Emergency of the State: Detention

Emergency of the State Detention Without Trial In Pietermaritzburg and the Natal Midlands, 1986–901

by Christopher Merrett

No one shall be imprisoned, deported or restricted without fair trial.2 Detention is unquestionably a political strategy, designed to quell, contain and eradicate democratic political opposition which could threaten the white minority South African regime.3

Background N the early hours of Thursday 12 considerable disarray – 91 people were June 1986, in an uncanny replay detained in June. of the events of late March 1960, Detention without trial is firmly as- I sociated with the SoE of 1986–90 but a State of Emergency (SoE) was announced by police raids on houses in in Pietermaritzburg, as in the country Pietermaritzburg. This enthusiasm was at large, it was nothing new. Activists premature: the authorities had to pro- from the city were detained in Durban duce a copy of the gazetted regulations after night-time raids in 1946 during to validate detentions under the Public the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) pas- Safety Act (PSA).4 The initial night- sive resistance campaign. In the 1960 time arrests were technically illegal, emergency, 19 prominent city residents, but the police simply fell back on s.50 including A.S. Chetty, Archie Gumede, of the Internal Security Act (ISA). Ei- Vasu Chetty, D.C.O. Matiwane, Peter ther way, they threw the anti-apartheid Brown, Omar Essack, Derick Marsh opposition in Pietermaritzburg into and Hans Meidner, were held in premature detention early in the morning of 29

March. They were to spend up to three Pietermaritzburg Old Prison of suicide months in prison. It was a defining mo- by hanging. He had been held for 306 ment, the point at which South Africa days.12 Most detentions, abuse in prison became everyone’s police state regard- and police cells and subsequent trials less of race.5 Over the next 25 years prior to 1986 related to ANC activity opponents of the regime were routinely in Natal orchestrated from Swaziland detained without charge under security where Jacob Zuma was a senior ANC legislation, although some later stood operative. Some of those detained were trial.6 In the autumn of 1971, Nina Has- held as state witnesses: their refusal to sim was detained for 78 days under the testify led to prison sentences of three Terrorism Act at Hilton police station, to five years.13 An unusual incident although she had two small children.7 took place on 10 June 1982 when 19 Her husband, Kader, had already been youths, including Duma Gqubule, were detained on 17 February and was held detained under section 22 of the Gen- in Greytown until 16 June 1971 when eral Laws Amendment Act. Two were he was charged under the Terrorism subsequently charged “with furthering Act for activities involving the Unity the aims of the ANC.”14 Movement.8 During the early and mid 1980s, the An apparent defector to Sweden, Pietermaritzburg area was character- Alexander Lambert, who claimed to ised by sporadic unrest around schools have worked for the Bureau for State and buses, and attempts by Inkatha to Security (Boss) described a Pieter- establish a dominant presence through maritzburg detention centre where near recruitment drives.15 This was ac- drowning and electric shock treatment companied by the collapse of official was administered.9 Anthony Xaba, structures in Edendale, Ashdown and who had served 10 years on Robben Sobantu and their effective replace- Island for Umkontho we Sizwe (MK) ment by civic associations and youth activity, was detained in November organisations. In 1983 the government 1975 with members of his family. On tried to impose a town council on Imbali the top floor of Loop Street police sta- and Inkatha’s attempt to control it was tion he was “systematically assaulted, a catalyst for unrest and violence.16 tortured and interrogated for two days”. A move to establish a civic associa- This included being hung out of the tion in Imbali in 1985 resulted in the window by his feet and “swung back- firebombing of Robert Duma’s house. wards and forwards . . . his head banged Several weeks later on 25 August, against the wall. His arm was broken a march on the Federal Theological in the process.”10 Four years later he Seminary demanded its closure.17 A was named by the Minister of Police retaliatory petrol bombing of the house as a Terrorism Act s.6 detainee.11 Two of Inkatha leader and Imbali councillor deaths in detention occurred in Pieter- Patrick Pakkies followed. The names maritzburg in rapid succession: Samuel of Inkatha councillors came up with Malinga (age 45) died in Edendale monotonous regularity in connection Hospital on 22 February 1977, officially with acts of intimidation and violence of heart disease and pneumonia after and by 1986 Inkatha was operating a 22 days detention. On 26 March 1977, paramilitary group of unemployed men Aaron Khoza (35) was found dead in and youth in Imbali and Ashdown.18

Unsympathetic residents were forced Edendale Hospital in a critical state out of the area. In the background was before being released on bail two days the Indaba, a scheme backed by big later. On 18 May his home and a vehicle business to establish a regional power parked outside were petrol bombed. base for Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who In April Fanozi Mathonsi was held by needed significant demonstrable sup- police and assaulted at Imbali; and the port amongst Zulu speakers to improve Sobantu home of Committee of Twelve his credentials. Inkatha’s objective was member Thami Mthalane was torched. an enhanced profile that would earn it a A month later, Nkosinathi Mchunu seat at national negotiations.19 was murdered by Inkatha members During 1985 the province of Natal masquerading as police. The Pieter- was reckoned to be relatively quiet maritzburg Agency for Christian Social compared to the rest of the country with Awareness (Pacsa) accused Inkatha only 13% of unrest deaths.20 During the and the Imbali Community Council first half of 1986, as had been the case of co-ordinating vigilante groups.22 At since 1980, school boycotts continued the time of the declaration of a SoE, in Mpophomeni, Sobantu and Edendale Pietermaritzburg’s townships were on in protest at overcrowding, promotion a short fuse. between standards and food,21 and co- The security laws of South Africa incided with a bus boycott over fare in- were already far-reaching in their scope creases. In February buses were burned but declaration of a SoE was useful to on the Edendale Road and there were the authorities for three reasons. First, also attacks on taxis and other vehicles. all members of the security forces were Inkatha representatives were ejected granted arrest and detention powers al- from a Nucleus of Twenty meeting at lowing for operations on a mass scale. the Lay Ecumenical Centre in Edendale Second, they were indemnified unless to discuss the bus crisis and the area’s male fides could be shown. And third, underlying politics soon escalated into strict media controls were provided. violent conflict. In March, Congress Powers over persons, gatherings, or- of South African Trade Union (Co- ganisations, the media, political activity satu) and Inkatha members clashed and schools were draconian.23 Some at Ashdown over buses, followed by analyses argue that the government armed Inkatha marches at Sobantu in would have preferred to avoid a full- opposition to the popular Committee of scale emergency given that the 1985 Twelve. A grenade attack at Amakholwa partial emergency had led to flight of High School in Edendale was followed foreign capital. But the alternative, by closure of seven Department of declaration of unrest areas, was depen- Education and Training schools. A ban dent on the Public Safety Amendment on outdoor meetings, except for sport, Bill held up by the Houses of Delegates from 28 March seems to have brought and Representatives of the tricameral this situation under partial control. parliament.24 Under the PSA, four sets On 5 February Sikhumbuzo Ngwe- of emergency regulations were issued, nya Mbatha, United Democratic Front relating to security, prison, media, (UDF) joint secretary, was abducted and educational institutions; and with in Imbali, assaulted and taken to Ples- amendments they remained in force sislaer police station, then admitted to for four years.

First emergency, 1986–7 to communicate with them at Howick The events of this emergency25 are police station were also taken in.29 On indicative of the region’s relatively Soweto Day, a domestic worker exuber- low profile at the time. Records show antly announcing to the street that she that at least 255 persons were involved was on holiday was reportedly detained in 268 separate detentions (nationally and held for six days. And a member 10 000 people were held in the first of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) two weeks and 25 000 in all by June who had advertised a challenge to Presi- 1987.) They joined two ISA detainees dent P.W. Botha to lift the SoE, allow all already held on 12 June 1986. The tar- meetings, free all political prisoners and gets were mainly high-profile figures announce a general election was held in organisations linked to the UDF, but for five days.30 From time to time there also included grassroots activists.26 Of were reports of mass short-term arrests, those who could be categorised, stu- probably the result of police or army dents, scholars and teachers accounted activity in townships. One such incident for about 40% of all detainees, com- was reported from the New Hanover munity group members about 15%, area with up to 250 people held. clergy and church workers about 10%, Ten percent of the detentions fell and trade unionists 3%. Organisations under sections 29 and 31 of the ISA; affected were the NIC, civil rights and the remainder under section 3 of organisations aligned to varying de- the emergency regulations. These were grees with the Freedom Charter,27 and sufficiently vague to leave room for student congresses, civic associations legal challenge and in the case of Peter and youth organisations from the sur- Kerchhoff on 25 July in the Natal Su- rounding townships. Detainees from the preme Court (NSC) it was argued that Azanian Students Movement (Azasm) he had not been properly arrested. This and Forward Youth were also recorded, followed the Durban Supreme Court but none from Inkatha. Some personal (DSC) ruling of 12 July in which part details of the detainees were known: at of section 3 of the emergency regula- least 12% were under the age of 18, only tions had been set aside allowing for the 8% were female and 80% were African. release of Lechesa Tsenoli. The Kerch- The pattern of detention appeared hoff case was, however, dismissed on somewhat arbitrary, explained by the 14 August, thwarting an application on fact that the security branch (SB) were behalf of six more detainees made a day instructed to clear up their own back- before.31 It did, however, provide some yards and probably inserted a degree relief. Evidence of the psychological of personal animus into the exercise.28 damage (depression and disorientation) Then, in incidents typical of police caused to Kerchhoff by isolation was states, some people simply happened to sufficient to persuade a full bench of be in the wrong place at the wrong time. the NSC that he should not be held on A group of 20 St Joseph’s Scholasticate his own: after 32 days he was joined by students decided to march from the two other detainees. On 10 September university’s Pietermaritzburg campus appeals against both the Tsenoli and into town on 12 June to protest against Kerchhoff judgments were heard in emergency detentions. They did not get Bloemfontein, although Kerchhoff was far and three of their lecturers trying released on 16 September two weeks

