Democracy at Risk

DEMOCRACY AT RISK

NOVEMBER 2017

Excerpt of the second issue of the journal Global Challenges, realised in collaboration with the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy. > http://globalchallenges.ch > http://graduateinstitute.ch/democracy DEMOCRACY AT RISK DEMOCRACY AT THE CROSSROADS Dominic Eggel Research Office

MEXICO, Mexico n what has been described as a Deep disenchantment with democracy According to Zakaria, what is funda- City. A woman walks “decade of decline” (2006–2016) for is sweeping Eastern and Central Europe mentally at stake is not democracy but by as police officers I stand guard during liberal democracy, freedom has been as Hungary and Poland dismantle con- liberalism. Since liberal democracy for a farmers’ march in continuously eroding all over the world. stitutional rights and civil liberties. many has come to stand for democracy Mexico City. More than 20 years after Francis Populist leaders in Western Europe are tout court, it is now seriously challenged 8 August 2017. Fukuyama’s triumphant celebration of calling for similar measures. by the new phenomenon of illiberal Bernardo MONTOYA/ AFP/Getty Images the “end of history”, it seems that Despite such alarming signs, how- democracies on the ascendency. liberalism, both economic (free trade) ever, democracy remains perhaps the Illiberal democracies are best char- and political (pluralism, civil liberties, most successful political idea in modern acterised as regimes elected by a pop- constitutional safeguards), is in serious history. In 2015, it was the most wide- ular majority but striving to undermine crisis. In 2015, Turkey ranked last among spread form of government in the world, constitutional safeguards, the rule of electoral democracies in Freedom with largely “free and fair” electoral law, and civil liberties. Adopting a win- House’s index. The Arab Spring has processes in place in 125 countries. Even ner-takes-it-all approach (volonté given way to widespread disillusion and liberal democracy’s detractors such as générale), they discriminate against violence. In Latin America, several Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Narenda Modi, ethnic, religious and/or sexual minor- democracies have regressed on the Viktor Orbán, Vladimir Putin, Rodrigo ities in the name of the majority. They slippery slope towards cronyism (Brazil) Duterte, Beata Szydlo and Donald Trump tend to concentrate power in the exec- and authoritarianism (Venezuela, have all been elected by majorities and utive in a process of constitutional Bolivia). Asian democracies are facing praise their own democratic credentials. re-engineering that co-opts or corrodes trouble too, as illustrated by a regain in Outright autocratic regimes such as the judiciary (Hungary, Poland), the nationalist rhetoric (Japan), endemic China, Cuba and North Korea call them- legislative (Venezuela), or both (Russia). corruption (South Korea) and outright selves democracies too. They weaken civil society by reverting illiberalism (the Philippines). We thus face a paradox: while elec- to a set of “authoritarian best prac- What is equally a cause for con- toral democracy continues to be tices” including media censorship and cern is that democracy is on the defen- acclaimed everywhere, a series of indi- state propaganda. They mobilise sive in its Western heartland. The cators measuring political and civic free- resentment and anxieties by construct- Economist’s Democracy Index in 2016 dom show it to be in deep trouble. The ing enemies, both external (migrants, downgraded the United States, the key to this paradox may well reside in the European Union) and internal beacon of democracy for much of the the notion of “illiberal democracy”, first (NGOs, human rights activists). Political modern era, to a “flawed democracy”. coined by Fareed Zakaria in 1997. opponents are intimidated, publicly

2 vilified (“lock-her-upism”) or subjected legitimisation (referenda, plebiscites), social media revolution, coupled with to repression by the arbitrary applica- while striving to maintain an illusion of postmodern epistemic uncertainty, has tion of purposefully vague laws – often pluralism. ushered a new era of “post-truth poli- antiterrorism legislation. The final step A number of potential causes may tics” with little space for rational dia- in consolidating illiberal democracies be identified behind the recent surge logue. Fourth, as the United States retreats from its traditional role of global harbinger of democracy, rivals like China and Russia have been quick to put forth “While electoral alternative models deemed more competitive, or morally righteous. Fifth, and democracy continues finally, since its emergence in the Age of Enlightenment, liberalism (freedom) to be acclaimed has entertained a complex and ten- sion-riddled relationship with democ- everywhere, a series of racy (equality). Liberal democracy, as the 20th century has shown, is an utterly indicators measuring fragile construct. The question remains how illiberal political and civic democracies are likely to evolve in the 21st century. Will they stabilise and freedom show it to be become a permanent fixture of geopol- itics? Or, on the contrary, will liberal in deep trouble.” democracy prove resilient and keep the upper hand? To answer these questions, the consists in emasculating the electoral of illiberal democracies. First, younger present dossier investigates seven case process: not by rigging elections – generations show signs of historical studies from around the world, starting which usually remain free and fair – amnesia as they are no longer cognisant from the premise that illiberal democ- but by loading the dice long in advance. of the totalitarian horrors of the 20th racy is best represented on a continuum In marked contrast to more full- century. Second, a generalised senti- ranging from first worrying signs as in blown authoritarian regimes, however, ment of insecurity and occupational Trump’s America to more advanced illiberal democracies do not yearn for angst in a fast-changing world has authoritarian regimes as in Putin’s the total control of society. Selectively estranged people from the political Russia – with many shades and nuances repressive, they seek regular popular elites in their own societies. Third, the in between.

