The Effects of Destabilisation * •* - the Militarisation of Regional Relations Became a Major Feature of the 1980S, Justified by the 'Total Strategy' Doctrine

CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

EXTERNAL AGGRESSION AND DESTABILISATION The Record of the SADF

ANC Background Paper

Historically, South Africa's white minority governments have sought to dominate the Southern African region by economic, political and military means. While lip-service has been paid to the concept of peaceful co-existence, in practice successive National Party governments have come to adopt an increasingly bellicose attitude to. independent Africa, seeking ever more militaristic means to ensure South Africa s regional dominance. The new conditions which have emerged ■since the SADF's withdrawal from AngolJ and Namibia and the changing situation in South Africa create the opportunity for a decisive break with “the past.

The effects of destabilisation * •* - The militarisation of regional relations became a major feature of the 1980s, justified by the 'Total Strategy' doctrine. The government led by PW ' Botha, in which the military estabilishment played an important part, perceive our neighbours as vital components in a Moscow-orchestrated 'total onslaught' against South Africa. This exceptionally reductive approach to regional relations plunged the whole region into violence and retarded or reversed development, with extremely negative consequences for South Africa as well

as our neighbours. The regional results of the 'Total Strategy' bave been a disaster. War in all its manifestations, and with its consequences of famine and disruption of production and services, is conservatively estimated by various UN agencies and international bodies to have cost 1.5 million lives. Almost four million people have been displaced - 2.2 million within their own national boundaries and at least 1.5 million who have become regional refugees.1 The Frontline States have calculated the total cost to their economies of South African destabilisation, direct and indirect, at US$45 billion.2

It will take ’ our region decades to recover from this calamity. Even when a new non-racial South Africa takes its place to contribute to the economic reconstruction of the region, it will be a long process to rebuild the regional economy. The human suffering will scar us for generations. i

If the object of the SADF's regional strategy was to destabilise and inflict suffering ithen it can claim considerable success. But in political, diplomatic and strategic terms the destabilisation campaign must be seen as a failure even from Pretoria's point of view. The aggressive regional policy of ’the 1980s deepenend the South African government's-regional .isolation and contributed in no small way to the the intensification of internal sanctions. The war and resulting isolation hastened the decline of the South African economy and contributed to a political culture in which simplistic military solutions were sought for political problems.

Even in security and strategic terms the strategy has been costly and at best a partial success for the SADF. While the government may pride itself on securing the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, it should be borne in mind that those forces were only brought there in the first place because of South African invasion. The SADF was, of course, forced to withraw from Namibia which is now independent under \

* SWAPO - those who argue that the military occupation of Namibia weakened SWAPO's support need to explain why support for SWAPO in electoral terms was directly proportional to the intensity of military operations in specific areas. In the area known as Ovamboland, where the SADF presence was by far the most marked, SWAPO obtained no less than 93 per cent o the vote - even sections of the South African-controlled military forces were reported to have voted for SWAPO.

South African aggression also had the effect of obliging neighbouring states to strengthen their armed forces. The SADF has been- unable to match the pace of this mi 1 ary modernisation because , of the arms embargo and its international isolation, with the result that the balance of military power has been gradually tipped against Sout Africa although the SADF still remains by far the strongest force in the region. The concrete effects of the change, in the balance of forces were shown clearly in the SADF s campaign in Angola, where the SA Air Force was unable to n s ■ operational flights and the Army failed to take the town of

Cuito Cuanavale.

The record of destabilisation

The history of destabilisation and aggression may be traced back to 1975 with the ostensibly secret SADF invasion of Angola, which by any standards was, a political error for which the South African government paid dearly in terms o its regional and international relations. Attacks on Ango a continued - mostly notably Operation Reindeer in which t e Kassinga Massacre took place.

When PW Botha became Prime Minister in 1978, he resurrected plans for South African regional domination in the form of the constellation of Southern African States. After 1980, and the independence of Zimbabwe, a more openly military- interventionist policy was pursued and the next two years saw a succession of often unco-ordinated attacks, consisting mainly of sabotage, assassinations, kidnappings and bombings.

Between 1983 and 1985 the destabilisation campaign became more directed, although no less violent, and was coupled with diplomatic and political initiatives which resulted in the Nkomati Accord and the agreement with Angola in 1984. But these political agreements were all but destroyed during 1985 with the renewal of the war against Mozambique and Angola.

In 1986-8 there was a massive intensification of the war on all fronts, especially in Angola where the situation developed rapidly into conventional stand-off war. This phase of generalised escalation was brought to a halt only by the SADF's failure to take Cuito Cuanavale and the advance of Angolan and Cuban forces down to the 1 Namibian border, which obliged the SADF to sue for peace. I

South Africa's regional military strategy during the has taken a number of different forms:

* Assassinations,' kidnappings and other attacks on individuals.-Mostly the targets of such actions have been.ANC personnel and refugees, although the citizens of host countries have been killed as .well. The result of such actions has often been to increase the solidarity of host countries with the ANC. We count among these actions the massacres at Matola in 1981, Maseru in 1982 and Gaborone in 1985 Most of the actions have been carried out by the Reconnaissance Commandos, the Civil Co-Operation Bureau or the Security Branch of the SAP, specifically its 'Askan

units.