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State before the outcome was announced. was severely assaulted and suffered im- The Appeal Court overturned the DSC paired hearing in the left ear, a damaged ruling thus revalidating sections 3(1) jaw and salivary glands, and headaches. and 3(3) of the emergency regulations. An interim restraining order was issued This marked an end to legal challenges by the NSC on 19 September. and showed that the courts held little It is unclear whether the situation at potential for the efforts of human rights police stations was a matter of omis- lawyers, although the Metal and Allied sion or commission. Conditions were Workers Union case in the DSC (15 July sometimes primitive and amounted to 1986) established the right of detainees solitary confinement. This and a spare to access to lawyers. diet were listed as punishment for be- By concentrating detainees in New haviour in detention34 yet together with Prison, Pietermaritzburg the SB ironi- a lack of exercise were experienced by cally replicated the very non-racial detainees at some police stations. One society they were determined to pre- detainee was held at Camperdown in vent outside. Most detainees were isolation from 26 June until 7 August interrogated, some in prolonged and when a lawyer gained access. The SB persistent fashion.32 The main purpose argued that a mistake had been made was collection of information about and moved two detainees from Thorn- the ANC, but military police were also ville. The practice of placing detainees involved and they were primarily inter- in scattered police stations and moving ested in the End Conscription Campaign them about was thought to be an at- (ECC). At both the New and Women’s tempt to obstruct monitoring by family, prisons food, general conditions and friends, lawyers and Descom; and a way exercise facilities were as prescribed of disorientating detainees and exerting by regulation. Detainees were visited psychological pressure. Some detainees by the inspecting judge, although by reported being held at four locations early 1987 there is evidence that the over 12 weeks.35 panel of judges had stopped their visits Conditions at New Prison, accord- and prisons service medical staff were ing to a detainee held in June 1986 and also absent.33 again in mid 1987, gradually declined. But later detainees were dispersed The food deteriorated and opportuni- to various police stations where proce- ties to voice complaints dwindled as dures could be lax. A female detainee visits by nurses, the district surgeon and reportedly arrested in July remained judges fell away. Detainees were not without shoes and a change of clothing allowed access to the ordinary prison for eight weeks in the middle of winter. regulations and although they had use of Most of the initial batch of high-profile the library, newspapers were not permit- detainees had been released by mid July, ted. Questions were also raised about leaving in prison numbers of grassroots management of detainees’ accounts and activists. By September accounts of letter rights. Petty officialdom exceeded physical assault had begun to filter out the regulations, for example cancelling of New Prison, and more seriously from food orders for a week after an alterca- police stations. A UDF activist from tion.36 On the other hand, exercise was Mpophomeni held at Alexandra Road provided together with board games. police station from 16 September 1986 However, lights were turned out unrea-

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State sonably early especially at weekends tained son had hanged himself. These when supper appeared at 2.30 pm. Ironi- cases bear all the signs of the dirty tricks cally, there was no racial segregation department of the SB. amongst political prisoners and by the Other detainees were harassed on end of the first emergency interrogation release by the military police if they had had become infrequent. The purpose, it links with the ECC. By 20 July 1986 seemed, was largely that of neutralising four had been detained at army camps, individuals and organisations. usually for just a day, where they were Early in the SoE, deputy minister of questioned. On at least one occasion information Louis Nel claimed that all the detaining officer refused to identify next-of-kin were informed of deten- himself, so the incident amounted to ab- tions. Local evidence showed this to duction. Foreign passport holders active be economical with the truth. People in anti-apartheid activity were targeted simply disappeared without trace, espe- and relatives of detainees from the black cially if they were African. For instance, community were known to have been Descom informed a mother about the picked up and held for a day as part of detention of her son 10 days after the a general pattern of intimidation. event. The situation was clouded by About half of the detainees of 12 June the fact that many activists went into 1986 were released within a fortnight hiding, and complicated in September compared with the national average of 1986 when visitors were subjected to 10%. But the last of their number was unexplained delays in gaining access freed only on 22 May 1987 after 341 to detainees at New Prison. Some had days and there were two other cases travelled fruitlessly from as far away involving more than 300 days. Four as Empangeni. detainees were deported, among them There was also orchestrated harass- Theo Kneifel of St Joseph’s Scholas- ment, directed at family and friends of ticate at Cedara and a German visitor, detainees. This was particularly marked Walter Hattig.37 One detainee, C.D. on Soweto Day 1986 when the families Moodley of the NIC, released after 55 of two detainees (Joe Vawda and Peter days (some of them spent in isolation at Kerchhoff) received hoax phone calls Mountain Rise police station sleeping claiming they had been admitted to on a cold stone floor) was effectively hospital with heart attacks. On the night banned and required to acknowledge of 15 June a bogus pamphlet on a fake his retirement from active politics. letterhead purportedly from the UDF Two ex-detainees were subsequently and Cosatu called for a stayaway and murdered, and four others assaulted, gave the details of five payout points, by vigilantes. In a notorious incident in with the addresses of five anti-apartheid Sobantu on 11 June 1987 Frans Ngcamu activists, two of whom were in deten- was killed and Sifiso Bhengu injured tion. These pamphlets were distributed after an attack by Azasm members.38 in Sobantu, the centre of Pietermaritz- Six people were subsequently convicted burg and at Ezakheni near Ladysmith. of murder. With the passage of time the Some of those named received threaten- level of informal violence increased ing phone calls and visits from the SB. and one father commented that he felt In November the mother of a detainee his son was safer in prison than at the received a hoax call to say that her de- mercy of vigilantes. As far as is known

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State only 48 detentions (about one in six) control over the Edendale valley. Re- resulted in charges: mainly unlawful cently appointed head of the local SB, assembly, public violence and posses- Brigadier Jac Büchner,41 greeted riot sion of banned literature. The number of squad reinforcements in October 1987 convictions is unknown. All detainees with the opinion that they were reac- bar the Hammarsdale nine detained on tion units. They were used to contain 15 May 1987 and seventeen ISA pris- fighting within townships, intervening oners were released on 11 June 1987. when Inkatha was at a disadvantage.42 The general level of unrest during Later revelations were to show that “the this period was low. In October 1986 security police had an intimate rela- there was a grenade attack on the home tionship with Inkatha and Uwusa” and of Imbali community councillor Austin encouraged “a destructive ethnicism”43 Kweyana in which his daughter was in opposition to universal democratic killed. United Workers Union of South values. In a memorandum to Büchner in Africa (UWUSA) members were at- mid-January 1988, Dacom put the view tacked at Dambuza and Sobantu in that detention without trial was fuelling October. These incidents can be inter- the unrest by targeting township youth preted as anti-Inkatha violence, but the from informal anti-Inkatha groupings motive for a grenade attack on the house that styled themselves self-defence of Eliott Madondo in Sobantu is hard to units (SDUs).44 One of their antagonists categorise.39 from March 1987 were 300 rapidly and poorly trained police auxiliaries popu- Second emergency, 1987–8 larly known as kitskonstabels (instant During this period, in particular from police). Many had Inkatha or vigilante November 1987 onwards, the charac- backgrounds. Their role was pacifica- ter of the SoE in the Natal Midlands tion rather than policing and one of changed radically. In all, 1 292 de- their specialities was the mass round up tentions were recorded; but 56% of of young men taken in for questioning them occurred from November 1987 at Plessislaer and Mountain Rise police to January 1988 during a period of stations where personal information anarchy in the townships surrounding was recorded and photographs taken. In Pietermaritzburg. Indeed, from Janu- Parliament on 19 April, Minister of Law ary 1987 to March 1988 the Centre for and Order Adriaan Vlok announced that Adult Education monitoring group 259 had been taken from Ashdown and recorded 586 events and 446 deaths 218 from Sobantu of whom four and 45 linked to political violence in which eight had been detained respectively. the largest group of victims belonged From September 1987 there was to Charterist-inclined organisations.40 a spectacular increase in the number By the same token, the partiality of the of incidents reported. This began to state is evident in the use of detention subside only in February 1988. Some without trial at particular times. Clearly commentators locate the source in the the police used the SoE regulations as two-day national stayaway in May 1987 a massive dragnet and as a means of against whites-only elections: opposed avoiding bail procedures. These were by Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s Inkatha, it particularly handy tactics in a cam- was supported by 90% absenteeism in paign designed to impose Inkatha’s the Pietermaritzburg area. The tipping

