the IGE.

Since 2012, every year there have been roughly the same number of Spanish immigrants as emigrants through the region (IGE, 2018). While citizen immigration (return) from places like

Venezuela keeps growing, the numbers of Spanish citizens returning from other countries has seen a modest increase. Meanwhile, the numbers of Galicians leaving, either for other autonomous communities of Spain, or for other countries, practically negates the number of

Spaniards entering Galicia. Young people with a college degree is the category with the highest unemployment rate in Galicia currently hovering at 40 percent (IGE, 2019). Based on these

99 sentiments and the statistics it could be that right now Galicia acts as gateway, rather than a destination for Galician descendants.

Returnees vs. Immigrants

When contemplating the strategy put forth by the Xunta, a logical question is why such a heavy favor of return over any other type of immigration? Given the demographic situation facing Galicia, one would think any influx of young people, from anywhere, would be desired.

When looking at the migratory movements of foreigners (those without Spanish citizenship), a net immigration appears, as Galicia has roughly ten thousand more immigrants than emigrants per year in this category. Yet non-Spanish immigration is not commented upon at all in the

Xunta’s publicity. The positioning of returnees vs. immigrants is quite stark based on the content narrative put forth by the Xunta. Return is handled by the secretary of emigration, which has a

Twitter handle, a flashy Instagram account, an attractive and interactive webpage, and a very beautiful office in the historic center of the capitol of Galicia. The office of immigration, on the other hand, has a webpage buried in the directory of social inclusion, in the council of social politics, with no social media presence, and a physical office in the general administrative building in the Xunta’s northern location in the outskirts of Santiago de Compostela.

When I asked the leadership about favoring Galician return vs immigration, both of my institutional informants spoke about an ease of adaptation for Galician returnees that is, according to them, harder to come by for immigrants without that cultural background:

(Returnees are) not more important per say, but they are more easily attainable,

have more qualifications, and can more easily contribute. (Emma, Council of

Galician Culture)

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They also spoke about the reception of returnees vs that of other immigrants in Galician society, stating that returnees are more readily welcomed because of their pre-existing familial, cultural, and emotional connections to Galicia:

Well, we are favoring the return of our family members. When the Galician

returnee gets here, they are welcomed like a member of the family. They know

our customs, our culture. That process of return is not full of difficulty like in

other cases. Logically, and evidently, Galicians feel like their family members

have returned, and in many cases, it is the literal truth. (Antonio R. Miranda,

Secretary of Emigration)

I asked returnees themselves what they thought about their social reception into Galicia compared with possible discrimination other immigrants may feel. The majority said that they feel perfectly well accepted and have faced little to no discrimination. Many said that the fact that they are from Latin America ignites a connection in people, since most Galicians have some familial connection to a country in that region:

When I speak to people here it is something that gives me value and that people

like. They like to know I am from Argentina, and I’m well received because of it.

(Ana. Returnee, Female, early 20s. Argentina)

In terms of being favored, however, many still felt that when it comes to jobs they are not favored over other immigrants, and not on an equal playing field as Galician-born applicants:

I feel intolerance sometimes, especially when applying for a job. Between me and

the local? They will always take the local. (Esteban. Student, male, mid 20s.

Argentina)

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Most returnees expressed their opinions that Galicia is generally an open and tolerant society to those immigrants who come in legally and abide by the social norms of western European society:

If your behavior is not compatible, you will not have the same opportunities.

People here will not sympathize with bad behavior. People from who come

here with the proper papers, working hard, selling things on the streets, …people

will help out. You can see that people will buy those things, lend a hand, give

some money, because they are trying hard. (Mar. Returnee, female, mid 30s.

Argentina)

Yet, others made it clear they understood their privilege in the current Galician and Spanish immigration system, especially given the European “migrant crisis” narrative of recent years:

This construction of a (migrant) crisis, why? Because they are coming from South

of the Mediterranean in dangerous boats (…) I am conflicted because I feel like I

am on my grant of a different category. I am better received than other people.

Definitely. (Clara. Student from Argentina. Female, early 20s.)

Emilia also told me that Argentinians are well received in Galicia:

I speak with people from all over, people from various immigrant groups. And I

see a lot of discrimination. So, Argentinians are, at least right now, well received

here compared to other groups. (Emilia. Returnee. Female, late 20s. Argentina)

Conclusion

Galicia is attempting to tap into its human resource in the diaspora through programs and policies aimed at incentivizing diaspora involvement and ultimately return to Galicia. Working off the broad aims of the engagement laws, Galicia, as the autonomous

102 community with the highest number of diaspora abroad, has taken their regional diaspora engagement above and beyond that of the state, specifically targeting Galician diaspora with policies that aim at eventual diaspora return. Since the inauguration of Antonio R. Miranda as

Secretary of Emigration in 2012, the Xunta has implemented two diaspora engagement strategies, one rooted in connecting, or embracing with the diaspora and subsequent generations, and the other aimed at tapping diaspora, specifically pursuing their return and settlement in the region through financial incentives. After speaking with lawmakers, diaspora in Argentina, and returnees in Galicia, the results of the strategy as it nears its 2020 terminus are mixed. Issues that arose were the attraction and retention of youth in Galicia, miscommunication in the application of the policies between Xunta offices in Galicia and abroad, and job placement for high skilled returnees. According to interviewees, the biggest issue with the strategy is the perceived backwards implementation of it. Referring to Figure 5.5, perhaps innovation, job creation, and investment need to precede demographic dynamism to achieve a robust workforce and a healthy economy. If not, Galicia may act as a European gateway and not a destination for high skilled returnees from the diaspora.

Another theme that informants had conflicting thoughts about was the ethnocentrism of the policies themselves. All informants understood that the demographic shift is one of the key issues facing Galicia now, but only a few of them were willing to talk about the implied racism of favoring European return over other types of immigration. While Galicia does receive immigration from Eastern Europe and Africa, as well as non-citizen immigration from Latin

America, these numbers are modest when compared with other regions of Spain, like Andalucía and Catalonia (IGE, 2019). With an economy dominated by tourism and growing service sector jobs, Galicia might try to incentivize any immigrant to come and settle in the region. Yet the

103 rhetoric of diaspora return, and high skilled and highly educated diaspora at that, remains the focus of Galicia’s public immigration platform. This messaging presents Galicia as a utopia for young, educated, and skilled workers of European decent, a reality that is yet to be fulfilled.

Returnees say they did not migrate to Galicia because of the return incentives but rather because of family ties, social adaptability, and quality of life. Returnees reported struggling with job placement and frustration with the Xunta’s application of the return policies. Meanwhile, diaspora in Buenos Aires was more likely to mention and appreciate the cultural programs offered by the Xunta than the return programs. Return migration was never considered in conjunction with the Xunta’s return policies. Moreover, diaspora return incentives in the midst of a xenophobic European migrant “crisis” are inherently ethnocentric when in reality Galicia needs young workers of any ethnicity. Given these findings, regions like Galicia might consider concentrating their diaspora engagement efforts on “embrace” rather than “tapping” policies as these will continue to strengthen ties between regions and diaspora and perhaps attract diaspora who choose to migrate due to push factors while not being exclusionary to non-descendant immigrants.

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CHPATER 6 – BUENOS AIRES FOSTERING THE COLLECTIVE & PROMOTING DIVERSITY

Buenos Aires, as a , a capital city, and an autonomous region, commands the attention of Argentina and the . As the political, cultural, and academic powerhouse of Argentina, the city of Buenos Aires leads the country, acting as its sole gateway to the globe. Yet while it may be easy to think of Argentina and Buenos Aires as one in the same, recent political narratives prove otherwise. In 2017, President issued a decree stating that the then liberal immigration policies would be tightened. In the statement, Macri described what he and his administration consider to be the dangers of immigration and of immigrants, citing an uptick in criminality in the country (Grimson, 2017). The presidential decree has led to a policy shift in Argentina resulting in the tightening of borders and an increase in deportation of illegal immigrants which mirrors that of the Trump administration in the U.S

(Nau, 2019). While these policies were being drafted, the autonomous capital city of Buenos

Aires was re-tooling its own set of cultural policies and tourism campaigns aimed at highlighting cultural diversity and ethnic pluralism in the city under the umbrella of human rights.

In a country which for almost 200 years boasted of itself as a “white” nation, the shift from whiteness of was an abrupt turn foreshadowed by a few key events. The

2001 economic crisis set off a flurry of genealogical research as Argentinians scrambled to secure passports from countries of origin. In this process, Argentina became a country of emigration for a brief while, and Argentinians began to experience prejudice abroad (Aguiló,

2018). Since then, Argentinians have been questioning their status as a “white” country made up of European descendants. Then, the Kirchner administrations that followed the crisis deliberately

105 replaced the national narrative European exceptionalism with a Latin Americanist position

(Biglieri, 2007). Finally, the global trend of multiculturalism as an attractive and merchandisable trait set the stage for marginalized peoples to gain more visibility.

Buenos Aires has recently been critiqued for its hastening of consumer culture, neo- liberalization of public space and goods (Kanai, 2009), and its potentially culturally destructive tourism campaigns (Dinardi, 2017). As a mega city, Buenos Aires holds the power of the national and global imagination, both in the images that it curates and exports to the world, and in the urban experience that it produces for both locals and tourists (Gilbert, 1996). In the past decade, Buenos Aires as a city has gone above and beyond the messaging of the state to boost its global image as a culturally diverse and accepting place, despite rising poverty and narratives of racial fear fueled by local and social media (Barbero, 2018).

Because of the strong tradition of ethnic associationism, Buenos Aires has a vast network of cultural collectives that the city has used as the foundation of its cultural promotion platform.

One of the main modes of cultural promotion has been the proliferation of an urban festival series called Buenos Aires Celebra, which dedicates one day for each of the ethnic collectives in the city to celebrate together in the heart of the historic district. Another way the city has incorporated the collectives has been the protection and promotion of association buildings, for example by including them in Noche de los Museos (Night of the Museums), wherein association buildings are opened alongside museums for free community entry and tours. Because Buenos

Aires is a diasporic hub for many countries, the city has cultivated space for the facilitation of diaspora engagement actors such as multi-scale government agencies, tourism companies, and private ethnic schools and hospitals. These multi-faceted strategies have on-the-ground reverberations among the cultural communities that lend their images to such campaigns. This

106 chapter will describe the ways in which Buenos Aires has gone about boosting ethnic visibility and promoting cultural diversity in a time of rising xenophobia across Argentina. Voices from city officials and collective leaders point to an overall positive reception of the policies and initiatives, but a few key problems point to the brown-washing of Buenos Aires. I will then look at the case of the Galician community in the city specifically, and will explore and contextualize the reception of these policies among active individuals in the Galician collective.

The National Framing of Immigration

President Mauricio Macri’s urgent 2017 decree on immigrant criminality certainly shifted the until-then liberal official policy on immigration, yet at the same time it mirrored fomenting public opinion about “undesirable” immigrants coming into Argentina from elsewhere in Latin

America. Since the 2001 economic crisis in Argentina, opinion on immigration has gone from positive to negative, tracing the story arc of crisis in Argentina’s own streets in the early 2000s which saw many Argentinians emigrate, to the crisis in and later Venezuela which continues to push Latin into a now-stabilized Argentina.

Negative public opinion about non-European immigrants is baked into Argentina’s first constitution, an opinion written about extensively by one of Argentina’ s most prominent founding fathers, Saremiento. As the ’s “European State,” Argentina held on to ideas of itself as a white nation until the mid 2000s (Aguiló, 2018). More recently, East immigrants, such as the Japanese, have also been welcomed as desirable immigrants (Ko, 2016), and categories for Afro and indigenous peoples have now been made available in the census, for the first time recognizing the mere presence of these groups. Yet as quickly as the pendulum swings toward a national re-examination of racial discourse, it swings back toward fear of

Immigrants with darker skin tones. In his recent book, Ignacio Aguiló (2018) traces the ways in

107 which the Argentinian nation became both more accepting of, and more fearful of minorities of color. As popular culture came to re-examine the label of “negro” which is given to anyone who is not white, more nuance surrounding minorities of color arose. And, while the country healed from economic crisis and the rest of the region grew in precarity, Argentina began to accept immigrants of color from pooer neighboring Latin American countries. Argentina then congratulated itself for its’ “first world” status among other desirable destination countries while at the same time increasingly fearing both legal and illegal immigration and rising crime rates in cities (Aguriló, 2018, p.101). The election of president Macri sealed the Argentinian swing to the right, and the subsequent shift in immigration policy.

In a personal interview, the national director of immigration, Horacio Garcia, stated that immigration is not a problem per se, but that immigrants need to settle outside of the city of

Buenos Aires. In our conversation, he outlined his status as the son of immigrants from Spain and told the common story of the European migratory flows which made the country what it is today. He stated that immigration is very low compared to historical levels and assured me that it is not the country of origin that worries him, but the capacity of the City of Buenos Aires to continue to absorb more bodies:

The city is at capacity, and yet this is an empty country. The population density of

the Buenos Aires metro area is 10 thousand people per square kilometer. In the

whole country, it is 16 people per square kilometer. Meanwhile, 90 percent of the

people we have processed in the past three years have stayed here (in Buenos

Aires), the city is full. (Horacio Garcia, National Director of Immigration)

Across from Mr. Garcia’s Buenos Aires office is the national museum of immigration, known as the Immigrant’s Hotel. It is called the Immigrant’s Hotel because it was the processing

108 point for immigrants in Argentina from 1911-1953. If immigrants did not have an immediate place to go, needed job placement services, or needed medical attention, they were given a bunk bed and allowed to stay in the hotel for up to five days. Today, the hotel serves as a free museum, documenting and memorializing the groups that passed through its halls with the display of paperwork, photos, and recreations of the living space provided. The Immigrant’s

Hotel in Buenos Aires can easily be compared to Ellis Island in New York. Both facilities served as the key point of disembarkation and processing of European immigrants who at the time were deemed suspicious and disease-ridden. Today, they both serve as mythologized national beacons of freedom in popular culture, and work to justify white superiority by reinforcing the narrative of past “good” migrations (Irwin, 2013).

Due to the time period in which the Immigrant’s Hotel was operating, it processed mostly

European immigrants largely hailing from Italy, Spain, and Eastern Europe. Thus, the memorialization and commemoration taking place inside the museum focuses almost exclusively on migrants from Europe. Pictures of Caucasian families lugging suitcases down boat stairwells, waiting in lines, and bidding goodbye to neighbors are accompanied by first person stories of the journey and settlement in Buenos Aires. The pictures and stories portray struggle and hardship, but with the patina of a morally just and noble cause, both from the state in the goal of filling the country, and from the immigrants in settling and making an honest life in Argentina (Figures 6.1

& 6.2).

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Figure 6.1 - Book in the Argentine Hotel Figure 6.2 - Photo of Galician Immigrants in of Immigrants museum. Photo by the Argentine Hotel of Immigrants Museum. Author Photo by Author

This museum, like Ellis Island, ends the timeline of immigration at the closing of the facility. Because this acts as the only official commemorative story of immigration in the capital of Argentina, popular imagination of immigration is effectively sealed off with the closing of the museum timeline. Anyone who arrives in Argentina after the mid 1950s is part of a new narrative of immigration, one that is left to be shaped by popular culture and public perception.

Immigration after this period also becomes decidedly different, shifting from European points of origin to a flow of migrants from other Latin American countries like , , and

Columbia, later Peru, and most recently Venezuela.

Diversity Promotion in Buenos Aires

Within the mayoral office of Buenos Aires is the Secretary of Human Rights and Cultural

Pluralism. This is the office responsible for monitoring issues of race and sexual orientation in the city and crafting policies which promote tolerance and acceptance. The secretarial position contains three major areas of work: the Office of Collectives, which deals with the ethnic collectives of the city; the Office of Diversity and Coexistence, which supports LGBTQ rights;

110 and Memory Park, which is a project dedicated to remembrance of victims of through memorials and public art. This chapter will focus on the work of the Office of

Collectives, which does the most visible work of cultural promotion in the city, dealing directly with the ethnic groups that call Buenos Aires home.

The principal functions of the Office of Collectives are broadly, to “value the culture of the collectives and integrate those cultures into the larger culture of Buenos Aires” (Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 2019). With this goal in mind, the office has created events surrounding sport, culinary arts, youth, and social aspects of the collectives of the city, always making a point of including the larger public in their discourse on the collectives in an attempt to open the collectives up to the city and vice versa. There are several specific programs that the office has rolled out, about half of which involve the incorporation and retention of youth in the collectives, and others of which have become staples on the city’s festival calendar.

Youth Programs

One of the goals of both the city and the collectives is to encourage participation from youth. The collectives have acted as social spaces and community centers in the past, but youth involvement has been dwindling in recent decades. The largest collectives are now on their second or third generation of Argentinian-born descendants, and many of this generation now have multi-cultural backgrounds. They exhibit a complicated sense of belonging to any one collective association, existing largely in a digital, rather than a physical space (Suarez, 2012).

The office of collectives has created a digital network which connects youth from different collectives, and uses the collaborative ideas generated to foment new inter-collective programs, as well as plugs youth into leadership roles in city projects. The digital network is open to any youth ages 18-35 in the city belonging to any ethnic community, no membership in an

111 association required. Programs that this group has come up with and organized include conferences, lectures, a physical booth for the dissemination of information about the network, a youth business exchange, and a city-wide “mini .”

Today, many association properties have sporting options available, such as indoor soccer, , and, in some cases, swimming pools and full gyms. This has proven to be a popular point of connection between youth and the collectives, and the office of collectives has tapped into this more modern association function. The Mundalito de Jóvenes (Youth “Mini”

World Cup) is a soccer tournament hosted by the city which fields teams from each of the participating collectives (Figure 6.3). The teams of youth, largely comprised of men, sport jerseys with the flags of their associations or of their ancestral home country. This is an event that has occurred every year since 2016, when the first was Paraguay.

Figure 6.3 - Youth “mini world cup” of the collectives. Source: Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (2019)

The office has also created two contests to incite civic participation in youth across the collectives. The first is a photography contest, which asks that amateur photographers submit

112 photos that reflect some scene of life inside the collectives. The top three photos are used in promotional materials in both public and private endeavors related to urban enhancement. The second contest is called “Know Your Roots,” and it centers around giving decedents from specific countries the opportunity to travel to their countries of origin. Each year the city partners with one collective to give a young person the opportunity to travel to that country. This contest is only in its second year, but publicity from the 2017 contest, which focused on Italy with the collaboration and sponsorship of the Italian collective and Italian Tourism Office, features contest winner Francisco traveling to Italy to meet his great-grandmother and learn more about her life.

Festivals and Events The Office of Collectives has put several yearly events into effect, including a culinary competition, a day to celebrate immigrants, and a rolling series of festivals dedicated to each of the collectives in the city. These events take up most of the office’s time and budget, accounting for about 90% of their resources. They have also been very well received, with higher than expected turn-out rates and positive reception among the city’s collectives.

In collaboration with the city’s Secretary of Culture and their Capitol of Gastronomy campaign, the Office of the Collectives has created a space in the city where chefs and restaurants from different collectives can come and sell their traditional ethnic foods. This space is called Patio de los Lecheros, and is a public-private enterprise. The space was converted from an abandoned railroad loading yard into an open patio surrounded by permanent food stands. The space is cared for by the city and occupied by private businesses. The space also boasts a public herb garden, a beer garden, and a stage where performances are held on the weekends.

The restaurants involved in the Patio de los Lecheros are invited, along with others, to participate in the yearly Gastronomic Patio of the Collectives, an event that gathers ethnic 113 restaurants from all over the city into the Av. De Mayo, the most central thoroughfare in Buenos

Aires, to display and sell their fares. While the Gastronomic Patio is on the street, there is a stage at the end of Av. De Mayo, where a chef competition is happening. This is called the Desafío de Cocineros, a live cooking contest in which 30 chefs from different collectives compete by presenting traditional dishes to a panel of famous Argentinian chefs.

In the first week of , which has been designated the month of the immigrant, the city hosts a Dia del Inmigrante, “Day of the Immigrant.” All 50 collectives are invited to participate, but the city does most of the work, constructing performance pavilions, a history of immigration timeline tunnel (Figure 6.4), and areas for games and educational talks. The event has been held in public , but has lately been held on Av. de Mayo in the heart of the city.

Entry is always free.

Figure 6.4 – Immigration timeline tunnel. Source: Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (2019)

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The most important event that the Offices of Collectives has rolled out in the last decade is the Buenos Aires Celebra series. This is a massive series of rolling festival days, totaling 30 to

35-day long events each year. Each major ethnic group in the city can claim a date on the city calendar, usually one that corresponds to an important day in the group’s history and celebrate their cultural contribution to the city and the country through showcasing their culture and unique traditions. Each ethnic association collective must spearhead the planning and implementation of their unique festival. The city of Buenos Aires describes the series as having a double objective: “that the collectives are able to celebrate the important dates of their homelands, demonstrating their culture, history, and identity, and at the same time sharing it with neighbors and tourists” (Buenos Aires Celebra, n.d). Each unique festival in the series takes place on the centrally located Av. de Mayo.

Digital Presence When looking at the presentation of cultural diversity displayed on the Buenos Aires city website, an aura of peace and coexistence radiates off the screen. Each of the programs that have been outlined thus far have their own official pages and social media handles, as do many other pages and sections of the city’s overall web presence that are geared towards showcasing a diverse and tolerant city.

