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DUNN, D. Elwood, 1942- THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA AS REFLECTED IN SELECTED POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

The American University, Ph.D., 1972 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

^3)Copyright by

D. Elwood Dunn

1972 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA AS REFLECTED IN SELECTED POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS

by

D. Elwood Dunn

Submitted to the Faculty of the School of International Service of the American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Studies

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman:

Dean of the School jf Date:

1972

The American University _ _ Washington, D.C. THE AMEBICAN UNIVERSITY JUL 191972 PLEASE NOTE:

Some pages may have

indistinct print.

Filmed as received.

University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

INTRODUCTION

PART I SOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

I. THE MAJOR FACTORS SHAPING LIBERIA'S POLICY: BACKGROUND . . . 1

The Historical Factors ...... 1

The Social Factors ...... 16

The Economic Factors ...... 26

The Policy-Making Process as a Factor ...... 43

I I . LIBERIA'S POLICY ON POLITICAL ISSUES: 1944-1971 ...... 53

The Principles ...... 53

The Principles in Practice ...... 63

Liberia and the United Nations ...... 74

PART I I LIBERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN ACTION: THE UNITED NATIONS CASE STUDIES

I I I . LIBERIA AND THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE ...... 80

The Apartheid Question ...... 81

The Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations ...... 115

The Congo Crisis, 1960-1961 ...... 154

IV. LIBERIA AND THE COLONIAL ISSUES ...... 194

Question of the Disposal of the Former Italia n Colonies ...... 195 i i i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

The Question of A lg e ria...... 222

The Question of South West Africa ...... 245

CONCLUSIONS ...... 274

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 285

APPENDICES• 303 iv

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

I . A. Leading Indices of Economic Growth ...... 34

B. Indices of Growth of Real National Product in Selected Countries, 1954-1960 ...... 34

II. Assistance to Liberia (Total Actual Expenditures by Economic Sectors in Thousands of Dollars) ...... 38

I I I . Foreign Aid Receipts and Debt Retirement, 1965-1970 ...... 39

IV. External Medium - and Long-Term Public Debt Including Undisbursed as of December 31, 1967 ...... 41

V. Table Sampling African Votes on the China Representation Item, Session V (1950) to Session XV (1960)=...... 125

VI. Table Sampling African Votes on China Representation Item, Session VI (1961) to Session XXVI (1971) ...... 140

VII. Table Sampling African Votes on the Accredition of the Kasavubu Delegation ...... 173

V III. Table Sampling African Votes on the Congo Problem, General Assembly Session XV - 2nd Part ...... 184

IX. Table Sampling African Votes on the Future of Libya, General Assembly - 3rd Session ...... 205

X. Table Sampling African Votes on the Future of Somaliland, General Assembly - 3rd Session ...... 210 V

LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

TABLE PAGE

XI. Table Sampling African Votes on the Future of Eritrea, General Assembly - 3rd Session...... 212

X II. Table Sampling African Votes on the Future of Eritrea, General Assembly - 5th Session (1950) ...... 221 X

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0 4 t INTRODUCTION

An investigation into what had been written on Liberia's foreign policy revealed a real dearth of studies in this area. Because of the historically close dealings with the American people, most of the few studies of Liberia's foreign policy have focused on United States-

Liberia relations.1 In the early 1930's, Liberia was locked in a dis­ pute with the League of Nations that concerned accusations of slavery and forced labor being practiced in the republic. A second group of studies on Liberia's policy have centered on what has been called the

"slavery crisis".2 Thus, studies of Liberia's foreign relations have tended to dwell on United States-Liberia relations and League of

Nations-Liberia relations.

With the sole exception perhaps of an unpublished master's thesis,^ this w riter is unaware of any systematic study of Liberia's foreign policy that did not concentrate on Liberia's relationship with either the United States or the League of Nations. This state of af­ fairs seems to this w riter a modest ju stification for undertaking this study.

^The systematic studies unearthed by the w riter are almost a ll unpublished theses. These w ill figure both in the statement of sources of data and in the general bibliography.

2Here also (with the notable exception of Nnamdi Azikiwe's Liberia in World P o litic s ), theses make up most of the source material.

3foye c. Barnard, The Position of Liberia on Major Issues Before the United Nations (Western Reserve University, T9627. vii

The purpose of the study is to attempt a political inquiry into

Liberia's post-war policy, which, incidentally, corresponds to the

Presidency of William V. S. Tubman (1944-1971).

Because of the important use that Liberia makes of its United

Nations membership fo r the conduct o f its diplomacy, the w rite r has adopted a case-study approach to the subject. Analysis of Liberia's post-war policy, then, w ill be made through selected political issues in the United Nations.

In the first part, the study will set forth the sources and major developments of Liberia's policy from the beginning of the nation's history to the present.

Part two (the core of the study) will seek to reveal Liberia's policy in the world o f the United Nations (that is , since 1945) and tangentially relate that policy to Liberia's traditional political attitude (that is, prior to 1945). It is hoped that this study will add important details to the generalizations and statistics on "bloc p o litic s",^ so that the reader w ill be better able to understand the determinants of the voting pattern of an individual member state. The second chapter offers an outline and analysis of the major principles of Liberia's policy during the Tubman era and a general chronological development of that policy during the same period.

4Thomas Hovet, J r ., Africa in the United Nations, Northwestern, 1963, and Bloc Politics in the United Nations, Harvard University Press, 1961, fo r examples of studies on caucusing groups in the United Nations. The third and fourth chapters cover the international political

questions (United Nation case studies) grouped as the problems of in­

ternational peace and colonial problems, respectively. While there is

some obvious overlapping in the two sets of issues, the w riter has sep­

arated them because they are not the same in nature. More precisely,

Liberia considers both the Apartheid question and the Congo crisis® as much more closely related to the issue of peace (African peace, world

peace) than the colonial issues - disposal of the former Ita lia n colo­

nies, the Algerian question and the question of South West Africa® -

that have been chosen.

The case study approach w ill employ the United Nations debates as

a means of analysis.7 There is an advantage to the use of this research

technique. Not only are governments obliged to declare policy on a

broad range of topics, they are also subjected to doing so in a set

frame of reference. This means that for the purpose of the details of

international policy and comparative foreign policy,_the.political sci­ entist has access to an enviable experimental situation, in using the medium of the United Nations debates with its context of control and

®The question of the representation of China was a clear issue of international peace, or, as some would put i t , "a cold war problem".

®It has not been found necessary to include the other two major African colonial issue - Portugal's African Territories and Rhodesia because the Liberian positions on them parallel the position on South West Africa,

7Janet Welsh Brown's "Burmese Policy in the U.N.: An Analysis of Five Selected Political Questions", was useful in helping the writer crystallize his thoughts as to framework. See microfilm No. 3010, The American University Library. uniformity. One can, for instance, distinguish the Liberian brand of

"nonalignment" from the Guinean (Conakry), or the Liberian political attitude from the "new" African states.

The cases have been chosen because: (1) there is need for a suf­ ficien t period of time for the revelation of trends in Liberia's policy, and (2) they represent the political issues that were or are of para­ mount concern to post-war Liberia and also to much of Africa.

This methodological approach w ill fa c ilita te a balanced evalua­ tion of policy; Liberia's stand on these cases should say much about the state's political role in the world organization. By comparative analysis, one can illustrate how Liberia's policy differs from, or is similar to, that of her historical mentor, the United States or from a

"new" African state. In this regard, Liberia's voting record and speeches w ill, at appropriate points, be compared with those of the

United States on the one hand, and the Republic of Guinea (Conakry) on the other.®

The lim its of the selected cases are acknowledged. They alone can never te ll us about a ll the facets of policy. I f the cases can substantiate the generalizations made about Liberia's policy or point to discrepancies between professed policy and practised policy, they w ill have amply served the purpose.

The research sources have been categorized as primary and secondary.

®For those issues prior to 1958 or before Guinea's independence, the Liberian position will be placed in the context of the United States- Soviet Union poles of opinion. X

Included in the primary sources are o ffic ia l documents of the United

Nations organizations, the official papers of President William V. S.

Tubman, documents of Liberian governmental departments, and importantly, an interview with Liberia's Secretary of State, J. Rudolph Grimes, which lasted over an hour. The interview covered a broad range of issues be­ fore the United Nations and was conducted at the Liberian Mission to the

United Nations in October of 1971. I t may be useful to add that the w riter served in the Liberian Department of State as a Cadet and as a clerk-typist between January and October 1965."

Among the secondary sources are the works of B ixler, Azikiwe and numerous unpublished doctoral theses on various aspects of Liberian pol­ it ic a l, economic, cu ltural, and developmental history.

The w riter is indebted to Dr. Darrell Randall of the School of

International Service, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, fo r his many useful suggestions and other assistance; and to Dr. Larman Wilson, Mem­ ber of the Committee, for his advice. Special thanks are due to Dr.

Durward V. Sandifer, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, who contributed immensely to the final mise-au-point by his appraisal, and who also served on the Committee. The w riter gratefully acknowledges the Department of Education, Government of Liberia, for providing the bulk of the funds which made possible the undertaking and completion of this study. Gratitude is expressed to a few friends, both in Liberia and the United States, who aided by making source material available.

Finally, special thanks to my family who, with warmth and understanding, sustained me throughout the research. PART I

SOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT OF LIBERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY Chapter I

THE MAJOR FACTORS SHAPING LIBERIA'S POLICY: BACKGROUND

1. THE HISTORICAL FACTORS

The history of Liberia may be divided into three broad periods:

(1) the period before the colonial settlement, roughly from 600 B.C. to the very early 1800's, (2) the colonial period, including the causes that led to colonization and independence (1800 - 1848), and (3) the period of the republic from 1848 to the present.

Knowledge of the f ir s t period comes from the reports of Necho, the Egyptian Pharoah, who, we are to ld , sent a Phoenician fle e t around the West African coast in 600 B.C., and the navigator Hanno of Carthage who sailed a century la te rJ These early vis its seem to have been largely exploratory, as would be those of the Portuguese who were to follow.

After the sailor, Pedro de Cintra of Portugal, reached the

Liberian coast in 1461, the area became known as the Grain Coast pri^ marily due to the abundance of grains of Maleguetta pepper, then as valuable as gold, which was the principal item of trade. In 1663 the

B ritish Royal Company installed two trading posts on the Grain Coast

(Mesurado and Grand Sesters), both of which were destroyed by the

Dutch a year la te r.

1r . W. Porter and W. R. Stanley, "Liberia", Encyclopedia Britannica (1970), p.1025. (Excerpt) 2

Only at the beginning of the 19th century was interest in the

Grain Coast revived. With the tide fo r the abolition of the slave trade and slavery rising in those parts of the world that nurtured the inhuman practice, the Grain Coast was suggested as a place suitable for

"disposal" of freed slaves.

This takes us then into period two of Liberia's history. The principal fact of the history of Liberia (at least starting with this period) is the aftermath of the transatlantic slave trade. The imme­ diate situation to which the founding of Liberia is traceable is the condition of "free people of color" in the United States of America following the birth of the American Republic in 1787. A number of

American notables, among them Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe, had at different times aired concern for the plight of the free blacks.

Following the black uprising in Richmond, Virginia in the fall of 1800,

Jefferson, who was then President of the United States, sought to show his concern by attempting to cooperate with others in a package solu­ tion to the problem.2

Governor James Monroe of Virginia was authorized by a unanimous vote of the Virginia State Legislature "to correspond with the Presi­ dent of the United States on the subject of purchasing lands without

2Hannah Jones, The Struggle for Political and Cultural Unifica­ tion in Lib eria, 1847-1930 (Northwestern University, Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, 1962) pp. 50-55; A. Alexander, A History of Colonization on the Western Coast of A frica, (New York: Negro Universities Press, Reprinted 1969) p. 63. 3

the jurisdiction of the State of Virginia whither persons obnoxious to

the law or dangerous to the peace of society may be r e m o v e d " . 3 j n his

communication to the President, the Governor suggested a portion of

land in the American west for the black settlement. In his reply

Jefferson indicated approval of the Virginia resolution, but had in mind a te rrito ry non-contiguous to the United States as site of set­ tlement. 4 Meanwhile, President Jefferson started correspondence with the British regarding the possibility of sending American blacks to the Sierra Leone colony.5 But the Napoleonic wars in Europe and later the War of 1812 between America and Britain ended these negotiations.

At this juncture, the increase in the number of free blacks was causing concern among religious men. In 1810, there were about 60,000 free blacks in the United States. By 1820 they reached a quarter mil­ lion.® Chief among the religious leaders was a Presbyterian Minister,

Robert Finley, who became the leading s p irit behind the creation of the

American Colonization Society (ACS) in 1816. By this date, the Anglo-

American war had ended and the question of black colonization was again raised. The ACS fe lt that i t had the most reasonable solution.

The purpose of the ACS/ according to the declaration of its founders, was to organize repatriation to Africa for those free blacks

3philip Slaughter, The Virginia History of African Colonization, (Ferguson, Va: Macfarland, 1855) p .1 4lbicl, p. 63

5Founded in 1787 by the Sierra Leone Company with royal backing.

6Jones, 0 £. cit., p. 52 4 willing to go. The motives for the organization are legion. The major ones may be summarized thus: response to the wishes of some blacks to

leave America; belief of its leading white sponsors that blacks could not function effectively in American society and that the "return to

Africa" would be "the restoration of a race to its original integri­ t y ..." ; fear of white southerners that a danger was posed to slavery by the existence of free blacks.7

One writer, in defense of the originators of the ACS, stated that "whatever they might think of slavery", they were "determined to engage in a benevolent enterprise, which should aim to accomplish a great good, without meddling with a subject so exciting, and so dif­ fic u lt to be disposed o f, as that of American slavery..."®

But whatever the good intentions of the officers and members of the society regarding the question of finding a place of refuge for free blacks in America, the a v a ila b ility of material resources would be an absolute necessity for the success of the undertaking. Also basic to the success of colonization would be the tacit political backing of the United States Government. In the case of an earlier British- inspired repatriation of blacks on the West African coast, both of the above requirements were amply met. Neither the ACS nor the United

States Government was unaware of the Sierra Leone Colony.®

7william Nesbit & Samuel Williams: Two Black Views of Liberia, (New York: Arno Press, 1969) Edwin S. Redkey's Foreword, TT.

®A. Alexander, op. cit., pp. 15-16 ®Ibid, pp. 39-47 5

Liberia was conceived as a result of concerted effo rt between the ACS and the Government of the United States following the passage of the March 3, 1819 anti-slave trade law. While the ACS had its plans well worked out, i t lacked the material resources. On the other hand, the United States Government, "also looking for a site on the West

Coast of Africa as a temporary home for recaptured Africans on the

Atlantic Ocean", had the financial means but could take no action since i t was constitutionally debarred from undertaking colonization. 10

On January 14, 1817, Congress was petitioned by the ACS for aid in the plans for free black repatriation. I t was not until the Con­ gressional Act of March 3, 1819 that a positive response came. The

Act, among other things, greatly accelerated the colonization process of both ex-slaves and free blacks on the West African coast. I t pro­ vided for an American agent in Africa who would receive and arrange settlement for the "returned exiles". The President of the United

States was empowered "to make such regulations and arrangements as he may deem expedient for the safe keeping, support, and removal beyond the lim its of the United States of a ll such negroes, mulatoes, or per­ sons of color, as may be so delivered and brought within th eir ju ris - diction."H

l&Jones: op., c it . , p.49.

11 Raymond Bixler, The Foreign Policy of the United States in Liberia, {New York: The Pageant Press, 1957X"p. 4; Jones, op c it . , pp. 64-65. After much public debate over the Act, including a "Supreme Court opinion on the issue of colonization",™ President Monroe sent a special message to Congress on December 19, 1819. In i t he detailed a most liberal interpretation of the Act. It must be recalled here that he had been an ardent friend of black repatriation.™

On February 6, 1820 the Elizabeth, the Mayflower of Liberian history, set sail with eighty-six immigrants, escorted by the USS

Cyane, a navy vessel. This v/as the fir s t group of immigrants. This group formed the nucleus of the settler population of what became Li­ beria.™

By the early 1840's, Liberia had acquired the semblances of nationhood. Before and during this same period, the major European powers of the day "held sway on the Coast of Guinea"; which included the Liberian coast. Direct confrontation between the Liberian author­ itie s and some European nationals began when certain Europe merchants began to openly defy Liberia's t a r if f laws. Arguing that Liberia was not a state, some of them carried th eir goods into the then Liberian

Commonwealth without the payment of custom duties.™

™Jones, op. c it . , p. 65; Charles Huberich, A Political and Leg­ islative History of Liberia, (Vol. I, p.69).

™Bixler, op. c it.,p. 4; Jones, op. c it., pp. 66-67; Huberich, op. c i t . , p. 70.

™Jones, op. c i t . , pp. 68-86; C.’ Abayomi Cassell, Liberia, His- tory of the First African Republic, (New York: Fountainhead Publishers, Inc. 1970T"pp. 65-79.

™L. A. M arinelli, The New Liberia, (New York, London: F. A. Praegeis Publishers, 1964) pp. 37-38. 7

For the preservation of its "corporate existence", Liberia im­ pounded the L ittle Ben, a vessel belonging to a B ritish subject for violating its ta riff laws. Soon the Liberian Government-British sub­ ject confrontation would become a Liberian Government-British Govern­ ment confrontation. The British first retaliated by seizing the John

Seyes, a Liberian vessel and selling i t . Liberia appealed to its par­ ent organization, the ACS, and the latter turned to the United States

Government for advice.

The B ritish , meanwhile, sought through diplomatic channels to know "the nature and extent of the connexion subsisting between the

American colony of Liberia... and the government of the United States."

Mr. Upshur, the United States Secretary of State, formulated in a let­ te r what la te r became standard American policy toward Liberia. Noting that Liberia was established by "a voluntary association of American citizens" and that "its objectives were to introduce Christianity and promote civilization in Africa", he wrote in a pointed reply to a

British Government query, inter alia:

...It is due to her Majesty's Government that I should inform you that this government [U.S.] regards i t [Liberia] as occupying a peculiar position, as possessing peculiar claims to the friendly consideration of all Christian powers; that this government w ill, at all times, be prepared to interpose its good offices to prevent any encroachment by the colony upon any just rig h t of any nation; and that it would be very unwilling to see it despoiled of its territory rightfully acquired, or improperly restrained in the ex­ ercise of its necessary rights and powers as an independent s e ttle ­ ment. 17

1^Abayomi C. Cassel1, Liberia: History of the First African Repub- lic . (New York: Fountainhead Publishers, In c ., 1970) p. 128. ^ L e tte r of Mr. Upshur to Mr. Fox in American Journal of In ter­ national Law, Supplement, 1910, pp. 212-214. After the ACS had been assured of the substance of the United

States Government's attitu d e , i t advised the people of the Liberian

Corranonwealth "to take into th eir own hands the whole work of s e lf- government, including the management of all their foreign relations'.'^

Liberia's Declaration of Independence was then in the very near future. If one can speak of a burning Liberian nationalism, this period started it all. Disillusioned at'the*half-hearted^attitude of the United States Government coupled with the national feeling of sus­ pense, Hilary Teague (Liberia's f ir s t Secretary of State) voiced the sentiments of many Liberians when he said:

. . . I t is from within that the elements of national overthrow have most commonly evolved, and the weakness under which nations expire generally results from disease of the national h e a rt... The genius of universal emancipation, bending from her lofty seat, invites you to accept the wreath of national independence. The voice of your friends, swelling from the breeze, cries to you afar — Raise your standard! Assert your independence!! Throw your banners to the world!1!19

On July 5, 1847, the f ir s t Liberian constitutional convention convened for the purpose of preparing a Declaration of Independence and organizing a national government fo r an independent L ib eria .20 On the

26th of the same month, the declaration was made to "the nations of

Christendom" and the constitution was duly signed.

Commenting on the Declaration of Independence Azikiwe has said:

. . . I t is a matchless document in the records of African p o litic a l institutions. It is destined to arouse the lethargy of millions

^Marinelli, op. c it., p. 37. 19Azikiwe, op. c it., p. 60.

20cassell, op. c i t . , Chapter 9. of Africans, at home and abroQv!, to a realization of the political destiny of the black man in the history of the world. Unfortunate' ly , this document failed to give the Liberian indigenes the praise due to them for not only accommodating the ,immigrants,bbut?also as­ similating and amalgamating with them. I t failed to recognize the political acumen and the social and material cultures of the Afri­ can5 tribes which inhabit these regions. This l i t t l e oversight, due probably to Christian zealousness, might have averted the ever persistent bugaboo of the aboriginal problem.21

This "aboriginal problem" has been the issue over which the struggle

for Liberia's political and cultural unification has been waged.

With independence proclaimed and the constitution duly signed

and ratified, Liberia began both de facto and de jure existence. De

facto existence had been the case prior to this period, for as Huber­

ich has said, Liberia "possessed fu ll sovereign rights acquired under

a valid derivative title from the native chiefs, having full power,

under native laws and under international law, or under an original

t it le based on occupation".22 Existence on both counts followed the

establishment of the republic and the recognition extended by members

of the family of nations.23

The third period of Liberia's history, the period of the Re­

public, had by now set in. Aptly characterized as "the century of

survival" (at least as concerns the pre-World War I I section of this

period), this era cannot be understood unless the omnipresence and the

2lAzikiwe, op. c it., pp. 61-63. The aboriginal problem will be taken up in the section on "Social Factors".

22Huberich, op. c i t . . Vol. I , p. 274. 23Great Britain recognized Liberia in 1848, followed shortly thereafter by France and othe European nations. Recognition from the United States did not come until 1862. 10

omnipotence of European colonialism in Africa is fully appreciated.

Marinelli makes the analogy that in the same manner that free blacks

were a threat to the institution of slavery in the United States, a

free black republic in an ocean of "white" possessions in West Africa

was a threat to the institution of colonialism. As circumstances in

the United States in the f ir s t half of the 1800's had resulted in the

founding of the parent organization fo r Liberia,2^ so circumstances in

Africa had resulted in the possibilities that led to the settlement of

Liberia.

In Africa of the early 19th century, the age of colonial imperi­

alism was in the immediate future. Britain was following a policy of

slavery abolition in her empire, and therefore was not wholly unfriend­

ly to a negro republic as "a refuge fo r the free people of color of

North America". France was recovering from the Napoleonic wars, and,

in any case, Jules Ferry's "poussie coloniale" was yet in the future.

But while the mood of the "powers th at were"jrwas one of cnon-hosti 1-tty, the

time was not distant when they would regard a free negro republic in

Africa with some apprehension as the fierce battle for exploitation

and division of the continent broke out -- the scramble for Africa.25

^ "S e lf-in te re s t, prompted by the wish to be rid of the problem - of the free negro in a slave society, combined with the great philan­ thropic interest of the ACS had pressured the U.S. Government to as­ sume large responsibilities in the founding of the negro state in Africa..." Bixler, op. c it., p. 13.

25Ibid. Following the 1870 Franco-Prussian war, France began a policy of

colonial expansion. This was no mere consolidation of colonial hold-r

ings, but a deliberate policy of expansion. She was of course joined

by others. The Belgian King, Leopold I , through the efforts of his

emissary, Henry Morton Stanley, acquired what la te r became the Belgian

Congo. Britain also was fu lly engaged in acquiring possessions. Not

a single one of the major European powers of the day did not take part

in the frantic national competition for overseas possession.

All in a ll, this new expansion of European colonial imperialism -

expansion of an essentially economic nature - left Liberia in the midst

of a raging storm. Even with America's essentially moral support, Li­

beria was pressured by Britain on her Northern fro n tier and France on

her southeastern fro n tie r, into making many te rrito ria l and economic

concessions.26

But Liberia survived this expansionist era (1847-1947) and fol­

lowing periods because of a number of factors, chief among which was

the "peculiar" American interest at least in the nation's survival.27

Other reasons may have stemmed from Liberia's advantaggouscifgeopalitical

position (between British and French colonies), a position that may

have accounted for Franco-British disagreement regarding Liberia.

»' ■ • • . . •

26For details on boundary problems, see: J. P. M itchell, America's Liberian Policy, (University of Chicago: Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, 1955) pp. 40-84.

27ibid; Bixler, op. cit.: P. Norris, U.S. and Liberia: The Slavery Crisis, 1929-1935, (Indiana University: Unpublished Ph. D. " Thesis, T96T5 ------Mitchell presents this analysis:

...The B ritish regarded Liberia with a minute degree of sentimen­ tality as one of the good aftermaths of the slave trade. Whilst they would take Liberian territory, they harboured no desire to see her obliterated. Despite the fact that Liberia declared her in­ dependence in order to combat British traders, that government was the first to recognize the new state... The French viewed Liberia as a stumbling block in th e ir path of Em pire...28

And so the history of Liberia followed its turbulent course through the decades from one politico-economic crisis to another. One major crisis may be designated the "Roye Affair". It concerns a loan of one hundred thousand pounds that Liberia's fifth President negoti­ ated with London banks. Very poorly managed, what remained after a prepaid fifte en year interest charge was deducted, amounted to less than one h alf of the original loan. Popular discontent ensued. Roye, concerned about his forthcoming bid for re-election, decided to resort to extra-constitutional methods. He cancelled the elections and an­ nounced that he would succeed himself. With the opposition party in OQ the forefront, the populace violently divested Roye of his authority.

He was la te r imprisoned and died an ignominous death.

This was the first and only coup d'etat in the nation's history.

More than the loss of international prestige the affair cost Liberia a substantial public debt that remained for almost a century. The Roye loan of 1870 was repaid thirty years later, but an intermittent series of loans le f t Liberia almost hopelessly in debt until the 1950's.30

28M itchell, op. c i t . , p. 363. 29Marinelli, op. c it., p. 40. 30lbid, pp. 40-51. 13

The rest of the story of foreign loans w ill be taken up in the section on economic factors.

Another crisis of historical significance that Liberia had to face concerned charges of slavery and forced labor in the republic.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Liberia was a subject of discus­ sion between Britain and France, on/the one hand, and the United States, on the other. The two European powers wished that the United States would have Liberia mandated with itself as the administering authority.

These Europeans f e lt that Liberia could no longer make i t without sub­ stantial external assistance.3^ The United States refused, but prom­ ised to aid Liberia in the liquidation of its public debt. The United

States Congress refused to cooperate.

In 1926, with the advent of the f ir s t major foreign concession­ aire in Liberia - the Firestone Rubber Company - an apparently desper­ ately needed loan was assured through the Finance Corporation of Amer­ ica. Following this period, the Liberian economic situation improved s lig h tly , but then came the world economic depression.

Added to the economic difficulties were health regulations, labor practices, and administrative policies which were subjected to unmerci­ ful local, but above all, foreign criticism. The rumors that had for many years circulated regarding the practices of slavery and forced labor in Liberia finally came to the attention of the American

31F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations,(Oxford Uni­ versity Press: 1952) Vol. II, p. 568; Norris, op cit., p. 243. 14

Department of S tate.32 Secretary.of State Henry Stimson sent a note to Liberia's President C. D. B. King requesting that Liberia "immedi­ ately cease its use of slave labor and forced labor, especially its export of Liberian tribesmen to Fernando Po".33

President King denied the charges and suggested that an impartial commission conduct an "on the spot" investigation. In 1930. an Inter­ national Commission of Inquiry to Investigate Slavery and Forced Labor in Liberia found evidence of a practice "... scarcely distinguished from slave raiding, slave tra d in g ..."3^ Reforms were suggested which

President King accepted and tried to implement. The Liberian'Legislature greatly incensed by the action of the President (who together with the

Vice President was personally involved in the shipment of Liberian tribesmen to Fernando Po), called for his arid the'Vice President's resignation.

The Secretary of State, Mr. Edwin J. Barclay, succeeded to the

Presidency and he immediately repudiated a ll actions of the previous administration in the slavery crisis. He then accepted the Commission's

32The 1926 Slavery Convention organized by the League of Nations was adhered to by the U.S. and Liberia as w ell. All nations were to report their labor practices and also those of other nations which they desired to call to the attention of the Convention. " It was in 1929 that Liberia's unwholesome labor policies would soon be brought before the Slavery Convention and when this occurred America could not escape censure for the delinquency of its protege..." Norris, op. c it. 246.

33Ibid, 3^Ibid, p. 58. 15 report in principle. The United States angered by this move, refused to recognize the Barclay Government. More than five years of impasse followed.

F in ally, Barclay won his point; no reform geared at undermining the integrity and sovereignty of the Liberian state would be accepted, short of forced imposition. Eventually the United States recognized the Liberian Government after it became apparent that the crisis had stirred the Liberian people and aroused their initiative.

In 1943, President Barclay decided not to seek re-election. The

Associate Justice William V. S. Tubman, a leading candidate for the of­ fic e , won the election by an overwhelming majority and succeeded to the Presidency in 1944. President Tubman remained in o ffice u ntil his death in 1971.

Aware of the changes taking place after World War II, President

Tubman endeavored to guide Liberia into the mainstream of A frica's con­ temporary history. I f the f ir s t hundred years of Liberia's national existence are accepted as "the century of survival",35 then the years following, especially beginning in the early 1950's, can be considered the period of s e lf appraisement fo r the task of social and economic development.

35r. l. B uell, Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847-1947 (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1947) pp. 112-140. 16

2. The Social Factors

Most histories of Liberia usually start with the causes leading to the return of Black Americans to Africa and the founding of the re­ public. Especially in the older books, hardly any noteworthy mention is made of the indigenous Africans who inhabited the Grain Coast for many years prior to the coming of the Colonists. The social factors that follow concern the people of Liberia as a whole. I t is a survey of the interaction between the two main elements of the Liberian popu­ lation. Alluding to these two elements, an author in the 1940's, noted:

Two Liberias appeared inside the sovereign and geographic bound­ aries of the one country. One was that of the self-sufficient African living his traditional life on the principles of his na­ tive institutions and amid social conditions natural to him in his indigenous enviroment. To him there was no apparent need for any change. The other was that brought into being by the western settlers with their high ideals and alien cultural in­ heritance. . .36

Not only at the Declaration of Independence of the republic but starting with the settlement of the colonists from America, the ques­ tion of how the returned exiles would relate to the African seems to have defied solution. The leaders of Liberia's first Constitutional

Convention increased the d iffic u ltie s by their exclusion of the abor­ iginal inhabitants in any significant way in either the Declaration of

Independence or the Constitution.

In the Declaration, note the following excerpts: "We the ...

36George Brown, The Economic History of Liberia, (Washington, D. C.: The Associated Publishers, 1941) p. 20. 17 people of the Commonwealth of Liberia were . . . induced . . . f ir s t to expatriate ourselves . . . from the land of our nativity and to form set­ tlements on this barbarous coast.” "We, the people of the Commonwealth of Liberia were originally inhabitants of the United States of Amer­ ic a ." ^

Of the Constitution, Huberich has written:

I t is a serious defect in the Constitution that no provision was made regarding the government of the native tribes, leaving all questions to be determined by general legislation subject to the limitations imposed by a Constitution framed for the government of an entirely different population...38

The two major historical documents of the land had thus systematically excluded the numerical majority of the population from the body poli­ tic. As Marinelli put it, there was only one way of righting this wrong - the pursuit of unity.39

But few, i f any, influential Liberians gave serious thought to a solution that would spell unity; notable among the few was Dr. Edward

W. Blyden.^0 From the time of the conflict arising from the fir s t land purchase in 1821 to very late in the 1800's the settlers apparently never realized the fu ll import of the problem. Perhaps lik e other

37a . K. Dormu, The Constitution of the Republic of Liberia and the Declaration of Independence with Notes (New York: Exposition Press, 1970) pp. 37-42.

38Huberich, o]3. c it ., Vol. I I , PP. 1230-1231.

39Marinelli, o£. cit. , p. 61.

40Edward W. Blyden, Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967). 18 groups settling in Africa they too were blind to the African cultural reality. Alexander Crumwell stated it well:

We have been for years building up fa nation and the kingdom of Christ here along the beach. We have thought that Liberia was to exist only fo r the advantage of a few Americans. We turn our back upon the vast sea of human souls and the illuminated ocean of in­ fluence and power on the continent.41

The settlers were not alone in th e ir warped conception of the

Africans. The latter reacted to the newcomers as did Africans in other lands to the European presence. True, they recognized the sim ilarity in skin color between themselves and the s e ttle rs , but that seemed to be the only commonality.

Another cause of misunderstanding between the two groups was the role of foreign intrigues, especially those unleashed by slave traders along the Liberian coast. With their interests coinciding with those of certain unscrupulous native chiefs, these slavers feared the poten­ tial disruption of their very profitable trade by the settlers. To as­ sure the continuance of the inhuman but thriving tr a ffic i t was neces­ sary to en list the support of the natives by supplying them with the means and urging them to fig h t lest "these negroes from America... eventually take the bread - or rather the rum - out of their mouths".42

Added to the foregoing considerations, the natives noted an air of superiority displayed toward them that, at best, was one of "tute­ lage or condescending benevolence". Resistance ensued and open

4lAlexander Crumwell, The Future of Africa (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1862) p. 84. 42Robert Smith, We Are Obligated (Hamburg: Hanseatische Druckan- s ta lt, 1969) p. 51. hostilities were frequent. The last tribal uprising is said to have been as late as the late 1930's.43

Every Liberian President has had, in varying degrees, to face up to what some have characterized as the native problem. President

Daniel B. Warner said in 1866:

...No desire to exterminate these people and aggrandize their te r­ rito ry brought us here. They are our brethren, deluded though they often appear; and our Constitution expressly declares that their improvement is a cherished object of this government. The govern­ ment, then, being for mutual advantage, is one that calls for mu­ tual support. The aborigines should assist in the great work we have to perform...44

Under the administration of James S. Payne, an Act of the Nation­ al Legislature (1869) created the Interior Department (concerned with hinterland administration). Nothing substantial followed before the administration of President Arthur Barclay, when the policy of indirect rule, applied in neighboring British African possessions, was intro­ duced into Liberia's administration of her hinterland. Barclay in his annual message on December 9, 1911,said of this policy: “I wish to point out... that the Berlin Conference of 1885 with respect to Africa, settled the rules upon which African territory was to be acquired, and by these rules Liberia [must] a b i d e " . 45 in essence, i t was a policy aimed toward bringing the various ethnic groups into one administrative unit as a prerequisite for "ingrafting them into the national scheme of

43Jones, op. c i t . , p .262.

44Huberich, op. c it ., Vol.IP , pp. 1232-1233. 45jones, op. c it., p.209; details of the system of administration are on pp. 209-224. 20

administration."46

One writer believes that Barclay's interior policy received its

stimulus not so much from the broad Berlin Declaration as from French and British charges that Liberian claim to territo ry would henceforth not be recognized by them unless Liberia effectively occupied the area.

The impetus for change would have held much more meaning had i t been

internally derived (that is , from within the settler-Liberian commu­ nity) rather than a forced reaction to external developments.47

Soon the entire interior policy crumbled because of increasing political corruption. Government administrators in the hinterlands exacted material tributes of all sorts from the tribal citizens. Forms of forced labor for road construction purposes and the transportation of o ffic ia ls and members of th eir entourage in hammocks created much resentment among the natives. In many instances, these resentments developed into armed resistance across the nation, such as, the Grebo resistance (1875), the Kru resistance and war (1915-1916 and again in the 1930's), the Gola resistance (1917), soon joined by the neighboring

Gbandi, Belle, Kpelle, Mende, Gissi and Vai.^8 The Government, with l i t t l e American aid, was able to subdue these various uprisings, but the root cause of the civ il wars remained — the question of cultural and p olitical unification between settler-Liberians and indigenous-

Li beri ans.

46Jones, op. c it . . p. 208, Speech of Didhoo Twe. 4?Gus Leibenow, Liberia, the Evolution of Privileqe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, iyt»y) p. bl. 48jones, o£. c it . , pp. 225-248. 21

Surely, some progress had been made in the direction of unifica­ tion. The Government had recognized the problem, and under the Arthur

Barclay administration, had begun to do something about i t . National conferences in itiated by Barclay provided native chiefs an opportunity to consult directly with the President. These conferences were con­ tinued by Barclay's successor, C. D. B. King.

