Endgame and Waiting for Godot

百me, Being，，且nd 』ngi』且ge: Toward 且 Phenomenological Reading of Endgame and F站iting for Godot 1

Time, Being, and Language: Toward a Phenomenological Reading of Endgame and Waiting for Godot

:le Cheng-chen Chien

Abstract

Critics often label Beckett’s plays as 叮 absurdity" and ''nothingness.” Contemporary readers tend to characterize them as postmodern plays and strip their "meaning. ＂ τbis pa­ per will discuss the insu血den叮 of present pheno血enological studies of his plays on the one hand; on the other, it will speculate on the ”meaning” of the pla戶旭 the postmodern scene. Phenomenology must enter into a dialogue with contempora可 discourse to assert its

屯ein忌” While the postmodern critic or deconstructionist questions the so-called "presence, "presence” must face the presence of dialogue to be present. With reference to Heideg­ gerean philosophy, this paper will point out: when the playwriught seems to transform the" presence” into a simulacrum and empty the textual meaning, through the simulacrum of the characters and the modulating intentionality, the reader reads the meaning of the te且

Keywords: phenomenology, Heidegger, Simulacrum, factica!, Being-with, presence , silence, Idle talk, authentic being

*Professor, Department of Foreign Languages and Litera阻re, J:iational CJ:!ullg-Hs旭E Unive自 ity 固立中興大學畫中 夜間吉！：學報（Journal of Taichung Evening School, ;\'CHU), Vol.2(1996), 79~ 100

一 79 一 2 〈固立中興大學臺中夜間部學報〉

In Endgame and Waiting for Godot, the individual, living not sequentially but 區 dis­ connected fragments of time, has no reassurance of his e泊stence or identity except through language. The broken dialogue reflects a dislocation of being and time. The essence of being is vanishing like a meaningless drop falling from the eaves. E芷istence to the charac­ ters' consciousness is so inconsequential and insigr世1cant that they anticipate its quick end( and aoso their own end). But life drags on; it washes back and forth in a desperately slow tempo. For both Beckett and his characters, this slow cadence of deterioration inflicts more suffering on the individual than a severe thrashing. The world is o世y the remains of a by-gone world, and the survivors are not of the kind who could mtegrate the remains and launch a recycle.τhey are left there only to witness and endure the glacially slow approach of death.τbe world is seen as an enonnous hole, an empty cave or human skull, 1 or a bar­ ren stretch of land on which nothing stands except a single tree.2 In Beckett’s world, time often appears stagnant: Clov remarks that time is always the same (En申amι29 ）﹔ Winnie sees nature "No better, no worse, no change" and man "No pain”（品rppy Da戶， 13), and the characters in 的＇it品g for Godot find themselves sus­ pended in dubious duration. In Beckett’s plays, stillness is a kind of tranquillity that beto­ kens the impending yet delayed end. Being hangs on the dangling drops of time, frag­ mented and scattered; existence, though nearly emptied, must be endured--when time comes, its roo血 has to be filled. Language parallels humans' concept of being and time. To view this kind of world, one is liable to embark on a serious thinking of existence in phenomenological perspective. Alain Robbe-Grillet’s classical study of Beckett’s theater

smacks of Heideggerean apprehension.τbe stage, for Robbe-Grillet, in accordance with. Heidegger's Being-there, is the locus of presence. With absence of programme or a priori

pr扭ciples, the playwright endows the characters like Vladimir and Estragon in I平台itingfor Godot with freedom and presence on the stage. Another noted Heideggerean reading comes from Lance Butler’s book Samuel Beckett and the Meaning of Being in which a

trace of ’,ontological parable” is mediated through language to be a presence. Yet the idea of presence is complicated and questioned by the later deconstruction and post­ modernism. Presence therefore is to be modified to enter into a dialogue with contempo­

ra可 scenes. In a contempora可 context, presence may still affirm itself in its self-

口。nu Time. Bei 嗯，且nd Language : Toward a Phenomenological Reading of Endgame and Waiting for Godot 3

reflexiveness. Presence does not have to be limited to the presence of the characters. Stag­

ing may question their presence by giving them a seeming presence. Presence 血ay also

point beyond itself to the presence of a simulacru血， of the being of a reality, or the reality of being. Moreover, the contemplation of the presence of the playwright and the charac­ ters turns out to sigr吐E扭扭ly spotlight the being or the self of the reader. It is through this point of departure that a phenomenological (and mostly Heideggerean) re-reading of Beckett's plays alleges its "being.” Heidegger in his Being and Time points out that humans "are thrown into” or "fall into” the world. But beings are always beings-in-the world or beings-with-the world.3 ， τbe

world of Dasein is a w的－ world mjtwe.句 Being-in is E血ig－叫th Others’＇（Heidegg 叮 155) Being-with Others clothes existence with pre-understanding of the outside world. Heideg ger proceeds:

Being alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its ve可 possibility is the proof of this

On the other hand, factical Being-alone is not obviated by the occurr巴nee of a sec ond example of a human being "beside" me, or by ten such examples.(157)

In 附j[ing for Godot, the world where Estragon and Vladimir are in binds them in such a

dialectic of being alone and being with others. On the one hand, they are "alone可﹔ on the

other hand, there is someone else keeping them waiting. This ”someone else," Godot, in a sense seems to suggest a possibility to terminate their being-aloneness and their predica­ ments. But the unending delay of the arrival of the other renders the duration of existence

in time to be a literal va叩um. A possibility with being-with others ironical句 inte自由自

由 eir sense of being-alone. The waiting also a血plifies the more pernicious aspect of time.