In 2018, The Office of the Collectives unveiled another digital platform specifically for the collectives, called BAxColectividades. This platform is meant to connect members of the collectives with one another, and to resources in the city to expedite the processing and of newer migrants. The platform features an interactive map showing the location of and information about each registered ethnic association. The platform also features personal stories about migrants in the city, highlighting a diverse cast of people. Many of the people represented on the website are people of color from non-European collectives. The choice of 115 highlighting non-European collectives is indicative of the city’s aim of broadening the ethnic narrative counter to the traditional Argentinian national portrait of an all-white populace.

The number of collectives in the city is around 50, most of which hail from European backgrounds. In the BAxColectividades platform, there is a running banner with flag icons corresponding to each of the collectives. The website invites users to click on each of the icons and learn more about each collective. Clicking on any one of the flag icons will present users with a page full of information about that collective, including history of migration to Argentina, number of immigrants in the city, curiosities and fun facts about the collective’s role and influence in the city, and recipes from the kitchens of that collective. Despite some collectives playing a much larger role in the development of modern Argentina and of Buenos Aires, it seems that the Office of the Collectives makes a point to give equal digital real estate to each collective, no matter how small or recent in the city.

The platform was unveiled at Patio de los Lecheros, with city officials and leaders from the collective invited to showcase the new website. Figure 6.5 shows all of the collective leaders in attendance posing with the city’s Secretary of Human Rights.

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Figure 6.5 - Collective leaders at the unveiling of the BAxColectividades Digital Platform. Photo by Author.

Through its digital presence, as well as through the various initiatives aimed at ethnic diversity promotion and the protection of the collectives, the city of Buenos Aires is trying to project an image of racial equality and cultural diversity which contrasts with the current rhetoric coming from the . Based on interviews with the National Director of

Immigration, a city legislator, the head of the Office of the Collectives, and leaders of various collectives, the initiatives are well received across the board, and the city is doing a better job of receiving immigrants and promoting tolerance than the state. However, because the policies are based on the existing collective structure and the social networks therein, they inherently favor older European collectives and their descendants, pointing to a brown-washing effect.

Urban Policies and the Collectives The head of the Office of Collectives is Adrian Varela, who answers to the Secretary of

Human Rights in the Mayor’s office. Mr. Varela states that the purpose of his office is crafting policies that protect and promote the cultural heritage of the city’s collectives. Central to 117 the narrative that the office espouses on their website as well as the narrative that Mr. Varela recounted for me during our interview was the historical importance of the migration that Buenos

Aires received:

Since the city was constructed from the migratory flows which brought the

collectives here and ended up populating all of Argentina, the city of Buenos

Aires understands that the collectives are a part of cultural heritage of the city.

(Adrian Varela, Director of the Office of Collectives)

Practically, no one in Buenos Aires would disagree with this statement made by Mr. Varela.

However, when thinking about the relative importance of migratory groups, two collectives dominate both the historical and contemporary Argentinian narrative: the Spanish and the

Italians (Shumway, 1991). Spain and Italy had the most emigrants settle in Argentina, and more

Argentinians claim an Italian and/or Spanish ancestry than any other decadency. These groups, along with the smaller Eastern and Northern European migratory flows, were famously encouraged by the state in the 1800s to build a white and “civilized” country and are still used as proof of the success of the Europeanization project of Argentina’s founding fathers (Slater,

2008). These groups now boast politicians, businessmen and women, famous artists and architects, and renowned scholars. These two groups also made the largest mark on the cultural landscape of the city of Buenos Aires, establishing more small businesses and cultural associations than any other group (see Chapter 10). So, while the historical importance of migration writ large cannot be ignored or understated, the Spanish and Italian collectives still dominate most realms of cultural life in Buenos Aires and continue to dominate in the social imagination of Porteños as a European populace made up of ‘desirable’ migratory flows

(Barbero, 2018).

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Because the narrative of European dominance has held steady for so long in Argentina, the arrival of new immigrants from Latin America has brought something of a cultural shift. In many social sectors, new faces have brought about a fear of the unknown and a stereotyping of the newcomers as poor and criminal (Barbero, 2018). Cecilia Fererro, a member of city legislature, mirrored this fear in our interview:

In the last few years there has been a difference in the reception of migrants from

Latin America, and this generated resistance in sectors of society who think that

there is a ‘good’ migration and a ‘bad’ migration. In some neighborhoods where

there are more migrants, a discourse of immigrants taking something away from

the city, and I think it is that mentality of deserving, or owning something because

you got here first. (Cecilia Ferrero, Buenos Aires city legistlature)

The policies created by the Office of Human Rights and the Office of the Collectives are an attempt to address this social insecurity and promote tolerance between new and old groups. As

Mr. Varela states: “the main goal of the office (…) is the coexistence of racial groups in the city.”

Participation In our interview, Mr. Varela stated that the work Buenos Aires is doing shines as a

“global example of cultural and racial acceptance.” The model of cultural and racial acceptance that the city has created is modeled off the existing structure of the collectives, and depends on the participation and robustness of the associations that make up each ethnic collective. For example, the Buenos Aires Celebra series is organized by the collectives themselves, and the survival of the event is predicated on the willingness and ability of each collective to cooperate and execute the event:

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For me the ideal formula for the events we do, in terms of organizing and

planning the events and the care of cultural patrimony, is the participation of the

collectives, and the promise from each association in the participation of the

work, because that will give the event and authentication (Adrian

Varela, Head of Office of Collectives)

In 2018, the Galician community did not have a BA Celebra event, because of an inability among the leadership to decide on a date. Mr. Varela points out that without the assistance of the collectives in planning and execution, the events would not have legitimacy from the collectives in question and may be poorly attended and/or perceived as inauthentic.

While the issue of inauthenticity is a valid concern, some of the collectives are better able to participate and plan events and programs due to their status as established members of the city. In the case of older collectives such as the Spanish and Italians, many associations boast elite members who hold well-connected positions such as government offices. Because of the status of these members and the subsequent cache of the associations to which they belong, some associations, and by extension their respective collectives, are in a much better position to influence, plan, and execute events in the city. Ms. Ferrero expressed this concern in our interview:

Connecting with the city depends on the links that each organization has made

through their leaders and the government. If the energy does not come from the

actors in the collective nothing will get accomplished. I don’t see it as part of the

public agenda of the city. I don’t see members of government trying to strengthen

these relationships or make the collective patrimony the front and center (…) so

the impetus is on the collectives. (Cecelia Ferrero, Buenos Aires City Legislature)

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As Ms. Ferrero puts it, the activity of the Office of Collective depends on the participation of actors in the collectives themselves. Yet some collectives are more engaged in the socio-political life of the city than others. As previously mentioned, the Spanish and Italian collectives, as the largest and most influential groups, have larger and deeper social networks which gives them more freedom to tap into resources in planning and hosting events and gaining resources from the city. As Buenos Aires Celebra constitute the largest events put on by the Office of

Collectives, and indeed are some of the largest events on the city calendar, they require the coming together of various groups. Direction and participation from the collective are prerequisites for an event, but getting more funding and legitimacy is helped by participation from the government of the collective in question. In the case of many European collectives, the home governments and their /consulate counterparts in the city enthusiastically participate. Buenos Aires Celebra Galicia for example is backed by participation and funding from the office of the Xunta, whose Buenos Aires office acts as the consulate for the region. The

Xunta gives support to the collective, helps to organize and promote the event, and plays a role in the festivities of the day as well. As Mr. Varela puts it, the best BA Celebra events are those that have institutional governmental support:

I would like each collective to have the institutional backing that is necessary

regarding economic help especially, from the country of origin. (…) it usually

makes the celebration better than it would be if it were just the collective, which is

made of volunteers, so it’s much harder to find resources, to give the proper

amount of time. These are pretty large events, so they are difficult to plan and pull

off. (Adrian Varela, Head of Office of Collectives)

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The Xunta de Galicia is an example of a government with a high level of investment in their diaspora. European governments such as those in Spain and Italy may see an event series like the

BA Celebra as an opportunity to embrace and subsequently tap into their human capital abroad.

Other governments, like those in Venezuela, , and Bolivia, may be less enthusiastic to give backing to an event series like this due to demographic and political issues being faced at home.

Upkeep of Association Buildings Many of the policies created in The Office of the Collectives are meant to alleviate problems that are commonly communicated from the collectives to the city. Issues such as youth engagement, digital training, and online presence are common among many of the collectives in the city that largely consist of older members. Another common problem is upkeep of association buildings. Many of the associations in the city boast prominent buildings in some of the city’s oldest neighborhoods; Figures 6.6, 6.7, and 6.8 are just a few examples. Many are able to rent out spaces to help with upkeep, or house restaurants to bring in extra income; but others, because of high operating costs coupled with a dwindling member population, are in danger of losing their buildings. Because of this, the Office of Collectives has a fund to help with building upkeep, recognizing the importance of having and maintaining a physical space in the city for cultural events.

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Figure 6.6 – Centro Galicia. Figure 6.7 – French Basque Figure 6.8 – Peloponnese Photo by Author. Center. Photo by Author. Union. Photo by Author.

Due to the timing of migratory flows in the city, older, primarily European collectives are the ones that hold valuable property in the city limits. Some collectives, like the Galician collective, have dozens of association buildings in the . While upkeep of the association buildings can be costly, the tax system in Argentina and the autonomous city of

Buenos Aires creates an environment where older property is taxed relatively lightly, thus encouraging the retention of property across generations ( et al., 2014). The same system which makes it ideal to inherit property makes acquiring property in the city extremely difficult.

Consequently, newer collectives own fewer buildings than older collectives.

Lack of property is an issue when it comes to obvious problems like generating a meeting place for members and events, but owning buildings can also be an income generator if portions of the property are rented out. Centro Galicia for example owns the majority of a city block in the Balvanera neighborhood of Buenos Aires. Centro Galicia converted a wing of its building into a gym complete with indoor basketball court and swimming pool roughly ten years ago, and is now able to collect membership dues from patrons in the neighborhood. Parking is another income generator for property owners in the city, as space is at a . Many of the larger

123 and older buildings have been able to find space to create parking lots or garages to rent out to auto owners in the crowded city. The most common way for association buildings to generate income though is through restaurants.

Figure 6.9 – Casa de Galicia. Photo by Author.

Many of the association buildings in the city house restaurants in the front or street level of their complexes. Many Galician associations, such as Casa de Galicia (Figure 6.9), Centro

Lucence, and all have fully operational restaurants and bars open to the public, although the patrons of these establishments are generally members of the association or of the larger collective. Because so many of the association activities revolve around food and celebration, they all have kitchens and the ability to produce large quantities of food. Selling of typical regional fares is not only a way for associations to make extra money, but it is also a point of pride in being able to showcase ethnic food to the city and establish themselves as fixtures of a diverse culinary scene in Buenos Aires.

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Those associations that do not own property not only lack a physical place to meet and develop strategies for mutual help and long-term cultural survival, but they also lack visibility and recognition in the urban landscape. Over the past few decades, Buenos Aires has been embarking on a program to preserve and protect important historic buildings in the city (Airaldi

& Mareque, 2011). Some associations have been recognized as having buildings worthy of protection and long-term promotion:

We have gotten a certificate of distinction as a cultural place in the city. Before we

were not. This is no small thing (…) now they recognize the ethnic institutions as

cultural places of interest and include us (in city wide cultural events). (President

of the Association of the Parish of Vedra)

As this quote indicates, the certificate of distinction not only protects the building from unnecessary modifications, but it also allows for inclusion in city-wide cultural celebrations and designates the association on the city map of important places. Obviously, those associations that lack a physical building do not have the opportunity to be distinguished in this way.

Exclusive Inclusivity Buenos Aires is trying to achieve an image of inclusiveness and diversity which, as Mr.

Varela states, can be looked to as a global model. While Argentina certainly has a history of open-door immigration policy, those policies have historically privileged Europeans, and the narrative surrounding immigration in the country continues to focus on European contributions.

While immigration is modest in Argentina, the days of European immigrant flows have long passed, replaced by groups from Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and most recently, Venezuela. These more recent immigrant groups disrupt the imaginary ideal of a white Argentina and have been largely left out of the national narrative. In 2017 Argentinian President Mauricio Macri halted the open-door immigration policy and placed blame on immigrants for rising crime rates in the 125 country. In an effort to combat the rhetoric of populism coming from the federal level, the city government has implemented the policies previously outlined, using the strong structure of the ethnic collectives as the network through which the policies are implemented.

Despite all the work that the Office of Collectives is doing to promote the co-existence and visibility of different racial groups in the city, many of my informants still expressed a perceptive shift towards racial stereotyping or all out racism in recent years which mirrors the discourse coming from the then Argentinian president and both the presidents of the US and

Brazil.

I think that there is the danger that our image of inclusiveness and integration is

changing. And I think that this is a trend that we are seeing unfold in a global

discourse, what is happening in Italy, what is happening in Brazil, the US.

(Cecilia Ferrero, Buenos Aires City Legislature)

Even as the city has launched its campaign for racial tolerance, crime is on the rise, unemployment is up, and the Argentinian economy is not doing well overall (Margheritis, 2019).

In this type of socio-political climate, and in a country which has worked to erase all non-white subjects from its citizenry (Alberto & Elena, 2016), the recent largely dark-skinned and immigrant population bares the blame.

As previously discussed, newer groups in the city do not have networks that are as well established as groups that have been growing their base for generations. Because these human rights and diversity policies depend so heavily on the existing structure of the collectives, they inherently favor older, more established (read European) collectives. Newer collectives are at a disadvantage in a variety of ways: they are not as entrenched socio-politically, they do not have as many assets in the form of association buildings, they lack organization and numbers, and

126 finally, as new immigrants, they are in survival mode. The president of the Galician federation of

Associations stressed this point during our conversation about these city policies, expressing concern for members of newer groups who may still be struggling to find their footing in a new environment:

If you are a recent migrant, (…) you are thinking of how to integrate into society,

how to get a house, how to educate your children, which is what our parents and

grandparents did. So I think there is a big benefit in that fact that we are settled.

(President of the Federation of Galician Associations)

Not only are the older groups comfortably settled and going on their fourth generations of thriving ethnic associations, but they have more socio-political connections both due to their longevity in the country, but also due to the racist structures that continue to order society in

Argentina and Latin America. The privileging of white, European decedents in Latin America is almost accepted as a given, with a long and regimented history of racism that continues today albeit in the less regimented way (Telles & Flores, 2013). This privileging has resulted in far more in positions of power in Argentina and in the city of Buenos Aires. The

Galician association, for example, proudly claim three national presidents, several (including at least two current) national cabinet ministers, , and city legislators as members of the collective. Newer, primarily darker-skinned, groups face different challenges while adjusting to life in Buenos Aires, which is still a predominately white city.

In order to get a sense of how this adjustment has been for one of the most recent ethnic collectives, I reached out to the president of a Venezuelan association for a phone interview. He indicated that the rhetoric coming from the national president has been damaging to the overall social climate, and that they have received very little help or recognition from the national

127 government. The city government, on the other hand, he said has welcomed them with open arms. He stressed that what the country is currently lacking in openness and inclusion the city is actively making up for. Yet, when I asked about how the city policies are helping his association in concrete ways to achieve its goals, he said that the main help has been in the form of individual social assistance which is afforded to all citizens. In terms of what the Office of

Collectives is doing to help them, he, like many others, love the BA Celebra series. Unlike other collectives though, he noted two key differences which effect the potency of most of the programs that the Office of Collectives offers:

The main difference between us and older collectives is organization. The Italian

collective has 70 associations. We have 2. (…) and we don’t have a building.

(President of the Association of in Argentina)

Conclusion

Buenos Aires has inadvertently created policies which privilege groups that were given an advantage through racist nation building policies of the past. Historical immigration policies favored European groups in alignment with the founding principles of Argentina’s “white exceptionalism” in Latin America. These policies, coupled with European push factors, allowed millions of Europeans to settle and thrive in Buenos Aires in late 19th through the 20th century.

These groups established mutual-aid organizations, which coalesced into strong ethnic collectives which wield power in the city today. Newer immigrant groups have also established collectives, but newer groups have fewer assets, and largely due to the nature of in

Argentina’s precarious economy these groups will have a harder time establishing intergenerational wealth than previous groups of immigrants. The recent diversity and inclusion strategy spearheaded by the office of human rights utilizes the existing structure of the ethnic

128 collectives in Buenos Aires to create and apply their policies. While these have been well received across the board, older collectives are inherently favored because of their organizational entrenchment through sheer numbers and property holdings. As long as the Office of Collectives is basing their policies off of the existing and inherently unequal structure of the collectives, the policies of inclusivity that they promote will be of an exclusive nature. Cities and regions that are pursuing visible diversity, perhaps due to the global trend towards inclusivity, must be critical of the ways they are enacting these strategies so that they don’t build upon racist policies of the past, further exacerbating inequality.

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CHPATER 7 – “SOMOS COMO UNA PLAGA” – GALICIAN LIFE & LANDSCAPE IN BUENOS AIRES

Walking down the streets of the crowded Feria de San Telmo market in the heart of

Buenos Aires, my Argentinian-Galician friend and I stop at a kiosk to admire some leather goods. We start chatting with the artisan, and she picks up on the fact that he is Galician. “Where is your family from?” she asks.

“Spain” he answers.

“Yes, but where?”

“Galicia.”

“Where in Galicia?”

“”

“Where in Pontevedra?”

“Um, near Louirido”

“Ah, ok. I am from Vedra.” She is satisfied and they chat a little more about this and that.

When we moved on, I asked her how she knew he was from Galicia. She answered: “When people say they are from Spain, often they mean they are from Galicia. Usually I can tell by last names. We’re like a plague, we are everywhere.”

When she says Galicians are everywhere, she means it. Galicians have shaped the political, cultural, and economic reality of Argentina, with a particular emphasis on the city of

Buenos Aires. Because they are one of the largest historical immigrant groups in the city,

Galicians have had a significant impact on the everyday urban landscape. However, Galician

130 presence in the contemporary city can be construed in multiple ways to serve the narratives of multiple actors. Because they are a sub-state ethnic group with a history of social marginalization, Galician symbology can be framed as the triumph of a minority underdog. At the same time, they are a European group given the privilege of fitting into the predominant national ideology of Argentina as a white, European nation. Most Galicians do not participate in the Galician ethnic collective, and as the vignette above illustrates, many of those Galicians identify as being of Spanish descent unless pried for more specific location of origin. Galician is one such identity that is able to code switch between a unique and little known ethnic , or be incorporated into the larger Spanish-Italian umbrella which characterizes most Porteños.

Buenos Aires is ground zero for the ideological battle between racial diversity and classic

Argentine-European national identity in 21st century Argentina (Ko, 2014). Nowhere else in the country do people identify as strongly with a European identity, but at the same time, the city has been purposefully shifting its public image towards one of inclusion and, at least superficial, diversity (see Chapter 5). Galicians, because of their dual status as once-maligned minorities and white Europeans, occupy an interesting place within the narrative tension emerging in Buenos

Aires.

Where does the largest regional group of immigrants fit into these dueling narratives? I argue that Galicia, as a minority within Spain which is also a large European immigrant group, serves both of these seemingly antithetical narratives. Both narratives are served by the presence of Galician symbology in the city of Buenos Aires because of Galicia’s dual positionality within these frameworks. This chapter will outline the public presence of

Galicians in Buenos Aires, highlighting some of the Galician markers and performances in the urban landscape that contribute to the Porteño narrative of diversity while working at the same

131 time to maintain the predominance of European symbology that serves the Argentine national identity.

Symbolic Landscape More active than “region” and more subjective than “area,” landscape as a geographical concept cannot be measured or precisely mapped. It is a subjective phenomenon which evokes emotion as well as practicality and materiality. As a whole, landscape is a construction and interpretation of experience in a lived environment. Landscape is a subject which is constantly in flux, able to be constructed, interpreted, and demolished. Cosgrove (1998) succinctly states that the key principle of landscape is the result of “active engagement of a human subject with a material object” (p.13). Landscape can be usefully interpreted as an image or a human-made work of art. Looking at landscape as iconography, the researcher may strive to assess the

“intrinsic meaning” of the art by considering the social and political context in which it was created, as well as contextualize that meaning through the interpretation of a contemporary viewer (Cosgrove & Daniels 1988). Examining landscape as a meaning-making icon, landscape begins to reveal stories of family, neighborhoods, cities or nations.

Landscape is a key part of what solidifies a nation. If a nation is just an “imagined community” weaved together by technological innovations which make social constructs more readily distributable and readable (Anderson, 2006), than the construction of landscape is a cornerstone of that project which makes one state distinguishable from the rest (Scott, 1998). In certain countries, like the U.S. and Scandinavia, nature and rurality take a preeminent role in the ideology of the nation (Crang, 1999; Olwig, 2003; Lowenthal, 2003; Häyrynen, 2004). Yet, even in these rural idyllic scenes, nature has been transformed into a national text that is readable by members of said nation. Thus, landscape is a social commodity; the result of the transformation

132 of nature (Cosgrove, 1998). Nowhere is the transformation of nature more apparent or more rapid than in the urban landscape.

