Humb, 37989 2759

SUPPLEMENT TO The Gazette Of TUESDAY, the 17^ of JUNE, 1947 by Registered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 19 JUNE, 1947

THE RIVER PLATE BATTLE 3. I decided that the Plate, with its larger The following Despatch was submitted to the number of and its very valuable grain Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on and meat trade, was the vital area to be de- the 30th December, 1939, by Rear Admiral fended. I therefore arranged to concentrate H. |H. Harwood, K.C.B., O.B.E., Rear there my available forces in advance of the Admiral Commanding South American time at which, it was anticipated the raider :— might start operations in that area. 4. In order to bring this about, I made the H.M.S. AJAX, following signal to the South American Division 30th December, 1939. timed 1315 of 3rd December, 1939: — I have the honour to submit the following " In view of report pocket battleship, report of the action /between H.M. Ships amend previous dispositions. CUMBER- AJAX* (Captain C. H. L. Woodhouse, Royal LAND self-refit at as Navy), ACHILLES | (Captain W. E. Parry, previously arranged but keep at short notice ) and EXETER (Captain F. S. on two shafts. ACHILLES leave Rio de Bell, Royal Navy), under my orders, and the Janeiro area so as to arrive and fuel Monte- German Armoured ADMIRAL GRAF video 0600 (Zone plus 2) 8th December, SPEE on Wednesday, I3th December, 1939, EXETER leave Falkland Islands, and the sequence of events leading to her self- for Plate a.m. 9th December, cover- destruction on Sunday, i7th December, 1939. ing S.S. LAFO'NIA with returning volunteers. AJAX, ACHILLES concentrate All times throughout this report are in the in position 35 degrees south, 50 degrees west time of Zone plus 2, except where otherwise at 1600 (Zone plus 2) loth December. stated. EXETER to pass through position 090 degrees Medanos Light ^50 miles at 0700 PRELIMINARY DISPOSITIONS I2th December. If concentration with 2. The British ship DORIC STAR had re- AJAX and ACHILLES is not effected by ported 'being attacked by a pocket battleship that time further instructions will be issued in position 19 degrees 15' south, 5 degrees to EXETER. Oiler OLYNTHUS is to re- 5' east during the afternoon of 2nd December, main at sea rendezvous until situation clears 1939, and a similar report had been sent by instead of proceeding to Falkland Islands." an unknown vessel 170 miles south-west of 5. Strict W/T silence was kept after passing that position at 0500 G.M.T. on 3rd December. this signal. From this data I estimated that at a cruising 6. Concentration of all three ships wa.'. speed of 15 knots the raider could reach the effected by 0700 Tuesday, I2th December, Rio de Janeiro focal area a.m. I2th December, and I then proceeded towards position 32 de- the River Plate focal area p.m. I2th Decem- grees south, 47 degrees west. This position was ber or a.m. I3th December and the Falkland chosen from my Shipping Plot as being at Islands area i4th December. that time the most congested part of the di- * Wearing the Broad Pendant of the Commodore verted shipping routes, i.e., the point where Commanding the South American Division. I estimated that a raider could do most damage t Of the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy. to British shipping. 2760 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 JUNE, 1947 7. On concentrating I made the following 13. It appeared at this stage as if the enemy signal limed 1200/I2th December to my was undecided as to her gunnery policy. Her Force: — turrets were working under different controls, " My policy with three in com- and she shifted target several times before pany versus one pocket battleship. Attack eventually concentrating both turrets on at once by day or night. By day act as EXETER. two units, ist Division (AJAX and 0623-0630. ACHILLES) and EXETER diverged to per- 14. EXETER was straddled by GRAF mit flank marking. First Division will con- SPEE's third salvo, one shell of which burst centrate gunfire. By night ships will normally short amidships, killed the starboard tube's remain in company in open order. Be pre- crew, damaged communications and riddled the pared for the signal ZMM* which is to have searchlights and aircraft. Preparations were the same meaning as MM* except that for being made at this time for catapulting the air- Division read Single Ship." craft, but as both were by then out of action, 8. I amplified this later in my signal they were manhandled over the side. 1813/I2th December as follows: — 15. At 0624, after EXETER had fired eight " My object in the signal ZMM is to avoid salvos, she received a direct hit from an n-in. torpedoes and take the enemy by surprise direct-action shell on the front of " B " .turret. and cross his stern. Without further orders This shell burst on impact, put the turret out of ships are to clear the line of fire by hauling action, and splinters swept the bridge, killing astern of the new leading ship. The new or wounding all personnel there with the excep- leading ship is to lead the line without further tion of the Captain and two others, and wrecked orders so as to maintain decisive gun range." the wheelhouse communications. I exercised this manoeuvre during the even- ing of i2th December. 