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State point was the KwaShange massacre Police numbers had been reinforced of 13 Inkatha youths in an attack led at the turn of the year and the Truth by a policeman. He claimed he was Commission records the involvement of under threat from arsonists released on Inkatha paramilitaries known as Caprivi bail, but was convicted and jailed for trainees under Daluxolo Luthuli.49 It 12 years. A key feature was violence named Warrant Officer Rolf Warber of orchestrated by Inkatha warlords that the SB as having incited kitskonstabels involved a threatening recruitment to attack and kill members of the UDF. drive and later a counterattack against Amongst Warber’s allies was Imbali dissenters. To this the authorities at best councillor, Abdul Awetha.50 The number turned a blind eye while detaining large of people dying in unrest-related vio- numbers of anti-Inkatha people. The lence during this period, mainly young only restraint was provided by interdicts people, was indicative of civil war, “the brought by lawyers acting on behalf most vicious and sustained regional of Cosatu. On 31 January 1988 there conflict in South Africa’s recent his- was an effective invasion of Ashdown tory.”51 The scale of the violence can be from Mpumuza by Inkatha supporters gauged from contemporary reports that escorted by South African and KwaZulu more people were dying in Edendale police. At the preceding rally the UDF than Beirut and trade unionists called and Cosatu were denigrated as Indian it the valley of widows. Parallels were dominated organisations and threats drawn with low-intensity conflict in El were made to kill, expel and burn the Salvador and the Philippines where ap- 46 houses of those who opposed Inkatha. parently spontaneous violence was used Eleven people died in this exercise in to promote a conservative agenda in op- political cleansing. Two further at- position to popular causes.52 Geographi- tacks, led by Mamfana Majola, took cally the violence started in Imbali and place with police assaulting defenders. Ashdown and migrated up the valley A witness later described the scene: “I through Edendale to Vulindlela, which saw two police vans drop off ammuni- until this point had been politically tion at the mobile police station and peaceful. A flood of Imbali refugees drive to Mpumuza to back the IFP in migrated to Sobantu and this triggered their attack. The police were in front conflict between UDF and Black Con- … shooting at people.”47 This was sciousness supporters.53 The violence of the start of Operation Doom: attacks this period effectively divided the Eden- on Cosatu-aligned bus drivers and an incursion into Pietermaritzburg itself dale valley into two zones: the upper were to follow (43 Inkatha members area from Taylor’s Halt to Elandskop was Inkatha; the lower from Gezubuso were charged with public violence in 54 Retief Street.) Kentridge argues that towards Pietermaritzburg was UDF. this displacement of violence into the The effect on bus transport from the urban area happened because township upper valley to Pietermaritzburg was territory was now so tightly demarcated; one of the catalysts for the Seven Day and because anti-Inkatha refugees could War of early 1990. be easily spotted around the bus station. Chamber of Commerce backed local As a surrogate battleground it proved peace talks were severely affected when fertile territory for abductions that usu- 13 UDF activists including joint secre- ally ended in murder.48 taries Martin Wittenberg and Sikhum-

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State buzo Ngwenya Mbatha, meeting to incarceration. To add to this he stated discuss negotiations, were detained on that political affiliation had nothing to 13 November 1987.55 Five days later do with these detentions.58 Of those Kam Chetty of the Pietermaritzburg whose personal details were known, at Combined Ratepayers Association least 114 were under the age of 18 (one was detained. This suggested that there as young as 13) and all except three was a deliberate attempt to take out the were African. At least 49 were female, leadership of anti-Inkatha organisa- of whom two were detained with babies tions. Local businessmen and foreign and a third was pregnant. There are embassies successfully put pressure on several instances on record of several the authorities for the release of Witten- members of the same family in deten- berg and Ngwenya, but restrictions were tion and at least 10 detainees had been imposed.56 Others detained were held inside during the previous SoE. It is pos- until the following July. The peace talks sible that in the intense general unrest were effectively ended by the February members of Inkatha were detained. In 1988 restrictions placed on the UDF and February 1988 well-informed sources other Charterist organisations whose revealed that one such detainee was office bearers were detained again in at New Prison; and in June 1988 there March. Amongst those affected were were unsubstantiated claims of 20 held the Natal Students Congress (Nasco), briefly. No names have ever been re- National Education Union of South corded and indeed when the identities of Africa (Neusa) and youth organisations Inkatha members were revealed in court from Edendale, Sweetwaters, Dindi, interdicts, the attorney-general’s office Mvelweni and Taylor’s Halt. The other claimed they had gone into hiding.59 target involved affiliates of Cosatu such Except for four detentions under sec- as the Transport and General Workers tion 29 of the ISA, all took place under Union (TGWU), the National Union of section 3 of the emergency regulations. Metalworkers (Numsa) and the Post and Inevitably, the scale of detention led Telecommunications Workers Associa- to overcrowding and a deterioration of tion (Potwa). conditions at New Prison: poor food, The detainee population conse- sloppy administration of detainees’ quently grew rapidly to a peak of over accounts, lack of outdoor exercise and 700 in January 1988 declining to about indoor games, rudimentary medical 100 by mid year, although it had been treatment, denial of the right to study, rumoured just before Christmas 1987 and too few church services (detainees that it was well over 1 000, with 800 at were not allowed to organise their own) New Prison alone.57 For a brief period were listed in a memorandum compiled Pietermaritzburg was at the epicentre by lawyer Rishi Thakurdin. Warders of detention without trial. Most of these were often aggressive and abusive detainees were members of informal and summary punishment was handed anti-Inkatha groupings. Police spin out without explanation contrary to doctor Brigadier Leon Mellet made the the principle of audi alteram partem. absurd claim in January 1988 that all Lawyers again used the argument that those detained had committed crimes, this amounted to a punishment regime ignoring the question why most were in contravention of the emergency never charged after long periods of regulations and the Prisons Act.60 The

Thakurdin memorandum also recorded given for one fortnightly visit at a time an incident on 27 December 1987 in C and it had to be conducted in English, section of New Prison where a detainee Afrikaans or through an interpreter. No was assaulted. Returning from lunch, physical contact was permitted. other detainees smelt teargas, refused to At the end of this SoE, 104 detainees enter their cells and were sjambokked. were redetained, 100 under the PSA and A prison official reportedly told the four under the ISA. In the meantime detainees that the only language they hundreds had been released back into understood was violence. Detainees the community, three by their own ef- then set up committees to make repre- forts as escapees. Some of them were sentations, but these were not recog- charged with offences ranging from nised. The situation was alleviated in public violence, arson, possession of early 1988 by transferring 150 detainees firearms and intimidation to murder. to Westville Prison. Conditions were Twenty charges, including 18 of the 60 reported to be better, but family visits of murder, were dropped and there were were made more difficult. Pressure from four acquittals, but there is no compre- lawyers led to the award of study rights, hensive record of the court experience more of a problem than in other parts of detainees. of the country, for detainees at the be- Other detainees were released under ginning of April 1988. On 2 May 1988 restrictions. Those placed on the joint some form of protest, probably singing, secretaries of the UDF have already took place at New Prison in connection been mentioned. At the end of this SoE with the sentencing of Gordon Webster. a further group of 10 detainees was It led to the loss of visiting rights for a prohibited from taking part in activity short while and further protest by 25 on behalf of the UDF or its affiliates, families.61 attendance at gatherings critical of Pressure on cell space led to extensive national and local government or the use of police stations such as Thornville, municipal elections, and advocacy of Plessislaer, Boston, Wartburg, Dalton, election boycotts. Richmond, Cramond, Hilton, Impendle The numbers of detainees being re- and Howick. Towards the end of this leased were so large that from March SoE improved conditions were noted at 1988 a further problem emerged: fami- some stations where relations with de- lies had no knowledge of persons the tainees were cordial: open air exercise authorities claimed to have released. was provided and the food and access to They became lost people and enquirers reading material were superior. Several were sent from police station to police long-term detainees successfully ap- station. Some detainees discovered that pealed not to be transferred from police they had lost their jobs and this was stations back to New Prison, suggesting particularly marked in the construction an honourable role for some officers industry. The problem of vigilantes of the South African Police. However, remained a constant fear for released at New Prison the inconsistent policy detainees, two of whom were killed in of the authorities regarding visits an- December 1988. This was indeed an gered and confused detainees and their SoE marked by anarchy compared with families and punished them financially the comparatively decorous procedures and psychologically. Permission was affecting detainees during the previous