While most scholarly discussion of national identity and landscape focuses on the image of the rural, cities are where the power of nationality is created and codified (Diener & Hagen,

2018). While national identity is often solidly enshrined in the central places of cities–– particularly capital cities––nationality is also challenged in urban landscapes (Mills, 2005), and new interpretations of nationalist pasts are uncovered ( & Johnson, 2002). Because of its densely layered and ever-changing nature, reading the urban landscape becomes extremely difficult and subjective. Yet, in our globalized world, most cities feel the pressure to show their best side as a unified brand aligned with several social standards including sustainability, human rights, and diversity (Aronczyk, 2013).

The sections that follow give an overview of the central importance of cities to Latin

American and Argentinian national identity, and, through key examples, illustrates the centrality of European and, within that ethnic umbrella, Galician symbology which helps re-solidify

Argentina as a white nation, while at the same time establishing Buenos Aires as a diverse and human-rights-oriented city.

Latin American Urbanism & Buenos Aires Cities hold massive amounts of power in today’s world no matter where you look.

Globally, around 55% of people live in cities as defined by the UN (United Nations, 2018). In

Latin America, the number of urban dwellers hovers around 81%, making Latin America the second most urban region in the world. Most urbanites in Latin America live in mega cities of more than 1 million inhabitants. Many of these mega cities are simultaneously primate cities and capital cities, making them the undisputed power centers of their respective countries. While in

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Anglo-America an idyllic and individualistic ideology of the rural continues to predominate nationalist thought and identity, Latin America idolizes the urban and with it the urban dweller.

Most cities in Latin America were founded (or re-founded atop native cities) by Spanish colonists who were highly influenced by Roman social norms. Living in the city was the only way to achieve and maintain status and power. Cosmopolitan ideals permeated post- independence Latin American nation building, crafted as they were by elite criollos, descendants of Spanish . The exultation of the urban was interrupted only superficially by the

“rise of the Indian” which saw indigenous culture re-glorified and added to many national ideologies in the early 20th century (Itzigsohn & Vom Hau, 2006). The indigenous movements of the early 20th century were followed by massive rural to urban migration in the mid 20th century, which made Latin America the world’s most urbanized region for decades, growing primate cities into concentrated points of power and population. These cities have shaped the images of the states containing them, creating and maintaining the idea of what it is to belong to or be outside of the nation (Radcliffe & Westwood, 1996).

As Argentina’s primate and capital city, Buenos Aires is the uncontested center of social, cultural, political, and economic life in the country. As such, Buenos Aires commands the focus of the world and is also the mirror through which Argentina looks at itself. The morphology of the city was planned to mimic the openness of the Pampas region in a nod to the Argentinian interior, yet the boundaries of the city remained sharp, defined by a peripheral which is now a highway (Gorelik, 2005). One can travel for miles and miles within the metro area of

Buenos Aires, but it is not until crossing this peripheral road that the traveler is greeted with the sign that specifies entrance into the Capital Federal, autonomous city-region of Buenos Aires. It

134 is within these boundaries that the national identity of Argentina has been solidified into an urban landscape which reflects a middle-class European cosmopolitanism.

Domingo Sarmiento, perhaps the most influential of Argentina’s founding fathers, believed that civilization was epitomized by a white European populace rooted in industry and capitalism (Shumway, 1991). In order to achieve his goal of creating an industrious and white nation, he instituted liberal immigration laws for Europeans, and set out to build the Argentinian capital in the image of a European metropolis (Gorelik, 2005). Sarmiento contracted mostly

French architects to expand the existing capitol city, and to revamp the center for the Argentinian centennial celebrations. What resulted was the inauguration of the “Paris of the South.” Visitors gawked at the similarities in the grand residences, interconnection of and parks, and architecture between Buenos Aires and European cities at the time (Gorelik, 2005).

The majority of the European immigrants which were flooding into Argentina in the early 20th century made Buenos Aires their home, further cementing the status of Buenos Aires as a

“European” city.

Between 1900 and 1930, Buenos Aires and the residents that call the city home

(Porteños), reaped the benefits of an economic boom. In this time period, European immigrants filled out the middle class, and within a few generations, poor immigrant families were educated white workers. Many became public administrators themselves. Credit lines were opened up to middle class families allowing for intergenerational upward mobility. Because of this steep rise of economic prosperity, immigrants were able to put their own stamp on the city in the form of businesses, clubs, and comfortable homes in peripheral neighborhoods (Germani, 1964).

European immigrants, even those originally considered low class, like Galicians, became quintessential Porteños; white, European, and middle class. Through their incorporation into the

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Argentine national narrative, Galicians, along with other groups, were in a position to shape the urban landscape, injecting it with ethnic symbology, memorials, and toponymic markers of

Galicianness. Prominent buildings, centrally located public art installations, parks and plazas, and street names came to bear physical emblems of Galicia. The city is a mosaic of European sub-groups representation, the sum of which reminds residents and tourists of the European essence of this city in Latin America. The synchronous development of the city of Buenos Aires and the Argentine national identity reinforces the deep connection between national and spatial belonging (Zhang, 2002).

In the 1950’s, Peron decaled that Buenos Aires was “la ciudad de la gente” —the city of the people, welcoming rural to urban migration and signaling a move away from Buenos Aires’ formerly-elitist status. After Peron came the from 1976-1983, which opened the country up to liberalization and free market economic ideology. In the 1990s, Buenos

Aires implemented further neoliberal reforms which fomented in the 2001 economic crash, the most devastating crisis Argentina has ever experienced. The crisis exacerbated social and spatial inequality, turning some neighborhoods into flashpoints of contestation which often manifested along lines of race and class (Centner, 2012).

After the 2001 economic crisis, Buenos Aires experienced a massive real estate boom perpetuated by rapid property speculation at rock bottom prices. This brought about changes in the urban landscape which were not welcome by the middle-class residents who had made the city in their image. Neighborhood coalitions popped up to defend these landscapes in a somewhat paradoxical anti-gentrification movement wherein white middle class residents were protesting the construction of high rises and the modification of an “authentic” urban landscape in both high income (Strain, 2010), and historically lower income neighborhoods (Guano, 2003).

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This white urban has informed redevelopment in the city and influenced the ways in which citizens interact with their neighborhoods (Centner, 2012).

Some neighborhoods, like the former port neighborhood of , have become hyper-gentrified and essentially remade into a neoliberal playground of high-rise apartments, modern museums, and hip hangouts. Others, like San Telmo, Monserrat, Palermo, and

Balvanera, worked to maintain their “authentic” neighborhood identities by implementing historical designations and protections for buildings and monuments, and resisting new construction. These urban protectionist movements are in line with the new rhetoric of broadly construed social rights in that they work to protect a democratic conception of neighborhood identity. However, such conservation campaigns have also been criticized for preserving the

European status quo under the justification of porteño heritage (Skoll & Korstanje, 2014). This is wrapped up in the packaging of Buenos Aires as a diverse and inclusive city, which in today’s global climate is equivalent to urban justice (Gilroy, 2000).

The discourses of urban rights, social inclusivity, and racial tolerance that Buenos Aires has been producing since 2002 are built on essentializing ethnic groups in the city and spatializing those groups in a concrete way. European ethnic groups like Galicians were, at one time, actively participating in an Argentinian nation-building project of Europeanness; playing down their poorly perceived Galician origins in favor of a larger scale Spanish or European identities, and reaping the benefits of upward mobility that would allow them to imprint the city with (appropriately European) markers of Galicianness. After the crisis, at a time when Buenos

Aires has just begun to think of itself as diverse, ethnic identities have become re-signified and re-purposed to serve the new narrative (Ko, 2014). A regional European identity like Galician can now be viewed as an ethnic minority, essentially serving to further the new urban discourse

137 of racial diversity, while still propping up the overall Argentinian national identity of European whiteness.

Enduring Galician Landscapes of Buenos Aires Riddled throughout the city, one can find concrete examples of Galician symbology.

Sometimes they are illustrations in corporate ads, sometimes art, and sometimes toponyms.

These symbols have, in some cases, become banal elements of the landscape, blending in and contributing to the overall Argentinian and porteño identity of overarching Europeanness. In this section, I will provide examples of these concrete Galician-porteño landscapes, which I call enduring, as they are ascribed on the landscape in durable materiality, but not necessarily permanent. I will also discuss temporary Galican landscapes, which are brought about through performances which temporarily imbue porteño spaces with overwhelming Galicianness. With these examples, I will be highlighting the sometimes-hidden ubiquity of Galicia in the urban landscape, and the banality of these emblems within the Argentinian racial project, but also the ability of Galicia to represent racial difference and minority group pride.

Corporate Symbology The largest private financial in Argentina is responsible for the ubiquitous and most banal Galicia symbology in the city. was founded in 1905 by families of Galician immigrants and has since grown into the second wealthiest bank in the country, and the most important bank in Buenos Aires. Banco Galicia advertisements are everywhere, and with them comes the name of Galicia, but also the cross of Santiago, which is in the bank’s emblem, and the regional symbol of Galicia. The cross of Santiago is the cross of St.

James, reminding Spaniards of the fight against the which drew strength from the Iberian north, and marking the way of St. James which culminates in Galicia. Figure 7.1 shows a picture that I snapped on the first day I arrived in Buenos Aires. It shows a partnership 138 between Banco Galicia and Starbucks which promises a 15% discount for Banco Galicia cardholders. Banco Galicia is the largest debit card issuer in the country, meaning that millions of Argentinians are walking around with little Galician symbols in their wallets. Not only is the banal Banco Galicia emblem tucked into every corner of the city in advertisements, ATM booths, and in wallets, but the bank’s skyscraper is also one of the largest in the financial district, seen from afar in Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.1 – Starbucks board advertising using Banco Galicia’s debit card. Photo by Author.

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Figure 7.2 – Banco Galicia’s downtown Buenos Aires building (center with neon red writing) seen from San Telmo neighborhood. Photo by Author.

Countless smaller businesses have been founded by Galicians over the years, many of which have Galician symbology baked into the names, facades, or offerings of the organization.

The majority of these are restaurants. The following images show a few examples from various central neighborhoods. Figure 7.3 is an obvious depiction of Galician affinity though the display of the Galician flag in the window of the San Telmo restaurant, but the name of this establishment is also emblematic of Galicia. Maraxe is a Galician word which means “a gentle breeze coming off the sea” (Real Acedemia Galega, 2020) and is emblematic of the connection between the Galician language and coastal landscape, both of which many Galician immigrants left behind. Notice that it still bills itself as a Spanish restaurant though, advertising “platos españoles,” much like a Nepalese restaurant in the US might itself as an Indian restaurant.

The San Telmo brew pub in Figure 7.4 is more innocuous in its connection to Galicia.

The name of the pub “Breoghan” is a reference to the Celtic King Breogán of Galicia, who, according to myth, discovered Ireland by looking across the sea from the Galician coast. There

140 are Celtic elements to the décor inside the pub as well. When I asked the bartender about the name of the pub though, he did not know what it was in reference to but agreed with my assertion that it was probably in reference to Galicia, because as he put it, the owners are

“Spanish.” Figure 7.5 shows a restaurant in which has been named after the second largest city in

Galicia, A Coruña, but the name reflects the translation, in which the ‘A’ is substituted for ‘La’.

Figure 7.3 – Spanish-Galician restaurant in San Telmo. Photo by Author.

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Figure 7.4 – Breoghan Bar in San Telmo. Photo by Author.

Figure 7.5 – La Coruna restaurant in San Telmo. Photo by Author.

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Figures 7.6 & 7.7 similarly show Galician affinity through the establishment names. Figure 10.6 being a bar in the Chacarita neighborhood metro station named Gallego (Galician). Figure 10.7 is a hotel again named after the city of Coruña in Galicia, though the owner chose to omit the

Galician prefix choice of ‘A’ or the Castilian ‘La’.

Figure 7.6 – ‘Gallego’ bar in Chacarita. Photo Figure 7.7 – Hotel Coruña. Photo by Author. by Author.

The following images also depict small businesses but show Galicianness in other ways.

The San Cristobal neighborhood restaurant in Figure 7.8 is named “Miramar” which means “to look at the sea.” In and of itself this name is not explicitly Galician, but once you enter the restaurant, there is a sign that proudly states that the restaurant was founded by Galician immigrants in 1950. Figure 7.9 also depicts a restaurant in the Monserrat neighborhood which bears the nondescript name of Plaza Mayor (Central Plaza). This name could be a reference to

Plaza mayor in , the most famous plaza of that name. This is a Spanish Restaurant,

143 advertising dishes from various regions Spain, including pallela from , and two dishes from Galicia; pulpo () and merluza ( fish and garbanzo bean soup). These two restaurants provide common examples of Argentinian national identity in the urban landscape.

They simultaneously incorporate the nested symbologies of Castilian Spanish and Galician all through the porteño stylistic design of filete. Filete is an artistic typeface that can be seen throughout the city. It originated in Italian immigrant communities and was creolized into the popular symbol it is today. It is so important to Argentinian identity that it was declared by

UNESCO as an element of intangible cultural heritage of Argentina in 2015 (UNESCO, 2020).

By advertising through the Argentine filete typeface, these Spanish offerings are declared to be Argentinian as well.

Figure 7.8 – Restaurant Miramar in San Christobal. Photo by Author.

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Figure 7.9 – Spanish restaurant Plaza Mayor in Monserrat. Photo by Author.

This chapter opened with a vignette from Feria de San Telmo, the city’s largest open-air market that happens once a week. Just like elsewhere in the city, Galicians and Galicianness are found everywhere here, if you know where to look. My friend and guide through the market is not only a member of the Galician collective, but also a lifelong resident of San Telmo, so she knows the vendors well. She points out many vendors at the market that she knows are Galician, and we chat with several of them. We are joined by another friend from the collective and we wander into the antique section of the market where we spot some Galician porcelain figurines.

These porcelain figures are unmistakably Galician, distinguished by their use of blue and white and depicting abstracted figures of Galician folklore (Figure 7.10). They are made by the company Sargadelos in Lugo, Galicia, and are popular collectables found in most Galician

145 homes. Notice the Galician word “leite” (milk) written on the one in the back. My friends are not surprised to see them here, but they ask the price and after a little haggling buy two of the four

(they already had the others). Objects in this part of the market change every week and are acquired from all over the city. The presence of these Galician objects at the fair highlights the ubiquity of Galician families and the circulation of their objects through the city.

Figure 7.10 – Galician figurines (blue & white) sold at Feria de San Telmo. Photo by Author.

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Another typically Galician object that can be found throughout Buenos Aires is the granite stone cross. In Galicia, the stone cross is one of the main pieces of vernacular culture through which national identity was cultivated and tied to territory (Villares, 2015). The use of the granite stone cross symbolizes the rural, the pious, and the rugged all at once, regional symbology that has since become common in produced imaginaries of Galicia (Silvestre &

González, 2007). The presence of Galician stone crosses in the urban metropolis of Buenos Aires links the two disparate regions and helped to incorporate Buenos Aires as the proverbial 5th province of Galicia. Many of the Galician associations in the city have had stone crosses erected in their courtyards or small-scale crosses installed in their libraries, but you can also find examples of Galician stone crosses in public spaces.

Religious symbology Figures 7.11 & 7.12 are of a cross outside of the church San Ignacio de Loyola (the oldest church in Buenos Aires) in the Monserrat neighborhood in the heart of Buenos Aires. It was inaugurated in 2018 in corporation between the Xunta, the Governments of Buenos Aires and

Argentina and the Spanish Embassy. The placing of the cross inaugurated the new Camino

Branco (White Route) from to Galicia. This is part of the Camino de Santiago cultural project, which has been designating more international routes of the Camino de Santiago, or

“Way of Saint James,” including a Brazilian route in 2019, and this Route in 2018

(Figure 7.13)( AICA ,2020). The designation of international routes helps fulfill one of the objectives of the Xunta’s office of emigration strategy to promote the Camino de Santiago among diaspora communities (see Chapter 5).

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Figure 7.12 – Text depicting the cross as a stop on the Figure 7.11 – Galician stone cross outside of the Church ‘white route’ of the Way of Saint James, donated by the of St. Ignacio de Loyola. Photo by Author. Xunta. Photo by Author.

Figure 7.13 – “White route” of St. James. (AICA.com)

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Figure 7.15 – mention of Galicia in the Immigrant Hotel Figure 7.14 – Galician cross in Lemaza park. Photo by national immigration museum. Photo by Author. Author.

Figure 7.14 shows the Galician cross that sits atop a hill in the Lemaza park in San

Telmo. This cross was donated by the Earl of Fenosa, a royal title created by Franco in the 1950s for an enterprising Galician family. The placement of this cross in a popular public park which is also home to the Argentinian national history museum indicates a symbolic accretion (Dwyer,

2004) of Galicia to the Argentinian national narrative. Another public museum which works to tell the national story of Argentina is the immigration museum the Immigrant Hotel (mentioned in Chapter 6). Galicia, as the region with the largest number of immigrants, is mentioned throughout exhibits in the Museum of Immigration, which works to solidify the Argentinian national identity as a country of predominantly European immigrants, where Galicia fits in as one of those groups (Figure 7.15).

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Public Art Galicia shows up in public art throughout the city as well, sometimes through obvious depictions of the Galician countryside, or through done by Galician immigrant artists.

Figure 7.16 shows a mural of Santiago de Compostela, the capital of Galicia and the endpoint of the famous Camino de Santiago, in the centrally-located Moreno metro station. On the left of the mural, you can see the of Santiago, perhaps Galicia’s most recognizable landmark.

This is one of dozens of murals painted on mosaics depicting Spanish landscapes, all of which adorn the stations of Line C, colloquially called linea Española, which runs north south along the grand above. In 1997 this station was declared a National Historic Monument, along with other stations containing artwork from this Spanish landscape series (Ministerio de

Justicia y Derechos Humanos, 2020).

Figure 7.16 – Santiago de Compostela depicted in Moreno metro station. Photo by Author.

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On the centrally located street, one can find two examples of important public art works done by Galician artists. Nothing in the subject of these works indicates a connection to

Galicia, but the Galician community claims these art works as important pieces of Galician history while Buenos Aires claims them as important pieces of Argentinian heritage. Figure 7.17 shows the massive fresco which adorns the of Galerías Pacífico, once the national art museum of Argentina, now a grand . The mural was a collaboration between four artists, one of which was Galician-born Manuel Colmiero (Babino, 2006).

Figure 7.17 – Mural by Galician artist Manuel Colmiero in Galerías Pacificos shopping center. Photo by Author.

Just up the street is an abstract installation done by Luis Seone, an Argentinian-born son of

Galician immigrants. Seoane and his family moved back to Galicia in 1916, where he went on to study law and publish about the Francoist suppression of Galicia that he had experienced first- hand. He exiled himself to Buenos Aires along with other Galician nationalists of the time, and continued his pro-Galicia work through writing and art. The 3-D mural seen in Figure 7.18 was

151 done by Seoane in 1959 in the Galerías Larretas shopping arcade. This piece is one of 25 works of art in the city by Seoane that have been designated as cultural heritage of Buenos Aires (La

Gaceta del Retiro, 2020)

Figure 7.18 – Mural installation by Galician artist Luis Seoane in Galerias Larretas. Photo by Author.

Included in these enduring Galician landscapes of Buenos Aires are, of course, the many association clubhouses in the city that bear Galician names and symbology. Many of the clubhouses serve dual functions which brings those outside of the collective in, like restaurants or spaces for sport. The example in Figure 7.19 is of the gym that Centro Galicia owns. This entire city block in the Balvanera neighborhood is controlled by Galician interests. On the right, you can see the grand entrance to Centro Galicia, currently the largest association in the Galician collective. If you were to walk beyond this entrance and turn the corner, you would find the

152 entrance to Santiago Apostal, the Galician collective’s private K-12 school. In the middle of this photo you see the Xunta de Galicia’s Buenos Aires consulate office, and on the left you see the gym Ximnasio Keltia. The other organizations occupying this block are obviously Galician, but unless you knew something of Galicia the gym might pass as a typical urban space. This gym space functions as an income generator for Centro Galicia, but because of the name they have given it, it too serves as an enduring symbol of Galician identity. “Keltia” is a reference to the

Celtic identity of Galicia and the attachment Galicians have to their mythic pre-Roman past. The spelling of both words is in Galician, highlighting the pride Centro Galicia takes in maintenance of the Galician language in Argentina. Both the spelling of the name and the name itself are imbued with Galician national identity.

Figure 7.19 – Centro Galicia (right) the Xunta consulate (center) and Ximnacio Keltia (left) in Balvanera. Photo by Author.

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Temporary & Performative Galician Landscapes The Galician collective is comprised of roughly 50 associations, most of which have their own buildings and private spaces. The most active of these associations gather at least once a week for performances, dinners, or social gatherings within walls of their association clubhouses.

Often though, the collective gathers in other spaces of the city, temporarily transforming porteño landscapes into performative spaces of Galician identity.

Two examples of these performances occurred in public theatres in November of 2018.

The first of examples is a performance of the Royal Bagpipe Group from in Galicia that was on tour (Figure 7.20). This show took place in the historic Teatro Avenida on the central Av. de Mayo, and was free for anyone who wanted to attend, as long as you printed out a ticket ahead of time. This event was listed on the city cultural calendar, as well as publicized throughout the Galician collective. It was not a full house, and the majority of those in attendance were members of the Galician collective. The audience was able to sing along as the national of Galicia and other favorite Galician tunes when played.