16. Captain F. S. Bell, Royal Navy, then decided to fight his ship from the after conning THE ACTION. position, but owing to communications being destroyed it was some time before the ship could Wednesday, i^th December, 1939 be brought under the control of that position, 0530-0623. \nd then it could only be done by means of a 9. At 0520 /I3th December, the SquadroE chain of messengers to pass orders to the after was in position 34 degrees 34' south, 49 degrees steering position. 17' west. With the last of the dawn I exercised Meanwhile EXETER had swung to star- manoeuvring signals, and then re-formed the board, and was closing her " A " arcs,* but she squadron on a course of 060 speed 14 knots in was brought back to port by an order from the the order AJAX, ACHILLES, EXETER. At torpedo officer, Lieutenant-Commander C. J. 0614, smoke was sighted bearing 320 and Smith, Royal Navy, who succeeded in getting EXETER was ordered to close and investigate word through to the lower conning position. it. At 0616 EXETER reported " I think it is a Two more n in. hits were received in the pocket battleship " and two minutes later the fore part of the ship during this phase. enemy opened fire, one n-in. turret at 17. AJAX and ACHILLES were in Concen- EXETER and the other at AJAX. tration firing and seemed to be making good 10. The First Division immediately altered shooting. They were closing the range course together by signal to 340 degrees to close rapidly and gaining bearing on the enemy. the range. Captain F. S. Bell, Royal Navy, of 0630-0638: H.M.S. EXETER, hauled out of the line and 18. About this time, the GRAF SPEE altered course to the westward in accordance shifted the fire of one n in. turret on to the with my plan, in order to attack the enemy from First Division and AJAX was straddled three a widely different bearing and permit flank times at about 0631. The First Division turned marking. All ships increased speed. slightly away to throw out the enemy's gun- EXETER opened fire at 0620, ARCHILLES fire. at 0621 and AJAX at 0623. His secondary armament was firing alter- An enemy report was immediately initiated nately at AJAX and ACHILLES, but with no and was broadcast at 0634. Amplifying reports effect, though some salvos fell close. were made at 0640, 0646 and 6722. 19. AJAX catapulted her aircraft with lji. From this point until the action was Lieutenant E. D. G. Lewin, Royal Navy, as broken off, no alter course signals were made. pilot, at 0637, a very fine evolution observing Captain W. E. Parry, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. that " X " and " Y " turrets were at that time ACHILLES manoeuvred his ship as necessary firing on a forward bearing. Owing to delay in to clear her line of fire, remaining close to establishing W/T communication the first air AJAX and conforming to her movements. spotting report was not received until 0654. EXETER proceeded independently, her initial This method was then employed for the rest course being about 280 degrees. of the action. 12. AJAX and ACHILLES opened in Single 20. The First Division turned back to port Ship firing, but Concentration was employed as at 0634 in order to close the range. soon as W/T touch had been established at 21. EXETER fired her starboard torpedoes about 0625, in local control at 0632 as she turned 'back to * The signification of these signals was : her westerly course, but at 0637 the GRAF ZMM—ships are to turn to course .... starting SPEE altered course some 150 degrees to port, with the rear ship. MM—Commanders of Divisions are to turn their * The arcs on which all guns of a ship's main arma- Division to course .... starting with the rear ment will bear, this allowing them to fire simul- Division. taneously at the enemy. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 JUNE, 1947 2761 and steered to the 'north-westward under cover 27. Captain Bell, of H.M.S. EXETER, of smoke. AJAX and ACHILLES imme- hauled round to the westward at 0650, and was diately hauled round, first to north, then to the still engaging the enemy, adjusting his course west to close the range and regain bearing, so as to keep " Y " turret bearing. accepting the temporary loss of " A " arcs. EXETER now had a list of 7 degrees to star- Both ships were by this time proceeding at full board, and had several compartments flooded speed. forward as a result of an 11 in. hit under the It appears probable that the First Division's forecastle. She was still being engaged by concentration and also EXETER'S fire had up GRAF SPEE, but the latter's fire appeared at to this point been most effective and it is thought this time to be falling a considerable distance that this and the firing of EXETER'S torpedoes over EXETER. were the cause of the enemy making smoke and altering course away. 0708-0728. 0638-0650. 28. GRAF SPEE'S range from the First Divi- sion was still 16,000 yards at 0710. I then 22. At about 0638 EXETER altered course decided to accept the" loss of " A " arcs ia to starboard so as to fire her port torpedoes. order to close the range as rapidly as possible. She then steered to the north-east to close the Course was altered to the westward, and AJAX First Division till about 0645 when she turned and ACHILLES were ordered to proceed at to a westerly course to keep within range. their utmost speed. 