Before Godot comes, a vast infrnitude of ti血e has to be passed; a dialogue or an action becomes necessary to fill the empty time and finish with it.

Thus the dialogue in 研討血g for Godot may appear loosely connected to the spec­

tator or the reader yet it emerges 企om an implicit struggle with time. Time imposes on any

mo血ent of existence; life finds itself disseminated but it has to deal with this impact be­

cause humans are destined t。”fall into” the world to sustain this moment in life. For them, to be or not to be, in or out of time, is not a meaningful question. Time is to be done with even though it is beyond the concern or care. Heidegger regards care as an ontological

nHM 4 〈 國立中興大學臺中夜間部學報〉 ground from which one projects oneself onto the other. Being-with others is riveted in care.4 In Waitng for Godot, however, existence reveals itself in its carelessness. Estragon can suggest "To t叮 him [Pozzo] with other names, one after the other. It’d pass the time. And we'd be bound to hit on the right one sooner or later" (54). The question of name is one of Beckett’s major concerns. To assert a name is to assert a subjectivity. Here Es­ tragon’s lines not only touch on the uncertain self, they also deal with playing the game of names or identities as a means of passing the time. The change of names from Pozzo, to Abel, to Cain virtually means the change of faces--faces are overlapped and identities are commingled.τ'he disappearance of a face implies the vanishing of a self; the mixture of faces suggests the ambiguity of identity.5 Beckett’s language thus, with terse phrases and simple sentences, throws light from one lamp simultaneously on two different facets. Iden­ tities are extremely tenuous with this easy coming and going of names; and the coming and going of the m血es is the coming and going of time. Every name pronounced is a moment spent. In these two plays, for the characters, meaning does not reside in significant actions but in action the main significance of which is that it fills a particular moment and kills that moment. So the function of Estragon’s dreaming overrides the dream thought and the dream content. But the function is not the character’s intentional appropriation; rather, it is unintentionally adopted to kill the time, which ironically fulfills the intentionality of the text. The manifold function, to a different degree of reception, for the character and for the te泣 and the i血plied author of the te泣， is that, as Vladimir says’”passed the time"(58). While waiting for Godot, the vast span of time requires them to say or do something­ -anything. The response to this silent imposition is to say something meaningless, and to do something absurd. In this meaningless duration, aspects of absurdity become a corol­ la 可. Estragon and Vladimir talk about an erection and play at master and slave. Trivial thoughts and actions, yet reflections of a sad necessity. Those common phrases, "passing time" and ”killing time’” suggest that humans nor­ mally regard time as flow旭g and alive. In l平妞，ting for Godot, time does ”ooze” by: evening, night, the following day succeeds one another in chronological order. A future will follow the present but their ”waiting’, anticipates an ascertained unce rtainty.τ'heir

nonru Time. Beir唔， and Language : Toward 且 Phenomenologi臼I Reading of Endgame and I平'ailing for Godot 5

game of passing time is to temporal泣e a moment. While Heidegger’s temporali可 is a human act to temper with physical time of present, the characters' te血porality of time in this play just empties the present. Heidegger po扭ts out that T’expecting is possible o剖y on the basis of awaiting’’ ing for a future. The ideas of ”Godot will come" and "waiting for Godot ，呵 again like other words and acts, are just employed to fill 姐 the vacuum of duration, to "kill the time.'' For them ’的 temporalize time is to end 恆的ne. But for Clov in Endgame time seems to come to a standstill. From Clov’s perception, everything stops 芷 time stops. But the stagnation of time is figuratively the non-existence of time. Once time becomes non-existent, all beings become non-beings. Hence Clov says there is no nature(ll). Hamm’ s disagree血ent with this perspective bears testimony to a

more pessimistic view of life--to him nature e沮sts and time IDOV(~S, since they bring about humans' steady deterioration on the long slow way to death. Their uses of ]anguage are also different in accordance with their different perceptions of time. Clov's language is ter阻， and dead tired, reflecting his conception of nature and time as extinguished; Hamm, however, seems to derive a bitter relish from the methodical destruction wrought by time and nature. He watches his language and plays with words. Language is a momentary

pain-reliever; language, as in Waiting for σodot, is tweaked to fill in the vacuum of time and narcotize the pain of its dragging dullness. As Peter Gidal observes’”It is the produc­ tion of language as endless attempt to ward o証 the end”(54). Hamm’ s attitude toward time also marks his language style. On the one hand, he chooses words carefully and formally (for example,”Accursed Progenitor''9), suggesting that the pass旭g of time corresponds to the rhythm and speed of the creation of language.

τbe slow rhythm also reflects his hesitation to meet the final destiny, death--”Enough, it’s time it ended, in the shelter too. (Pause.) And yet I hesitate, I hesitate to ... to end. Yes, there it is, it’s time it ended and yet I hesitate to... (he yawns) ... to end”(3). On the other hand, he acknowledges that it is Being that suffers as opposed to non-being. He expects hopelessly a quick end of being and the language becomes harsh, quick and uncertain:

Hamm: Never (Pause.) Put me h 血y co血n.

Clov： τhere are no more co扭曲．

-83- 6 〈 固立中興大學臺中夜間部學報 〉

Hamm: Then let it end!...With a bang!...Of darkness! And me? Did anyone have pity on me?(77)

On the whole, Hamm seems to be more snared 旭 the slow moving of time; he has to re­ main as a reluctant being, who real泣es the agony of existence yet chooses existence. He is ” thrown into" existence and ’ , cannot but" exist. Sartre suggests in his Being and Noth 'ngness that confronted by nothing being becomes a being. Hamm seemingly shares similarity with this Sartrian attitude, yet without its stoical (and therefore) heroic gesture.