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State year. Those monitoring the situation regulations were used as a means of believed that the uncertainty surround- avoiding bail applications. On 7 July, ing detentions and the refusal of the 35 Gezubuso residents were arrested on police to share accurate lists of releases public violence charges but transferred exacerbated the township crisis. to SoE detention and released without charge between 19 and 22 August. Third emergency, 1988–9 Similarly on 28 April 1989, six people Consideration of this Emergency were detained under the SoE as they left reverts from sheer numbers to condi- court having been granted bail. tions. In addition to the 104 persons One in six of those detained during redetained on 11 June 1988, a further this period had trade union connec- 299 detentions (including four multiple tions, in particular with the National detentions) were recorded, a situation Education, Health and Allied Workers not dissimilar to the 1986–7 SoE. This Union (Nehawu) and Amalgamated does not include a continuing pattern Clothing and Textile Workers Union of short-term mass detention, for ex- (Actwusa). Nearly half of all detainees ample at Dambuza and Machibisa, for were scholars and community group the standard routine of interview and members from the Edendale Valley photograph. Other short-term deten- (Imbali, Ashdown and Wilgefontein) tions of less than 24 hours took place and the Hammarsdale area (including at Ashdown in early February 1989 and Shongweni and Inchanga). Only three the press reported a round up of 230 detainees were female; 37 were minors, people at KwaHasa near Mpophomeni although at least 10 were over 40 years over the weekend of 18–19 March 1989. old and one was as old as 57; and all Towards the end of 1988 many of were Africans except six from the In- the detainees held in Pietermaritzburg dian community. were from Richmond and New Ha- Even with relatively low numbers nover and areas outside the Midlands of detainees the authorities continued such as Hammarsdale, Shongweni and to spread them around, for example Inchanga (125 in all). Durban detainees to police cells at Thornville, Hilton, were also held, but from December Howick, Bishopstowe and Impendle. In 1988 the focus shifted back to the Piet- July 1988 Dacom and Pacsa complained ermaritzburg area, particularly Imbali. through the Attorney-General about the In January 1989 the detainee population thin sleeping mats provided in winter was 191 but by mid-April the figure had and the situation improved after inves- dropped to only seven, the lowest for tigation by the visiting judge. Diet was three years. This was due to the hunger a major problem. It consisted of white strike described below. porridge, samp without salt and mealie Of those redetained, four were trans- rice sometimes with boiled beans, car- ferred from SoE regulations to s.31 of rots and pork fat. Supper at 4 pm (earlier the ISA (state witnesses). The same at weekends) meant many hours without happened to two s.29 detainees (long- food and detainees were not permitted term preventive detention) indicating to keep utensils in their cells. Medical that the State was gearing up for trials. care was rudimentary with Panado dis- Subsequently, all new detentions in pensed for all ills, treatment was often 1988–9 took place under the SoE. The delayed and doctors were sometimes

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State hostile. The regulation hour of exercise and going home”: the situation appeared was often cut to 15 minutes that did not never-ending.64 This protest was called include exposure to the sun. Punishment off after negotiations. In mid January, was regarded as arbitrary, failed to fol- five representatives approached the SB low the prescribed guidelines and was and were led to believe that release was often imposed for minor offences. Leg imminent, but depression heightened irons, solitary confinement, reduced when nothing happened. Having heard diet; and deprivation of visits, study about the national hunger strike that rights, exercise and access to the library, had started on 23 January at Diepkloof, radio and tuckshop were all used by the on 18 February as many as 100 Pieter- authorities. Even more sinister were the maritzburg detainees joined in. It was saturation of blankets in water, removal accepted that not all could last for very of mattresses, use of teargas in cells and long and a week later they had been interference with the lights. reduced to 40, reportedly suffering from Increasing numbers of complaints dizziness, headaches, problems with were received about assault during their joints and difficulty with urinating interrogation. Other abuses concerned as a result of a water-only diet.65 By confinement to cells and deprivation this time strikers had lost three to four of food and exercise (July 1988) and kilogrammes of body mass and had dif- teargassing (September 1988). Subse- ficulty sleeping because the lights were quently it was believed that detainees left on. Families were denied visits and had been shackled. There is evidence detainees were deprived of the radio. of serious abuse of some detainees: But the strike was attracting internation- beatings on the head with boots and al attention, including a démarche from guns, electric shock treatment, hanging the German government. Lawyers for from a window, immersion in ice-cold Pietermaritzburg strikers faxed Minister water and confinement to the boot of a of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok about car. The standard obstruction of visitors the situation, but received no response. continued. Pressure was applied on Some of these strikers had been held detainees to become informers and for well over a year since late 1987 or threats made to hand them over to local early 1988, a situation not dissimilar to warlords on release. that of prisoners of war or what moni- In mid December a detainee placed tors described as the Gulag syndrome of in solitary for refusing to stand up for a indefinite detention as had been experi- warder and possessing a list of detainees enced in Ian Smith’s Rhodesia.66 As the went on hunger strike for six days.62 Irish Committee for Justice and Peace in From 2 to 5 January 1989 all detainees Dublin put it, “A hunger strike may be at New Prison used the same method to one of the few possibilities of making protest about abusive warders and late a personally significant statement in a delivery of food orders. More generally situation of powerlessness, especially the strike was interpreted as reaction to for prisoners in certain situations.”67 On general stress and the DDD syndrome day eight of the strike it was reported – debility, dependence and dread.63 One that those involved were being spread anonymous detainee commented on around police stations at Boston, Dal- “the banging of doors, the clattering of ton, Howick, Mid Illovo, Richmond and keys rais[ing] your hopes about release Mountain Rise and even as far away

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State as Muden and Mooi River.68 This was two lawyers to Minister of Law and presumably designed to break strikers’ Order Vlok in Cape Town on 7 March, joint resolve. Lawyers initially thought 19 days into the hunger strike, it was they had been released, raising old fears suspended on the understanding that about disappearance. Subsequently all those involved would be charged questioned about this tactic elsewhere, or released. This was honoured by the the police responded darkly that “we minister, although he could not resist ac- can transfer people anywhere we want cusing certain organisations of orches- to”.69 Loss of about 10% of body mass trating the strike. The detainees started after a week on hunger strike requires eating again from 8 March. Most were hospitalisation, although under South released over a three-day period from African socio-economic conditions, 13 to 15 March after a spell of medical and on a poor prison diet, deterioration observation, although one emerged can be more rapid. Indeed, by 27 Feb- from prison only in April, apparently a ruary, seven detainees were in hospital victim of bureaucratic error. Twelve of at Edendale or Northdale (one) and the the strikers were charged, but as far as total reached 13 the next day.70 One of is known all of these cases were with- the seven was Sikhumbuzo Ngwenya drawn. Ironically, the national strike Mbatha. His mother described him: was about to resume because promises “He is very thin. His eyes are inside his about release had not been kept and new head. He looked very weak and at first detentions had occurred. he did not recognise me”.71 The number With the start of Pietermaritzburg’s in hospital was 35 on 7 March with two February hunger strike an Ad Hoc having abandoned the strike and another Hunger Strike Support Committee was three released.72 formed to collect information and orga- The Pietermaritzburg strike thus nise support. Its activities included two started just as the national initiative placard stands, an inter-faith service and was suspended. On its 15th day the the placing of two large advertisements local branch of the Medical Associa- in the Natal Witness. Dacom inserted a tion of South Africa (Masa) expressed small daily block in the paper recording concern. In general the doctors who the number of days detainees had gone came into contact with strikers were without food. It also arranged two meet- co-operative and readily supplied law- ings for friends and relatives of strikers yers with information. Some strikers to share information and offer counsel- took medical advice and consented to ling, and provided material support for drips of glucose, dextrose, electrolytes hospitalised hunger strikers. The main and vitamins. The SB promised release burden fell on lawyers who were caught in return for an end to the strike, but between pressure from strikers, families would not give dates in writing. The and the SB. This intensified when their strikers saw their efforts as part of the clients were dispersed and their pro- wider struggle of the Mass Democratic test to Vlok went unanswered. On 15 Movement (MDM).73 February 1989, a 48-hour public fast In Pietermaritzburg hunger strikers took place and culminated in an inter- were visited in hospital by lawyers, denominational service.74 Some student family and friends although this was leaders extended this fast to eight days not the case elsewhere. After a visit by ending with a vigil and prayer service