3 DEMOCRACY AT RISK RUSSIA: HAUNTING WESTERN DEMOCRATIC IMAGINATION Ivan Krastev Visiting Lecturer Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

f a Martian were sent to earth with The answer can be found in from the past, now it looks like an Ithe secret mission to figure out the Dostoevsky’s novel The Double, the ambassador coming from the future. trends of world politics, he would cer- story of a low-level clerk who ends up Russia is a classic example of a tainly be puzzled by the outsized role in the madhouse after meeting his dou- non-democracy functioning inside the that Putin’s Russia plays in the 21st ble, a man who looks like him, talks like institutional framework of democracy. century imagination of the West. him, but who displays all the charm It is a regime in which periodic pseu- Almost half of the Americans tend to and self-confidence that the tortured do-competitive elections are instru- believe that Moscow rigged the 2016 protagonist profoundly lacks. When it ments for dis-empowering, not empow- US presidential election; many comes to Russia, the West feels like ering, citizens and the electorate’s Europeans suspect that the Kremlin Dostoevsky’s protagonist in the pres- voice is not heard. Could it be that shapes public opinion in their countries; ence of his double. However, while in competitive elections in the West – and some of the leading Western media Dostoevsky’s novel the double looks shaped by the manipulative power of outlets insist that Russia’s President like a person that the protagonist money, disfigured by growing political Vladimir Putin is the world’s most influ- ential political leader. While in the beginning of this century Russia was viewed as a mixture of failure and banality, today in the minds of many it “Russia is a classic has mutated into the model of the world to come. example of a Frankly speaking, neither Russia’s brutal annexation of Crimea, nor its mil- non-democracy itary involvement in Syria or aggressive meddling in American elections could functioning inside sufficiently explain the obsession of the West with Russia. Russia suffers from the institutional low European-level birth rates and almost African-level life expectancy. Its framework population has one of the highest per- centages of university-educated people, of democracy.” but with the lowest labour productivity per hour worked in the industrialised world. The country is profoundly corrupt and though President Putin is a strong leader, the prospects of Russia’s devel- always wanted to be, for the West polarisation and emptied of meaning opment after him are highly uncertain. Russia has become the double the West by a lack of genuine political alterna- So why then is the Western political fears it could become. While some tives – resemble Kremlin-engineered imagination so obsessed and preoccu- years ago Russia was perceived by the elections more than we like to think? pied by Russia? Western public as a shadow coming Could it be that the global spread of

4 RUSSIA, Tuva. democracy signals not the liberation or capacity for rationally guided coop- pattern of repression and exploitation Russian President of the masses but the liberation of erative action, of increasingly frag- characteristic of most illiberal and Vladimir Putin (left), accompanied by elites from the electorate? mented state institutions worldwide. undemocratic societies in the past. defence minister Moreover, Russia provides the most Significantly, the Russian experi- Russia is a classic case of how a Sergei Shoigu, radical example of the feudalisation ence also sheds light on the global handful of very rich and politically unac- guides a boat during and the incoherence of the state in the phenomenon of “superfluous people” countable self-enriching rulers have, his vacation in the remote Tuva region age of globalisation. Inside Russia’s produced by a worldwide movement despite internal rivalries, managed to in southern Siberia. deep state, different departments or for the liberation of the rich. Russia is stay atop the country’s fragmented soci- Between 1 and 3 agencies – the ministries, the police, an impressive example of the global ety without resorting to historically high August 2017. the prosecutors, and so forth – may trend toward growing economic ine- levels of violence. This political model, Alexey NIKOLSKY/ AFP/Getty Images seem irresistibly dominant to ordinary quality in the 21st century. But at the neither democratic nor authoritarian, citizens but they spend much of their same time Putin’s Russia is, in a sense, neither exploitative in the Marxist sense time fighting each other, often over the a socialist utopia: only nature is nor repressive in the liberal sense, is an control of liquid assets, and face no exploited! Russia’s ruling class did not image of the future that should keep us real incentive to cooperate. Such a enrich itself by exploiting labour but awake at night. loose-knit and conflict-ridden state can by privatising the public patrimony, In short, what causes anxiety in the neither impose itself consistently on especially the country’s hydrocarbon liberal West is not that Russia will run society nor respond intelligently to industry. Ordinary Russians do not even the world, but that much of the world social pressures and demands. What seem to them to be worth exploiting. will be run the way Russia is run today. disturbs Western observers is that Rather than trying to dominate or con- What is disturbing is that the West has while reasons for the growing incoher- trol their fellow citizens, the privileged started to resemble Putin’s Russia more ence of Western states do not neces- few have simply turned their backs on than we are ready to acknowledge. sarily resemble the factors shaping the them. This strikingly new Russian pat- Russian case, the trend is similar. The tern of spoliation and neglect tells us loss of a shared national purpose rad- much more about what is going wrong ically undermines the interoperability, in the West today than does the older

5 DEMOCRACY AT RISK THE UNITED STATES AND THE TRAJECTORY OF DEMOCRACY David Sylvan Professor of International Relations/Political Science Faculty member, Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy

lmost 200 years ago, Alexis de what Louis Hartz called a “new society”, 20th century, other factors were added: ATocqueville published De la one without an hereditary aristocracy, economic and military power, language, démocratie en Amérique, putting the with vast fertile lands only thinly settled universities, popular culture, and the intellectual seal of approval on the idea by peoples who could easily be swept sheer omnipresence of the mass media. of US-style democracy as a model for aside, and with oceans and distracted These in turn led to a sort of path other parts of the world. Tocqueville’s great powers protecting it from inva- dependence, in which elites in other analysis went far beyond formal insti- sion, was mostly elided by those who countries acquired the habit of looking tutions and laws to the normative drew inspiration from the democratic to the United States for ideas about underpinnings of participation, equal- norms they saw flourishing in the United participation and transparency, not to ity, and voluntary association. Arguably, States. Indeed, even the most scathing mention the details of certain types of it is these norms which, in spite of the political critics of the United States legislation, administrative arrangements numerous evils in American history – found themselves having at least to within organisations, the setting up of from slavery and the destruction of the quote, perhaps to finesse, or, horrors, advisory bodies, and, of course, many other facets of US society unrelated to democratic norms. The fact that many of those elites in other countries had “The United States themselves been educated in the United States, understood English, and had was a democratic grown up consuming US popular culture, further reinforced this habit. Thus, inspiration also even if many US political ideas, such as its 18th-century constitution or its insist- because of its protest ence on first-past-the-post voting rules, were no longer imitated, the habit of movements.” looking to the United States, perhaps copying certain of its practices, but in any case using those practices as an argument for certain policies, remained indigenous population to plutocracy, to adopt outright, features of what they alive and well. Not even the presidency support for foreign dictators, and the imagined to be American democracy. of George W. Bush, with its hanging tyranny of the majority mentioned by From attempts at extending the fran- chads, invasion of Iraq, and heartbreak- Tocqueville himself – served as a cyno- chise through to legislation modeled on ing incompetence on Hurricane Katrina, sure for people and countries around the Freedom of Information Act, US could stamp out that habit: numerous the world. democratic norms continued to serve US expatriates can attest to being con- The normative power of US democ- as a model. gratulated by complete strangers after racy was that it was an ideal which, At first, this influence stemmed from the election of Barack Obama in 2009. somehow, had been concretised. That the obvious contrast between the US One would like to imagine that this this had occurred in the situation of experience and that of Europe. In the changed after Trump assumed the