23. During this period, EXETER received 29. At 0716, GRAF SPEE made a drastic two more n in. hits. "A turret was put out alteration of course to port under cover of of action, and the second shell burst in the smoke, but four minutes later she turned to Chief Petty Officers' flat amidships, started a the north-west and opened her " A " arcs on fierce fire, and caused the 4 in. magazine to be the First Division. AJAX was immediately flooded by burst water mains. All compass re- straddled three times by n in. at a range of peaters were now out of action, and Captain 11,000 yards, but the enemy's secondary arma- Bell, using a boat's compass, resolutely main- ment was firing raggedly, and appeared to be tained EXETER in action with " Y " turret going consistently over, between AJAX and firing in local control and the gunnery officer, ACHILLES. Lieutenant-Commander R. B. Jennings, Royal Navy, controlling the fire from the after search- 30. At 0720, the First Division turned to light platform. starboard to bring all guns to bear. Our shoot- 24. At 0640 an ii in. direct- action shell fell ing appeared to be very effective, and a fire short of ACHILLES in line with the bridge and * was observed amidships in GRAF SPEE. burst on the water. Splinters killed four ratings 31. At 0725, AJAX received an 11 in. delay in the D.C.T. and stunned the gunnery officer, action 'hit on the after superstructure. The Lieutenant R. E. Washbourn, Royal Navy. shell passed through various cabins, then " X " Captain Parry and the Chief Yeoman who were turret trunk, wrecking the turret machinery on the bridge were also slightly wounded at the below the gunhouse and finally bursting in the time. The D.C.T. itself was undamaged and, Commodore's sleeping cabin, doing consider- after a few minutes, resumed control from the able damage. A portion of the base of the after control position which had temporarily Shell struck " Y " barbette close to the train- taken over. The survivors of the crew of the ing rack and jammed the turret. It was this D.C.T. took over the duties of the casualties in shell that killed four and wounded six of " X " a most resolute and efficient manner. turret's crew. This one hit therefore put both About 0646 reception on ACHILLES fire 'v X " and " Y " turrets of AJAX out of control W/T set faded, and thereafter she action. carried on in individual control. 32. It now appeared to me that GRAF SPEE intended to neglect EXETER and was deter- 0650-0708. 1 25. During the period ACHILLES was in in- mined to close the First Division on a north- '.dividual control, she had great difficulty in westerly course. Thinking she would hold this finding the line, and at first her salvos were course, it was decided to fire one broadside of falling well short. Reports of the fall of these torpedoes (from AJAX. salvos were transmitted by the aircraft of At 0724 AJAX turned to starboard and fired AJAX whose gun control officer, not knowing four torpedoes at a range of 9,000 yards. tha-t ACHILLES was no longer in concentration GRAF SPEE probably saw these being fired, firing, accepted them as referring to his own as she at once turned some 130 degrees to port, fall of shot, and corrected accordingly. though she came (back to the north-west three The enemy was making smoke at the time, minutes later. and conditions for direct observations were very 0728-0740. bad. 33. EXETER had been dropping gradually This resulted in AJAX salvos falling well astern, as she had to reduce speed owing to over and the target was not found again until damage forward. She still continued firing 0708. " Y " turret- in local control until about 0730, when power to the turret failed due to flooding. 26. AJAX and ACHILLES hauled round to She could then no longer keep up with the the north-westward at 0656 to open their "A " action,/and about 0740 steered to the south- arcs. GRAF SPEE made frequent alterations east/at slow -speed,, starting -to repair damage of course to throw out our gunfire, and 'from and make 'herself"seaworthy..". ' 0700 onwards she made great use of smoke; she appeared to have some form of. chloro- 34. AJAX and ACHILLES hauled back to sulphonic apparatus aft, and used this as well about "260 degrees "at 0728 to ".close the range as smoke floats,. ."•-"• ...... still: fuither. r. At 0731, .-the." aircraft reported 2762 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 JUNE, 1947 '' Torpedoes approaching, they will pass ahead full speed. She left at 1200, on the initiative of you." I decided, however, not to take any of her Commanding Officer, Captain W. H. G. chances, and altered course to 180 'degrees, Fallowfield, Royal Navy, who had by then engaging the enemy on the starboard side, with only received very jumbled messages. On the range closing rapidly. So as to blank receipt of my signal she at once increased to ACHILLES' fire for as short a time as possible, full speed. I directed her by signal to pass under the stern At 1005 ACHILLES over-estimating the of AJAX. enemy's speed had closed to 23,000 yards. 