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State on 23 February. By the climax of the similarly treated and released in early detainees’ action, Mayor Mark Cor- May. nell had met the SB, the Chamber of A large number of releases involved Commerce had expressed concern, restriction orders, in a sense a new prominent citizens were signing up form of detention. This typically in- to a roster of 24-hour fasts and many volved prohibitions on UDF activity, people wore yellow ribbons. Another addressing gatherings of more than solidarity fast was organised from 10 10 people, writing for publication and to 12 March ending with a service at leaving the magisterial district (usually the Metropolitan Methodist Church on Pietermaritzburg). House arrest was National Detainees Day. sometimes specified. Particular empha- The hunger strike amounted to the sis was laid on boycotts, especially of largest protest by detainees themselves the October 1988 municipal elections. and the total number involved nationally Restriction orders issued to ex-hunger reached 700.75 Its outcome was regarded strikers were similar, but included daily as a major victory by those apparently reporting to a police station; and pro- hopeless and powerless at the hands of hibitions on media interviews and in- the state.76 The strike showed they were volvement at educational institutions.78 not without hope or power, although Those restricted pointed out that they they had to go to extreme lengths to had been turned into their own jailers, prove this. It echoed the outcome of removed from a small jail to a larger, the Robben Island hunger strike of the in some ways more dangerous, one.79 1960s: “somehow the atmosphere on Restriction orders imposed continuing, the Island was never exactly the same cumulative stress upon released detain- as it had been before”, recalled Indries ees and their families.80 Naidoo.77 Clearly political conditions in The daily trip to the police station, 1989 were such that the state could not sometimes distant, could be hazard- afford the death of a detained hunger ous.81 A regular routine plus confine- striker. Indeed, it is possible to argue ment to a specific night-time location that the hunger strike was one factor in provided readily identifiable targets. the growing confidence that made the One restriction imposed in April 1989 MDM’s Defiance Campaign possible. initially required two daily reports to Vlok made speeches from time to time a police station 10 kilometres away. suggesting that he would close down or After his Imbali house was attacked, further restrict human rights monitoring one restricted person was permitted groups, but his failure to do so was an to move. An Edendale restrictee was indication of rapidly changing times. allowed the same concession, but this Another hunger strike started amongst was rescinded by the Minister of Law six Pietermaritzburg detainees on 1 and Order. Another had his house arrest April. On 4 April three of them were hours shortened so that he could attend taken to Pelonomi Hospital in Bloem- university. However, once the Defiance fontein where they abandoned their Campaign was under way in the second protest on 7 April. They were returned half of 1989 restriction orders were to Pietermaritzburg and released by largely ignored. the end of the month. The other three Alfred Muntu Ndlovu, held under resumed their strike in mid-April, were s.29 of the ISA was charged with terror-

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State ism, furthering the aims of the ANC and and were transferred to Grootvlei prison two counts of attempted murder. When in Bloemfontein. A number of minor the trial began in November 1988, charges were laid against detainees, three s.31 detainees acted as state wit- but lawyers argued that this was done nesses and a fourth refused. Ndlovu was to cover up partisan action by police. convicted on 22 February 1989 on the The national emergency ended on terrorism and attempted murder charges 8 June 1990 and was reimposed only and sentenced to five years. Of the SoE in Natal.83 The new regulations made detainees, 26 were charged with murder, provision for an initial 30-day deten- four with attempted murder, nine with tion period followed by a maximum of public violence, two with malicious five months. Detainees could be moved injury, 18 with possession of firearms, from place to place and interrogated; nine with attending an illegal gathering, and doctors and lawyers had conditional two with possession of banned literature rights of access. The Natal emergency and another 12 with unknown offences. was lifted on 18 October. There were two acquittals and one There were no redetentions in terms charge was withdrawn, but the other of the Emergency on 8 June although outcomes are unknown. two ISA s.29 detainees were still held. Four ex-detainees were killed by vigi- Ten new detentions were recorded, lantes: at Sweetwaters in August 1988, five under the SoE. Three had been at Imbali and Taylor’s Halt in February detained before. One detainee was held 1989 and in Edendale in March 1989. at Bishopstowe police station for two Two others from the previous Emergen- weeks and threatened to go on hunger cy were killed by vigilantes in Decem- strike. He was told he would be moved ber 1988. The threat of vigilante action to Grootvlei, but was released instead. caused many ex-detainees to become On 24 August 1990 the hitherto refugees. Considerable publicity sur- unused device of unrest areas (local rounded a red Husky minibus, a “torture or regional states of emergency) was mobile” employed by the police to ter- imposed under the PSA on 27 Reef rorise people, particularly ex-detainees, and Vaal Triangle townships. Other in the surrounding townships.82 areas in the Transvaal and Western Cape were later named unrest areas.84 Fourth and fifth emergencies, Richmond was declared an unrest area 1989–90 and 1990; and unrest areas on 4 December 1991 and this status was 85 The hunger strike spelled the beginning renewed until 2 June 1992. Two ANC of the end for detention without trial leaders were detained, one of them 86 in the region. Fourteen persons were Sifiso Nkabinde. Nelson Mandela redetained at the start of fourth SoE, claimed that the Richmond unrest was four of them juveniles. A total of 21 stoked by the Third Force (and indeed new detentions took place following ar- that the greater Pietermaritzburg area rests in July and August 1989 and May was the centre of such activity), but this 1990. None of these detentions was long seems far-fetched. Pietermaritzburg was term and most of the detainees were declared an unrest area in early May youth congress members or suspected 1992 with a curfew (21h00 to 04h00) of links with the ANC. Three of them and restrictions on public meetings. went on a hunger strike in July 1989 Powers of detention were granted, but

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State they were not used.87 During the second two to three months. While this descrip- half of 1992 unrest areas were declared tion fits probably 50% of all detainees, for the first time in the Eastern Cape and it is most typical of period II. Orange Free State. Richmond, together Initially detention had a disabling with Umbumbulu, was again declared psychological and practical effect on an unrest area in November 1992.88 The anti-apartheid organisations. A small main advantage of unrest areas to the core of period I detainees were long- authorities was the power to declare term, some of them held under the ISA. curfews. During period II there was a quantum leap in the number of detentions: press Political impact reports suggested a high of 1 000 in the Over and above the rhetoric of law detainee population. This peaking co- and order, the precise agenda of the incided with the escalation of violence government can be gauged from a around Pietermaritzburg. During period number of variables: the characteristics III the situation was confused but there of the detainees; the size of the detainee were significant numbers of long-term population; and the experiences of detainees, the presence of detainees detainees on release. This analysis is from other areas reflected migration best served by a periodisation that cuts of the violence, and the hunger strike across the emergencies: period I, June signalled the effective end of detention. 1986 to September 1987; II, October It is generally accepted that nationwide 1987 to June 1988; and III, June 1988 50 000 people were detained during to October 1990. the SoE of which the Natal Midlands During period I most detainees, figure was about 2 000. But the pattern except a few bystanders caught up in in the region was distinctive. Nationally events, were UDF or ANC supporters. 26 000 people were detained in the first A significant number were high-profile emergency declining to 6 000 in the UDF leaders or figures from Black Con- second. The Natal Midlands trend was sciousness aligned organisations. Dur- the opposite, starting with relatively ing period II this changed radically and small numbers and taking on the char- 89 the majority of detainees were young acteristics of mass arrests in period II. members (amaqabane) of anti-Inkatha Most detainees were released without self-defence units (SDUs). Detentions charge, although there is no complete of UDF leaders carried on, most nota- record, indicating the preventative bly those held on 13 November 1987 purpose of detention. The best esti- at a meeting about peace talks. No mate suggests that no more than 20% more than 20 Inkatha members were of detainees were charged with an of- detained and Black Consciousness fence and that the conviction rate was adherents were no longer a factor. Dur- very low. Most of those against whom ing period III the pattern changed once charges were successfully pursued were more. Trade unionists began to feature ISA detainees. During period I, one and UDF members reappeared, many released detainee signed an undertak- of them scholars and mostly from the ing to withdraw from politics, but its Hammarsdale area. Overall the average legality was highly questionable. Con- emergency detainee was male, aged finement to a magisterial district was from 18 to 25, anti-Inkatha and held for part of the bail conditions of a charged