Figure 7.20 – Performance of the Royal Bagpipe Group at Teatro Aveneda. Photo by Author.

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The second performance in November of 2018 took place in the modern Usina del Arte cultural center in the La Boca neighborhood. This show was for another touring Galician act,

Luar na Lubre, a celebrated group which utilizes traditional Galician instruments and sounds like the tambourine, the flute, and the bagpipe to compose modern folk songs (Pawlikowska, 2020).

Again, tickets were free to those who reserved them, but this time it was a completely sold out show (Figure 7.21). The musical set was all in Galician and the band spoke Galician when chatting with the audience. Towards the end of the performance, the band brought two members of the Buenos Aires collective onto the stage to perform with them, one played the bagpipe and the other the tambourine. Playing with members of the local collective, speaking Galicia, and consistently referring Buenos Aires as the 5th province of Galicia worked to blend the territorial

Galicia and Buenos Aires into one entity, reinforcing the connection between the two regions through temporary performance.

Figure 7.21 – Performance of Luar na Lubre at the La Boca community center. Photo by Author.

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In July of 2019, I witnessed two other types of Galician performances in Buenos Aires.

These took place not in public theatres, but on the streets of the city itself. The association

Amigos del Camino de Santiago has organized a mock Way of Saint James through 27 kilometers of the city, stopping at various cultural points like the stone crosses mentioned earlier in the chapter. Figure 7.22 shows part of the group of over 100 people having completed the route. The idea of this route is to help Argentinians complete a portion of their Camino before coming to Galicia to finish the 100 kilometers required of an “official” pilgrimage (TVG, 2019).

Like the Camino Branco and the other international routes that have been established, this mini route helps to promote the Camino de Santiago per the Xunta’s diaspora engagement plan.

Figure 7.22 – Argentinian ‘camino’ walkers. Photo courtesy of Ines Martinez.

Dia de Galicia the holiday that celebrates Galician national identity. The day as established in 1919 by the Galician language group to celebrate Galician identity on the 25th of July, which is also the day of St. James (Santiago) the patron saint and popular cultural symbol of Galicia. The holiday was celebrated from 1919 until 1936, when it was abolished during the Franco Dictatorship. The holiday was officially re-established as the

Galician Día de la Patria in 1975, three years after the return of Spanish democracy (Salgado,

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2011). In diaspora communities, however, the celebration of Día de Galicia never took a hiatus

(Seixas, 2001). Communities of Galicians around the world would gather and synchronously celebrate as the clock struck midnight in Galicia. Through collaboration between the city, the collective, and various sponsors, Día de Galicia has been celebrated by the entire collective at the obelisk in the heart of Buenos Aires since 2017. It is sanctioned as a cultural event by the city through the Department of Human Right’s office of the Collectives. In 2019, the tradition of a global synchronous Día de Galicia celebration reached its centennial, adding to the significance of the event. The celebration at the Buenos Aires obelisk gathered Galician associations from all over Argentina in addition to the usual porteño members of the collective (Figure 7.23). There were flags and chocolates distributed bearing the name of the Spanish insurance company

Ospaña (Figure 7.24). Others brought their own Galician flags (Figure 7.25), dressed in traditional Galician costume, or wore jewelry emblazoned with symbols of Galicia.

Figure 7.24 – Ospañia worker handing out Figure 7.25 – Intergenerational members of the Galician flags, bags, and chocolates in collective at Día de Galicia. Photo by Author. celebration of Día de Galicia. Photo by Author.

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Figure 7.23 – Galician collective gathered at the Obelisk for Día de Galicia. Photo by Author.

Conclusion Physical reminders of a national identity, both temporary and enduring, make the imagined community of a nation concrete (Anderson, 1991). Markers of Galician identity in

Argentina’s capital city reinforce the predominant national mythology of white European industriousness, while at the same time serving the emerging Buenos Aires narrative which frames the city as diverse, multi-ethnic, and welcoming. The enduring landscapes of

Galicianness that can be found throughout the city show how Galicia has been present through the nation building period of Argentina, serving as one of the key upwardly-mobile European immigrant groups that is exemplified in the story of the Argentine nation. The examples of performance in the urban landscape show how the Galician collective can highlight their difference from other European groups, namely Spain, by celebrating Galician holidays and

158 using instruments and emblems not typically associated with Spain. These performances also highlight the difference between diaspora in the city and from those who no longer feel an affinity for their immigrant past. Both the enduring and temporary Galician landscape symbology given as examples in this chapter can be interpreted as serving dual narratives on both the state and regional scale. Galician symbology is banal in its Europeanness, but heightened in its difference from Spanish symbology, just as the Galician identity on the whole is heightened for its minority status within a country of overwhelming Spanishness. The transformation of Buenos Aires public spaces into places of minority group performance show

Galician ethnic uniqueness, while the inclusion of enduring Galician symbology in central national spaces denotes how Galicia fits into the Argentine identity of European whiteness.

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CHAPTER 8 – MINIFUNDISMO, & THE STRUCTURE OF THE GALICIAN COLLECTIVE

When Galicians began to settle in Buenos Aires, they formed educational and recreational mutual aid associations to help newcomers with the transition. Large associations like Centro Gallego worked as hospital, cultural center, and meeting place for any Galician who cared to be a member. Those larger institutions fostered a collective sense of Galician identity and pride among a group of immigrants who were consistently looked down upon. In addition to the larger centers, Galicians also established smaller associations structured around localities of origin such as municipalities or parishes. Because of the atomization of Galician villages, the natural tendency was to re-create that sense of micro community in the city (Nuñez-Seixas,

2011). These micro-territorial associations existed in conjunction with the larger Galician and

Spanish associations, with memberships that often overlapped. Because there had been such a massive number of Galicians entering the city for so many decades in the late 19th and early 20th century, the micro-territorial structure was supported and flourished with members being able to socialize with their trans-local neighbors. For decades, members would pay dues to one or more organizations, participating in the cultural life of the collective, and reaping the medical, social, and educational benefits of the collective organizations within the hierarchy as it had been established over one hundred years earlier.

Today, as the Galician collective nears its fourth generation, the micro-territorial association structure is being internally criticized for fracturing the power of the Galician collective in the city writ large. Dwindling memberships in many of the micro-associations has led to a general dilution of the presence of the Galician collective, although it is still the largest

160 regional ethnic collective in the city. Recently, the office of collectives of the city of Buenos

Aires rolled out their BAxColectividades platform, which does not differentiate between Spanish and Galician associations. This is seen as a harbinger of the failure of the collective to come together and organize themselves around their true strength and large numbers. This chapter explores how the collective has organized itself around localities of origin, and how this larger collective structure works in the context of Buenos Aires. I then answer the question of if and how the collective sees themselves moving forward in a stronger, more united way, but without losing their translocal identities.

Establishment of Micro-Territorial Associations in Buenos Aires No other group in Buenos Aires has created such an extensive network of associations based on micro-territorial localities of origin. So why is it that Galicians have organized themselves in this way? The reasons are largely threefold: temporary/seasonal workers, political motivation on the part of local entities in Galicia, and the emergence of a Galician elite in

Argentina (Seixas, 2014).

The first wave of Galician migrants to Argentina considered themselves temporary workers, and therefore found it beneficial to maintain strong links to locality of origin in Galicia.

This wave of migration was a short-term economic strategy, meant to bolster the earnings of a family during a rough economic period in Galicia (Nuñes-Seixas, 2014). Indeed, of the first wave of migrants that came between 1885-1930, roughly 50% eventually returned to Galicia

(Seixas, 2010). On the other hand, the emigration hit Galicia hard, felt principally and most acutely at the local scale. At the turn of the 20th century, the parish was the most important community organization, and thus the organizational framework that many emigrants emulated in Argentina. At the time, there were 3,785 parishes in Galicia, which consisted of the grouping of some 16,600 villages and towns (Villar, 1919). Each parish counted, on average, 545 161 inhabitants across all the villages contained in that parish. While micro-territorial associations organized around the parish were growing, so too were the larger Galician associations, such as

Centro Gallego (est. 1907) and Casa de Galicia (est. 1918), which were created for macro aid purposes, such as medical treatment and job placement. Newcomers would join the larger aid associations to get work and healthcare, but also join or establish a micro-territorial group to maintain the feeling of neighborhood that they had left in Galicia. By participating in multiple scales of associations, early migrants could more efficiently find work, be taken care of, send correspondence and remittances, and then arrange return transportation home.

Several groups of origin-country actors influenced the establishment of the micro- territorial Galician association structure. These were principally agrarian associations in Galicia organized around the parish or municipality, and political factions aiming to upset municipal power structures by eliciting the support of both the agrarian societies and emigrant groups

(Seixas, 2014). There are many instances where a call went out from a parish in Galicia to the emigrant population for help with some local project. Typical projects were cemeteries, schools, and hospitals. Others included funding for agrarian society political work, such as the effort to consolidate land holdings.

Observers of this phenomenon have commented that the key reason Galicia was the only ethnic group able to achieve this re-creation of local organization is due to sheer numbers, as

Galicia was the ethnic region with the greatest number of immigrants in Buenos Aires (Moya,

1998, Seixas, 2010). Numbers, combined with a high density of Galician immigrants in certain neighborhoods in Buenos Aires, and the proximity in which they lived and/or worked, did indeed create the circumstances in which neighbors from Galicia could come together informally and celebrate local saint days or relax after work. But the impetus to come together to create official

162 associations where informal networks existed before was only possible with an emergence of

Galician-Argentinian elite which could be tapped for resources, and around which the new micro-associations grew (Nuñes-Seixas, 2014).

Due to these factors, the number of Galician associations in Buenos Aires grew to its peak of 348 unique entities between 1920 and 1926, which accounted for roughly half of all

Galician municipalities (Nuñes-Seixas, 1998; 2014). The centers continued their work trying to develop projects in Galicia, but, in the process, this work also transformed the Galician community’s sense of itself. The centers offered educational and cultural training that lifted a largely illiterate group of rural expats out of poverty within one generation. Furthermore, the associations constructed a sense of Galician pride which reversed the famous “self-hate” that many Galicians carried with them (Farías, 2018). Despite their success in creating a strong

Galician community rooted in homeland cultural traditions, from mid-century onward, these micro associations began to disappear.

Galician Associations in Buenos Aires Today Today there are roughly 50 Galician associations in the city of Buenos Aires. That number includes the macro associations like Centro Gallego as well as the dozens of micro associations that still represent their locality of origin in name, crest, and micro-group identity. In

2001, when the Argentine financial crisis hit, economic help from Galicia was sent to the

Galician collective in Buenos Aires, marking an historic reversal of the remittance flow that once existed between the two regions. Since then, associations have received help from an economically stable Galicia, usually from the Secretary of Emigration’s diaspora engagement office. While the associations no longer send remittance money to villages or parishes back home, the pride for having done so in the past persists across generations.

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The diaspora engagement policies and economic help disseminated through the network are in large part coordinated through the Xunta’s consulate office in Buenos Aires. With the establishment of a strong regional political presence from the Xunta, the Galician collective structure can be conceptualized by the diagram in Figure 8.1.

Figure 8.1 – Conceptual model of the Galician Collective structure.

The overall structure of the collective is supported by the large base of micro associations which also feed the membership of the larger regional associations. This membership base is dwindling, however, as the collective crosses into its fourth generation of Galician immigrants in

Argentina. The aging membership base is apparent in the demographic composition of most of the micro associations, and bodes badly for the longevity of the smaller clubs. While the collective is aging, the Galician community is growing.

Collective vs. Community When speaking with Galicians in Buenos Aires, there is a subtle vocabulary distinction that is frequently deployed to differentiate between two groups of people of Galician descent.

The collective is the group that is both of Galician descent and actively participate in the associations. The Galician community is comprised of anyone who has Galician lineage, but do these individuals do not participate in the collective. This relationship can be thought of as a

164 nesting Venn diagram, with the Galician collective lodged inside of the large Galician community (Figure 8.2).

Figure 8.2 – Galician community vs. Galician Collective

As any model will predict, the first generation in a country will form ethnic enclaves and remain relatively seeped in the culture of the homeland. The second generation will grow with one foot in and one foot out of the cultural bubble of their parents, acculturating with far more success than the first generation. The third and all subsequent generations will continue to mix in and substitute cultural traits of the host country with those from their ancestral homeland (Alba and Nee, 2009). The Galician case is no different in this respect. Despite the relative cultural similarities between host and home nation, today’s Galician descendants have by and large abandoned those cultural traits that would distinguish them as “Galician” in an

Argentinian social sphere, the most obvious being quick abandonment of the Galician language.

Because the Galician migrants were the largest segment of the Spanish population to immigrate to Argentina, and because they were in many cases the poorest and most poorly educated

European arrivals, “Gallego” became a derogatory synonym for any Spaniard. Naturally, many

Galicians choose to immediately hide their regional identity with varying levels of success.

Although Galicians have long since climbed the socio-economic ladder of Argentine society and

165 thus normalized the status of Galician heritage, the common jokes persist. One such example appeared while chatting with a Buenos Aires bookstore owner about my study of Galicians:

“What separates an Argentinian and a Galician? A counter.” This joke both reveals the working- class roots of Galicians in Buenos Aires, and the mockery which they received as a large segment of the immigrant population in the early 20th century. One of my informants suggested that the education and professionalism acquired by Galicians since this joke originated distances them from Galician culture rooted as it is in rural tradition:

The generation of my grandparents were all workers. They worked in factories or

they worked in taxis, or they worked as construction workers, stuff like that and

the women worked in manual labor, or they did not work. And many of them

were illiterate. There were others who were intellectuals, but the many who got to

the country in 1920 were illiterate low skilled workers. Since Argentina grew so

much in the years between 1920 and 1950, their children all went to the

university. My parents went to university. And they are all lawyers, professors,

architects, scientists, professionals. This generation does not have a special

emotional connection to Galicia. (Antón, Union of Galician Associations)

Generational culture slip was a key theme across my interviews. When probing members of the Galician collective about the cultural divide between those who have chosen to stay in the collective and those who have not, the general consensus was that there are no hard feelings towards those who are in the “community.” Rather, many of those in the collective now feel the obligation to educate Galicians in the community about their own roots:

I work in social security and I always meet Galicians who come in to see me. Or

kids or grandkids of Galicians. Just by reading the names I see that they are

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Galician and I ask “where are you from?” If they can they tell me, but often they

don’t know and I have to guess based on clues. (Gloria, Vedra)

Cultural performance like dance and music is the most overt way that Galician express their culture:

When I say I dance and I play the bagpipe, they look at me like “Wow a

bagpipe!” When I say that I do Galician dance, they think that I’m talking about

flamenco or something, which has nothing to do with Galician dance. And you

have to explain that part. (Fernanda, Vedra)

Interviewees stressed again and again that it is understandably rare for youth to want to stay in the collective. Those interviewees who are young themselves were quick to point out the anomaly of their existence in the collective:

The first generation is of one culture. The second generation is of two cultures.

And the third generation is of 30 cultures. The third generation that is more

integrated in the collective, like me, that is not common. (German, Federation of

Galician Associations)

Other common themes in these discussions included second generation individuals who felt they were not fervent enough for their parents. Others from the first or second generation blame themselves for the lack of interest that their children now show:

I suppose I am responsible for that. I did not cultivate it enough, I did not transmit

it, and I guess it’s too late now. They would say their identity is Argentinian.

(Rosa, Centro Galicia)

More common still was a general lament on the outdatedness of the programs offered by the associations:

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What I see (…) from the other institutions is that many times they are

concentrating on topics, things that don’t exist anymore in Galicia. If you see a

program of the collective, not in mine, because I put on actual music, but in those

programs, it looks like everything ended in 1940. It’s absurd. (German,

Federation of Galician Associations)

The quote above speaks to the double-edged nature of many diaspora groups; they maintain the culture of the homeland from the moment of emigration, not from the present. In this way, the culture of the diaspora is a time capsule, preserving the traditions of a faraway land in a bygone time. This can be a positive, especially in the case of Galicia, since the Franco dictatorship attempted to stamp out regional uniqueness and fundamentally changed the way Galicians today interact with and express their culture. On the other hand, the diaspora slowly lose touch with the contemporary homeland, maintaining a romanticized idea of a place that no longer exists. This is one of the reasons the Galician government has set up the Escolas Abiertas (open schools) program, both to expose Galician youth to the traditions maintained in the Americas, as well as to expose youth from the diaspora to the reality of Galicia:

The way we are going now, we will not last very much longer. A few institutions

will survive, but with the passing of generations the majority will die. They need

to have things that interest the youth, they need to be revolutionary, those will

survive. (Gloria, Mos)

As time passes, the first and second generation will pass away leaving the survival of the collective to a largely disinterested third and fourth generation.

While generational diminishment is a problem being faced by most if not all of the ethnic collectives in Buenos Aires, Galicia’s fragmented micro association network is unique in the

168 city, forcing the potential problem of political disconnection due to the splintered nature of the leadership. Emblematic of this problem is the subsuming of the Galician collective into the

Spanish collective in the city’s informational platform about the collectives.

BAxColectividades In December of 2018, Buenos Aires’ office of collectives rolled out a digital platform meant to highlight and celebrate all of the ethnic collectives of the city in an interactive webspace. The site includes an interactive map of all the ethnic association buildings in the city

(Figure 8.3). While other regions, such as Basque Country are present, Galicia has been lumped in with the Spanish collective. Galician association building locations appear as Spanish flags on the map, while Basque associations appear as their own category of collective, with their own flag. In order to find out more about each collective you have to click on the flag of the collective you wish to explore, yet there is no page for the Galician collective. The page detailing the history of the Spanish collective contains pictures of the BA Celebra Galicia, but does not specifically mention the importance of Galicia to the overall Spanish migration.

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Figure 8.3 – Map of collective organizations in BAxColectividades Platform. Source: BAx.Colectividades (2019)

This digital platform was unveiled at the Patio Gastronomico, where leaders from many collectives gathered to hear the secretary of human rights speak about the platform. I attended the event with the president of a Galician association who also happens to hold a prestigious position in the Argentinian government. He exclaimed regret that the Galician collective was not included while the Basque collective was. When we approached Adrian Varella (Secretary of the

Collectives), we asked why Galicia did not appear on the map. Mr. Varella shrugged his shoulders as he contemplated this omission for what seemed like the first time. I thought this exclusion of Galicia was odd as I watched the friends, one a Spanish member of the Buenos

Aires city government, the other a Galician member of the Argentinian national cabinet, go on to

170 discuss other topics. How could such a large and seemingly powerful collective like Galicia be left out? I began to include the question of this omission in my line of questions to members of the Galician collective.

One thought was that Galicia is Spain, while Basque Country is not. Unlike the hyper- nationalistic and separatist Basque, Galicia is a sub-state nation, but most Galicians have no problem assuming a dual Spanish-Galician identity.

Well, the Basque country is not considered Spain, but Spain is basically

considered Galicia. All Spanish people are called Gallego. That site is not

representative anyway. It’s a marketing site. (Fernanda, Vedra)

As this quote makes clear, the efforts put forth by the city government do not carry much meaning within the collective structure itself. While everyone participates in the BA Celebra series, many people I spoke with had not even seen the website and were not bothered by the fact that Galicia did not appear, since, as this interviewee states, it is for marketing, not for people who are in the know.