35. At 0732 GRAF SPEE turned away to GRAF SPEE thereupon altered course and the west, making much smoke and zigzagging fired two three gun salvos at ACHILLES; the to throw out the First Division's 'gunfire, which, first was very short, but the second fell close particularly from ACHILLES, appeared to be alongside. She appeared to wait for the first very accurate at this stage. AJAX was also salvo to fall before firing the second. making very good use of her three available ACHILLES turned away at full speed under guns. GRAF SPEE altered to the south-west smoke and resumed shadowing at longer range. at 0736, and again brought all guns to bear on the First Division. 44. At 1104 a merchant ship was sighted close to GRAF SPEE. She was stopped and 36. By 0738 the range was down to 8,000 was blowing off steam. A few minutes later yards. At this time I received a report that the following W/T signal was received on 500 AJAX had only 20 per cent, of ammunition k/cs: AJAX (pre-war call sign) from GRAF left and had only three guns in action, as one SPEE—" please pick up lifeboats of English of the hoists had failed in " B " turret and steamer." " X " and " Y " turrets were both out of On coming up with the merchant ship she action. turned out to be the British S.S. GRAF SPEE'S shooting was still very SHAKESPEARE. All her boats were hoisted, • accurate and she did not appear to have and in response to any signals she reported that suffered much damage. she was quite all right and did not require any I therefore decided to break off the day assistance. By this time she was moving out action and try and close in again after dark. to the southern flank. Accordingly at 0740 AJAX and ACHILLES At 1105 I received a signal from EXETER turned away lo the east under cover of smoke. who reported that all her turrets were out of 37. One of GRAF SPEE'S last salvos action and that she was flooded forward up to drought down AJAX'S main top mast and No. 14 bulkhead 'but could still do 18 knots. destroyed all her aerials. Jury aerials were, I (ordered her to Jpsroceed to •the Falkland however, soon rigged. Islands at whatever speed was possible without straining her bulkheads. She later reported 38. It subsequently transpired that the re- that one gun of " Y " turret could be fired port of shortage of ammunition in AJAX re- in local control. ferred only to " A " turret, which had been At 1347 I informed the British Naval firing continuously for 81 minutes, but this was Attache, Buenos Aires, that GRAF SPEE not realised at the time. was heading direct for the Plate. 39. GRAF SPEE made no attempt to 45. At 1543 ACHILLES signalled " Enemy follow, 'but steadied on- a course of about 270 in sight 297 ", and later reported " Suspected degrees, proceeding at about 22 knots on a 8 inch ." However, at 1559, she nega- course direct for the River Plate. tived the report, and the ship sighted was 40. After opening the (range under smoke for subsequently identified as S.S. DELANE, six minutes, I again turned the First Division whose streamlined funnel gave her a similar to the westward and ordered ACHILLES to appearance to a " Blucher" at very long shadow in Sector " A ", on the enemy's star- range. board quarter, and A TAX in Sector " B ", 46. Shadowing continued without incident on his port quarter. The range at this time until 1915, when GRAF SPEE altered course being about 15 miles. and fired two salvos at AJAX who immediately 41. The general trend of GRAF SPEE'S turned away under smoke. The first salvo fell retreat at this stage was about 255 degrees. His short and in line, the second in AJAX'S wake very conspicuous control tower made it an easy as she turned. The range at this time was about matter to shadow him at long range in the 26,000 yards. excellent visibility .prevailing. 47. It now appeared that GRAF SPEE in- At 0807, as A TAX'S aerials were still down, tended to enter the Plate, and at 1902 I ordered I ordered ACHILLES to broadcast GRAF ACHILLES to follow her if she went west of ^PEE'S position, course and speed to all Lobos, while AJAX would proceed south of the British merchant ships. A similar message was English Bank in case she doubled back that broadcast every hour from AJAX until the way. I also directed ACHILLES to take end of the chase. I also passed this informa- every, advantage of territorial waters while tion to Admiralty at 1017 and 1700. shadowing. My instructions were perfectly 42. At 0912, AJAX recovered her aircraft, carried out by Captain W. E. Parry who took the operation being excellently performed ACHILLES inside Lobos Island and close to under difficult conditions by Captain C. H. L. the Uruguayan coast. Woodhouse, and the pilot of the aircraft, Lieu- 48. Just after sunset GRAF SPEE fired three tenant E. D. G. Lewin, Royal Navy, and salvos at ACHILLES, the third being very shadowing was resumed. close. ACHILLES replied with five salvos and 43. At 0946 I ordered CUMBERLAND, then appeared to straddle. ACHILLES at this time at the Falkland Islands, to dose the Plate at was just clear of Punta Negra. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 JUNE, 1947 2763 49. The Uruguayan gunboat URUGUAY If enemy leaves before 2100, ships in touch closed AJAX about 2115. She appeared to be shadow at maximum range—all units con- on patrol duty, but was soon left astern. centrate on shadower. If enemy has not left by 2100, leave patrol positions and concen- 50. GRAF SPEE also fired single salvos at trate in position 090 degrees San Antonio 15 ACHILLES at 2132, 2140 and 2143, but the miles by 0030; AJAX will probably join visibility to the eastward was very bad for her CUMBERLAND on her way south. at these times and firing must have merely been " If enemy leaves after sun- intended to keep shadowers at a distance. set, CUMBERLAND is at once to fly off one 51. Those shots, however, did not deter • aircraft to locate and shadow enemy, if neces- Captain Parry from keeping touch and by 2200 sary landing in a lee, risking internment, and ACHILLES had closed to within five miles of trying to find a British ship in the morning. GRAF SPEE. The latter was well silhouetted If plan miscarries, adopt plan " B," all units first against the afterglow, and then against the concentrate in position 36 degrees south, 52 lights of Montevideo. GRAF SPEE proceeded degrees west at 0600." north of the English Bank and anchored in I also repeated my signal 1200/i2th Montevideo roads at 0050. December (see paragraph 7) to CUMBER- 52. My chief pre-occupation at that time was LAND at 1136/I5th December, substituting how long did GRAF SPEE intend to stay there. CUMBERLAND for EXETER in the original. The primary necessity was to keep to seaward of 58. AJAX took in 200. tons of fuel from the GRAF SPEE if she came to sea again, and OLYNTHUS, bad weather causing wires to part at the same time to avoid being caught against including the spans of two hurricane hawsers. the dawn light. At 2350 I ordered AJAX and AJAX then proceeded to join CUMBERLAND. ACHILLES to withdraw from the Plate, ACHILLES to patrol the area from the 59. I received a report that GRAF SPEE had Uruguayan coast to a line 120 degrees from landed a funeral party this morning, and later, English Bank, and AJAX the southern area, .that she had been granted an extension of her both ships to move back into the Plate in their stay up to 72 hours, in order to make herself respective sectors after dawn. seaworthy. It appeared that she had been damaged far more extensively than I had Thursday, iqth December. thought likely, and had been hit 60 to 70 times 53. I requested His Britannic Majesty's in all. The British ship ASHWORTH was Minister, Montevideo, to use every possible sailed at 1900 and GRAF SPEE accepted the means of delaying GRAF SPEE'S sailing, in edict that she would not be allowed to sail order to gain time for reinforcements to reach for 24 hours after this. At the same time I me. I suggested that he should sail British could feel no security that she would not break ships and invoke the 24-hour rule to prevent her out at any moment. leaving. Saturday, i6th December. 54. I learned that ARK ROYAL, RENOWN, NEPTUNE, DORSETSHIRE, SHROPSHIRE 60. CUMBERLAND, AJAX, and and three were all closing the Plate, ACHILLES made rendezvous off San Antonio but none of them could reach me for at least at 0030 in accordance with my plan. The five days. squadron closed the Plate towards dawn and AJAX flew off her aircraft for a reconnaissance 55. CUMBERLAND reported that she would of the harbour. The aircraft was instructed not arrive in the Plate at 2200 /I4th December, to fly over territorial waters. having made the passage from the Falkland Islands in 34 hours. I ordered her to cover 61. The aircraft returned at 0830 and the 'the sector between Rouen and English Banks, crew reported that they had been unable to with ACHILLES to the north of her and AJAX see anything owing to bad visibility. They to the south. These dispositions were main- had been fired at while in the vicinity of the tained during the night of the I4th/i5th Whistle Buoy. This seemed to indicate that December. GRAF SPEE was taking advantage of the mist and was trying to break out. All ships went Should GRAF SPEE come out, she was to be to action stations, but a report received shortly shadowed and all ships were to concentrate afterwards from Montevideo indicated that sufficiently far to seaward to enable a con- GRAF SPEE was still in harbour! certed attack to be carried out. 62. I informed H.B.M. Minister, Montevideo, Friday, i$th December. of the firing on our aircraft, and suggested that 56. I ordered R.F.A. OLYNTHUS, Captain an investigation into this might be a way of L. N. Hill, to proceed to Rouen Bank to be delaying GRAF SPEE sailing. He replied, ready to fuel H.M. ships, and proceeded there however, that it was definitely not GRAF in AJAX. I ordered CUMBERLAND to close SPEE who fired, and that it had possibly been and cover AJAX, remaining at visibility dis- the Argentine Guard Gunboat at Recalada, or tance to the northward so as to be able to give in some other position. warning in case GRAF SPEE came out without her sailing being reported. 63. The Admiralty informed one in message 0219/i6th December that I was free to engage 57. I made the following policy signal timed GRAF SPEE anywhere outside the three-mile 1135 / I5th December: — limit. I decided to move my patrol into the " My object destruction. Necessitates con- area north and east of English Bank, as I con- centrating our forces. Increased risk of sidered that a battle in the very restricted water enemy escape accepted. ACHILLES is now just outside the three-mile limit off Montevideo to watch north of English Bank and CUM- was impracticable, owing to lack of sea room, BERLAND to west of English Bank, latter and possibility'of " overs " landing in Uruguay showing herself off Montevideo in daylight. and causing international complications. 