Hamm may identi勾 himself, and has been identified by criti叫 with Hamlet or

Richard III as a tragic hero, 6 but what Beckett finds in him probably is only a living being in an endless dragging-on e入dstence. A being is consumed in time. Trivialities fill up the stage space and the time of performance, and by present旭g these trivialities the play con­ iumes time for both the characters and the spectator. The function of language is to main­ tain as neutral a tone as possible, so as to l 血m as accurately as possible the duration of a bleached life.τhe language thus is trivial, desulto 旬， scattered like fragments of life emerg­ ing and disappearing in drops of time. The infinitude of consciousness is projected in the ever-shifting conversation, which moves at random from one subject to another over a bewilderingly wide range of topics. As with human existence itself, language turns back to question its own meaning and ends in a freedom from the conventionally defined parameters. Hannah Case Copeland argues that Beckett’s language is a mask, a tool that hides the real meaning, an ”obstacle to the ef.』 fective representation of...vision"(19). Some critics are inclined to believe that Beckett dis­ trusts language. Martin Esslin declares that "language in Beckett’s plays serves to express the breakdown and the disintegration of language"7(63). John Pilling also quotes Proust

and Three Dialogu自附的 Georg臼， Duthuit to confirm the insu宜lciency of Beckett’s Ian­ guage: "There is no communication because there are no vehicles of com血unication”（ 16).

Any commenta可 on Beckett’ s 可nsufficient” language requires a lengthy clause to supple­ ment this argument as a qualification. The word ”supplement" tinged by a Derrida’s de­ constructive overtone implies the addition of something beyond the argument. Given that language is not a tool of reflection, Beckett’s language, as Mr. Howard Harper suggest, is ” not about something; it is something’,(270). As a Derridean reading, Stephen Barker sug-

-84 一 Time, Being, and Language : Toward a Phenomenologiαi Reading of Endgame and Wai由rg for Godot 7

gests, "Being is never spoken by language, only by its imminence’'(184). Perhaps Jessica

Prinz gives one of the most con社ncing views to expound upon this issue:’'Thus the human being, logic, and language are all presented as 血echanisms that 缸e ine伍cient and broken down’'(104). In other words, Ian耳iage is SU血ciently presented to look like insu但dent to suggest the negativity of reality. Selιreferentiality in Beckett, as Barbara Trielo証 observes,

"expresses the relentless eternity of the self condemned to speak forever” ( 99). It is a being or self that is constructed in a loosely constructed language.

To respond to a typi臼l deconstructive reading, language might lapse into silence.

Hassan once remarked tersely, "Literatu間， turning against itself, aspires to silence, leaving us with uneasy inti血ations of outrage and apo 臼lypse"(3). Silence does not merely refer to the silence of the characters 扭扭 many of Beckett’s works.8 Michael Ri宜aterre ever pro 旬 nounces: "a poem says one thing, and means another"(l). And with respect to this "mean­ ing another,'’”there are three possible ways for semantic indirection to occur. Indirection is produced by displac旭g, distorting, or crea自ig meaning''(2). In other words, while the di­ gression or distortion is liable to be interpreted as the impossibility of meaning, it e泣en­ sively creates a meaning in a different scope. Moreover, this something distorting yet cre­ ating meaning might be something in silence. 執That Riffaterre refers to poet可 also equally applies to Beckett’s plays. Helene Baldw姐， s Samuel Beckett's Real Silence might strike the reader as a possible exploration of Beckett’s concept of language and being but it turns out to be a treatise on his religion and mysticism. Silence as a mode of articulation of be­ ing is probably the most important aspect of Beckett’s language. The lacuna between the characters' lines, while interpreted as ”no vehicles of communication’” silently enunciates

Beckett’s most ineffable treasures. Harper also po 泊的 out that the works of Beckett and some other great modern writers are inexpli臼ble(270). Georges Poulet in his noted essay,

℃riticism and the Experience of Interiority, ~ after an exegesis of the inadequacy of struc­ turalism, asserts that mental activity ”is e>.'Posed 姐 its ineffability and in its fundamental in­ determinacy’,(72). Silence is the echo of multifarious silence. The work exists ironically to articulate something inarticulate. While silence is sometimes paradoxically regarded as a highest form of critique of language, as in Linda Ben-zvi’s observation in Beckett(216-18), for Hei-

nmu－「 uv 8 〈 國立中興大學臺中夜間部學報〉 degger, silence is the authentic language: Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be able to

keep silent, Dasein must have something to say--that 函， it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself.(208) Beckett does have something to say and it is authentic. In his deconstructive reading of Beckett’s fiction, though promulgating "the text’s refusal to state, to confirm, to set up a stable referential relationship between itself and reality"(21), David Watson finds in Beck­ ett: ’,The drive towards silence is the trajectory of desire seeking a reuniting with the Real"

”This drive to silence becomes short-circuited into an imaginaηidentification with the moi” (51). Silence is not’的 with some critics, to be equated with nothing. in a te>..1 that seems to refuse to unfold itself, Beckett’s world has already been unfolded. The discourse thus is situated in two different dimensions--one in its inaccessibility to the reader, the other, based on the negativity of the first dimension, positively in its revelation of an authentic be­ ing and a world in reality. That’s why questioning Fedennan's argument that "Beckett is too fond of words, too committed to words,. .. the language of his fiction becomes ... a pure anti-language"(Federman 43), Watson affirm 日：’＇ In my argument, Beckett is ’committed to words,[in a positive sense] "(85). Beckett’s disjo 旭ed syntactical ne}..US might impress the reader as a salvo of pyrotechnic enigma but the desultory dialogue, at least in his plays, is ” genuine discoursing” to express the fragmented tnviality of life. When Estragon asks，’嗎Te always find something, en Didi, to give us the impression we exist ？” （ I拍iting for Godot 45 ), the incalculable fragments of life and being are articulated in language of silence. In a digressive text, while the being of the characters seems to be sliding into the vacuum, the reality of the world and an authentic being are inscribed in a writing space. Silence is "a soundless echo11 9 that reveals language and being.