But a major breakthrough in government recalcitrance on the "na­ tive problem" came afte r 1927 when charges of governmental complicity in the practices of slavery and forced labor focused the international spotlight on Liberia. Now a problem essentially within Liberia's do­ mestic jurisdiction was internationalized. A fter the International

Commission of Inquiry submitted its findings to the Liberian Government in 1930, a policy of reconstruction was begun. This policy eventually became the foundation of the more contemporary movement for national unification.

Under President Edwin Barclay's administration, the second chapter of the slavery crisis opened (the firs t chapter began with President

King, 1920-1930). The;President reactedto the Commission's^recom­ mendations by declaring: ■ ‘ - ir.g:

Liberia and Liberians in the past few years, have had to pass through the crucible of both responsible and irresponsible c riti­ cism. This has thrown into high relief their real and fancied de­ ficiencies. The severest self-analysis w ill not leave us uncon­ vinced that some of that criticism was ju s t. This experience w ill have been without benefit i f i t has not developed in us the courage to face realities. We should not, therefore, hesitate to shed that self-complacency vdth which we have been so strongly inhibited in the past, and secure that assistance and adopt completely recom­ mended methods such as w ill assure the strengthening of our 22

National In s titu tio n s , the broadening of our social a c tiv itie s and the proper basing of our Nation.s economic l i f e ; 4^

Evidently before becoming President in 1944, Tubman must have read very carefully the League of Nations Report by the International

Commission of Inquiry into the Existence of Slavery and Forced Labour in the Republic of Liberia, especially its recommendations.50 For the two major policies of his administration - Open Door and National Uni­ fication - closely adhered to the Commission's recommendations.

The Tubman program of national unification was hailed by admini­ stration apologists and sympathetic w rite rs ^ as the boldest and the most sincere in the long history of the struggle for unity between the two historic groups. We are told that "for the first time in the his­ tory of Liberia, a policy of goodwill and equality for the indigenous people was promulgated",52 Tubman being the promulgator. But the evi­ dence of history does not completely support this contention. Presi­ dent Warner back in 1866, President Arthur Barclay (1904-1912) and even the three predecessors of Tubman - Daniel E. Howard, Charles D.B. King

(to a lesser extent) and Edwin J. Barclay expressed in varying ways

j i /' 49Buell, op. c i t . , p. 43. SOLeague of Nations Report (Geneva: December 15, 1930) V I, C. 658, M. 272; Norris, Op. cit. j pp. 53-72. 5^Harinelli, op. c it.; Smith, op. c it.; C.M. Wilson, Liberia, Black Africa in Microcosm (Boston: Harper and Row, 1971). 52Smith, op. c i t . , p. 101; Illu s tra tiv e of Smith's uncritical assertions is the following: "In only a quarter of a century, Tubman succeeded in saving democracy in Liberia. When seventeen administra­ tions with a combined life of ninety-six years had foundered." p. 12. 23 goodwill for the indigenous people. This leads us to the question of contextsr historical contexts.

I t must be agreed that in terms of concrete achievement no admin­ istration before Tubman's had achieved as much as his in terms of the pursuit of unity. But could this be otherwise given the historical context in which he operated (1944-1971)? Could the League of Nations'

1930 Commission recommendations remain accepted only "in principle"?

Would the series of Liberian civil wars of the past continue to be of the same character were one to occur in this day and age? Marinelli was right: the only acceptable solution to the problem of how the two historic groups would relate with one another was the pursuit of unity$3 President Tubman was by no means unaware of the African national­ is t stirrings throughout the length and breadth of the continent of

Africa as the second World War climaxed. I f in the past i t was in L i­ beria's interest to remain aloof from African affairs, now not only international but also domestic imperatives necessitated a radical re­ vision. Perhaps Leibenow overstated the case when he characterized the independence of Guinea in 1958 as a threat to the Liberian leadership:

...The Guinean... leader (unlike the Liberian) sought the rapid political, social, and economic mobilization of all segments of society within a socialist state. In creating a new society, the Parti Democratigue de Guinee (PDG) was seeking to eliminate u lt i­ mately all vestiges of tribalism and traditionalism, a course of great appeal potentially to Liberia's tribal people, many of whom had kinsmen on the Guinean side of the b o rd e r...54

^ M a rin e lli, op. c i t . , p. 61. S^Liebenow, "Which Road to Pan-African Unity? The Sanniquellie Conference, 1959" in G.M.Carter (ed) Politics in A frica, 7 Cases, 1966. 24

But the potential appeal that tribal Liberians could have regarding

Guinean developments cannot be dismissed, especially when one remem­ bers the "Fahnbulleh A ffair" and the writings on the walls at the

University of Liberia and other institutions during and following the t r ia l. Henry Fahnbulleh, a trib a l Liberian and former Ambassador to

Kenya was charged by the Government and convicted of attempting to overthrow the constituted authority by violent means. At his t r i a l , he expressed doubt as to whether any court in Liberia would render him justice as, even before being heard, he had already been condemned by the National Legislature and by mass demonstrations.55

Much progress has been made in the direction of creating loyalty on the part of all the inhabitants of Liberia to the Liberian nation, but much s t i l l remains to be done. The question arises who is inte­ grating whom in this unification process. In other words, on whose terms are settler-Liberians and indigenous-Liberians coming together?

Dormu seems to be making a case for the indegenous-Liberians.56

55west Africa, July 6, 1964, p. 704; for further information see: JEUNES AFRIQUE, Number 397, August 1968, pp. 28-32; "Le Liberia f a it son proces" by Di-Djilene Sice and Number 384, May 1968, p. 19. "Liberia: un proces bien orchestre". Author's note: Mr. Fahnbullah was pardoned and released by the new President, Mr. Tolbert, while this study was in progress.

56Dormu, 0|D. c it. , pp. 112-113. 25

He put it quite bluntly: “The aborigines are no longer a people to be

'civilized'.." He believes a Preamble (to the Constitution) and a

National motto that a ll Liberians can be proud of are needed. He sug­ gests fir s t that the second paragraph of the Preamble be made to read:

"Therefore, We the people of Liberia, composed of the aborigines of this country and the descendants of African people who were carried into.

captivity to the Western Hemisphere...11; second, instead of the dis­ uniting "love of liberty ("...brought us here...1' and "...met us here"),

it should be written: "The love of liberty unites us h e r e " . 57

These are ideas, in this writer's opinion, that ought to be brought to the full light of national public debate. They would doubt­ less be countered by ideas essentially of a status quo nature spring­ ing from a not insignificant emotional attachment on the part of most settler-Liberians to such historic symbols as the national motto, the

Constitution (all of it), even the national flag. Perhaps some mutu­ a lly acceptable synthesis would result.

Whatever the future holds as regards the unification issue, i t is clear that the new Liberia (the image that the Government seeks to por­ tray) is trying to catch up culturally with the rest of Africa. Not that the African cultural heritage is not part of the Liberian legacy as much as i t is part of the legacy of other African states, but the society that mattered in Liberia for many years deliberately looked down on this legacy due primarily to ignorance and a false sense of

57 Dormu, oj). c i t . , pp. 113-114. 26 pride and arrogance. Circumstances (the growing intra-African con­ tacts, for instance), now too powerful for Liberia to evade are compel­ ling her to change.

The definitive move toward the inclusion of all Liberians in the national body politic has influenced foreign policy considerations.

Liberia's African policy grew, in large measure, out of the domestic issue of interior administration. Formulated with other factors in view as well, Liberia's policy seems now committed to close inter-and- intra-African cooperation.58 There seems to be some rough correlation between Liberia's national unification policy and its advocacy of Af­ rican solidarity and cooperation.

3. THE ECONOMIC FACTORS

Liberia is in many ways typical of the developing countries of

Africa - - an economically newly emerging, non-industrial state desper­ ately trying to accelerate production in all fields. Like many of her

African neighbors, she depends on the world market for her economic de­ velopment. Significantly the United States and the European Economic

Community import almost a ll of Liberia's iron ore and rubber. This heavy dependence on two products fo r the majority of her export earn­ ings affects her foreign policy choices. Economic development programs also involve foreign policy. Eco­ nomic policy is designed to encourage foreign investment (in essence,

58oepartment of Information and Cultural Affairs (DICA), Presi­ dent Tubman on African Unity. 27

The Open Door policy), and the foreign national sources of investment have been connected to foreign grants and loans made to the Liberian

Government.59 As McLaughlin notes, "the central feature of the Liber­ ian economy is the predominance of foreign investment in the private sector, and foreign, particularly United States, aid in the public sector".50 It is against this background that the writer will attempt to examine some of the major features of the Liberian economy.

The economy of Liberia is based on three principal sectors of production -- subsistence agriculture, commercial agriculture, and mining. While government and service industries must also be mentioned as important sources of employment and income, they are secondary to the three primary production sectors.61

Essentially an agricultural country, between eighty-five to nine­ ty percent of the population of Liberia lives in the rural areas.

More than seventy percent of the total labor force is engaged in sub­ sistence agriculture. Subsistence agriculture is farming carried out at the village level, generally, only to meet local consumption needs.

Some African ethnic groups do engage in farming fo r marketing purposes,

59"German interest was more of less coincidental with that of DELIMCO, with a $2 million grant in 1960 and loans of $12.5 million in 1961 and $15.7 m illion in 1963. Sweden granted $1 m illion in 1961 for a vocational school in Nimba..." William A. Hance, African Economic Development (New York, London: F.A.Praeger, Revised Edition, 1967Jp. 85. 60Russel U. McLaughlin, Foreign Investment and Development in Liberia (New York, London: F.A.Praeger, 1966) Preface.

61 Ib id , p. 17. 28 but these are rare. In contemporary Liberia, there is cash crop farm­ ing, but prim arily fo r the money income needed to pay taxes or purchase imported goods.62

Both subsistence and cash crop productions in the villag e economy are on a very small-scale. Methods are pre-modern and non-technical, output per worker is low, and hardly any capital is utilized. These characteristics and related ones, explain "the prime economic cause and effect of Liberia's low per capita income",63 which is deceptively high in the urban centers and miserably low in most of the country.

McLaughlin traces the resultant interaction effect between the village and modern sector to these considerations: Since government alone provides fo r infrastructure investment such as hospitals, schools, roads, etc., (village agriculture having no export surplus adds little to such investments), "the subsistence sector absorbs resources far in excess of its meager contribution, and by so doing, indirectly retards other lines of development".64

Further, low income and productivity among the village population

"lim it demand and consequently the rate of investment in manufacturing, since economies of scale cannot be re a liz e d ... because of the limited consumer market".65

Commercial agriculture is farming in which the principal activity is crop production for domestic and foreign marketing. Five major

62McLaughlin, op. c i t . , p. 17. 63ibic[, p. 1 7 .

64 lb id , pp. 17-18. 6 5 ib id ., p. 19. 29 export crops are rubber, palm kernels, coffee, cacao, and piassava.

Involved in the production of these are both Liberians and expatriates, but the la tte r predominate. Of the fiv e crops, rubber is the princi­ pal one in terms of dollar value, with the Firestone Plantations Com­ pany as the largest single producer.

In addition to Firestone, which began operations in Liberia as far back as 1926,®^ more recent foreign investors include: B.F. Good­ rich Corporation, Liberian Agriculture Corporation, Salala Rubber Cor­ poration and African Fruit Company. There are about 1,900 independent

Liberian growers,67 some of them now out of business, some operating at a loss due to the uneven competition with the above concerns and also the fall in world rubber prices, the latter affecting all rubber producers. The rubber companies were paying about $4.5 m illion in income taxes to the Liberian government in the mid 1960's. This figure changed as world rubber prices fluctuated.

As the lead Liberian product, rubber has now been replaced by iron ore. The decade 1950-1960, saw the proportion of total export earnings from agriculture (rubber and the rest) decline from 90 percent

66"Firestone has two plantations — one in Harbel; the other in Cavalla, Maryland County. Its 220 square mile site at Harbel is the world's largest single rubber planation. At Cavalla, it maintains a 31 square mile project. Both planations have nearly 11 million rubber trees planted on 90,000 acres... In 1969 its processing plants pro­ duced more than 117,000,000 pounds of natural rubber..." Source: Cole & Cassell (eds.), The Liberian Trade and Industry Handbook, 1971.

67Robert W. Clower et a l , Growth Without Development (North­ western University Press, 1966) p. 91. 30 to about 60 percent. During the same period, export earnings from mineral, rose from one percent to nearly 40 percent.68 Falling rubber prices due in part to the development of synthetics along with a phe­ nomenal expansion in iron output explain the decline in agricultural exports. Rubber, however, continues to lead in the agricultural sector.

Because the backbone of the Liberian econorr\y is agriculture econ­ omists maintain that eventually widespread economic development w ill be inextricably linked to the effective promotion of agricultural pro­ duction. In the late 1960's, agriculture engaged more than 75 percent of the economically active population but th eir contribution to gross domestic product was only 24 percent of the to ta l. Without the foreign rubber industry, i t is doubtful that even this percentage would have been attained.

Turning to iron ore mining, statistics show that i t is the largest single economic activity in Liberia. Presently (1971) four major companies are operating with an annual production of about twenty m illion tons. The four companies are: Liberian Mining Company or LMC

(in itia te d in 1949 by a group of American investors with capital from the participating Republic Steel Corporation and a loan of $4 million from the United States Export-Import Bank); The National Iron Ore Com­ pany or NIOC founded in 1961 (50 percent owned by Government, 35 per­ cent by Liberians and 15 percent by LMC); Liberian Joint Venture or

LJV (started in 1963 by a combination o f the Liberian-American-Swedish

Mineral Company (LAMCO) and the Bethlehem Steel Corporation); Bong

68Clower, op. c it., p. 227. 31

Mining Company or BMC founded in 1965 (owned in equal shares by the

Liberian Government and the German Liberian Mining Company - Delimco).

In addition to the deposits being exploited by these four companies,

Liberia has other deposits that await future mining.

I t must here be pointed out that iron ore is also subject to domestic and foreign market fluctuations and a depletion of the mines and therefore cannot be relied upon to bolster the economy indefinitely as i t clearly has since the early 1950's. Indeed, McLaughlin reminds us of the danger of this reliance on royalty payments and taxes by citing the Liberian budget crisis of 1963. The crisis was caused by a fa ll in mineral prices and also that the Liberian Joint Venture had delayed construction of its mining facilities.69

With the character and structure of the economy in the background, consideration must be given to the current economic situation and fu­ ture prospects. To better explain th is, i t is necessary to b riefly recapitulate Liberia's economic history.

In the years immediately prior to 1950, the Liberian Government revenue was under $1 m illion. Exports in 1939, for example, totalled

$2.8 million while imports were $2 m illion. Economic development de­ pended largely on the Firestone Rubber Company, the f ir s t , and at that time, only foreign concessionaire in the country.

Before this, Liberia's major economic problem was how "to provide

69McLaughlin, op. c i t . , p. 31.

1 32 money fo r ... the expenses of the state in the absence of productive i n d u s t r y " . 70 Foreign loans, debts and more loans was the order of the day as the f ir s t loan of 1871 led to others in 1906, 1911, and 1926

(guaranteed by Firestone as the concession agreement was being nego­ tiated) .

Between 1940-1950, external circumstances provided impetus to the economy, such as the second World War and Liberia's strategic location.

During the war, the United States Army b uilt Robertsfield (Airport) and engaged in some road construction. The army also started health services that were expanded in the form of aid by the United States

Government following the war. Also, Lend-Lease funds were used to con­ struct the Free Port of Monrovia. Rubber prices soared during World

War I I and also during the Korean War. Thus i t was that the general world situation was favorable to the Liberian economy. McLaughlin notes these factors as essential to understanding public and private

United States interest in Liberia and also that of other countries, for instance: (1) the worldwide concern over the economic development of underdeveloped countries; (2) the emerging political nationalism among African countries in general; (3) increased knowledge of African natural resources and peoples.71

70George Brown, op. c it ., p. 21: Charles D. Sherman, Economic Ef­ fects of Foreign Loans and Concessions in Liberia (Washington, D.C.: The American University, Unpublished Master's Thesis, 1948); Mr. Sher­ man was Liberia's Secretary of the Treasury fo r many years.

7lMcLaughlin, op. c i t . , p. 182. 33

But the economic policy enunciated by the Tubman administration

that came to power in 1944 connot be excluded. After a ll, the his­

toric and political fear of foreign investment had justly expended it­

self. A new day had dawned in international relations. The war had

ended, or nearly so; African nationalist demands had increased. The wisest thing economically and p o litic a lly a Liberian President could do was to open the door to trade and investment ( i t was never closed to loans and grants). It was this policy that contributed greatly to the transformation of the Liberian economy after the in itial growth caused by the wars.

I t is small wonder,then, that the expansion rate of the econony during 1950-1960 exceeded that of almost a ll other countries in the world.72 (Refer to Table I for growth indices). A Northwestern Univer­ sity study team offers this information:

Gross domestic money income more than quadrupled... Government re­ ceipts increased more than eightfold, tonnage of goods imported nearly quadrupled, rubber exports increased from nothing to nearly three million long tons per year, the money sector labor force nearly tripled, net money income of trib al households more than quadrupled, and mileage of all-weather roads quadrupled...73

But this phenomenal growth, economists te ll us, is not a ll that i t seems. The Northwestern team characterized i t as "growth without devlopment", meaning that enormous growth in primary commodities pro­ duced by foreign concessions for export has been unaccompanied either by structural change to induce complementary growth or by institutional

72ciower, et a l . , op. c i t . , p. 24. 73Ib id , p. 23.; TABLE I

Leading I ndices of Economic Growth , 1950-1960

(1) (G) (7) (8) (3) (4) (4) 1 (2) (2) 1 Income dollars) Exports dollars*) dollars*) t < 5 )„ Iron Ore Iron long tons) tons) 1 long long tons) long lung tons) lung Net Money Net (millions of (millions (millions of (millions (millions of (millions (millions of (millions (millions of (millions Labor Force Labor years) (man Tribal Sector Tribal (thousands of (thousands Money Sector Money Govt. Revenue Govt. Cargo Imports Cargo Mileage of All- of Mileage Gross Domestic Gross Money Income Money Weather Roads Weather Tonnage Dry of Tonnage Rubber Exports] Rubber | | Vear 1950 35,8 3.9 120 66.7 — 1.8 30,000 230 1951 45.7 12.8 161 79.3 .2 2.2 — — 1952 52.6 8.6 143 78.0 .9 2.7 — 250 1953 58.4 11.2 155 78.8 1.3 3.0 — _ 1954 60,5 11.9 165 82.8 1.2 3.4 — — 1955 79.1 15.3 191 87.5 1.8 3.9 56,000 — 1956 89.7 17.9 213 88.5 2.0 4.5 — — 1957 90.9 20.1 254 83.9 2.1 4.8 — 470 1958 97.1 18.1 241 94.8 2.1 5.5 68,000 — 1959 130.1 24.6 305 96.2 2,8 6.3 — — 1900 154.7 32.4 396 95.4 2.9 7.3 82,000 1,150

‘Here and elsewhere in this book, all values are in U.S. dollars—the official unit of account and medium of exchange of the Republic of Liberia. Sources: Staff research. Monrovia Port Management Company files. Firestone Plantations Company flics. Monrovia Port Management Company files.

I ndices of Gnownt or Real National Product in Selected Countries , 1954-1960 (1954 = 100)

Real Gross National Product Real Gross National Product Per Capita 1SG0 I960 Liberia 175 170 United Kingdom 116 112 United States 121 109 Japan 180 150 West Germany 150 140 Ireland 104 10S Switzerland 131 122 Congo 110 105 Nigeria 150 140 Ghana 160 155 Uganda 125 120

Source: U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (May. 1902). and staff rescarcti.

Source: Clower et a l, op. c i t . , p.24 35

changes to diffuse gains in real income among all sectors of the popu­ la tio n .^

McLaughlin seems to agree with the Northwestern team's assessment.

He adds that the future of meaningful economic expansion w ill depend not on foreign investment and aid as prime movers of the economy (which

is now the case), but a relegation of the latter to a marginal position and an increase in domestic capital formation and development of the human potential of the state.75

For the rest, it seems that the rather rapid expansion of the

"enclave industries" is nearing an end. The growth of iron ore pro­ duction, the principal factor in post-war economic growth, is not ex­ pected to continue given that the mines are now working at or close to capacity. Barring favorable results in the ongoing exploration, particularly for petroleum, growth in mineral production is expected to slow down considerably.

The future for rubber, the second principal product does not seem bright either. Prices are not expected to recover from th eir present

low levels except for "an abnormal demand situation" (a major war).

But the competition from synthetic rubber w ill continue.

Some brighter prospects are the increase in production of coffee and a number of fruits and vegetables. Also likely to grow rapidly are the production of fis h , poultry and forest products (timber, for

74ciower et a l, op. c i t . , Preface v i.

^McLaughlin, op. c i t . , pp. 197-198. 36 example). These are a ll, however, starting on a very small scale.

Manufacturing industry also holds some promise. Quite a few plants are operating or soon-t-be in operation, among them, palm ker­ nel, oil mills, fish canneries, starch reducing plants, a nail factory, cement firms, o il refinery, aluminium-frame window factory, etc.

The growth of these manufacturing activities carry with them the seed of diffused economic growth, which would reduce dependence on the

"enclave industries" while significantly drawing increased numbers of

Liberians into activities of a productive nature.

For the realization of these growth possibilities, however, a much larger power program and improved means of transportation^ are necessary. Also required is the a v a ila b ility of funds to finance in­ vestments in the private sector. Given the paucity of private domestic savings, financial assistance from abroad is necessitated.

But what is the state of aid to Liberia? Since the second World

War, the United States, B ritain , France, West Germany, the United Na­ tions and its specialized agencies have given Liberia technical

76Notes on the transportation situation: Most of the mileage of the road network was constructed by private concessionaires to reach their concessions and these, while often maintained by the concession­ aires, have been brought into the national system. In 1968, in agreement with the Liberian government, Pan American World Airways took over the management of airfield s in Liberia. Liberia is the largest "maritime" nation in the world, ahead of the United Kingdom and the United States. But to realize the meaning of th is , the following must be noted: The Liberian Government charges only $1.20 per net registered ton, plus an annual tax of 10 cents per net registered ton, and does not maintain control over ships flying a Liberian flag. Registered tonnage exceeds 22,596,000. For details on Liberia's "flags of attraction", see: B.A.Boczek: Flags of Convenience: An International Legal Study (Cambridge: Har­ vard University Press, 1962). 37 assistance, grants and loans of various types. These donors have been joined in more recent times by China (Taipei), Israel, Sweden and

Italy/Vatican. As Table II shows, the United States has been the largest single donor to Liberia. Table III provides more data on loans. The tables should be read together.

The tables also point out the overall declining level of aid.

Between 1965-1968 foreign assistance (U.S. included) was favorable.

The 1967 net flow of aid was $22 m illion (half of which came from the

United States). As such, the population received $20.00 per capita in aid, a number "approximately four times the average for the developing countries of the non-Communist world".77

In 1968, there was a radical change in the aid picture. Most large public infrastructure projects were completed, or nearly so by that time. Aid here represented an enormous contribution to gross in­ vestment in the public sector. "In 1967, foreign aid projects alone accounted for $20 million of public capital formation, with $18 million provided by loans and grants".' The 1969 total was only expected to be "$11.3 million with the government contributing $1.3 mi 11 ion".78

Between 1967 and 1968 the actual total of United States foreign assist­ ance, in reflecting this decline, dropped from $22,484,000 to

$16,240,000. This downward trend is expected to continue until feasi­ b ility studies have been completed on proposed projects fo r the 1970's.

77Rudolf Johnson, Foreign Aid to L ib eria, CD0S/D0C. 5, Depart­ ment of Planning & Economic Affairs", Monrovia, Liberia, p. 14.

78lbid, p. 6 38

TABLE I I

ASSISTANCE TO LIBERIA (TOTAL ACTUAL EXPENDITURE BY ECONOMIC SECTORS IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)

V 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 UNITED STATES 22,746 22,572 22,484 16,240 11,560 13,038

WEST GERMANY 5,150 3,446 3,812 630 1,570 1,100

GREAT BRITAIN 356 286 118 78 220 78

FRANCE 34 26 48 64 58 68

SWEDEN 259 231 226 200 187 180

ITALY/VATICAN 419 549 52 29 " 36 36

ISRAEL 60 76 44 60 47 64

CHINA/TAIWAN 90 160 160 224 200 220

Source: Rudolph Johnson, Foreign Aid to Liberia, Department of Planning and Economic A ffa irs , Monrovia, October 27-29, 1969, pp. 43-53 39

TABLE I I I

FOREIGN AID RECEIPTS AND DEBT RETIREMENT, 1965-1970

(Millions of dollars) 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 (a) Foreign Aid Expenditures 31.4 30.2 29.5 18.9 18.7 17 to 19

(b) IMF Drawings 3.0 5.2 5.2 3.4 3.4 1.0

(c) Gross Foreign Receipts (a + b) 34.4 35.4 34.7 22.3 20.1 18 to 20

(d) Foreign Debt Retirement 10.2 10.3 9.8 12.1 14.0 14.3

(e) IMF Repurchases - 3.6 4.2 3.4 4.4 3.0

(f) Total Foreign Debt Service (d + e) 10.2 13.9 14.0 15.5 18.0 17.3

(g) Net Foreign Aid (a minus f ) 24.2 21.5 20.7 6.8 2.1 .7 to 2.7

Source: Department of Planning & Economic A ffairs, Monrovia,CD0S/ DOC. 5, 1969, p. 54. 40

With the decline in aid has gone the rise in service payment on the public debt with the result that "by 1970-71, unless something rad­ ical is done to replenish the pipeline, foreign aid to Liberia will probably be zero or even negative, on a net basis. A major reason for this situation is the high level of debt servicing which will persist up to 1976 " . The hope that infrastructure will be internally stimu­ lated is dim, especially when one considers that one-third of all gov­ ernment revenues goes toward repayment of existing debts. Table IV presents details on these debts.

As stated previously, there seems to be a clear link between the government’s economic policy and its over-all foreign policy. Govern­ ment revenues deriving from internal sources have been low, i f one ex­ cludes the "enclave industries", which are funded by foreign interests.

Some economists think that Liberia's economic problems do not stem ex­ clusively or even importantly from local lack of wherewithal for eco­ nomic expansion, but rather from the Government's calculated refusal to revolutionize the agricultural sector, the really key sector.

Much of the financial resources needed fo r development must come from overseas since i t cannot for now be internally generated. This has been the way of Liberia's economic development - foreign invest­ ment in the private sector and foreign aid in the public sector.

79johnson, op- c it . , pp. 6-7. This, by no means, suggests that Liberia w ill have terminated payments on existing loans by 1976. During 1965-68, for instance, loans from the United States were payable in 40 years; whereas amortization on loans from West Germany varied, for the same period, from 15 to 25 years. See Johnson, p. 13. 41

TABLE IV

EXTERNAL MEDIUM - AND LONG-TERM/PUBLIC DEBT INCLUDING UNDISBURSED AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1967

DEBT REPAYABLE IN FOREIGN CURRENCY (IN THOUSANDS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

DEBT OUTSTANDING MAJOR REPORTED NO MAJOR DEC. 31, 1967 ADDS. UNTIL ADDITIONS Dec. 31, 1968

Disbursed Only Including ITEM Undisbursed

TOTAL EXTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT 155,454 182,540

PRIVATELY - PLACED DEBT 48,274 48,274

SUPPLIER'S CREDIT 36,853 36,853

PRIVATE BANK CREDITS 11,421 11,421

IBRD LOANS 3,897 4,250

U.S. GOVT. LOANS 86,018 109,726

EXPORT - IMPORT BANK 30,075 30,075

OTHER 55,943 79,651

LOANS FROM GOVT'S. OF OTHER IBRD MEMBERS 17,265 20,290

GERMANY 16,785 17,410

UNITED KINGDOM 480 2,880

Source: S ta tis tic a l Services Division Economic Department (IBRD) July 30, 1968. 42

Dr. Russell U. McLaughlin mentioned to this w riter in a conversation

that he tried to point out in his book, that economic development de­

pends on what's happening elsewhere much more than what's happening in

Liberia it s e lf .80 All of this points to a sizable Western involvement

in economic development that may not be devoid of political implications.

One government analyst sums up rather well the Government's think­

ing on the much talked-about alternative of economic regionalism. Mr.

D. Franklin Neal, Under-Secretary of the Department of Planning and

Economic A ffairs, has written:

Expansion of Liberia's external trade or for that matter diversi­ fication of exports can not be achieved through sub-regional eco­ nomic cooperation. The non-compensatory nature of our economies in the West African sub-region makes this quite evident. To broaden the base of its economy Liberia w ill have to exploit its natural resources, develop and expand agricultural base industries by the introduction of new crops and the adding of more value to exports into semi finished or finished products where possible. The markets of West Africa certainly w ill not provide the oppor­ tunity to achieve this goal because of the non-compensatory nature of our principal items of production... The question then is can Liberia without preferential trade links with... Europe afford the sacrifice and opportunity cost of a trade policy oriented and committed to regionalism? I t is doubtful that national interest in this case can best be served by such a policy...« !

SOjhis is not an exact quote. The conversation with Dr. McLaugh­ lin occurred at the Annual Conference of the Liberian Studies Associa­ tion, University of Delaware, Summer 1970.

81D. Franklin Neal, Liberia's Foreign Trade Pattern, 1940-1968 CD0S/D0C 1, Department of Planning & Economic A ffairs, Monrovia, Liberia. 43

4. THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS AS A FACTOR

As with the other factors shaping Liberia's policy mentioned above, the purpose here is to provide a general description of Liberia's foreign policy decision-making process. Because l i t t l e , i f anything, has been written on the subject one must cautiously proceed along these lines: first, outline the institutional setting in which decision is made, and secondly, attempt to relate this to the individuals, the de­ cision-makers who quite often "arrive at th eir decision by confronting their values with their image of the [domestic and internati

The institutional setting of decision-making carries with i t sev­ eral elements, two of which stand out: (1) powers and functions dele­ gated to the major branches of Government by the Constitution: (2) the role of the people.

Liberia's Government has Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches, and as in the American p olitical system i t is the Executive branch which provides leadership in the conduct of foreign affairs.

Lerche suggests three "especially pertinent" reasons "for such execu­ tive pre-eminence": I t "has access to , and possesses... information without which action becomes impossible, useless, or dangerous"; i t "is the medium of official international contact...", and finally, "the ex- cutive branch has the expertise, the competent agents who know the 'how'

82joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 9. 44 and the 'where' of policy and are thus able more effectively to suggest the 'what* and the 'why'."®3

The Liberian Constitution confers on the President, who is both

Chief of State and Head of Government, certain powers relating to for­ eign policy operations. Part of Section I , A rticle I I I of the Consti­ tution reads:

...He [the President] shall have power to make treaties, provided the Senate concurs therein, by a vote of two-third of the Senators present. He shall nominate, and with the advice and consent of the Senate appoint and commission, all Ambassadors, and other public Ministers and Consuls, Secretaries of State, of National Defense... He shall receive all Ambassadors and other public Ministers...84

The President is also Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air

Force.

In addition, the President of Liberia has a number of other for­ eign policy powers conferred upon him by the national Legislature as circumstances require. To cite but one such legislative grant to the

Chief Executive — the 1931 Moratorium Act suspending loan payments in connection with the Firestone operations in L i b e r i a .85

The office of the President is of course but one, albeit the key one, in the overall executive establishment. Two sub-executive agen­ cies — the Presidential Assistancy or Advisory and the Department of

State — are crucial to the mechanics of foreign policy in Liberia.

^Charles Lerche, Foreign Policy of theJAmerican People (New York: Prentice-Hall, In c ., 1967} pp. 36-37.

84Dormu, op. c i t . , pp. 30-31.

85n . Richardson, Liberia's Past and Present (London: The Diplo­ matic Press and Publishing Co. , 1959) pp. 159-179. 45

Noteworthy to mention is the considerable use Liberia makes of its

Membership in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and also the Organization of African Unity.

Let us first examine the Executive Office of the President. Not too unlike the American Presidency, "behind the President" of Liberia is an elaborate staff for assisting him in his task of initiating, co­ ordinating and ultimately shouldering responsibility for action. Of­ ficials of the Executive Mansion whose jobs relate directly to foreign affairs are: the Special Assistant to the President, and advisers to the President, respectively, on African Affairs, International Affairs,

Legal Affairs, Military Affairs and Economic Affairs.

Before proceeding to the organization of the State Department, one must mention a body which stands as the most important single en­ tity in the group of Presidential assistants — the Cabinet. The Cab­ inet of the Liberian Government consists of the President as Chairman,

The Vice President (who is also President of the Senate), the Speaker of the House of Representatives, a ll Department heads, and such other officials as the President may choose to invite. The Cabinet's func­ tions are varied but regarding foreign policy, the Cabinet deals with questions of national security86 and the pursuit and protection of na­ tional economic interests. Free discussion of these and related matters

86There exists an Executive Action Bureau responsible fo r coordin­ ating the Security functions of a ll Government agencies. At times its Director attends Cabinet meetings. U. S. Army Handbook on Liberia (Washington, D.C., The American University, Government Printing O ffice, 1964) pp. 398-470. 46 are theoretically what occurs during Liberian Cabinet meetings.8?

In the entire structure of government, the Department of State stands as the major single agency source of foreign policy formulation.

Other executive agencies have important roles to play, but it is the

State Department, always retaining a central position, that coordinates actions in the lig h t of national objectives.

The Secretary of State, is the chief adviser to the President on foreign affairs. His exact role, depends largely "on his personality and that of his chief, on the problems that arise during his tenure, and on the specific issues that fall to him to decide".88 Yet despite his importance, the Secretary of State, like the heads of other Depart­ ments, serves at the pleasure of the President. Considering the Liber­ ian political system, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a Secretary of State would remain long in office where there was any disagreement with the President.

Judging from the tone of the Annual Reports of the Secretaries of

State to the Legislature, one can conclude that political harmony has prevailed between Tubman and a ll three gentlemen (Gabriel L. Dennis, Momolu Dukuly, and I J. Rudolph Grimes) who have served as Secretary of State during his administrations. Even at the time of the League of

87As no "view from the inside" is yet available, we must assume that the Cabinet debates are a reflection of the Liberian "public de­ bate" of national issues, which is not very considerable.

88Lerche, op. c i t . , p. 41. 47

Nations intervention in Liberian affairs, Secretary of State Louis A.

Grimes and late r Clarence L. Simpson were, like the Liberian "public

that mattered", at one with the President in the philosophy which per­

vaded the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

An important factor of the office of Secretary of State is the

precedent which makes the Secretary next in succession to the Presidency

after the Vice President. The Secretary also acts for the President

when the la tte r is either momentarily disabled or without the repub­ lic's jurisdiction.89

The chart which follows presents an organizational breakdown of

the State Department and shows the various Linder Secretaries and func­

tional offices under the Secretary of State.

The geographical and functional breakdown of the Department's

offices reflect changes in the international environment and the re­

sponses of the Department of State to these changes. For example, the

African-Asian Bureau is a relatively recent addition. In 1961, the

activation of a Bureau of Economic Affairs was recommended in that year's State Department report reflecting the apparent need for a for­ mal diplomatic role in the pursuit of national economic development.

Like most other member-states of international organizations, Li­ beria pursues certain of its objectives through the United Nations and

89since 1930, when Secretary of State Barclay succeeded to the Presidency upon the pressured resignations of President King and Vice President Yancy, the precedent has prevailed. Dormu, op. c i t . , p.62. ORGANIZATION OF LIBERIA'S DEPARTMENT OF STATE o 6 w to co H i < CO w m O o O

Prepared by Writer DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND CONSULATES ABROAD 48

its specialized agencies, and also the Organization of African Unity

(OAU). With respect to the United Nations, Liberia has employed the

framework of the Afro-Asian group, but at times has also acted outside

that framework in the pursuit of fundamental liberites as embodied in

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As regards the OAU, Li­

beria's interest seems to have been one of attempting to make of the

organization an instrument for harmonizing relations among the states

of Africa and not an instrument for supranational integration. At the

headquarters of both organizations, Liberia maintains formal diplomaic

representation - - A Permanent Mission in the case of the United Nations,

and an Embassy in Addis Ababa serving both Liberia's relations with the

Ethiopian Government and the Permanent Secretariat of the OAU.

