Kyed, H M and Gravers, M 2015 Integration and Power-Sharing: What are stability the Future Options for Armed Non-State Actors in the Myanmar Peace Process? Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 57, pp. 1–20, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gt

RESEARCH ARTICLE Integration and Power-Sharing: What are the Future Options for Armed Non-State Actors in the Myanmar Peace Process? Helene Maria Kyed* and Mikael Gravers†

Myanmar is confronted with a contested peace process after over six decades of armed conflict between the national army and around 20 ethnic Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs) in the country’s resource rich borderlands. Although a Nation- wide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed by eight ANSAs in October 2015, other groups have not, and fighting continues in some areas. A key controversy is insecurity about the future political and economic positions of the ANSAs, along with mistrust in the army’s commitment to peace. In this article we dis- cuss five re-integration options for ANSA members, including not only economic integration, but also integration into political parties, local government, civil society organisations and the security sector. We argue that conventional DDR programming is unrealistic in Myanmar, because the ANSAs are strongly opposed to any disarmament and demobilization before a far reaching political settlement towards federalism is reached. This calls for a more flexible sequencing of DDR that begins with reintegration options or what has been called RDD. In addition, reintegration efforts should not only be technical exercises, but be firmly embed- ded in disaggregated power-sharing guarantees, including for lower- and middle-­ ranking ANSA members at the local level. This will not only support more sustainable peace, but also help build more trust in the peace process. We conclude the article by considering the role of the international community.

Introduction and a rapid influx of international aid agen- In Myanmar/Burma a core preoccupation cies and investors. In this article we engage is the ongoing peace process that will end with the wider debate about ‘Demobilization, 65 years of armed conflict in the resource-rich Disarmament and Reintegration’ (DDR) borderlands populated by ethnic minorities. programmes and argue that in the pre- This takes place alongside a transition from sent Myanmar peacebuilding context it is totalitarian military rule towards democracy highly unlikely that conventional DDR pro- grammes will suffice to support stability and sustainable peace (Jensen & Stepputat * Danish Institute for International Studies, DK [email protected] 2014; Munive & Jakobsen 2012; Munive † Aarhus University, DK 2013; Muggah 2005; McMullin 2013b). This [email protected] is because of the predominant focus in DDR Art. 57, page 2 of 20 Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing programmes on disarmament, as a first step In this article we similarly argue that the in the process, and on economic incentives to lack of political will to disarm in Myanmar successful integration. In Myanmar this DDR calls for an exploration of potential (re)inte- template overlooks key political motives gration options for ANSAs as a starting point behind both the causes of conflict and the for discussing DDR. This, we suggest, will not demands of the peace negotiations. For six only help obtain sustainable peace but also decades 20 ethnic armed organisations have increase trust in what currently is a contested fought for self-determination and have, to peace process. Given that a political agree- varying degrees, enjoyed considerable state- ment is still in the process of being reached, like control over ethnic territories and peo- it is equally necessary to ground a discussion ples. For this reason ethnic Armed Non-State of reintegration within a wider framework Actors (ANSAs) are strongly against laying of conflict resolution (Walter 1999; Zartman down arms before a comprehensive politi- 2001; Ramsbotham et al 2012). This means cal settlement is reached. A core demand framing integration options as an element of ANSA leaders is a federal system that not of disaggregated power-sharing guarantees only gives them political positions but also (economic, political and military), which can allows them to retain arms in the different help create trust in the peace agreement ethnic nationalities areas. (Walter 1999). Overall, the Myanmar situation raises the On 15 October 2015 eight ANSAs signed a question of whether conventional DDR in Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with some contexts should be substituted by what the government and the head of the national is now referred to as ‘third generation DDR’ Burmese army after two years of intensive or ‘RDD’ (reintegration, demobilization and negotiations. However, the remaining seven disarmament) (Sedra 2003). Reversing the ANSAs who were invited to sign have not conventional sequence, RDD begins with done so, and another three ANSAs have been incentives – economic and political – for excluded from the NCA by the government. reintegration and only ends with some form Fighting between government and ANSA of disarmament or arms control (Munive & forces also continues in some ethnic areas Jakobsen 2012: 362). It is increasingly real- and even the groups that have signed are ized that ‘sequencing flexibility’ may be internally split on the NCA. The peace pro- needed to adapt DDR to particular contexts. cess therefore remains contested. At a higher A UNDPO report (2010: 28) highlights that, political level this reflects insecurity regard- ‘[p]rioritizing reintegration before starting ing whether the government and the army disarmament and demobilization may be will commit to a federal system. At the lower advantageous in cases where political will level armed actors are insecure about their is lacking for disarmament.’ Reintegration future options, including their sources of opportunities, including non-material incen- income, recognition and security, which cre- tives such as political recognition, can serve ates mistrust in the peace process. The peace to move a stagnant peace building process negotiations have so far left out any open along and may also provide incentives to discussions of what will happen to the many financially motivated combatants of lower- thousand middle- and lower-ranked soldiers ranks (ibid). There are also matters of secu- and officials once an agreement is reached. rity and trust at play, as Walter (1999: 154–5) Instead the current draft agreement focuses argues: ‘because combatants are likely to on high-level political and military aspects, become highly fearful and insecure as they including a promise to hold a political dia- demobilize, they can gain an added sense of logue regarding changing the political sys- safety if they are not forced to disarm fully, tem. While these high-level settlements will especially not before the political terms of an clarify the overall framework for the future agreement have been fulfilled.’ possibilities of ex-combatant integration, Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing Art. 57, page 3 of 20 more concrete options and guarantees also and our interviews in Myanmar. They are in need to be discussed at this current stage of no way exhaustive but should be read as an conflict resolution. As Walter (1999) argues, initial contribution to the debate about rein- the incentives to accept and implement a tegration in Myanmar. In fact, we make a call peace agreement depend not only on resolv- for a more in-depth analysis of the armed ing the root causes of conflict and agreeing groups, their incentives and motivations, not on the overall political system, but also on as a homogenous group but as a complex more disaggregated security and power- and dynamic set of actors. It is important to sharing guarantees. These can help mitigate note that the integration options will overall the enormous uncertainties that rival parties depend on what kind of political settlement face in the implementation of peace trea- is reached, including important power-shar- ties: e.g. fear of attacks, of losing income and ing arrangements and the possibilities for positions and of being excluded from future building trust and ensuring security in the government arrangements. Power-sharing implementation process. It is therefore nec- guarantees can include the distribution of essary to firstly provide a short background specific posts to ex-combatants in govern- to the conflicts and to discuss the main ele- ment, administration, service delivery and ments and challenges of the nationwide security forces, including at the local