2764 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 JUNE, 1947 64. Information from Montevideo was to the distance during the operation. The squadron effect that GRAF SPEE was still repairing then cruised in company off the south-east of damage, having obtained assistance from the the English Bank, remaining concentrated shore, and had provisioned. It was reported throughout the afternoon and ready again to as unlikely that she would sail that night; on take up the same night patrol as on the previous the other hand, once again I did not feel able •night. to rely on such an optimistic report. 70. It was reported that GRAF SPEE had 65. I signalled the following appreciation to landed all her borrowed welding apparatus dur- ships in company timed 1615/i6th December-r- ing this forenoon. We all expected that she would break out at any moment. I would " My object Destruction necessitates keep- •like to place on record the fact that at this ing my force together. My Appreciation. stage the most cheerful optimism pervaded all Rely on getting his time of sailing and initial ships in spite of the fact that this was the fifth course from shore. For subsequent move- night of waiting for the enemy. ments rely on CUMBERLAND'S aircraft 71. At 1540 I received a. signal that GRAF reconnaissance reports. SPEE was, transferring between 300 and 400 " Enemy's courses of Action. (a) North men to the German ship TACOMA lying close of English Bank, (b) Between English and to her in the ante-port. At 1720, a further Rouen Banks. (c) Between Rouen Bank report stated that over 700 men with their bag- and San Antonio. (d) Double back on any gage and some provisions had now been trans- irack. My Course of Action. I rule out ferred, and that there were indications that righting him off Whistle Buoy as being politi- GRAF SPEE intended to scuttle herself. cally impossible. Until the dawn phase I Shortly after this GRAF SPEE was reported want to keep the advantage of light and from as weighing. this it follows that I must keep to the east and move to intercept him from area to area 72. I immediately altered course to close the depending on time and information. My Whistle Buoy, and increased to 25 knots. Plan. To keep within reach of intercepting AJAX'S aircraft was flown off and ordered him north of English Bank moving south or to proceed towards Montevideo and report the doubling back as information comes in. position of GRAF SPEE and also TACOMA. Tactical. I must keep CUMBERLAND so GRAF SPEE left harbour at 1815 and pro- placed that she will not have her fire masked ceeded slowly to the westward. TACOMA also initially, and therefore I will work in divisions weighed, and followed her out of harbour. 8 cables apart with ACHILLES in close 73. I ordered my squadron to assume the . order astern of AJAX. First Degree of Readiness, in case GRAF SPEE " After action commences, divisions have intended re-transferring her crew from complete freedom of action. CUMBER- TACCMA outside the harbour, or intended to LAND'S aircraft is to be flown off as soon break out with or without her surplus crew. as news is received of enemy's sailing." 74. AJAX aircraft reported sighting GRAF SPEE in a position in shallow water some six 66. The British ship DUNSTER GRANGE miles south-west of Montevideo. At 2054 the was sailed from Montevideo at 1700 and a aircraft signalled: "GRAF SPEE has blown further period before GRAF SPEE could be herself up." allowed to sail was claimed. It was, however, reported that she had made very rapid pro- 75. The squadron carried on towards gress with her repairs, and might break out Montevideo, proceeding north of the English at any moment. Bank, AJAX and ACHILLES cheering ship as they passed each other. 67. The difficulty of intercepting GRAF SPEE 76. Once again Captain Woodhouse and who had so many courses of action open to (Lieutenant Lswin made an excellent recovery her will, I feel sure, 'be realised. It was in of AJAX's aircraft, this time under almost dark the dog watches of this evening that I received conditions. the Naval Secretary's signal 1717/i6th Decem- 'Navigation lights were then switched on a-nd ber informing me from the First Lord of the the squadron steamed past the Whistle Buoy Admiralty of the (honours so graciously within about four miles of the wreck of the bestowed by His Majesty the King on myself, GRAF SPEE. It was now dark, and she was Captain W.' E. Parry, Captain C. H. L. ablaze from end to end, flames reaching almost Woodhouse and Captain F. S. Bell, and also as high as the top of her control tower, a that I had been promoted to Rear Admiral magnificent and most cheering sight. to date I3th December. This was a most stimulating tonic to us all and I took steps to REMARKS BY REAR ADMIRAL COMMANDING pass it on to H.M. Ships under my command, DIVISION. emphasising the share of .all concerned in the Appreciation of conduct of Commanding honours which their senior officers had received. Officers and Ships' Companies. 