Language in silence ushers in a world of irony.τbe muffled tone of language makes the spectator or the reader laugh away his tears (in silence). One of the most frequently quoted passages reads as follows: Nagg: Can you hear me? Nell: Yes, and you? Nagg: Yes (Pause.) Our hearing hasn’t failed.

nohu戶 Time, Being, and Language : Toward a Phenomenological Reading of Endgame and Waiting for Godot 9

t‘~ell ﹔ Our what?

但1dgame 15) The sadness felt by the spectator for Nagg and Nell with their lost shanks, their falling eye­ sight, all the s戶nptoms of their bodily suffering, is thus balanced by the joke about Nell's approaching deafness. Another strong reason for sadness is converted by language to comedy and the ”humor" critics like Valerie Topsfield perceives in Beckett is this shift旭g and com血ingling of bitterness and smile. This juxtaposition of tragedy and comedy again is com血ensurate with Beckett’s conception of hupian existence. Existence is situated in the realm of overlapping ambiguity. His language trespasses the demarcation of linguistic lo­ cution and orients itself through the characters toward the spectator. To receive this kind of language is often a shocking experience mingled with pleasant freshness. Irony in this particular case depicts deftly the different receptions of the characters and the spectator.

τbe spectator can sense the comic effect in these ironical lines, yet the characters Nagg

here--can feel only the suffering.τbus the spectator and the characters are located on dif­ ferent planes; though the spectator can conceive of the sadness running through the whole play, at this particular moment, the feeling of sadness turns suddenly into laughter. The contrast between the tragic sense and the comic feeling at this moment hence enhances the depth and dimension of the play. The multiplicity of perceptions shows the multifaceted functions of language. Language strings together being and time.

τhe past in Endgame and Waiting for Godot is ambiguous. In Endgame, it gradu­

ally e血erges, like a slo恥 developing photograph from the characters' own narrative. A past is there, undoubtedly; yet this past exerts no causal effect on the present. There was a

past time, there is a present time; but time as a continuous and linking ele血ent does not

join these ti血es together. Language probably can join these po扭怯， yet what is connected

seems to be the scattering attributes of the characters, not the disjoined tim臼. Hamm’ s love making in the woods and Nell's journey in Lake Como do not cause their present de­

caying to dea由 . He肛y's past in "Embers” does contribute to the spectator's understanding of the present, yet again an invisible blade cuts time into disconnected planes. Worse, what is narrated is an ambivalent account of an ambiguous past: The past is shrouded in ambiguity in 研告iting for Godot Ironically, this also deals with the contrast

-87 一 10 〈固立中興大學畫中夜間部學報〉 between the spectator’s time and the characters' time. The spectator can clearly observe the passing of time，台om evening to night, from night to evening again. Yet the character, Estragon, seems to be in a continuously emptied time. What can be grasped is the present: time is obliterated when the moment is gone.

Heidegger wisely suggests that "remembering is possible only on that of forgettin巨， and not vice versa; for in the mode of having forgotten, ... a Dasein lost in the 'superficiality' of its object of concern, can bring itself by remembering."(389). In Waiting for Godot,

nothing about yesterday is certain. The characters seem to ruffle the tenuous memo可 of a

dubious time. If remembering based on forgetting, as Heidegger suggests, is to bring Da』 sein back to itself, the characters in this play seem to let forgetting prevail their duration, steeped in idle talk10 to pass the duration. At the beginning, except for the conversation between Estragon and Vladimir that seems to pick up some shreds of the past, yesterday is described as a vague, obscure, remote, extracted time. Estragon: We came here yesterday. Vladimir: Oh no, there you’re mistaken. Estragon: What did we do yesterday?

Vladimir ：可'hat did we do yesterday? (11)

τhe uncertainty about yesterday implies their existence is suspended in a fragmented moment, severed from the chain of time. If time is severed, it seems that there is nothing to forget. If there is nothing to forget, there is nothing to remember to bring Dasein to it­ self. Yet the line reads: Vladimir: Why…(Angrily) Nothing is certain when you’re about. The line then makes the spectator cast his doubt on Estragon's pessonality instead of his ac­ tivities. In other words, the problem of ambiguity ensued from a questionable being rather

than questionable deeds. 嗎'hat has been clearly presented in Act I is completely rejected by Estragon in Act E ; he does not believe that he forgets it; rather, he simply thinks it never happened. The passage shocks both Vladimir and the spectator. The spectator has seen what happened on stage, but Estragon’s denial of its existence seems to reject the real­ ity of the spectator’s experience of Act I . Steven Connor in his reading of Waiting for

-88 一 Time, Bei 嗯，且nd Language : Toward a Phenomenologi但l Reading of Endgame and 研'ailing for Godot 11

Godot suggests that the appearance and reappearance of the characters on the stage is the doubling (and，個 Derrida's sense, a doubt) of presence. ”To reappear, to be on the stage aga恤， is in itself to allow the shadow of absence or non~being to fall a叮oss the fullness and simplicity of Dasein"(ll月．

The questioning of dubious presence is a typi臼l deconstructive strategy. But to ques­ tion about the presence as being or non-being of the characters in this play also addresses the Heideggerean existential conce凹， The characters on the stage do not necessarily aver the presence of their beings.τhe stage 血 a way 函 a limited space for the characters as an enunciation of existence, albeit existence without essence as in Sartrian phraseology. A rumination of existence naturally leads to either the disclosure or the withdrawal of being. Either of them will enter the phenomenological or Heideggrean mind. The question about being as presence is still the consideration of beinιτhe question about meaning pro­ nounces a meaning in different context.