6 ARIZONA, presidency in 2017. To some degree it because of its constitution, its relatively in other countries. As one South African Phoenix, USA. did, as elites lowered their expectations broad electorate, its legislative arrange- campaigner put it, “When the sit-ins President Donald Trump speaks at for US policy and focused instead on ments, or its free press, but also because started in the USA, I felt I was there. a “Make America short-term coordination with their of its protest movements. The story of We read the news eagerly and identi- Great Again” rally. American counterparts. But this is to Gandhi being inspired by Thoreau’s fied unconditionally with those who 22 August 2017. ignore the enormous boost that Trump’s essay on civil disobedience is well- were demanding their basic rights.” Nicholas KAMM/ AFP/Getty Images talking points, and the aides he known, but this is only the tip of the Thus, the jury is still out on whether appointed, gave to xenophobic and American iceberg. For example, trade or not the United States, under Trump, authoritarian forces around the world. union struggles (which resulted, among will become an antidemocratic model. It is no accident that European advo- other things, in the choice of 1 May as In the end, what matters is not so much cates of immigration restrictions and International Workers’ Day), antiwar what Trump does as what his fellow crackdowns on the press, the judiciary, protests, and the multiple strands of citizens do in response. and dissenting voices lauded Trump, protests for civil rights (most famously even before election night; by the same the Civil Rights Movement against racial token, there is clear mutual admiration injustices) each had a marked influence between Trump and various autocratic on analogous activities in numerous leaders. In effect, the United States is countries. The point is not that protest still a model, albeit an antidemocratic movements in the United States served one. as models elsewhere: some did, but in This, however, is not the end of the other cases, influence ran in the other story, or even of the current episode. direction. Rather, the fact that protests We would do well to recall that the did occur in the United States, in the United States was a democratic inspi- face of well-known antidemocratic bar- ration not only, or even primarily, riers, was itself significant to activists

7 DEMOCRACY AT RISK TURQUIE : LE VIRAGE AUTORITAIRE D’ERDOĞAN Jean-François Bayart Professeur et titulaire de la chaire Yves Oltramare Religion et politique dans le monde contemporain Membre du corps professoral, Centre Albert Hirschman sur la démocratie

TURQUIE, Ankara. ouvent avec une joie mauvaise, ensuivi un glissement autoritaire du pouvait se targuer du soutien du Des manifestants constat est fait du retour de la pouvoir, de plus en plus personnel, du corps électoral. Mais il perdit alors la brandissent des S drapeaux turcs sur la Turquie à ses vieux démons autori- président turc. Celui-ci, en quelques majorité absolue des sièges, et se place Kizilay lors d’un taires. Et l’Europe d’éprouver un lâche années, a brisé l’échine politique de lança dans une périlleuse fuite en rassemblement contre soulagement de se voir enfin débar- l’armée, des médias, de son alliée la avant. Il manœuvra, au prix d’une le coup d’État manqué rassée de la venimeuse question de néoconfrérie de Fethullah Gülen, de la reprise de la guerre civile dans le du 15 juillet. 10 août 2016. Adem ALTAN/ son élargissement à l’Anatolie. représentation parlementaire des Sud-Est, pour obtenir la convocation AFP/Getty Images Car la Turquie de Recep Tayyip régionalistes (ou nationalistes) kurdes, de nouvelles élections, en novembre, Erdoğan a rejoint le camp des « démo- de l’opposition civile, libérale et écolo- et les gagner. Après la tentative de craties illibérales » dès lors que l’élec- gique qui s’était manifestée dans l’en- coup d’État de juillet 2016, il perdit tion de Nicolas Sarkozy à la présidence semble du pays en 2013. Ahmet Insel toute limite. Il se fit tailler une de la République française, en 2007, a a été le premier à parler alors de la Constitution présidentialiste à sa rendu illusoire toute perspective « poutinisation », ou de l’« orbanisa- démesure. Le Parti de la justice et du d’adhésion à l’Union européenne. Face tion », de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. développement (AKP) est à sa botte. à Ankara, Bruxelles n’avait plus de Jusqu’aux élections législatives La liberté de la presse a été de facto moyen : ni carotte, ni bâton. Il s’est de juin 2015, le président Erdo ğan abolie. Les législatives de novembre