Foreign-policy decision, in the strict sense, is of course a gov­

ernment monopoly. Even in countries of western democratic trad itio n ,

the initiative and resposibility for the conduct of relations with for­

eign governments remain in the hands of the government. There is no

question of government monopoly in the Liberian system.

But Liberia also operates, at least in theory, under a democratic

system akin to that of the United States. This means that the role of

the people ought to be a powerful and often controlling force in deci­

sion-making. The peculiarities of the Liberian situation makes this a

far cry from reality.

F irs tly , Liberia operates under a de facto one-party system. This means that party and government are synonomous. Whatever foreign policy

platform the party decides on is generally what prevails in government 49 policy. It is not unlikely that the party platform on foreign policy would emanate from the Department of State.

Secondly, the political atmosphere produced by the one party sys­ tem makes the public expression of opinion highly unsafe. For example, the office of the President has been so insulated from public review and/or criticism that departure from these norms on the part of any citizen or group, of citizens are easily characterized as seditious, conspiratorial, criminally libelous, and punishable accordingly.^

I t follows of course, that where the Presidency has been so pro­ tected from public review, the administration's policies and spokes­ men would enjoy sim ilar immunities. I t is thus the e litis t approach to the making of foreign policy that almost wholly prevails in the Li­ berian system^ This approach does not imply that the opinions of the people when these can be determined, are wholly ignored by the Govern­ ment. There are means of getting reactions to policy, and these re­ actions assist the Government in either modifying or strengthening its position on foreign policy, thereby avoiding dissent or opposition.

90|_iberian Code of Law, 1950, T itle 27, Chapter 3, Sections 52-57; Also Gus Liebenow, Liberia , in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Roseberg, Eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkely: University of California Press, 3rd Printing, 1970J p. 467.

^This approach holds that since "...foreign policy is a tapestry of infinite complexity, and even the expert can only hope to achieve familiarity with a part of its intricate design, the people must be w illing to give government a free hand". See: Gabriel Almond, The Amer­ ican People and Foreign Policy, p. 143. 50

There are many elements that enter the process of deciding on a

course of action in foreign affairs, the influences of both the inter­

nal and external environments and the rational methods of the decision­ makers, being crucial ones. Yet "the assessment of the environment does

not lead to decisions and to p o litic al action automatically, but only

through its fusion with an element existing within the decision-m akers". 92

In other words, the element of individual opinions and inclinations is

influential and important to the decision-making process. I t is the ele­ ment that involves the values or the politico-philosophical outlook of officials as they relate to the perception of the domestic and inter­ national environments by the o ffic ia ls .

Tubman set the course which other o ffic ia ls were obliged to fo l­ low, by committing Liberian policy "to the concept of a free enterprise system, democracy, and a pragmatic search for solutions to problems of multinational existence".93

Liberia seems to be a prisoner of her history. Nothing in the policies pursued by the Tubman administration suggests a radical de- parture from the choice made more than one hundred years ago regarding the destiny of the republic. As former Vice President C. L. Simpson put i t in his Memoirs:

Two courses were open to us (to Liberia in the beginning): one was

92prankel, op. c it., p.m.

93r. e. Townsend and A. B. Jones (Eds), The O fficial Papers of W. V_. S. Tubman, President of the Republic of Liberia (London: Long­ mans Green and Co., L td ., 19687p. 517. 51

to merge at the outset the comparatively small advanced elements of the population into the mass of those who, for various reasons, were at a more primi tiye stage of development and to hope that in due course all would progress homogeneously and simultaneously. The other was to preserve the ideal of western democracy on how­ ever small and imperfect a scale and to direct our efforts at grad­ ually improving the system and extending i t to broader sections of the population while accepting the realities of the situation at every stage. We adopted the la tte r course, and i t can at least be said that i t has worked for nearly a century and a half and that i t has achieved slow but continued progress.94

The commitment to the values and principles of western democracy strongly influenced the set of values adopted by the men who guided

Liberian foreign policy. It is small wonder, then, that one of Liber­ ia's foremost concerns in her international relations during the Tubman era was remaining a strong and tested a lly of the free world. More w ill be said on this theme in Chapter I I .

In summary, the discussion on Liberia's foreign policy attempted to explain how many of the factors unique to Liberia's history have in­ fluenced the shape of her foreign policy. Obviously some of these were more important than others depending on time and circumstance.

Perhaps ju s tifia b ly and based on the b rief background presented, a conclusion may be reached that Liberia's foreign policy was strongly influenced by sympathy for the colonially oppressed, nationalistic causes, sensitivity to racial slights by the small developing nations, questions of national unity, and opposition to the pressure and subver­ sion (but only in principle) of the large Western Powers, (opposition

94C. L. Simpson, The Symbol of Liberia, Memoirs (London: The Dip­ lomatic Press and Publishing Co., T§i51)p. 240. (The underlining is the w rite r's ). 52 in principle because of Liberia’s apparent willingness to be pressured by the United States). Thus specific factors can be related to the con­ ditioning of specific aspects of foreign policy. The interaction of these factors in different contexts is discussed la te r.

Beyond th is , the analysis must admit of more complexity and in­ clude many more variables such as the political predisposition to look at the real world, of which, President Tubman said:

My concern and that of the Liberian people is what i t has been since this administration took office in 1944 - that in all matters of national and international affairs, we must never lose the substance for the shadow, but rather that we must be re a lis tic and truthful and keep our feet on the ground.95

Other variables include the economic necessity of obtaining development assistance and other forms of foreign capital and the official prefer­ ence for the West and things Western confronted with the re a litie s of :: an African cultural rebirth which cannot be ignored. An elaboration of these considerations must necessarily follow.

95Townsend and Jones, op. c i t . , p. 186. CHAPTER I I

LIBERIA'S POLICY ON POLITICAL ISSUES: 1944-1971

1. THE PRINCIPLES

In his f ir s t inaugural address on January 3, 1944, President Tub­ man set forth his foreign policy orientation. He stated:

The "Good Neighbor" policy enunciated and being propagated by the Government of the United States of America... as well as that of the Government of Great B rita in , seems to me to be so basically correct... as to have attracted and attached me all the more to their general national and international aims... We shall, therefore, aim at cultivating the closest possible friendly relations with those Governments and, shall endeavour to identify ourselves most intimately with them in making practical the Four Freedoms - Freedom of Speech; Freedom of Religion; Free­ dom from Fear; and Freedom from Want - which they have proclaimed to the world and which we shall expect to apply in equal measure to ourselves.'

This commitment to help "make the world safe fo r democratic ide­ ology'^ continued to be a major feature of Liberia's policy throughout the Tubman era. This political attitude, essentially directed to policy a ffin ity with "Democracy's torch-bearers”,3 has not waned with the ap­ parent shift in policy emphasis to the most burning issue of post war

A frica - decolonization. While Liberia's attitude toward the la tte r

lR. E. Townsend (Ed) President Tubman of Liberia (London: Consoli­ dated Publications Co., Ltd., 1959, 2nd Edition 1969) p. 17.

^Tubman's Independence Day Message, July 26, 1961, R. E. Townsend and A. B. Jones (Eds) The O ffic ia l Papers o f W.V.S. Tubman, President of the Republic of Liberia (London: Longmans Green and Co., L td .,1968) p. 46. ^Tubman's Independence Day Message July 26, 1950, so referred to the American people, R. E. Townsend, op. c i t . , p. 168. 54

has been marked by a notable degree of support - especially within the

framework of the United Nations - the Western outlook has manifested

its e lf in most of the colonial questions..

One may thus indicate two attitudes as directive of Liberian pol­

icy: (1) Policy a ffin ity with the democracies on the broad issues of war and peace, and (2) Anti-colonialism. The f ir s t has its origin in

the history of Liberia,but was given new emphasis under the Tubman

Presidency. I t has served as a guidance to the positions that Liberia

has taken on foreign policy issues.

Anti-colonialism as an attitude of Liberia's policy is historic­

a lly a more recent phenomenon■» Other than general expressions of b e lie f

in fundamental human rights, one hardly finds any clear manifestation

of support for African nationalistic aspirations by the Liberian Gov­

ernment prior to the onset of the decolonization movement. This by no means suggests that Liberia condoned colonization during the period when it became fully established in Africa. Public statements have in

fact constantly indicated the contrary. Tubman said in 1961, that Li­ beria "condemned, fought and waged wars against colonialism and impe­ rialism for more than a hundred years", and that despite the crushing odds, Liberia never became a "tool" or "stooge" in colonialist hands. He continued:

We have provided an asylum for Africans from a ll the colonial coun­ trie s in which they were subjugated in the colonial days; we have shared our material resources with our brethren to the lim its of our capacity; we were indeed the pioneers in the battle of Africa against exploitation ancj serfdom.4

^Townsend and Jones, op. c it., p. 187. 55

This theme of Liberia's early contribution to African emancipa­ tion is echoed in Marinelli: "In Liberia, almost every aspiring African nationalist has found support for his cause, including financial aid".5

The The above pronouncements, notwithstanding, positive anticolonial­ ism as a concept of Liberia's foreign policy grew out of the role that

Liberia has been forging for herself in the African regional subsystem.

To associate with the aspirations of the New Africa necessitated an al­ most unequivocal adherence to an anti-colonial stance.

The principles of policy have been formulated in the lig h t of the national interests or Tubman's perception of these interests. The basic and obvious objectives are f ir s t and foremost, the maintenance of inter­ national sovereignty, security, and relative freedom of action; and secondly, national economic and social development. These were ably expressed by Secretary of State J. Rudolph Grimes when in Peace and

Friendship are the Cornerstones of Liberia's Foreign Policy, he stated that two fundamental national interests have influenced Liberia's for­ eign policy - the preservation of its independence and its determina­ tion to further the internal development of the human and economic re­ sources of the country.5 Both are linked to general domestic policy for their pursuit is dependent not only on Liberia's relations with her neighbors and international peace, but also on her internal p olitical

5Lawrence A. M arinelli, The New Liberia (New York, London: F. A. Praeger Publishers, 1964) p. 101.

5New York Times, July 25, 1965, Section 11, p. 4. 56

stability and feeling of security.

The six Tubman administrations (1944-1971) upon which this study

is focused have sought to prosecute these general objectives. As was

pointed out in the section on historical factors, for the first one hundred years of her national existence, Liberia was preoccupied with the objective of maintaining national independence. L ittle , i f any, attention was devoted to economic and social development. The years following the second World War marked a turning point in that the vig­ orous pursuit o f one key objective gave way to the simultaneous pursuit of the two - maintenance of national independence and promotion of eco­ nomic and social development.

Anti-colonialism has for Liberia been translated into champion­

ing the advancement of colonial peoples to independence and the drive for racial equality in particular and human rights in general. Before

there was hardly any sign of Africa's presence in the United Nations,

Liberia champanioned for Africa the right to self determination. In

1946, after quoting President Tubman to the effect that Liberia would

lend its fu ll support to the teaming millions who were s t i l l p o litic a l­

ly dominated, Mr. C.Abayomi Cassell declared before the United Nations that "only when we liberate all who are held in any form of bondage of the slightest degree, when every set of people, according to their eth­ nic group, shall determine how they prefer to live, will there be that

lasting peace we all so much desire and talk about".?

?United Nations. O ffic ia l Records of the General Assembly, F irst Session, -38th Plenary Meeting, October 26, 1946, pp. 758-760. 57

Ambassador Henry Ford Cooper In 1953, put the case for Liberia's anti-colonial attitude more succinctly. He said before the United Na­ tions:

We, as Liberians, whose existence was brought into being through grinding oppression, cannot be indifferent to and uninterested in the cry of our brethren in Africa... or any portion of the universe. We have known the pains of oppression and the stigma of color, and we owe i t to our national self-respect, to our race, to our contin­ ent, to our fellow Africans and to Mankind itself to lend an ear to the plaintive cries fo r freedom and to give a ll the support we can to the aspirations of those people whose only wish is to be free men and masters of their own destinies. No coercion or intimida­ tion, no promises or cajolry will deter us in thisccausel8

But this anticolonial ism was to be pursued with another commit­ ment in mind - the commitment to the democratic ideology. The reason­ ing here perhaps is that states do not become independent in a p o liti­ cal vacuum. The fact that they are subject to the conflicting forces of the international system necessitates political prudence in the pol­ icies of state. I f Liberia would "at a ll times and in a ll circumstan­ ces lend its aid and support to the cause of a ll dependent peoples",8 she nonetheless would do this bearing in mind the worldwide competition between the forces of totalitarianism and those of d e m o c r a c y . 10 As to

8United Nations. O fficial Records of the General Assembly, 8th Session, 38th Plenary Meeting, September 21, 1953, p. 63. 9United Nations. O fficial Records of the General Assembly, 12th Session, 685th Plenary Meeting, September 24, 1957, p. 96.

lOThis w riter found no evidence that Tubman's perception of in­ ternational relations was other than a struggle between good and evil, his occasional intermediate practical attitudes, notwithstanding. 58 whether there is an inherent discrepancy between the declared all-out support and the manner of ultimate accomplishment w ill hopefully be re­ vealed in the discussion to follow on Liberia's relations with other countries and the United Nations.

For the realization of Liberia's policy, certain international conditions must prevail, the most evident being relative peace in the world. How best to bring this to pass has not always been clear for

Liberia. In this approach to peace, Liberia's policy could take one of three alternatives: (1) genuine neutralism, similar to Switzerland's;

(2) complete non-alignment; or (3) a "strong, healthy, and tested ally of the free world"The question was which course to follow.

Although in her formative years, Liberia pursued a policy of neu­ tralism , world events and her close ties with the United States forced her to abandon this policy. Thereafter, Liberia vacillated between non-alignment and support of the democratic powers.

Before World War I , Liberia was governed by international legal provisions relating to the rights and duties of neutrals. During the

Spanish-American War, President Wilmot D. Coleman by and with the ad­ vice and consent of the cabinet issued on June 20, 1898, a neutrality proclamation respecting the war then in existence "between His Majesty the King of Spain, represented during his Minority by Her Majesty the

llTubman at a dinner honoring the visiting American Vice Presi­ dent Nixon, March 7, 1957; Townsend and Jones, op. c i t . , p.206. Queen Regent of the Kingdom and the United States of A m e ric a ".12 At the start of the f ir s t World War, President Daniel E. Howard issued another neutrality proclamation in regard to the belligerents of that war.13

Prior to the second World War, the Liberian Government under

President Edwin J. Barclay had associated its e lf with the League of

Nations policy of sanctions against Ita ly , only to have this revoked on

August 1, 1936. A neutrality proclamation was made on September 19,

1939. This was followed by a de facto break of diplomatic relations between Germany and Liberia.

Viewing the international situation, and mindful of what Liberia received for her eventual participation in the f ir s t World War (bom­ bardment of Monrovia by German gunboats and near-economic strangulation due to the arrest of trade with Germany, then an important trading part ner of Liberia), President Barclay delayed decision on the question of joining the Allies. Arguing that it was most unlikely that any action of Liberia's could importantly affect the world situation, he nonethe­ less conceded that i t was beyond doubt that Liberia's future would be profoundly affected, "We cannot suppress our sympathies, but we can be circumspect in deed and fully appreciative of realities".14

By early 1944 when Tubman took o ffice, the dramatic change in the international situation led Liberia to appreciate the new reality —

12charles Huberich, A Political and Legislative History of Liber- ia (New York: Central Book Company, Inc; 1947) Vol. I I , p., 1172.

13ibid, p. 1173. 14lbid, p. 1185. 60 the Allies were winning and the Axis powers were close to defeat. By a

Joint Resolution of the national Legislature, Liberia then o ffic ia lly declared war against Germany and Japan, o ffic ia lly because in late 1942,

Liberia had entered into a defense agreement with the United States, and American forces were stationed on Liberian so il. This went a l i t t l e beyond a mere show of sympathy. President Barclay, in refusing to of­ fic ia lly declare war, was simply attempting to keep his options.

President Tubman opted when he urged the legislative Joint Reso­ lution declaring war. "As a nation", he told the Legislature on Janu­ ary 26, 1944, "we should be reminded that whatever interrupts the peace of the world, or attempts to check the prosperity of any part of Christ­ endom, tends to involve u s ..." I5

Having been taught by events in the 1930's to be skeptical of the assurance of collective security (the rape of Ethiopa), Liberia had now returned to the principle of collective security in new garb — the grand alliance against the Axis aggressors that late r was to take a new name, the United Nations Organization.

Henceforth, Liberia's policy would oscillate between the new prin­ ciple of non-alignment in international affairs and fu lly associating its e lf with the western democracies, that is , the free world. Now, the days of s tric t neutrality were gone, especially fo r economically deve­ loping countries. The cold war, brought on by the Soviet-American conflict led to the creation of a group of Afro-Asian states, united in

15Robert Smith, We Are Obligated (Hamburg: Hanseatische Druckan- s ta lt, 1969) pp. 90-91. 61 their desire not to further jeopardize peace by joining power blocs, but rather to serve as a bridge of understanding or communication be­ tween the cold war participants.

Liberia participated in the two landmark non-aligned conferences, that of Bandung in 1955 and that of Belgrade in 1961. Rather than lengthening this aspect of the question, i t may suffice to mention that the countries of Afro-Asia opted for non-alignment for a wide variety of reasons. India's reason was voiced by Prime Minister Nehru when he said in late 1946;

. . . I am not prepared even as an individual, much less as the For­ eign Minister of this country, to give up njy right of individual judgment to anybody else in other countries. This is the essence of our policy, and that is the essence of nonalignment.16

But, while Liberia has agreed to associate herself with the broad

.objectives of the non-committed states, she did not hesitate ( at least for the twenty-eight years of the Tubman era) to accentuate her basic political beliefs.

In his second inaugural address President Tubman went beyond the endeavor of his f ir s t inaugural to identify the Liberian Government with the American Good Neighbor policy. In 1952, he not only reiterated

16G. H. Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States (New York, London: F. A. Praeger Publishers, 1966) p. 115. The aim of Liberia's foreign policy was to cultivate the closest possible friendship with the Western democracies and to identify with the four freedoms pro­ claimed by the United States and Great Britain. See Tubman's fir s t in­ augural address in Townsend, op. c i t . , p. 17. 62

previous policy regarding the "century-old trusted, tested, friend and mother country" — the United States, but he added:

We shall entertain no grudge, antipathy or prejudice against any state or nation, except in instances where states or nations of opposing ideologies and p o litic a l divergence of views seek to im­ pose th eir p o litic a l whims, creeds, and wishes upon other peoples without and against their free and spontaneous w ill, thereby agi­ tating and supporting internal dissension and coups d 'e ta t...17

By 1963, with Liberia no more the lone independent African re­ public as a result of the awakening of that "angry young giant", Africa,

President Tubman sought to make it crystal clear where Liberia stood, at least ideologically. "We wage no war against socialism", he declared,

" if i t is kept within the te rrito rie s and among people so inclined, but we shall fig h t t i l l death any attempt to impose and force upon us what we consider a mystical illusion".18 More precisely, Liberian policy was "committed to the concept of a free enterprise system, democracy, and a pragmatic search for solution to problems of multinational exis­ tence..."19

As the catalogued causal determinants of policy show, the presence of many western concessionaires in Liberia has not only subtly, and often times, directly affected the direction and tone of policy, but the very option fo r the open door policy (which invited the concession­ aires) has shown a politico-ideological preference for western politi­ cal and economic orientations. One could go even further and assert that Liberia's history has been aligned toward western concepts. I t is

17Townsend» op. c i t . , p. 103. 18Townsend & Jones, op. c i t . , p. 223. 19Ib id , p. 517. 63 small wonder then that the "strong, tested and healthy a lly ..." approach to peace would have high priority in Liberia's policies.

2. THE PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE

(a) Liberia and the United States

In the United States Department of State report on United States

Foreign Policy 1969-1970, Secretary of State William P. Rogers is re­ ported to have emphasized during his African tour in early 1970," ...th e continued deep interest of the United States in preserving and increas­ ing the special ties that bind"the United States and Liberia .20 The early development of American-Liberian relations was discussed in the historical factors section of Chapter I.

During the second World War, despite Liberia's initial refusal to abandon a policy of neutrality as regards the belligerents, she pro­ vided the Allies with an important m ilitary base, and was the principal supplier of natural rubber when war in Asia cut o ff the Asian sources of rubber.

Since the war ended, Liberia has expanded its o ffic ia l contacts with the United States. In the economic realm (see the economic factors in Chapter I for d etails), the United States provides forty percent of

Liberia's imports and purchases twenty-five percent of her exports. The

United States continues to be Liberia's chief trading partner, followed

20United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970, A report of the Secre­ tary of State, Department of State Publication 8575, General Foreign Policy Series 254, Released March 1971, G. P. 0 ., Washington, D.C. 64 by the group of states belonging to the European Economic Community.

Liberia has two military agreements with the United States, one on Mutual Defense Assistance (1951), and the other on cooperation " ...

in the event of aggression or threat of aggression..."(1959).21 Two other indices of closeness between the two countries are the permission granted by Liberia for the installation of Voice of America relay facil­ ities on its soil, and President Tubman's expression of support for

President Johnson's policy in Vietnam during his (Tubman's) la s t v is it to the United States in 1968.22

Prior to this expression of support, President Tubman, in his

1965 Annual Message to the Legislature, said of the war:

The war in Vietnam has occasioned accusations, charges, and counter charges, each side maintaining that the other is the aggressor. I do know that one of the parties in this war has asked fo r a nego­ tiated peace at the conference table and has evidenced its sincer­ ity by efforts to effectuate this in different ways and by diverse means which have been ignored or rejected by the other p arty...23

(b) Relations with the Non-African World

Although diplomatic and in one case (Germany) significant commer­ cial relations with Europe date from the mid-nineteenth century, there has recently been a new turn to Europe probably to insure against being referred to as an American "colony" or "slave and enclave of the dollar".

2lText of the treaties is presented in Appendices II and III of this study.

22gus J. Liebenow, Liberia. The Evolution of Privilege (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969) p. 193.

23Townsend and Jones, op: c i t ; , p. 142. 65

The United Kingdom not only was the f ir s t to extend diplomatic recog­ nition (1848), but she is today important in the galaxy of Liberia's trading partners. As pointed out in the economic factors, relations with the European Economic Community and Scandinavian countries which buy more than half of Liberia's iron ore, are rather close. Most of

Liberia's trade (1970) is now with the EEC. Liberia presently obtains some of her m ilitary equipment from Switzerland. The Department of

Defense recommended in its 1970 Annual Report that the Liberian M ilitia adopt the Swiss M ilitia system.

Along with this more open door policy toward foreign investments has gone a marked diversification of Liberia's external contacts and trading relations. Israel and China (Taiwan), each for its own reason has joined the lis t of donors to Liberian development and have become trading partners. Socialist Yugoslavia also maintains diplomatic rela­ tions with Liberia. But this is the extent to which Liberia has gone in o ffic ia l and sustained contacts with the Socialist w o r l d . 24

The most recent of Liberia's significant external contacts is that of relations with Japan. In his first report to the Department of State, the fir s t Liberian Ambassador to Tokyo, Mr. Roland H. Cooper, indicated that exports to Liberia from Japan were about $12.5 million annually.

About eighty-four vessels with an aggregate of 1,656,195 net tons were

24ln the interview with Secretary of State Grimes in October 1971, this writer was informed about Polish-Liberian trade relations and also occasional trade with the Soviet Union. 66 registered under the Liberian "flag of attraction" or of "convenience" during the same p e r i o d . 25

(c) Liberia and Africa

President Sekou Tour6 of Guinea in a speech on the occasion of

Liberia's independence anniversary in 1959, spelled out what in effect was Liberia's special psychological role in the re-emergence of Africa.

He said:

In the history of this new Africa which has just come to the world, Liberia has a preeminent place because she has been for each one of our peoples the living proof that our liberty was possible and nobody can ignore the fact that the star which marks the Liberian national Emblem has been hanging more than a century - - the sole star which illuminated our night of dominated people.26

But Liberia's role in the decolonization of Africa was not purely psychological; i t was also p o litic a l. This is to say that Liberia did not simply rely on her political survival, but made moves and champi­ oned the cause of colonial Africa for many years prior to 1957 for the independence of Ghana.

Many have been the commentators and writers who have branded Li­ beria "soft on colonialism". Often quoted to support this assertion are remarks by Liberia's Ambassador C. T. 0. King who said "that his country lagged materially behind the new nation of Ghana because i t had always been independent and had never reaped the (material) advantages of

• ^Department of State Annual Report, November 2, 1970, p. 21: see Appendix IV for a lis t of countries with which Liberia has diplomatic relations.

26Marine11i, op. c it., p. 100. 67 colonialsim..."27

Perhaps an argument could be made to support this point of view i f one makes i t in a pan-African framework. I f , on the other hand, one sought to expose things as they were and apparently s t ill are — that is observing Liberia's role in the context of the nation-state system

— a completely different conclusion would be reached. This is not to suggest either a non-desirability or a non-possibility of pan-African unity. It is simply an exposition of the motives behind Liberian pol­ icy.

I f Liberia greeted with trepidation the independence of Ghana and

Guinea in 1957 and 1958, respectively, i t was not as Liebenow seems to contend that she would have preferred that their independence be delayed, but simply that the new situation of the transfer of sovereignty from

Europeans to Africans was to be reckoned w ith.28 Guinea, to cite but one case, was not simply gaining its independence; i t was replacing

France as one of Liberia's neighbors. Additionally, the manner of

French departure necessitated close analysis on the part of the Liber­ ian government given the context of post-war international politics.

This is perhaps why the LIBERIAN AGE commented thus on the then pending independence of Guinea:

There is a tendency among imperial powers to say that African lead­ ers are Communists when they demand independence... What are the facts about Guinea? Its Premier is a staunch Trade Unionist who

27New York Times March 24, 1957, as quoted in G. Carter (Ed), Politics in Africa, 7 Cases, p. 7.

28gus Liebenow, Which Road to Pan-African Unity? The Sanniquellie Conference, 1959, in Carter, op. c i t . , pp. 7-8. 68

controls his territo ry through the unions. But apart from this Mr. Tour6 was educated in Communist countries. He has been labeled in many circles [a] "Marxist-trained" unionist. What everyone is watching now is , w ill Guinea remain with France or go the Communist way as an independent country? Whatever is her answer, we in this country must be on guard. And France should really not do anything to force the Africans into a tigh t corner. Most patently we would like to see a Guinea that is stable since part of that.territory is also Liberian territory which we have sought by peaceful means and negotiations to regain.29

Two years later the Secretary of Defense in his annual report,

alluding to the pending or accomplished independence of Guinea, the

Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone, expressed the need of government to fu lly

adjust to the new situation in the national interest:

With the attainment of independence of our sister African brothers contiguous to our borderline, problems which were never thought of are arising and have to be grappled with every degree of efficiency and alertness. Not only are the problems of the crossing into our territories of citizens of other states involved but also the ques­ tion of national ideologies, some of which are divergent to ours and destined to threaten and uproot the very foundation upon which our democratic institution was founded. To ensure that the situa- tion just referred to will be averted and not permitted to take a foothold in Liberia we have to strengthen and increase our border control units and give more attention to border problems as they arise from day to d a y . 30

The proliferation of African independence has brought both the establishment and intensification of contacts between Liberia and the states of independent Africa. The independence of Ghana and Guinea had a noted impact on Liberia's relations with her fellow African states.

Whereas in the past Liberia largely reacted to African developments, begining in 1957, she sought to take in itia tiv e s . Unless she

29Liberian Age, editorial of October 3, 1958, as quoted in Carter, op. c it . , p. 8.

30lbid (Quote from Annual Report of the Defense Department, 1960; underlining is the w rite r's ). 69 magnified her "...importance in intra-African a ffa irs", reasoned Li­ beria, "even her special relationship with the United States was likely to be diminished, with more and more foreign aid directed to Nigeria,

Ghana, and other larger and more activist states. Unless Liberia took positive stands on issues, African leadership would be monopolized by the radical group".^ Even though United States aid to Liberia reached its peak during this period, the United States, nevertheless, granted more aid to the newly emerging states in an attempt to win them over to the Democracies. Liberia already was an ally of the free world.

Accordingly, Liberia has moved to establish special links with like-minded African states, an approach made largely through personal diplomacy. President Tubman went out of his way to demonstrate the political a ffin ity between himself and the following African leaders —

Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and many of the leaders of francophone Africa. Basing his stance on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, Tubman boldly supported the unpopular Moise Tshombe of the Congo when the la tte r was

Premier in 1964.32 Despite his abhorrence of some of the actions of the "radical" governments o f, say, Nkrumah's Ghana or Kieta's Mali,

Tubman managed to maintain friendly contacts and diplomatic relations.

With her more immediate neighbors Liberia has also maintained

31Liebenow, op. c it ., p. 199.

32see Tsombe's own account in My Fifteen Months in Government, translated by Lewis Bermays, O.B.E. /[Texas: University of Plano Press, 1967) pp. 57-58. 70 especially good relations. With Sierra Leone, prior to the advent of the government of Mr. Saika Stevens (1968), the relationship of politi­ cal a ffin ity prevailed. With the Stevens government there have been some strains in relations, but nothing near the point of rupture. Li­ beria's relationship with Felix Houghouet-Boigny's Ivory Coast cannot be other than excellent given the fact that the two leaders share the same view on pan-Africanism, capitalism and contacts with the West.

When speaking of Liberian-Guinean relations i t would seem that similar application of good relations would have no foundation. This is , however, fa r from being the case. Despite the ideological chasm separating Liberia's True Whig Party (that is, the Liberian Government) and the Parti Democratique de Guinifee. (that is , the Guinean Government), and despite the fact that "the major protagonists of the cold war found their respective major spheres of influence in Africa face to face at the Guinean-Liberian b o r d e r " , 33 Tubman succeeded in so blunting these factors of separation as to make them almost non-existent.

There are other considerations in the Tubman-Tour6 relationship.

Guinea depends upon Liberian roads and the Free Port of Monrovia for the transportation of its raw material into the world market. Not that

Guinea has no alternative, but the Liberian route is shorter and thus more economical. Additionally, Guinea's use of the Liberian Nimba-

Buchanan railroad and the Buchanan port has made i t economically fea­ sible for Guinea to mine the iron ore found in its portion of the Nimba

Range. For economic reasons, among others,;Sekou Tourfe refused to

33Liebenow, op. c i t . , p. 201. 71 succumb to his ideological inclinations in his relations with Tubman's Liberia.34

(d) Liberia and African Unity

Liberia's views on pan-African unity have been well documented in a number of studies. This study w ill be limited to quoting a few of the pronouncements of the Tubman era on the question and making a con­ cluding comment in the light of them. In his 1957 Independence Day message, President Tubman said:

The question of leadership of A fric a ... is being s k illfu lly man­ euvered deliberately at this time to separate and weaken the ties of friendship which should exist among African states... In this connection I have observed that there seem to be three schools of thought on this subject. There are those who feel that Liberia should assume leadership based on the fact that she is the oldest African Republic and is riper in political experience; but i t w ill require more than age and p olitical experience to assume leadership of Africa. There are others who hold that Ghana should assume that role because she is physically more developed and em­ braces larger te rrito rie s . I t w ill require more than development and larger territory to assume leadership of Africa. And there are yet those who opine that Egypt with its rich traditions dating back to the remotest antiquity should assume leadership. I t w ill re­ quire more than rich traditions of antiquity. It will require, in my opinion, the aggregate of all three of these and more besides. It will require the aggregate of the best of all that Liberia, Ghana, Egypt, Tunisia, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Morocco, N igeria... and all other African territories and states possess, moulded together, to assume the leadership of Africa, compounded in such a manner as to represent the divisibility of Africa indivisible. I am inclined to the view that each African state must remain independent, enter- ing4.of course,.into pacts, treaties or international agreements, naturally so as to strengthen and accelerate mutual intercourse and reliable ties of friendship among them, which will be beneficial to themselves and the w o rld ...35

34lbid, pp. 201-203. 35Townsend, op. c i t . , pp. 185-186; M arinelli, op. c i t . , pp. 121- 122; President Tubman on African Unity, Department o t Public Informa­ tion, Monrovia, p. 7. 72

In an O fficial Gazette of January 26, 1959, Liberia's views as to the best means of arriving at African unity were set forth:"The Liber­

ian Government and people believe that there is no substitute for free­ dom except i t be greater freedom through equal participation and unlim­

ited fulfillm en t of the whole purpose of a people..." I t continued:

Hence, taking into consideration differing economic systems, d if­ fering political allegiances and preferences, differing cultural backgrounds and differing social customs; and not wishing to super­ impose any a rtific ia l unity upon these differences, i t is the opin­ ion of the Liberian Government that the peoples of Africa should resolve to achieve close association and cooperation, without pre­ judice to their national or international identities, in the fol­ lowing or some sim ilar manner: 1. That a single Convention which would provide for a permanent organization to be known as The Associated States of Africa, be concluded among the independent African nations and those which have fixed dates upon which they shall achieve inde­ pendence, with the understanding that other non-independent countries of Africa shall have the right to join the organi­ zation upon attaining independence. 2. That the Associated States of Africa provide for continuing consultation on problems of common interest and for the peace­ ful solution of a ll disputes which may arise among its mem­ bers. 3. That, within said organization, Regional Associations be rec­ ognized where they already exist or be organized to develop closer unity and provide uniform and common solution to spe­ cific problems in certain areas...36

In this rather early stage of the development of pan-Africanism

in independent Africa, Liberia had thus set forth a well articulated point of view. The Associated States of Africa approach to unity was

in diametrical opposition to the United States of Africa approach that originated from, and was successfully popularized by Ghana's Kwame

36president Tubman on African Unity, op. c it., pp. 8-9; Marinelli, op. cit. , pp. 122-123. (Unferlininq is" the wnter's.) 73

N k ru m a h .37 At f ir s t i t seemed that the Ghanian approach would prevail over the Liberian proposal. Following the f ir s t conference of indepen­ dent African states in 1958, Nkrumah, realizing the moderate tempera­ ment of Tubman, decided to pursue the United States of Africa approach despite the Liberian position. The Ghana-Guinea and la te r Ghana-Guinea

-Mali unions were indicative of this. But little , if anything, resul­ ted from their feeble attempts at unity.

At a number of landmark gatherings beginning with the Saniquellie summit in 1959, the Liberian approach began to gain more support. At

Saniquellie (Liberia) where Tubman, Tourd and Nkrumah met, the Liberian position prevailed with Tubman's s k illfu l diplomacy resulting in the deflection of Tourd from the Nkrumah proposal.38 This may have been a p o litic a l tactic on the part of Tourd. This assumption is made because

Guinea's foreign policy s t i l l leans toward the Nkrumah plan of pan-Afri- can unity. Two key Guinean foreign policy objectives are: The promotion of African unity and the maintenance of neutral status or non-involve­ ment in the power struggle between East and West.39

Following the Saniquellie Conference was the meeting of the Casa­ blanca Powers, in essence a riv al gathering, which was held in Morocco,

January 4-7, 1961. The Casablanca Powers included Morocco, Egypt, Mali

3?See Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: International Publishers, 1963) and other writings.

38por details of the summit meeting see: Liebenow, o|3. c i t . , pp. 1-31; Marinelli, op. c it. , pp. 123-129; and Tubman on African Unity, op. c it . , pp. 11-12.