Moreover, the question of being of the characters highlights the question of be旭E of the spectator. The doubt cast on Estragon now is returned to the spectator himself. In fact, in Jf全iting for Godot, the spectator finds it difficult to side wi由 Estragon or Vladimir. Es­ tragon’s remark may lead the spectator to think that he has trouble with 血e血。可﹔ but a fur­ ther reading may suggest that what one has thought is also uncertain. The spectator may find Vladimir equally questionable. Vladimir observes "that things have changed here since yesterday’,--four or five leaves, for instance, grow on the tree oveminght. 訂ie spectator is tempted to ask if Vladi血tr is really suffering an ill田io且， as Estragon claims: how could the leaves grow so big overnight ？ τbe spectator now is chilled by the thought that what he saw in Act I may also have been illuso可﹒ τhe play thus shows multiple ambiguity. Ambiguity according to noted semioticians like Eco violates the sign坦er-sign由ed coordinates. The strength of ambigui可 in this play does not dwell in a question whether Vladimir or the spectator has a vision or whether a nightmare throws Estragon into oblivion. Rather, Beckett’s language, with its ambiguous passages, opens up possibilities for the participation of the reader or the spectator to re-examine and to concretize the text. The ambigui叮F of the te泣 is closed as such that it renders an opening to the reader.

τhe te泣 is ambiguous partly because, asτ'heodor Adorno remarks’”it becomes the

89- 12 〈固立中興大學畫中夜間都學報〉 aggregate of its empty forms, of a grammar that has renounced all reference to its content”

(72）.百ie ambiguity of Beckett’s language partly lies in its desultoriness. As Hesla says’”a playgoer is a pri'討leged eavesdropper"(l49). Situated in a different plane 世Om the charac· ters, the spectator would find the language of the latter elliptic and inaccessible.τbis is especially true in En申amc. The spectator is an outsider who views and overhears a dia­ logue of which he neither knows the beginning nor the ending. Yet the characters seem to be conscious of the same objective of communication and they have at their disposal more or less the same "filing cabinet of prefabricated representations”(Jakobson 119). The dia­ logue sounds like a conversation between two passers-by, between two passengers in a bus, or, to some degree, between two Zen Buddhists. It is difficult to trace how much Beckett is shadowed by the oriental philosophy 11 , but we find some striking echoes of the words of eastern sages. The words，” Gog。” and ”Didi" amazingly sound exactly the same as Chinese characters respectively for elder brother （哥

哥） and younger brother （弟弟）. Similarity in sound corresponds to similarity in meaning.

Estragon and Vladimir in any sens巴 can be treated as brothers to each other. Their being 「＼ addressed as (by each other) Gago and Didi thus are given a metonymical overtone. The dialogue in Endgame markedly reflects a tinge of Zen's language style. The images in Zen Buddhists' conversation jump from one to another without a linear trace. The listener has to situate himself in the same consciousness of th巳 speaker, where the idea lies latent in images. Whether or not he can catch the meaning in these ”jumpy” locutions depends on his insight and capability of his intuition. A monk asks a Zen teacher, for example, "All laws go to one, and where does this one go?” The teacher Chao-chou （趙州） answers,” When I was in Ch'ing-Chou, a tailor made me a gown which weighs seven kilograms." No linear relation between the question and answer and the answer is hardly an answer at all.

The dialogue between Hamm and Clov in Ena位ame e曲ibits this kind of pattern:

Hamm：執Thy don’t you kill me? Clov: I don’t know the combination of the cupboard. Hamm: Go and get two bicycle-wheels. (8) In one way, the dialogue between Hamm and Clov may partially correspond to what Pra-

-90- Time,Bei時， and Language : Toward a Phenomenological R~ding of Endgame 血d Waiting for Godot 13 jnaparamita (The ”Diamond" Sutra，金剛經） enacts that ’,all o吋ect－血ages are illusory”; all object-referred actually refer to emptiness.12 Therefore, dwel曲ig on the "concept” of non­ existence of all objects, the answer is unlikely to anchor any locus of referent-referred cor­ relation. In another w呵， however, although the dialogue lacks a linear concatenation be­ tween two lines, like the lines in the conversation between Zen Buddhists, there is still an implicit l旭k lurking between them insofar as the audience can project himself into the plane where the characters or the interlocutors stay. In other words, the reader should betake himself as the direct receiver of the message from the addresser, rather than the ob­ server of the transaction of the message. 百iis projection directly into the conversation al­ lows him to take a glance at the openness of the addresser's consciousness. A tentative reading of Chao-chou’s answer might be like this: the very one law goes to where the un­ usual usualness lies. In other words, this law is a Jaw of variety in unity; the daily a旺air of making a gown is a transformed universali可 in particularity. Clov's seemingly incongruous statement that he wants to know the combination of the cupboard may partly answer the question why he does not want to kill Hamm although this interlocking question-answer demonstrates their language wits rather than a reflection of real motive ， τbe spectator projects himself in a litera可 dimension where he is no longer an outsider but an active par­ ticipant in its production.