68. The squadron spent the night patrolling on a north and south line five miles to the east 77. I have the greatest pleasure in informing of the English Bank Light Buoy. OLYNTHUS you of the very high standard of efficiency and proceeded to sea with order to be at the Rouen courage that was displayed by all officers and Bank by 1000 the next morning if GRAF SPEE men throughout the five days of the operation had not broken out. under review. 78. Captain W. E. Parry, Royal Navy, of Sunday, ijth December. H.M.S. ACHILLES; Captain C. H. L. 69. I ordered ACHILLES who was getting Woodhouse, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. AJAX; low in fuel, to oil from OLYNTHUS off iihe and Captain F. S. Bell, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. Rouen Bank during the forenoon. AJAX and EXETER, all handled their ships in a most CUMBERLAND acted as look-outs at visibility efficient and resolute manner.. . SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 JUNE, 1947 2765

•79. In addition I would like to place on record H.M.S. EXETER. At this point GRAF the very great assistance that I received SPEE turned away under smoke and from that throughout this period from my Flag Captain time onwards her Commanding Officer dis- and Chief Staff Officer, Captain C. -H. L. played little offensive spirit and did not take Woodhouse, Royal Navy. advantage of the opportunity that was always So. The speedy arrival of H.M.S. CUMBER- present either to close the First Division or LAND, Captain W. H. G. Fallowfield, EXETER, the latter—and he must have known Royal Navy, from the Falkland Islands, was it—only having one turret in action. Instead a most creditable performance, especially as GRAF SPEE retired between the two and allowed herself -to be fired at from both flanks. that ship was self-refitting at the time the Only at one period, i.e., at 0720, did' she again action commenced. open her " A " arcs and concentrate on the 81. Throughout the days of waiting off the First Division, and she immediately abandoned Plate, R.F.A. OLYNTHUS, Captain L. N. this when AJAX fired torpedoes. Hill, arrived punctually at the various rendez- 89. Her frequent alterations of course under vous given him and did everything possible to smoke were, from an avoiding action point of facilitate the refuelling of H.M. (Ships. view, well carried out and undoubtedly threw 82. Within my own knowledge, and from the out our gunfire. This has shown up the neces- reports of the Commanding Officers there are sity for more frequent practice at a highly many stories of bravery, devotion to duty and mobile target at fine angles of inclination. of the utmost efficiency which shows that H.M. GRAF SPEE had an exceptionally high Ships have been forcefully trained and made degree of manoeuvrability and apparently used thoroughly ready to deal with the many and full wheel for her turns. On many occasions various exigencies of battle. In accordance this gave her an apparent list which raised our with Admiralty message 1755/i6th December, hopes, but she always came upright again on I am submitting separately a list of officers and steadying. ' ratings whom I consider to be especially deserv- ing of award. I would remark, however, that 90. At no time did GRAF SPEE steam at a the standard -throughout has -been so high that higher speed than 24 knots, and generally her the preparation of this list has been very speed was between 19 and 22 knots. It was difficult'. noticed that from the time of first sighting she was making a considerable amount of reddish- 83. I would like also to place on record the brown and occasionally white smoke. honour and pleasure I had to taking one of H.M. Ships of the New Zealand Division into 91. Enemy smoke screens were good but not action, and fully concur with the Commanding entirely effective as they did not rise high Officer of H.M.S. ACHILLES in paragraph 27 enough. A point brought out was the necessity of his report where he remarks that " New for remote control of our smoke floats. En- Zealand has every reason to be proud of her deavours to light ours while the main armament seamen during their baptism of fire." was firing presented many difficulties. 84. Further, it is most satisfactory for me to Enemy Gunnery. be able to inform you that the machinery and 92. GRAF SPEE'S n in. fire was accurate equipment generally of H.M. Ships proved to throughout, particularly for line. The rate be of the -highest efficiency and well able to of fire was slow and there were short periods stand up to the prolonged strain of battle. in which either one or the other turret did Lessons learned. not appear to be firing, but by the evening 85. The main impression left on my mind is phase both turrets were in action. They of the adequacy of our peace -training. Little certainly did excellent shooting at AJAX and that had not been practised occurred, particu- ACHILLES at a range of about 26,000 yards larly among the repair parties. Nevertheless, while these ships were shadowing. It was there are a very large number of points brought evident from this that shadowing ships should, out in the reports by the Commanding Officers available speed permitting, zigzag so as to pre- and I would recommend that they should be vent too accurate range plotting by the enemy. carefully studied. It was also found desirably to make drastic alter- ations of course when the first salvo was fired. 