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State ex-detainee in September 1987, but Law and Order Vlok, “radicals . . . will restriction orders were almost entirely not be tolerated. We will fight them. We a feature of period III with 70 recorded have put our foot in that direction and cases. In essence the demands of these we will eventually win the Pietermaritz- orders circumscribed political lives and burg area”.93 The Liberal Democratic marked out targets. It was in effect a Alliance asked the crucial question: different version of detention, one that what business does a police force have was less damaging to the government’s in fighting anyone?94 An editorial in the image. Allied to this was the constant local paper took this further describing threat of violence from allies of the Vlok’s statement as outrageous: “the government. At least eight ex-detainees mere holdings of opinions is not illegal, were killed by vigilantes and there were nor is it the job of the police to engage allegations that on release detainees in any kind of thought control.”95 were threatened with the attentions Detention without trial sent a clear of violent opponents. There were also message to political activists: the price many examples of non-fatal assault that of involvement could be very high. converted ex-detainees into refugees. Indeed, detention was arbitrary, unan- Commenting on security legislation nounced and unexpected and could several years before the emergency, involve months at the mercy and whim a future chief justice in a democratic of hostile and sometimes brutal people. South Africa wrote: “one of the ways Detention effectively had no defined in which the State has increased its time limit. Vlok issued the outright lie in powers is by curtailing the powers of March 1990 that only those advocating the courts to protect fundamental free- violence had been detained.96 This was doms”.90 As “agents of the executive” an inopportune moment for such propa- the police were granted indemnified ganda during a short period of intense power that was aided by the judg- civil war around Pietermaritzburg when ments of conservatives on the bench.91 hundreds of detentions might have been Detention without trial, restrictions on expected. Instead there were virtually release, informal violent repression and none, indicating that the authorities a general climate of fear were a notable used detention not as part of impartial symptoms of this strategy. It was spe- policing but rather as a political weapon cifically targeted at Charterist-inclined in particular circumstances. Yet the organisations and informal anti-Inkatha police propaganda machine blandly groupings. Inkatha warlords operated maintained throughout the SoE that it with impunity although emergency, was playing an impartial role.97 Vlok security and criminal law could justifi- denied that there was a breakdown of ably have been employed against them. law and order in Natal, a statement de- Indeed, it was impossible for warlord scribed as “ludicrous” by Lawyers for activity to have taken place without Human Rights and “mind-boggling” police complicity.92 State strategy was by a Natal Witness editorial. The latter blatantly partisan, designed to disrupt went on to point out that such supposed affiliates of the UDF and Cosatu while ignorance was made possible by the reinforcing Inkatha’s ambitions. The government’s monopoly of information government’s own statements support under the SoE. 98 the evidence. In the words of Minister of

An assessment by the Human Rights These were signs that Inkatha’s sup- Commission99 concluded that deten- port was waning. The police maintained tion without trial was apartheid’s “big the fiction that they were a neutral force gun” to neutralise the opposition (in supporting the legitimate structures contrast to Latin American-style dis- of civil authority who happened to appearances). It had an air of legality be Inkatha office bearers in the semi- but could be used against individuals, rural areas. This aligned the police groups or whole communities, to extract solidly with local enforcers such as information and confessions, to break Sichizo Zuma of the Inkatha Youth opponents physically and psychologi- Brigade, Imbali town councillors like cally, to recruit informers, and to justify Patrick Pakkies, Abdul Awetha and ongoing restrictions after release.100 Jerome Mncwabe, and rural chiefs It was a powerful weapon used in and indunas such as David Ntombela. tactically different ways, depending All exhibited characteristics of violent on circumstances, by the SB and their authoritarianism that earned the de- shock troops in the Riot Police, to influ- scription of warlord and which were ence the balance of political power in either ignored or abetted by the police. the Pietermaritzburg area. The conclu- Many detainees described how their sion of the 1986 Indaba conference original arrests were the result of joint opened up the momentary possibility of Inkatha and police operations in which a federal political solution in Natal, seen they were tracked down, assaulted and as a major opportunity for Inkatha and interrogated by vigilantes before being the political aspirations of Mangosuthu detained.103 Buthelezi. The only feasible measure of One of the results was that organ- its popularity was membership numbers isations with democratic inclinations and this added urgency to the recruit- and aspirations were forced to work in ment drive that had started in the early undemocratic and secretive ways that 1980s. Inkatha was notoriously weak detracted from their potential. It took in the Pietermaritzburg area, even in out of circulation politically astute lead- the rural, upper reaches of the Edendale ers, damaged institutional cohesiveness Valley. Stayaways in support of the and exposed organisations to opportun- Sarmcol strikers in Howick in July 1985 ists and infiltrators. It removed leaders and against the whites-only general from the peace process and arguably election in May 1987 were strongly op- prolonged conflict, making a mockery posed by Buthelezi, yet were met by an of the government’s commitment to sta- impressive worker endorsement.101 It is bility. The experience of Sikhumbuzo relevant to note that although large parts Ngwenya Mbatha, Pietermaritzburg of the upper Edendale valley known secretary of the UDF, is emblematic of as Vulindlela (formerly Swartkop lo- this. Detained on 26 June 1986 he was cation) fell under the administration released after 350 days at the end of of the KwaZulu bantustan, they were the first emergency. Involved in peace still policed by South Africa, not their negotiations with youth leaders he was homeland counterparts although Kwa- redetained on 13 November 1987 for Zulu police members were active as five days. In 1988 he was detained yet bodyguards.102 again and spent altogether 25 months in jail without trial during the SoE.104

After his assassination on 8 February that “securing the structures of inclusion 1992 many tributes were paid to his po- and exclusion was a dirty, brutal and litical effectiveness, but Colin Gardner brutalising business.”106 summed it up: “S’khumbuzo suffered a Both at the time, and subsequently, good deal for the cause. One had a sus- the effect of detention on individuals picion that what the police particularly was largely neglected, caught up in the disliked in him, besides his efficiency drama of broad political developments. and effectiveness within the liberation John Dugard had “referred to the Ter- movement, was his reasonableness, his rorism Act as being so horrific that few essential gentleness . . . he was so obvi- people have been able to grasp its sever- ously a man of peace.”105 ity”.107 By 1986 this Act had become the The human rights implications of equally draconian ISA, to which on 12 detention without trial were of course June 1986 the emergency regulations national. In the case of the Natal were added. The state security regime Midlands they took on added mean- in force in South Africa in the years ing within the context of widespread 1986–90 was just one step short of the violence from late 1987 onwards. methods of full totalitarianism: only Abuse of human rights indicated that the concentration camps were missing. the authorities feared a severe threat It is reasonable to argue that all those to their legitimacy. Detention without detained for more than a short period trial was a tactic of last resort that sent were subjected to psychological abuse a simple message: engage in political by the very nature of their detention activity outside the limits prescribed by and that this was a deliberate part of government and you, your family and state strategy. The solitary confinement comrades will be deprived indefinitely suffered by some emergency detainees of basic civil rights notwithstanding the was deemed as damaging as physical fact that for most detainees these were assault or electric shocks. already very limited. Detention touched the lives of thou- This was highly dangerous. Deten- sands: family, friends, political com- tion devalued an already questionable rades and colleagues: “the damage legal system in many people’s eyes. caused to society as a whole is felt far Government abandoned the rule of beyond the detainees themselves”.108 law and resorted to oppression that For many this was entirely counter- included handing over the townships productive, radicalising rather than to an indemnified, politicised police subduing. Many people emerged from force and its vigilante allies. The detention stronger and more com- overt abandonment of human rights mitted, which acted to create greater led to a scenario in which there was solidarity. It forced the MDM to focus a rapid deterioration in mutual regard more clearly on human rights and the for the rights of others, most obviously constitution of the Republic of South manifest in extreme violence. History Africa finalised in 1996 is a model in abounds with examples of the victims of that regard. It also reinforced the posi- violence quickly resorting to the same tion of an already strong civil society tactics. And the long-term effect on the sector in the region consisting mainly of police themselves was considerable: certain elements in the local university 20 years later Anthony Altbeker wrote alongside individuals within the legal