Leaders of the collective such as association presidents were quick to give another, albeit related, hypothesis as to why Galicia does not appear on the website. Because Galicia is indeed considered to be within the greater Spanish collective, many of the leaders serve in administrative role across both groups. For example, the current president of Centro Galicia used to be the president of the Federation of Spanish Associations. Over time, I am told, those influential people in the Galician collective sought out more publicity and power in the greater

Spanish collective, consolidating power within the Spanish collective. One leader explained it thusly:

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The presence of so many leaders divided the collective into groups, which, over

time favored the rise of certain personalities who could speak for the entire

collective. These people don’t want to share the spotlight…they are looking to be

alone in the photo…and they forgot what was good for our collective. It is

nothing more and nothing less than nastiness. (Gonzalo, Union)

The root of this division is the micro-territorial structure of the associations which make up the collective itself. Because each association president is looking out for their own members and their own building and having their own parties, focus on the larger collective is hampered. In the meantime, according to those I spoke with, certain people are able to speak unopposed on behalf of the Galician collective:

Each club goes after what they want. Each one feeds their own. There is no

solidarity, no unification. (Luz, Estrada)

The Galician collective is the largest proportion of the Spanish collective and the largest regional collective in the city, yet due to their micro-territorial structure they have allowed themselves to be subsumed by the Spanish collective in the eyes of the city:

(…) it is total micro territorialism! They replicated the map of Galicia in Buenos

Aires. And I think that that is why Galicia does not show up on the

(BAxColectividades) map of ethnic collectives in the city. They are weakened by

their massive yet fractured organization. (Cecelia Ferreiro, City Legislature)

Fragmentation and the Need to Unite

Coupling the looming demographic problem with the loss of political power that the

Galician collective has inadvertently seeded, most Galicians I spoke to stressed that there is a pressing need to unite. Interviewees felt that uniting could consolidate not only a democratic

172 power and voice within the collective, but also a sense of united cultural atmosphere which may retain more youth. At the moment, the cultural program offered by each association is very repetitive, focusing on traditional singing and dance, bagpipe, tambourine, and drum. A few associations offer contemporary dance, and even fewer fuse traditional and contemporary sounds in an exciting and novel way:

The main thing needs to be the cultural atmosphere, and in this area we need the

majority of Galicians. But Galicians are not there, the majority of them, because

they prefer to be in their little club from their little parish, from their little village,

and they don’t understand that this is destructive. (José, Centro Galicia)

Some suggested that consolidating within the bigger and more financially solvent centers would be the way to survive going forward:

We won’t fix anything if we all stay in our little tiny centers. We should go to

Centro Galicia and conserve and fight for the youth culture. (Marcelo, Xeito

Novo)

While the need to unite is apparent and vocalized freely, the reality of fusing associations frightens members who do not want to see the identity of their small association perish. This is not to say that association merges have never happened. Two successful examples include Tuy-

Salceda and Arantei, Vilamrín and . In these examples the formerly solitary micro- associations have hyphenated their names and re-designed their crests to reflect the original crests from their municipality or parish of origin. Even given these successful cases, interviewees spoke of those fusions as a novel thing of the past era of the collective:

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There was something that influenced the unification of Tuy-Salceda, and Centro

Galicia…but that doesn’t happen these days. (Pedro, Federation)

Unification was spoken about as a thing of the past, as Jaime said:

Some have united, but not a lot. I don’t know why, because the language is the same, the

costumes are the same, the songs the , all the same. I think the most important

thing to preserve is Galicia. I can see trying to preserve the identity of Coruna, Lugo, the

4 , I get that, but inside of Pontevedra, it’s all the same. (Jaime, Centro Gallego)

Several of the interviewees spoke of the need to unite while in the same sentence expressing apprehension about the logistics of it. Who would keep the building? Which name would be first in the title? What would the new crest look like? Many expressed outright that association presidents do not want to give up power that comes with being the “big fish” in the micro- association pond.

My informant in the council of Galician culture told me during our interview in Galicia that the Xunta is keenly aware of the Argentinian association situation, and that the Xunta has begun to encourage associations to merge as well, understanding that the demographics beget an unstable economic future. Many of the associations largely consist of elderly Galicians that gather once or twice a year for a big meal. A major concern for the collective and the Xunta, is the possible loss of property if the association buildings are not cared for through the dues of a robust membership base. During the merge, the new hyphenated association can potentially capitalize on the selling of one of the properties and reinvest that money in the collective. In reality, it has proven very difficult to convince leaders of smaller associations to merge:

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What is happening in Argentina is particularly complicated because they do not

want to change, they do not want to leave their individual associations. (Emma,

Counsel of Galician Culture)

Micro Case: Mos Some micro associations meet once a year for a big meal and other than that do not have any cultural program. Others, although they represent tiny parishes, are doing surprisingly well.

Mos, for example, is an association which represents descendants of a municipality in the

Pontevedra province. Mos is just outside of Vigo, a larger city in southern Galicia (Figure 8.4).

Mos, like any of the micro associations in the Galician collective, has an incredible pride about the uniqueness of their locality of origin. That pride continues to grow as they age. Mos just celebrated their centennial in 2018, an accomplishment that stands in stark contrast to the failure of roughly 300 Galician micro associations in that same 100-year time period. Their crest is the same as the municipal crest from Mos in Galicia, the same crest that one of the leaders I interviewed has tattooed on his forearm (Figures 8.5 & 8.6).

Figure 8.4 – Location of Mos in Galicia. Figure 8.5 – Crest of the parish of Figure 8.6 – Member of association pf Source: Galipedea.com Mos. Source:Galepedia.com Mos showing his tattoo of the crest. Photo by Author.

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Leaders of the association of Mos, told me that they understand it would be “good” to unite for the well-being of the overall collective. In a demonstration of the clustered geographic nature of many of the associations, one leader counted all of the associations within close proximity to the Mos building where we were conducting the interview:

One block from here is the Rianxe. 10 blocks from here is the association of

Vigo, 1 kilometer is the casa de Galicia, 3 blocks is , Vedra is 15 blocks.

The good thing would be to unite. (Diego, Mos)

They said at one point in their recent history there was a vote to unite, but it was voted down in an open show of hands by the collective membership. They stressed that they are not against uniting, but that the lives of each association body are unique, and that what they need to do as a collective they will do together, but what they can do alone, they will. Maybe, he says, “the good thing would be to unite.” He goes on to stress that they do not need to:

When we lose people, when we lose money, then we will be forced to unite. We

are doing well economically, and many associations are, because we have

property. (Alberto, Mos)

In the case of Mos, they themselves are doing fine, because they do have a good segment of young to middle-aged people, as well as a savvy volunteer staff that has been able to capitalize on the grants available from the Xunta to maintain their building. They will only unite if

“forced” to do so, not by the Xunta’s pressure, but because of economic constraints.

If that hypothetical day were to come sooner rather than later, how would they prefer to go about uniting? Given that they have an acute awareness of the proximity of their building to other buildings in Buenos Aires, perhaps they would unite with their neighbors in the city. They did say that they would want to do it by proximity, but not by proximity in Buenos Aires:

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We would have to do it by proximity. Proximity to Mos in Galicia. So we would

have to unite with Vigo. Vigo was founded in 1918 like us. The majority of

members of Mos are also in Vigo, so there are similarities. (Gloria, Mos)

Vigo is Mos’ neighbor municipality in Galicia, and they have a thriving association in Buenos

Aires as well. While discussing this hypothetical merger, the leaders of Mos began to show discomfort with the idea of merging with such a large association which represents a city, and not an urban municipality like themselves. They reiterated that they would not want to lose their individualism, and they would not want to feel like Vigo is doing them any favors either:

But Vigo would have to unite with us just as much as we would have to unite with

them. They have property too, they are doing fine. It’s more a matter of

individualism. (Gloria, Mos)

Some spoke of a fear of losing unique place histories:

We have a different history apart from Vigo, I don’t see the motive for uniting

yet. Maybe the day after tomorrow when we run out of people, but…My great-

grandfather was a founder of this club, and I don’t have a necessity to be here, but

I come for the custom, I come here to get together and have a coffee with my

friends and the kids, and when someone is sick everyone is in communication. It’s

a community. It makes me feel good. (Alberto, Mos)

The difficulty of if and how to unite is tied to the emotional belonging between a group of people rooted in a history of trans-localism. That trans-local tradition which has created a fractured political power structure in the Galician collective is, in the eyes of those participating in the micro-associations, nonetheless worth fighting for:

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My adolescence was spent between these 4 walls. We have goals of growing. We

have survived here for 100 years, so we will be here another 100! (Lupe, Mos)

Conclusion

At the end of the day, most of the collective members I spoke with understand that uniting would be a beneficial way to consolidate membership and political sway for the overall collective. The lack of consensus on if, when, and how to unite keeps unification stalled for now.

The primary motives for keeping the micro associations autonomous stem from emotional human reactions, namely power and nostalgia. The power that each micro association president holds among their own membership base is greater than the power they would hold in a larger, united association. Two presidents of two micro associations of varying character and history would have to substantially negotiate simple characteristics of the new association such as name, crest, location, board membership, and events calendar, all while either sharing power or ceding primary leadership. Among the membership of each micro association, the nostalgic ties to the physical buildings where they have grown up and in which they continue to gather remain an incredibly strong motivation for not uniting. The pride that a given micro association has about their links to a locality in Galicia and the contributions they have made in that community ‘back home’ are strong, but, I found not as strong as the pride these members have in their survival as micro associations comprised of a tight knit group of people all hailing from a tiny municipality or parish on the other side of the Atlantic. Therefore, the link between the micro-associations and their respective origin localities in Galicia is not so indicative of a concrete translocal relationship, but more of an emotional translocal relationship, wherein connections to the home locality have become detached from Galicia itself and transformed into symbols of independence and resiliency within the collective. Because this micro-association structure is unique among all

178 the collectives of Buenos Aires, the Galician collective takes a certain satisfaction in that unique, if not destructive, quality.

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CHAPTER 9 – MANAGING THE COLLECTIVE: THE UNION OF GALICIAN ASSOCIATIONS & THE FEDERATION OF GALICIAN ASSOCIATIONS

The Galician collective in Buenos Aires is composed of dozens of micro-associations which represent parishes or municipalities from Galicia itself. Enveloping these micro associations are two more managerial entities; the Union of Galician Associations and the

Federation of Galician Associations. These federations provide varying degrees of protection, connection, and engagement for the member associations. For over 100 years, the existence of these federation entities in Buenos Aires has resulted in political schisms between the two groups. The federation, rooted in radical and the movement, skews far left. The Union, born out of disagreements which arose within the federation during the Spanish civil war, skews center right. At times, the political disagreements of these two entities have created rifts in the Galician collective.

The Galician collective in Buenos Aires is comprised of individuals with a variety of political leanings and social ideologies. Despite Galicia’s official status as a “historical nation” in

Spain, Galicia as a region tends to be moderate in their overall political views, especially when compared with more radical independence movements seen in Basque country or Catalonia

(Máiz & Ares, 2018). Yet the political divide among Galician diaspora in Buenos Aires is arguably more intense due to the root causes of the immigration itself and the social microcosm that the city creates. The majority of Galician immigrants in Buenos Aires were under-educated rural workers who easily entered Argentina at a time of expanding economic opportunity. Over time, many of these young Galician families built a modest amount of wealth that still circulates through the collective. A smaller portion of Galicians came to Argentina fleeing political

180 persecution during the Spanish Civil War. Galician nationalists like Alfonso R. Castelao came to

Buenos Aires and fomented their Galician independence movement in Argentina, helping to grow Galician national identity from afar. Today, the political ideologies that these two types of immigrants represent have trickled down through the generations and manifest themselves in the functions and membership bases of the two Galician umbrella organizations. While at times through history the tension produced by the differing views of the organizations has negatively impacted the collective, today, the two work in harmony, providing different services for a diverse membership base. Using document analysis and interviews with the leaders of each organization, this chapter outlines the history and functions of these organizations and the role they play in promoting the Galician collective in Buenos Aires. The Union and the Federation, in part due to their differing political views, function differently within the collective: the Union offers applied training and resource management, while the Federation offers their own set of academic and cultural programs aimed at promoting broader social justice causes.

History of the two Federations Federation of Galician Associations The older of the two organizations is the Federation of Galician Associations in the

Republic of Argentina (which will henceforth be referred as the Federation). Established in 1921, and originally named the Federation of Agrarian and Cultural Galician Societies, its original purpose was “redemption of the Galician peasant, overcoming the economic and cultural backwardness of Galicia, and the liberation of the Spanish people as a whole” (fsgallegas.com,

2020). According to the current director of the Federation, it was created by decision of the micro associations, which felt they needed a more unified voice without losing their own identities. What was happening in Spain played a major role in the creation of the Federation, because it was a transition period in between a monarchy and a dictatorship. The politically

181 engaged diaspora of the moment were influenced by the growing independence movement in

Galicia, and the radical changes that were occurring world-wide. At the time, the key goal of many micro-territorial associations was agrarian reform for their localities back in Galicia.

Because of this shared goal in the context of a precarious republican Spain, a federation was created to give more weight to the collective voices of the associations, and to consolidate power and voice. Most of the associations at that time were left leaning, favoring a representative republic in Spain. Therefore, the founding ideology of the Federation was one of leftist republicanism. Between 1921 and 1942, the Federation moved locations various times, all within the San Telmo-Monserrat neighborhoods of Buenos Aires. In 1942, the Federation bought the property which currently houses the organization. The property was bought from a British family sympathetic to the Spanish republican cause at a reduced rate. The property included two buildings: one large house (Figure 9.1), and another building to the side of the house which has since been converted into a theatre with meeting spaces above.

Figure 9.1 – The Federation of Galician Associations building in San Telmo, Buenos Aires. Photo by Author.

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The Federation lobbied for anti-military and pro-peasant action in Galicia. In the run-up to the civil war they sent delegates to Galicia to help cast votes for republican Galicians in national elections who would argue for a constitutional Galician statute of autonomy (Farías,

2017). After the 1936 coup and impending civil war, the Federation published the first Galician book in Argentina, and used the money generated by the publication of that book to send money to the Republican front. They also raised money to bring persecuted Galician intellectuals to

Argentina. The Federation harbored some of the most outspoken Spanish republicans of the era and continued to incubate radical ideas of and in opposition to the Franco dictatorship. By 1950, the Federation had enlisted the membership of over half of the micro associations in Buenos Aires, with a total of 15,000 members.

During the military dictatorship of the , many important members of the Federation

“disappeared” due to involvement with leftist groups. According to the president of the

Federation, they were weakened in that era and had to quiet their activity. Outside of the headquarters building there is a plaque dedicated to Galician activists who went missing during this time (Figure 9.2). Unlike other plaques from memorial groups around the city which contain colored mosaic tiles, this plaque is written in Galician and contains shell fragments since the shell is an emblem of Galician national identity.

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Figure 9.2 – Street plaque dedicated to Figure 9.3 – Museum of Galician Immigration Galician ‘disappeared’ during the dirty dedication plaque. Photo by Author war. Photo by Author

In 2005 the Federation decided to open a wing of their headquarters into a free public museum. The Museo de la Emigracion Gallega en la Argentina (MEGA), now permanently displays documents, photos, clothing, letters, and other ephemera of the multi-wave emigration from Galicia to Argentina (Figure 9.3). The creation of the museum was, according to co- director Miguel Chiloteguy, a culmination of various forces: a realization of the end of physical migratory flows from Galicia to Argentina, and a concern for the care and preservation of material and immaterial patrimony from a century of migration (Farías, 2018). Additionally, the museum preserves materials from micro associations that no longer exist, chronicling the story of the proliferation and shrinking of the Galician micro-associations. The museum operates as the public face of the Federation, occasionally hosting open houses for the public, and participating in city wide events, such as Noche de Los Museos (Figures 9.4 & 9.5).

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Figure 9.4 – Historical reenactment at Noche de Los Museos, Figure 9.5 – Performance and onlookers at Noche de los November 2018, at the Federation. Photo by Author Museos, November 2018, at the Federation. Photo by Author

Materials in the museum proudly display the history of leftist action the Federation has taken part in through the years:

We have a letter which is displayed in the museum here (…) which is from the

Cuban government after the revolution, because we had sent the communist

forces money to help provoke revolution before the 26th of July. The painting

there is by three brothers who were Galician immigrants in Cuba, and they sent

that as thanks. Castro was a Galician, and what happened to his father in Galicia

was very consequential, the exploitation that he received through feudalism there.

So the Federation has always been very linked to causes like that, republican,

socialist, progressive and leftist. (President of the Federation)

Union of Galician Associations There is far less scholarly material available on the history of the Union. This may be because the Federation has incubated its own group of academics who work in conjunction with the library and museum there. The Union, on the other hand, concentrates more on contemporary 185 and applied issues as they relate to the body of associations under their tutelage. Therefore, this section is based on an oral history from the president of the Union.

In the early 20th century, the Federation was the only umbrella organization for the

Galician associations. According to the president of the Union, the Spanish Civil War produced the schism between the Federation and the Union, whereupon the Union broke away from the

Federation due to political differences and economic management disagreements. In the breakaway, the organization Alborada was created, which managed all the financial stocks of the membership dues. In the split, Alborada kept these stock shares, which eventually reverted to the

Federation, much to the chagrin of the newly formed Union.

In addition to disagreements over the management of money, two distinct political identities emerged in the early 20th century which correspond to the movements which were happening in Spain. The and the popular party became the most dominant forces in republican Spain. While the Federation was staunchly leftist and backed the socialists and the

Galician National Bloc (BNG) the Union came to identify with the Popular Party (PP), which is center right:

Apart from all of the fighting that occurred, the Union and the Federation

developed distinct political identities which were influenced by movements in

Spain and here in the community. The majority of the Spaniards here identify

with the Popular Party (PP), a lesser percentage with the Socialist party, and a

very small number with the party that influences the Federation the most, which is

the BNG (Bloque Nacional de Galicia). The Union and the Federation have very

different political ideologies in respect to Spanish authority. (President of the

Union)

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The Union does not have a building, choosing instead to headquarter themselves in revolving locations of member associations. When I visited the president and one of the board members, they were located in the Casa De Galicia, which is an association and restaurant complete with bar, dance hall, and library. The Union banner is displayed in the corner of the library, right below a picture of the former King of Spain, (Figure 9.6). Elsewhere in the library, there is a picture of Castelao, the famous leftist Galician political thinker, as well as Spanish dictator Francisco Franco.

Figure 9.6 – Banner of the Union of Galician Associations. Photo by Author.

Current Activities The Union and the Federation both remain active entities in the greater Galician collective, albeit through very different activities and with different aims. Generally speaking, the Federation maintains a schedule of activities which are based in academic discussion and celebration of pre-colonial Galician identity. Conversely, the Union maintains an applied focus on practical training of association leaders, upkeep of buildings, and technical competency for all member associations. 187

Federation Today Firmly rooted in the ideologies of republicanism, Galician nationalism, and agrarianism, the Federation continues to push radical agendas forward with the goal of modernizing Galician culture and political life, and involving Galicia in current global issues. Figure 9.7 shows a poster board of their mid-summer activities from 2018. Included in the offerings are bagpipe classes, theatre, language classes, and a list of the cultural events. It is important to note that the Galician language classes offered by the Federation focus on the pre-standardized language, before it became “Castilianized” in the eyes of many leftist Galician nationals.

Figure 9.7 – Bulletin board of activities at the Federation in December of 2018. Photo by Author.

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Other cultural activities going on at the federation include a lecture and discussion series revolving around progressive global issues. One such talk included a panel about national memory and Francoism in Spain (Figure 9.8). Speaking at this panel was a Galician member of the EU parliament, as well as a member of the Galician National Bloc. Other events happening at the Federation while I was there included a discussion with leaders of the Palestinian collective of Buenos Aires on Palestinian rights and common threads between Palestine and Galicia’s colonization and suppression.

Figure 9.8 – Panel on Francoism in modern Spain with Galician EU representative Ana Miranda Paz (far left), the president of the Federation (center left), Ana Ponton, current leader of the Galician Nationalist Bloc (center right), and Juan Lopez Paez from the Argentine United Left party (right). Photo by Author.

Also while I was there, female members of the collective coalesced a feminist action group called “Galegas na Diaspora” (Galician Women in the Diaspora) and began to hold meetings with the support of the Federation. Figure 9.9 shows a flyer for their first event. This flyer was created by an artist in the collective who specializes in feminist and Galician folk art.

The flyer shows a raised fist emblazoned with the green bandana which symbolizes the flight for

189 abortion legalization in Argentina. Since their first meeting, Galegas na Diaspora have organized regular meetings, talks, and participated in abortion legalization marches on the

Capitol building.

Figure 9.9 – Flyer for gathering of Galegas na Diaspora at the federation. Art by Rosa Carbia. Shared with Author via WhatsApp.

The Federation’s museum wing has also been active in scholarly research. Dr. Ruy Farías was the director of research at the Federation until of 2020 and is also a professor of history at the University of San Martín in Buenos Aires. Dr. Farías has published extensively on the Galician migration. He spoke about the value of the Federation both as an academic and as a member of the Galician collective himself. Dr. Farías continuously stressed that the collective needs to adapt to reflect a 21st century Galicia:

The Federation is one of the only places which is working to establish a unique

identity. Morriña (nostalgia) cannot be the only identity. There needs to be artistic

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projects which are different from folklore, which are Argentinian–Galician. (Dr.

Ruy Farías, former Director of Research MEGA)

His quote hints at the reality that the majority of the collective is in something of a Galician time capsule; cooking traditional dishes, wearing traditional clothes, doing traditional dances, and little else. The Federation on the other hand prides itself in linking a modern Galicia to contemporary political issues like settler colonialism in the and abortion rights in

Catholic Latin America. the Federation is unique in its view outside of the collective.

While originally created to help give a larger voice to the micro-associations, the

Federation today has few member associations. They have transitioned away from collective action and toward independent academic and reform endeavors. Today they have ~10 dues paying federated associations, a fraction of what they had in the 1950s. Most the associations slowly moved their memberships to the Union after the split between the two. The Federation does not advertise this dwindling membership, but they do not seem harmed by it either. Rather, their focus has been on contributing politically to the progressive issues of the city and the country, while bringing attention to leftist global causes.

Because the Federation has a headquarters, museum, library, and performance space in the historic core of the city, they operate in a visible way despite the relatively low membership rates. Those who are members, the president pointed out to me, have access to the materials and spaces of the building:

The benefit of being a part of the association is that any member group can come

and use the space for meetings or talks or performances or whatever. Some

associations don’t have their own physical centers, so we give them that. About

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70% have their own centers, and 40% don’t have their own house, in all of

Argentina. (President of Federation)

In addition to their building in the city, the Federation also holds property in the outskirts which serves as a recreation facility. Open spaces like these are at a premium in Buenos Aires, and the larger associations pride themselves on having such facilities. The property that the Federation owns has a pool and a field, which is available for any member to use.

According to the President of the Federation, there is a tiered approach to their concern in serving the community: Galicians first, then Basque and Catalonians, then other Celtic groups such as Irish, Welsh, and Scottish, then recent immigrants from disenfranchised regions.