level. ceasefire negotiations in Myanmar. We con- It may also imply ‘interim arrangements’ clude the paper by reflecting on the role of whereby ANSAs are allowed to maintain international aid agencies in the peace pro- administrative and security roles in the ter- cess, with Myanmar representing a rather ritories they have controlled until integrated exceptional case of very low international institutions are established. Hartzell & involvement. Hoddie (2003) further add the importance of economic power-sharing guarantees, From Armed Conflict to Contested especially in contexts where certain identity Peace groups have a history of being economically Myanmar has been blighted by civil war, marginalised. Apart from providing an incen- ethno-nationalist conflict and outbreaks of tive to sign an agreement, these guaranties communal and religious violence since colo- are also important for sustainable peace. nial times. Thirty-three per cent of its 51.4 This argument emanating from the debate million residents belongs to ethnic minorities on conflict resolution is closely related to the and the remainder to the Burman majority. integration aspects of DDR programming. There are today an estimated 20 active ethnic In light of these insights, this article dis- ANSAs, including numerous splinter groups, cusses integration options for the ANSAs: which represent the different ethnic minor- what ‘exit’ options do ANSA members have ity groups (e.g. the Shan, Karen, Kachin, Mon, after decades of conflict and how do they Chin, Kayah, Rakhine, Wa, Pao-o, Naga, Lahu, envision their future – as armed actors, civil Lisu and Palaung, each with various sub- servants, politicians, businessmen or some- groupings) (Smith 1999).2 These groups have thing else? In addressing this question we fought the national army to obtain a federal draw on semi-structured individual and constitution since 1949, two years after inde- group interviews held in Mon and Karen pendence from the British. Most of them states as well as in Yangon in January 2014 also have political wings, their own flags and and on prior research.1 We discuss five dif- uniforms. Over different periods they have ferent integration options. These consist of a administered their own ‘micro-states’. Some, combination of different forms of political, like the Karen National Union (KNU), have economic, civil society and security sector their own departments of education, health, integration. The options are of our own crea- justice, forestry and local defence. Today the tion but are inspired by the DDR literature ANSAs can muster an estimated 100,000 Art. 57, page 4 of 20 Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing soldiers. The size is difficult to access, but and a new order of classification and admin- it ranges from the large United Wa State istration divided subjects according to not Army (UWSA), with an estimated 20–25,000 only ethnicity, but also culture and religion troops, to the Karen National Union (KNU), (Furnivall 1956: 304–307). Apart from eth- with approximately 4–6000 troops, and the nicity, religious diversity has been central New Mon State Party (NMSP), with 500–700 in the conflict, which had begun during the soldiers (Gravers & Ytzen 2014). British conquests in the 1800s when eth- The political economy of the ANSAs has nic minority Christian converts helped the been tied to a shadow economy, linked to British fight Burman rebels led by Buddhist cross-border trade, especially with China and monks.3 Thailand, and income from the borderlands’ During World War II Christian Karen and natural resources such as minerals, gems, Kachin states cooperated with the British timber and opium (Woods 2011). ANSAs are forces against the Japanese army, alliances also known for taxing ethnic populations that resurrected tensions between the ethnic and larger ANSAs have received substantial minorities and the Burman majority. During donations from the ethnic diaspora as well the negotiations leading to independence as from donors and religious organisations. ethnic minorities expected their loyalty to Over the course of the armed conflict, access the British to be rewarded with autonomy. to and control over trade and resources have A conference in Panglong was organised in played a strong role, along with identity poli- 1947 with the main ethnic group leaders, tics. Shifting military operations and trade and here a federation was discussed that alliances with China and Thailand have also would grant autonomous administration to influenced the strength of the ANSAs. For the ethnic minorities (Gravers & Ytzen 2014). instance, in the 1970s–80s the KNU was However, the federal principles of the 1947 regarded as the de facto authority by Thailand constitution never materialised. This laid at the local level in the border region, but the roots for the long civil war. The Kayah in the 1990s the Thai commander-in-chief rebelled in 1949, followed by KNU, which struck a deal with the Burmese military gov- almost managed to take over the then-cap- ernment to gain access to agricultural and ital city, Rangoon (now Yangon).4 The KNU mineral businesses in Karen state and dams retreated to the hills of present Karen state and ports in Mon state. This substantially (established in 1952) where it established undermined the ANSAs (Oh 2013). the de facto government of the Kawthoolei The armed conflict in Myanmar has (Old Country) state. The Mon took up arms resulted in establishing the borderlands as with the KNU in 1950 and, after a ceasefire a segmented society where military organi- agreement, rebelled again in 1958 with the sation and a shadow economy amalgamate formation of the NMSP (South 2003). The in an ethno-nationalist semi-state polity. Kachin and other groups followed in 1961. Weapons have remained crucial to protect In 1962 General Ne Win staged a coup, civilian supporters as well as businesses overthrowing Prime Minister U Nu, who had against Burmese army attacks and economic promised states to the Rakhine and Mon incursions. In addition competition between groups. Fearing that other ethnic groups and within ethnic organisations has been would secede, Ne Win took power and strong. launched a military offensive, demanding unconditional surrender from the ANSAs. History of conflict and previous His idea of order was a corporate state of one ceasefires nationality and he created a one party social- The seeds for the ethnic-based armed conflict ist union. Major military offensives during were already sown during British Colonial his rule weakened many of the ANSAs’ ter- rule. Ethnicity was reified and politicised ritorial control. After pro-democracy protests Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing Art. 57, page 5 of 20 in 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Services (Keenan 2013). The deal involved Council took over power from Ne Win and stable salaries, social benefits and continued initiated the first ceasefires with at least 17 armament for the ethnic soldiers. Whereas ANSAs (between 1989 and 1997).5 These this arrangement resembles reintegration ceasefires focused on economic and military elements from DDR programs elsewhere, it matters, excluding any political settlements involved neither disarmament nor demobili- towards federalism. For this reason some sation, and came with no political settlement. ANSAs, like the KNU, did not agree to a cease- Consequently, many ANSA leaders refused fire. Those who agreed were allowed to keep the deal, resulting in renewed cycles of fight- their weapons and were given lucrative local ing and tensions.7 Like the 1990s ceasefires, trade deals, territorial control over specified the BGF initiative has been criticised not only ethnic areas and even industrial and inter- for undermining ethnic political demands, national trade concessions, in exchange for but also for exacerbating abuses of villag- giving up the armed struggle (Oh 2013: 10). ers, illicit business and land-grabbing by BGF The 1990s ceasefires split up many of the forces (Keenan 2013: 3–4). Until 2011, join- ANSAs due to internal disagreements, fatigue ing the BGF was made a precondition for any from fighting and conflicting economic inter- peace talks with the government. ests. For instance in 1994 many Buddhist sol- The BGF initiative was implemented after diers in the mainly Christian-led KNU/KNLA a longer political process beginning in 2003 mutinied to form the Democratic Karen with the military government declaring a Buddhist Army (DKBA), under the leader- seven step roadmap to ‘disciplined democ- ship of a Buddhist monk.6 The DKBA signed racy’, which in 2008 led to a referendum for a ceasefire with the government and coop- the new constitution, followed by general