* Economic sabotage, especially of transport facilities, ports and oil instalations. Again, the Reconnaissance Commandos have been primarily responsible. * Surrogate forces: The SADF began its collaboration with UNITA in 1975 when UNITA backed the South African force which invaded Angola. The extensive SADF support for UNITA in the form of training, logistical support, intelligence and arms is no longer open to question. UNITA's campaign m Angola has been characterised by brutality, including kidnappings, the destruction of villages and the indiscriminate laying of landmines, with the result that Angola today has the highest per capita number of limbless people in the world. In Mozambique, the SADF's Special Forces took over control of the MNR or Renamo from the Rhodesians. The MNR has grown into a monster, ravaging large areas of Mozambique. It is not'- necessary here to document the appalling atrocities carried out by the MNR, whose activities are universally reviled and condemned. A senior US State Department official recently described the MNR as waging 'a systematic and brutal war of teirror against innocent Mozambican civilians . . . one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War II.'4 The SADF also attempted at various times to establish surrogate forces to operate in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Zambia.

* Conventional war: The war in Angola took on many of the features of conventional war in the second half of the 1980s, especially during Operations Hooper and Modular. This demanded a steady increase in funds, armaments ammunition, and led to relatively high casualty rates. Black units such as 32 Battalion, 121 Battalion and the operational units of the South West Africa Territory Force were involved, as well as white Citizen Force units, notably 61 Mechanised

Battalion.

Time for real change

we are now in a new situation. South African involvement in Namibia and Angola has ended, except for possible residual support for UNITA. The De Klerk government has promised that official support for the MNR has ended, and the sporadic but increasing operations in other neighbouring states have been drastically reduced. There is realistically no military threat to South Africa in the region, even by the standards of the 'Total Strategy' doctrine.

However, the response of the South African government to the new situation has so far been very limited. The reduction in the defence budget in real terms is less than what could have been expected given the vast cuts in operational expenditure and manpower that must have resulted from the end of the war in Angola and Namibia. While some aircraft have been decommissioned and some -cuts made, particularly to the Air Force and Navy, it is notable that these cuts on the whole do not affect the SADF forces which could be deployed against neighbouring states, and are mainly related to the discredited 'Cape Sea Route' strategic! doctrine. Furthermore, Armscor is apparently continuing with its expensive conventional weapons development projects, including the Cava figher project and the development of ,an intermediate range nuclear-capable missile, the need for both of which is premised on the possibility of an escalating regional war.

It ‘should be remembered that in 1984, following ^the agreements with Angola and Mozambigue, the SADF covertly continued its war, apparently ‘without the knowledge of parliament or in some cases even of the cabinet, particular, as documents captured by the Mozambican authorities showed, Special Forces continued its support for the MNR.5 Again, there is now evidence that support for the MNR is continuing from South Africa through unofficial channels. A feature of the destabilisation campaign has been the secrecy in which it has been conducted. Indeed, for a number of years parliament was not even informed of SADF operations, such as the backing for UNITA and the MNR, which had far-reaching strategic conseguences. Another indication that operations in neighbouring states have not yet ended was provided earlier this month when Father Michael Lapsley was seriously maimed in a parcel-bomb attack in Zimbabwe.

If the process towards regional peace is to be made irreversible, then concrete steps should be taken dismantle the structures responsible for the regional war and to place the SADF under legitimate political authority. Particular attention should be paid to the Special Forces, the Reconnaissance Regiments and 32 Battalion and the structures of the Security Branch responsible for regional operations. These units have been almost exclusively involved in external regional operations and their continued existence can only be taken as a sign of bad faith. Similarly, conventional units such as 61 Mechanised Battalion and the Citizen Force units in the SADF’s drmoured and mechanised brigades have no possible justification other than large- scale regional operations, while the development of expensive ‘armaments tailored for regional warfar.e does not correspond to a situation of unfolding peace.

The ANC envisages that in the near future South Africa will live in peace with its neighbours, on the basis of mutual co operation and security as outlined in the Freedom Charter. We believe that steps should be taken Aow to prepare for this future and that no useful purpose .is served by the SADF continuing to retain and develop its offensive capability.

References

1. Johnson, P. £ Martin. D., Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilisation Report, Commonwealth Secretariat, London

1989, pp 10-11 2. UNICEF, Children on the Front Line, UNICEF, New York,

1989, p 35 3. independent 17.11.89 4. Johnson & Martin p xii 5. Cawthra, G., Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine, IDAF 1986, pp 167-8

Collection Number: AG1977

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