39victor D. DuBois, Guinea, in Colman and Roseberq, op. c i t . , pp. 212-213. 74

Guinea, Ghana, Libya, and the Algerian Provisional Government. Between

May 8-12, 1961, the Monrovia Conference was convened. This was the largest gathering in the Continent's history with twenty-one indepen* dent African states attending. The deliberations at Monrovia were con­ tinued in Lagos in January 1962. Following Lagos, attempts were made to draw together all of independent Africa in preparation for the most important of a ll the meetings, the Addis Ababa Conference of May

1963. This conference, attended by th irty-eig ht heads of state, re­ sulted in the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). For a ll practical purposes, "the OAU has failed to be the dynamic force in

African affairs which Nkrumah had hoped, and Tubman had feared, i t might be".40

3. LIBERIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Liberia's relationship with the United Nations may be considered from two broad aspects - functional and p o litic a l. The former involves the role that the United Nations and its many specialized agencies has played in Liberia's development, and conversely the contribution that

Liberia has made to these functional agencies.41 in the latter case - and this is the primary concern - i t is necessary to outline the salient features of Liberia's political attitude on the range of issues brought before the World Body. For better understanding of the relationship

40Liebenow, op; c it ;i p. 204.

41 For a brief discussion of this aspect see: J. Hilary Wilson, "The U.N.: A Partner in Liberia's Progress" in The Liberian Star, Dec­ ember 12, 1969, p .6. 75 with the United Nations, a brief recapitulation of Liberia's involve­

ment in international organizations leading to her role in the creation of the United Nations, w ill be presented.

Unlike the preponderant majority of African states, Liberia was a

member of the first universal attempt at international organization.

She was a signatory of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Consid­

ering the era and the circumstances of her own history, her role in the

League was perforce "minor and somewhat defensive".42

Despite her unhappy experience with the League of Nations, Liberia,

like other members of the international community, saw hope rekindled

as the second World War approached an end. The f ir s t perhaps decisive

sign of the approaching climax was the January 1942 Declaration by the

United Nations, signed originally by twenty-six nations. Other nations

rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for vic­

tory over Hitlerism could adhere to i t . On the 26th of February 1944,

Liberia officially communicated its adherence to the Declaration. In

so doing, she subscribed to the Atlantic Charter, promulgated in August

1941, and expressed the hope for world peace following the war which

would "afford assurance that all the men in all ,sthe lands may live out

their lives in freedom from fear and want".^

The steps to the Charter of the United Nations are too well known

^Thomas Hovet, J r ., African States and the Uni ted Nati ons (North- University Press, 1963) p. 20.

^Yearbook of the Uni ted:Nati ons ^ Department of Public Informa­ tion (New York, 1946) p. 2. 76

to recount here. Let i t simply be said that the Yalta Conference (and,

before i t , the Dumbarton Oaks proposals regarding a future internation­

al organization) resolved the establishment of a general international

organization to maintain world peace and security. Additionally, those

countries which had declared war on Germany and Japan by March 1, 1945,

and had signed the Declaration by the United Nations, could be founders

of the organization.

Liberia was among the f if t y nations meeting at San Francisco be­

tween April 25th and June 26th, 1945. Studying the Dumbarton Oaks pro­

posals, the Yalta agreements and amendments propose'd by various govern­ ments, the conference agreed upon a United Nations Charter which event­

ually was signed by a ll the representatives. Vice President Clarence

L. Simpson, head of the Liberian delegation, signed on behalf of Li­

beria. On October 24, 1945, the Charter came into force with the filin g of their instruments of ratificatio n by the major powers and a majority of other signatories. Liberia deposited its ra tific atio n on November

2, 1945.

Among the amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the Yalta agreements emanating from governments at the San Francisco gathering, was one of some importance regarding Liberia's relationship with the

United Nations. As the structure of the United Nations was being for­ med, Liberia sought to inject the principle of representational equal­ ity on the Security Council — the key decision-making body of the Uni­ ted Nations. She proposed an alphabetical rotation of non-permanent

'members in order to insure the participation of all states in that 77

organ. The proposal was overruled then, but was raised again, in other

forms, a few years later when the question of adequate African repre­

sentation became crucial.

Since 1960, Liberia has served terms on both the Security Council

and the Economic and Social Council. Liberia's Angie Brooks-Randolph

served as Chairman of the General Assembly's Fourth or Trusteeship Com­ mittee during the 16th session of the General Assembly. In addition,

Mrs Brooks-Randolph served as President of the 24th session of the Gen­ eral Assembly in 1969. Liberia also was represented on the Economic and Social Commission on Human Rights.

Liberia fu lly supported the 1950 Uniting fo r Peace Resolution of

the General Assembly, and made a modest contribution toward the United

States - inspired United Nations efforts in Korea. Liberia continued to

support the efforts of the United Nations in maintaining peace, and

recently, actively participated in the United Nations Truce Supervision

Organization in the Middle East. To this day, Liberia strongly supports the Organization's peace-making activities.

Liberia has also been active in advocating self-determination and

independence for colonial states. Criticism was voiced that since Li­ beria was never p o litic a lly dependent, she could not symbolize African

aspiration for self-government before the decolonization movement.44

According to some critics, what Liberia did, in effect, was to ride with the tide and finally align herself with modern African nationalism

44Hoyet, op. c i t . , pp. 23-24. 78 because i t was now respectable and real.

The history of Liberia's early attitude toward colonial peoples has s t ill to be written. However, since the United Nations came into being, Liberia seems to have striven for the liberation of subjugated peoples, within the lim its of her capacities. While i t is true that

Liberia had no decisive influence on the sections on Trust and Non-

Self-Governing Territories which were incorporated into the United Na­ tions Charter, her views in the various debates of colonial or quasi­ colonial issues have not left unaffected the character of the worldwide colonial structure.

Ten years before African membership in the General Assembly sharply increased and African influence started to ris e, in 1950, Li­ beria asserted her stand on the question of dependent peoples. Com­ menting in the General Assembly's Fourth Committee on the Trusteeship

Council Report A/1306, Ambassador Henry Ford Cooper said:

...he regretted that he could not associate himself with the con­ gratulations which had been extended to the Administering Author­ itie s on th eir achievements in the Trust Territories; he had been impressed, rather, with the aspirations of the indigenous popula­ tions, which had occasionally made themselves f e lt through violence, and had, in some instances, compelled the Administering Authorities to accede to the demands of the people. The small measure of self- government, )advanced education and social and economic improvement won by the indigenous population had been achieved through great sacrifice. History had shown that no people had attained its in­ dependence except through its own express w ill to be master of its own destiny...45

The Ambassador further commented that the Liberian Government was

45united Nations. O fficial Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Fourth Committee, 149th Meeting, (1950) p. 37. 79 in favor of amalgamating non-self-governing and Trust Territories,

since conditions in both types of territories were virtually the same, the indigenous inhabitants must have a common desire for p o litic a l freedom, and the administrative union of the te rrito rie s could, therefore, only result in a strengthening of that desire.46

This certainly presages the policy of the 1960 General Assembly "Decla­ ration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and

Peoples".

Contending that the peoples of the world hoped and planned for the future while livin g in the present, Ambassador Cooper concluded by reminding the Administering Authorities:

...o f the dangers inherent in quelling the national aspirations of those people. Undesirable propaganda could not find a more fe r t ile field than the minds of those inhabitants of Trust and Non-self- governing Territo ries who, feeling themselves held back and repres­ sed in their desire for self-determination, believed that they had nothing to lose.47

These views were consistent with government policy up to the

1960's, and beyond. Liberia has fe lt that one of the essential purposes of the spirit of the United Nations Charter was the elimination of all

Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories by their elevation to indepen­ dent statehood.48 it was within the framework of this basic belief that

Liberia took a stand on the many colonial issues with which the United

46ibid.

47united Nations. O ffic ia l Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, op. c it., (Underlining is the writer's.)

48united Nations, O ffic ia l Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Fourth Committee, 211th Meeting; comments of Ambassador Dudley Lawrence on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, p. 59. 80

Nations has been occupied since its inception.

As mentioned, the colonial issues cannot be considered by them­ selves for they have become enmeshed with larger issues of world poli­ tics in the United Nations. In the late 1940's, the question of the disposal of the former Ita lia n colonies of Africa proved to be not mere­ ly a matter of sovereignty transfer but also one of adjusting to the changing tides of power politics. This also holds true for the more contemporary case of South’ West Africa. To understand this situation more completely, the full spectrum of interests of today's world powers must be reviewed. Thus, consideration of the United Nations case stud­ ies and a test of some of the generalizations made in this chapter are the next items for discussion. PART I I

LIBERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN ACTION:

THE UNITED NATIONS CASE STUDIES CHAPTER III

LIBERIA AND THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE

"Peace", Secretary of State Grimes once asserted, "is one of the cornerstones of Liberia's foreign policy"J But even the most b e llig ­ erent of states justifies its action in terms of promoting international peace. To say that Liberia has, since 1944, posed herself as a cham­ pion of peace is to suggest the type of peace that fa c ilita te s the pur­ suit of her foreign policy objectives. For in order to maintain her independence, promote her economic and social development, and help to eradicate colonialism and its vestiges, particularly from Africa, there must be relative peace Tn the world.

I t is in this lig h t that Liberia has taken a stand on the many issues touching world peace within the United Nations frame­ work. The case studies that follow will attempt to explain Liberia's position on some of the crucial issues of international peace. As al­ ready mentioned in the general introduction, the three questions have been chosen primarily because they seem to this w riter the most repre­ sentative of issues that interest Liberia and much of Africa.

Apartheid in South Africa was chosen because of the real poten- ial it holds for racial bipolarity, an eventuality which could danger­ ously undermine world peace. While the China representation issue did

I The New York Times, July 25, 1965, Section 11, p. 4. 81 not directly concern Africa, its cold war implications afforded an op­ portunity to observe the attitude of Liberia (and Africa) on the shift­ ing alliances in international politics. The choice of the first Congo crisis was motivated by the desire to observe how Liberia reacted to a threat to the independence of a fellow African state, especially when that reacting was done within the institutional framework of the United

d Nations.

1. THE APARTHEID QUESTION

The United Nations and with i t , the world community, has been in­ volved in South Africa's racial policy since 1946. From 1946 u n til

1952, the question took the form of the treatment of Indians in the then Union of South Africa. Since 1952, i t has become a question of race conflict resulting from the apartheid policies of the Government of South Africa.

Perhaps the best way to approach the subject is f ir s t to review the United Nations Charter. That document requires that a ll member states promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms both within national boundaries and in interstate relations. The Charter also insures members against intervention in matters essentially within the domestic sphere. For a variety of legal and p o litical reasons which w ill become apparent in the discussion that follows, the African states have systemically rejected the applicability of the domestic jurisdiction clause to the apartheid question. Primarily directed to pacific settlement of international disputes (Chapter VI), the Charter 82 further provides for collective measures against states when the Secu­

r ity Council determines that there is threat to international peace, breach of the peace, or acts of aggression (Chapter V II) . In addition, the 1950 Uniting for Peace Resolution of the General Assembly also pro­ vides for collective measures when world peace is threatened.

Basing their case on these provisions, the African states and other anti-racial forces in the United Nations have moved from one stage of diplomatic pressure to another in their attempts to produce a reversal of the apartheid policy. The question arises as to why Li­ beria and other African states have taken such an interest in the apar­ theid policies of South Africa. The answer is that national honor and the dignity of the African as a human are involved. For apartheid, as practiced in South Africa, has literally divided the South African in­ to four racial groups, namely, white, colored, Asian, and African. Its theoretical basis is the inherent superiority of the white race over others, but specifically the African race. Thus the battle of the Af­ rican states against colonialism which fostered the white supremist doctrine that is apartheid, continues to be waged unmitigatingly.

The efforts of the African countries to bring about a resolution of the apartheid question can be divided into four phases. From 1952 to 1960, the African nations sought to establish the right of the Gen­ eral Assembly to censure by declaration, the policy and practice of apartheid in South Africa. From 1960 to 1964, they tried to win Gener­ al Assembly support for increasingly specific and forceful recommenda­ tory resolutions. A third phase of the anti-racial drive was the move 83

(parallel with the efforts in the General Assembly) within the frame­ work of the Security Council fo r the imposition of mandatory sanctions against South Africa. The contention here is that apartheid is not only a violation of fundamental human rights, a provision a ll members are pledged to respect, but also that the situation of apartheid calls for the application of the "threat to peace" provision of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.2 A fourth and continuing phase (19.th to 25th Session of the General Assembly), brings us up-to-date on the efforts of the anti-apartheid forces to combat South Africa's policy, primarily but not exclusively, through the United Nations.3

Phase I Origin to the 15th General Assembly

The f ir s t phase of diplomatic pressuring started really before

1952. The fir s t session of the General Assembly in 1946 yielded to mild pressure from the budding anti-racial forces and unanimously adopted an anti-racial resolution. The resolution was couched in ex­ treme generalities and named no state.4 Thereafter, India took the lead in keeping up the pressure by annually spearheading the drive for including on the General Assembly agenda, an item on the treatment of

2Waldemar A. Nielsen, African Battleli.ne (New York: Harper & Rowe, 1965) p . 66.

30ne of the fir s t resolutions passed by the United Nations on this question was Resolution 103 (1) calling for an end to religious and ra­ cial discrimination.

^United Nations, First Session, Plenary Verbatim Records, Novem­ ber 19,"~t946^ p. 975. 84

Indians in the Union of South Africa.

On the 12th of September 1952, thirteen Afro-Asian states re­

quested that the question of race conflict resulting from the policy of apartheid of the Government of South Africa be placed on the agenda of the 7th session of the General Assembly.5 The explanatory memorandum referred to a dangerous and explosive situation that the race conflict was: creating and stressed the threat to international peace and the fla ­ grant violations of the basics of human rights and fundamental freedoms that were resulting from apartheid. The memorandum went on to say that apartheid not only challenged a ll the ideals for which the United Nations stood, but was contrary to "specific and repeated recommendations" in resolutions of the General Assembly — 103(1), 217(111), 395(V), 511(VI), a ll of them urging the termination of racial discrimination.®

Considering South Africa's past attitude regarding the United Na­ tions discussions on aspects of its policies (Southwest Africa, for ex­ ample), the debate now became more joined. Thus, two sides were formed

- those favoring United Nations debate and possible censure by declara­ tions, the policy and practice of apartheid, and those marshalling all possible support to uphold the principle of non-intervention specified in Article 2:7 of the Charter.

®The states were: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

^Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953, p. 297. 85

While South Africa and its supporters pleaded f ir s t for non-inclu­ sion and then for non-discussion of the item because of United Nations legal incompetence, the anti-racial forces took exactly the opposite position. The voices and votes of the latter prevailed. Liberia was among the majority favoring both inclusion and discussion of the item.

The vote for inclusion was 45-6-8, with Egypt, Ethiopia, the United

States, and the Soviet Union also voting in favor. When the Ad Hoc Political Committee met to consider the item, the representative of South Africa outlined his Government's position. The factors which should preclude discussion, according to Mr. Jooste, were that with the single exception of enforcement measures by the Security

Council under Chapter V II, the United Nations is prohibited from inter­ vention in the domestic affairs of member states. He declared further, that the Charter did not define the methods to be employed by member states in the achievement of such objectives mentioned in A rticle 55 as higher standards of livin g , fu ll employment and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The international cooperation pledge given in A rticle 56 to promote the purposes of A rticle 55 did not diminish the right of states to repel interference in their internal affairs, or authorize the United Nations to use the dictatorial device of discussion or resolution.

Mr. Jooste continued by stating that A rticle 2:7 served as count­ er-balance to the absolute right of veto of the Great Powers and grant­ ed to the Small Powers, protection of their inherent right to manage th eir internal affairs unmolested. 11 But fo r the compromises exemplified 86 for the Great Powers by the rights of veto and the Small Powers by Ar­ tic le 2:7, there would have been no charter".7

In this position South Africa was supported by France and the

United Kingdom, among others. The Soviet Union was with the majority, that is , the anti-racial forces, while the United States attempted to follow a p o litic a lly expedient middle course. The United States had voted for inclusion of the item, but later followed a policy of non- alignment in regard to the South African position and those opposing i t .

Ultimately, i t seemed that the United States grew sympathetic toward the South African stand.8

The Liberian representative, Mr. E. C. B. Jones, expressed support for the Indian view on the question of United Nations competence. The

Indian position, clearly outlined by Mrs. Pandit in the Ad Hoc Politi­ cal Committee, stressed that the issue of competence must be weighed against the background of the facts. Article 2:7 did not preclude Uni­ ted Nations discussion of the item. Article 1:3 proclaimed respect for human rights as one of the purposes of the United Nations, and Article

10 vested the General Assembly with the right to discuss any question within the Charter's scope and to make recommendations accordingly.

^United Nations: O fficial Records of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee (Summary Records of Meetings) 13th Meeting, November 12-20, 1952, pp. 65-67.

8Amry Vandenbosch, South Africa and the World (University of Ken­ tucky Press, 1970) pp. 235-236. 87

The Ad Hoc P o litical Committee's deliberations were reduced to

three draft resolutions. The firs t, sponsored by South Africa exclu­

sively upheld the provisions of Article 2:7. It was rejected by a vote

of 45-6-8.

A second d raft was sponsored by eighteen powers, including Libe­

ria. It sought to establish "a commission to study the international

aspects and implications of the racial situation in the Union of South

Africa in the light of the Charter and the resolutions of the United

Nations on racial persecution and discrimination, and to report its findings to the 8th Session of the General Assembly".9 This d raft with amendments, was adopted by a vote of 35-2-22, with the United States among those abstaining.

The th ird draft resolution was sponsored by four Scandinavian states. This compromise (between the two earlier drafts) essentially called "upon all members to bring their policies into conformity with th eir Charter obligations to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms".^ The draft was adopted in its entirety 20-7-32, with Liberia, Ethiopia and Egypt (then the only independent African

States i f one excludes South Africa) abstaining, and the United States voting in favor.

At its Plenary Session, theeGeneral Assembly proceeded to act on the report of the Ad Hoc P o litical Committee which contained both the

9Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952, Document A/Ac.61/L.8/Rev 1, p. 299. TQlbid, Document A/AC.61/L .12. 88

18-power and the Scandinavian draft resolutions. The former draft be­ came Draft A, while the la tte r became Draft B. Over South Africa's objection, Draft A was adopted 35-1-23, with the United States abstain­ ing. Draft B was then also adopted 24-1-34, with the United States voting in favor and Liberia, Ethiopia, Egypt and the Soviet Union ab­ staining.^

The Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Af­ rica reported yearly from 1953 through 1955. The f ir s t report noted the non-cooperation on the part of the Union of South Africa. I t then made a b rief outline of the; problem. Taken up by the 435th Plenary Ses­ sion of the 8th General Assembly, the question was referred to the Ad

Hoc Political Committee. There, the Liberian representative, Mr. R. S.

S. Bright supported the report, commenting that Article 2:7, like all the Articles of the Charter, was subordinate to A rticle 1. Unless the

United Nations maintained international peace and security, its proper functioning would be seriously hampered. Liberia would side with the defenders of human rights and dignity. Imploring the South African Gov­ ernment to listen to reason, Mr Bright referred to the changing times, the new feeling and concepts and fresh definition of man's place on earth that had been initiated.12

The Committee reported to the Plenary Session, a 17-power draft

^ United Nations, ORGA, 7th Session, 401st Meeting, December 5, 1952; also Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952, pp. 304-306.

12United Nations, ORGA, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 8th Session (1953), 3lst - 43rd Meeting, p. 170. 89 resolution that i t had adopted. The jo in t resolution would have the

Study Commission continued, hopefully with South Africa's cooperation.

Liberia was among the sponsors. By a vote of 38-11-11, the 17-power d ra ft, with minor modifications, was adopted.

Despite the pleas from Liberia and others, cooperation from South

Africa was not to be had. This was reflected in the Commission's re­ port to the 9th General Assembly in 1954. When that report came up for discussion in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, apparently reacting to the known South African position and also the United States attack on the report, the Liberian representative, Mr. Dudley Lawrence said that apartheid could not be viewed in isolation, for i t had worldwide impli­ cations. "No state," he continued, "should refrain from taking a forth­ right stand against racism either by arguments based on Article 2:7 or considerations of expediency'.'^ The General Assembly concluded its ac­ tiv itie s on the item for the 9th Session by recommissioning the Commis­ sion.

At the 10th Session, the Comission added the reactions of world opinion on the racial question to its previous report. Notable mentions were made of reactions from the World Council of Churches and the Ban­ dung Conference of non-aligned nations, both of which expressed abhor­ rence against racism. Positions on the question by member states were maintained. The Commission was charged to keep under review, the racial

^United Nations, oja.cit., Ad Hoc Political Committee, 46th Meet­ ing, December 7, 1954, p. 2247 90 situation in South Africa over the opposition of the United States, among others.

Between the 10th General Assembly in 1955, and the 13th in 1958, there was nothing eventful in the regular but mild pressures that the anti-apartheid forces sought to apply on South Africa. But South A fri­ ca's dislike of the pressures lead to its temporary withdrawal from the

United Nations deliberations in 1956; its representative returned in

1957, at the suggestion of its friends.

At the 14th session in 1959, pressures were stepped up as could be judged by the tone of the speeches, and of course, the background to the 1959 debate. Africa, the continent primarily concerned about the degradations and indignities of apartheid, was fast coming into its own p o litic a lly . In April 1958, there had been the Accra conference of in­ dependent African states, and also the introduction of Guinea to the international scene. The debate over the future shape of political Af­ rica was beginning to take form. While Liberia was not a newcomer to the game of diplomacy, there was now an a ir of urgency in her interven­ tions on the apartheid question. I t is probable that she sensed the revolutionary mood of emerging Africa and did not wish to isolate her­ self. 14

Speaking before the Special Political Committee to which the apar­ theid item had been referred, the Liberian representative, Mr. C. Abayomi

14See Chapter I I , "Liberia and Africa". 91

Cassell said that:

...th e deplorable lo t o f the non-white people of the Union, who were not even entitled to freedom of movement, might one day lead to a revolution of unimaginable consequences, which must be avert­ ed, despite the blindness of that country's leading c irc le s ... The question was v ita l to the peoples of Africa, who wished to prevent the evil doctrine of 'apartheid' from spreading to other parts of the continent. The risk was very real. It was suffi­ cient to recall that the League had been unable to halt in time the spread of another evil doctrine, fascism. The U. N. should take warning from that historical precedent and go on from the stage of mere resolutions to stronger and more decisive action...15

The 14th General Assembly concluded its work on the apartheid item by adopting a 36-power draft resolution. By its terms, the Assem­ bly, following its 1958 resolution, appealed to South Africa to change course. But the vote reflected a growth in the anti-apartheid forces

(62-3-7). While the United States voted in favor because of the reso­ lution's relatively mild tone and its non-censuring nature, the growing number of African votes could not be considered as being cast for the same reasons.16

Reading the milder tone of the resolutions toward the end of the

1950's, as a reflection of friendlier attitudes on the part of the more influential members of the United Nations, a leading spokesman for the

Nationalist Party of South Africa voiced gratification that the "out­ side world is prepared more and more to appreciate South Africa's stand­ point".1 7 But the year 1960, marked a sharp turn in precisely the

16United Nations, ORGA, Special Political Committee (Summary Rec­ ords), 141st Meeting, 1959T~P* 71. 16African membership was on the rise. To that of Liberia, Ethiopia, and Egypt were added, between 1952 and 1959, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Ghana, and Guinea. ^Vandenbosch, op. c i t . , South A frica House of Assembly Debate, p .239. 92

opposite direction. Seventeen new African states attained internation­

al sovereignty and sixteen were admitted to the United Nations, to be

closely followed by a number of others, all speaking with one voice

against apartheid.

In addition, there was the famous "wind of change" speech d eliv­

ered by the B ritish Premier, Harold Macmillan before the South African

parliament. I t was in February 1960, when Mr. Macmillan endeavored to

outline to South Africa's leaders, the irreversible trend of decoloni­

zation in Africa and the impact that trend would have on the African states having white minority Governments. Put otherwise, the lim ited freedom doctrine embodied in apartheid could no longer be guaranteed security. All this was stated from the point of view of British policy.

That policy, the Premier said, sought to create in a ll areas of B ritish influence, harmony between the races by mutual respect. He warned of possible divergences between the policies of his country and those of

South A frica.

It may well be that in trying to do our duty as we see it, we shall sometimes make d iffic u ltie s fo r you. I f this proves to be so we shall regret i t . But I know that even so, you would not ask us to flin ch from doing our duty. You, too, w ill do your duty as you see i t . 18

As la te r events proved, not only may this speech have emboldened indi­ genous South Africans to confidently challenge the domestic policy of apartheid, but it also may have hardened the determination of the Boer

■ *

18Nicholas Manseigh, (Ed.) Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth A ffa irs , 1952-1962 (London, 1963) pp. 347-351, quoted in Vandenbosch, op. c i t . , p. 240. . 93

nationalists to in flict the inhumanities of apartheid on its African victims.

The year 1960, was not only the year of increase in African mem­ bership and "wind of change" warnings; i t was also the year of what has come to be known as "Sharpville". For the firs t time the apartheid

item, under a more somber and revealing heading was submitted to the

Security Council.

On the 29th of March 1960, twenty-nine Afro-Asian states (Li­ beria included) urgently requested a meeting of the Security Council to consider the "situation arising out of the large-scale killing of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation in the Union of South Africa".^ They characterized the situation as having the potential fo r international fric tio n , lik e ly to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

No sooner was the meeting convened, then the debate began. The

Liberian representative, Mr. Cox, referred to the brutality as an out­ come of a long series of repressive measures. On March 21, a group of

Africans gathered to demonstrate peacefully against the continuation of the pass system and to demand its abolition. Mr. Cox then read a statement of the Liberian Secretary of State, Mr. J. Rudolph Grimes, dated March 23, 1960:

The Government of Liberia has learned with great grief that on Monday, 21 March, 1960, policemen of the Government of the Union of South Africa fire d upon a crowd of Africans who were peacefully demonstrating against certain aspects of the inhumane and savage

^Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 142. 94

policy of 'apartheid'. The shooting occurred afte r several planes of the Government of South Africa had flown overhead in an attempt to frighten and disperse the crowd. In this rather barbaric act many Africans were k ille d and several hundred seriously wounded. It is to be observed that not a single African was armed with any weapons or instruments of war, nor were they even in any position to defend themselves against the weapons of destruction that were used against them. The Government of Liberia most seriously de­ precates and abhors this systematic, cold-blooded and ruthless mur­ der and vile slaughter of helpless Africans... especially so when they were Deacefullv askina for fundamental human rights... We have called not only for disarmament in the military sphere, but for disarmament in the world of prejudice, bias, hatred, selfish­ ness, intolerance, and all attitudes which are the end products of fear... But now we say that the U.N. must act with force, with vigour and without delay or hesitation...20

The statement concluded by calling on the Security Council to take meas ures to stop the violence and bring about respect for fundamental free­ doms, but short of employing the economic and m ilitary sanctions pro­ visions of Chapter V II of the Charter.

The position of Liberia was shared by a majority of Afro-Asian representatives, among them the Indian representative. In his inter­ vention in the Security Council debate, India's Mr. Jha went into sub­ stantive aspects of the question. "The shooting down of large numbers of unarmed men and women would have been regrettable in any case", Mr.

Jha said. That the demonstrators were peaceful and defenceless was bound to move world opinion. But one could not isolate the murders in

South Africa. "They are intim ately concerned with and are indeed, a culmination of the cult of racism in South Africa which the U.N. has

20united Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, 852nd Meeting, March 30, 1960, pp. 32-36. deplored and condemned over the years". Continuing, the Indian dele­ gate said: "that Sharpville and its sources could no longer stay on the plane of academic discussion on human rights". World peace was threat­ ened because it had a direct relationship to the "state of feeling" of millions of Afro-Asians (who comprised well over half of the world's population). He noted the near-universal unfavorable reaction to Sharp- v ille (U.S. State Department, USSR's Tass, Liberian Government State­ ment, above quoted, the New York Times, e tc .). The intervention was then concluded by a recall of H itle r's cult of racism and its interna­ tional consequences as a reminder of the very real implications of Ver- woerd's similar cult of racism. But now there existed nuclear weapons.2^

As usual, during the debate, South Africa repeated its previous contentions: the incompetence of the Security Council to discuss the item, invoking Charter Article 35, to attempt to prove that the

Council could only discuss disturbances and situations between states, not within a given state. The South African representatives went on to charge that the disturbances in South Africa were sim ilar to those in other states. In fa c t, the Security Council and other United Nations organs were to be blamed for having;emboldened:rithe/"agitators" by the annual debate and world-wide anti-South Africa propaganda. I f Sharp- ville was the result of these actions then the responsibility was not

South A fric a 's .22

2^United Nations, ORSC, 852nd Meeting, op. c it., pp. 15-16.

22Ibid, pp.18-25. 96

This urgently called meeting of the Security Council was conclu­ ded by the adoption of a mild resolution that called on South Africa to change course and requested the Secretary General, in consultation with

South A frica, "to make such arrangements as would adequately help in up­ holding the purposes and principles of the Charter and to report to the Security Council".23

The conclusion o f the Security Council's 1960 debate o f the South

African problem also ended Phase I of the drive by Afro-Asia and other anti-racial forces to pressure for change in South Africa. The General

Assembly had succeeded in establishing a rig h t to censure apartheid in

South Africa by general declarations. In the beginning, such major pow­ ers as the United States and the United Kingdom refrained from joining the majority and probably were in most cases responsible for the mild language of the resolutions, but when the Sharpville incident occurred, both nations were cooperating with the majority in its resolve to cen­ sure South Africa.

During Phase I, Liberia consistently remained on the side of those nations unreservedly opposed to the South African position. Nor was

Liberia in any way influenced by the moderating positions of the United

States. As mentioned in the discussion of Phase I, Liberia continually voted for the resolutions against the apartheid policy while the United

States maintained a middle-of-the-road position.

23Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 147. Resolution S/4300 was adopted by a vote o f 9-0-2. 97

Phase I I 15th Through 18th Sessions

Going now beyond mere censuring, the anti-apartheid forces sought to win General Assembly support for increasingly specific and forceful recommendatory resolutions. All of this started at the 15th regular session of the Assembly following the Security Council debate and reso­ lution on Sharpville.

After the usual debate on the merits and demerits of including the apartheid item on the General Assembly's agenda, inclusion was had largely as a result of Afro-Asian pressures. In the explanatory memo­ randum of the initiators of inclusion, reference was made to the fact that at the previous General Assembly (1959) an overwhelmingly adopted resolution (1375/XIV) calling for positive action to end apartheid had been passed, but there had yet to be any positive action.24

During discussion in the Special Political Committee to which the item was referred, two draft resolutions were submitted. One by five non-Afro-Asian powers calling on South Africa to change its apartheid policy and mildly condemning that policy. The other draft was submitted by twenty-six states, most of them African, with Liberia included. The text would, among other things (and this is the start of the "specific and forceful recommendatory resolutions"), "solemnly recommend that a ll states consider taking the following steps: (a) break o ff diplomatic re­ lations with the Union Government, or to refrain from establishing such

^Yearbook of the United Nations ^ 1960, p. 147. 98 relations; (b) to close the ports of each state to a ll vessels flying the South African flag; (c) to enact legislation prohibiting the ships of each state from entering South African ports; (d) to boycott all

South African goods and to refrain from exporting goods to South Africa; and (e) to refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircraft be­ longing to the Government and companies registered under the laws of the

Union of South A fric a ..." 2®

Both drafts were adopted by the Special Political Committee, the five-power draft by a vote of 93-1-0 and the 26-power draft by a vote of 47-29-18. In plenary, the twenty-six-power draft was so watered down that its sponsors decided to withdraw i t . 26 The five-power draft was then adopted as Resolution 1598/XV by a vote of 96-1-0 — a large major­ ity, but routine and essentially non-positive provisions.

When the 16th Session of the General Assembly convened in 1961, the apartheid question was fir s t treated in the general debate. This was the session of the now famous exchange between the South African and

Liberian representatives. Speaking at the 1033rd meeting of the General

Assembly , South Africa's Eric Louw spoke of quiet conditions in his country in contrast to the unrest and turmoil prevailing in several other African states. The conditions of quietude were true in spite of major efforts by subversive elements in London, New York, Accra, and

^Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 149.

2^The representative of Ghana said that "the teeth" paragraph having been taken out of the draft, i t now was useless. 99

Cairo, working as a team with subversive elements in South A frica, to s tir up trouble in the Republic. The Bantus, who preferred satisfac-* tory social conditions and economic progress, had been little influenced.

Continuing, Foreign Minister Louw said:

...Would the U. S. A., Canada, the Latin American countries -- all countries whose respective early histories of colonization are sim­ ilar to that of South Africa — be prepared, if their relative pro- ■ ~ portion of white to non-white populations were the same as in South Africa, to hand over the control of their countries to Negro or to Indian majorities? That, I think, is a pertinent question which demands an answer... The leaders (of Africa) are of course not - re a lly worried about the Bantu in South Africa because they know that they are fa r better cared fo r and better treated than the mas­ ses in their own countries.27

Before the South African representative could resume his seat, the

Liberian representative, Ambassador Henry Ford Cooper, quickly rebutted:

As the General Assembly is master of its rules, I move that the whole speech of the representative of South Africa be deleted from the official records of this Assembly. It is an insult to every African here, and not only to every African, but to every man of intelligence. The whole speech is fic titio u s , and fo r him to come here and say that the Bantu tribe in Africa approves of everything the South African Government does is beyond human reason. I am re­ minded of a story of a boy who asked his father why i t was that every time he saw a picture of a lion and a man, the man was k i l ­ ling the lion. The father told his son: remember, the man is paint­ ing the picture, but let the lion one day get the opportunity to paint the picture and you will see what it will be. And that is what I would say in the case of South A fric a.2**

Responding to appeals by a number of delegations, including those of the Ivory Coast and Nigeria, Ambassador Cooper agreed to withdraw his motion but moved fo r the General Assembly censuring South Africa or its delegate "for a statement made in the General Assembly which was of­ fensive, fic titio u s and erroneous, and of which the General Assembly

27llnited Nations, ORGA, 16th Session, 1033rd Meeting, October 11, 1966, pp. 390-395. 28ib id 100 fully disapproves". That motion was adopted by a roll-call vote of

67-1-20 with nine delegations not voting.2*5

As the 16th Session came to a close, the plenary had before i t two draft resolutions — a 31-power draft relating to the possible ex­ pulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, a revival of the "teeth paragraph" of the 15th Session d ra ft, and also a milder or more regular eight-power draft. The latter was adopted as Resolution 1663 (XVI) by a vote of 97-2-1.

When the 17th regular session of the General Assembly convened in

1962, thirty-four Afro-Asian powers presented a draft resolution whose fourth operative paragraph was sim ilar to the "teeth paragraph" of two years e a rlie r. Recommended by the Special P o litical Committee, the draft was entirely adopted in plenary by a roll-call vote of 67-16-23.

This came about a fte r a heated debate during which the United States strongly voiced opposition (eventually voting against) and the support­ ers pressing very strongly to have it passed. The resolution's.fourth and f if t h operative paragraphs read thus:

IV Requests Member states to take the following measures, sepa­ rately or collectively, in conformity with the Charter, to bring about the abandonment of those policies: (a) Breaking off diplomatic relations with the Government of South Africa or refraining from establishing such relations; (b) closing their ports to all vessels flying the Soutn Afri­ can flag ;

^Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, p. 110. Among those not taking part in the vote were the united States, B ritain and France. The Soviet Union and every African state present voted in favor of the mo­ tion which was adopted at the 1034th meeting of the General Assembly on October 11, 1961. 101

(c) Enacting legislation prohibiting their ships from entering South African ports; (d) Boycotting a ll South African goods and refraining from ex­ porting goods, including a ll arms and ammunition to South Africa; (e)Refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircrafts be­ longing to the Government of South Africa and companies regis­ tered under the laws of South Africa.