erated with the army to take over the KNU elections in 2010. Both events were allegedly headquarters. In exchange, DKBA was given marred with fraud. The military proxy Union logistical, military and financial assistance Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was as well as permission to conduct businesses declared the overall winner of the elections, (South 2011: 19). After the DKBA exit, more which in 2011 brought President U Thein splinter groups from the KNU appeared, led Sein into power. He introduced a surprising by officers who were fed up with the strug- political and economic reform agenda based gle and looking after their own business on fundamental rights of citizens. He also interests and the interests of their support- made a peace process with the ANSAs a top ers. This reflected the general emphasis on priority. By early 2012 ceasefires had been economic incentives in the 1990s ceasefires. signed with the majority of the ANSAs, fol- While they did bring some development pro- lowed by negotiations towards a nationwide jects that improved the lives of villagers, they agreement. also ended up strengthening the illicit busi- nesses of ceasefire groups and the national Nationwide peace negotiations – army. Rather than create sustainable peace, obstacles and challenges they allowed for the expansion of the army’s In December 2013 a National Ceasefire territorial control and counter-insurgency Coordination Team (NCCT), comprised of 16 strategies (Oh 2013: 11). ANSA members, began the process of draft- In 2009 the ceasefire groups from the ing a National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) 1990s became subject to the Border Guard together with the Union Peace-Making Work Force (BGF) initiative, which followed the Committee (UPWC), representing the govern- 2008 constitution’s demand for a single ment and army. The main political demands army. It was an open strategy for military of the ANSA leaders are a federal constitu- integration of the ANSAs as special units tion, the protection of the rights of ethnic under the command of the National Defence nationalities and a federal army into which Art. 57, page 6 of 20 Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing the ethnic ANSAs are integrated. Legal reform the promise of establishing a union based that regulates land ownership, development on the principles of democracy and feder- projects and control of the drug trade is also alism, which can be seen as a major step on their agenda. This last demand is closely towards power-sharing and decentralisation. related to the fear of unequal economic However, the guarantee of a change of the power and should be understood against the political system will depend on the out- background of the large-scale development comes of an inclusive political dialogue also projects initiated by the government dur- involving civil society and political parties, as ing the ceasefires, which ethnic communi- well as on constitutional amendments. The ties have associated with land-grabbing and political dialogue will only begin in early counter-insurgency. Importantly, the ANSAs 2016. As such the NCA does not include any are against disarmament before a political concrete and disaggregated power-sharing settlement and most envision this settlement guarantees, such as positions to ANSA mem- to include some form of continued arma- bers in government, the administration and ment. A major change for the government is security forces, which, as argued by Walter that since 2013 it no longer demanded that (1999) can be a very significant incentive to ANSAs first surrender weapons before enter- sign a peace agreement. The text does men- ing into political dialogue; it also agreed to tion that political dialogue should include discuss federalism. discussing a union army that will repre- In August 2015 the NCCT agreed on a final sent all ethnic nationalities, but it makes NCA text with the government, which on 15 no concrete guarantees for the continued October 2015 was signed by eight ANSAs, armament of ANSAs. In terms of economic including, among others, the KNU and two power-sharing such as the equal distribu- other Karen armed groups. However, the tion of resources and land rights (Hartzell & remaining ANSA members of the NCCT – Hoddie 2003), the NCA also does not pro- including the influential KIA in Kachin state vide any concrete guarantees. It only pro- and the NMSP, representing the Mon ethnic vides guidelines for ensuring that ANSAs group – decided not to sign. The large UWSP, and local communities are consulted before representing the Wa group, which is not the government rolls out major projects in member of the NCCT, also rejected an invita- the ceasefire areas. Although this could help tion by the government to sign. The official counter the widespread fear that the gov- argument is that they do not want to sign ernment and the army will use the NCA to unless the NCA is all-inclusive and therefore penetrate ethnic areas to make economic genuinely national. At the heart of this mat- and political gains, such guidelines provide ter is the government’s refusal to include no legal guarantees in themselves. This is three ANSAs that are in open combat with the likely an area of concern, especially for larger army in the Kokang area (the Ta’ang National ANSAs like the KIO, which controls areas Liberation Front [Palaung], the Arakan Army with many natural resources and lucrative and the Kokang Army [Myanmar National trade with China. Democratic Alliance Army]) and three oth- Although the NCA text illustrates that the ers regarded as too small and insignificant. parties have come a long way in agreeing However, apart from dissatisfaction with lack on basic principles and in increasing trust of full inclusiveness, the unwillingness of between ANSA leaders and USDP government some ANSAs to sign the NCA indicates con- representatives, there are still many uncer- tinued insecurities and mistrust about the tainties when it comes to implementation and future. power-sharing guarantees. A main concern is The NCA that was signed on 15 October also mistrust in the national army to commit guarantees an end to all hostilities, provi- to political changes and to end attacks, even sions for a military code of conduct and after the signing of the NCA. Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing Art. 57, page 7 of 20

Deep issues are at stake that make the con- means that the non-compromise factions flicts in Myanmar extremely difficult to end, in the ANSAs and the army remain influen- despite progress in the NCA process. If we tial. There is an internal elite struggle within look at the three dimensions – contradictions, most ethnic nationalities and their organisa- behaviour and attitudes – outlined by Galtung tions (Naing 2015; Gravers 2015a), including and others in the peacebuilding and conflict within those ANSAs that have signed the NCA. resolution literature (Ramsbotham et al 2012), In fact not everyone in the KNU supports the we can identify some of the most important 15 October signing. Those against the NCA stumbling blocks. particularly worry about the future status and The ethnic contradictions are still empha- power of the ethnic groups. The army works sized by all parties. The army and the USDP as a corporate unit but also seems divided government adhere to a singular Myanmar between ‘hardliners’ and ‘liberal’ officers. national identity while the ANSAs maintain­ Factionalism is therefore a major problem that they are independent ethnic ­nationalities. (Ramsbotham et al 2012: 174). However, the There is also fundamental political disa- idea of marginalising sceptics and spoilers greement about a federal constitution. The will only lead to further conflicts (ibid: 186; current constitution provides the military Gravers 2015a). Importantly, the ANSA lead- with 25 per cent of the seats in the two ers as well as their middle- and lower ranks houses of parliament and grants the worry about their future positions, which is ­president power to appoint ministers from further complicated by the fact that there are the ethnic states. Proposed amendments no concrete guarantees for inclusive integra- to these two parts of the constitution were tion in the current NCA. rejected by the parliament in June 2015 due Fighting during the NCA negotiations has to opposition from the military. This sent a demonstrated that behaviour has changed strong signal that the military is not com- very little. More than 40 clashes between mitted to federalism. The army also insists ANSAs and the army occurred from January upon upholding the Unlawful Association to August 2015 in Kachin and Shan states, Act, which makes those ANSAs that have and