8 2015 et le référendum constitutionnel Guerre froide, elle préfère au fond les annihiler toute forme d’opposition d’avril 2017 se sont déroulés dans un certitudes de l’autoritarisme aux évoque les grandes purges qui avaient climat d’intimidation policière et judi- aléas de la démocratie pour confier à suivi la révolte de Cheikh Saïd, en ciaire. Fait peut-être unique depuis la Turquie le sale travail : jadis, la lutte 1925. Son répertoire est celui du 1950, ils ont été entachés de soup- contre le communisme, aujourd’hui, nationalisme, ou plutôt du national- çons de fraude. Des purges de masse l’endiguement des migrants. Le PKK libéralisme qui entend assurer le balayent la police, l’armée, la magis- n’a pas plus joué la carte libérale, contrôle politique du néolibéralisme, trature, l’université, l’ensemble de la balançant entre le recours aux armes comme en Chine ou en Russie, en fonction publique et les partis et la négociation des petits arrange- Hongrie ou en Pologne. Ce à quoi d’opposition. ments autoritaires avec Erdoğan. La nous assistons, c’est à la résurgence Le retour de flamme autoritaire réaction des autres partis d’opposi- d’une situation autoritaire dont les est d’autant plus impressionnant que tion a été inepte et en porte-à-faux origines remontent à l’absolutisme le bilan démocratique d’Erdoğan, les avec la nouvelle Turquie, née de dix d’Adbul Hamid II, au Comité Union et cinq premières années de son exercice du pouvoir, n’est pas négli - geable. Aucun dirigeant turc n’était allé aussi loin dans la reconnais - sance, culturelle et politique, du fait “L’erreur serait kurde, et n’avait osé ouvrir des négo- ciations avec le Parti des travailleurs d’imputer à l’islam du Kurdistan (PKK). Aucun autre n’avait aussi nettement remis en la responsabilité cause la conception ethnoconfes- sionnelle de la citoyenneté. Enfin, son de la restauration accession au pouvoir symbolisait une alternance au profit des « Turcs noirs », que les « Turcs blancs » autoritaire.” laïcistes avaient marginalisés depuis les années 1920, en même temps qu’elle abrogeait l’ordre constitutionnel contraignant hérité du coup ans de pouvoir AKP, mais aussi de Progrès, au parti unique de l’entre- d’État militaire de 1980. profondes transformations écono- deux-guerres, aux régimes militaires Comment expliquer ce retourne- miques et sociales. Enfin, le piège de des années 1960-1980. ment ? Seuls les adeptes de la « tran- la guerre d’Irak et de Syrie s’est Ces précédents historiques sitologie » peuvent s’en étonner. La refermé sur Ankara, et a dramatisé la dénotent aussi, paradoxalement, l’en- formation de la démocratie n’a jamais question kurde. racinement de l’idée démocratique en été linéaire. La thèse de l’agenda anti- L’erreur serait d’imputer à l’islam Turquie. L’exercice du suffrage univer- démocratique caché, qu’aurait de tout la responsabilité de la restauration sel l’a régulièrement réhabilitée. De temps caressé le président, ne résiste autoritaire en Turquie. Même si ce point de vue, les résultats du pas à l’examen. Quelles qu’aient été Erdoğan puise dans les ressources du dernier référendum ont été sans ses intentions secrètes, le vrai conservatisme musulman pour étayer appel : malgré le matraquage de la problème est celui du rapport de force sa légitimité, il recourt surtout aux propagande de l’AKP, le non l’a qui s’est noué entre les tenants de vieilles recettes du régime kémaliste. emporté dans les grandes villes qui lui l’autoritarisme et ceux de la démocra- Son conflit avec lesfethullahci montre étaient jadis acquises, y compris à tie. Or, l’Europe s’est gardée d’ap - qu’il impose lui aussi la primauté de Istanbul, le fief de Recep Tayyip puyer les seconds, tout en versant des l’État sur le pluralisme religieux. Son Erdoğan depuis les années 1990. larmes de crocodile sur la lenteur des instrumentalisation de la tentative de « réformes ». Comme à l’époque de la putsch et de la dissidence kurde pour

9 DEMOCRACY AT RISK ORBÁN’S LAWFARE AGAINST LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY Shalini Randeria Professor of Anthropology and Sociology Director of the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy

eineken beer, the Helsinki tracts of EU-subsidised agricultural A new law assaulting academic HCommittee and the Central land redistributed to party function- freedom, passed in unseemly haste in European University in Budapest have aries. Policies, which initiated a mas- April 2017, threatens the very existence recently all been the object of the sive recentralisation of economic and of the Central European University Hungarian government’s unfavourable political power, were devised to ben- (CEU), whose professors were called attention. It tried to ban the beer on efit domestic businesses with close “officers of an occupying army” by for- the pretext that the red star on the can ties to the ruling Fidesz Party. The sys- mer Fidesz Minister Péter Harrach. The was a totalitarian symbol, to restrict tematic subversion of checks and bal- discriminatory law targeting the CEU the workings of the well-known NGO, ances followed a careful design of is of a piece with the systematic ero- and passed a new law designed to “lawfare”, i.e. legislation passed in ad sion of the autonomy of all universities close the renowned private university, hoc fashion without public scrutiny or in the country. Hungary has seen state whose fate still hangs in balance. proper legislative deliberation. First, expenditure on higher education sys- Prime Minister Viktor Orbán a new constitution was enacted that tematically decline since 2010, with a embodies the reactionary populist pol- weakened all checks on majoritarian- reduction of 25% between 2010 and itics gaining ground in many parts of ism. Next, the system for nominating 2013. Large funding cuts at all the world. In a well-publicised speech judges to the Constitutional Court was Hungarian state universities have in 2014 he had declared with pride altered to subvert the independence paved the way for the installation of that his country was an “illiberal state”, of the judiciary. Then, the electoral government-nominated “chancellors” and asserted later that the Trump rev- framework was changed to make it tasked with making managerial deci- olution happened in Hungary, the impossible for any other party to win. sions but de facto determining aca- country that led the global backlash The National Election Commission was demic appointments. The result is an against liberalism. Extolling the virtues brought under Fidesz control to curb alarming decline in student enrolment, of the nation, church and family, Orbán civil society referenda. Further, by which fell by 24% between 2010 and has positioned himself as the defender appointing only high party officials to 2014 and a staggering 45% in 2016 of Christian Europe against hordes of the office of the President, Orbán alone. Muslim migrants. With Orbán taking ensured that presidential powers Orbán’s government has embarked a leaf out of Putin’s authoritarian book, would not be used to block govern- on a programme of nationalising sci- and Poland currently modelling itself mental initiatives. Finally, new laws ence, founding, notably, the National on Hungary, one may well ask if illib- were enacted to guarantee political University of Public Service, a training eral democracies are there to stay in control of all media through a regula- ground for the new cadres of the Central Europe. tory agency exclusively manned by regime. The governor of the Hungarian Between 2010 and 2013 the gov- party loyalists. At their own peril can National Bank has, tellingly, utilised ernment led by Orbán enacted some the European Union (EU) and European the bank’s resources to establish a new 700 laws that rolled back economic People’s Party (EPP) continue to turn economics university in his hometown, liberalisation: property rights were a blind eye to this transformation of whose curriculum includes his own selectively whittled away and vast the “rule of law” into “rule by law”. theories. With channels of social