V Decides to establish a Special Committee consisting of repre­ sentatives of Member states nominated by the President of the General Assembly...30

This l i t t l e ground gained by the anti-apartheid forces was to be exploited to the fu lle s t. Soon the pressures would s h ift from the Gen­ eral Assembly to the Security Council. For its part, the Assembly con­ tinued its regular debate of the item during its 18th Session examining, principally interim reports of the Special Committee on Apartheid (in keeping with paragraph V of the 1962 Resolution of the General Assembly).

As a result of pressures exerted in both the General Assembly and the Security Council (the Assembly being the major theater of action), by 1964, there seemed to have been widespread approval of extensive but voluntary sanctions against South Africa.

During Phase I I , Liberia continued her anti-apartheid policy, sponsoring both the 26-power draft of 1960 and the 36-power draft of 1962, the revival of a former draft. The United States vehemently op­ posed both drafts. In 1961, Liberia forcefully countered the remarks of the South African Foreign Minister, Mr. Louw and eventually succeeded in persuading the General Assembly to censure Mr. Louw for his remarks.

Although the Soviet Union voted for the censure, the United States ab­ stained.

30Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962, p. 100. Phase I I I The Security Council Emphasis

Efforts at gaining approval for mandatory sanctions against South

Africa in the Security Council did not preclude the continuation of ef­ forts in the General Assembly. The anti-apartheid forces fully realized that the Security Council being the action organ of the United Nations

(as opposed to the essentially recommendatory organ that is the General

Assembly), any drive to get the United Nations to act in a positive way would have to be staged in that body. Accordingly, once the stage had been set in the General Assembly — and one must add significant devel­ opments outside the Assembly as well — the apartheid item was taken to the Security Council.

It was as a result of Sharpville in 1960, that the item first re­ ceived hearing in the Council. On July 11, 1963, thirty-two African states requested a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the item.

In th eir accompanying memorandum they recalled the resolution of the

Organization of African Unity condemning apartheid and calling for pos­ itive action to end it .31

Speaking before the Security Council at its 1040th meeting, Liberia

Secretary of State put the reason for calling the meeting this way:

We have come to the U.N. Security Council as representatives of a ll the (32) independent States of Africa under indigenous rule, bearing

^The then newly formed African regional organization dedicated not only to cooperation among the independent states, but also to the restoration of dignity and human rights to the Africans of South Africa* See Zdebej Cervenka, The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its Charter (New York, London: F. A. Praeger Publishers, 1969) pp. 20-23, for the resolution on apartheid and racial discrimination. the instructions of a ll heads of states and Governments who met at Addis Ababa in May 1963. We have come with no malice or hatred in our hearts; only with love and friendship for all peoples and Gov­ ernments who believe in and respect the dignity and equality of man. We have come in the interest of securing the freedom, the independ­ ence and the respect of our African brothers who are also members of God's family and who yearn fo r freedom and dignity, the ideals and aspirations which today, all of us who are here enjoy. 32

This appeal to conscience apparently had l i t t l e , i f any, impact on the influential nations of the Security Council. The only noteworthy clause of the resolution that was subsequently adopted was its call upon a ll states to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and all types of military vehicles to South Africa. While the United

States voted for the resolution (the United States since 1963 maintains a policy of arms embargo to South A frica), France and the United King­ dom abstained. France has completely ignored the resolution as exem­ plified by its rather extensive arms sale to the South African Govern­ ment. The United Kingdom under the Conservative Government of Mr. Edward

Heath has apparently abandoned the Labor Government's policy of cooper­ ation with the United Nations on the question of arms sales to South A frica.33

Other than the clause that led to arms embargo against South Africa, the resolution was mildly condemnatory. All attempts on the part of the anti-apartheid forces to secure Security Council backing for making the

32united Nations, QRSC, 1040th Meeting, July 22, 1963; Yearbook of the United Nations. 1963, p. 4.

33Keesinqs Contemporary Archives (Weekly Diary of World Events, 1971) The South African Arms Issue - British and African Attitudes, pp. 24437-24442. 104 1962 General Assembly resolution,parti a lly quoted e a rlie r in this sec­

tion, obligatory on all member states, failed. All other efforts at

going beyond the provisions of Chapter VI to those of Chapter V II equal­

ly met with failure. An August 7 resolution (S/5386) could receive Uni­

ted States support only i f the wording "is seriously endangering in te r­

national peace and security" was changed to read: "is seriously disturb­

ing international peace and security",a change which withdrew the re­

solution from under Chapter VII and put i t clearly under Chapter VI.

This is to say that apartheid was not the threat to the peace that would make i t lia b le to collective security measures. Because i t did have

this p otential, however, pacific settlement measures were to be employ­

ed.

Further meetings of the Security Council were held between Novem­

ber 27 and December 4, 1963. Liberia's Secretary of State once again

intervened in the debates, essentially countering the domestic juris­ diction arguments of the South African Government.34

In December 1963, Norway submitted to the Security Council, a

draft resolution that would have the Secretary-General establish, under his direction, a group of recognized experts to examine methods of re­

solving the situation of apartheid through f u ll , peaceful and orderly

application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to a ll inhabitants alike, and to consider what part might be played by the United Nations

34united Nations, QRSC, 1073rd Meeting, November 27, 1963, p. 4. 105 in the achievement of that end. The Norwegian draft was unanimously adopted on December 4, 1963.35

A meeting of the Council on the apartheid item was held in June of 1964. Invited to take part in the Security Council's examination of the Secretary-General Expert Committee's report, Liberia's spokesman was the Secretary of State. In his statement before the Council, Mr.

Grimes offered a rather complete review of the salient features of the question, re-emphasizing the position of the Liberian Government.

He and his African colleagues were once again before the Security

Council because of Liberia's and the OAU's concern about the "remorse­ less erosion of the lib erties of the Africans in South Africa". Basing his argument on the reports of the Group of Experts, the General Assem­ bly's Special Committee on Apartheid and the United Nations sponsored

International Conference on Economic Sanctions Against South Africa held in London, he went into a lengthy discussion of the issue.

In the interest of African peace and world peace, Grimes called for meaningful action from the Security Council. After dramatizing that the reward of death or torture awaited those who opposed apartheid in

South Africa, he declared that "since no internal means by which a change for the better" could "be effected, the conclusion" was inescapable that the "menace of a clash... lik ely to be both violent and embittered by, overtones of racial animosity" was imminent. I t was this fact that con­ stituted "the clear and present threat to international peace and

35Yearbook of the United Nations, 1964, p. 107. 106 security, which no amount of special pleading cloaked with the vocabu­

lary of moderation, can disguise. A race war in South Africa would in­

evitably involve the rest of the continent and almost certainly, in

view of the idealogical implications of such a conflict, the rest of the world".36

This was not only his assessment of the situation but that of

perhaps a ll of those sufficiently conversant with South Africa's racism

and believers in human equality. The Group of Experts report had listed

two main factors as crucial to the situation: on the one hand, the

mounting world condemnation of South Africa's racial policy, and the

growing determination of the African states to take positive action

against apartheid; on the other hand, there was the m ilitary prepara­

tion of the South African Government reported by the World Press coupled with repressive action and enactments which could leave many South Af­

ricans convinced that there was no alternative to violence.

This led the Liberian Foreign Minister to suggest to the Security

Council that mandatory economic sanctions were the only peaceful re­

course le ft open. And, for Mr. Grimes, who was basing his assessment,

in part, on the International Conference on Economic Sanctions held in

London, there was no impracticability about sanctions. To be sure,

there would be economic losses accruing to the major trading partners.

That was a small price to pay when weighed against "the losses inevit­

ably accruing if South Africa exploded into full scale racial warf.

36statement of His Excellency J. Rudolph Grimes, Secretary of State of Liberia before the Security Council, June, 1964, p. 5. 107

Moreover, South Africa was clearly vulnerable to total economic sanc­ tions. The London Conference had noted, among other things, that South

Africa imported 30 percent of her chemicals, 43 percent of her engine­ ering and transport equipment, and 52 percent of her petroleum and coal products.37

Mr. Grimes concluded his statement by reiterating that the pro­ gram of sanctions that Liberia and othe OAU member states "strongly emphasized" should remain in force only as long as apartheid persisted,

"for our objective is only to produce a sufficient breakdown of the op­ eration of the South African econonjy as would create a situation in which apartheid would be brought to an end."38

Like the Liberian representative, all of the other Afro-Asian representatives pressed for total mandatory economic sanctions. Because of the cool reception given the idea by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (South Africa's major trading partners together with

West Germany and Japan), the Afro-Asian pleas fe ll on deaf ears. Res­ olution S/5773 that was adopted at the end of the session, ignoring the call for mandatory sanctions, simply requested the Secretary-General to look into the possibility of assistance which the United Nations could render to fa c ilita te consultation among representatives of a ll the popu­ lation groups in South Africa.

37Grimes's 1964 Security Council Statement, pp. 27-30.

38lbid., pp. 32-33 108

The Continuing Phase 19th Through 25th Session

With apparent frustration from the reaction of the Security Coun­

c il, the anti-apartheid forces continued the struggle in the General

A s s e m b ly . 39 But there was no lessening of frustration here. Year after

year, unenforceable resolutions were passed increasingly tending in the

direction of total mandatory economic and at times military sanctions.

But what substantial meaning had they when the major trading, political

and racial partners of South Africa were ignoring them? During Phases

I and II of the drive by the anti-apartheid forces to enlist the entire

United Nations in pressuring for change in South Africa, there was a

relative achivement of objectives. During the f ir s t phase (1946-1960),

apartheid was, by general declaration, censured in the General Assembly.

The second phase (1960-64) saw mounting General Assembly support fo r

“specific and forceful recomnendatory resolutions".

It was beginning with the third phase of the drive to effect a

change in the policy of apartheid that clearcut disappointments began

to set in. All attempts at getting the Security Council to impose man­

datory economic or military sanctions have met with failure and the re­

sultant frustration.

39The Council was at times resorted to , as in July 1970, when 41 Afro-Asian states called a meeting to attempt to tighten arms embargo on South Africa in anticipation of the move of the new British Conser­ vative Government to lif t the embargo. Resolution 282 (1970) of July '23, 1970, called for arms embargo “unconditionally and without reser­ vation". 109 As of early 1971, the terminal period for this United Nations case study, the foes of apartheid have failed "to energize the power of the United Nations into a frontal assault backed by mandatory col­ lective measures on South Africa".40 Even the voluntary economic sanc­ tions and embargo on arms called for by the General Assembly and the

Security Council are fast joining the mass of unimplemented United Na­ tions resolutions on apartheid. France persists in publicly flaunting the measures, while a number of the other influential countries of the

United Nations discreetly circumvent them.

Perhaps the new direction that the drive to combat apartheid has taken is a world-wide dissemination of information on its evils. I t was within this framework that the United Nations sponsored seminars on apartheid in Brazil (August 23 - September 4) and Zambia (July 25 -

August 4) in 1966. The United Nations Office of Public Information also publishes and circulates to a global audience, facts and opinions on the inhumanities of apartheid. One such publication is Objective

Justice, a review periodical of the activities of the United Nations against apartheid, racial discrimination, and colonialism.

Summary

The term "apartheid" (separation of the races) came into existence as part of the platform of the National Party, which came to power in

40oavid A. Kay, The New Nations in the U.N. , 1960-67 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970) p. 72. 110 the South African general election of 1948. Since then, by a systematic series of legislations and enactm ents,41 racial discrimination has be­ come totalitarian in its social control function in South Africa. But since South Africa is a part of the global state system, she has had to deal with the system and the states that constitute it. In so doing, she has come just as she was with no other plea but that her credo and practice of racial inequality or white supremacy be accepted.

A preponderant majority of the world's peoples have rejected apar­ theid and have therefore sought by a series of measures to pressure

South Africa to renounce the doctrine of racial segregation. The United

Nations has been the principal forum where this 'dialogue de sous' has been going on for more than a quarter century.

From the inception of the United Nations debate of apartheid, Li­ beria has sought (in concert with others) through all the non-violent channels of international intercourse to get South Africa to abandon apartheid. Prior to 1960, African representation in the United Nations was so relatively small that her voice and votes were in many cases

41Among these are: (1) Group Areas Act — the removal of non­ whites from th eir own premises to in fe rio r and unproductive areas; (2) Suppression of Communism Act; (3) Total segregation of public trans­ portation fa c ilitie s ; (4) Exclusion of non-whites from combat service in the armed forces; (5) Denial of political rights including the right to vote to non-whites; (6) Restriction of the physical mobility of non­ whites to specified areas and at prescribed hours... For source see United Nations ORGA, 7th Session, Annexes Vol. I I , (14 Oct. to 28 Aug. 1953), Doc. A/2183, pp. 1-2; also for a summary of Apartheid laws, see United Nations Doc. ST/PSCA Ser. A/9, Dec. 1969. United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents Nos. 15/70 (Hay 1970), 1/70 (January 1970 and April 1970, respectively. m inconsequential. Beginning with I960, we have a new situation primar­ ily due to the weight of African numbers.

With this increase in African states (and one must add the Asians and others drawn into this anti-racial - anti-colonial coalition for reasons of their own) has gone an increased pressure on the United Na­ tions machinery for the purpose of getting the world body and its more powerful members to press South Africa for change. But many years of uneven and often uncommitted pressures have understandably produced no significant change. To the contrary, racism seems to be solidifying in South Africa.

As the Liberian Secretary of State put it in the 1969 General As­ sembly debate:

...the failure to exert appropriate pressures on the authorities there [not only in South Africa, but Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies as w ell] have resulted from the imbalance of often con­ flicting interests, confused aspirations and misdirected tenden­ cies. Perhaps it is precisely in this direction that the organi­ zation will have to turn in order to be able to ensure effective­ ness of its majority decisions.. .42

Undoubtedly apartheid is not a United Nations centered question.

Of relevance to this United Nations case study are questions of stra­ tegy, p o litic s, economics and id e o lo g y . 43 Great debates have taken

^statement by His Excellency J. Rudolph Grimes, Secretary of State of Liberia before the 24th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 24th, 1969, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations, New York, pp. 13-14. 43For analysis from this point of view see Amelia C. Leiss (ed) Apartheid and United Nations Collective Measures (New York, 1965). 112 place that have invoked these various aspects of the question. And the

Liberia position, while having as its basis the "sp irit of San Francis­ co", morality and human decency, does not at a ll re fle ct an unawareness of the above aspects. Liberia realizes the "desperate attempt to win some measure of world approval [for ap artheid],... as the conspiracy to ensure apartheid's passage into the company of accepted and partly forgiven aberrations of history (which have included the slave trade and colonialism) proceeds".44 Neither is Liberia unaware of the eco­ nomic stakes of such powers as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in the apartheid state. These states believe that the.logic of economic expansion w ill compel South Africa to reluctantly permit the gradual erosion of apartheid.45

But these and other facts do not seem to lead Liberia, as they do the United States fo r example, to conclude that apartheid w ill be aban­ doned through "the constructive interplay of p o litic a l, economic and social f o r c e s ".46 Liberia apparently views the problem too urgently

44$ecretary of State Grimes, June 1964 Security Council Statement.

45 For one opposing view on this see: Edwin Hunger, "South Africa: Are There Silver Linings"? Foreign A ffairs, Vol. 47, No.2 ,(January 1969) A recent United Nations study shows that Germany, Japan, Britain and the United States account for 60 percent of South Africa's international trade. See: "Industrialization, Foreign Capital, and Forced Labor in South Africa," a study prepared for the United Nations Unit on Apartheid by Sean Gervasi, United Nations, Document A/AC. 115/L.276, June 18, 1970.

46william J . Pomeroy, Apartheid Axis; United States and South A f­ rica (New York: International Publishers, 197TT 113

and too seriously to leave its solution to some unspecified "construc­

tiv e interplay of . . . forces". In any case, that would appear to con­

flic t with her close collaboration with the OAU in its support of wars

of national liberation in southern Africa, to cite but one set of cases.47

Conclusively, one may say that Liberia's policy on the apartheid question has been two-fold: on the one hand (and this seems the more

important), enlisting the en tire United Nations machinery into coercing

South Africa to abandon apartheid; and on the other, Liberia has given

support to the liberation movements bent on physically harassing the apartheid society.48

Regarding the firs t case, apartheid has been characterized by Li­

beria as a threat to international peace and security. For:

...since 1946, the world in which the South African system exists has become one in which many differences of race and color coin­ cide with divisions between former colonial powers and former colonies, between old nations and new nationalisms, and even be­ tween old communists and the new. I t is the haunting fear that d i­ visions along these lines w ill harden into a^ racial bipolarity that has transformed the problem of apartheid into one that touches upon the present ancT future peace of the worTd" As one observer put i t , we may have avoided World War I I I between the West and the Soviet Union only to find ourselves destroyed in a conflict between races in World War IV.49

47in the interview with the Liberian Secretary of State, Mr. J. Rudolph Grimes, this writer was told that Liberia has not only morally, but materially aided the liberation movements not only in the case of South Africa, but a number of other political entities that are now in­ dependent states. Mr. Grimes cited to the w riter the movements in Nyasa land (Malawi), Kenya, Zambia, etc. We have helped and we continue to help, Grimes said, without either "boasting" or "talking". 48ibid.

49Leiss op. c it., p. 161. (underlining is the writer's). Liberia has supported the liberation movements in the overall framework of the OAU, the latter being the near unanimous voice of Afri­ ca at least on the apartheid question. As was above mentioned, Africa's struggle against apartheid is not limited to support for the freedom fighters. F irst gradual and then a ll-o u t diplomatic pressures through the United Nations has been a feature of the policy of every African state. But defections from African unanimity on apartheid have begun.

In 1967, Malawi's President Hastings K. Banda called for change in Af­ rican tactics. "It is not with verbal threats that they [African lea­ ders minus Banda] will cause to fall the 'wall of Jericho' of apartheid.

Dialogues with South Africa and the other white minority states must re­ place the menaces v e r b a l e s " . 60

Banda's call for dialogue was picked up three years later by

Ghana's Kofi Busia, and in 1971, by Ivory Coast President Felix Houp- houet-Boigny. But the proponents of dialogue, while gaining some Afri­ can support, have encountered massive opposition from the rest of Africa.

This stand of the majority was eloquently reflected in the OAU's Mani­ festo on Southern Africa (Lusaka Manifesto). It declared that no dis­ cussion with Pretoria would be possible before "internal dialogue" was

SOBasil Davidson, "Pretoria veut rompre son isolement mais sans renoncer a Vapartheid" in Le Monde Diplomatique, No. 207, June 1971 p. 5. 115 begun between the Black majority and the White minority of South A frica.61

The prospects for a solution, peaceful or otherwise, to the prob­ lem of apartheid remain confused. The l i t t l e division within the ranks of the Africans reflected in the calls for dialogue has intensified that c o n fu s io n . 62 The African states remain m ilitarily incapable of mounting an expedition against the apartheid state. Those in the inter­ national community who could make a difference in the situation see ef­ fective mandatory economic sanctions as unfeasible and m ilitary action as inconceivable. Under the circumstances, who knows i f , a fte r a ll, apartheid will not enter "the company of accepted and partly forgiven aberrations of history (which have included the slave trade and colon­ ialism)"?33

2. The Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations

After more than two decades of debate, the 26th Session of the

United Nations General Assembly decided by a vote of 76 in favor, 35

61 See United Nations Document A/7754, November 7, 1969. The Doc­ ument was originally issued by 13 heads of States of East and Central Africa in Zambia in April 1969. I t was adopted by the OAU in September, and considered by the United Nations General Assembly as a special item. 52At the 1971 OAU Summit, dialogue with South Africa was rejected by a vote of 6 in favor, 28 against and 5 abstentions. Two states (Uganda and the Central African Republic) did not attend the Summit and there­ fore did not take part in the vote.

53The quote is extracted from Secretary of State Grimes, June, 1964, Security Council Statement, p. 11. 116 against, and 17 abstentions to admit the Government of the People's Re­ public of China and expel the representatives of the Chiang Kai-Shek regime. This was a decision of such historic proportions that many political observers and news commentators did not hesitate to character­

ize Peking's admission as lik ely to mean a new era for the World Organ­ ization and international relations in general.

Since 1949, the international community has been divided as to which of two regimes claiming to represent China should be seated in the United Nations. The question is broad and involved, for more than the competition between the governments on the mainland and the island, respectively,it concerns issues touching Communist China's place in the international scene and the character of the United Nations. In actu­ a lity , the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations has been a cold war question.

The state of China was one of the original members of the United

Nations, and since the creation of the organization has been one of the big five of the Security Council. In 1949, the Central People's Gov­ ernment of the People's Republic of China acquired through revolution­ ary warfare, control of virtu a lly a ll of China (700,000,000 people),

leaving the Government of Chiang Kai-Shek in control of only Formosa and the Pescadores (12,000,000 people).

In two telegrams of November 18, 1949 (Document A/1123), Chou-

En-Lai informed the President of the Fourth General Assembly and the

Secretary-General that the sole legal government representing a ll the

people of the People's Republic of China was the new government born of 117 revolution. I t should therefore replace in the United Nations as i t had done in China, the so-called Chinese National Government, which had been deprived of all legitimacy both in law and in fact.

The Soviet Union fir s t endorsed the declaration of Chou-En-Lai during a General Assembly debate on the question of international con­ trol of atomic energy.54 This endorsement was repeated at the 458th meeting of the Security Council on December 29, 1949. There, the Soviet

Union indicated that it would not regard the delegate of the Kuomintang group as representing China, or as being the representative of the Chi­ nese people in the Security Council. At the 459th meeting of the Se­ curity Council, the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution (S/1443) by which the Council would withhold credential recognition from Nation­ a lis t China.

P olitical bipolarization of the question began at the 460th meet­ ing of the Security Council. Before either the Soviet Union or the

United States spoke, the Yugoslavian representative intervened and stated that many governments, not excluding his own, had extended recognition to the regime in Peking; the Soviet proposal on the seating of main­ land China was in order because the establishment of Mao Tse-Tung‘s gov­ ernment was an expression of the sovereign w ill of the Chinese people.

The argument that Peking's acceptance in the United Nations was contin­ gent upon non-recognition of the Nationalist government by five Security

S^The Socialist Soviet Republic of Ukrania also endorsed the dec­ laration. See B. Farajallah: Les Groupe Afro-Asiatique Dans Le Cadre des Nations Unies (Libairie Droz, Gen6ve, 1963) p. 340. 118 Council members, was irrelevant to the issue. Recognition or non-rec­ ognition by individual governments of member states did not imply an analogous position in respect of representation in the Security Council.

The Council's attitude should not be guided by considerations of a do­ mestic and ideological character.55

The United States representative, directing his remarks to the

Soviet draft resolution, observed that the Soviet Union sought to unseat the Nationalist delegate because i t had withdrawn recognition from that government. The United States, however, persisted in its recognition of the Nationalist government which had accredited the delegate of China to the Security Council, and therefore, the United States would support him.

In his remarks, the Soviet representative stated that the prestige of the Security Council and of the United Nations was being undercut by the attitudes of the United States and France, among other delegations.

These delegations were transforming the Council into an organ compri­ sing not only the official representatives of states members of the Se­ curity Council, but also private persons representing no one. The rep- resentative.^ of the Soviet Union demanded the expulsion of the Koumin- tang group, and added that the w ill of the government which represented

China and the Chinese people in international a ffa irs should be the guiding criterion for the Council. That government was the Central

55united Nations, ORSC, Summary Records, 460th Meetinq, January 12, 1950, pp. 2^4"! 119

People's Government of the People's Republic of China.5®

When the Soviet draft was voted upon at the 461st meeting of the

Council, i t was not adopted, having failed to obtain the necessary af­ firmative votes of seven members. Six states voted against the d raft, three voted in favor (India, USSR and Yugoslavia) and two abstained

(United Kingdom and Norway). The Soviet delegate thereupon decided to withdraw from the Security Council until the Kuomintang delegate's ex­ pulsion. 57

In February 1950, upon the in itia tiv e of the Secretary General, a confidential memorandum was prepared on "the legal aspects of the prob­ lem of representation of states in the United N a tio n s".58 Later cir­ culated to Security Council members and released to the Press, the doc­ ument and Nationalist China's reaction to i t was enlightening in that it explained some of the arguments for and against the seating of the

Peking government.

As summarized in the United Nations Yearbook of 1950, the Secre­ tariat-prepared document stated that the primary d iffic u lty in the cur­ rent question of the representation of Member States in the United Na­ tions was that of recognition by Governments of Member States. After

56united Nations, ORSC, 460th Meeting, op. c i t . . p. 10. 5?United Nations, ORSC, 461st Meeting, January 13, 1950. Incident­ ally, it was during this absence of Mr. Malik, the Soviet representative, from the Security Council that the United States was able to spearhead the drive for in itia tin g United Nations involvement in the Korean War of 1950.

58united Nations Document S/1466, February 1950. arguing that the linkage was unfortunate from the practical standpoint,

and wrong from the standpoint of legal theory, the memorandum concluded

that the proper principle could be derived by analogy from A rticle 4 of

the Charter. Article 4, required that an applicant for membership must

be able and w illing to carry out the obligations of membership. The ob­

ligations of membership could be carried out only by governments which,

in fac t, possessed the power to do so. Where a revolutionary govern­

ment presented itself as representing a state, in rivalry to an existing

government, the question at issue should be which of the two governments

in fact was in a position to employ the resources and direct the people

of the state in the fulfillment of the obligations of membership. In

essence, this meant an inquiry as to whether the new government exer­

cised effective authority within the territory of the state and was ha­

bitually obeyed by the bulk of the population. I f so, the memorandum

stated, i t would seem to be appropriate fo r the United Nations organs,

through their collective action, to accord to the new government the

right to represent the state in the United Nations, even though individ­

ual members of the organization refused, and might continue to refuse,

to accord that government recognition as the lawful government for rea­ sons which were valid under th eir national policies.59

In Document S/1470 (March 13, 1950), Nationalist China protested

against the document and the possible motives for its preparation and

59Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, pp. 424-425. See also Document S/1466 ancT OBSC, 5th Year, Supplement for January 1 - May 31 1950, pp. 18-23, for the fu ll text of the Memorandum. 121 release: "China's struggle for freedom and national independence has a number of fronts," the protest began, — "the Formosa front, the Taiwan front, the mainland front with a number of sectors, and the United Na­ tions front". I t continued:

The U.N. front is moral in nature and is of vita l importance. Suc­ cess or failure on the U.N. front affects the decisions on the other fronts. Your memo is a deliberate attack on China's U.N. front. In time, it will be recognized as also an attack on the cause of freedom throughout the world. So long as the National Government of China continues to exist and fight the Communists, the latter are in no position to throw th eir fu ll energies into expansion in South East Asia. I f the Nationalist Government should cease to struggle against Communism in China, the Chinese Communists would be able to throw th eir fu ll power into South East Asia. There can be no question that the spread of Communism in Asia would hasten the coming of a third world war. For that reason, the U.N., founded to preserve world peace, should lend its influence to support the national Govern­ ment of China.

Consideration by the General Assembly

In addition to the Fourth General Assembly to which Mr. Chou-En-

Lai's cablegram was fir s t addressed, the question was also raised for the f ir s t time in the General Assembly's 5th Session by S ir Benegal N.

Rau of India. The Assembly was invited to make a decision by virtue of which the Central Government of the People's Republic of China would be entitled to represent the Republic of China in the General Assembly.

This request, put in the form of draft resolution A/1365 was debated upon at the 277th Plenary of the General Assembly.

The United States representative, Mr. Acheson, vigorously opposed the Indian request and urged the Assembly to vote i t down at once. His

^ U n ited Nations, ORSC, op. c i t . , pp. 23-26. 122 reasoning was essentially based on the fact that forty-three nations recognized the Nationalist regime as opposed to sixteen who recognized the Communist regime. Mr. Acheson also referred to the fact of China's original membership in the United Nations.

Supporting the Indian thesis, the Swedish representative, Mr. Unden, said that he considered the Peking government as having gained effective

. . . control of almost the whole te rrito ry of China, and as such is the legitimate government of China. I associate myself with the opinion expressed by India, namely, that our organization should be guided by the indisputable fact that the Chinese nation is today no longer represented by the Nationalist Government which has its seat in Formosa.62

When the Indian draft resolution was brought to a vote, it was re­ jected by 33 against, 16 in favor, and 10 abstentions. Among those vo­ ting against the draft were the United States, Liberia and Ethiopia.

Those voting in favor included the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, and the abstentions included Egypt and France.

However, according to the terms of a Canadian d raft resolution

(A/1370), the General Assembly decided to place the question before a

Special Committee which would report back to the Assembly taking into account the results regarding a Cuban proposal on the Assembly's agenda concerning the general theme of recognition by the United Nations of the representatives of a Member State.

Claiming not to have had the China question in mind, but a general

61United Nations, ORGA, 277th Meeting of Plenary, September 19, 1950, p. 6.

62Ibid, p. 13. 123 interest in some criteria for recognition by the United Nations of a member state, Cuba suggested these c rite ria :

1. Effective authority over the national territory.

2. The general consent of the population.

3. Ability and willingness to achieve the purpose of the Charter, to observe its principles and to fu lfill the international obligations of the state; and

4. Respect fo r human rights and fundamental fre e d o m .63

Ignoring the stated Cuban motive, but basing himself on the full import of the Cuban proposals, PakistanJs Sir Zafrullah Khan energeti­ cally refuted those proposals:

China does not request admission to the U.N. organization. I t is a Member State. Permit me to say that China, whether she be peace- loving or not, whether she be capable or not of f u lf illin g the ob­ ligations of the Charter, has the right to be present in the U.N. as a ll other Member States, unless — and this can happen to any member -- she is expelled in conformity with the dispositions of the C harter... The truth is that the General Assembly does not want to recognize a fact, not because this fact is not established, but because the majority considers i t unpleasant.64

The delegation of the United Kingdom presented a counter draft resolution to the Cuban proposal. Its operative paragraph recommended that where the question of the representation of a member state arises in consequence of internal processes or changes which have taken place in that state, the right of a government to represent the member state concerned in the United Nations should be recognized i f that government

63united Nations, Document A/AC.38/L.6. For the Cuban draft text see also Uni ted Nations, ORGA, F ifth Session Annex Vol. I I , Agenda Item 61, p .5. 64united Nations, ORGA, Ad Hoc P o litica l Committee, 60th Meeting November 28, 1950, p. 386. 124 exercises effective control and authority over all or nearly all the national territory, and has the obedience of the bulk of the population of that territory, in such a way that this control, authority and obe­ dience appear to be of a permanent character.65

A third draft resolution was submitted by the Dominican Republic.

It primarily resolved to request the International Law Commission of the United Nations to study the legal aspects of the item .66

Various amendments to the Cuban and B ritish proposals were submit­ ted with a view to making the criteria to be applied more detailed.

The Ad Hoc P o litica l Committee at its 60th meeting on November 28, 1950, adopted the entire report of a sub-committee i t had established to a t­ tempt to resolve the question.

The report (A/1578 and Add.1) of the Ad Hoc Political Committee was considered by the General Assembly. With minor amendments, the d raft was adopted as resolution 396 (V). The text recommended that whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to repre­ sent a Member state in the United Nation and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the lig h t of the purpose and principles of the Charter and the circumstance of each case.67

When the 6th Session of the General Assembly convened in 1951,

65unjted Nations, ORGA, 5th Session, Annex II, p. 6. See also Yearbook of the~United Nations, 1950, p. 430.

66United Nations, Document A/AC.38/?.23. 67yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, p.435. 125 the Soviet Union sought to have the China item included on the agenda.

Due primarily to massive opposition from the United States and its a llie s , the Soviet proposal was defeated.

TABLE V

TABLE SAMPLING AFRICAN VOTES ON THE CHINA REPRESENTATION ITEM, Session V (1950) to Session XV (1960)

General Assembly, Session V, Indian Draft A/1365.

Liberia...... N Ethiopia...... N Egypt ...... A 33-16-10 ...... R (USA)...... N (USSR)...... Y

General Assembly, Session V II, Credentials Committee Report (A/CRL.2).

Liberia...... Y Ethiopia...... Y Egypt ...... Y 42-7-11 ...... Ad (USA)...... Y (USSR)...... N

Legend: Y = Yes AB = Absent N = No AD = Adopted A = Abstain R =? Rejected

NOTE: Data on voting can be obtained either from the Year­ books of the United Nations or the Verbatim or Of­ fic ia l Records of Meetings where all votes are re­ corded . 126

TABLE V (Cont.)

General Assembly, Session X I.

Indian Draft A/L.210 General Committe Report, A/3550, ParaV 7. Liberia...... N Y Ethiopia...... N Y Libya ...... A A Sudan...... Y N Morocco ...... N R. Y 47-24-8... .Ad. Tunisia...... A A Egypt ...... AB N (USA)...... N Y (USSR)...... Y N

General Assembly, Session X II.

Pt. I Indian Draft General Committe Report, A/3670

Liberia N Y Ethiopia Y Y Egypt Y N Libya A Y Ghana Y 43-29-9..R N 47-27-7... .Ad. Morocco Y N Sudan Y N Tunisia A A

General Assembly Session X III

7-Power, Pt. I Part I I General Committee Report, Para. 16 Liberia...... A N Y Ethiopia...... A N Y U.A.R...... Y Y N Libya...... Y 29-40-12 Y 29-41-11 A 44-28-9 Ghana...... Y R Y R N Ad. Morocco ...... Y Y N Sudan...... Y Y N Tunisia...... A A A 127

TABLE V (C o n t.)

General Assembly, Session XIV

Part I , Nepalese Amendment Part I I General Committee Report, Para. 7.

Liberia N ' N Y Ethiopia Y A A U.A.R Y Y N Libya A A A Ghana Y Y N Guinea Y R Y R N 44-29-9 Morocco Y N AcL Sudan Y Y N Tunisia A A A

General Assembly, Session XV

Part I, Nepalese Amendment Part II United States-inspired General Committee Report.

L iberia...... N N Y Ethiopia...... Y Y N Ghana...... Y Y N Guinea...... Y Y N M ali...... Y Y N Morocco ...... Y Y N Nigeria...... Y Y N Seneral...... Y Y N Sudan Y 38-34-26 Y N 42-34-22 U.A.R Y R Y R N M- Cen. Af. Rep...... A A A South A frica ...... N N Y Chad...... A A A Gabon...... A A A Dahomey...... A A A Ivory Coast ...... A A A Libya ...... A A A Niger...... A A A Madagascar...... A A A Somalia...... A A A Togo...... A A A Tunisia...... A A A Upper Volta...... A A A Cameroon...... A A A Congo (B )...... A A A 128

At the 6th Session of the General Assembly, a moratorium on dis­ cussion of the item proposed by the United States was upheld by Liberia.

When the 7th Session of the Assembly convened in 1952, the Soviet

Union raised the question of the Chinese Nationalists' credentials in draft resolution A/CR/L.l. The United States submitted a counterdraft

A/CRL.2 to the effect that the China issue was not to be debated and that Nationalist credentials were valid. The United States draft was adopted by a vote of 47-7-11. (see Table V.)

From the 8th Session of the General Assembly through the 10th, a pattern of United States-initiated moratoriums on discussion of the item was maintained. Liberia and Ethiopia were among those supporting the curbing. Egypt abstained at the 9th and 10th Sessions.

On the 11th of November 1956, prior to the opening of the 11th regular session of the Assembly (Special sessions having previously taken place to deal with the international crises of Hungary and Suez),

India proposed inclusion of the China item. In so doing, the Asian na­ tion desired to halt the moratorium that had in the past been placed on the General Assembly's consideration of China's representation. In the

General Committee, the United States counterproposed non-inclusion, and this proposal prevailed.68

India thereupon took its case to the Plenary session during the discussion of the General Committee's report. The revived Indian

^Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956, p. 136; United Nations, ORGA, General Commttee, 108thmeeting. 129 proposal would in effect reverse the Committee's recommendations.