further fighting intensified in the last not yet signed the NCA illegal organisations few days before the NCA signing. The armed and makes any contact with them illegal. actors on the ground stick to their old Moreover, there are contradictory economic ways, which are the values of armed strug- interests, as mentioned above, as it is widely gle, despite trust building at the leadership believed that the army wants to gain control level. One positive step is the creation of liai- of natural resources in ethnic areas. The army son offices, which establishes direct contact now insists on a DDR plan with a focus on between combatants. Nevertheless, substan- ANSA disarmament as part of implementing tial transformation of behaviours will take the NCA, whereas the ANSAs want to time and depend on political results, which keep weapons. All these are fundamental remain unclear. structural contradictions impeding an Future peacebuilding through the imple- all-inclusive settlement. Thus integrative mentation of the NCA is, as elsewhere, even measures and structural transformations more complicated (see Ramsbotham 2012 during the peace process remain difficult et al) but if it is successful from the perspec- (Ramsbotham et al 2012: 175–176). tive of ethnic groups in the areas covered Attitudes have changed very little. by those ANSAs that have signed already, Nationalism and ethno-nationalism are still other groups may follow in signing. During dominant ideologies.8 Related to these ide- the NCA negotiations none of the parties ologies and the long history of violence is involved wanted to include international and a general and profound mistrust among all third party mediation, and it is still unclear parties. The presence of mistrust and fear if the international community will be Art. 57, page 8 of 20 Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing invited to play a role in monitoring the NCA would be necessary to get a federal system, implementation. As argued by a number of and it also continues to have 25 per cent of scholars, third-party commitments to assist the seats in both houses of parliament and ceasefire implementations can be important the power over three important ministries to create trust in peace agreements (Walter (defense, home affairs, and border affairs). 1999; Zartman 2001). They can help reduce Aung San Suu Kyi did not herself participate fear among combatant groups that the most in the NCA signing in October 2015, which powerful party to a conflict will fully take may indicate reluctance to support the cur- hold of government power as agreements are rent agreement. In the minds of those ANSAs being implemented. In Myanmar, interna- that have already signed, the negotiation tional aid agencies have only so far been offi- process had come to be perceived as what cially invited to support with development is often defined as a ‘hurting stalemate’ in projects and reconciliation in NCA areas. As conflict resolution literature, which indicates a former British colony, Myanmar guards its ripeness to sign an agreement (Ramsbotham independence and sovereignty and the mili- et al 2012). Others may hope that they can tary has always been suspicious of human get a better deal with the NLD, but this rights, considered Western ideas. Although remains to be seen. the EU was invited to sign the NCA as a wit- Another current political challenge for the ness, along with the UN and neighbouring ANSAs is the growing number of new eth- countries, the government did not agree to nic political parties, who also claim to rep- the ANSAs’ suggestion to also include spe- resent ethnic minorities (Hiebert & Nguyen cific European countries, like Norway and 2014). Although these lost most seats in the UK. The government only agreed to the November 2015 elections to the NLD include these countries as observers. As wit- they still stand as alternative ethnic politi- nesses and observers, the international com- cal forces that may question the role of the munity does not as such stand as a guarantor armed groups as legitimate stakeholders in of the NCA process. the political dialogue that follows the NCA A final and important area of concern is the (South 2014). The ANSAs may become more current political changes in Myanmar, influ- marginalized in the political process, and enced especially by the 8 November 2015 there is a risk that this can lead to renewed elections. Rather than waiting for all ANSAs cycles of armed conflict, especially if ANSA to be included, the president and the ruling members are not able to strike a deal that party, USDP, have undeniably pushed for also benefits them, politically and in terms the NCA before the elections so as to secure of economic survival. more votes. Conversely, those ANSAs that Against this background, the different did sign were likely fearful that the negotia- ANSAs’ incentive to sign and not to sign tion process would drag on too long if they the NCA stands between what could be an waited until after the elections. It is unclear urgent need to strike a deal before they how the National League for Democracy potentially lose political clout and the fear (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, which has that the current NCA will not assure the won an approximately 80 per cent major- ANSAs significant positions, due to a lack of ity in both Houses of Parliament, will stand any concrete power-sharing guarantees. In in relation to the ANSAs once it takes over line with Walker (1999), we argue that the the government in March 2016. The party lack of such guaranties creates insecurity has declared its support for federalism, but about what the NCA will mean in practice, how much power it will concede or decen- including for the middle- and lower-ranks. tralize to the ethnic states remains unclear. This calls for the need to discuss concrete In addition, the military still retains veto (re)integration options, even if at this point power over constitutional changes, which conventional DDR is not a realistic first step. Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing Art. 57, page 9 of 20

We therefore approach the debate about ending the use of violent means and increas- reintegration options in the next section as ing activities that are sanctioned by the main- not only important to sustainable peace, but stream community (Torjesen 2013).9 Already, also an urgent matter to increase trust in the there are some examples of ANSA members conflict resolution process. in Myanmar who have voluntarily disarmed or self-integrated, for instance as members Future Options for the Armed of political parties or civil society organisa- Actors tions (CSOs). While we draw on these exam- Interviews in Mon and Karen states con- ples, the options given below are of our own firmed the strong conviction that the ANSAs creation. As argued in the introduction we are not ready to disarm before any compre- do not see these integration options as only hensive political settlement. This was also following on from a process of disarmament the view of CSOs such as Mon Women’s and demobilisation, but also as an input to Organisation: ‘the people do not want the discuss more concrete and disaggregated armed groups to disarm, because they need power-sharing options, including military, them to protect their identity and freedom,’ political and economic, as part of the politi- adding that this is also a military power issue cal settlement and implementation of the because as long as ‘there are only Burmans NCA. This goes beyond national level agree- in the top army positions, the ANSAs do not ments on political institutions, like federal- accept the army proposals’ (group interview, ism or proportional representation, to also 16 January 2014). Keeping arms was not include local level positions. As Walter (1999: only seen as reflecting insecurities about 142) argues, ‘the more political, military and the military position of ANSAs, but also as territorial power can be disaggregated, the necessary to protect ethnic civilians due to more enforceable and credible promises to mistrust in the army. However there was share power will be’. For instance, as we dis- also concern that the ANSAs are losing their cuss below, federalism and democratic insti- popularity among civilians as armed actors. tutions are not in themselves a guarantee This legitimacy threat puts pressure on the that warring factions will obtain positions ANSAs to explore alternatives to reinvent (ibid: 140). In line with Hartzell & Hoddie themselves as serving roles other than just (2003) we further add the economic dimen- armed protectors. Other interviewees also sion to this equation, also considering liveli- argued that the ANSAs will not be satisfied