In this vi巳叭 one becomes dubious of Peter Gidal's observation that in W垣iting for Godot ”the viewer is placed in some purposively perfect (ideal) position, separate from the viewer-as-subject’s historical contradiction" and this "disallows the viewer-as-subject a place in production"(74). Even th 巳 most fleeting language comes to the spectator's concretiza­ tion to perceive its ··fleetingness.” Barbara Trieloff coπectly asse口5，官 eckett 司 s te泣s con tin ually demand this hermeneutic response. Meaning, we discover, lies in the relationship be­ tween the te泣 and the interpreter”(95). Meaning, thus, in Beckett’s plays, manifests itself at least in three strata. For the characters, the depleted existence is marked with meaningless duration. For the playwright, to depict the meaningless existence of the characters is to endow a meaning to the function of writing. The writer inscribes his being in the writing space, so does the playwright pro-

-91 一 14 〈固立中興大學畫中夜間部學報〉 ject his being onto the stage through the actors’ performance. For the reader, he can cap­ ture both the meaningless existence as acted out by the characters and the meaning of writ­ ing or stage-performance itself. Furthermore, he tries to materialize a meaning in seem­ ingly disjoined t間／perfo 訂nance and 坦 his actualization of the te說， he suddenly gazes at his own being in disclosure. Wolfgang Iser's noted The Implied Reader is devoted to the reader’s concretization of the text that sums up the gist of his often quoted Chapter, titled ’,The Reader Process: A Phenomenological Approach.” The dialectic of anticipation and retrospection, expectation and exasperation, assures a dynamic reading. 百ie flaw (or the hiatus or the gap) turns out to propel the reading in the flow. While there is rich trace of Heidegger's philosophy in

Iser"s perception, there is one chapter exempli布ing Beckett’s novels. Astonishing is that Iser's observation of Beckett's novels rightfully fits his plays as well. ”This compulsive cre­ ativity, together with a progressive deformation, makes the characters seem quite inaccessi­

ble to the reader’'(178). Yet ”they resolutely resist all attempts at total comprehension, for this is the only way in which they can break down the barriers to the reader’s contemplation

of his own idea"(177 ）， τhe reader’s role in Beckett's works would be the one who realizes

the unattainable absolute meaning of the character or the sto 可﹒ τhe significance of his role would be his concretization of the escapable, slippery meaning in the process of his search for meaning.

Probably it is true to infer that the most sign也cant phase of Beckett’s language in

these two plays is: the plays activate the spectator’s self in perc巳ption and creativity. The ambiguity of time, space and identity gives more room for the reader or the spectator to in­ tegrate or re-integrate the play out of his own perception. For an author, to make a work ambiguous is to renounce his own authority over the work. This renunciation of the author's

authority seems to erase the being of the self, yet it disperses and disseminates the self‘ In

an age of ’'The death of the author’” the name of an author turns out to be positively and yet ironically inscribed in writing through its self-negation. Negativity sometimes motivates

positivity. Iser in his another seminal work, The Act of Reading, obse白白：官y using

negation to turn language against itself, Beckett shows clearly just how language functions”( 223). Similarly, Beckett enacts his name through self-negation by offering a creative space

nHd門／ UH Time, Bei嗯， and Language : Toward a Phenomenologi但I Reading of Endgame and Waiting for Godot 15 for the reader or the spectator. Julio Cortazar in his Hopscotch argues that the reader is an accomplice of the author，冶 traveling companion’,( 407). He is simultaneanized 芷 he can abolish his own time and substitute the characters' time. ”τhus the reader would be able to become a co participant and co-sufferer of the experience through which the novel­ ist is pass旬， at the same moment and in same form ’,(407). As most se血ioticians like

Kristeva a血m, Robbe-Grillet suggests the 且tertextuality of literary studies 坦 his For A

λTew Novel and also ask the reader to participate in constructing the texts like E台tram Shandy, works by Joyce or by Faulkner. Beckett's admiration for Sterne and Joyce may also imply his expectation of this kind of reading of his own works from the reader (Pilling

144). As J. E. Dearlove remark且， Beckett’ s works 叮 are intelli巨ble only 芷 the reader 缸， sumes partial responsibility for them and a自ep臼 the task of reconstructing the disruptive and broken forms”(40). Beckett "does demand 血at his reader be involved in the recon­ struction of a discourse”(Ibid) . Beckett’s texi in a血bigui可y and fragmentation does not mark a line of exclusion, rather, it sends the reader an invitation.

But to. participate in the creation of the work is not 血erely to concretize a text, the reader also concretizes his self for those moments of duration. It seems that the famous adage by Oscar Wilde reverberates still resoundingly in contempora可 readers ：可t is the spectator, not life, that art really mirrors." In most cases, art reacts to life and yet it reflects the reader or the spectator. A constructive reading 叮 entails the possibility that we may formulate ourselves and also discover what had previously seemed to elude our conscious­ ness"(Iser, The implied Reade1﹔ 294），訂1e self is often buried deep in stratification of pre.­ conceptions and reading 旭 this way exposes the self of the reader to the spotlight. To un­ ravel Beckett’s te:x1 is to cognize the self as a capable reader. Actively e:x]Jeriencing the characters in Beckett’s plays in confounded time and space, and being, the reader e:x"Pe 討ences his own being in existence. A te泣且n never be entered unless the subject-object division is resolved. The reader’s participation in the text is not merely a contempora叩 theoretical Jargon or srtategy. It shold be seriously conceived as a life force of intersubjectivity. Fragmented as it is, it is life in multiple forms ， τbe disap­ pearance of self-object division enables the reader to deeply feel that ”Beckett’s characters silently struggle toward forms of being or structures that are suddenly disclosed by a 耳目，