During the debate, the Sudanese delegate called the China item a procedural matter, and then went on to express the view of one unit of the new Africa:

I think that we, all of us are aware that there are different ide­ ologies in the U.N. The only way that those d iffe ren t ideologies can liv e in peaceful coexistence and cooperation to secure world peace is for us to give every point of view a chance to be debated in the General A s s e m b l y . ..69

When the Assembly voted on the f ir s t Indian amendment (A/L.210) to the d raft recommended by the General Committee (A/3350, Paragraph 7), essentially calling for inclusion of the China item, India lost to Uni­ ted States pressures. The recommendation of the General Committee was adopted.

The 12th General Assembly's handling of the China item was essen­ tially uneventful.

During the 13th session, India once again attempted to lead a drive in the General Committee fo r inclusion of the item on the agenda, but was again unsuccessful.

In Plenary, seven Afro-Asian states proposed two amendments to the General Committee's report (A/3926, paragraph 12). The f ir s t would have the Assembly accede to , rather than reject, the request that the

China item be placed on the agenda; while the second would have the As­ sembly delete the provision not to consider any proposal to exclude the

69united Nations, ORGA, 580th Meetinq of the Plenary, November 16, 1956, p. 73. 130 representatives of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the People's Republic of China at the 13th session.

The new and a c tiv itis t African state of Ghana strongly endorsed the amendments. Speaking at the 754th meeting of the Plenary on Sep­ tember 23, 1958, Mr. Ako-Adjei, the Ghanian respresentative, declared that Ghana viewed with grave concern the continued present unsettled situation in the Far East. I t was his government's view that the set­ tlement of the China representation question would go a far way in re­ solving Far Eastern problems. A final and early settlement of this question w ill lead to the lessening of tension in international rela­ tions and w ill contribute towards ensuring the foundations of peace and security not only in the Far East but throughout the w o rld ...70

Both fir s t and second Afro-Asian amendments were rejected. The

General Committee's recommendation was adopted as Resolution 1239 (X III) .

Of particular interest is the Liberian abstention on the first part of the seven-power draft amendments regarding simple inclusion of the China item. Prior to this vote, Liberia had voted consistently for the United States position of sworn h o s tility to any accommodation with

Peking. Liberia's abstention appears to have been an attempt at seeking to accommodate its policy to that of newly emerging Africa.

One observer suggests that the Liberian vote could well have been an echo of the April 1958 Accra Conference of Independent African States,

70United Nations, ORGA, 754th Meeting of Plenary, September 23, 1958, p. 95. but he was quick to add that this was doubtful given the fact that there was no follow-up.71

Since the 11th session (1956) India had made formal proposals for including the China item on the agenda. Before this time the ques­ tion was raised essentially as a point of order (credentials). The de­ sire of the United States not to have the item discussed was s t i l l pre­ vailing. While Ethiopia had begun voting with the African majority that favored seating Peking, Liberia (together with South Africa) was the only African state that persisted in its support of the American position.

At the 15th Session of the General Assembly, i t was the Soviet

Union, not India that demanded formal inclusion of the item on the agenda. In the General Committee, the United States again lashed out against Peking. "There could be no doubt", the American spokesman said

"that, if they were now sitting in the U.N., the representatives of

Peking would be pushing as hard as they could to frustrate the action taken by the U.N. to safeguard the freedom and independence of the new

African nations."72 The majority was seemingly impressed with the Amer ican reasoning, as it was that point of view that was reflected in the

71Farajallah, 0 £. c i t . , p. 360. "Cette abstention fu t peut-etre I 1echo de la conference des Etats independants d'Afrique d‘Accra (1958) explication douteuse et en tous les cas, echo sans’ lendemain..."

^United Nations, ORGA, 129th Meeting of the General Committee, September 27, 1960, p .13. 132

Committee's recommendation to Plenary.

But this was only a warm-up stage of the debate, for the votes of the recently admitted African states (some sixteen strong) would be of decisive importance. This consideration led to tremendous pressures on these states from the American and Soviet blocs, respectively, as well as the neutralist forces. This pressure was clearly manifested in their speeches. The background of the debate was this: As the Plenary con­ sidered the General Committee's report, i t had before i t two amendments proposed by Nepal and a sub-amendment of Guinea to the second Nepalese amendent.

The Nepalese amendents were of the same order as those o f the 14th

Assembly. The Guinean sub-amendment proposed an addition to the second

Nepalese amendment to the effe ct that the Assembly would decide to con­ sider at its 15th Session any proposal to seat the representatives of Peking.73

While Liberia chose to indicate her stand on the issue by her vote

(See Table V ), the major'powers together with some a c tiv is t African states decided to make known th e ir positions by debate on the floor as well as voting.

The United States delegate, Mr. Wadsworth, said that even though the Soviet proposal concerning China had been raised and rejected over the years, it had never been raised at a more historic and critical moment. He was referring to the preponderance of African issues at the

73Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 171. 15th Session. Then Mr. Wadsworth came to what he considered the cen­

tral issue:

The attitude of the Chinese Communists on African matters is no sudden and temporary aberration. It is characteristic of the en­ tire aggressive and warlike behavior of Communist China... If Communist China has a seat in this organization today, i t would make an all-out attempt to tear down everything that the U.N. is trying to do in the Congo and throughout A f r i c a . 74

Mr. N. S. Kruschechev, the Soviet Premier, countered by seriously

questioning the motives of the United States expression of concern for

Africa. In essence he called the United States racist and neo-imperi-

a lis tic . The Soviet Union, on the other hand, represented its e lf as having a genuine in terest in the Africans "...because our peoples deep­

ly sympathize w ith ... those who are fighting fo r th eir freedom, those who fo r centuries have suffered and endured humiliation and oppression at the hands of the colonialists".^

Guinea's position, voiced by its spokesman, Monsieur Ismael Tour6, was that Peking should be seated at any cost. Contrary to what the Uni­ ted States had stated, Peking was no threat to Africa, according to the

Guinean delegate, but was instead a champion of the African cause. 76

Ghana's view was more to the point:

...th e group o f states in this Assembly which are opposed to the admission of the People's Republic of China persist... mainly be­ cause the People's Republic of China has adopted communism as a

74ynited Nations, ORGA, 881st Meeting of Plenary, 15th Session, October 1, 1960, Part I , Vol. I , p. 305. 75 lb id , pp. 310-311.

76united Nations, ORGA, 15th Session, 884th Meetinq of Plenary, p. 362. 134

political ideology. To us in Ghana... this is a very grave and dangerous attitude to take for this could be applied across the board to the detriment of Africa, of the U.N. and of world p eace. 77

Mr. Krishama Menon (India) as a representative of the non-aligned

forces, spoke of the need for universality in the United Nations. Africa had an important role in helping to bring that about.

The Liberian Stand: Installment One

During the period 1950-1960, Liberia voted consistently, but spoke very seldom, if at a ll, to explain her votes on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. To analyse a Liberian stand dur­ ing this period, then, one must relate the votes to the overall politi­ cal orientation of the Liberian regime.

As already said, the Liberian votes almost always coincided with the American position. That position in the early period oscillated between h o s tility toward Peking and indecision as to how to relate to the mainland Chinese regime which was in de facto terms the government of a ll China. With Peking's growing uncompromising ideological h o s til­ ity to the United States and its people, coupled with the signing in

February 1950, of a Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, United States policy began to be firm . The Korean crisis of 1950, both hardened and crystal­ lized America's China policy. Opposition to the seating of Peking be­ came, together with continued recognition of the Nationalist government and the refusal to recognize the Communist regime, a basic p illar of

77united Nations, ORGA, op. c i t . , pp. 363-364. 135

American policy.78

Even though two countries do not have identical motives for pur­

suing a given course of action, mutual commitment to an ideological

outlook can make them convenient a llie s . The China item in the United

Nations, at least during the fir s t ten-year period, had the world body

divided between the extremes of Soviet power and American power. I t

can safely be said that Liberia stood at the American end.79 if the

Philippines were sympathetic to the American position because of their

proximity to the zones of Communist danger coupled with special ties to

the United States, Liberia's sympathy stemmed principally from the lat­

ter consideration (that is, the special historical ties) with all its

implications.

In effe ct, the foreign policy of Liberia during this period main­ tained a close and strong political tie between Liberia and the United

States, not solely in bilateral relations between them, but also in Li­ beria's relations with other states or international organizations, pro­

vided they bore an implication for Liberian-American t i e s . 80 In the

case of the China item, the United States position was clear. I t would not lend support to a government born of violent revolution that was a

78Robert Blum, The United States and China in World A ffairs , (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966)pp. 224-225. 79see the votes for 1950-1960 period. See also Chapter I I of this study for the political orientation of President Tubman.

800n colonial and race relations issues, this did not generally apply. 136

"diabolical incarnation of some new and strange evil",81 and that if seated "would v itia te , i f not destroy, the U.N. as an Instrument fo r the maintenance of international peace11.82

Considering President Tubman's resolve to fight communism to the death in whatever guise i t appeared in Liberia (see Chapter I I ) , i t is not d iffic u lt to understand where Liberia would stand on a Communist-

Anti -Communist issue.88 In .addition to the ideological consideration,

there were some sound practical considerations. This was in the 1950's

when Liberia's strongest ties could not be with Africa, for political

Africa was only emerging at this time. There was also economic moti­

vation to Liberia's position (See the Economic Factors in Chapter I . ) .

Liberia did not see why she should jeopardize her friendship with the

United States which was the principal source of her financial aid and

technical assistance, simply to satisfy the Communist bloc from which

she fe lt no immediate threat, and from which she received no economic assistance.

Viewing the Liberian stand at this point - a stand heavily in­

fluenced by ideology - i t can be tentatively concluded that Liberia

81Blum, 0 £. c i t . , p. 262.

82United States Department of State Bulletin, V. 39, September 8, 1958f"pp. 385-390.

88In an NBC "First Tuesday" interview, Newsman Vanocur asked Tub­ man whether there was a threat of subversion against Liberia. Tubman answered thus: "Dont you know that Communism is in filtra tin g every­ where? Are you - you would see - you would wait and see the house burning before you get - provide means to extinguish it? Prevention is better than cure. That's what we're trying to do: prevent". The transscript was obtained by the w riter from NBC Headquarters at Rocke- fellow Center, New York City, First Tuesday, September 1, 1970, p. 34. 137 f ir s t chose to ignore the de facto situation that was brought about as a result of the victory of Mao-Tse-Tung's forces over those of Chiang

Kai-Shek. In other words, instead of basing its policy on the general principle of recognition, Liberia decided f ir s t to make a moral judg­ ment. Secondly, Liberia seemed to have been guided by Articles 2 and

4 of the United Nations Charter in the determination of her China pol­ icy. In th is regard, China was found unfit fo r membership on two im­ portant counts. Not only was she clearly branded an aggressor in the

Korean conflict, she was generally considered incapable of contributing to world peace and secu rity.84

The questions th at follow from the above are these: I f China was an aggressor in Korea (and one needs to recall the fact that the Ameri­ can General Douglas McArthur exceeded his instructions and in a real sense provoked China by threatening its te r r ito r ia l in te g rity ), why were not Is ra e l, the United Kingdom and France called aggressors by the

United Nations in the case of the 1956 Suez situation? The Liberian position also leaves undecided its attitude on the cardinal principle of universality of membership. The ultimate question is whether the

United Nations is to be a group of like-minded states or whether there exists no logical choice but a saints and sinners free-for-all situation.

Continuing General Assembly Consideration: 1960-1970

During this period the context in which the issue was debated would be altered, perhaps significantly. First the increase in membership

^Document PV, 1808, November 11 , 1969, pp.56-57. 138

that started at the 15th Assembly would continue, but the important

factor here was a rapidly growing pro-Peking feeling. The recognition

of Peking by Britain and France, the Si no-Soviet ideological s p lit,

Peking's successful production of the nuclear bomb, a ll these and more were to change the character of the debate.

Regarding Africa specifically, there was growing Chinese interest

in that continent's two outstanding preoccupations - economic develop­ ment and eradication of the vestiges of colonialism. But there is an

interesting note to be made. Both Peking and Taipei moved into Africa for support of their respective international positions. The degree to which one or the other was successful was an important determinant of

the African voting pattern on the item.

The 16th Session, in 1961, was of particular interest because i t was the f ir s t time that substantive aspects of the China item were for­ mally discussed. In the General Committee, the question was accepted without obstructions. After the Committee's report was accepted by the

Plenary, two draft resolutions were put forth. The firs t sponsored by the Soviet Union (A/L.360) called for the explusion of the Nationalists and the seating of the Communists. The second d ra ft, sponsored by five

powers, including the United States would have the Assembly decide (in

keeping with Article 18 of the Charter) that any proposal to change the

representation of China was an important question and would, therefore, require a two-thirds majority. By this device, the United States s h ift­ ed its policy from that of a moratorium on discussing the item to one 139 of quarantining the Peking r e g im e .85 jhe five-power draft and not that of the Soviet Union was carried by the General Assembly. Liberia sup­ ported the former.

Nothing eventful occurred during the 17th Session. The 18th Ses­ sion saw the beginning of what has now been popularized as the Albanian draft resolution. The draft called for the expulsion of the National­ is t delegates and the seating of the Communist regime in the United Na­ tions and all its organs.86

At the 1247th Plenary in 1963, one gets, perhaps the fir s t pre­ cise statement of the Liberian position. In his intervention in the debate, Ambassador Nathan Barnes said:

In our view this important question of the representation of China is not one that is easily resolved by a show of hands, even i f a two-thirds majority was established in favor of the claimant to the seat. No, the solution must be of deeper and greater signif­ icance... When my delegation voted for the proposal that the rep­ resentation of China in the U.N. was an important question (1079th Meeting), we did so not so much because of the requirements of the two-third rule, but because of the need to view this question in a manner that would not, as a matter of necessity, expel the pres­ ent representatives of China as a condition for the admission of the representatives of the People's Republic of China; since to take such action would clearly accelerate and heighten the chances of an explosion in Asia, the consequences of which is perhaps not d iffic u lt to imagine or comprehend. Liberia recognizes the Government of the Republic of China. This relationship has been strengthened over the years to the mutual benefit of both of our Governments. I t therefore follows from this

85jhe Guinean delegate called this "...a policy of systematic ob­ struction by the use of procedural tricks invented by the specialists in procedural evasion". 1377th Plenary, November 15, 1965, p. 6.

86united Nations Document A/5498; See also Yearbook o f the United Nations, 1963, p. 31. 140

fact of recognition that we could not support any draft resolution that proposes to unseat and displace the representatives of the Republic of China...87

The Albanian draft resolution (A/L.427) was rejected by a vote of 41-57-12.

TABLE VI

TABLE SAMPLING AFRICAN VOTES ON THE CHINA REPRESENTATION ITEM, SESSION XVI (1961) TO SESSION XXVI (1971)

General Assembly, Session XVI

5-Power Draft (A/L.372) Soviet Draft (A/L.36Q)

Liberia Y N Ethiopia...... N Y Ghana...... N Y Guinea...... N 61-34-7 Y 48-36-20 Mali...... N Ad Y R Sierra Leone...... A Y U.A.R...... N Y Ivory Coast Y A

General Assembly, Session XVII

Soviet Draft (A/L.3951

Liberia...... N Ethiopia...... Y Ghana...... Y Guinea...... Y Mali...... Y 42-56-12 Sierra Leone...... Y R U.A.R...... Y Ivory Coast ...... N

87United Nations, ORGA, 1247 Meeting of the Plenary, October 18, 1963, pp.6-7. 141

TABLE VI (C ont.)

General Assembly, Session XVIII

Albanian Draft (A/L.427)

L iberia...... N Ethiopia...... Ab Ghana...... Y Guinea...... Y 41-57-12 M ali...... Y R Sierra Leone...... A U.A.R...... Y Ivory Coast ...... N

General Assembly, Session XX

11-Power Draft (A/L.468) 12-Power Draft (A/L.469)

L iberia...... Y N Ethiopia...... N Y Ghana...... N Y Guinea...... N Y Mali N 56-49-11 Y 47-47-20 Sierra Leone N Ad Y J? U.A.R...... N Y Ivory Coast ...... Y N

General Assembly, Session XXI

15-P Dt (A/L.494) 11-P Dt (A/L.496 6-P Dt (A/L.500)

Liberia...... Y N Y Ethiopia...... N Y N Ghana...... N Y N Guinea...... N 66-46-7 Y 57-46-17 N 34-62-25 Mali N M Y £ NR Sierra Leone...... A N A U.A.R...... N Y N Ivory Coast ...... Y N N TABLE VI (Cont.)

General Assembly, Session XXII

12-P Dt (A/L.531) 15-P Dt (A/L.532) 5-P Dt (A/L.533)

Liberia...... N Y A Ethiopia...... Y N N Ghana...... Y N A Guinea...... Y 58-45-17 N 69-48-4 N M ali...... Y R N Ad N Sierra Leone...... N Y Y U.A.R...... Y N N Ivory Coast ...... N Y N

General Assembly, Session XXIII

"Important Question",(A/L.548 Albanian Draft (A/L.549)

Liberia Y N Ethiopia N Y Ghana N A Guinea N 73-47-5 Y 58-44-23 M ali N Ad Y R Sierra Leone Y N U.A.R N Y Ivory Coast Y N

General Assembly, Session XXIV

"Important Question",(A/L.567) Albanian Draft (A/L.569)

Liberia...... Y N Ethiopia...... N Y Ghana...... N Y Guinea...... N 71-48-4 Y 56-48-21 M ali...... N Ad Y R Sierra Leone...... Y N U.A.R...... N Y Ivory Coast ...... Y N 143

TABLE VI (Cont.)

General Assembly, Session XXV

"Important Question"(A/L.B99) Albanian Draft (A/L.605)

Lib eria...... Y N Ethiopia...... N Y Ghana...... N Y Guinea N 66-52-7 Y 51-49-25 M ali N Ad Y R Sierra Leone...... Y N U.A.R...... N Y Ivory Coast ...... Y N

General Assembly, Session XXVI

"Important Question" Albanian Draft

Liberia...... Y N Ethiopia...... N Y Ghana...... Y Y Guinea N 55-59-15 Y 76-35-17 M ali N R Y Ad Sierra Leone...... N Y U.A.R...... N Y Ivory Coast ...... Y N

A financial crisis during the 19th General Assembly le ft the China item largely undebated even though i t figured on the agenda.

During the 20th Session, there were two d rafts, one (11-power) emanating from the United States and its allies and the other (12-power) originating from the Soviet bloc that carried the Albanian formula of the 18th Session. The debate saw France (which had a year e a rlie r rec­ ognized Peking) delivering a spirited and w itty defence of Communist

China. France called Peking a "victim of ostracism which cannot fa il 144 to engender bitterness".88 Guinea viewed the issue as "a matter of fundamental concern to the Afro-Asian fam ily, of which the People's

Republic of China is an influential and active member".89 when the vote was taken the 11-power draft was adopted by a vote of 56-49-11. the 12-power draft was then rejected.

The 21st Session had before it three draft resolutions. A/L.494 was sponsored by fifteen powers, including the United States and was essentially an important question type resolution; A/L.496, sponsored by eleven powers, was an Albanian resolution type; the third draft

A/L.500, sponsored by six powers would have the Assembly establish a study committee on the question. The 15-power draft and the 6-power draft were adopted but the 11-power draft failed of adoption.

Miss Angie Brooks, the Liberian representative, attempted to ex­ plain Liberia's votes at the 1480th Plenary. She mentioned important aspects of what could be called a new emphasis in Liberia's policy

(that is, for the period 1960-1971). Suggesting that draft resolution

A/L.494 be read with A/L.496, she noted that A/L.496 contains two ele­ ments: (a) the principle of the right of Peking to occupy the position now held by Formosa; and (b) the principle of expelling the Republic of China, a Member State, from the United Nations. Even i f the General

Assembly were to concede that the simple majority rule is applicable to

8 8 u n i t e d Nations, ORGA, 1372nd Meeting of Plenary, 1965, pp.4-5. France's stand was to la te r influence a number of French-speaking Af­ rican states.

89|Jnited Nations, ORGA, 1377th Plenary, p. 6. 145 principle (a), it is evident that it could not legally apply the same majority rule to principle (b). The core of her argument was that ex­ pelling a member from an international organization as the United Na­ tions was a much more serious matter than admitting one.90

Draft resolution A/L.500 was supported by Liberia because "for the f ir s t time since the question of the restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations has been under consideration an attempt is being made to find a solution to this long-debated issue".91

Developments during the 22nd and 23rd Sessions of the General As­ sembly were almost along the lines of those of the 21st Session.

During the 24th Session, the usual Soviet (A/L.569) and American

(A/L.567) draft resolutions figured in the debate. As can be expected

A/L.567 was adopted, while A/L.569 was rejected. Liberia continued to side with those upholding the Nationalists.

The statement of the Liberian position by Mr. Lafayette Diggs, the Liberian representative, seemed both a rehashing of worn-out argu­ ments of the earlier period (1950-1960), as well as a useful insight to the new emphasis in Liberian policy that was mentioned above. Mr. Diggs questioned the peace-loving capacity of the Peking regimei charging it * in characteristic American fashion, of attempting to subjugate and

90she simply chose to ignore the argument th at the China question was not one of admitting or expelling a state, but that of seating one government and evicting another because of an effective change in regime in the one and only one Member State that is China. United Nations, ORGA, Provisional Verbatim Records, Plenary 1480, November 28, 1966, p. 46.

91 Ibid, p. 47. 146

dominate freedom-loving people in Asia, Africa and other parts of the world, and also for attempting "to repudiate all that for twenty-four years we have endeavored to establish and perpetuate here at the U.N.,

the only bastion of hope, security and the aspirations of peoples every­ where".^2

But the Liberian representative also emphasized the Nationalist

China factor in Liberia's policy. Liberia's support was unqualified.

There were two aspects to this Liberian support of the Nationalists.

The fir s t was as a result of principle. A member is not summarily ejec­

ted, especially a member who has tried all that is humanly possibe to

follow the rules and remain congenial. I f and when Peking showed signs

of preparedness to enter the United Nations, in the view of the Liber­

ian spokesman, its entry should not be at the expense of the National­

ists. This could only lead to a two-China policy.

The second aspect to the Liberian support of the Nationalists

sprang from practical considerations. Moving outside the activities

of the United Nations, China has given and is s till giving great assis­

tance to the continent of Africa under its program of foreign aid.

More specifically Liberia was the first African state to sign a mutual

cooperation agreement with Taipei, and also the f ir s t to p ro fit from

Nationalist China's agricultural expertise.93

During the 26th Session of the General Assembly, Liberia was per­

haps more active than she had ever been since the United Nations began

92unjted Nations Document, A/Pv, 1808, November 11, 1969, pp. 56-57.

93ibid; this will be expanded upon in Installment II. 147 debate of the China question. With the background to the 1971 debate and the results of that debate rather fresh in the public view, i t is not difficult to point out the last-ditch effort displayed by Liberia and others of the American line in trying to save a place in the United

Nations for the Formosa regime. However, the United States, at this time, had begun overtures to Peking that tended toward recognition.94

There were three key draft resolutions. Two were jo in tly spon­ sored by the United States and its principal friends which included Li­ beria. The f ir s t affirmed the right of representation of the People's

Republic of China and recommended that i t be seated as one of the five per­ manent members of the Security Council. The second was the important question draft resolution of the years preceding that was meant to block the expulsion of the Nationalist representatives.

The third key draft was the Albanian resolution that linked the seating of Peking with the expulsion of the representatives of Chiang

Kai-Shek. Here, Guinea figured among the twenty-two jo in t sponsors.

During the debate in the Assembly, Guinea's representative re­ stated his country's rather consistent position on the question of China representation. Guinea wanted an end to the traditional subterfuges of dilatory procedural tactics which had been typical of the China debate.

What reason dictated, in the Guinean mind, was that Peking be admitted

9 4 $ e e : President Nixon to V isit People's Republic of China - Dr. Kissinger's Secret Mission to Peking - American Support for Admission of Communist China to the U.N. - Peking,Attack on Two China Concept,in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, August 14-21, 1971, p. 24765A. Nixon called his projected trip "... a major development in our efforts to build a lasting peace in the world". 148 and the Nationalists representatives be expelled in order that a degree of reality be restored to international r e la t io n s .95

In his intervention in the debate, the Liberian representative,

Dr. T. 0. Dosumu-Johnson,called the pending United Nations decision on the China item momentous, and then offered an excuse fo r an unusually lengthy statement.96 This was only a part of the American campaign that sought to promote a two-China solution to the representation prob­ lem. Japan's Kiichi Aichi and America's George Bush were the standard- bearers of the drive. But the zeal of the Liberian representative was not lessened by a secondary role in the campaign. After a ll the major thrust of the American-led argument was fu lly acceptable to Liberia.

Dr. Dosumu-Johnson stated, with apparent conviction:

We are being asked to expel a founding member and founding father of this Organization on purely ideological grounds and because of the preponderance of the practitioners of that ideology in this Organization, the United N a tio n s .97

I f this course of action were followed, the United Nations would be wrecked and world peace would be so threatened that a third world war was bound to follow.

There were two major reasons why the United Nations would be wrecked. The precedence of expulsion that would be set would lead to so many expulsion drives based on politico-ideological differences that no one could te ll exactly where this would end. More than th is , however,

95united Nations Document. A/Pv, 1970, October 1971.

96Ibid, pp. 46-63. The full text of the statement is given in Appendix VI; of this study. 97lbid, p.46 and p. 62. 149 there was the reason implied in the so-called Buckley threat. The Jun­ io r Senator from New York remarked to the press while the China debate was in progress, that if the Nationalist Government were expelled, he and some th irty Senators would lead a drive to cut o ff American finan­ cial contribution to the United Nations.

After alluding to the many financial difficulties that currently beset the United Nations, Dr. Dosumu-Johnson said: " It w ill, in the opinion of my delegation, be very unwise to antagonize the sure, the tested and the certain for the untried and doubtful."98 The United Na­ tions would fall apart, then, because of the destructive diplomacy of expulsion and the financial insolvency the United States financial with drawal would engender.

The votes on the two key draft resolutions are now known. The priority or important question resolution was voted down 55-59-15, while the Albanian resolution was adopted 76-35-17. I t was as a result of these votes that Peking was seated in the United Nations and the representatives of the Nationalist regime were expelled.

The Liberian Stand: Installment Two

The fundamental reasoning behind the Liberian position is two­ fold — commitment to an ideology and commitment to the Nationalists.

Both of these include elements of a Liberian response to American in­ fluence. But they do not leave Liberia unappreciative of political

98united Nations Document, A/Pv, 1970, October 1971, p. 61. 150 re a lity . An added core element to Liberia's policy, then, is a grudg­ ing acceptance of the p o litic a l permanence of the Peking regime. To­ ward the end, Liberia wished to see Peking seated in the United Nations on the basis of a two-China solution, based on the idea th at the Peo­ ple's Republic of China will find its way into this Organization out of the coldness of isolation.

Unlike the initial attitude of political hostility toward Peking,

Liberia started around the early 1960's to espouse a two-China p o l i c y . 99

The inherent weakness in a two-China policy (a solution which both Chi­ nese regimes have rejected) has caused those who support this to lean more heavily on the side of one government than the other. Despite her two-China policy, Liberia has not fa ile d to capitalize on her commit­ ment to the Nationalist regime. This was the cardinal reason why the

Albanian resolution could not be supported by Liberia.

Elaborating on this aspect (commitment to Taiwan) of the Liberian position, Mr. B. Holder (Special Assistant to the Liberian Secretary of

State) emphasized that it was a question of principled0® Liberia's foreign policy in general was based on reconciliation and mutual accom­ modation. It sought to bring together all nations and peoples.

99This may have been due to a perceived need for neutralist cre­ dentials. To continue not to accept the re a lity of Peking would mean that Liberia was clearly allied with anti-Communist or im perialist forces.

lOOFollowing this w riter's interview with Secretary of State Grimes, he had a lengthy chat with Hon. Holder at the Liberian Mission to the United Nations in New York. 151 President Tubman's name figured in Africa on almost all major African efforts at peace-making and conciliation. This was a manifestation of the policy he advocated. To attempt to seat Peking in the United Na­ tions at the expense of the Nationalists would, as far as Liberia was concerned, be going against the type of world order Liberia strove to help bring to pass. It would be a very great immorality.

There was also a practical consideration to Liberia's commitment to the Nationalists. In other words, Liberia had a material interest in upholding the Nationalist Government.

One observer has linked Taiwan's agricultural and technical as­ sistance to Africa to its efforts to cling to its United Nations cre­ dential s .101 In Taiwan's Objectives in Africa, Ann P. Munro has w rit­ ten that with encouragement from the United States, Taiwan set out to convince African states of the threat that international Communism posed to th eir independence. In that regard, Taipei, not Peking, was the center for development model J02

While the Chinese Nationalists constantly; denied th is , a key ob­ jective of th eir aid to Africa was to secure support in the United Na­ tions Before the opening of the 26th General Assembly, Nationalist

China's Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-Kim visited Liberia, where he

l^Yawsoon Sim,"Taiwan and Africa',' Africa Today, Vol. 18, No. 3, July 1971, pp. 20-21. 1O^Africa Report, Vol. 8, No. 7, July 1966, p. 7.

103Leon M. S. Siawecki,"Two Chinas in Africa" Foreign A ffairs, Vol. 41, No. 2, January 1963, p. 401. 152

placed a wreath on the tomb of the late President Tubman and decorated

Secretary of State Grimes. This stop-over in Liberia was part of his annual African tour before the General Assembly met to s o lic it African votes and support.10^

The Chinese Islanders have been able to export technical exper­ tise in agriculture primarily because that expertise had been developed by the American-sponsored and financed Joint Commission of Rural Recon­ struction (JCRR). The program of agricultural and technical aid for

Africa begun in January 1969 was inspired, planned and executed by ex­ perienced personnel from JCRR. In it ia lly , Taipei bore the brunt of the financing. Later, it was the United States which furnished much of the

$7 m illion African aid budget from proceeds earned in the sale of Amer­ ican commodities in T a iw a nJ 05

In 1961, Liberia became the first African state to sign an as­ sistance pact with the Nationalist regime. As Boreham describes i t , a Na­ tionalist team was entrusted with the job of farming a demonstration s ite in Gbedin, Liberia, where both United Nations and United States agricultural missions had previously tried in vain to grow rice. With­ in four months, the plot yielded a harvest six times greater than the

IQ^Liberian s ta r, September 16, 1971, p. 1 and September 17, 1971, p. 1; also Free China Weekly, July 13, 1969, p. 1.

lOSo.K. Armstrong:"Free China gives Africa a Helping Hand',' Reader's Digest, Vol. 95, No. 571, November 1969, p. 187; and Bruce Oudes, "May Africa Lose From Peking's U.N. Entry", Africa Report, December 1971 153

average yield for the area.105 The foregoing at least hints at the economic consideration in Liberia's support of the Nationalist Chinese.

Much more mention of the ideological dimension of Liberia's policy

is unnecessary. Anti-Communism has been the driving force of this as­

pect of the policy. To the question of why Liberia does not recognize

Peking, the answer perhaps is, that there is no perceived immediate benefit to Liberia. As Mr. Holder indicated to this writer in the in­ terview, diplomacy is classically based on likemindedness. When i t was suggested that there had been changes in the nature of international relations, he s t i l l seems to have f e lt that any Chinese Communist (or

Soviet) diplomatic mission in Monrovia would have a disruptive p o liti­ cal influence on the country. The explusion in the Fall of 1971, of more than one hundred Soviet "diplomats" from London because of th e ir alleged involvement in a spy ring was often mentioned by the Liberian

O ffic ia l as the grave danger to which Liberia could be exposed.

Of course, Peking is now in the United Nations, in spite of Li­ beria's position or opposition. The accommodation that Liberia may have to make in the future ought not to be too d iffic u lt given the recent

106fiordon F. Boreman, Economic Aid: A Sino-African Case Study, (Taipei: China Publishing Company, n.dVJ p. 9. For information as to Peking's aid and other relations with Africa, the reader is referred to the following: W. Nielsen: The Great Powers and Africa (New York, London: F.A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969). As of early 1971, Peking had relations with the following African States: Algeria, Congo (B), Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Urganda, U.A.R., Zambia, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia and Nigeria, in addition to most of the liberation movements in "occupied" A frica. Taiwan had relations with 17 African States. 154

change of regime in Liberia. I t was perhaps this regime change that made Liberia susceptible to Peking's Ping Pong diplomacyJ07

3. THE CONGO CRISIS 1960 - 1961

(a) Origin of the Crisis to the Constitutional Crisis - September 1960

After many years of colonial rule, the Congo was granted in ter­ national sovereignty on June 30, 1960. According to the Loi Fondament- ale passed by the Belgian Senate and duly signed by the King, the Congo constituted "within its present boundaries, an indivisible and democra­ tic state". Prior to independence, all the preliminaries of govern­ mental organization had been carried out. Messrs. Joseph Kasavubu and

Patrice Lumumba were made President and Prime Minister, respectively.

One day before independence, a Belgian-Congolese treaty of friendship was signed. According to its terms Belgian troops stationed at Congo­ lese bases could be used in the Congo only upon the Congolese Defense Minister's request.108

Less than ttwo weeks following independence, there was mutiny in the army followed by a virtual breakdown of public order in the coun­ try. The situation was worsened by the unilateral intervention of Bel­ gian troops coupled with the announced secession of the Province of

107Liberia was invited by the People's Republic of China to the "third world" table tennis tournament held during the week of November 7, 1971. See the New York Times, November 7, 1971, p. 18, "China Ex­ pected to Champion Underdeveloped Lands at U.N.". Also see Liberian Age, "Liberia Accepts Communist China Invitation for Table Tennis" 7^ Friday, October 22, 1971, Vol. 25, No. 84. Monrovia.

^ C a th e rin e Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence (Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1965) pp. 42-84; "La Loi Fondamentale sur les structures du Congo" as quoted by Nkrumah: Challenge of the Congo, pp. 18-19. 155

Katanga. The ink has yet to dry on the written causes of the collapse

of public order in the beginning days of Congolese independence. Bel­

gium's Foreign Minister Spaak said of the crisis: "We made two mistakes

... we practiced paternalism for too long, and perhaps... after practi­

cing paternalism for too long we granted independence too suddenly."109

It is not proposed, in this section, to make a full study of the

crisis (causes and effects). The primary interest here is an expository

analysis of the position taken by the Liberian Government during the

United Nations' invited intervention in the Congo. To do th is , however,

the proper context for the Liberian prises de position must be provided.

On the 12th of July 1960, the Congolese Government addressed an

urgent appeal to the United Nations Secretary General requesting the

world body's assistance in halting the disintegration of the new A fri­

can state. More precisely, the request mentioned three questions: the

intervention of Belgian troops, breakdown of public order and the at­

tempted Katangese secession. The overriding question, however, was the

"unsolicited Belgian action" which was a clear "act of agression against

our country". The two other questions were but the consequences of

Belgian intervention, the la tte r being part of "colonialist machina-

tions".11^

1Q9United Nations, ORSC, 974th Meeting, November 15, 1961, p. 18; also Nkrumah, op. c i t . , for an African view. For a good analysis of some of the causes, see: Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate (John Hopkins Press, 1967) p. 6; and C. Kamitatu, La Grande Mystification du Congo - Kinshasa (Paris: Maspero, 2 eme ed., 1971) Chapter I.

110See Nkrumah, o£. c i t . , p. 19, fo r the f u ll message. An urgent meeting of the Security Council was called by the Sec­ retary-General on July 13 to handle the Congo's request for immediate military assistance.

First and Second Phases: Security Council Session, July 13 -14 to July 20-22, 1960.______

In his outline of the situation the Secretary General informed the Council of the three communications received from the Congolese leadership.111 He strongly recommended that the United Nations accede to the request for m ilitary assistance for the Congo. " It would then be understood the the Belgian Government would see its way to a with­ drawal of its troops..."113

The Tunisian delegate submitted during the debate a draft resolu­ tion (S/4383) calling for Belgian withdrawal of its troops and author­ izing the Secretary General to take the needed steps, in consultation with the Government of the Congo, to furnish the requested m ilitary as­ sistance. The Tunisian draft was adopted on July 14, by a vote of 8 to

0 with France, .China and the United Kingdom abstaining. I t was thus that ONUC (United Nations Forces in the Congo) was originally mandated and United Nations involvement begun.