hood survival and distribution of resources. with only economic incentives to disarm: ‘To The five options are: 1) integration into the have peace the government has tried to give security sector, including community polic- the armed groups opportunities like land, ing; 2) political parties; 3) civil service and cars and business, but the groups still do not local government positions; 4) economic trust them. The leaders need to be given high integration through job creation and skills positions. They hold onto arms still because training as well as the formalisation of large- they want a federal state’ (pastor, Karen state, scale businesses run by ex-combatants and; 17 January 2014). This reflects, as discussed 5) CSOs. We consider the obstacles to and the earlier, ANSA members’ political ambitions dilemmas of these options. and the need for power-sharing guarantees as incentives to engage in and commit to the Security sector integration: military, peace process. police and village defence In this section we consider five integra- In contrast to the dominant view of DDR tion options for the ANSAs. Integration here programmes that disarmament is a precon- refers to the process through which fight- dition for political stability, experiences from ers change their identity from ‘combatant’ elsewhere show that military integration to ‘civilian’, and change their behaviour by can work to create stability and pave the Art. 57, page 10 of 20 Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing way for integration (Spear 1999; Mutengesa police branches as well as into more local 2013; Berdal & Zaum 2013). For fighters who level village defence or community policing had known little else other than rebel life, (Knight 2009). Shared control of the judici- Mutengesa (2013) argues, military integra- ary and consideration of local level justice tion can be a way to ‘decompress’ and make and dispute resolution mechanisms in ANSA the transition to civilian life. It can also build areas are also important steps in reconcilia- confidence and give ex-combatants a much tion. Although SSR has yet to be discussed needed sense of employment security (ibid: in Myanmar as part of the post-NCA politi- 343). Conversely, hasty disarmament can cal dialogue, the ANSAs are proposing fed- mean ‘reintegration into poverty’ or, at worst, eral police forces for the ethnic nationality engagement in illicit activities or re-mobilisa- states as well as recognition of ethnic justice tion into militia units because employment systems. opportunities are scarce (ibid: 342). As Knight (2009) notes, integration into According to the current NCA a good num- the police is less straightforward than mili- ber of the ANSA members will likely be inte- tary integration, as it requires radically dif- grated into some form of restructured Union ferent skills and education than does the Army, ensuring ethnic nationalities represen- military. There is thus a need for comprehen- tation. It seems that stability will depend on sive training and careful recruitment among the development of relatively independent ex-combatants if human rights abuses by ethnic armed factions where ANSA com- police and/or their political instrumentali- manders are given equivalent ranks and/ sation by former leaders are to be avoided. or where the army is based on ethnic state Moreover police integration – and SSR more divisions. This would be an important power- broadly – need to take into consideration sharing guarantee, reducing the fear that the that even if the national police and courts Burman army would take over full military are not present, there is seldom a complete power (Walter 1999: 141). Trust-building security vacuum in conflict or ceasefire areas; will likely also depend on giving ANSA com- armed and non-armed local security forces, manders the guarantee to control their war- with varying levels of legitimacy and effec- time armed units in the ethnic territories. In tiveness, usually exist. This is the case in Tajikistan, for instance, such an arrangement Myanmar, although knowledge is needed on was combined with positions in government how these forces operate, are structured and for ANSA political leaders, resulting in con- relate to or overlap with the ANSAs (UNDP siderable stability and trust in the peace- 2012; McConnachie 2014). Such knowl- building process (Torjesen & Macfarlane edge could inform potential efforts to align 2007). However, due to a lack of political local-level security provision with the inte- regulation of illicit economies, such stabil- gration of ex-combatants into more formal- ity came at the cost of sustainable economic ised village defence or community policing development because commanders used schemes that work with civilians and create their positions for personal enrichment (ibid: partnerships with the police over time, as 327). There are thus important political-eco- is the case, for instance, in Liberia (Hill & nomic issues to consider with such forms of Bowman 2006). This also gives ex-combat- military integration. ants an occupation and a sense of worth in In general we suggest that military inte- the community. However, experiences from, gration should be combined with wider for example, Afghanistan warn against allow- Security Sector Reform (SSR), including the ing such groups to remain armed as this can police and the judiciary, as these institutions run the risk of them becoming independent are also extremely important for de facto militias who are not adequately accountable power-sharing. This can involve the integra- to their communities (Kumar & Behlendorf tion of ANSAs into national and regional 2010: 13).10 Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing Art. 57, page 11 of 20

Political parties ANSAs, or if individual ANSA members sup- Transformation of ANSAs into their own port them or would be willing to lay down political parties as well as political integra- arms to join them. Potentially, political inte- tion of ex-combatants into existing political gration could involve motivating combat- parties predominantly targets ANSA leaders. ants and commanders to join these existing However, it can also give lower- and middle- parties, especially those that represent their ranks a conduit for political expression so as political goals (like self-determination for to realise personal, social and economic goals ethnic nationalities). Some of the existing through non-violent means (Mitton 2008: party representatives suggested that alli- 202). Most of our interviewees supported ances could be built between ANSA parties political integration as an option in Myanmar and existing ones. A minister for the Karen but there were also concerns. One Buddhist People’s Party (KPP) asserted: ‘the KNU lead- monk stated: ‘The leaders [of ANSAs] are not ers can become party officials in the KPP or ready to be politicians in a democracy. They they could make their own party [. . .] and are not educated and civilised, but speak in then we can make an alliance. This would a too rough manner like military way. They mean a strong constituency because KNU do not understand that democracy is to be has support in the villages and KPP is strong representative of the people’ (Interview, in towns’ (interview, 15 January 2014). A key January 12, 2014). challenge now is that ethnic political parties In general it cannot be assumed that ANSAs can only get real national influence and ade- already have the required political and tech- quate representation in the current political nical skills to operate party apparatuses and system if they create broad alliances (Nilsen & engage in parliamentary politics. Thus in Tønnesen 2013). This is not only due to the other post-war contexts political integration ethnic groups being a minority, but also has commonly been supported by interna- because the current single member constitu- tional aid agencies who provide capacity ency voting system favours larger parties. building (ibid: 198). Conversely, Nilsen & Entering elections is therefore no guarantee Tønnesen (2013) argue that the problem of of de facto power positions for the ANSAs. adequate skills also concerns already existing A related concern is the political legitimacy political parties in Myanmar, and therefore a of the ANSAs in the ethnic constituencies. transformation of ANSAs into parties should According to South (2012) many Karen com- be seen as part of a wider democratisation munities in KNU-controlled areas display process. Likely successful political integration strong support for the KNU, yet there is con- will depend on a demilitarisation of the polit- cern that this is not the case in other Karen ical culture of ANSAs and beyond. Otherwise constituencies. Some