10 “Between 2010 and 2013 mobility within the country blocked, the government led by Orbán 600,000 of the better educated have exited in the past four years. Their voice enacted some 700 laws is now missing from domestic politics. Emigration can thus become an avenue that rolled back economic to eliminate unwelcome critics. But liberal democracy cannot survive in the liberalisation.” absence of free public debate and spaces of dissent, which autonomous universities provide. It needs strong, financially independent counter-majoritarian institutions, which advocate modernisation theory, and its reincar- EPP continue to tolerate with impunity HUNGARY, Buda diverse, even unpopular, positions. The nation, the postcommunist transition Viktor Orbán’s undermining of separa- Hill. Locals take an oath in front of a 70,000 demonstrators marching paradigm, would have us believe. Nor tion of powers, erosion of civil and polit- national flag of the through Budapest last April, chanting is democracy inevitably coupled with ical liberties, transforming Hungary into 1956 revolution (the “Free country, free university” in sup- liberalism. The EU may be in no position a “mafia state” – a term coined by the tricolor with a hole) port of the CEU, clearly recognised this, to influence the course of illiberal, former Hungarian Minister of Education during an induction ceremony of the far- while the state television ignored them, majoritarian, elected regimes in Russia, Bálint Magyar. Reactionary ideologies right Jobbik party. broadcasting instead a programme India, Venezuela, or the United States. and authoritarian rule often take root 25 August 2007. praising fishing in Hungary. But whether illiberal democracies take as much due to their popular appeal as Attila KISBENEDEK/ Democratisation is evidently not root in Europe will depend in large to the opportunism and hypocrisy of AFP/Getty Images the linear, teleological process that measure on whether the EU and the their liberal opponents.

11 DEMOCRACY AT RISK REINVENTING AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou Professor of International History Faculty member, Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy

he 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in democracies”, which should have Instead they revised the narrative to Tthe Middle East and North Africa given cause for caution. represent themselves as the promot- thickened the authoritarianism plot. When between 2012 and 2017 the ers of the “real” change needed in Since democratising change appeared revolts in the Middle East and North these societies. Nowhere was this at long last to be making headway Africa turned, for the most part, into better exemplified than in Egypt where across the region, initial forecasts violent civil wars in Libya, Yemen and Abdelfattah al Sisi forcibly replaced seesawed between hopes for sus- Syria and the expected changes failed Mohamed Morsi as president, while tained transitions and doubts about to materialise, culturalist explanations criminalising him and his supporters their viability. Often either unrealistic, proliferated, arguing that the region and conjuring up the image of a “new impatient expectations, or fatalistic was “unprepared” for democracy. Side- Nasser”. Similarly, in Syria, Bashar al and deterministic pessimism, such stepping the encouraging signs in Assad – amidst the widespread mur- prognoses were nonetheless logical Tunisia and in Morocco, these inter- derous repression of his opponents analytical outgrowths of observation pretations missed the key transforma- and a large-scale civil war – contin- of post-authoritarian systems. In ear- tion that the post–Arab Spring had ued to claim to be the candidate for lier cycles, or so-called “waves” of yielded, namely an authoritarianism “a new democratic Syria”. In Turkey, democratisation, the push towards redux, albeit one that was not only reacting both to the continuing Gezi representative systems was under- novel and hybrid but also internation- Park– and Taksim Square–centred stood to be a linear process. ally connected. The new-old authori- protests since May 2013 and a failed While emphasising the complex- tarian regimes of the Middle East military coup attempt in July 2016, ity of the transition process and its reasserted themselves in at least three Recep Tayyip Erdoğan jeopardised the inherent pitfalls, these assumptions innovative ways: (1) by appearing to country’s decade-long promising polit- and predictions still functioned on a embody change while crushing it; (2) ical transition heralded as a model in generic logic of a forward movement. by securing international support for, the region. In South-Western Europe in the 1960s, or tolerance of, their campaigns, and This unapologetic rebranding of in Latin America in the 1970s and in (3) by, more insidiously, sowing doubts authoritarianism in the Middle East Eastern Europe in the 1980s and amongst their populations about the was, secondly and more importantly, 1990s, the sequence had been thus need for, and value of, democracy. engineered through a message sent to – illustrated by push-and-pull contests Firstly, unable to halt the rebel- Western governments and societies and resistance but within an overall lions, the regimes in Egypt, Syria, that support or tolerate the repressive drive for transformation. Doubts about Yemen and across the Gulf gave the actions of these hybrid regimes as key the paradigm were already being axiom “If you can’t beat them, join to regional stability and the “security” expressed in the early 2000s, reveal- them” new meaning. They, however, of the West. As in the mid-2010s intol- ing a proliferation of “uncertain neither adopted the values of the erance, racism and societal divisions regimes”, “semi-democratic regimes”, democratisers nor co-opted them – as spread across Europe and the United “competitive authoritarianism”, they had done in the earlier 1990s States, Western governments pro- “façade democracy” and “illiberal cosmetic democratisation phase. posed more militaristic foreign policies