nw叮叮

> u 16 〈 固立中興大學臺中夜間部學報〉

ture or 恆 words" (Guichamaud 123). An identity wi由 others enhances a clearer view of the self. When a reader ac臼 h a work, he awakens an otherwise dormant being.τbe vac­ uum of duration in Beckett’s play in ambiguous and disjunctive language is not simply a game to kill the reader’s time.τbe reader may come to realize that the play is a writing space acted out on stage to preserve an idea and a self. Beckett himself deeply professes: ” The forms are many in which the unchanging seeks relief from its formlessness"( Malone Dies 197). Also, he ’,evoked existence as ’the mess’ and defined the writer’s function as the struggle to ，自nd a form that accomodated the mess"13(Zurbrugg 179). Creation be­ stows chaos with a from; even it sometimes appears formless. For an author, the forma­ tion of a work ”is his means of saving his identity from death”(Poulet 61). For the reader, the stage or the writing space is a transformed emanation of his own self. All of these can­ not be fully recogn泣ed unless he is being actively in the work as both a character and partly an author.

nudA44 Time, Being, and Language : Toward a Phenomenological Reading of Endgame and l站iting for Godot 17

Notes l . This refers to the setting of En申-a.me. Many critics regard this setting as the inside of a skull; Bernard, for instance, sees this is one of Beckett’s most important images. See

Bernard, 102. See also Rabinovi泣， 60. 2. This refers to the setting of Waiting for Godot. 3. For Heidegger, this being-in the-world or being-with-the-world is one’s phenomenal or

existential conte:i.1. Being is always being－前th others. See Being and Z五百e, Division I ,

Part N, for detail. In this paper, unless spec血ed, all quotes from Heidegger are from Being and Time.

4. For Heidegger, the linkage of "I" and others is established through 且re. With care, be­ ing can be with-others. See Being and Time, Division One, Part VI.

5.In I的＇iting for Godot, the incident that Estragon and Vladimir change and mix the hats

is another example of the ambiguity of identi可． 6. See Daivd H. Hesla, for instance, (152). Hesla’s argument in this aspect mainly quotes from Hugh Kenner. See Kenner, 155.

7. Critics like Esslin express similar views: :Michael Robinson sa抖， 刊訂ie theater allows Beckett to provide visual evidence of the untrustworthiness of language”(229-30). Linda

Ben-Zvi in discussion the relationship between Beckett and Fritz Mauthner a血rms the limits of language. See Ben-Zvi, 183-200.

8. Many of Beckett’s works clearly exhibit the phenom 巳na of silence. For instance, in The

Unnamable, "when they go sile 肘， it will be dark, not a sound, not a gl回mer" (108); in

Malone Dies, there is a depiction of "silence ... m the heart of dark”(27). Other refer『

ences to silence, see The Unnamabli白 109; Malone Dii閏月 31. And in 胏扭曲g for

Godot and Endgam烏 the dialogue between characters are often interluded by silence. With respect to scenes or images of silence in Beckett’s works, Rubin Rabinovitz has a

remarkable discussion in his ’,Beckett, Dante, and the Metaphorical Representation of Intangible Reality."

9.τbis is my transformation of Heidegger’s concept of the guiding formula of language

which is a soundless echo of language. See his On the 即告tv to Language, 113.

-95 一 18 〈 固立中興大學畫中夜間部學報〉

10. Idle talk, for Heidegger, is an expre岱ion of inauthentic being. See his Being and T曲e, Division I , Part V, Section 35. 11. In this aspect, it is noteworthy that John Sheedy in his ”The Net” gives a comparative discussion between 阿ting for Godot and Chapter LXXIII of Tao-Te-Ching （道德經 ). See Sheedy, 163-66.

12.In Buddhism, the concept of emptiness (sunya，空） is not really empty. It also posits ex『

isting (bhava，有）. Master Tao - Yuan （道源） interprets wisely this concept as:”Real emp­

tiness is not empty; it is wonderful existing. Wonderful existing is not e姐sting ﹔ it is real emptiness." （真空非空是妙有，妙有非有是真空） 13. Zurbrugg quotes Beckett’s remark from Tom F. Driver who conducted the interview with Beckett in 1961.

n 刊hu< u 百me,Bei時， and Language : Toward a Phenomenolo耳目j Reading of E扭扭扭e and Waiting for Godot 19

Works Cited

Adorno ，甘1eodor W’”Trying to Understand En申am月 W Samuel Beckett Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1985.

Baldwin, Helene L. Samuel Beckett's Real Silence. Universi可 Park and London: The Pennsylvania University, 1981. Barker, Stephen. ”Conspicuous Absence: Trace and Power in Beckett’s Drama,” Rethink· ing Beckett. Ed. Lance St. John Butler and Robin J. Davis. London：前1e Macmillan Press, 1990.

Barnard, G. 巳 Samuel Beckett: A New Approach. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1970.

Beckett, Samuel. En申ame. New York: Grove Press, 1958.

一一．正fappy Days. New York: Grove Press, 1961.

一． λ也lone Dies. New York: Grove Press, 1956.

一. The Unnamable. New York: Grove Press, 1958.

一．協告iting for Godot New York: Grove Press 司 1954.

Beckett, Samuel and Duthuit, Georges. "Three Dialogues,"' Samuel Beckett: A Collection 。•f Critical Es.均宮， Englewood Cl晶， N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.

Ben-Zvi, Linda. ”Samuel Beckett, Fritz Mauthn缸， and the Limits of Language," Samuel Beckett Ed. Harold Bloom. New York; Chelsea House Publishers, 1985.