86. As soon as the three ships were in com- pany at the Falkland Islands I ordered com- 93. Perhaps the most interesting point was mittees of the Gunnery, Torpedo and Engineer the mixing of armour-piercing delay action Officers to be formed so as -to analyse the projectiles and direct action. AJAX'S one lessons learned. Their conclusions have been ii in. hit and several of EXETER'S were of forwarded direct to Admiralty. the delay action type. A delay of 42 feet was measured in AJAX and 65 feet in Enemy Tactics. EXETER. It was most noticeable that at 87. The most salient point is that GRAF the short range at which the action was fought SPEE closed on sighting us, firing one turret the ii in. projectiles proceeded more or less on at First Division and the other at EXETER. a horizontal course through the ship and did not This initial closing of the range by the enemy directly affect the vitals below. had the effect of bringing both the 8 in. and 94. The direct action type produced most 6 in. cruisers into effective gun range at once serious, and to a certain extent unexpected and so avoided for us the most difficult problem results. They burst on impact with either the of gaining range in the face of n in. gunfire. ship or the water and showered splinters in all 88. It would appear that GRAF SPEE was directions, causing a very large number of heavily handled by the gunfire both of the First casualties to personnel and damage to rigging, Division's concentration and also by that of electric cables and material generally. I would EXETER in the initial phase, the culminating stress the necessity for more protection of perhaps being the firing of torpedoes by bridges, fire control cables and such important 2766 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 JUNE, 1947 parts of the offensive organisation as the 6 in. Increased Protection. director tower. A large number of casualties 103. There must always be a tendency for on EXETER'S bridge were caused by splinters a cruiser to desire increased protection and from the hit on " B " turret ricochetting off most of the claims must, generally speaking, the roof of the bridge. Immediate steps should be resisted. Nevertheless, there are portions of be taken to pad the under surface of bridge the control and of the offensive armament that roofs. I feel very strongly should be protected against 95. The ii in. shells that fell short made a splinters. black splash and in the vicinity of bursts a (a) The killing or wounding of nearly the black dust like soot was found. whole of EXETER'S bridge personnel is one 96. The enemy 6 in. fire was ragged and in- example. The .bullet-proof plating, backed effective and caused little, if any, anxiety. up by the instrument plate was more or less 97. There is some evidence that GRAF successful in keeping out most of the splinters. SPEE fired time-fuzed H.E. possibly from her It should, however, be made thicker and, as high angle guns. mentioned before, the underside of the bridge roof should be padded to prevent splinters Aircraft. ricochetting off it. It was this latter factor 98. The flying off of AJAX'S aircraft with that was the main cause of the casualties. " X " and " Y " turrets firing on a forward (b) The hitting of ACHILLES director bearing while the aircraft was waiting was a control tower was most unfortunate, and I gallant and most resolute effort. The handling consider that, particularly in those ships with of both AJAX and her aircraft during subse- only one director tower it should -be made quent recoveries was also very well carried out. splinter proof and also that the leads to it During the past two months I have been most should be in a protected tube. impressed with 'the rough weather capabilities (c) The After Conning Position. This of the Seafox type of aircraft. -, position was used throughout most of the 99. EXETER'S Walrus aircraft had been re- action in EXETER, but its communications fuelled for the dawn phase, and it was un- failed, and Captain Bell had to con the ship fortunate that both were hit by splinters before through a chain of messengers. In AJAX either could be flown off. It was extremely casualties 'from splinters occurred in this fortunate that the petrol which was being position, though it appears they were down- sprayed all over the after part of the ship did wards from a hit on the main-topmast. I not cause any fires. This danger must always consider that the after conning position be present when an unexpected encounter should be protected and more attention paid occurs. Again it emphasizes the necessity for to the security of its communications. emptying the aircraft of petrol should a night (d) Other exposed personnel liable to encounter be likely and for the ability to 'be attack from, splinters. I consider that the able to fuel and defuel quickly. experience of this action shows that some 100. Another point that comes out is the protection should be given to torpedo tubes' need .for speeding up the catapulting process. crews, H.A. guns' crews and 0.5 in. machine 101. The aircraft, once up, though extremely guns' crews. valuable at times, was not entirely successful. (Signed) H. H. HARWOOD, 102. GRAF SPEE'S aircraft was out of Rear Admiral Commanding, action before the 'battle and did not take part. South America Division.

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