Natalia 41 (2011) Copyright © Natal Society Foundation 2011 Emergency of the State profession and in religious organisa- by its members Peter Kerchhoff, Christine tions. Similarly detention challenged Chapman, Marie Dyer and Les Weinberg (all of whom are now dead); Colin Gardner, Ilan the libertarian instincts of the business Lax, Gaye Spiller, John Aitchison and Aaron community. Detention without trial, ap- Mazel. The work of the CAE is described in parently a strong weapon in the hands Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside of the state, had a fatal weakness: its the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: Philip, 1990): 130–3. Little was published in sheer injustice extracted a reaction the local press about detention because the even from some unpoliticised citizens emergency regulations were severe: The Natal and was guaranteed to elicit an adverse Witness was investigated 14 times in three reaction from the international com- months, for example (Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: 140). munity. Coupled with hunger strikes it 2 Freedom Charter, 1955 (Raymond Suttner ultimately proved a political liability for and Jeremy Cronin, 30 Years of the Freedom the government, although the long-term Charter (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1986: 264)). damage to the socio-political fabric of This mirrors article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “no one shall the Natal Midlands, as elsewhere, was be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or considerable. exile”. 3 Don Foster, Dennis Davis and Diane Sandler, Endnotes Detention and Torture in South Africa: 1 The basic data used in this article was Psychological, Legal and Historical Studies collected by the Detainees Support Committee (Cape Town: Philip, 1987): 154. (Descom), which was renamed the Detainees 4 The Public Safety Act (3 of 1953) provided Aid Committee or Dacom in February 1988 for indefinite preventive detention without when Descoms around the country, along with warrant by any member of the security forces 16 other organisations, were restricted under in order to maintain public order. It was the emergency regulations from performing conceived during the Defiance Campaign any activities. Descom/Dacom was assisted against the unjust laws of 1952. When the Act by Pacsa (Peter Kerchhoff and colleagues), was invoked on 12 June 1986 it provided the the Centre for Adult Education (CAE) at security forces with options additional to those the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg already in force under the Internal Security (John Aitchison and Vaughn John) and the Act (74 of 1982): detention of state witnesses Progressive Federal Party (Radley Keys). (s.31); short-term preventive detention Its purpose was to provide material and (s.50/50A); indefinite interrogative detention moral help to political detainees and their (the notorious s.29); and indefinite detention families and monitor and publicise the without interrogation (s.28). Sections 28 and effect of detention without trial on society 50/50A were effectively made redundant by in Pietermaritzburg and the Natal Midlands the PSA, although emergency legislation (Mooi River to Camperdown and Greytown to regulations had to be renewed annually. The Richmond). It was in daily telex contact with ISA had streamlined and superseded a range Amnesty International in London. Descom/ of legislation providing for detention without Dacom was careful to verify its information trial: General Laws Amendment Act (37 of and tended to err on the side of caution, but 1963, 90-day detention); Criminal Procedure it was closely aligned with affiliates of the Amendment Act (96 of 1965, 180-day United Democratic Front (UDF). Although detention); General Laws Amendment Act it was clearly not a politically-neutral body, (62 of 1966, 14-day renewable preventive its methods and the passage of time have detention); Terrorism Act (83 of 1967, s.6 done nothing to devalue the information it indefinite detention for interrogation in collected or the main trends it was able to solitary confinement); and Internal Security identify. Twenty and more years later, no new Amendment Act (79 of 1976, 12-month information has come to light to invalidate renewable preventive detention and 6-month its work. This was recorded in Detention detention of potential state witnesses in Under Three Emergencies (Pietermaritzburg: solitary). Dacom, 1989).The author acknowledges 5 Christopher Merrett, “The beginning of the the contribution made to Descom/Dacom end”. The Witness, 30 Mar. 2010. The arrests

were premature because a copy of the relevant violence that flared up in the Edendale Valley Government Gazette was not yet available in the second half of 1987 (David Niddrie, in Pietermaritzburg. The three whites were “Into the valley of death”. Work in Progress released when a court order was obtained by 52(1988): 11–12). lawyers Leslie Weinberg and Simon Roberts, 16 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report but detained a day later after the Gazette had 3: 240. been flown up from Cape Town by military 17 Philippe Denis, “Men of the cloth”: the aircraft. For an account of Brown’s detention Federal Theological Seminary of Southern see Michael Cardo, Opening Men’s Eyes: Africa, Inkatha and the struggle against Peter Brown and the Liberal Struggle for apartheid”. Journal of Southern African South Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, Studies 34(2) 2008: 305–6. 2010): 143–53. 18 Vigilante groups like those abetted by Inkatha 6 The nationwide figure for detentions under were known as contra-type organisations after security legislation from 1963 to 1986 was the right wing insurgents in Nicaragua. nearly 21 000. 19 David Niddrie, “Into the valley of death”: 15. 7 Almost 30 years later she paid tribute to the 20 Natal Witness 15 Jan. 1986. compassion and professionalism of the station 21 One of the organisations that sprang out of the commander, Dick Rust, and his wife who schools crisis in Sobantu was Forward Youth effectively protected her against the SB (Nina (Echo 16 January 1986). Hassim, “A tribute to my jailer”. The Witness 22 Natal Witness 2 May 1986. 7 Aug. 1998). 23 Human Rights and Repression in South 8 Kader Hassim received concurrent sentences Africa: The Apartheid Machine Grinds On that amounted to eight years on Robben Island (Johannesburg: Human Rights Commission, where he famously brought a case in 1973 South African Council of Churches and against the commanding officer. He won the Southern African Catholic Bishops the point in the Supreme Court that solitary Conference, 1989): 19–21. confinement could not be imposed without 24 Max Coleman (ed.), A Crime Against due process (see Neville Alexander, Robben Humanity: 39. The Public Safety Amendment Island dossier, 1964–1974 (Cape Town: UCT Act (67 of 1986) was promulgated on 26 June Press, 1994): 112, n.31. 1986 and first implemented on 24 August 1990. 9 James Sanders, Apartheid’s Friends: the Rise 25 It is termed the first emergency in this article, and Fall of South Africa’s Secret Service followed by the second, third, fourth and (London: Murray, 2006): 130, 424; “Portrait fifth (1987–8, 1988–9, 1989–90 and 1990). of a defector”. New African 148(1979): 40–1. But previous emergencies had affected 10 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report Pietermaritzburg and 121 other magisterial 3: 169. districts (of a total of 265) from 30 Mar. to 31 11 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979: Aug. 1960; and 44 magisterial districts (none 146. in Natal) from 21 July 1985 (the day of the 12 Max Coleman, (ed.), A Crime Against funeral of the murdered Cradock Four) until Humanity: Analysing the Repression of the 7 Mar. 1986. There were 11 727 detentions in Apartheid State (Cape Town: David Philip, 1960 and about 8 000 in 1985–6. Surprisingly, 1998): 59. no national emergency was declared at the 13 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1982: time of the Soweto Uprising in 1976. 237–8, 246. 26 Some of Pietermaritzburg’s detainees were 14 Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1982: already well-known, or would become 246. so: Thami Mseleku (director-general in 15 This overview is based on Paul Forsyth, the national departments of education and Pietermaritzburg Conflict Chronology: health, and high commissioner to Malaysia); Political Developments in Pietermaritzburg, Sikhumbuzo Ngwenya Mbatha (UDF 1980–1986 (Pietermaritzburg: Department secretary); Yunus Carrim (deputy minister of of Historical Studies, University of Natal, local government); Yusuf Bhamjee (mayor of 1991), a digest of press reports; and John Umgungundlovu Municipality); Adam Habib Aitchison, Numbering the Dead: Patterns (deputy vice-chancellor of Johannesburg in the Midlands Violence (Pietermaritzburg; University); A.S. Chetty (UDF chairperson); Centre for Adult Education, University of Chota Motala (ambassador to Morocco); John Natal, [1988]): 7. Forced recruitment by Jeffery (senior ANC member of parliament); Inkatha was seen as a significant catalyst of the and Peter Kerchhoff (Pacsa organiser).