Bloom Harold, Ed. 品muel Beckett. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 19 日5.

Butler, Lance St John. Samuel Beckett and 的eλleaning ofBeing: A Stu申 in Literature as Ph1losophJλLondon ： τhe Macmillan Press, 1984.

．．可 Ed. Re的inking Beckett London ： τhe Macmillan Press, 1990. Connor, Steven. Samuel Beckett: Repetition. Theol)' and Te.\1. London and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988.

Copela咽， Hann油 Case. Art and 的c Ar. '.st in the Works of 品muel Becke 汀， The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1975.

Co口缸ar, Julio. Hopscotch. Trans. Gregory Rabassa. New York: Raven Books, 1966.

Dearlove, J. E. Accommo曲曲g the Chaos: Samuel Beckett·s.岫'11丑iational Art. Durha血： Duke University Press, 1982.

Essli且， Martin. The Theatre of 的c Absurd New York: Double.day, Anchor Book, 1961.

Federrnan, Raymond. ”τ'he Irnpossibili可 of Saying the Same Old Thing the Same Old Way:

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Samuel Beckett’s Fiction Since Comment C'est; "L'Esprit createur, 11, no.3 (1971), 21-43. Friedman, Alan Warren. Rossman, Charles. Sherzer, Dina. Ed. Beckett Translatilg / 了于-anslating Beckett. University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University, 1987. Gidal, Peter. Understanding Beckett. Ney; York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986. Guichamaud, Jacques. "Existence Onstage’” Samuel Beckett. Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Celsea House Publishers, 1985. Harper, Howard. ”How It Is’” Samuel Beckett: The Art ofRhetoric. Ed. Edouard Morot­ Sir et al. Chapel Hill; North Carolina Studies in the Romance Languages and Liter­ atures, 1976. Hassan, Ihab. The Literature of Silence: Henry Miller and Samuel and Beckett. New York: Knopf, 1967. Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

-. On the 研包y to Language. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1971.

Hesla, David H. The Shape of 臼aos: An Interpretation of the Art of Samuel Becke汀， Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1971.

Iser’嗎＇olfgang. The Act of Reading. Baltimore and London ： τhe Johns Hopkins Univer­ sity Press, 1978.

~ The Implied Reader. Baltimore and London ： τ'he Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.

Jakobson, Roman. ”Two Aspects of Language; Metaphor and Metonymy’” European Lit­ era可 The。可 and Practice: From Existential Phenomenology to Structualism. Ed. Verson W. Gras. New York: Dell Publishing, 1973. Kenner, Hugh. A Reader's Guide to Samuel Beckett. New York: Farrar, Straus and Gioux, 1973. Pilling, John. Samuel Beckett. London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976.

Poul前， Georges. ” Criticism and the Experience of Interiority’” The Structuralist Contro­ versy Ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkings University Press, 1970.

Pri血， Jessica. "The Fine Art of Inexpression," Beckett Translating/ Translating Beckett. Ed. Alan Warren Friedman et al. University Park and Iρndon ： τh e Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987.

Rabinovi泣， Rubin. "Beckett, Dante, and the Metaphorical Representation of Intangible Reality’” Beckett Translating/ Translating Beckett. Ed. Alan Warren Friedman et al. University Park and London; The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987.

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Riffaterre Michael. Semiotics ofPoetry. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.

Robbe-Grillet, Alain,”Samuel Beckett, or ’Presence' in the τheatre ’” Ed. Martin Esslin. Samuel Beckett: A Collection of C抽出I Essa戶﹒ Englewood Cli宜， N. J.: Prentice­ Hall, 1965.

Robinson, Michael. The Long Sonata ofthe Dead New York: Grove Press, 1969.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological 五世ay on Ontology. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Libra可， 1956.

Sheedy, John J. "The Net," Casebook on I拍iting for Godot. Ed. Ruby Cohn. New York: Grove Press, 1967.

Sherzer, Dina. "Words About Words,., Beckett 扭扭曲ting/ Translating Beckett. Ed. Alan Warren Friedman et al. University Park and London：百ie Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987.

Topsfield, Valerie. The Humour ofS.1muel Beckett. London ： τne Macmillan Press, 1988.

Watso 且， David. Paradox & Desire in Samuel Beckett 全 Fiction. London: The Macmillan Press, 1991.

Zurbrugg, Nicholas. Beckett and Proust New Jersey; Colin Smythe, 1988.

門 門 MJMJ 22 〈固立中興大學畫中夜間部學報〉

時間﹒存有﹒語言

一貝克特劇本的現象學思維

簡政玉女可＝

摘要

貝克特的劇本挂常桂冠于荒謬和是無，當代的讀者進而將其歸類於典型的後

現代 Jt1l 場，因此「沒有意義」。本文一方面指出現有以現象學的論點討論貝克特

劇場的不足，另一方面嘗試以海德格的觀點探討所謂的意義在後現代的「意義」

。傳統現象學的論述必須經由當代的輸驗，和挂現代對話，才能證實其「存有」

，當 f呈現代式是解結構質疑其所謂的「存在」 (presence ）時，「存在」必須面對

對話，不能逃避，才能「存在」。本文經由海德格的哲學觀照，說明當創作家在

舞臺上使「存在」的用心，看到文本「存在」的意義。

關鍵詞：現車學、海德格、虛像、事實上、與存有並冉、「存在」、沈默、閑談

、真實的存有

＊國立中興大學外國語文學系教授

國立中興大學畫中夜間部學報（Journal of Taichung Evening School, NCHU), Vol 月 1996), 79~ 100

一 100-