Through the work of the Federation, he stressed that the Galician collective must “take the culture to the streets” in an expansion of the visibility of the Galician collective through their involvement with progressive issues in the city and on the global stage:

For example, the talk that we had with the Palestinians a few weeks ago. The

Palestinian ambassador has since contacted us and said they have a dance group

that would love to do something with us as group, and that is great for us, to find

common events, common causes with other collectives, and more than that with

more recent immigrants, like those from other parts of Latin America, and from

Africa. (President of Federation)

While the Federation is certainly active and involved in the cultural life of the collective and the larger academic and cultural life of the city, the primary service they provide, their primary responsibility is acting as guardian of the story of Galician immigration and culture in

Argentina. The Federation is currently working on a massive project to digitize all the documents in their archives. They estimate that this will take a decade of slow and steady work. Through the

192 museum, the library, their publications and academic cooperation, the Federation is able to maintain a level of scholarly voracity in the telling of the ongoing story of Galician emigration, as well as guide the gaze of the collective into the 21st century through participation in current events which are aligned with the progressive spirit of Galician nationalism and republicanism.

The Union Today While the Federation concentrates on academic work and larger-scale issues, the Union is more practical and measured in their approach to caring for the Galician community. Because they do not host their own events or have their own groups, they are able to concentrate on helping the associations under their tutelage to get all the benefits offered by the city of Buenos

Aires and the Xunta de Galicia. This approach was outlined for me by the current president of the Union of Galician associations when we met in their current headquarters in Casa de Galicia.

He described the function of the Union “as an intermediary between the governments of both

Buenos Aires, and the Xunta, and with the collective.

My conversation with the president of the Union was primarily driven by what they do in contrast to the Federation. The first thing that was pointed out to me was that the Union has more associations and members. According to the president they have a current association count of between 30 and 40 distinct societies. The view of the Union is that they should not act as their own association by putting on events and holding classes. Rather, they focus on helping maintain the current roster of activities within their membership base. In order for Galician associations to get financial support from the Xunta, they first need to have a certain status called

“Galiguidade.” Galiguidade is achieved by an association proving that they have a certain number of members, activities which prioritize Galician heritage, and the right contacts between the Xunta and the leadership. Registration is online and eligible associations must provide documentation yearly to keep Galiguidade. 193

The President of the Union was quick to point out that while they proudly have

Galiguidade status, the Federation does not, presumably due to their low membership numbers.

The Union spends a great deal of time helping member associations achieve Galiguidade and then helping them apply for funding through the Xunta. After funding is received there is still a tremendous amount of paperwork to send back to the Xunta, so they help with this as well. Any funding that the Union receives is used to help pay taxes and upkeep costs of the building they are currently occupying as well as administrative fees. The rest is put into the Union bank account and used for various collective-wide cultural events.

One of the goals of the Union is to better incorporate associations from the interior of

Argentina, which are often forgotten and, due to distance and poor infrastructure, marginalized:

Our objective is to try and take the collective of Argentina further, outside of

Buenos Aires there are a bunch of important societies that we would like to

federalize into the Union. We want to capacitate the entities, and the entities of

the interior need more help. (President of the Union)

Most of the Union member associations are located in the capital, with easy access to events and hands on help should they need it. Associations outside of Buenos Aires face a far different reality when it comes to communicating with the Union and using its services. In this day and age, it is assumed that technology could help these remote associations become more connected, but even that has proven to be an issue for the Union. They have attempted to create web-based services but find that the demographics of the regional clubs and the poor internet connections have hindered their progress:

We need to create a web learning platform that all the entities can use, regardless

of location. But we cannot do that without first teaching the people of those

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entities how to use these resources. Especially those clubs in the interior, many of

them are run solely by older people, who don’t know how to connect to the

internet, or don’t even have the infrastructure to connect to the internet. (President

of the Union)

Many of the centers in the interior are also in need of funding from the Xunta, but they first need to be registered as having Galiguidade. The Union is trying to help in this respect as well, but again finding the distance difficult:

Centro Gallego de is one thousand kilometers from the next center!

Many of these centers when they apply for Galegualidade, they are denied,

because they don’t have the necessary ‘documented’ requirements of number of

Galician members or Galician descendants. So we want to help them get

federalized and then find a way to get them Galegualidade so that they can

benefit from the economic grants of the Xunta. (President of the Union)

Conclusions When speaking to members of the Galician collective about the roles of the Union and the Federation, the political differences between the two are always brought up. Left-leaning members of the collective tend to be more active in the Federation, and right-leaning members tend to favor the Union. This theme was perhaps even more prevalent while in conversation with the two presidents themselves, as they both opened their respective interviews with the establishment of their political stances from inception to the present day.

The Union is adamant in their position of a unified and strong Spain. They also seem confident that the majority of Galicians in Argentina are moderate, not favoring Galician independence or radical political shift. The polling data certainly supports this thinking, since

195 most Galicians (in Galicia) have voted for the center-right Partido Popular in most of the elections of the past decade (Máiz & Ares, 2018). The president of the Union states:

We are equally aligned with the Socialist party and the Popular Party, but not the

Bloc. They are too radical. It’s all about that (pointing to the Spanish flag) right?

(President of the Union)

Supporting a strong and united Spain is akin to a dual Galician-Spanish identity, which is a common sentiment among Galicians (Máiz & Ares, 2018), but support of the monarchy is less common. On this the Union does not shy away either:

We here at the Union, we recognize the authority of the King, and we recognize

the authority of Spain. We are a part of Spain, we do not want to be separate, like

Basque country or Catalonia. (President of the Union)

The Federation, on the other hand, represents the minority of Galicians who adhere to a pre-Franco and pre-1978 constitution conception of Galicia, as it was laid out in the political theorizing of early 20th century leaders. Those who agree with the politics of the Federation are not bothered by the lack of Spanish flag nor would they have any problem openly critiquing the monarchy. The Federation has maintained that political mindset for almost a century, and applied it in the service of other national and global contemporary liberal issues such as Palestinian rights, feminist action, and collective memory and restitution in Spain, just to name a few.

The ways in which these two entities manage their respective slices of the collective is indicative of their politics. The Union in their concentration on fiscal opportunity and applied local management, and the Federation in their large-scale conceptual thinking about the structural issues that hinder Galicians and other immigrants in Argentina. The history and political tensions between the two are in many ways a microcosm of the political story of Galicia

196 itself. Both entities clearly govern in different ways and with differing political ideologies, but their spheres of influence overlap and bring the collective together through the highlighting of a diverse array of issues and actions.

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CHAPTER 10 – IDENTITY & INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE AMONG GALICIAN DIASPORA IN BUENOS AIRES

European collectives in Buenos Aires are undergoing a change, a change which is being spurred simultaneously by cyclical economic crisis in Argentina, and a steady demographic shift in Europe. The Galician collective is unique in this context in that the regional government in

Galicia, the Xunta, has created unique diaspora engagement strategies to lure young members of the diaspora back to live in Galicia specifically. These strategies and policies are outlined and discussed in Chapter 5. In this chapter, I will present the individual narratives of multiple generations of Galician diaspora in Buenos Aires, focusing on how they have constructed their identity through a transnational framework, and how their sense of belonging to Galicia and

Argentina is shifting due to the new relationship being built between the two poles, and the strategies deployed by the Xunta.

All interviews quoted here are from voices within the collective. Participation in the collective implies at least partial membership within the Galician diaspora. The thousands of

Argentinians of Galician descent not participating in the collective may or may not consider themselves a part of the diaspora or even know about the opportunities afforded to them by the diaspora engagement strategies of the Xunta. Exploring insider/outsider identities and the ability of the Xunta to tap into those outside of the collective (the Galician “community”) is a potentially rich data mine that I have not had the opportunity to explore. Rather, I chose to focus on those who do have contact with Galicia via media, relatives, and participation in the clubs and associations which make up the collective. By doing this, I can assume a baseline knowledge of

198 the diaspora engagement programs and a baseline of attachment to some form of Galicia, whether real or imagined.

In addition to membership in the collective, I chose intergenerational subjects for these interviews. By presenting intergenerational voices alongside one another, I can analyze themes of generational divide in the emotional belonging of subjects to both Galicia and Argentina. This chapter will assert the importance of the intergenerational lens in assessing transnational belonging and in the negotiation of the feasibility of taking advantage of various engagement policies. This becomes especially pertinent as the diaspora engagement policies of the Xunta are primarily aimed at attracting young people.

National Identity Members of diasporic communities by definition feel a divided or dual national identity

(Cohen, 1997). First generation diaspora are often assumed to have the most difficult relationship with their country of residence (Hugo, 2009), while each subsequent generation’s national sense of belonging becomes more and more weighted toward country of residence. Research on intergenerational transnationalism has yielded various results. Some show children of migrants as having little to no connection to the homeland (Kasinitz et al., 2002; Portes, 2001; Rumbaut,

2002), while others have shown that elements of homeland, such as native language use, sporadic travel, and digital media usage work to maintain intergenerational transnational links

(Basch et al., 2000; Levitt and Glick-Schiller, 2004; Purkayastha, 2005; Wolf, 1997; Bianchera

2019).

My interviews with the Galician collective prove that all sorts of influences work to interrupt many assumptions of intergenerational transnationalism. Digital media, presence of the

Galician Xunta in the city, the Porteño tradition of immigration and sustained ethnic

199 communities, and the existence of the strong collective structure itself all emerged as factors influencing the self-described national identity of the Galician diaspora in this group. The interview data on individual experience presented here consists of 31 individuals of multiple generations, genders, association memberships, and levels of involvement in the Galician collective of Buenos Aires. 21 interviews were given individually, and the remaining 6 were given in a group. Table 10.1 shows the self-proclaimed national identity distribution of this group.

Table 10.1 – national identity among Galician diaspora sample group

National identity #of respondents Argentinian 5 Combo Spanish/Argentinian 2 Combo Galician/Argentinian 13 Galician 11 .

Argentinian Identity When asked about national identity, the question was interpreted in multiple ways. Some quickly stated their identity as Argentinian, explaining that an Argentinian (or a Porteño) identity is by default a mixture of multiple :

I am a product of what came off the boats. A mix of everything. I am nothing

strange though, that is what all Porteños are. (German, Second Generation

Argentinian)

Leda described her ancestry as the following typical mixture:

Well, I am the granddaughter of Spaniards the granddaughter of the Italians and

the sixth generation of Argentinians. (Leda, Third Generation)

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For these respondents, being Argentinian, and more specifically, being Porteño means that you are some combination of immigrant, more often than not with roots across the sea. That immigrant identity solidifies itself into a fully Porteño being, which exists in harmony with various ethnic facets and, in the case of the collectives, performances.

When talking about being an Argentinian, some respondents spoke about nationality as a prioritization of the here and now. Alma, a third-generation respondent from the association of

Vedra explained that, while she loves the Galician world that she is able to float in and out of,

Argentina is the reality of her everyday life:

I feel that Argentina is my country. Besides the day to day that brings be into the

Galician world, which I love and I cherish, and I feel that I belong in, I do feel

that Argentina is my first priority. (Alma, Third Generation)

Similarly, Fernando expressed that he is Argentinian, yet qualified his experience as being rooted in Galician-ness based on the fact that he grew up in the collective:

I am Argentinian. I am a product of the political – economic exile, but I was born

here. I grew up in this club though. Every Saturday I would come here with my

family to enjoy the company of the club members, and in that way I maintain my

Galician roots. (Fernando, Second Generation)

For respondents such as Analia and Fernando, national identity is thought of as non- additive, either this or that, Argentinian or Galician. Even though by Alma’s response you can deduce that she has a dual sense of belonging to a version of Galicia world and to Argentina, she felt there was only the possibility for one answer. This interpretation of national identity is perhaps influenced by the Spanish translation of “national identity” to something more like

“nationality” or “citizenship.” When asking this question, I did not specify how the interpretation

201 could be construed. I did offer an explanation of the concept if subjects asked for further clarification, which they often did. When clarifying I used the term raizes nacionales, or national roots to try and the concept from legal definitions and towards a more emotional and familial connotation.

Combo Identity The majority of respondents interpreted the question of national identity as open to duality, and decided to give the answer of a combination identity consisting of Galician and

Argentinian. Most of these respondents were in the second or third generation, which in this conversation influenced their willingness to weigh a strong Argentinian identity as equal to their

Galician heritage:

Well, I describe my identity as an Argentinian, and Argentinian Galician. An

Argentinian who adores Argentina, and a Galician who by coincidence lives in

Argentina, but who loves Argentina as much as Galicia. I feel like I live on both

sides. (Rosa, Second Generation)

The sentiment of “living on both sides” was a theme that arose multiple times from multiple sources. Some respondents expressed going through an identity crisis at some point in their young adult lives related to feeling pulled in both directions. Emmanuel, a third-generation respondent in mid-thirties told me that his grandfather, who was born in Galicia, chastised him for drinking yerba , the ubiquitous Argentinian tea drink. His grandfather felt that his embrace of this Argentinian tradition was muddling his Galician identity. He says he resolved this tension by making room for both identities in his life:

I felt an identity crisis, until I resolved it in a way…today I feel Porteño and

Galician. Even though I was not born in Galicia but I feel that the Galician culture

is mine. But I also feel Porteño. (Emmanuel, Third Generation) 202

Some respondents who fell into the “dual identity” category were also open to a third

Spanish identity as an extension of their Galician identity. The compatible nesting of a Galician and Spanish identity is typical in Galicia itself, with roughly fifty percent of Galicians consistently identifying as “no more Galician than Spanish” and vice versa since 1984 (CIS.es,

2020). Among this group of diaspora the trend seems to hold, reflecting the moderate nature of the Union of Galician associations discussed in Chapter 8:

I have a dual identity, one that has two facets which are equally important. I am

Galician-Argentinian. But I feel just as much a part of this country as I feel I am a

part of Galicia, and my extension I should say Spain also. (Maria, Second

Generation)

While the majority of the people that I interviewed did seem to exist in a moderate political space in regard to Galician autonomy, some were certainly more radical, agreeing with the Federation’s view of an independent and progressive Galicia and Argentina. Diego, a second- generation respondent in his mid 40s made sure to differentiate between Galicia and Spain in his explanation of his dual identity, describing Spain as a made-up entity propped up by the internal nationalities it has colonized:

(I am) Galician! Spain does not exist. I feel 100% Galician and 100%

Argentinian. It’s not math. It’s an approximation. But that’s how I feel. (Diego,

Second Generation)

These testimonials, even those of fragmented or combination identities, still suggest an element of essentialism, that is all or nothing all of the time, even if “all” means all of multiple entities. In the quote above, Diego claims to be both 100% Galician and 100% Argentinian, and in the context of my question we can assume he means that as a default state. But research on

203 migrant positionalities suggest that everyone shifts their identities in accordance with their surroundings (Anthias, 2002). This conception of identity as a process rather than an essentialized state or a possession that gives it importance in the study of society (Mouffe, 1994), but it is what makes asking subjects about it so difficult. Perhaps in the confines of the Galician associations where I interviewed these people, surrounded by pictures and ephemera from

Galicia, and the street noise of Buenos Aires emanating from outside, they felt 100% of both identities, but in other contexts they may not.

Few respondents touched on positionality in their description of identity. Maria, however, pointed out the flexibility of her identity when she travels between Galicia and Argentina:

It’s curious, in Galicia, I am Argentinian, and here I am Galician. Depending on

the context or the place I am more of one than the other. (Maria, Second

Generation)

Lorenzo spoke about needing to fashion his identity to fit the nested of Buenos Aires and the collective in which he grew up:

I had to reinvent my identity because in my case, I was not born in Galicia.

(Lorenzo, Second Generation)

Growing up inside the collective is an immersion of Galician culture. Even though Lorenzo was born in Argentina, second and third (and so on) generation identities are bound to be more complex due to the multidirectional influences received at different points in their lives.

Others spoke not only about the influence that growing up in the collective had on them, but also the influence of different Spanish and Galician attitudes from different generations of family members:

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Everything that my Mother’s generation consumed in the 40s and 50s and 60s and

even into the 70s was an image that was sold of Spain to the outside. So I grew up

in between those worlds, in between the stories that my Grandmother would tell

me that seemed weird or incredible which I did not take as Galician folklore, but

as reality, and what my mother would put it in my head about Spain. (Celia,

Second/Third generation)

Celia’s mother turned 11 on the coming to Argentina from Galicia. Because her mother was so young when she migrated, Celia might be considered a “two and a half” generation. The Spain that her mother was educated about was the Spain of Franco, where

Galician identity was suppressed in favor of a Castilian ideal. Her grandmother, on the other hand, transmitted Galician folklore and stories of life in Galicia, like dancing with bread on her head and climbing mountains to visit neighbors. The Spanish, Galician, and Argentinian identities were negotiated and are still influenced by Celia’s active participation in the Galician collective.

Galician While most second and third generation respondents told me that they either had a mixed or Argentinian identity, most first generation immigrants, or those who were born in Galicia and moved at some point in their lifetimes, said they identify as solely Galician. Again, this may have to do with the translation of “national identity” to something more akin to “citizenship.”

Those born in Galicia for the most part do not have Argentinian citizenship, rather they have , and the right to vote in only Buenos Aires elections.

One of the respondents who is a leader in the collective showed me his Galician flag tattoo when I asked about his identity and he gave me permission to take a picture of it (Figure

10.1) for inclusion in this research: 205

I did this (gestures to tattoo), so that people will know. I like it when people ask

me what this is. Not everyone knows that this is the Galician flag, but I want them

to know and I want them to know that I am Galician. (Miguel, First Generation)

Figure 10.1 – Tattoo of Galician flag. Photo by Author

Miguel has a poignant story that goes along with that tattoo. He told me that he decided to have the tattoo done after a relative back in Galicia had been buried with the Spanish flag against their wishes. This story illustrates the condition under which many of his generation grew up; under the thumb of Francoism. He said that he did not want the same thing to happen to him, so he made sure the Galician flag would always be on him even after .

Another first-generation theme was the stronger differentiation between Spain and

Galicia. Not only because of the conditions under which many migrated from Galicia to

Argentina, but also because of the treatment Galicians received in Argentina. Due to the sheer mass of Spaniards who emigrated from Galicia, a common joke during the 20th century was to call all Spaniards Galicians. Since Galicians were mostly coming from poor, rural backgrounds and in many cases were illiterate, Spaniards and Galicians alike sought to distance themselves from that label. Over time, this “self-hate” or “auto-odio” reactionarily manifested in an even stronger identification as Galicians for those inside of the collective:

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When people ask me if I am Argentinian, I say no. Italian? No, I am Galician. But

pay attention, Galician from Galicia! You have to say this otherwise they may

thing you are just talking about Spain, because here all Spaniards used to be

called Galicians. (Xerome, First Generation)

Morriña: Longing for Galicia During the interviews, many respondents noted a longing for Galicia, which may indicate a desire for return. Longing is a quintessential and perhaps stereotypical trait of Galicians.

Indeed, roughly half of my respondents mentioned longing for or missing Galicia in some way during the interview. When it was mentioned, it was usually referred to as morriña, the untranslatable Galician word which is something like a mixture of nostalgia and longing. A reason why morriña is so ubiquitous in Galician culture is because the most important Galician literature and political theory was born in Buenos Aires during the exile of Galician nationalists in the early 20th century. The nostalgia which the exiled felt saturated the work they produced while in Argentina and was ingested by Galicians everywhere. A second reason for the nostalgia rich culture lies in the sheer number of people who emigrated. Everyone in Galicia was touched by the emigration in some way, making the sentiments of morriña appropriately digestible for everyone.

The famous morriña of Galicia is here, it was born here! Why else would all of

these Galicians come here every week to play cards and listen to music? It is a

part of our identity, and it is a part of our identity over there too. (Raul, First

Generation)

Raul makes a point in stressing that morriña was born in Buenos Aires, but it is a very present part of life in Galicia too. For example, in research done for a different project, when I asked people in Galicia about what words came to mind when they thought about the Galician 207 language, many responded with the word morriña, even though we were in Galicia and had made no mention of the diaspora (Hannum, 2016).

Second generation nostalgia or morriña is well illustrated by this quote from Anton, who took advantage of the Xunta’s scholarship program for post-secondary education and attended the University of Santiago de Compostela in the early 2000s.

One time someone asked me what happened the first time I set foot in Galicia,

when I was 22 or 23. And I explained that before I had gotten to Galicia, I was

dying of nostalgia for a place that I had never been. It was that. (Anton, Second

Generation)

The second and third generation experience of morriña is transmitted through the popular and familial culture that circulates the clubs, like pictures, soundtracks, books and movies, but also through the stories their parents and grandparents tell them about a mythologized version

Galicia, which exists in a static and glorified past. In many cases, those stories come from relatives who emigrated when they were quite young, further distorting the portrayal of Galicia told in stories. Anton told me that he was very much influenced by his mother’s version of

Galicia that she experienced as a child. His mother emigrated when she was five years old:

My mother does not remember a rainy day in Galicia. To her, all her days there

were sunny. This is a region that experiences on average 180 days of rain a year!