12 EGYPT, Cairo. and asserted support to authoritarian development was reached when the late 2010s an “empire-strikes-back” Thousands Middle Eastern regimes in a notable current US Secretary of State Rex disposition questioning in a deeper and of Egyptians demonstrate in departure from their earlier defensive- Tillerson stated in May 2017 that more problematic fashion the very pur- Tahrir Square to ness. A newfound resoluteness and human rights values would now take suit of democracy. The shared senti- denounce violence ment that “revolutions only bring against protesters, trouble” and that “democracy is prob- especially women. 23 December lematic” – now voiced by conserva- 2011. Citizenside/ “By sowing doubt tives, now silently tolerated by former WAHEDMASRY militants – spread slowly but surely as to the value of across these societies. Thus expanded the repertoire of authoritarianism. democracy, the region’s What a difference six years made! Whereas in the spring of 2011, the dom- authoritarian regimes inant regional and international feeling had been one of “never again” should benefitted from their the Mubarak’s style of rule see the light of day, by the spring of 2017 a ability to bounce back form of demand for strict authoritarian rule seemed to have crystallised as and be repressively societies in the Middle East were now torn between their dissatisfaction with creative.” the current regimes and their anxieties of chaos and instability. By success- fully sowing doubt as to the value of democracy, the region’s authoritarian assertiveness therefore emboldened a back seat compared to economic regimes certainly benefitted from their these authoritarian regimes, whose interests or national security. ability to bounce back and be repres- bedrock remained, however, the con- Finally, and even more problemat- sively creative. But they were also par- tradictions and hypocrisies in Western ically, many Middle Eastern authori- taking of a wider global moment of policies. A high (or low) point of this tarian regimes began to adopt in the neo-authoritarianism.

13 DEMOCRACY AT RISK UGANDA: MANAGING DEMOCRACY THROUGH INSTITUTIONALISED UNCERTAINTY Rebecca Tapscott Research Fellow, Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy

UGANDA, Kisoro. n 2016, thirty years after he violently structural adjustment policies. Inter- state power and fragmented subna- Facade with poster seized power, Uganda’s President national donors swiftly labelled Ugan- tional power bases. The regime has of President Yoweri I Museveni. Yoweri Museveni was reelected to his da a “donor darling” on its way to dem- used protracted civil unrest to justify 23 July 2012. fifth term. In 1986, Museveni had ocratic transition. Recent assessments uneven development and a militarised By Adam JONES/ become president of a country of the regime are less optimistic. It is state. Today, Uganda resembles other CC BY-SA 3.0 economically and socially devastated now seen as a hegemonic party-state seemingly fragile African states with from years of autocratic rule by strong- that relies increasingly on patronage long-lasting regimes like Angola, Eri- men rulers Idi Amin and Milton Obote. and violent coercion. Scholars have trea and Zimbabwe. Museveni made some early reforms, catalogued how decentralisation Such cases present a paradox. How implementing decentralisation and policies have actually recentralised can state fragility, a system of elec-

14 toral governance, and autocratic rule preventers as ordinary community giving wide berth to issues they think co exist sustainably? An examination of members, powerless except to report are sensitive. Pervasive uncertainty how citizens experience Uganda’s illib- crime like any other citizen. Constant also erodes trust between constitu- eral regime is revealing. Unsurprisingly, vacillations between promises made ents and authorities. Citizens are cog- the regime restricts civil liberties and and broken, authority claimed and nisant of the fact that politicians also maintains distributive systems that denied, contributed to uncertainty face harsh sanctions for challenging offer overwhelming structural advan- in interactions between citizens and the regime’s interests. Politicians who tage for the ruling regime. However, crime preventers, and between crime survive this system are thus assumed it also governs by instrumentalising preventers and state authorities. to be complicit in the regime, making uncertainty. Uncertainty is produced The government’s ability to continu- citizens suspicious of those who claim via arbitrary government use of au- ally redefine the role of crime preven- to act in good faith. Unsubstantiated thority backed by a threat of violence. ters was made possible by a widely rumours further fuel this scepticism: As a result, it infuses citizens’ percep- held perception that the ruling regime tales of state-organised assassina- tions of the state – particularly state retained access to overwhelming force tions circulate when public figures die security actors but also politicians and – a perception reinforced through unexpectedly; allegations of bribery government officials. citizens’ memories of state-sponsored proliferate when politicians support the ruling party. However, producing suspicion without evidence allows politicians to maintain the possibility – however slight – that they could act in their constituents’ interests. In turn, “Institutionalised this keeps many citizens marginally en- gaged with the democratic process. arbitrariness helps I have termed this strategy of rule “institutionalised arbitrariness”. DEMOCRACY AT RISK explain how states Institutionalised arbitrariness helps explain how states maintain “hy - maintain ‘hybridity’ bridity” or “illiberal democracy” as UGANDA: MANAGING the status quo. The arbitrary use of or ‘illiberal democracy’ harsh discipline means that the state can permit occasional expressions DEMOCRACY THROUGH as the status quo.” of liberal politics such as democratic elections, universal suffrage, civil society, free association and a free INSTITUTIONALISED press. It is thus difficult for citizens and international observers to decisively Take the experience of Uganda’s violence. The ruling regime and its mil- categorise the regime as oppressive UNCERTAINTY “crime preventers”. So-called crime itary have fought civil insurgencies and autocratic. preventers are mainly underemployed since taking power, often sacrificing The functioning of a democracy young men, recruited en masse be- civilian life in the process. Sporadic is premised on the ability of citizens fore the 2016 elections with prom- and unpredictable state violence in and their representatives to develop ises of access to government loans everyday life further buttresses this meaningful and reliable expectations and employment in the police force. perception. For example, the police of each other. However, in environ- Their mandate was vaguely defined. often use teargas and live or rub - ments marked by high uncertainty, ar- Politicians on both sides of the aisle ber bullets to disperse rallies. More bitrary assertions and denials of state stoked fears that crime preventers mundane instances of state coercion authority disrupt feedback loops and would use violence to intimidate op- include security sweeps rife with fragment citizen organisation. Under position voters and candidates, and intimidation and extortion. such circumstances, citizens cannot facilitate vote manipulation. However, The perception that the state could develop meaningful expectations, nor the reality appeared more mundane. intervene anytime and deploy over- can they demand regime accountabil- At times, crime preventers assisted whelming force produces a particu- ity. Thus, “illiberal democracies” can the police in arresting and detaining lar type of subject, namely, one that produce uncertainty and contingency civilians. At other times, the police and is comparatively subdued and risk to manipulate formally liberal govern- government officials sidelined crime averse. Ordinary citizens self-police, ance for the pursuit of illiberal ends.