27 For example, the National Education Union of Security Council’s Mozambique working South Africa (Neusa), National Union of South group (which included Craig Williamson) African Students (Nusas), Pacsa, Descom, in its liaison work with Renamo. He was Natal Organisation of Women (Now), End specifically involved in planning raids on Conscription Campaign (ECC), South African ANC houses in Maputo and the murder of Committee for Higher Education (Sached), their occupants (see Terry Bell, Unfinished Association for Rural Advancement (Afra), Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) and (Observatory: RedWorks, 2001: 254)). In May the Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches 1989 he left the SB in Pietermaritzburg and (PMBCC). was appointed commissioner of the KwaZulu 28 David Webster, “Repression and the State of Police. Emergency”. South African Review 4 (1987): 42 David Niddrie, “Into the valley of death”: 9, 149. 11. 29 At first it was not clear how many seminarians 43 John Aitchison, “Can the Inkatha gate be had been detained, but the number soon closed?” Work in Progress 77 (1991): 6, 8. became evident: Howick police sent a 44 Descom, “Memorandum addressed to the message to St Joseph’s for 20 knives, forks commanding officer of the Security Police in and spoons. Pietermaritzburg” 14 Jan. 1988. 30 Natal Witness 14 June 1986: 10. The name 45 Debates of the House of Assembly 19 Apr. attached to the advert was Ronald Devy. 1988. These incidents were reported on the 31 In a familiar move, police switched one of the BBC World Service programme “Focus on detainees to the more stringent s.29 of the ISA. Africa”, 24 Mar. 1998 at 18h30 GMT. 32 Peter Kerchhoff was thought by the SB 46 Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: 200. to belong to 46 organisations (which may 47 Lou Levine (ed.), Faith in Turmoil: the Seven well have been true), so detainees like him Days War (Pietermaritzburg: Pacsa, 1999): 59. were regarded as useful potential sources of The witness was a Mr Ndlela. information. 48 Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: 90–3. 33 The matter of visiting judges was also a 49 Luthuli was previously an ANC operative problem on Robben Island: see Neville involved in the Wankie Campaign and an Alexander, Robben Island dossier: 89. accused in the 1969 ANC trial (SADET, The 34 Government Gazette 10281 (12 June 1986). Road to Democracy in South Africa vol.1, 35 Police stations used were Bishopstowe, 1960–70 (Cape Town: Zebra, 2004): 532). Camperdown, Dalton, Howick, New Hanover, 50 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report Richmond and Thornville; and Alexandra v.3, ss. 210, 214. Warber also armed members Road, Mountain Rise and Plessislaer in of Inkatha implicated in violence. He died Pietermaritzburg. violently at Winterskloof at the end of 2009. 36 This could only be done legally by a senior Officially he committed suicide, but questions officer as punishment for a gazetted offence remain about the circumstances. (Government Gazette 10281, 12 June 1986 51 David Niddrie, “Into the valley of death”: 6. s.21). 52 Max Coleman (ed.), A Crime Against 37 Kneifel was involved in liberation theology Humanity: 112–13, 114. circles and active on the Pietermaritzburg 53 John Aitchison, Numbering the Dead: 8, 22, campus of the University of Natal. He had also 28. been part of the setting up of trade unions in 54 Tim Smith, “The Seven Days War 1990” in Namibia. Lou Levine (ed.), Faith in Turmoil: 104. 38 Natal Witness 12 June 1987: 1. 55 Amongst the others were Stembiso Hlongwane 39 Echo 20 Aug. 1986; Natal Witness 9 and 23 (Edendale), Mzwandile Mbongwe (a university Oct. 1986. student from Imbali), Msizi Mfeka, Pamela 40 John Aitchison, Numbering the Dead. Mnandi, Madomane Mnguni (Mpophomeni), 41 Büchner was regarded as an expert on Nthuthuko Mokubung (Edendale), Sibusiso anti-ANC operations. Before arriving in Ndlela, Jameson Ngomane, Snothi Nkabinde Pietermaritzburg he had an active, hands-on (Magwagwa) and Zakhele Ntshangase, all career. According to Dirk Coetzee testifying from UDF aligned organisations. before the Harms Commission in 1991, 56 Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: 157. Büchner was one of the founders in 1981 The restrictions involved a ban on participation with Coetzee and Jan Viktor of the Vlakplaas in twelve organisations (including the UDF hit squad. By 1984 he was assisting the State and a fictitious body) except for peace

negotiations under the auspices of the 72 The hospitals involved were Edendale (6 Chamber of Commerce; confinement to hunger strikers), Greytown (4) and Estcourt the magisterial district of Pietermaritzburg; (4); and Northdale (10), Grey’s (6) and and a ban on attendance at anti-government Midlands Medi Clinic in Pietermaritzburg (5). gatherings. 73 The MDM was the broad front for anti- 57 Numbers were so large it was impossible government protest that emerged in 1989. It to keep track of releases, so the numbers was largely driven by the UDF and Cosatu, in detention at any one time are unknown. but embraced any anti-apartheid organisation. Indeed, monitoring in any depth became 74 Natal Witness 18 Feb. 1989. An advert placed extremely difficult. The townships were on 16 Feb. was sponsored by two dozen local increasingly hazardous places, access to organisations. prison even for lawyers became more strict 75 Human Rights Update May 1989: 49. and parents stopped enquiring about their 76 Heather Hughes and Christopher Merrett, children: ironically they felt they were safer “Detentions”. South African Human Rights in prison. One source believed that a third and Labour Law Yearbook 1990: 90–1. of all South African detainees were held in 77 Indries Naidoo with Albie Sachs, Island Pietermaritzburg in early 1988 (“Detentions: in Chains: Ten Years on Robben Island by developments during 1988/9”. Critical Health Prisoner 885/63 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 26 (May 1989): 5, 7) although this was 1982): 175. probably exaggerated. 78 Dacom Fact Sheet 2 (Dec. 1989). 58 Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: 72. 79 Heather Hughes and Christopher Merrett, 59 David Niddrie, “Into the valley of death”: 10. “Detentions”: 88, 91. 60 Memo submitted by Rishi Thakurdin to the 80 Max Coleman (ed.), A Crime Against head of New Prison, 11 Jan. 1988. Humanity: 74–5. 61 Natal Witness 6 May 1988. 81 Durban ex-detainee Chris Ntuli was killed 62 The hunger strikes are covered in Sidla shortly after leaving a police station. Ekhaya: We Shall Eat at Home: The Detainees’ 82 Weekly Mail 3 Nov. 1989. The details emerged Hunger Strike in Pietermaritzburg, 1989 from a court case. (Pietermaritzburg: Detainees Aid Committee, 83 Proclamation 96, Government Gazette 12523 1990). Questionnaires were completed by a (8 June 1990). few detainees and their details augmented 84 Human Rights Commission, Review of 1990 from information held by Dacom. (Braamfontein: HRC, 1991): 1. 63 Betty Livingstone, Dee Pinto and Louise 85 Government Gazette 13671 (4 Dec. 1991), Frankel, “The psychological effects of 13807 (3 Mar. 1992) and 14012 (2 June 1992). detention and hunger strikes on mental 86 Natal Witness 12 Dec. 1991. The HRC, health”. Critical Health 26 (May 1989): 24–5. however, made no record of this. 64 Sidla Ekhaya: 4. 87 Government Gazette 13897 (8 May 1992) 65 Natal Witness 24 Feb. 1989. and 14044 (8 June 1992); Natal Witness 66 Human Rights and Repression in South 9 May 1992; Anne Truluck, No Blood on Africa: The Apartheid Machine Grinds On Our Hands: Political Violence in the Natal (Johannesburg: Human Rights Commission, Midlands 1987–mid-1992 and the Role of the South African Council of Churches and State, White Political Parties and Business the Southern African Catholic Bishops (Pietermaritzburg: Black Sash, 1992): 82. Conference, 1989): 21; David Webster and 88 Government Gazette 14402 (6 Nov. 1992). Maggie Friedman, “Repression and the State For a personal account of unrest in the area in of Emergency: June 1987–March 1989”. the 1990s see Andrew Ragavaloo, Richmond: South African Review 5 (1989): 18–19. Living in the Shadow of Death (Johannesburg: 67 Irish Committee for Justice and Peace, fax STE, 2008). dated 15 Feb. 1989 to Southern African 89 “Detentions”. Work In Progress 56–57 (1988): Catholic Bishops Conference. 34. 68 Natal Witness 25 Feb. 1989. 90 Arthur Chaskalson, “Opening address” in 69 Weekly Mail 8 Sep. 1989. A.N. Bell and R.D.A. Mackie (eds), Detention 70 John Falk, “Medical and ethical aspects of and Security Legislation in South Africa: detention and hunger strikes”. Critical Health Proceedings of a Conference Held at the 26 (May 1989): 14; Natal Witness 1 Mar. University of Natal, September 1982 (Durban: 1989. Centre for Adult Education, University of 71 Natal Witness 28 Feb. 1989. Natal, 1982): 2.

91 Don Foster, Dennis Davis and Diane Sandler, to 31 March 1990): background, course and Detention and Torture in South Africa: questions” in Lou Levine (ed.), Faith in 154–5. Turmoil: 111. 92 Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: 103 Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: 183, 197–8. 199, 200–1. 93 Natal Witness 27 Feb. 1988. 104 Karen Allsopp, Comrade Lost: A Life to 94 Echo 3 Mar. 1988. Inspire Us (Pietermaritzburg: Pacsa, 1992): 95 Natal Witness 9 Apr. 1988. 5–6. 96 Natal Witness 22 Mar. 1990. 105 Colin Gardner in Karen Allsopp, Comrade 97 Anne Truluck, No Blood on Our Hands: Lost: 36. 22–3. 106 Anthony Altbeker, The Dirty Work of De- 98 Natal Witness 18 and 19 May 1989. mocracy: a Year on the Streets with the SAPS 99 This was the independent, apartheid-era (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2005): 242. HRC; not to be confused with the Chapter 9 107 Torture is Part of the System: State Violence body set up under the 1996 Constitution. in South Africa and Namibia (London: ANC, 100 Max Coleman (ed.), A Crime Against 1984): 7. Humanity: 43. 108 John Falk, “Medical and ethical aspects of 101 Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: detention and hunger strikes”: 11. 221–3. 102 John Aitchison, “The Seven Days War (25