By the time of the second Security Council meeting (July 20-22), the Belgian troops had not yet withdrawn. Dramatizing the impatience

111 Request for urgent technical assistance in the fie ld of admini stration and improving security; formal request for m ilitary assistance a telegram of clarification that spelled out the intention of the Con­ golese Government. 113United Nations, ORSC, 15th year, 873rd Meeting, July 13-14, 1960, pp. 3-4. 157 of the Congolese Government, Mr. Lumumba addressed an "ultimatum" to

Dr. Ralph Bunche, the Secretary General's personal representative in the Congo:

If the U.N. finds it impossible to assure, from now to July 19, 1960 at 24 hours, the mission that we have requested of i t , that is to have evacuated the Belgian troops from the national t e r r i­ tory and to take the places occupied by the Belgian Metropolitan forces, we w ill, with regret, be obliged to solicit the interven­ tion of the Soviet Union; but we hope you will be able to avoid this eventuality.113

Little by little , the full international implications of the cri­ sis began to unfold. Soon positions emphasizing law and those empha­ sizing politics would be discernible in the ongoing debate. While i t had accepted the Security Council's resolution of July 14, the Congo­ lese Government refused to lim it itself to the resolution's juridical import.. The mission of the United Nations forces was not prim arily to assure the withdrawal of Belgian troops but to re-establish and main­ tain internal public order.11/1 Lumumba f e lt that unless Belgian troops and the colonialists were out of the Congo, all other efforts would be in vain. Convinced in this belief he invoked the spectre of Soviet in­ tervention.

On the 18th of July 1960, representatives of African states, mem­ bers of the United Nations, met in New York and in.'a joint declaration requested the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the C o n g o . 1 1 5

During the July 21-22 meeting of the Security Council the Secre­ tary General was authorized in broad and vague terms, to take a ll the

113Farajallah, op. c it., p. 292. H4ibid, p.292. T^ibid, p.293. 158

necessary measures concerning the withdrawal of Belgian troops.116

Third and Fourth Phases: Security Council Sessions, August 8“9 to August 21-22, 1960.______

The Katanga question figured prominently during the f ir s t meeting

(August 8-9). ONUC had in effect quelled disturbances in five of the

Congo's six provinces. Secessionist Katanga continued to oppose a Uni­ ted Nations presence.

But the Secretary General began to feel that the time was at hand for applying the July 14 resolution to Katanga as well. He was rein­ forced in this feeling by the Security Council's attitude in the passage of the second United Nations Congo resolution, the key paragraph of which called upon the Belgian Government to implement speedily the July

14 resolution on the withdrawal of its troops and authorized the Secre­ tary General to take all necessary action to that effect.

In the process of reaching his decision, the Secretary General was subjected to pressures from many quarters. Tshombe maintained (and the Belgian Government concurred) that since restoring public order was the chief mission of ONUC there was no need to come to Katanga as all was now calm. However, most Western Governments said that while the two resolutions gave the United Nations the right to replace Belgian troops in all parts of the Congo including Katanga, this could not be done in a way that would a lte r the balance of power between Lumumba (Central

Government) and Moise Tshomba (Secessionist Katanga). What followed

n ^ F a ra ja lla h , op. c i t . , p. 295. 159

from this was that the United Nations must negotiate, not force its way into Katanga.117

A third view, shared by Lumumba, the Soviet Union and some Afro-

Asians demanded immediate entry of ONUC into Katanga. The Africans in

this group were Pan-Africanist in their political outlook, and their de­

mands with the others were to the effect that i f the United Nations

failed to act they would invite Soviet intervention to put an end to

Tshombe's pretences. The Secretary General and some other Afro-Asians

stood midway between the las t two positions, that is the United Nations

must intervene m ilitarily but do so with great caution.118 The Afri­

cans in this group were essentially Statist in their political outlook.

They apparently accepted and agreed to play the game of international

politics as it was.

The foregoing considerations, coupled with deteriorating relations

between Congolese and United Nations O fficials in Leopoldville and the

heightened possibility of direct Soviet intervention convinced the Sec­

retary General that swift action was required. He, therefore, announ­ ced that Dr. Bunche was going to E lizabethville (Katanga) on August 5,

to be followed by contingents of United Nations troops the next day.119

When i t became clear that the Katanga authorities would accede to

neither ONUC's negotiating nor forcing its way into the Province, Mr.

Hammarskjold resorted to delay tactics regarding his announced plans

fo r entry into Katanga. Because a recourse to force seemed the only

H7Hoskyns, op. c i t . , pp. 159-160. H 8Ib id , p. 160. 119 lb id , p. 161. 160 way le ft for United Nations entry, the Secretary General requested the

Security Council to clarify his mandate. In other words, he did not see the use of force regarding Katanga as within ONUC's competence.

In the meantime, Lumumba made a tour (August 2-8, 1960) of six

African States, including Guinea, Ghana and Liberia. The stoppage of the Katanga entry had resulted in a marked change in relations between the Lumumba Government and the Secretary General. I t also resulted in strained relations of sorts between Pan-Africanist African Governments and S tatist African Governments at least as fa r as those relationships concerned the Congo crisis.

Writing to President Kasavubu from Conakry on August 6, Mr. Lumumba said:

J'apprend que, contrairement a mon telegramme envoye^au Secretaire General des Nations Unies, celui-ci a refuse d'envoye des troupes au Katanga. Cette attitude tend a favoriser le mouvement de seces­ sion du Kananga. II s'ag it d'un complot de haute strategie que nous devons denoncer sans re ta rd ... Les troupes de I'ONU ne font que parader au Congo au lieu de nous aider.dans 1'evacuation des troupes beiges... Nous sommes assures d'une aide m ilita ire directe des pays africaines. Je negocie des accords en ce sens et tous les Etats africains sont prets a nous aider.120

Lumumba had been told by Sekou Tour6 that Guinea would put her entire forces at the disposal of the Congo i f ONUC failed to enter Ka­ tanga. When asked about his reaction to the solicitations of the Con­ golese Premier, William V. S. Tubman said that Liberia was w illing to see force used in the Katanga situation, but he did not say whether or

120Farajallah, op. c it., p. 297. 161

not i t must be within the United Nations framework.121 Previous and

la te r Liberian pronouncements led to the conclusion that Liberia always wanted the entire problem resolved within the United Nations framework.

The Congolese leader's position vis-a-vis his relations with the

United Nations and the Secretary General was stoutly supported by the

Governments of Guinea, Ghana and the U.A.R. In a message to African

leaders Ghana's Nkrumah wrote:

I believe that we should now press the U.N. Security Council to demand the complete and unconditional withdrawal of a ll Belgian troops immediately from a ll parts of the Congo... I f no new U.N. solution was forthcoming, then Ghana would lend to the Congo such armed support as the Congo might request. I am certain that i f we a ll stand together in support of a policy of complete, uncon­ ditional and immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga and other parts of the Congo, it will be possible to resolve the present crisis within the framework of the U.N.... Nevertheless, I am sure that i f the worse came to worse and no U.N. solution was found, and, therefore, Ghana had to give m ilitary assistance to the Congo outside the framework of the U.N., Ghana would have your sympathy in taking this action. I hope we shall also have your support in any m ilita ry steps which become necessary through the fa ilu re of the U.N. to deal with the issue.122

Reactions by most African leaders were not very favorable. Since the inception of the Congo c ris is , Ghanian diplomacy had sought to ex­ ert a preponderance of influence in the area. Ghana's Pan-Africanist assertions that she was, in fa c t, working fo r the general African cause seemed to have impressed very few Governments. The great majority sim­ ply saw Nkrumah's move as that of a single leader operating from a single state. Going back to early July I960, when Nkrumah's Ghana sought to be

T2lHoskyns, op. c i t . , pp. 165-166.

122Farajallah, op. c i t . , p. 297. 162 the diplomatic pilot for Africa, we find reservation, and in some cases open expressions of irrita tio n by some leaders at Ghana's u n ilateral­ ism in the Congo. In his July 12 cable to all African leaders Nkrumah stated that he had decided to send a special mission to obtain f ir s t ­ hand information on disturbance in the Congo; reactions went thus: Tuni­ sia replied that she looked forward to working with Ghana "as well as other African States au niveau des nations unies". Upon Tubman's public expression of regret at the dispatch of the Ghanian Mission, Nkrumah sought to reassure the Liberian leader by referring to the need for

"quickest possible action... in view of the rapidly developing situa­ tio n " .123

To return to the Secretary General's request for mandate c la rifi­ cation, we must note the fu ll background to the August 21-22 meeting of the Security Council. In his second report on the Congo (released Au­ gust 7th) the Secretary General outlined his interpretation of the Ka­ tanga situation. His opinion was that the dispute between the Central

Government and Katanga was an internal matter which* did not have its roots in the Belgian attitude. ONUC's security control role in Katanga could not lead i t into partisanship in this co n flict nor should i t be permitted to shift the weights between personalities or groups or schools of thought in a way which would prejudge the solution of the internal p o litic al problem. Mr. Hammarskjold seemed convinced that once the

Security Council clearly stated in a resolution that ONUC would remain neutral in the political and constitutional disputes, the way would be

123w. Scott Thompson: Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966 (Prince­ ton University Press, 1969)p. 133. 163 clear fo r United Nations entry and Belgian withdrawal from the Province]2^

From what has been said earlier, it is clear that Africa was split on the conflict between Lumumba's Government and the Secretary General regarding ONUC's role. The United States sided with the Secretary Gen­ eral while the Soviet Union supported Lumumba. I t was in this atmo­ sphere of violent disagreement that the Security Council met to c la rify the mandate of the Secretary General. The resolution that emerged fo l­ lowed almost exactly Mr. Hammarskjold's request that ONUC, in whatever it did, would remain neutral in the political and constitutional dis­ agreements between the Province and the Central Government.125

By the time of his third report, the Secretary General was dis­ turbed over the problem of outside assistance to the Central Government and the Katanga authorities particularly in view of the Security Council's call on all states to refrain from any action likely to impede the res­ toration of public order in the Congo.126

In early September, the Secretary General asked the Belgian rep­ resentative for information on Belgian officers in Katanga and other groups in armed conflict with the Central Government, and on the unload­ ing of Belgian weapons at Elizabethville. The reply was that there were no Belgian officers attached to the Katanga forces but "experts" rend­ ering technical assistance under the terms of a friendship pact. Regrets

l 24Hoskyns, op. c i t . , p. 167: See New York Times, August 7, 1960 (for Secretary General *s second report to the Security Council).

125united Nations Document, S/4426.

126yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 59. 164 were expressed that some light weapons from Belgium, ordered for the

Force Pub!ique before June 30, had been delivered in Elizabethville

"owing to the incompetence of an ill-informed o ffic ia l. . . 12?

To the Secretary General's request for information regarding the nationality and status of crews of certain troop-transporting planes which the Soviet Union had placed at the disposal of the Central Govern­ ment, and 100 trucks which the Soviet Government had offered to ONUC but which had not been delivered to the appropriate United Nations au­ th o rities, the Soviet representative replied that these were a ll matters touching bilateral relations between the USSR and the Congo and of no concern to the Secretary G e n e ra l. 128

One can see from the foregoing that superpower rivalry in the Con­ go was now in fu ll swing with the USSR supporting Lumumba against what was seen by some as the ONUC-Katanga combine, while the United States took nearly the opposite stance. For all practical purposes, the Super­ power accord that was necessary for creating ONUC in the f ir s t place had evaporated. Further, the desire of the African States not to have the

Congo become an enjeu du monde and Hammarskjold's preventive diplomacy did not succeed too well in avoiding cold war penetration of the area.

Hoskyns suggests that in view of the cold war rivalry in the area, negotiation, not more polarization, was called for. There was need for

1 ^ Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 59.

128Ibid, For notes to Belgium and Belgian replies to the Secre­ tary GenefcTTs inquires, see S/4482/Adds 1-3. The the same thing re­ garding the USSR see S/4503. 165 negotiation not only between the various Congolese politicians but also between Lumumba and ONUC. Realizing th is , the African States sought at the Leopoldville Conference (August 25-30, 1960) to do just th a t.129

But the mutually exclusive stands of the cold war participants made this unworkable. "The western reaction and the general tendency to make

Lumumba the scapegoat for all the difficulties of the Congo situation killed their effort [African leaders] and had the effect of making the division between those who supported Lumumba and those who opposed him even sharper..."130 I t would not be long before the tension between these groups would reach the point of no return.

(b) The Congolese Constitutional Crisis, September 1960 - February 1961

The point of no return was reached on September 5, 1960, when

President Kasavubu revoked the Lumumba Government and named Senator

Joseph Ileo to form a new government. The Prime Minister reacted by announcing the dismissal of the President and calling upon the people, the workers and the army to rise. The Council of Ministers supported the Prime Minister. On the same evening the United Nations Mission had closed a ll major airports to tra ffic other than those of ONUC on the grounds that this was in the interest of peace and order. The follow­ ing day the Leopoldville radio station was temporarily closed. The

129Thirteen independent African countries plus a few nationalist groups attended. Basically they tried to restrain Lumumba in his new unilateral tendencies and wished he would cooperate with the United Nations.

130Hoskyns, op. c i t . , p. 196. 166

Congolese Parliament failed in its attempt to reverse the mutual dis­

missals.131

On September 11 , 1960, both Mr. Kasavubu and Mr. Lumumba sent com­

munications naming two different delegations to the United Nations Se­

curity Council.

Security Council Meeting, September 9-17, 1960

In addition to Tunisia, six African states (Ghana, Guinea, Ethio­

pia, Morocco, the U.A.R. and Liberia) took part in the debate. It must

here be recalled that the big power rivalry in the Congo created a po­

litical vacuum in the area. Because of the United Nations position of

neutrality "the interested powers in the Congo — practically everyone

— moved to support, in accordance with their interests, the antagon­

istic political factions".132 This was the true background to the Se­

curity Council meeting.

I t was at this meeting that Liberia, perhaps for the f ir s t time,

spelled out its Congo policy. Henceforth, Liberia's intervention in the debates would be more frequent, for she was a fu ll member of the

1961 Security Council.

Dr. Dosumo-dohnson, the Liberian representative made a plea fo r

131 Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 60. For details of the constitutionality of the acts of the Congo leader, see Hoskyns, op. c i t . ,pp. 197-246.

132Farajallah, op. c it ., pp. 306-307. For more details, see: Stanley Hoffman, "In Search of a Thread: The U.N. in the Congo Labyrinth", International Organization. Vol. XVI, No. 2, 1962; also Hoskyns, op. c it., pp. 225-227. 167 reconciliation in the interest of the Congolese and Africans. Liberia had an im plicit belief in the United Nations and its instruments:

Second, the Liberian Government supports the Secretary General and the U.N. on the Congo. Third, the Liberian Government is in favor of the Central Government of the Congo. Fourth, the Liberian Government believes that the U.N. should take steps to restore order in the Congo with the cooperation of all members of the U.N. Fifth, the Liberian Government w ill, as always, contribute its quota to any fund established by the Secretary General in the interest of the Congolese people.133

This position on the Congo was consistent with Liberia's funda­ mental policy, the representative said. That policy was that Liberia refrained from taking sides in the factional p olitical disputes within other states. Liberia's sole interest and overriding desire are to see the Congo with a central Government administered and maintained by the

Congolese people. The Liberian delegate then appealed to the gentlemen of the Council to bury th eir hatchets, forget innuendoes and pursue the only task, that of cooperating closely with the Secretary General as he sought to implement United Nations resolutions. "This must be done, we pray, not in diffused solitariness but rather in condensed s o lid a rity .1,134

As the debate approached a climax, the United States and the So­ viet Union submitted draft resolutions S/4516 and S/4519, respectively.

The United States position was essentially that of the Secretary Gener­ al's which was a melange of neutrality and leanings toward Kasavubu against Lumumba. The USSR for its part, called for the withdrawal of

ONUC since its action constituted a "flagrant violation of the Security

133United Nations, ORSC, 906th Meeting, September 17, 1960,p. 13.

134Ibid, p. 14. 168

Council's decisions on the question of the C o n g o " .136 Mobutu's sudden

coup added tenseness to the already difficult situation.

The African Governments, in cooperation with some Asian Govern­ ments, worked for a compromise solution to the Lumumba-ONUC controversy.

Two major objectives inspired the compromise attempt - strengthening

the Central Government and continuing the United Nations M i s s i o n . 1 36

Draft resolution S/4523 submitted by Ceylon and Tunisia was the essence

of that compromise.

But the compromise embodied in the draft resolution was unaccept­

able to the Soviet Union. This is why its representative.,* Mr. Valerian

Zorin, submitted a series of amendments designed to convert the draft

into a "made in Russia". When this did not succeed, the USSR resorted

to the veto. This was the very fir s t time that the Security Council had reached an impasse on the Congo. The "Uniting for Peace" resolution

(377A (V) of November 3, 1950) was invoked and the Congo question was

transferred to an emergency special session of the General Assembly.

Fourth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, ______September 17-19, 1960 ______

The attitudes of the various States remained the same as in the

Security Council session. At the 858th meeting on September 17, a sharply worded debate characterized the American-Soviet exchange.

Liberia and Guinea, in their statements in the debate, provide an

^Hoskyns, op. c it., p.230.

136Farajallah, op. c it., p. 310. 169 example of contrast in African opinion. Where Liberia viewed a complex situation created as a result of outside interference of all types,

Guinea saw the events of the Congo as -the outcome of a vast conspiracy, not only against the Congo, but against African freedom and independ­ ence. The conspiracy was organized by none other than the imperialists.

Where Liberia called for caution and patience in the world organiza­ tion's attempt to restore the territorial integrity of the Congo, Guinea seemed prepared to substitute ONUC by a coalition of progressive f o r c e s . 137

In the end, the Afro-Asian States managed to arrive at a solu­ tion of compromise quite similar to that of the last meeting of the Se­ curity Council. Draft resolution A/L.292 was submitted by seventeen states, including Liberia. The draft was adopted by 70 votes to 0 with

11 abstentions (Soviet bloc, France and South Africa).

Most Afro-Asians saw this resolve as simply opening the door to the pending debate during the 15th regular session of the General As­ sembly. I t was at that session that they intended to open "le dossier volumineux du drame congolais" fo r the purpose of showing "the flagrant contradiction there is between the spirit of the three resolutions of the Security Council and the actions of the U.N. authorities who were to apply those resolutions in the C o n g o " . 138 African solidarity in the matter then, hinged on the application of the resolution.

137por Liberia see 862nd Meeting of the Emergency Special Session September 19, 1960, pp. 74-75; for Guinea see 861st Meeting on Septem­ ber 19, 1960, p. 59.

138Farajallah, op. c i t . , p. 312. 170

First Part of the 15th General Assembly (1960)

One can discern three African groupings from now on. The fir s t group was pro-Lumumba and highly c ritic a l of the attitude of the West and the Secretary General. I t included such states as Ghana, Guinea and the U.A.R. which felt that restoration of legality to the Congo meant a restoration of the Lumumba Government. They also advocated a firm and determined United Nations policy regarding Katanga.

The second group included the cautious or moderate African States, among them, Liberia, Ethiopia, Tunisia. While they shared the view of the f ir s t group on the Katanga question, they were much more circumspect regarding the Kasavubu-Lumumba controversy. They unreservedly supported the Secretary General and ONUC.

The third group consisted essentially of the French-speaking Af­ rican States recently admitted to United Nations membership. The states of this group were quite attached to France and by and large conserva­ tive in their Congo policy.139

These three groups quite often projected their political prefer­ ences as the struggle for influence by the world's leaders was waged in the various debates and votes. In some instances, States of the first and second groups came together in attempts to bring peace to the Congo.

Since early September, both a Kasavubu and a Lumumba delegation had been present in New York, each claiming representation and demanding

139For notes on the groupings, see Hoskyns, op. c i t . , pp. 256-258. For details on the third group, see Mirlande Hippolyte: Les Etats Du Groupe De Brazzaville Aux Nations Unies (Paris, Colin, 1970). 171 recognition. Because the Credentials Committee had not yet made a de­ cision on the seating of the Congo (even though United Nations member­ ship had been granted), the seat remained vacant. The rival claims to the seat produced a state of confusion in the General Assembly.

President Sekou Tour£ of Guinea added to the confusion when he urged in a speech in the Assembly on October 10, that the Lumumba dele­ gation be seated on the basis of Rule 29 of the Assembly's Rule of Pro­ cedure. 140 Guinea and other members of the f ir s t group submitted a draft resolution in this vein. The Second group opposed i t on the grounds that Kasavubu could not be dismissed so easily. The seat, they fe lt, should remain vacant for the time being.141

This development alarmed the supporters of Kasavubu who included the western powers headed by the United States, Africans of the third group and a few others. Mr. Kasavubu at once flew to New York and ad­ dressed the General Assembly. He seemed to have won considerable sup­ port for his position.

Now the firs t group, cognizant of Kasavubu's strength started a move for adjourning the whole debate on credentials sine die on the grounds that to make a choice now would be purely p o litic al and would

14°The Rule states: "Any representative to whose admission a mem­ ber has made objection shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives, until the Credential Committee has reported and the General Assembly has given its decision."

^ iF a ra ja lla h , op. c i t . , p. 259; Hoskyns, op. c i t . , p. 260. 172 therefore not facilitate the task of ONUC and the Conciliation Commis­ sion.142

But the West started its own drive to get the Assembly to pass the draft resolution that the Credentials Committee had come up with.

By the terms of draft A/4578, the General Assembly accepted the creden­ tia ls of the representatives of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) issued by the Head of State and communicated by him to the President of the General Assembly in a le tte r dated November 8, 1960. The draft was adopted by a vote of 53 to 34 with 19 abstentions.

A victory for the West was clear. The Indian delegate called the vote "arm twisting". The Correspondent of Le Monde called i t "un suc- ces du gros baton americain". The Observer said that "the Kasavubu vote was obtained by intense United States and western lobbying behind the scenes of the United Nations and by the decision of the African

States of the French Comnunity to vote for Kasavubu".14^

The vote shows how states of the f ir s t group favored Lumumba, while those of the third group showed a definite pro-western stance. The po­ sition of States of the second group in which Liberia figures, was one of almost absolute neutrality. In spite of the tremendous pressures from the West, Liberia refrained from taking sides between Kasavubu and

Lumumba. I t would appear from this that Liberia departed from its usual

142United Nations, ORGA, 913th Meeting of the First Committee, 15th Session, September - November, 1960, p. 848.

143Le Monde, November 24, 1960; Observer Foreign News Service, November 24, 1960; both quoted in Hoskyns, op. c i t . , pp. 263-264. 173

TABLE V II

TABLE SAMPLING AFRICAN VOTES ON THE ACCREDITION OF THE KASAVUBU DELEGATION

MOTIONS OF ADJOURNMENT

GHANA GHANA GHANA MALI GUINEA DRAFT 913th 917 th 923th 924th 924th RESOLUTIOI\ SESSION SESSION SESSION SESSION SESSION OF CREDEN1 COMMITTEE LIBERIA Y A A AA A CAMEROON N N N NN Y C.A.R. N N A A A A CHAD Y N N N NY CONGO(B) N N N N NY DAHOMEY N N N NN Y ETHIOPIA Y Y Y YY A GABON N NN N NY GHANA Y YY YY N GUINEA Y YYY Y N IVORY COAST N N N N N Y MADAGASCAR N NN N N Y MALI Y YY YY N NIGER N NN N NY

NIGERIA Y - - - - - SENEGAL Y NN NN Y SOMALIA Y AA A AA TOCO Y YY Y Y Y

UPPER VOLTA Y A A - - -

-348930-18 51-36-11 50-34-13 47-32-16 50-32-14 53-24-19 (AD) (R) (R) (R) (R) (AD) tendency in voting with the United States on issues which were not too colonial. The fact of the matter is that the Congo had tremendous co­ lonial implications, and rather than appear to be with the West, Li­ beria choose abstention.

But this is certainly not the whole explanation. Liberia's Congo policy has been to a considerable extent guided by the assessments of the situation by the Secretary General. In the case of the credentials question, the Secretary General had indicated support for the Ghanian adjournment motion which meant disapproval in principle of the western drive. Further, Liberia did not want to appear involved in the faction­ al political disputes in the Congo. Under the circumstances theri, ab­ stention seemed logical.

The battle over credentials terminated, the General Assembly re­ sumed the firs t part of the 15th Session. Two draft resolutions were before the Assembly. The f ir s t , an 8-power draft (including Ghana and

Guinea), would "urge the immediate release of a ll political prisoners under detention - more particularly members of the Central Government and Parliament and measures to prevent armed u n its ... in the Congo from interference in the p olitical lif e of the country and from obtaining support from abroad".144

The United States and Britain submitted a draft resolution re­ questing the Secretary General to continue ONUC and calling fo r the guarantee of security to a ll political prisoners by the International

144Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p.76: A/L.331 and Add.l. 175

Committee of the Red Cross. Both the 8-power and the 2-power drafts were rejected, the firs t by a vote of 42-28-27, with Liberia among the abstainers, and the second by a vote of 43-22-32, with Liberia again abstaining.

According to Ambassador Henry Ford Cooper, Liberia abstained on the 8-power draft because certain of its operative paragraphs were in violation of the United Nations Charter or outside the Secretary Gen­ eral's guidelines. The Liberian representative then outlined the basis upon which Liberia took a stand on the 8-power d ra ft, and in the pro­ cess, made a Liberian assessment of the crisis up to that moment:

...The entrance of the U.N. into the affairs of the Congo took place at the request of the Congolese Government then in exist­ ence, which Government was at that time composed of Mr. Kasavubu, President, Mr. Lumumba, Prime Minister and the Parliament. We know now that such a Government no longer exists. As the report of the Secretary General states, there is no Central Government; there are only p o litic al factio n s... In the circumstances, three choices lie before the U.N.: in the first place, since the Gov­ ernment which had requested U.N. aid no longer exists, the U.N. could withdraw from a ll further activities in the Congo - - this would mean chaos and, as Mr. Hammarskjold has said, c iv il war for many years to come. Secondly, i f withdrawal were to lead to con­ fusion and chaos, then the next alternative, if the U.N. is not to act as a bystander in the Congo, would be to replace the Gov­ ernment which no longer exists and with which the U.N. was pledged to cooperate. As many delegations have contended, the U.N. is not a super state and i t was never intended to make the Congo a trust territory... Thirdly, having received no mandate to retire or to replace the Central Government which has disintegrated, the U.N. must either cooperate wherever possible with the existing authori­ ties whether these authorities are legal or illegal — or be a by­ stander. . .145

145General Assembly Verbatim Records, 953rd Meeting of Plenary, 15th Session, Part I , Vol. 2, December 17, 1960, p. 1355. 176

When both the 8-power draft and the 2-power draft failed of, a<-1 doption, the General Assembly adopted an Austrian draft resolution (15

92/XV) that had the Congo item retained for the second part of the 15th

Session.

But the transfer of the arrested Lumumba to Katanga and his even­ tual assassination so radically altered the situation that the Security

Council had to urgently meet.

(c) Development of the Crisis from the Lumumba Assassination

The Lumumba assassination created a whole new crisis. African differences intensified as did internal Congolese differences. The

Armfee Nationale Congo!aise broke into groups of "private armies". This situation lent itself to subtle exploitation by the larger powers. This was the atmosphere as the Security Council delegates gathered.

Security Council Session, January - February, 1961

On January 7, 1961, the Soviet Union had requested a meeting of the Security Council to deal with the threat to peace and security created in the Congo as a result of"fresh acts of Belgian aggression and the flagrant violation of the international status of the Trust Ter­ rito ry of Rwanda—Urundi". This accusation was made because on Decem­ ber 25, 1960, the Secretary General's Special Representative reported that 60 Congolese troops from Stanleyville (Lumumbist stronghold) ar­ rived in Kivu and arrested the local army Commander and others for their loyalty to Leopoldville. ONUC was helpless. Shortly afterwards, about

100 soldiers from Leopoldville were flown to Rwanda-Urandi. Transported 177 to the bridge on the Congo border by Belgium, they entered Kivu Janu­ ary 1, 1961. The Kivu garrison took 60 prisoners and repelled the others.146

When the debate started Liberia had just been elected to a one- year term on the Security Council. She symbolically represented in the

Council, all Africa including the Congo (all factions of the political lif e ) . As Ambassador George Padmore said, Liberia actively participated in a ll United Nations efforts to bring peace to the Congolese people.

Not only did she have m ilitary units in the Congo (Liberia had 225 mem­ bers of its armed forces under ONUC) she was also a member of the Secre­ tary General's Advisory Committee on the Congo and a member of the

United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo.147

Liberia co-sponsored draft resolution S/4625 (together with Ceylon and the U.A.R.) calling upon Belgium as the Administering Authority of the Trust Territory of Rwanda-Urundi, immediately to cease a ll action against the Congo.

The resolution originated with the firs t group (sometimes identi­ fied as the Casablanca Powers). While the U.A.R. and Ceylon (Asia) were part of the group, Liberia was not. In fact, Liberia spearheaded a drive to bring together in Africa the radical Casablanca Powers and the conservative Brazzaville powers. This was the so-called "Monrovia group"

146Vearbook of the United Nations, 1961, p. 78.

!47united Nations, ORSC, 926th Meeting, 16th Year, 1961, pp. 1-2. 178

How then could one explain Liberia's collaboration here? I t must be recalled that one of the tenets of Liberia's foreign policy is pragma­ tism. There is no immutable position. There is only a pragmatic search for solutions to problems of multinational existence. On another level,

Liberia's attitude here could be seen as an attempt to avoid isolation in Africa so the the radicals could not claim a ll the victories. Fol­ lowing a heated debate the draft resolution was rejected 4-0-7.

But Liberia had gone all-out in displaying African solidarity.

When the United States representative sought to support Belgium by brand­ ing the Soviet's complaint (which was the reason for calling the Secur­ ity Council meeting) an "isolated in c id e n t",^ 8 Ambassador Padmore re­ torted in rather strong language:

...The U.S. delegation has referred to the incident like a mosquito and an elephant [Mr. Barco of the U.S. had said: "an elephant gun has been trained on a mosquito..."]. Both the elephant and the mosquito are well known to Africans and, I presume, to the U.S. Possibly a different context or connotation may be applied by the two peoples, but to us Africans the meaning might be more subtle. Although we love the elephant for its decorative aspects and its contribution to the beauty of the African scene, is i t not true that the mosquito is relatively a nuisance, nuisance enough to keep you awake at night? Has not the Congo problem been such a nuisance in the international field as to keep awake many countries and their people? . . . I f the action of Belgium is casually passed o ff as an incident and some of us would accept th eir assurances that this w ill not happen again — then what about the more violent leaders of Africa who would like to claim other means of settling disputes and who even tend to look upon the U.N. with prejudice? To whom shall we turn then? Bewilderment might not be a strong enough word... Let us hope that even if the elephant is displaced the nui- ance of the mosquito w ill likewise be r e m o v e d . 149

148United Nations, ORSC, op. c it., p. 10.

149United Nations, ORSC, 927th Meeting, January 14, 1961, pp.11-12. 179

As the Security Council debate proceeded news of Lumumba's death was received; the meeting was temporarily adjourned. President Tubman issued a statement from Monrovia characterizing the k illin g of Lumumba and his associates as "a tragic, regrettable and despicable affair".

A fu ll international enquiry into the circumstances of the death was called for. Mr. Tubman then renewed an earlier suggestion for recon­ ciliation of the factions, national and international, in the Congo situationJ58

When the Security Council resumed its meeting, there was a re­ alignment of forces. The United States and the Secretary General had been drawn closer to the position of the Casablanca powers. Liberia had much e a rlie r been drawn to this position. Now the states of Groups

One and Two together with the United States and the Secretary General would move to strengthen Congo's central government, and then resolve the Katanga question.

Taking the initiative, Afro-Asians of this new coalition worked out a draft resolution that urged ONUC to forthwith take all appropri­ ate measures, including a halt to all military operations, to prevent the occurrence of c iv il war in the Congo. The draft further urged the use of force, where necessary, and the withdrawal of a ll Belgian troops and personnel. The carefully worded resolution was submitted by Liber­ ia , Ceylon, and the U.A.R. on February 17, 1961.151

150s/47i4, February 15, 1961, contains the fu ll text of Tubman's statement. 151 Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, pp.83-84. For an account of African negotiation of the draft, see: Afrique Action, February 27. 1961. 180

In the early hours of February 21, 1961, the three-power draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 9 to 0 with France and the Soviet

Union abstaining. The question that remained was how would the reso­ lution be implemented?

Second Part: 15th Regular Session of the ______General Assembly, March - A p ril, 1961.

When the question of implementing the Security Council resolution was raised, the earlier political divisions once more emerged. Afri­ can states of the f ir s t Group (Casablanca powers) proposed a program of implementation that would keep the Congo a unitary state. The third

Group (Brazzaville powers) proposed a confederal solution.

President Nkrumah of Ghana voiced the sentiments of the f ir s t

Group. His proposal would, in e ffe c t, place the Congo under a tempor­ ary United Nations trusteeship or more accurately, African trusteeship with full United Nations blessings.152 This succinctly was the pro­ posal of the u n itaris t group to which Guinea belonged.

The confederal solution that emanated from the new .francophone

African states was in lin e with the proposals of the Tananarive conr ferees, a group of 18 Congolese leaders including Kasavubu (Central

Government) and Tshombe (Katanga). This group held a conference in

Madagascar on March 9-15, 1961, at which Tshombe proposed a loose con­ federation as the only solution to the Congo's problems. He added that the orily other alternatives were United Nations trusteeship or a Com­ munist takeover. Kasavubu acquiesced. As Farajallah put i t , this was

152 United Nations, 961st Plenary, March 7, 1961, pp. 1-11. 181

a truimph of "katangisme generalise".153

Linder the circumstances a compromise solution was called for.

Liberia (a state of the second Group) was instrumental in helping to

bring this about. The proposed solution was embodied in two draft res­

olutions (A/1.339 and Add 1-3; A/L.340 and Add 1-4 and Add 3/Corr.l)

The fir s t concerned its e lf uniquely with the Belgian presence and that

of the mercenaries, a presence that was considered the principal cause

of the new deterioration on the situation in the Congo. As Liberia's

Henry Ford Cooper put i t in his statement:

The stumbling block or the hindrance to any solution in the Congo has been outside interference and in particular the interference of the Belgians... The (Belgians) have not returned to the Congo and the Congolese people with a view to assisting the Congo and the Congolese people but rather to continuing exploitation of the Congolese wealth which has enriched the coffers of the Belgian Government...154

The second draft (A/L.340 and Add 1-4) centered on a denouement of the Congo's constitutional crisis. On this question , Cooper said:

As long as there are two prevailing points of view, as long as there are two Governments — one in Leopoldville, recognized by certain countries, and another in Stanleyville, recognized by other African states - - i t w ill be impossible for the African- Asian countries to become solely responsible for working out a solution or formulating a plan that w ill bring to the unhappy country, peace, order and a stable government... My delegation is of the opinion that the fir s t requirement in the Congo crisis is to establish some form of Government that.will-embrace, all fac­ tions in the Congo. I t is with this in mind that my Government is appealing to the members of the United Nations to encourage rather than to hamper the efforts of the Congolese leaders in this direction...155

153 Farajallah, op. c i t . , p. 330. 154united Nations, ORGA, 972nd Meeting, Plenary Session, March 30, 1961, pp.H45-146: 155ibid, p. 144. Overall, then, Liberia's position during this second half of the

15th General Assembly was one of neutrality as regards the Casablanca

group to which Guinea and Ghana belonged and the Brazzaville powers which completely supported Tshombe's proposed solution. Ambassador

Cooper in his March 30 statement, had both groups in mind when he said:

" ... not only the Belgians but nearly every stater in the U.N., and

particularly Asian and African states, have interfered directly or in­

directly by giving advice, counsel and direct assistance".156 He plead­ ed for a return to first principles,,those that spoke of United Nations member states assisting the Congo only within the framework of ONUC.