15 DEMOCRACY AT RISK POST-TRUTH POPULISM IN VENEZUELA Rafael Sánchez Senior Lecturer in Anthropology and Sociology Faculty member, Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy

VENEZUELA, Caracas. lliberal democracy is democracy renders all state branches into developments in Venezuela, however, Volunteer rescuers minus constitutional liberalism. adjuncts of the ruler, Venezuela’s would suggest otherwise. In my view step aside to take I cover as riot police According to Fareed Zakaria, without Chavist regime seems to be a good Chavism’s significance and dynamism motorcyclists charge liberalism’s checks and balances example of an illiberal democracy. have less to do with democracy, under- on opposition activists democracy lends itself to the kind of I would, nonetheless, raise the follow- stood as majority rule, than with protesting against the “people-making” based on ethnic, ing question: Does Chavism have any factors that such an understanding newly inaugurated Constituent Assembly. class, racial or religious majorities, a unique features? Following the stand- occludes. Despite having lost its elec- 4 August 2017. feature that is intrinsic to the authori- ard argument on “illiberal democracy” toral edge Chavism has recently Ronaldo SCHEMIDT/ tarian populisms or “illiberal democra- the answer would be negative as become even more authoritarian and AFP/Getty Images cies” proliferating everywhere. Chavism would simply offer yet repressive but without drawing (other Characterised by plebiscitary rule and another cautionary tale about democ- than fraudulently) on a majority that it an expansion of the executive that racy without liberalism. Recent no longer possesses.

16 “While the opposition controls ever more ineffective sites of democratic The following suggestions may further our understanding of this situation. expression, the regime The collapse of representative democracy and of the nation’s rep- ‘democratically’ holds resentative institutions instigated by a neoliberal structural adjustment the firepower.” programme in the 1980s explains Venezuelan Chavism better than the mere question of democracy. Though it initially came to power following a democratic implosion, the trajectory peals to the “people” functioned as the placing the army, which is now sub- of Chavism since is only intelligible as political means to vertically restore a jected to minute forms of intelligence part of the breakdown of political rep- fantasised lost unity, sustaining such monitored by Cuban agents, in control resentation that is an endemic, even fantasy is increasingly untenable both of the nation’s food distribution and postliberal, condition currently affect- ideologically and institutionally now vast mineral wealth. ing not just Venezuela but the world. that the political is horizontally beset Meanwhile invocations of “democ- This breakdown has two critical ef- by an increasingly divided, differenti- racy” and “the people” continue but fects: firstly, it reveals a crowd sociali- ating society. mean what the regime wants them ty hitherto enclosed within social and Under these no longer totalising cir- to mean, irrespective of any numeri- political institutions and, with it, the cumstances, appeals to the “people” cal majorities. The recent top-down emergence of bodily affect as a crucial function according to an unabashedly decision to set up a “Constituent political and social crucible. Secondly, “tribal” logic aimed at erecting a war Assembly” capable of bypassing the in such a situation, there is a grow- machine centred on affect and the opposition-controlled parliament ing inability of any representative in- body. It operates on an ever more frag- is the latest in the regime’s Hump- stance to occupy the place of the uni- mented social terrain, which it does ty Dumpty politics. Yet this is not a versal, and, from there, represent the not seek to totalise but to control and case of an “illiberal democracy” if by whole of society to the state. Under dominate. In what in the current cli- that one means a well-consolidated, these conditions infectious affective mate of post-truth politics amounts to semitotalitarian regime. A more likely contagion spreads. This amounts to a a Humpty Dumpty effect in the sense scenario, I fear, is: an intensification of preeminence of the horizontal over the that a word “means just what I choose the prevailing civic strife, corruption, vertical as the axis along which forms it to mean”, the word “people” can violence, narcotrafficking and chaos. of personal and social experience and simply refer to “my people”, however While the opposition controls ever relations are formed, unformed and the ruler chooses to define them. “My more ineffective sites of democratic transformed. people” are then those always ready expression, the regime “democratical- Confronted with such a slippery to bodily crush the enemy rather than ly” holds the firepower. terrain brought about by globalisation any numerical majority that supports From the very beginning Chavism in and traversed by myriad images and a government or a policy. all its exorbitance foreshadowed ten- desires circulated by the media, the The result is “dominance without dencies at work everywhere in times Venezuelan state is unable to totalise hegemony” (Ranajit Guha). Having of the “retreat of the political”. Trump’s society, or represent it as a whole so- lost its majority, Chavism still insists populist, Humpty Dumpty–like assault ciety accountable to itself. on maintaining power. To achieve on American liberalism bears witness Like sovereignty or democracy, this, the massively corrupt regime to similar tendencies. In order to de- populism too mutates amidst such an has developed a whole new arsenal fend democracy and liberalism, we will unstoppable “retreat of the political” of control mechanisms ranging from need to rethink them in the face of this as the instance capable of totalising the wholesale distribution of weapons withdrawal of the political. “society”. If in classical populism ap- to civilians, the so-called colectivos, to