ANSA leaders fear los- political integration could risk reproducing ing popular support and control over client patronage politics and the mobilisation of populations during the current peace pro- military networks within electoral politics. cess, especially as civilians resettle in govern- Yet these issues cannot be generalised across ment-controlled areas. Transformation into all the ANSAs in Myanmar; the larger ANSAs, political parties as part of a peace settlement like the KNU, already have entrenched politi- and disarmament process will arguably only cal structures and some internal democratic be attractive to the ANSAs if they believe procedures in place, whereas smaller splinter they are able to mobilise enough votes. Even groups do not. if federalism and democratic decentralisa- A core challenge to political integration in tion were agreed on in the political dialogue, Myanmar is the great complexity and hetero- these institutional arrangements would geneity of already existing parties that repre- not be a de facto power-sharing guarantee sent the same ethnic minorities. It is not clear to the ANSAs (Walter 1999). In other con- to what extent current parties represent the texts, such insecurity for ANSAs has led to a Art. 57, page 12 of 20 Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing combination of political integration in the language into government schools through form of electoral competition with the guar- corporation with the Ministry of Education antee of specific positions to ANSA members (ibid). Such cooperation can be contrasted within the government and state apparatus with the fact that the rolling out of govern- (Torjesen 2013; Mitton 2008). The question ment schools and clinics, staffed only by is whether the incoming NLD government Burmans, in ethnic areas during the cease- and other ethnic representatives would agree fires has created antagonisms and fears that to such privileged positions for the ANSAs in the government is taking over control before Myanmar. a political settlement is reached. It also Political integration also needs to consider sends a signal that ethnic representatives are the potential power games for positions excluded from government, underpinning among top and mid-level ANSA members, mistrust in the peace process and in govern- which may also affect lower ranks (Torjesen ance reform in general. 2013: 6). If lower ranks do not feel that they Apart from job creation for ex-combatants, benefit and are represented through the local government integration could already political integration there can be a risk of be part of a disaggregated power-sharing violent remobilisation (Christensen & Utas guarantee in the implementation of the NCA, 2008). According to Spear (2007) one of the allowing the ANSAs to continue to adminis- problems in other post-war contexts is that ter the ethnic areas they control. This would many ANSA members do not regard being mitigate fears that the government and in the political opposition as providing for army will take full control during the NCA them economically, at least not sufficiently. implementation. Ceasefire negotiations have This calls for a consideration of the hetero- already discussed ‘interim arrangements’ geneity of incentives to give up fighting and that could include ANSA structures at the thus for different integration options. local government level until official govern- ment institutions and services are rolled out, Civil service and local government but the details regarding how this will play positions out are not yet clear and there are no direct Another possible option for ANSA members guarantees in the NCA. Naturally, the longer- is positions within local government ser- term institutional developments within this vice provision and administration, based on field will also depend on the extent to which already existing experiences and structures. federalism is accepted. As studies have shown the ANSAs, along Local government integration needs to with a range of ANSA-linked Community- carefully consider already existing power Based Organisations (CBOs), have to varying arrangements at the local level, so as not to degrees had quite extensive administrations lay the ground for future tensions. Not only as well as social service delivery in the areas do local governance setups vary across the of health, education, agriculture, land tenure ethnic minority states due to the shifting con- and so forth (Jolliffe 2014). Instead of view- tours of the conflict, but there are also areas ing these as oppositional to state-building, with mixed local government, for instance they should be seen as an asset in consoli- areas where government-appointed village dating and improving service delivery dur- leaders and ANSA leadership structures co- ing the peace agreement implementation. exist, sometimes alongside village leaders According to Jolliffe (2014: 10), cooperation accountable to other armed factions, like between ANSA-linked service providers and smaller splinter groups (Interview, KPF leader, the government can also contribute to rec- January 2014). Against this background the onciliation in the long term. This is already post-NCA political dialogue should early on seen with the NMSP education sector, which include a dialogue about what will happen has been successful in introducing Mon with existing personnel within the various Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing Art. 57, page 13 of 20 local government setups and the power posi- also benefit the economic integration of ex- tions they hold. This will be very important combatants. However, as experiences from to the successful implementation of the elsewhere show, this will likely be more NCA. South (2012) questions the governance realisable if ex-combatants are given height- capacities and technical expertise of existing ened skills and education as part of, for personnel from the ANSAs, but adds that this instance, internationally-funded skills train- also applies to government officials. As expe- ing. Specht (2003) also suggests that there riences from elsewhere (e.g. Aceh, Indonesia) may be a need for the government to lobby show, it is important that not only ANSA potential employers and give them concrete leaders, but also rank-and-file combatants incentives (like tax reductions) to recruit ex- and civilians from other ethnic groups, are combatants, as it cannot be assumed that pri- included in local government initiatives, so vate businesses will necessarily be willing to as not to produce new forms of dominance hire them. (Ansori 2012). Economic integration should not only be seen as a technical exercise of post-war Economic integration: job creation, employment creation, however, but also as education and training an integrated element of the conflict resolu- In DDR programmes economic integration tion process. This implies framing integra- is understood as a process whereby com- tion within wider economic power-sharing batants are moved from livelihood sup- guarantees, including share of resources port mechanisms associated with military and access to business concessions, as part networks to employment in formal and of the peace agreement (Hartzell & Hoddie informal sectors (UN 2008). This covers a 2003). It also implies establishing incentives range of mechanisms like vocational and to enter an agreement that will outweigh the agricultural training, job placement, educa- benefits of war economies for combatants tion for ex-combatants, income generation (Zartman 2001). According to interviewees, a with microcredit schemes, and public works real worry in Karen and Mon states is that the schemes (McMullin 2013a). Apart from pro- new businesses, which are predominantly viding an income that moves them away owned by the Burman majority or by foreign- from combat or criminality, a job can also ers, will not hire local Karen and Mon, but give ex-combatants a sense of pride in sup- import Burman labourers. This tendency will porting their families and thus aid their psy- not only make it difficult for ex-combatants chological and social reintegration (Specht and returning IDPs to get jobs, but also chal- 2003). In previous years DDR programmes lenge the consolidation of economic power have also begun to involve whole commu- by the ethnic minorities in their own areas. nities in joint community development and This is also why the ANSAs demanded in the reconstruction work, where civilians and ex- NCA negotiations a guarantee that all larger combatants participate and get on-the-job development and business projects planned training (such as the rebuilding of schools, for the ethnic areas only be approved on the clinics, roads and wells) (Munive & Jakobsen basis of consultations with the ANSAs and 2012: 362; UNDPO 2010). This also poten- local communities. However, to what extent tially lessens distrust and increases toler- this will be cherished in the implementation ance between different conflict-affected of the NCA in Karen state remains to be seen groups, thereby also supporting reconcilia- and may set an example for the Mon armed tion (Specht 2003: 96). group, the NMSP, which has still not signed. Myanmar is already experiencing large ANSAs also fear losing economic power investments and new businesses (the coun- themselves as a consequence of the imple- try is opening up to foreign investors and mentation of the NCA. This concern is likely the economy is being liberalised). This could more acute among those groups that control Art. 57, page 14 of 20 Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing

large natural resources and trade, like the Civil Society Organisations KIO, and is deeply embedded in what Woods Civil society organisations (CSOs) enjoy an (2011) has defined as ceasefire economies. expanding space for operation in Myanmar These include the many economic activi- and with the increase in international donor ties that ANSAs have developed in the ter- flows inside the country there is a growing ritories they were granted control over demand for local NGOs as partners in devel- through bilateral ceasefires, ranging from opment. In one respect such new CSOs could cross border trade, mineral extraction and be seen as challenging the ANSAs’ local plantations to illegal drugs and gambling. legitimacy because many of them claim to They also include the Burmese military’s eco- represent those civilians who did not par- nomic incursions into ANSA territories and ticipate in the armed struggle. Conversely, the borders around them. Economic rein- many of those operating in the ethnic states tegration should consider such economies, still need the protection of the ANSAs and which are deeply embedded in networks therefore have deep alliances. The possibility of power and contestations over control of of CSOs becoming spaces for ex-combatant territories and resources. Key combatants integration into civilian life is not something have often enjoyed the benefits of the war one reads about in the DDR literature, but or ceasefire economy and this position can in Myanmar could be relevant. This became be hard to break. Some of our interviewees clear in Mon state when we met the Ramanya stated that a key challenge is that the armed Peace Foundation (RPF), established after conflict has created a kind of ‘lost genera- the 2012 NMSP ceasefire. Two of its found- tion’ of people who have known little but ers were former NMSP members and essen- military conduct and who see few opportuni- tially had ‘self-integrated’ by setting up the ties to join the licit economy. Specht (2003) RPF, which now receives considerable inter- speaks about creating a ‘political economy national donor funding to support the peace of peace’, which involves closing off illicit process by doing projects in the areas of water routes to economic gain. Another option is and sanitation, women’s empowerment and to formalise ex-combatants’ existing agricul- leadership training in NMSP ceasefire areas. tural or mineral businesses and other forms Their work is ground-breaking because, as of trade and grant them land and business one of the first CSOs, it was registered with concessions. This option already has histori- the government and allowed to carry out cal roots in Myanmar. For instance the Karen development projects in NMSP areas. The Peace Force General used his ceasefire deal two founders already had some skills to ena- with the government in 1995 to commence ble them to re-invent themselves as a devel- large-scale agricultural and infrastructural opment CSO because they had been part of projects, which also benefitted the popula- the NMSP’s education department. Similar tion in his area. These experiences point examples exist in other ethnic states. towards a potential entry point to economic (re)integration via economic power-sharing Conclusion between government and ANSAs. However, In this article we have argued that there is it is important to mitigate the risk that such a need in Myanmar to begin a discussion a deal involves the personal enrichment of on future (re)integration options for ethnic ex-combatants at the expense of other mem- ANSAs, rather than highlight disarmament bers of the local populations. This calls for a and demobilisation as the first steps in a DDR more concrete dialogue in the near future on process. This alternative sequencing of DDR ways to regulate and formalise the informal is already being discussed in the interna- economic activities of ANSAs so that they tional DDR debate, where it has been argued serve the economic rights of ethnic commu- that in contexts where there is a lack of polit- nities at large. ical will to disarm it may be more sustainable Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing Art. 57, page 15 of 20 to begin with (material and non-material) in agreements more disaggregated power- reintegration initiatives (UNDPO 2010; sharing guarantees, such as positions in local Thruelsen 2006: 36). This RDD approach government and security forces. Hartzell & could be a valuable option for Myanmar. Hoddie (2003) further add economic power- However, we have also argued that there is sharing guarantees, such as the distribution a need to frame reintegration options within of resource control and access to state funds. the wider debate on conflict resolution and Although eight ANSAs have now signed the peace negotiations (Walter 1999; Zartman nationwide agreement, there is still much 2001), rather than confine it to the technical concern among the remainder of the ANSA aspects of DDR or RDD programming. This leaders, as well as among middle- and lower- means framing integration options as part of ranks about their future options and posi- more disaggregated power-sharing (political, tions. This also regards members of those military and economic) guarantees already groups that have already signed the NCA, during peace negotiations. Such guarantees such as the KNU, which is internally split on can help create incentives to reach agree- the agreement. As reflected in a media state- ments as well as build trust in the implemen- ment by a general of the KNU’s armed wing, tation of agreements. many combatants feel that there is a need As discussed in this article, the ANSAs in for a concrete ‘political roadmap’ in the NCA, Myanmar will not lay down arms before the including specific guarantees, rather than political system changes towards a federal the promise alone of a political dialogue one, and even talks about disarmament at (Karen News August 26, 2015). the moment can be detrimental to the peace In this article we have discussed five dif- process. Conversely, economic incentives ferent integration options that combine to reintegration that focus on employment concerns for military/security, political and opportunities will likely only satisfy some economic power-sharing, and which also ANSA members unless combined with politi- consider middle- and lower-ranks. Thus we cal positions and guarantees that ensure the have also focused on local-level positions, distribution of resources to ethnic groups. such as in service delivery and sub-national The strong emphasis on power-sharing guar- administration, along with political parties antees should be seen in light of the excep- and civil society organisations. It is clear tionally long history of ethnic-based armed that there are no quick solutions or blue- conflicts in Myanmar’s borderlands under prints. The modalities need to be based on repressive military regimes which have, particular contextual understandings and despite the growth of war economies, always a consideration that armed actors are not been embedded in strong ethno-political homogenous groups. So far in Myanmar agendas. Moreover there is currently a fear the incentives of lower- and middle-ranked among the ANSAs, including members of armed actors to transform themselves have those that have signed the NCA, that a peace been silenced in the peace talks. Experiences agreement could be used by the government from elsewhere show that such kind of exclu- and military to take full control of the eth- sion can run the risk of creating autonomous nic areas, through development projects and spheres of violence and predation (Derksen the expansion of state institutions that do 2014; Spear 2007). In Myanmar it has also not include ANSA members and the ethnic meant continued mistrust in the peace pro- populations, but the Burman majority. This cess by over half of the ANSAs. Mid-level is a fear also reflected in other peace nego- commanders are particularly important to tiation processes, as shown by Walter (1999), consider here because they often enjoy con- who argues that such fear can be a strong siderable local power and access to infor- disincentive to commit to peace agreements. mal businesses (Spear 2007: 181; Derksen One solution to this impasse is to include 2014). In Myanmar such commanders have Art. 57, page 16 of 20 Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing for years run de facto local micro-states. EU, the UN, Japan and neighbouring coun- These positions they hold raise questions tries, only acted as witnesses and observers. not only about future economic reintegra- It is still unclear to what extent international tion options, but also about politics and actors will take part in any implementation power-sharing. As Derksen (2014: 2) argues, and monitoring of the NCA, but a peace it is important that a political settlement also keeping mission is highly unthinkable. This involves ‘translating national power-sharing meagre international involvement comes into local arrangements that give the main despite the massive influx of development local actors access to power and resources.’ agencies since the country opened up in In this light, we suggest that the post-NCA 2011. The advantage is that the peace process high-level political dialogue about federal- can be seen as more home-grown and locally ism should immediately include considera- or nationally owned rather than internation- tions of concrete integration options at the ally driven. However, there is also cause for local level. This is much more important than concern that current donor modalities can rushing into DDR programming with its ulti- undermine, rather than support, the peace mate focus on disarmament and demobilisa- process. This is because currently the vast tion. Equally important at the moment is a majority of donors are principally involved in military code of conduct and inclusive moni- supporting the government-led reform pro- toring mechanisms that will ensure effective cess, along with providing humanitarian aid. implementation of a nationwide ceasefire They are already engaging in state-building, and reduce the fear that fighting will con- before and on the side-line, of the peace tinue. Right now a key concern is exactly that process. open combat between ANSAs and the army In Mon and Karen states there was a has not ended in all areas. Before this hap- strong view that until a political settlement pens political talks may be futile. Civil soci- is reached between the government and ety involvement is crucial in monitoring and ANSAs, international donors should avoid in future reconciliation measures, including supporting government development ini- in dealing with traumas and repatriation of tiatives (including schools, clinics, etc.) in IDPs and refugees. ethnic areas. Such initiatives have until now The remaining question is what role the been seen as boosting the legitimacy and international community, including develop- control of the USDP government as well as ment agencies, can play in the future peace undermining the ethnic political agenda. process and the implementation of the NCA. Although it is likely that an NLD government According to conflict resolution scholars will be more trusted by the ethnic minorities, like Walter (1999) and Zartman (2001), third it is still important that donors are consider- party mediators and external commitment ate of being inclusive of ethnic nationalities’ to assist peace agreement implementation – concerns when they are operating through e.g. through peace keepers – are key ingredi- government agreements. There must at least ents to successful peace processes. Mediators be a strong awareness among internationals can provide credibility to ceasefire incentives about their potential damaging effects on (Zartman 2001: 300) and third party actors creating trust in the peace process. can help enforce commitments to demobi- Having said this, there are clear openings lisation and power-sharing arrangements, for support, especially after the signing of thereby increasing trust and reducing fears the NCA, have also in October 2015 launched that either of the parties will cheat (Walter a ‘Joint Peace Fund’ earmarked for develop- 1999: 137). In Myanmar international agen- ment projects and reconciliation in ceasefire cies have not been invited to become third areas. Moreover, ethnic CSOs are welcoming party mediators and at the signing of the donor funds for development assistance to NCA foreign representatives, including the areas still marked by conflict. International Kyed and Gravers: Integration and Power-Sharing Art. 57, page 17 of 20 agencies could also support ex-combatant 5 On the ceasefires see Kramer (2010), reintegration and provide assistance to insti- Zaw & Min (2007), Callahan (2007) and tution and capacity building that supports M. Smith (2006). agreed-upon power-sharing arrangements 6 For details on the DKBA and the Buddhist (Walter 1999). This also means being sensitive Munk, U Thuzana, see Gravers (2015b) to ethnic inclusion more broadly in govern- 7 The United Wa State Party (UWSP) and ment institutions, including administration, the Kachin Independence Organisation police and so forth. However, as suggested (KIO) also refused the deal. In effect this in the critical DDR literature, such support meant that these groups broke their prior should not take the form of export models ceasefire agreements with the govern- but be based on careful contextual analy- ment (Keenan 2013: 1). sis that is sensitive to the power dynamics 8 This is equally reflected in the recent and heterogeneity of the ANSAs (Munive & anti-Muslim riots and laws against inter- Jakobsen 2012; Spear 2007; Torjesen 2013; faith marriages supported by nationalist Muggah 2005; McMullin 2013b). Buddhist monks, which seem to have gained widespread support in the popu- Competing Interests lation (Gravers & Ytzen 2015). The authors declare that they have no com- 9 We have decided to use the concept of peting interests. integration rather than reintegration as used in the DDR literature. This is because Notes in Myanmar the prefix ‘re’ is somewhat 1 The interviews were distributed as fol- of a misnomer. It suggests that armed lows. In Karen State: two Karen Buddhist actors were totally separated from fam- monks, two Karen political party repre- ily and community life during the armed sentatives, one ward administrator in the conflict and it downplays the fact that DKBA area, one KNU Liaison officer and ANSAs have not exclusively used violent ex-combatant, one KNU splinter group means but also governed by other means leader, one leader of Karen development and partially lived civilian lives (Torjesen CSO and three group interviews (Karen 2013: 3). ANSA ex-combatants in village for disa- 10 Kyed & Gravers (2014) also discuss the bled, two Karen youth and environmen- option of integration into the private tal networks). In Mon state: two Mon security sector, which is growing towns political party leaders, two NMSP liaison and cities of Myanmar due to massive eco- officers, one Mon women’s group organi- nomic investments and developments. sation, one Mon/NMSP development CSO, and two religious leaders. In Yangon References we interviewed representatives from the Ansori, M H 2012 From Insurgency to Myanmar Peace Center and the Myanmar Bureaucracy: Free Aceh Movement, Aceh Peace Support Initiative as well as had Party and the New Face of Conflict. Sta- several informal conversations with aca- bility of Security and Development, 1(1): demics and journalists. 31–44. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/ 2 See list of ANSAs in Gravers & Ytzen sta.ah (2014: 168–72). Berdal, M and Zaum, D (eds.) 2013 Politi- 3 Today 80–90 per cent of the Chin and Kachin cal Economy of Statebuilding: Power after are Christian and about 20–25 per cent Peace. New York and Oxon: Routledge. of the Karen are Christian. Callahan, M P 2007 Political Authority in 4 On the long Karen struggle and its com- Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, plexity, see Thawnhmung (2012) and Occupation, and Coexistence. Washington: Gravers (2015a). East West Center Policy Studies no. 31. 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How to cite this article: Kyed, H M and Gravers, M 2015 Integration and Power-Sharing: What are the Future Options for Armed Non-State Actors in the Myanmar Peace Process? Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 57, pp. 1–20, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gt

Published: 03 December 2015

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