(Anton, Second Generation)

The morriña that permeates from the first generation to the second and onward is in many cases linked to a glorified nostalgia that Anton’s mother describes. Because they were brought over early in life, many in the first generation hold something of resentment for being taken away from Galicia against their will, and subsequently still think of Galicia as their rightful home:

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(…) my grandmother, she will always say she did not come to Buenos Aires, but

that she was brought (cross talk lots of agreement). (Leda, Third Generation)

Marta spoke of her painful experience migrating as a child:

From a psychological point of view, it is the same as being exiled, as a

punishment. Each day I thought we would go back. I thought, any day now we

will go back. One week, one month, one year passed in expectation of going back.

(Marta, First Generation)

Miguel said he will never be totally comfortable in Argentina:

But you are not comfortable here when you are born over there. Your head is

always in another place, your home. (Miguel, First Generation)

All generations are now able to indulge not only in daydreaming of Galicia but daily social participation through the use of digital media. The use of technology has become one of the most important facilitators of diasporic identity, fostering what some call a “digital diaspora”

(Witteborn, 2019), or “techspora” (Kusek, 2014). It is through these digital means that many of the second and third generation are able to have a close relationship with Galicia. Several interviewees mentioned the use of Whatsapp to communicate with friends and family in Galicia on a near daily basis. These digital tools help to maintain a closeness and familiarity that was impossible in earlier generations. On the other hand, many talked about how this familiarity impacts their visits to Galicia, in a way making them less special. One respondent recounted that before social media the entire family would clear the calendar for her stay, packing the visit with events and reunions. Now when she goes to visit, the novelty is no longer there, since they are able to talk so frequently.

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It is also through digital outlets like social media that the Galician government is tapping into the new generations of diaspora to entice return. Given the high numbers of respondents across all generations that gave unsolicited responses linked to morriña, the possibility of return is presumably open to consideration. While the likelihood of return can be linked to nostalgia and longing or homesickness, it is more strongly informed by socio-economic considerations and positionalities among the diaspora.

An important aspect which informs the positionality of the diaspora in Buenos Aires is the economic status of Argentina relative to Galicia/Spain at any given moment. Many spoke of morriña as a relative pull which is dependent on the socio-economic climate. Having lived through various severe depressions in recent Argentinian history, many of the diaspora that I spoke to linked Galicia to a possibility of escaping the tumult of economic uncertainty that has become routine in Argentina. When I was in Argentina conducting interviews, November and

December of 2018, the Argentinian peso was worth .026 of a dollar, after having consistently fallen in value since 2015. At the time of writing ( 2020) the peso has fallen by another

50%, and is now valued at .015 of a dollar (GMBH, 2020). Xerome provided thoughtful reflection of the relative nature of his Galician morriña:

Nostalgia tends to increase in bad times here. In these (economic) conditions, the

nostalgia does get more intense. (Xerome, First Generation)

The Question of Return The key goal of the Xunta’s diaspora engagement plan is to entice the return of young professionals from the diaspora. The Xunta is doing this through a variety of incentivization programs (see Chapter 5), tapping into the structure of the diasporic collectives abroad to disseminate the message of the benefits of return. Ethnic return migration is a cornerstone of many diaspora engagement strategies, but these strategies usually come from the state. Return 210 migration in these contexts insinuates return to an ethnic ancestral “homeland,” but does not necessitate any lived experience or direct connection with that homeland (Tsuda, 2009a). The diasporic members of the Galician collective in Buenos Aires maintain a heightened level of connectedness that spans generations. This is due to the strength of the network, including the scalar structure of the collective, and the circumstances under which the collective was formed, including the exile of intellectuals and the receptiveness of Buenos Aires to European immigration. Because of the strength of the collective, members are able to perform

“Galicianness” on a near daily basis, and maintain links to the homeland through the various means previously mentioned. The expression of Galician and Galician-Argentinian identities and

Galician longing illustrate this strength and maintained connection.

The sentiments of Galicianness and Galician longing that I found among my sample of respondents in the collective do not seem to influence the willingness to participate in the

Xunta’s return programs. I did not ask specific questions about the intention to return. Return was a theme that arose organically during the conversation, usually in response to questions about the general history of an individual’s family migration, or in the case of younger generations, questions about how the Argentinian government cares for the collective.

The majority of respondents did not indicate that permanent return was a consideration or an intention, but most respondents did mention that they make frequent trips of various lengths to

Galicia, and those that did spoke about these trips various times throughout the interview. While trips were spoken about enthusiastically as a point of pride, return, if spoken about at all, was not an exciting prospect. Rather, the topic of return took on a somber feeling, either because of the failed intention to permanently return, or the conditions under which return would become a serious consideration.

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The consideration of return is largely an economic calculation, just as it was for these respondents’ parents and grandparents when they made the decision to leave Galicia generations ago.

I was born here, but I have traveled all over, I have traveled to Galicia, and I

always come back here. This is my home. I don’t know what it would be like to

go and live in another country. (Marcelo, Third Generation)

When Marcelo spoke about return, the tone of Galicia as a second home or a homeland shifts.

While Galicia may be a homeland to this group, Spain is still another country, and for most of these diaspora, even the first generation, return means leaving the home that they grew up in.

Unlike those Galicians who made the trip across the Atlantic years ago, the Galicians that

I spoke to had moved up socio-economically. These are residents of Buenos Aires who are doing well, in large part thanks to the economic calculation made by their ancestors to leave the farm in favor of a growing Latin American city. These respondents have made comfortable lives in

Buenos Aires, and leaving that life would require a significant impetus. Some that I spoke to in the first generation mentioned that return had been a “strong possibility” or a “dream,” but that over the course of the years their lives unfolded and they settled in Buenos Aires:

We always had the desire to go back to live. But life keeps moving on. What

happens is that you live your life. We have three children, four grandchildren, and

so we don’t have much time to think about what could’ve been. I am lucky in this

way. I have a family that I value much more than anything that I left behind. I am

happy, I have no complaints. (Gonzalo, First Generation)

This is consistent with findings from other migrant groups on the mismatch between the desire to return and the probability of return (Lu, 1999). Those in the first generation were more

212 likely to express a stronger desire for return or said that they had harbored hopes of return for significant portions of their lives. These quotes show that return is constrained by social, economic, and political forces, and that those forces are fully understood by those who desire return. The added constraint of generational embeddedness further reduces the likelihood of return in the Galician-Argentinian case.

The strongest theme that arose around the topic of return was that of rising economic insecurity in Argentina. Most of those who I interviewed have a living memory of the 2001 economic crisis in Argentina, which was the most severe in decades (Aguiló, 2018). After years of relative stability in the early aughts, the Argentinian peso has been devalued consistently since

2015 (GMBH, 2020). These economic realities are troubling for residents, and having a second citizenship is seen by many as an emergency outlet should things take a dramatic turn for the worse:

(…) with all the complicated economic developments that occur here we always

had the intention to move back over there, so I could say we have an emergency

outlet to go back and live in Galicia. (Estevo, First Generation)

Many in the second and third generation also see dual citizenship as an emergency outlet, but would prefer to not have to take such drastic measures. The group that I spoke to in the second and third generation is composed of young professionals for whom the push factor of economic instability has not yet been reached. This group has an added layer of embeddedness due to the fact that they were born in Argentina and grew up in Argentina, albeit in an

Argentinian-Galician setting:

I am passionate about Argentina moving forward. I want the country to end up ok,

to function well, and for everyone to come out of the crisis ok. The economy is

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something that we are always worried about, something that never lets us relax,

but my choice is to go to Galicia as many times as I can, but to live in Argentina.

(Luz, Second Generation)

Some added that to leave Argentina, even in times of crisis, would be to give up on the country.

Every few years when there is an economic crisis (…) there is always the

possibility of going back to Spain, and lamentably many people think of that as

the first option, but for me that is the last option. (German, Second Generation)

Those who I spoke with who did leave Buenos Aires for permanent return to Galicia mirrored these sentiments of opportunity calculation in their decision making. In the small group of returnees that I interviewed in Galicia, I found that the main reason for leaving was tied to social unrest manifesting in the crime violent rates that have been on the rise in Buenos Aires.

Examples of theft and mugging were given to illustrate personal experiences with the crimes that have been linked to the general economic downturn in Argentina. Most of the returnees that I found to interview were young families or couples who were looking to raise children in a more socially stable environment. All of these respondents insisted that the incentives offered by the

Xunta had nothing to do with their decisions to migrate.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that, while national identification with Galicia remains high and longing for Galicia as a homeland is a popular sentiment among diaspora in Buenos Aires, the desire for permanent return is still low. Although respondents overwhelmingly identify as some version of Galician diaspora, the hybridization that has occurred over generations of social integration and economic advance within this group has negatively affected the desire for return.

This finding influences the potential success rate of the Xunta’s “Return 2020” plan, which aims to recruit young professionals from the diaspora for return settlement in Galicia. The young 214 professionals that the Xunta seeks are second and third generation diaspora who, while maintaining links to Galicia through the collective and its various associations, are embedded members of the Argentinian national society.

Research on return migration is underdeveloped due to lack of consensus regarding motivations for return migration and appropriate methods to study it given faulty data surrounding the subject (Lu, Zong, & Schissel, 2009). Furthermore, discussions about return migration tend to be limited to first-generation return, or return of those who emigrated. Such discussions frame return migration as a “failure” in the neoclassical sense (De Haas, 2010). An academic discussion surrounding return of successive generations of diaspora is severely lacking, even though this is the demographic that most European countries are currently tapping through their various diaspora engagement strategies.

Research from other cases has shown that migrants with lower levels of socio-economic integration are more likely to desire homeland return (Carling & Pettersen, 2014; De Haas &

Fokkema, 2011). Over the more than three generations that the Galician collective in Buenos

Aires has been growing and connecting with Galicia, individuals have also been embedded in

Argentina, connecting with local communities, growing families, and building livelihoods. Based on the data that I collected through interviews with Galician diaspora in Buenos Aires, return is a last resort pending economic meltdown. This sentiment is somewhat mirrored by those who did choose to return, who said that economic insecurity was one factor, but also cited social discord such as violence, homelessness, and theft linked to general economic distress in Argentina and

South America. Those returnees stressed that they did not make the decision because of the return policies offered by the Xunta, but because of the calculation of opportunity for them and especially for their young children.

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Tapping into successive generations for return migration may prove difficult for the

Xunta if the targeted populations do not see a net benefit in return. The Xunta has seen more success in recruiting participants for return programs in places like Venezuela, where recent economic meltdowns have led to severe loss of wealth and opportunity. In Buenos Aires, the single locale with the largest number of Galicians and Galician descendants outside of Galicia itself, the policies enacted to tap into the diaspora do not seem to be enough to incite return.

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CHAPTER 11 – OVERVIEW & ANALYSIS

This dissertation was organized in an attempt to illustrate the scalar nature of the diaspora networks in each region, from the macro institutions in Spain and Argentina to the micro scale, highlighting the individuals that are affected by these policies. I set out to shed light on how origin and émigré regions utilize diaspora institutions to their benefit, and to investigate how these institutions affect national identity both in points of origin and in points of arrival. The major outcome of this question for my case study was a combination of many interconnected factors, which ultimately led to a doubling down of national identity in the émigré region of

Argentina among Galician diaspora. Other findings include the aims and benefits to each region from the policies which affect diaspora.

In chapter 3, I included a conceptual framework, which builds on the institutional development and analysis framework showing the elements of this transnational case that I sought to highlight and the possible linkages between scales that I predicted (Figure 3.1). This conclusion will scale out with an overview and analysis of the entire diaspora engagement system in this particular trans-regional case, and its effects on Galician individuals in both regions, plugging findings into the IAD framework and narrating their connections and outcomes

(Figure 11.1). As you can see when comparing the two images, the connections between aspects of the framework have been modified in some areas. There is no longer a direct correspondence between Buenos Aires and Galicia. As it turns out, there is not much direct cooperation happening between these two regions at the government level, and therefore their actions are not directly affecting one another. Other changes include a direct linkage between political economic context on the regional scale and the individual scale, and the influence that this factor had on

217 decision making among diaspora, as well as a broader conceptualization of the impact of the state among regional components.

Figure 3.1Figure

–

IAD Framework Extended

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Figure 11.1Figure

–

Updated & & IAD framework annotated Updated

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Figure 11.2 – Detail of Argentina/Buenos Aires side of IAD framework

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Argentinian & Buenos Aires Framing Argentina’s framing of national identity and migration policy is built on the construction of an ethnic European state (Box A1). Although recent campaigns have begun a shift towards multiculturalism, Argentina is still invested in the image of itself as a white country within Latin

America. The continued narratives of European immigration which are displayed in the immigration museum, the European symbology in the central landscapes of Buenos Aires, and the recent populist regime and immigration policy restrictions reflect the continued investment in the maintenance of that national identity. The public discourse surrounding immigrant groups from Latin American countries like Paraguay, Bolivia, and Venezuela, as well as the newly recognized Afro-Argentinian group encapsulates the othering of non-European groups in

Argentina. European groups, especially Spanish and Italians, are able to be invisible in

Argentina, existing within the state-established paradigm of whiteness as the status quo. This status quo is reflected in the Spanish and Italian symbology that has been incorporated into the landscape of the capital city, displaying the banal nationality resulted from historic Argentinian-

European symbiotics. Newer immigrant groups continue to be demonized in public discourse and portrayed as non-Argentinian even when rhetorically being brought into the fold.

Regional level: Buenos Aires (boxes C1-C4) Over the past decade, Buenos Aires has been leading the Argentinian campaign to diversify and expand public awareness surrounding multiculturalism. As the capital city and predominant gateway of entry, Buenos Aires was and still is the major immigrant hub of

Argentina. As such, the city is a microcosm of income inequality which often falls along racial lines. Many of the clashes portrayed in the media and in former President Macri’s xenophobic rhetoric occurred in Buenos Aires. As Argentina’s showcase city, and a powerful global entity of

221 its own, Buenos Aires has moved to prioritize diversity and inclusion along the lines of a global trend of cosmopolitan inclusivity.

Because of its added status as an autonomous region, the city has been able to establish its own policies and projects to address and counteract the glaring racism built by the

Argentinian state over a century ago. The secretary of Human Rights and her subsidiary offices have deployed a number of strategies to project 21st century Buenos Aires as a diverse and tolerant city worthy of global praise. Some examples include the Buenos Aires Celebra series, the establishment of migrant assistance stations, and the integration of the city government and the pre-existing ethnic collective networks. Taken together, these initiatives have been well received in the city among a populace that, while predominantly European identifying, also thinks of itself as tolerant and cosmopolitan.

Individual level: Galician Collective (boxes G1-G4) Buenos Aires’ policies have been well received by the Galician collective. The collective has been beneficiary of various programs including the designation of association buildings as historic spaces, the incorporation of Galician holidays as city cultural days, and, of course, yearly celebration of the Galician collective in the Buenos Aires Celebra series. As one of the city’s older and more established immigrant groups, the Galician collective is able to benefit from these programs more than recent immigrants have been able to. Because the diversity programs created by the city to a large extent rest upon the effectiveness of the existing collective networks, they inherently benefit older, largely European collectives.

Although Galicia is a European collective, they are also a collective of a repressed sub- state nationality. Because of their dual nature as both a part of the majority (able to exist within the predominantly European-Argentinian state narrative) and as a minority group (an historically repressed sub-state ethnic group of Spain), the Galician collective simultaneously fulfills both 222 the Argentinian narrative of maintaining a white and European country, and the Buenos Aires narrative of moving towards diversity by highlighting ethnic minorities that exist in the city. The

Galician collective is able to walk this line effectively, participating within the larger Spanish collective at times, and simultaneously performing ethnic difference through costume, music, dance, and food. The local landscapes of central Buenos Aires reflect this with prismatic effect, as Galician businesses and markers deftly incorporate aspects Spanish, Argentinian, and traditional Galician symbology, recognized as both in group and out group depending on the onlooker’s point of view.

The Galician collective is apparently comfortable in their dual role. Despite the ongoing problem of micro-territorialism within the collective and the slow disappearance of associations, members of the Galician collective are relatively well positioned within the city socio- economically. Because of their ability to both blend in as European descendants and perform as minorities, they are uniquely suited to benefit from the impetus towards diversity as well as the

Argentinian status quo. Despite the social and economic capital that their situation has brought, general insecurity in Argentina makes long term planning precarious. Being a Spanish citizen is thus seen as a safety net should instability in Argentina become intolerable.

Most members of the collective are Spanish citizens via the ius sanguini citizenship law.

These rights of citizenship compounded by the diaspora engagement incentives provided by the

Xunta makes permanent return to Galicia an attractive option for many Galician diaspora.

However, the reality of permanent return is more contingent on push factors than on the pull factors that the Xunta has amplified. This is evident in the numbers of returnees that Galicia has received from countries like Venezuela, which has recently undergone a monumental crisis. For those diaspora in Buenos Aires, steady inflation and growing social unrest is balanced by relative

223 comfort in a cosmopolitan city. The tipping point of this fine balance is different for everyone, yet findings suggest that permanent return is seen as a comforting safety net, but a last resort for most.

When considering a permanent return to Galicia, most second and third generation respondents expressed feelings of not wanting to “abandon” Argentina. Sentiments of national identity shifted over the course of these conversations as well, moving from a focus on Galician heritage and identity to a doubling down of Argentinian pride and a reiteration of all the reasons why they love living in Buenos Aires. One respondent who had gone to Galicia for his master’s on the Xunta’s scholarship program put it poignantly: his mother had immigrated to Argentina as a child and it emotionally scarred her for life, so, he told me he “did not want to repeat the family history by doing the same to his children.” Even though these are Galician diaspora steeped in the culture of Galicia through active involvement in clubs and organizations that make up the collective network, their everyday lives are Argentinian, especially for the second and third generation who only know Galicia from visits or in abstract. Those for whom the balance has tipped in favor of moving to Galicia expressed many of the same sentiments of being proud

Argentinians, of missing Buenos Aires and typical Argentinian wares, and in many ways expressed feeling more Argentinian than ever having “returned” to Galicia.

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Figure 11.3 – Detail of Spain/Galicia side of IAD framework.

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Spanish & Galician Framing Spain is in many ways a divided country, existing in a constant state of precarity in regard to the threat of national separatism on multiple fronts. While academic attention is more often given to the sub-state that at times aim to break away from Spain, still exists, albeit in a diffuse and banal way. Spain is an imagined national community in the sense that a central government exercises constitutional authority over the daily lives of all its disparate citizens, through a variety of socio-political institutions (Anderson,

2006). It is well known that Spain consists of several sub-state ethnic nationalities. Spain itself is not considered an ethnic nationalism but a civic one, finding the foundations of its national unity in constitutional authentication (Seixas, 2005; Balfour & , 2007). Establishment of migration and diaspora engagement policy is also based in the constitutional rights of privileging

Spanish citizens, but the granting of citizenship to diaspora is given through ius sanguini, or blood ties (Box B1). Children born of Spanish parents can be naturalized as Spanish citizens at any point in their lives. As long as this chain is not broken, generations of diaspora can remain

Spanish citizens indefinitely. While Spain is not considered an ethnic nation, the constitutional basis for Spanish citizenship is derived from ethnic heritage of Spanish descent and favors immigration of co-ethnics. This state level ethnic affinity migration policy sets the stage for local immigration policy making in which regions and localities shape community specific laws to meet their own needs.

Regional Level: Galicia (boxes D1-D4) In Galicia, the needs regarding migration are to reverse demographic shift. Diaspora engagement policies created by the Xunta build off of Spanish citizenship laws and aim to recruit migrants from the region’s large pockets of diaspora in an effort to re-invigorate the workforce with co-ethnics. By embracing diaspora through a variety of funds and activities, the Xunta

226 hopes of incentivizing eventual permanent return to Galicia. This regional policy is specific to

Galicia in the utilization of their well-established diaspora networks to disseminate messages and apply policies. Galicia may be uniquely suited to succeed at this regional diaspora engagement experiment, since they are the region with the most emigrants and the largest diaspora base, and because they are an ethnic nationality, which presumably helps in maintaining ethnic affinity among diaspora over time.

The prioritization of diaspora for immigration stems from a presumption that co-ethnics are better prepared to enter the Galician workforce and will better fit into Galician society.

The regional framing of Galicia as a rural nationality in need of young workers, compounded by the rules in use of prioritizing ethnic co-nationals, and the political-economic context of Galicia as a centrist and slowly converging region set the stage for the emergence of regional diaspora engagement policies aimed at attracting Galician diaspora in a variety of ways. The Xunta has created a comprehensive “return plan” which incentives the diaspora to settle in Galicia thereby contributing to the invigoration of the Galician workforce. The Xunta has placed extra attention on the recruitment of young educated people and in the encouragement of small businesses. The

Xunta has also partnered with various local companies to establish special contracts for diasporic returnees. Altogether, the Xunta’s return strategy is a policy outcome in response to continued demographic shift and outmigration of young people in Galicia. The strategy builds upon Spain’s co-ethnic citizenship laws, and relies on the large resource pool of well engaged Galicia diaspora in the exterior.