17 DEMOCRACY AT RISK DEMOCRACY ON THE BRINK: FOUR KEY INSIGHTS Christine Lutringer Senior Research Fellow, Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy

emocratisation is not a linear ry’s systematic dismantling of liberal as Krastev suggests, liberal and illib- Dprocess, nor can the continued democratic institutions. For the Middle eral democracies today seem to mirror development of liberal democracy be East, Ould Mohamedou shows how in each other’s anxieties. While Russia taken for granted. Disenchantment the name of “stability” and “security” continues to be obsessed about the with democracy has gained ground Western governments have tolerated Western gaze, the expansion of Rus- among new democracies where many the ongoing “rebranding of authori- sian authoritarianism has gripped the of the promises associated with eco- tarianism“. Democratic ideals in the political imagination of the West as nomic and political freedom have failed Middle East and North Africa region well. If there is justifiable concern with to materialise. But trust in political have thus been compromised by an in- the ideological and financial links be- elites and institutions has also plum- terplay of internal and external forces. tween Putin and the European Right, meted in many of the established democracies. By drawing attention to changing narratives about the shape, and even “We are currently the desirability, of democratic institutions as well as examining the practices witnessing an expansion of governance in many majoritarian democracies, the contributors to this of the repertoire of issue of Global Challenges highlight some key aspects of the undermining democracy along with of liberal democracy worldwide: 1. Ambiguous impact of the (in) that of authoritarianism action of international institutions. Neoliberal structural adjustment pro- – or, perhaps, even the grammes have had a detrimental impact on representative institutions in blurring of the two.” several countries of the Global South (and some in the Global North too, as the case of Greece shows), as suggest- ed by Sánchez’s analysis of populism 2. Shifts in the attractiveness of there is equal worry that the Russian in Venezuela. Yet, paradoxically, where democratic and authoritarian models. model may predict the future shape of supranational institutions, or interna- Sylvan’s analysis alerts us to the polities (including Western democra- tional financial institutions, possess worldwide historic influence that the cies) worldwide. some leverage to ensure prevalence of US “democratic model” has exerted 3. Restructuring of state insti- the rule of law, freedom of expression through its oft-lauded constitution, its tutions amidst new socioeconomic or separation of powers, they often fail culture of active political participation, configurations. Krastev identifies a to use it to ensure a commitment to and its strong civic movements. The new pattern of resource extraction in these liberal principles. Randeria ar- current political scenario, however, Russia which may be best character- gues that EU intervention and sanc- calls into question several aspects of ised as “spoliation and neglect”. Rand- tions have been conspicuous by their this model, and emboldens illiberal eria delineates the new contours of the absence despite, for instance, Hunga- voices all over the globe. Moreover, Hungarian state, which has narrowed

18 USA, Washington, all spaces of dissent while concentrat- governance by “rule of law” into an tributions to this dossier. But in what DC, Democracy ing economic power in the hands of a authoritarian “rule by law”. Focusing sense these can be considered democ- Spring activists, April 2016. tiny elite loyal to the leader. In Vene- on Uganda, Tapscott’s analysis reveals racies at all remains a moot question. zuela, where the expansion of execu- the subtle ways in which a state main- We need a better understanding of tive power goes hand in hand with a tains control over society by fostering citizens’ experiences of politics and breakdown of political representation, a climate of uncertainty fuelled by ar- the state in everyday life across the Sánchez explores the emergence of bitrary interventions. Thus, irrespec- world: the protection of civil liberties bodily affect as “a crucial political and tive of formally liberal politics, “insti- can hardly be sustained within polit- social crucible”. Given the retreat of tutionalised arbitrariness” precludes ical, economic and social structures the political, the Chavist regime has citizens from entertaining reliable designed to buttress illiberal regimes. used control mechanisms embedded expectations regarding state-society These structures influence citizens’ in the military and economic machin- relationships. perceptions of the state, which in turn ery of the state to strengthen its own The lived experiences of democ- produces particular types of subjects power base. racies today are being shaped by a and subjectivities. To understand 4. Use of liberal means to es - multitude of reconfigurations at the current patterns and future trajecto- tablish and entrench illiberal de- national, local and translocal levels. ries of (il)liberal democracies, it is as mocracies. Ironically, elections can At the beginning of the 21st century, important to study the working and be instruments for disempowering we are witnessing an expansion of the transformations of institutions as it is citizens where they serve to liberate repertoire of democracy along with to analyse the responses of citizens elites from the electorate (Krastev). that of authoritarianism; or, perhaps, to these changes. Today, the need to The 2017 constitutional referendum even the blurring of the demarcation counter “the overproduction of opin- in Turkey was organised to formally between the two. Bayart identifies the ionated opinion” – as emphasised by reinforce presidential powers amidst power dynamics between the propo- Albert O. Hirschman in 1989 – and to widespread intimidation and massive nents of authoritarianism and those get the citizenry to engage critically in purges (Bayart). Large parliamentary of democracy as the real issue in the the polity is as urgent as ever. Creative majorities can be used to undermine face of an intensifying struggle over imagination is required in order to (re) the rule of law and to establish instead the redefinition of democracy. Illiberal make democracies into vibrant spac- illiberal forms of rule by hastily pass- democracies do not share unique de- es of participation but also objects of ing ad hoc legislation without public fining features that would allow them political desire. scrutiny. Randeria analyses the pro- to be subsumed under a common de- cesses that transformed Hungary’s nominator, as illustrated by the con-

19 The Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy at the Graduate Institute, Geneva

he Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy addresses the current challenges faced by Tboth established and more recent democracies in an interdisciplinary and comparative perspective. In view of the growing disenchantment with liberal democracy as well as the tensions between neoliberal globalisation and democracy, the Centre seeks to develop projects that bridge theo- retical and empirical research, academic and policy work. Its activities include: > research that aims to understand the plurality of democratic experiences by focusing on citizens’ democratic aspirations, their dissatisfaction with existing institutions as well as the dynamics of participation and protest in various regions of the world. Drawing on Albert O. Hirschman’s scholarship, research at the Centre also aims to explore changing forms of civic engagement including different forms of ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ > organisation of a series of public lectures and conferences > collaborative activities with academic institutions, international organisations as well as with partners in Switzerland and worldwide

ALBERT HIRSCHMAN Among the foremost intellectuals of the twentieth century, Albert O. Hirschman was a brilliant theorist of problems of economic and political development. Born in Berlin in 1915, his work addressed two questions that are fundamental to the study of democratic politics today: When and why do people engage in, or disengage from, public welfare and public action? When and how do people bring about social and political change? © Hernan Diaz

Contact: [email protected] @AHDCentre

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