Local Level: Galician Diasporic ‘Returnees’ (Boxes H1-H4) For those diaspora that have made the decision to move to Galicia, findings indicate that the incentives offered through the Xunta’s Return Strategy has had little impact on the core decision making process. According to my informants, the motivation to move was 227 predominantly a result of push factors such as increasing economic insecurity and social instability. After the decision had been made to leave Latin America, many of the families I spoke with then considered settlement location bringing in a variety of pull factors such as language, citizenship acquisition, ease of social transition, and economic prospects. While all the respondents that I spoke with were of Galician descent and held Spanish citizenship, many also had other citizenship ties, such as to Italy or . These informants by and large choose

Galicia because of ease of settlement. Familiarity with the region, social and familial ties, good schools, and language correspondence were all cited as pull factors in choosing Galicia. The

Xunta’s return policy, according to my informants, was merely a perk.

All of the returnees that I spoke with save for one elderly couple had chosen to settle in a

Galician city. Transitioning from one of the largest cities in the world to a rural region in

Northwest Spain was eased by at least choosing an urban locale in Galicia. Many of the most robust Argentinian communities in Galicia are in the southern city of Vigo, on the Portuguese border. Informants said that of all the cities in Galicia, Vigo is the most cosmopolitan, not to mention the warmest. The choice of settling in a city negates one of the Xunta’s strategy prongs, which is to work with rural municipalities to incite return settlement in heavily depopulated areas. By settling in Vigo, or any other city, returnees are not able to capitalize on certain settlement grants from rural municipalities.

While informants stressed that the return strategy incentives were not a factor influencing their decision to move or to settle in Galicia, they still chose Galicia in part because of intergenerationally maintained ties through the diaspora network in Buenos Aires. Had they not been integrated in the Galician collective in Buenos Aires they would have less of a sense of

Galician identity and less of a sense of Galicia in general. While the Galician collective is a

228 longstanding institution in Buenos Aires, it has been interconnected with the Xunta’s diaspora engagement offices for over three decades now. Galician organizations have benefitted from embracing strategies deployed through the emigration strategy, like association building upkeep, and subsidized trips to Galicia for emigrants and artistic youth. The establishment of a foreign consulate in Buenos Aires helped to expedite the engagement policies, and many of those working for the Xunta in Buenos Aires are also active members of the Galician collective, further integrating the two entities on an interpersonal level. Thus, it is impossible to say which diaspora engagement policy enticed returnees, if any. Due to the fact that “tapping” and

“embracing” diaspora engagement strategies have been working in tandem for over three decades, the integration of the Xunta’s overall strategy into the Galician collective in Buenos

Aires is total. Even if the Xunta as an institution is not omnipresent in the collective, Galicia is certainly omnipresent, and therefore banal nationalism is at work.

While returnees I spoke with were unhappy with the application and processing of the returnee benefits, all were happy with their decisions to move. Social stability, structural economic security, and overall quality of life were cited as having been improved. The only group that was unsure about staying in Galicia long term were the students who had come to

Galicia on scholarships to pursue . Job prospects in Galicia are still relatively limited for highly skilled workers, and these students that had just completed master’s degrees were having a hard time finding jobs in their fields. Similarly, some of the young parents that I interviewed were also having to take jobs outside of their professions. While the students were in

Galicia to get high quality training and hopefully find a high-quality job, the young families had made the move as a holistic choice, prioritizing the long term health of their children and the acquisition of civic assets above career detours.

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Because all but three of the returnees that I interviewed were recent migrants, having been in Galicia for under a year, economic issues may mount over time. The modest job market in Galicia may prove to push some returnees into other parts of Spain or Europe, as it has done to so many young Galicians in the past decade. If this is the case, then Galicia would be a gateway to Europe. Galician identifying diaspora with Spanish citizenship like those that I interviewed are able to settle in Galicia with help from the Xunta’s return plan, and with help from the social networks that their membership in the diaspora provides. While Galicia has many of the social and civic aspects interviewees stated that they desire, the job prospects may transform Galicia into a stepping stone after which returnees can more easily move on to other, more economically diverse regions of Spain or Europe. This is a hypothesis that requires more study. I would like to keep in touch with the families and student returnees that I interviewed over the next several years and longitudinally study their transitions from Argentinian-Galician diaspora in Latin

America, to Argentinians of Galician descent in Galicia.

Outcomes (Box K1) The diaspora engagement policies coming from the Xunta coupled with the diversity oriented public atmosphere that Buenos Aires is trying to create produces a situation in which

Galician identity is able to thrive. The Galician collective in Buenos Aires has the support of both the Xunta and the Buenos Aires government, having been utilized by both regional institutions to propagate current messaging and achieve regional goals. Both regions benefit in different ways from the survival of the Galician collective as an ethnic entity, and Galician diaspora themselves benefit from these policies in multiple ways.

In Buenos Aires, the goal is to reposition the city as a global example of diversity and tolerance within an historically European focused Argentina. While the state narrative of white

European identity in Argentina continues to exist and is very present in the landscapes and 230 narratives of Buenos Aires, the city government has been working somewhat successfully to counter that narrative in the transformation of Argentina’s capital into a cosmopolitan global city. In order to do this, the city has created policies which tap into the existing structure of the ethnic collectives in the city, the most well-established of which are European groups. In re- positioning these groups, such as Galicians, as ethnic minorities in the city, Buenos Aires is able to achieve their look of diversity while not truly disrupting the status quo.

To achieve their diversity and tolerance goals, Buenos Aires benefits from active and engaged diaspora collectives. While Buenos Aires does not have much direct contact or cooperation with the Xunta, the city benefits from the Xunta’s support of the Galician collective.

Galicians, as the largest sub-state ethnic group in the city, supply the ideal case of a group which blends in as white and propagates the national mythology of a European nation, yet when called upon can perform otherness. In this way, Galicians are very well suited to be used as an example of a successful and integrated minority ethnic group in the city, serving both the regional, and the state narratives.

Galicia benefits from a strong diaspora collective in Buenos Aires in two ways: that they are a human resource for recruitment back to a demographically precarious Galicia, and that they act as entrepreneurial messengers for Galicia abroad. The blatant aim of the return strategy is that the Xunta will recruit 20,000 returnees by 2020. This will supposedly help to ease Galicia’s advanced demographic transition and reinvigorate the economy of the converging region. Having a diaspora base like the collective that has been nurtured by the city government in Buenos Aires is thus of great benefit to Galicia. Many diaspora in the Galician collective of Buenos Aires are now well positioned socially to endorse Galician companies and products in Argentina. This benefit has been nurtured by the Xunta’s emigration plan, which does not explicitly aim at

231 tapping diaspora for return, rather, this plan embraces diaspora by providing services and funding that helps keep the diaspora network cohesive. By helping the Galician associations and clubs in the diaspora, the Xunta is hoping to retain members of the diaspora through participation in the various organizations that make up the diaspora collectives. The more the diaspora remains engaged through the generations, the more chances Galicia will have to insert itself into international economic opportunities.

The indirect transnational coalition that has been built between the Galician Xunta and

Buenos Aires impacts individuals in the diaspora in many ways. Galician collective members are now beneficiaries of the various programs which have resulted from the regional initiatives.

Members of the Galician collective feel connected to Galicia in an abstract way through the heritage and traditions passed down from family members and in a very concrete way through the connection with Galicia provided by the presence of the Xunta in the activities of their associations. Diaspora across all generations said they feel affinity with Galicia and a sense of national identity, although that identity did tend to become additive or secondary in later generations. On average there was positive reception for the Xunta’s programs as well as when considering the actions of Buenos Aires. When discussing the of the Xunta’s strategy though, sentiments of Galician national identity were quickly qualified.

Galician national identity is strong in the Galician collective of Buenos Aires. Members believe in their continued role in the story of Galicia as the “5th province” and as keepers of many of Galicia’s most important histories. Yet permanent return to Galicia is a last resort for most. Second and third generations especially made note of the sense of security they feel at having a European passport, and of having the option to be welcomed in Galicia should they feel the need. But for the most the push factors listed would have to reach a much more dire level for

232 these Argentinian-Galicians to leave their homes in Buenos Aires. The clear outcome of these factors was not an inclination to focus on Galician identity, but a renewed focus on Argentinian national identity that would see diaspora stay in Argentina and contribute to the success of that country.

Of course, the balance of return can be tipped at any moment, which was the case for those returnees that I interviewed in Galicia. These returnees, the majority of them young students or families, had made the difficult decision to leave Argentina and settle in Galicia.

Even though they had made this decision though, they did not report feeling more Galician, even though they felt perfectly comfortable and accepted by society. Unsurprisingly, they too reported feeling more Argentinian when faced with the move. Even though their status as Spanish citizens registered in Galicia qualifies them for participation in the return programs, they still said that while socially they are well received, they feel like outsiders, especially when looking for jobs.

While they are not visually distinguishable as immigrants, they have an Argentinian accent and a porteño dialect. They have different certifications for professional training and education. They miss the creature comforts of home, like good (BBQ) and getting together in people’s homes instead of bars. On the spectrum of difficult transitions, these returnees acknowledged that they are comparatively very lucky, and having an altogether smooth settlement. But it is still not perfect, and the outcome for those that I spoke with was a whole new point of view and appreciation of their Argentinian national identities.

Buenos Aires, as host region of the Galician collective, and Galicia as home region, is a symbolic transnational coalition. Both regions benefit from a robust Galician presence, which has been supported by the recent proliferation of policies from both governments. The members of the Galician collective benefit through the added stability of the collective in Buenos Aires

233 and through the safety net of possible return to Galicia. This transnational coalition has ultimately increased the visibility of the Galician collective to the benefit of both regions, and, while supporting the expression and performance of Galician identity, has ultimately increased

Argentinian national identity among the diaspora when faced with the Xunta’s ultimate goal of permanent return.

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CHAPTER 12 – CONCLUSION

By seeking to understand aims and benefits of diaspora engagement on the regional scale, this dissertation critiques patterns in landscape, group participation, motivations, and identity outcomes of individual participants in my case study. As an autonomous region and spotlight city in Latin America, Buenos Aires has been trying to position itself as a diverse and inclusive global city. The way they have implemented this suite of policies is by tapping into the existing ethnic collective structure in the city. By utilizing the existing structure of ethnic collectives, they are able to easily disseminate support programs to ethnic groups in the city as well as well as highlighting their efforts through such programs as BAxCollectividades. However, by utilizing the existing collective structure, they are inadvertently creating an environment of exclusive inclusivity, as the most well-established collectives, which also happen to be European, reap the most benefit from the programs. The Galician collective is one such European ethnic group that benefits from the new focus on diversity in the city. By utilizing the collective network in this way, Buenos Aires is able to show diversity through a display of ethnic performance, but also continue propagating the overarching Argentinian narrative of normative whiteness.

The Landscape of Buenos Aires reflects this norm as well. While spaces have been made for ethnic collectives to celebrate their cultures, the most well-established groups with the most social capital are still the best represented, Galicia among them. Stone crosses, shells, prominent association buildings, Galician food, performances, and names all adorn the central streets of

Argentina’s capital city. A group like the Galician collective is ethnically different because they are a minority and arguably oppressed group in Spain, but they are still able to blend in as

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Argentinians of European decent. Therefore, the banal nationalism of Galician symbology works to highlight the Buenos Aires diversity initiatives, but also fits into the classically Euro-centric national psyche of Argentina.

While the Galician collective is one of the oldest and most prominent in the city, the way that it is organized has led to its weakening over the years. The structure of the Galician collective mimics the localized and isolated nature of the villages and parishes from which the immigrants originally hailed. While this structure reflects the history of strong translocal relationships between the associations and Galician localities, it has contributed to fractures within the large collective overall. This micro-territorialism may continue to weaken the Galician collective as small associations continue to lose members to old age and lack of youth participation. The merging of collectives is seen as a logical way forward, but stubbornness in the leadership and the discomfort that change brings has stalled the consolidation process.

Members of the Galician collective do continue to passionately participate, mostly through activity in their micro-associations, but also though activities in the umbrella support organizations like Centro Galicia, the Union, and the Federation of Galician associations. While the collective is by and large made up of elderly diaspora, a few associations maintain a robust youth presence. Growing up in an association with a large youth presence and being involved in extra curriculars like music, dance, and sport seem to help retain membership. Some associations, like the Federation, also spearhead political action groups that involve the Galician collective in global issues like abortion rights and Palestinian struggle, which works to keep the collective current in an atmosphere that often dwells in the past.

Most of the diaspora in Buenos Aires are Spanish citizens, having taken advantage of the law that designates any child of a Spanish citizen to also have the rights of Spanish citizenship,

236 no matter where in the world they live. Building off of the bloodline citizenship law of the

Spanish state, the Xunta de Galicia is culminating their “Return 2020 Strategy” which aims at incentivizing return of Galician emigrants and their decedents in the diaspora. The Xunta hopes that because of their large numbers of emigrants and the special attachment that Galician diaspora have to the region as an ethnic nationality, that they can entice permanent return of the diaspora to help reverse their advanced demographic shift and stimulate the economy. The statistics show that in terms of physical return of Spanish citizens, the Xunta has not been very effective in their tapping strategy. Modest numbers of Spanish citizens from Latin American countries Venezuela, Cuba, and to a lesser extent Argentina have been returning steadily over the past ten years, but an equal number of young workers have been leaving Galicia in the same time period.

Those that have made the decision to return to Galicia indicated that they did so not because of the pull factors associated with living in Europe, Galician national identity, or the engagement policies. The returnees that I spoke with said that they were motivated by push factors, chief of them being economic instability in Argentina. While their reception in Galicia has been socially positive, especially when compared to that of immigrants from other ethnic groups, many of my returnee informants were still uncertain about the economic prospects in

Galicia, and indicated feeling like outsiders, particularly when looking for jobs.

Diversity initiatives from Buenos Aires coupled with diaspora engagement policies from the Xunta aimed at return have ultimately worked to re-enforce Argentinian sense of self among the diaspora as well as returnees that I spoke with. When faced with the real choice of leaving

Argentina, informants were quick to re-iterate their Argentinianness, and those who had been

237 pushed to return also expressed a stronger Argentinian identity given their new outsider-insider status in Galicia.

Ultimately, utilization of the Galician diaspora resource seems to be working well for

Buenos Aires in their pursuit of publicizing a more diverse global city. The Xunta on the other hand, does not seem to have reached their 2020 goal of 20,000 permanent diasporic returnees, despite their investment in embracing and tapping the diaspora communities abroad, especially in Buenos Aires. Other elements of the diaspora engagement plan, such as return investment from diaspora and a longer-term returnee flow are yet to be determined. More research is needed to conclude whether Galicia is a permanent stop for returnees, or if it acts are more of a

European gateway for the young, high skilled diaspora that the Xunta seeks to attract.

Migrants create multi-scalar networks and tie places together through their attachments to homelands. In some cases, these attachment networks are so strong that they last generations, and influence nation building and identity from afar. With the rise of government diaspora engagement institutions at multiple scales, it is logical that existing diaspora networks be utilized as a resource to further the aims of the origin (homeland) governments.

In utilizing the existing resource of well engaged diaspora in the city, Buenos Aires has inadvertently created policies which privilege groups that were given an advantage through racist nation building policies of the past. Galicia, in trying to tap into working age diaspora, has not been effective at pulling youth for permanent return, rather, the success that they have had is more contributable to circumstantial push factors coupled with the political safety net of citizenship. In enacting these ethnically selective return policies, Galicia is working to exclude others from the immigration narrative. Diaspora themselves were more likely to have a renewed

238 sense of Argentinian identity in the midst of increased engagement from the Xunta, especially those of younger generations.

Given these case study findings, the main takeaways are three: 1. Cities and regions need to move beyond brownwashing, and critically assess diversity policies to make sure they are not building on historical racism and inequality. 2. Given that push factors influence migration more than pull factors, especially among younger, socially embedded generations of diaspora,

“embrace” is a more effective and less exclusionary diaspora engagement strategy than

“tapping”. 3. Even in cases of slow and segmented assimilation with strong diaspora institutions, a migrant group that is socially and economically comfortable will develop strong identity attachments to the place that they reside, confirming the compatibility of multicultural incorporation and national identity.

This case illustrates how diaspora engagement can operate on the sub-state scale, benefiting both sending and receiving regions differently: in the case of the receiving region, to publicize an “appropriately diverse” global alpha city, or in the case of the sending region, to inject “socially compatible” youth into a demographically precarious populace. My case also shows that even in instances of strong diasporic networks and attachment, second and third generations must negotiate multiple identities and ultimately may feel a greater responsibility to the nation that they were raised in when questioned about making a permanent return. It is ultimately push factors that motivate the return decision, showing that even when national identity connection is strong, it is ultimately economic considerations that are at the forefront of migrants’ minds.

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APPENDIX A

Preguntas Institucionales (Galicia)

1. ¿Cuál es tu función?

2. ¿Cuáles son los objetivos de esta institución?

3. ¿Por qué es importante mantener relaciones entre la diáspora y Galicia hoy en día? a. ¿Que importancia tienen las relaciones entre Argentina y Galicia?

4. ¿Dónde se invierten la mayor parte de los recursos?

5. Como mi proyecto trata específicamente de Buenos Aires, y Galicia, ¿Tienes más relación/contacto con el gobierno de Argentina, o directamente con Buenos Aires? ¿Cuál sería el nivel de cooperación ideal entre Buenos Aires y Galicia? desde su punto de . 6. ¿Ve la relación entre Argentina y España, y específicamente entre Buenos Aires y Galicia cambiando?

7. ¿Desde su punto de vista, como cree que influye en otros países o regiones, el hecho de tener una población bien conectada con sus raíces en otro país? Como, por ejemplo, los gallegos en Buenos Aires.

8. ¿Por otro lado, como cree que le ayuda a Galicia el hecho de tener una diáspora bien conectada con sus raíces en otro país?

9. ¿Como cree que evolucionara el concepto de contratación/cooperación de la diáspora en Galicia, en España y Europa en general?

10. ¿Cuál es la reacción de la población gallega ante el crecimiento de la legislación dirigida a la diáspora?

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Preguntas Institucionales (BA)

1. ¿Cuál es tu papel aquí?

2. ¿Que es la función de esta institución?

3. ¿Cual son los objetivos de esta institución? a. ¿Que estás haciendo para lograr estos objetivos?

4. ¿Como están celebrando y facilitando la diversidad de la ciudad?

5. ¿Dónde concentra la mayoría de tus recursos?

6. ¿Por qué es importante celebrar los grupos étnicas en la ciudad?

7. Hablando de la diáspora contratación con los países de origen, ¿como te vas coordinando con estados, y/o regiones? a. ¿Por cuanto tiempo has sido coordinando con ellos?

8. Hablando de la diáspora de Galicia específicamente, ¿cuanta cooperación sucede entre ustedes y ellos?

9. ¿Cuál es el nivel de cooperación desde el país de origen que te ves cómo optima? a. ¿Por qué? b. ¿cómo beneficiará la ciudad? c. ¿cómo beneficiará la diáspora?

10. ¿Cuanto supervisarían recibes tu institución desde el gobierno de Argentina? a. ¿En cual áreas tienes lo más y lo menos libertad?

11. ¿Dónde va el área de diáspora contratación? a. ¿Va a ser más o menos fuerte en los siguientes años?

12. ¿Cuál fue la respuesta del público en Buenos Aires al tema de esforzar las conexiones con diáspora y países de origen?

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APPENDIX B

Preguntas Individuales (Buenos Aires)

1. ¿Cuál es tu identidad étnica? 2. ¿Cuál es tu identidad nacional? 3. ¿Cómo describes tu origen a personas que nunca te han conocido? 4. ¿Por cuantas generaciones ha estado tu familia aquí en Argentina? 5. ¿Por qué moviste tu familia desde Galicia? a. ¿Fue una transición difícil? b. ¿qué tipo de asistencia recibió tu familia al llegar aquí? i. ¿De la comunidad local? ii. ¿Del Gobierno de BA/Argentina? iii. ¿De Galicia/España? 6. ¿Mantienen lazos con Galicia en este momento? (Ej: familia, viajes, donativos de dinero etc.) a. ¿Cómo mantienes estos lazos entre años/generaciones? b. ¿Cuánta impotencia tienen estos lazos? 7. ¿Cómo expresa la comunidad gallega aquí su identidad cultural? 8. ¿A que grupos gallegos pertenecés? a. ¿Cómo encontraste a ellos? 9. ¿Tienes ciudadanía gallega? a. Sigues la política gallega? b. Votas en las elecciones gallegas? 10. ¿Cuál es el rasgo más “gallego” que tiene tu/tu familia? 11. ¿De que manera te sientes más conectado a Galicia?

260

Preguntas Individuales (Retornos Gallegos)

1. ¿Cómo describes tu identidad? 2. Cuéntame la historia de la emigración de tu familia desde Galicia. 3. ¿Cuándo y por qué tomaste la decisión a regresar a Galicia? a. ¿Fue una transición difícil? b. ¿qué tipo de asistencia recibió tu familia al llegar aquí? i. ¿De la comunidad local? ii. ¿Del Gobierno de BA/Argentina? iii. ¿De Galicia/España? 4. ¿Cuáles son las diferencias entre la sociedad gallega aquí y allá? 5. ¿Sientas como eres a parte de la comunidad gallega aquí como todos los que eran nacidos aquí? a. ¿En cuales momentos sientes más adentro y en cuales momentos sientes más afuera? 6. ¿Cuál es el rasgo más “gallego” que tiene tu/tu familia? 7. ¿Todavía consideras como un miembro de la diáspora gallego? ¿O algo diferente?

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APPENDIX C

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