The world organization was the best instrument of neutrality and impar­ tiality available in the situation. At any rate, it was the only court to which the small countries could repair for the upholding of their

rights. Liberia spoke from experience.

In addition to the 21-power draft resolution (A/L.339) and the

17-power draft resolution (A/L.340) above mentioned, the General Assem­ bly had before i t two other draft resolutions. A Soviet-proposed draft would have the General Assembly "declare that no actions leading to a violation of the unity ... of the Congo could be allowed; deem it

156united Nations, ORGA, op. c it ., p. 143. Earlier Ambassador Padmore had spoken thus of outside interference: "... the situation in the Congo today provides a classic example of the truth of the old adage that too many cooks spoil the broth... Mr. Hammarskjold's ladle is not the only one in the broth. There have been other ladles, each stirring in a different direction, and the result is that the broth had now been transformed into a witches brew..." ORSC, 938th Meeting, February 17, 1961, p. 2. 183 necessary that Parliament convene not later than 21 days after the text was adopted; request ONUC to ensure the safety of Congolese Parliamen­ tarians’! 157

The last draft resolution, submitted by Ceylon, India and Morocco, would have the Assembly take note of the Secretary General's report touching the implementation of the February 21, 1961 Security Council resolution regarding an investigation into the death of Lumumba; estab­ lish a Commission of Investigation consisting of four persons named by the Governments of Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico and Togo; request that the

Commission proceed without d e l a y J 58

As the following table shows, Liberia voted in favor of the twen­ ty-one and seventeen power draft resolutions, as well as the three pow­ er draft resolution. The cold war controversy that was implied in the

Soviet-sponsored d raft may have led to Liberia's abstention. Guinea, on the other hand, voted for the twenty-one power draft and the three- power d ra ft, but abstained on the seventeen power draft probably because i t represented too much compromise. On the Soviet d raft as w e ll, Guinea was affirm ative. Its strong and unequivocal language fe ll well with

Guinean temperament and was in line with the Casablanca viewpoint.

The constitutional crisis ended or was resolved with the formation of the Adoula Government on August 2, 1961, in keeping with Congolese constitutional procedures. With the problem of governmental s ta b ility

^Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, p. 95.

158ibid. 1 8 4 TABLE VIII

TABLE SAMPLING AFRICA VOTES ON THE CONGO PROBLEM, GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION XV - 2nd PART

CONGO(L) 21-POWER 8 - POWER 17-POWER U.S.S.R. DRAFT OF CEYLON AMENDMENT DRAFT AMENDMENT DRAFT DRAFT TO-21-POWER (OPERATIVE TO-17-POWER IN D IA & MOROCCO DRAFT POWER-2) DRAFT

LU o CO • LU X CO 1 y t— _J •>- cj v> LU «s: - j 3 — Z * 0 o . 0 z a >*• UJ o 0 O LU OS OS UJ z CO 1— CU < 0 os x LU M > - LU ’ —I UJ Z < LU LU OS • h - < c _ 1 J- —J X CL U 0 M X O 1— —1 —1 Ul J— z X UJ LU X UJ UJ CL. > - < c c c H-1 CO 3 U)ZX to j_ x s X < 52: i u £ h— Z 3 -J

LIBERIA AA X A Y Y Y - A Y CAMEROON Y Y A A A A Y A A C.A.R. Y Y Y A A ANA A CHAD Y Y Y Y YY YA A CONGO(B) Y Y . Y A Y YNN A CONGO(L)Y Y Y N A A N N ' DAHOMEY Y Y * Y A YY N N . A ETHIOPIA N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y GABON Y Y Y A Y Y . N N A GHANA N N V Y Y Y AY Y GUINEA N N Y Y Y Y A Y Y IVORY COAST Y Y Y A N N A MADAGASCAR Y Y Y A A Y N N A MALI N N Y Y Y A Y Y NIGER YY Y A Y YN N A NIGERIANA Y Y YY A Y SENEGAL YY Y Y Y Y Y A Y SOMALIA N A Y Y Y Y Y A A TOGO NA Y Y Y Y Y A Y UPPER VOLTA Y Y Y Y Y. N A 6 5 -5 -3 3 6 0 -2 6 -2 3 5 3 -2 9 -1 7 4 5 -3 -4 9 (AD) AD R AD

See Table V For Key to Votes.

v ; 185 behind, at least fo r the moment, ONUC and the world community s t ill had the Katanga problem on hand. Prime Minister Adoula recognized the fu ll import of the Katanga secession and the great necessity of ending i t . This is what he said in his inaugural address:

La secession katangaise a f a it grand to rt au pays. C'est e lle qui nous a divsee, c'est elle qui a prive I'Etat d'une grande partie des resources budgetaires qui lui appartiennent... C'est dans les tout prochains jours que votre gouvernement est resolu a reduire la secession katangaise.159

In order to preserve the little progress that had been made in terms of restoring order to the Congo, and more specifically in order to avoid a Gizengist (le ftis t) threat to the new Government, ONUC, fu l­ ly backed by the United States and a majority of Afro-Asia, moved to end the Katanga secession. The American Undersecretary of State, Mr.

George W. B a ll, maintained that the resolution of Katanga secession would contribute decisively to the ability of the Leopoldville Govern­ ment to cope with the diversionary activites of Antoine GizengaJ60

I t must be noted here that there were shades of difference in the A fri­ can attitudes. Ghana and Guinea supported the e ffo rt, not of course, fo r fear of Gizenga, but primarily because they wanted an end to Katanga and the Congo division that i t represented. They hoped that once Ka­ tanga had been restored to the Congo, the dreams that the fallen first

Prime Minister had for the Congo could somehow be implemented.

159Farajallah, op. c it., pp. 335-336.

160George W. B all, "The Elements in Our Congo Policies", Depart­ ment of State Pub!ications (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Of­ fic e /“Becember, 1961) No. 7326, p. 19. 186

For Liberia, the restoration of public order was crucial. Since the presumed le ftis t threat to the Adoula Government suggested a return to the former chronic political in s tab ility, crushing Katanga was worth pursuing. Liberia had no quarrel with either a divided or united Congo, what was most important was a restoration of governmental stabilization and peace among the African nations.

The Katanga Problem: Sessions of the Security Council from November 1961. ______

As other developments continued elsewhere, the United Nations representatives continued, with great difficulty, to negotiate with the

Belgian Government and the Katanga authorities for the evacuation of foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers, in keeping with the resolutions of the Security Council.

The f ir s t United Nations attempts at employing force in Katanga met with dismal fa ilu re . The tragic death of Mr. Hammarskjold while on one of his many mission in the Congo, helped add urgency and solidarity to the United Nations efforts. The Afro-Asians (especially its moder­ ate members) appealed to the big powers to take action to assist ONUC recoup from temporary setbacks in Katanga. The United States, with Bel­ gian cooperation and Soviet acquiescence began to move with resolute­ ness in the drive to end the secession.

Intervening in the Security Council debate, Liberia's Ambassador

Nathan Barnes submitted draft resolution S/4985, co-sponsored by Ceylon and the U.A.R. The Ambassador said:

The heart of the Congo problem is the callous pursuit of self- interest by foreign enterprises both public and private... The 187

backbone of this secession (Katanga) is the foreign support and assistance which the provincial Government continues to receive. The draft resolution now before you seeks to break this back­ bone by eliminating the elements of that assistance...161

The Security Council adopted by a vote of 9-0-2 (France and the

United Kindom abstained) this very important resolution’that authorized the Secretary General to take vigorous action, including the use of a requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations command. The resolution also declared a ll secessionist activities against the Congo as contrary to the Loi Funda­ mental e and the decisions of the Security Council, and specifically de­ manded that such a c tiv itie s then taking place in Katanga cease fo rth ­ with J 62

With fu ll United States backing, ONUC moved ahead to implement the November 24 resolution. By early 1963, the Secretary General could say of ONUC - - mission accomplished. Progressive withdrawal of ONUC from the Congo followed, and by June 1964, the forces were completely withdrawn.163

Summary

The 1960-61 Congo crisis grew out of a clash between Belgium and

161 United Nations, ORSC, 974th Meeting, 16th year, November 15, 1961, pp. 2-6. 162United Nations Document S/5002 of November 24, 1961. 163Hosk.yns, op. c i t . , pp. 444-467 fo r details of ONUC's m ilita ry and other moves following the passing o f the resolution. 188

the Congo. This clash was soon brought into the orbit of the East-

West struggle and had a number of neo-colonialist implications as well.

Since we did not set out to make a fu ll study of the cris is , we shall

lim it these remarks to the way in which the crisis affected the inter­

ests of the African states in general and of Liberia in particular.

For the African states, the crisis was perhaps the firs t oppor­

tunity for the show of pan-African solidarity as well as the first true

test of the idea that concerted African action within the United Nations

framework would not only curtail foreign intervention but make bet­

ter the chances for African solutions to African p ro b lem s. 164 in their

desire to insulate the Congo from the cold war, the African states found

a ready a lly in Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, the proponent of

"preventive diplomacy". This form of diplomacy is a means of lim iting,

when possible, the expansion of the cold war by charging the United

Nations to assure the task of fillin g the politico-economic vacuum in

those regions of the world that were outside of the geopolitical zone

of the two major powers. In the case of the Congo, the United States

supported the in itia l United Nations intervention because i t was fear­

ful of Soviet penetration in the very heart of Africa i f public order

was not restored. The USSR aimed at the elimination of predominant

Western influence in Africa.

But the "pressure of events" in the Congo soon exposed African

differences, and the penetration of the cold war into the Congo, despite

164Hoskyns, op. c i t . , p. 477. 189

African efforts to the contrary, began to condition African attitudes on the Congo issue. Three rather distinct groups emerged: Group One, the Casablanca powers, Group Two, the moderates of the Monrovia powers, and Group Three, the arch conservatives of the Brazzaville powers.

Group One held the view that the one enemy in the Congo drama was neocolonialism, that the one legitimate authority in the Congo was that representing genuine nationalism. As for the United Nations, its role was none other than that of unequivocally placing its resources at the disposal of the legimate regime. I f i t acted otherwise, invited in- 165 tervention from friendly quarters would be fully justifiable. This was the view that Guinea's Caba Sory, together with others, sought to get across in the many United Nations debates on the Congo.

The third Group simply took over the categories of the f ir s t Group but used the opposite view, in that the identifiable enemy in the Congo crisis was not neocolonialism but Communism; the supporters of Lumumba were called "Soviet Satellites" or "Crypto-Communists". " If the radical scored the United Nations mission because i t would not intervene enough, the conservatives criticized the United Nations because i t intervened too much."166

For the states of the second Group to which Liberia belonged,

166Robert C. Good, "The Congo Crisis: A Study of Post-Colonial P olitics", in Lawrence W. Martin (Ed), Neutralism and Nonalignment, (New York, London: F. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1963).

166Ib id , p. 55. True to its b e lie f, when a ll others agreed, the Congo Government (Brazzaville) was the only one that protested United Nations final military action against secessionist Katanga. 190 there was a tendency to approach the problem more in terms of " in s ti­ tutions and procedures rather than personalities and symbols". The enemy in the Congo was Belgian, African and non-African intervention­ ists as well as irresponsible Congolese leaders. To end these inter­ ventions, ONUC and only ONUC must be e m p l o y e d . 1 67 i t seemed that i t was the restoration of public order, not the concern about which po­ lit ic a l tendency would be adopted in the Congo that preoccupied Liberia and other states of this group.

Guinea and Liberia, one might say, shared a common objective re­ garding what the United Nations must do in the Congo. Both agreed that the United Nations support the legal institutions of the Congo and in­ sure its territorial integrity. This is why these two states were of­ ten together as key draft resolutions (resolutions of conciliation) were being submitted. When, however, the time of implementation drew near, Guinea and Liberia often parted company, for while the former wanted the United Nations to commit its e lf to the Congolese national­ ists faction, the latter advocated political neutrality for ONUC.16®

All of the African states played a role in initiating ONUC. To­ ward the end of the operations, however, when United Nations O fficials and the United States Government became convinced of the necessity of

167Good, op. c i t . , pp. 57-60.

168But given the manner in which the problem developed, i t was perhaps too much to expect political neutrality of ONUC. The title of Lefever's book, Uncertain Mandate typifies the labyrinthian situation into which the Congo crisis developed. Unequivocal support fo r ONUC, therefore, leaves many important questions unanswered. 191

ending Katanga's secession, except for providing troops, Africa's role

dwindled in importance. But ONUC was unhesitatingly moving to accom­

plish its mission.

When this firs t and major Congo crisis was over, Secretary of

State J. Rudolph Grimes concurred with the Secretary General's assess­

ment of the United Nations Congo Mission. In his annual report of

1963 (A/5801/Add, p. 6 ), Mr. U. Thant said that the United Nations had served African and world peace in its response to the Congo crisis chiefly "by preventing a power vacuum in the very heart of Africa which would have been extremely grave, with the inevitable risk of East-West confrontation as well as inter-African rivalry and conflict".I69

I t was this b e lie f, fe lt not only as the crisis eased, but when it was in progress, that led Liberia to remain at the side of the Sec­

retary General and United Nations efforts. In pursuit of this policy,

Liberia retained and maintained her m ilitary presence in the Congo un­ t i l the key operations were over. This was not true of Guinea which withdrew its forces in January 1961, and also refused to pay its quota of the costs of the United Nations operations. By the end of 1965, this amounted to $9,938,170 Guinea withdrew support because her as­ sessment of the situation, as stated elsewhere in this study, was at variance with the Liberian and United Nations lin e. Even the decisive

169qUoted in the statement of Mr. Grimes during the General Debate, United Nations, ORGA, 1300th Meetinq, Plenary, 19th Session, December 11, 1964, p. 22.

170Lefever, op. c i t . , p. 167. 192

action the United Nations undertook in Katanga did not remove the Guinean

fear of continuous neocolonialist machinations.171

In a final word on his analysis of Liberia's Congo policy, Barn­

ard suggests that Liberia went to the Congo to defend the cause of peace

and freedom, and that the new colonialism was defeated.172 This w riter

cannot wholly,share this view, which also seems to be that of the of­

fic ia l Liberian line (Note Grimes' statement above). This w riter be­

lieves that Liberia went to the Congo to avoid isolation in Africa, but

above a ll, to help keep the cold war out of the area. I f the cold war

came despite the effo rt (which is what happened) then i t sought to in­

sure that whatever the result, there would not be another convert to

Communism. The Soviet Union cooperated in in itia tin g ONUC because i t

wanted to reduce Western influence in the Congo (and in effect, increase

Soviet influence). When ONUC terminated its mission, Western influence

remained intact despite the criticality of the crisis. It is not neces­

sary, at this point, to recall the friendship that characterized the

relations between the Adoulo Government and the West. Added to this

17lGuinea and others of the fir s t Group remained highly suspi­ cious of United States motives in giving ONUC the needed in itia tiv e to , break the Katanga secession. Catherine Hoskyns stated that the United States moved because the possibility of Communist intervention-couTd never be wholly excluded, i f Katanga remained a separate state. For details on U. S.Congo'poljcyi'See: Lefever, pp7‘ 75.-94- ' * 172foye C. Barnard, The Position of Liberia on Major Issues in the U. N. (Western Reserve University, Unpublished Master's Thesis, T962T p. 51. are the fifte e n months of Moise Tshombe's Prime Ministership of the

Congo's Central Government. I f the resolution of the fir s t Congo crisis was a victory for the statist African governments (which in­ cluded L ib eria), i t was a decided setback fo r the African governments favoring Pan-Africanism. CHAPTER IV

LIBERIA AND THE COLONIAL ISSUES

As with the issues of world peace, the cases on colonialism have

been chosen as illu s tra tiv e of the generalizations made in Chapter I I concerning Liberia's anti-colonial policy.

Liberia's position on the disposal of the former Italian col­ onies w ill show a determined and persistent opposition to European po­

litic a l control of Africa. On the question of Algeria, Liberia's policy*,

prior to 1958, was one of equivocation on how best to resolve the hos­

t ilit ie s in North Africa. Beginning in 1958, and perhaps as a result of the clear-cut position of radical Africa, Liberia demonstrated an un­

reserved support for the Algerian Nationalists.

On the question of South West Africa, Liberia's activities have

been much more pronounced than most other colonial issues (except, per­

haps, the Angolian question which Liberia fir s t brought to the attention

of the United Nations on February 15, 1961)J

Together with Ethiopia, Liberia instituted contentious proceed­

ings against South Africa before the International Court of Justice.

While this was only one strategy in the overall African attempt to wrest

the mandated territo ry for South Africa's control, the tremendous ef­

forts of Liberia point toward a decided interest in ridding Africa of

colonial domination and the attitude of white supremism which is so much

1 Lawrence A. M arinelli, The New Liberia (New York, London: J. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964) p. 103. 195 a part of the problem.

1. QUESTION OF THE DISPOSAL OF THE FORMER ITALIAN COLONIES

(a) Origin and Framework of the Question

In th eir preparation at Yalta for the San Francisco Conference that gave birth to the United Nations, B ritain, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they (together with France and China) would include an international trusteeship system as part of the machinery for maintaining the future peace. Such a system, they agreed, would apply to existing mandates of the League of Nations, territo ries detached from enemy states as a result of the World War, and territories voluntarily placed under trusteeship. I t was this understanding embodied in the working paper that emerged from the Yalta deliberations, that was for­ malized in Chapters X I, XII and X III of the United Nations Charter.2

Territories to be detached from ehenjy states as a result of the war - such was the case'of the former Italian colonies. In itia lly , not much international attention was given to the question. No decision on the fate of Ita ly 's African territo ries was contained in the Italian

M ilitary Armistice of September 3, 1943, and the Additional Conditions of the Armistice that were transmitted to Italy from Malta the following September.^

^Emil J. Sady, The United Nations and Dependent Peoples (Brookings Institution, 1956) p. 20 and p. 22.

3lta1y and the United Nations, Report of a Study Group Set Up by the Italian Society for International Organization (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1959) p. 37. See also: “U.S. and Ita ly 1936-1946", U. S. Department of State Publication 26669, European Series 17, p. 63. By the time of the Potsdam Conference (July 17 - August 2 , 1945), some international concern began to be noted. "The disposal of all ter­ ritory". it was decided, "previously belonging to Italy would be ar­ ranged during the preparation of the peace treaty with that country."4

A Council of the Foreign Ministers of the big three was set up at Pots­ dam "to continue the necessary preparatory work fo r the peace s e ttle ­ ment". When the Council of Foreign Ministers (France was now included) met in London (September 11 to October 21, 1945) to look into the mat­ ter of the disposal of the former Italian colonies, it soon became ap­ parent that they were as preoccupied by th e ir own conflicting aims and interests as they were by the problem of how to reconcile them with the

Charter of the United Nations.

The position of the United States at the London conference was that Italy, having shown herself incapable of administering the terri­ tories in question, the United Nations must now be charged with these colonies. Mr. Molotov of the Soviet Union f e l t , as did United States .

Secretary of State Byrnes, that the te rrito rie s should not be returned to Italy, but he disagreed on the question of collective trusteeship.

The USSR favored individual trusteeship. Both France and the United

Kingdom had certain claims on parts of the territories that did not

4Republique Francaise, Recueil de textes a I'Usage des Conferences de la Paix, Imprimerie Nationale (Paris, 1946, Document No. V III, p.47), as quoted in Boutros Farajallah: Le Groupe Afro-Asiatique Dans Le Cadre des Nations Unies (Geneve: L ib ra irie Droz, 1963) p. 139. 197 facilitate their dealing with the question. France was m ilitarily oc­ cupying the Fezzan (Libya) as a result of its conquest by Free French troops during the war, while Britain had similarly established a m ili­ tary administration over Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (Libya).® The B rit­ ish Premier, Mr. Churchill had declared in September 1943, Britain's special interest in Cyrenaica.® All of these positions were to undergo modification, and thpse of the United Statesand the USSR were substan­ tia lly changed.

A rticle 23 of the Peace Treaty with Ita ly states that the disposal of Libya, Italia n Somaliland and Eritrea:

...s h a ll be determined jo in tly by the Governments of the Soviet Union, of the United Kingdom, of the United States of America, and of France within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty (15 September 1947) in the manner laid down in the jo in t declaration of 10 February 1947, issued by the said Governments, which is reproduced in Annex XI.

Annex XI provided that:

... if with respect to any of these territories the Four Powers are unable to agree upon the disposal within one year from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Italy (15 Septem­ ber 1947), the matter shall be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations fo r a recommendation, and the Four Powers agree to accept the recommendations and to take appropriate meas­ ures for giving effect to it J I t was in keeping with these provisions that the Four Powers on

5Benjamin R ivlin, The U.N. and The Ita lia n Colonies, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950) p. 5.

®Adrian P e lt, Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization (Yale University Press, 1970) p. 58.

^Yearbook o f the United Nations, 1948-1949, p. 256. 198 September 15, 1948 informed the United Nations Secretary General (A/645) of their inability to reach an agreement regarding the future of the former Italian colonies and that therefore, the matter was being handed over to the United Nations.

I t became a question of what made i t d iffic u lt, i f not impossible for the major powers - especially the United States and the USSR - to agree on a question that in itia lly seemed of no relevance to th eir se­ curity interests. The answer is that the passage of time brought real­ ization to these nations that some of the areas were of strategic im­ portance especially as the cold war gathered momentum. As w ill be seen, this did not fa il to enter into the United Nations debate of the ques­ tion.

There was a related reason fo r d iffic u lty of agreement and the change of attitude on the part of the great powers. The general elec­ tions in Italy on April 18, 1948, gave victory to the Social Democrats and a decisive defeat to the Communists who had gained some power in post-war Ita ly . Following the formation of the De Gasperi Government on May 23, 1948, Ita ly joined the anti-Communist block of states.8 The question of the disposal of the former Ita lia n colonies thus went to the United Nations inextricably knotted in the overall struggle for power. This was how the major powers treated i t . For Liberia and Afro-

Asia, i t was fir s t and foremost, a question of exiting from the areas

European colonialism.

8United Nations Document, A/C.1/W8, October 28, 1948. 199

(b) Consideration b.y the General Assembly, 3rd Session, 2nd Part, Apri1-Hay 1949

The group of territories that make up the former Italian colonies

— Libya, Ita lia n Somaliland and Eritrea — was one of the few areas, except for the Trust Territories, in which the United Nations had a d i­ rect role in shaping constitutional c h a n g e s . 9

For clarity in presentation we shall treat each area separately, even though the General Assembly had them grouped. While our major con­ cern is that of the attitude of Liberia, vis-a-vis the fate of these colonies, we must, here, as we did elsewhere, place the position in the context in which it was taken,

Libya

Opinion expressed in the Assembly's First Committee was, for the most part, in favor of a unified and fu lly sovereign Libya incorporating

T rip o litan ia, the Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. The method of achieving this status, however, was the subject of lengthy debates.

The United States representative said that any decision on Libya's future must be guided by the two basic principles of Chapter XI of the

Charter: that of primary interests of the inhabitants, and the need to safeguard international peace and security. In applying this to Libya, he suggested that the General Assembly speedily grant fu ll independence because the inhabitants were advanced in self-government. But there was a further consideration — the region was of strategic importance in the

^The others are the Netherlands East Indies, Palestine, and North Korea; see Sady, op. c i t . , p. 44. 200 balance of power in the Mediterranean and the Near East. As such i t should be placed under the United Nations Trusteeship System.10

Mr. Gron\yko, the Soviet representative, held the view that the administering powers (Britain and France) were devoting their attention to transforming the former Ita lia n colony into strategic m ilita ry bases fo r the armed forces of the United States and the United Kingdom. In that regard, he cited a statement in The Economist (August 1948) touch­ ing the strategic importance of Libya in the Eastern Mediterranean. He called fo r the establishment of a United Nations Trusteeship with the

Trusteeship Council appointing an administrator, the latter being di­ rectly responsible to the CouncilJl

Liberia proposed independence for Libya following a period of

United Nations Trusteeship, with the United Kingdom as the Administering

Authority until such time as the United Nations could find a better for­ mula for administering the territory.12

Several draft resolutions were submitted.13 A/C.1/455, submitted by Iraq, recommended immediate independence for Libya. I t was rejected,

20-22-8, with Liberia and Ethiopia abstaining, while Egypt voted in favor.

An Indian draft (A/C.1/448) would have Libya placed under United

Nations collective Trusteeship, with independence or union with adjacent

l QUnited Nations, O fficial Records of the General Assembly, Gen­ eral Committee, 238th Meeting, 1949, p. 6.

11 Ibid, 240th Meeting, April 9, 1949, pp. 22-23, and United Na­ tions Document, A/C.1/433.

12united Nations. ORGA. First Committee, 245th Meeting, April 19, 1949, p. 71. ISyearbook of the United Nations, 1948-1949, p. 258. 201

territories according to the expressed wishes of the people. This even­

tuality would be after a period of not less than ten years, and not more

than twenty years. The fir s t and second parts of the paragraph were

both rejected, 19-29-9 and 33-4-20, respectively.

Egypt proposed several amendments to the Sub-Committee's recom­ mendations.^ A first amendment (A/C.1/468) called for the deletion of

the provision granting Libya independence provided the Assembly decided

that this move was appropriate. It was rejected, 20-17-21. A second amendment provided for a replacement of the Sub-Committee's proposals for individual trusteeship of each of Libya's three regions, by a plan that could place a united Libya under United Nations Trusteeship. The

Egyptian amendment proposed conferring the functions of the Administer­ ing Authority on five powers, including Egypt. The first part of the amendment was rejected, 32-10-17.

The Sub-Committee studied the various draft resolutions and pro­ posals submitted to the First Committee and i t presented draft resolu­ tion A/C.1/466 providing for Libya's independence after ten years under

United Nations Trusteeship. Recommended as the Administering Author­ ities were the United Kingdom (Cyrenaica), France (the Fezzan), and

Italy (Tripolitania).

The provision of the Sub-Committee's amended draft resolution was voted upon paragraph by paragraph. The fir s t operative paragraph (a) calling for United Nations Trusteeship for Cyrenaica with the United

l^The Sub-Committee or Sub-Committee 15, was created by the First Committee to coordinate the la tte r's deliberations on the item: disposal of the former Italian Colonies. 202

Kingdom as the Administering Authority was adopted, 35-17-8. This was embodied in the First Committee's report to the Assembly and formed the basis for debate in the Plenary S e s s io n .15

While the United States and France would accept the report as i t stood, most of the other members harbored reservations on specifics.

Especially controversial was the proposal that Italy return to Libya as the Administering Authority for the Tripolitanian region.

At the 217th meeting of the Assembly's Plenary Session, Liberia's representative, Mr. Henry Ford Cooper, was given the podium. Speaking pointedly on the question of Ita ly 's return to Libya and the overall s p irit in which proposed draft A/873 was conceived, Mr. Cooper said that despite all the principles of democracy embodied in the United Nations

Charter and other documents of relevance to the issue, draft A/873 was tantamount to saying that "democracy" was another word for "oppression".

In effect, the proposed draft stated that self-determination was the right only of the strong, that the world was under the dominion of the god of the golden ca lf, upon whose a lte r must be sacrificed all that was just, all that was human, in order to appease its insatiable appetites.15

It needs to be recalled here that Italy, in the eyes of the West, had returned to respectability with the 1948 election victory of the

Social-Democrats and the defeat of the Communists. This, together with

ISUnited Nations Document. A/873, 1949,

IGUnited Nations, ORGA, 217th Meeting of the Plenary Session, May 17, 1949, p. 569. 203 other points of differences between West and East reflected in the Sub­ committee's proposed d ra ft, was what Mr. Cooper had reference to , in part — the question of power politics. Liberia's anti-colonial stance did not set well with this big-power diplomacy, thus, Mr. Cooper called fo r a return to f ir s t principles - the United Nations Charter and the terms of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

The proposed resolution was at variance with both of the above cited instruments (Charter and Peace Treaty). Continuing his statement,

Mr. Cooper referred to Paragraph One of the proposed resolution pro­ viding for Italy's administration of Tripolitania under the United Na­ tions u ntil 1951. He said that the appointment of an advisory council for the interim period seemed to indicate the imposition on Italy of a probationary period (1949-51), at the end of which, it would be decided whether the democratic attitude of Ita ly was s t i l l tainted by fascism.

If Italy required three years of experience in democracy before it could be entrusted with the administration of Libya, why did not the same principles apply to former Italian Somaliland?!7 That question had not been answered.18

Amendments and proposals along the lines of those made in commit­ tee were submitted in Plenary. The Iraqi amendment (A/875/corr.l) ask­ ing that Libya be given immediate independence was voted on and rejected,

27-23-9.

17Ita ly was suggested as the Administering Authority fo r Somali­ land placed under United Nations Trusteeship for a ten-year period.

1^United Nations, ORGA, 217th Meeting of the Plenary Session,p.270. 204

Egypt's amendment A/885, seeking to establish a fixed term for the duration of the trusteeship period, asked that the words "unless the General Assembly decides that this step is not appropriate at this time" be deleted from Paragraph One of the Sub-Committee's draft reso­ lution. It was adopted by a vote of 36-16-18. A further Egyptian amend­ ment regarding a five-power administration of a united Libya in the in­ terim before independence, was rejected by 41-10-8.

Part A of the F irst Committee's report (A/873), as amended, was voted upon by paragraphs. The proposal to grant Libya independence a f­ ter ten years was adopted 48-8-0. Liberia voted in favor.

The proposals calling fo r B ritish and French administration (under

United Nations Trusteeship) of Cyrenaica (a) and the Fessan (b) were adopted by votes of 36-17-6 and 36-15-7, respectively.

At the 218th Plenary meeting, oral amendments by Argentina and

Iraq regarding the provision that the Advisory Council assist in the administration of T rip o lita n ia, were adopted; however, the Committee's proposal, as amended, that T ripo litania be placed under United Nations

Trusteeship by the end of 1951, with Italy as the Administering Author­ ity, failed the two-thirds majority required; it was rejected by a vote of 33-17-8.

The third session of the General Assembly ended with Libya's fu ­ ture essentially undecided. 205

TABLE IX

TABLE SAMPLING AFRICAN VOTES ON THE FUTURE OF LIBYA GENERAL ASSEMBLY - 3rd SESSION*

IRAQI INDIAN EGYPTIAN EGYPTIAN SUB-COMMITTEE 15 DRAFT DRAFT AMENDMENT AMENDMENT DRAFT PARA. to 1st PART to REST of ______2 of 1st PARA. PARA. I of of SUB-COM- SUB-COMMIT- Line Line Line ______MITTEE TEE DRAFT (a) (b) fc)

LU LU LU LU UJ LU 0 ) 0 ) LU LU LU LU LU LU 0 ) 0 ) 0 ) + J 0 ) + -> t=I—I£ 1—1 •i—+ » 40 4 J *r—+> e E _ ,>- _E _s- E >- _ E >- E= >> E >> E= >* o ooc c oO d ; C£ o O o;c c o o h o u o i- o l . < u •a : U c C< t_> c£ C_) nj O lO CJ lO Z z z z c c c LU 4 0 LU 4-> LU +J LU +-> 0) +->0)4-5 0) in _] —i i1/1 / i _J i inLO i m —I in r— to i— m Q- ' Q- ' Q. l— Q. i— Q_ i— Q_ I— Q_

LIBERIA Y A - A Y A A YYNYAA

EGYPT Y A - Y Y Y Y NNNNNN

ETHIOPIA AAA AA -_ AYA Y AA YYYYNA

Q lo l Q oil Q C | 0=1 oc| §| ocl o 'I <1*3:1 ■ar|oc

r— r-» t-- — 00 CO c n o CM CO r— CO LO LO O) I—• co i— i i CM II II 1 1 i i i i o CO 1 I""- LO O O r^. ps. LO LO r-N r--. CM CM t— i— r— r— i— p— r— i— i— i— 1 1 1 II II i i 1 1 i i CM r-» CO O LO CM r— LO LO CM LO LO CO CM CM CO CM PO CO *U- CO CO CO CO CO CO

*For Key to Votes, see Table V. 206

Former Ita lia n Somaliland

The prevailing view in the First Committee was that the territory be placed under United Nations Trusteeship as a step to ultimate inde­ pendence. Ita ly was most frequently suggested as the Administering Au­ thority. Truly, Africa was still under the colonial yoke. But the three African states including Liberia, which were then members of the

United Nations, tried to speak in Africa's behalf.

Liberia's position, at this point, was that Italian Somaliland be placed under Trusteeship with the United Kingdom as the Administering

Authority. If the British were to decline the responsibility, then

Ethiopia was to be substituted. Incidentally, Ethiopia's original stance on the matter was that she be charged with administration in be­ half of the United Nations. Liberia was firm ly opposed to any form of administrative responsibility for Ita ly .^

Draft resolutions submitted in Committee included these: Iraq proposed (A/C.1/546) that the territory be placed under collective trus­ teeship of five states for a ten-year period with independence as the goal. It was rejected by 36-12-0. A Soviet draft (A/C.1/433 Rev. 1) proposed a trusteeship agreement sim ilar to that i t previously proposed for Libya with the exception that independence be granted only after ten years, and that Ethiopia be substituted for Egypt as a member of the Advisory Committee. This was rejected by 33-14-10. India's proposal was identical to that made regarding Libya. I t was voted down

^Yearbook, op. c it., 1948-1949, pp. 58-59. 207

by a vote of 29-19-9.

After examining the various proposals and drafts, the Sub-Commit­

tee recommended to the First Committee (A/C.1/466) that the territory

be placed under United Nations Trusteeship with Ita ly as the Adminis­

tering Authority. The Committee adopted this by a vote of 36-17-5.

Between the 216th and the 219th Plenary Sessions, the question was reviewed on the basis of the General Committee's report.20

The proposal to have Italy administer the territory was vigor­

ously opposed by a number of Afro-Asian representatives, among them,

Liberia's Ambassador Henry Ford Cooper. These representatives empha­ sized the objections which had been recorded by many groups of the in ­

digenous population of the territory.

Ambassador Cooper was suspicious of the motives behind the pro­

posed solution regarding Somaliland's future (see Paragraph Two of the

First Committee's recommendations). I f the intention was to grant com­

plete independence to the people of that te rrito ry , why was not a date fixed for the end of the period of trusteeship as had been done in the

case of Libya? Mr. Cooper was fearful lest Somaliland under trusteeship and administered by Ita ly be transformed, "by an automatic and imper­ ceptible process", into a colony.21

Liberia desired immediate independence for Somaliland. I f the

General Assembly considered the te rrito ry unprepared, then Liberia would

20United Nations Document, A/873, 1949.

21 United Nations, ORGA, 217th Meeting of Plenary, 2nd Part, 3rd Session, p. 570. 208 propose the following amendment to Paragraph Two of the Committee's rec­ ommendations: " .. . that former Ita lia n Somaliland be placed under the

International Trusteeship System, with Italy as the Administering Au­ thority for a period of fifteen years, after which time the General As­ sembly will consider whether the inhabitants have made significant prog­ ress to warrant their independence".^

Mr. Cooper said that the rejection of this amendment would leave

Liberia with no alternative but to refrain from being a party to a de­ cision contrary to all the assurances that had been given. As an Af­ rican state, Liberia could not support a plan which threatened the peo­ ples of Africa with permanent subjugation.23 The Liberian amendment was rejected, 23-19-9, and Liberia, true to its word, voted against the

Committee's proposal.

What seems slightly contradictory here is the fact that Liberia, in Committee, had declared unceasing h o s tility to granting Ita ly any responsibility in the administration of the territory. How is it then, that she suggested a fifteen-year Italian administration of the terri­ tory under United Nations trusteeship during discussion in Plenary?

Secretary of State G rim e s 2 4 would probably explain this by reference to the give-and-take of international parliamentary democracy. The temp­ tation is great to link this mini volte face with mild pressures from

22united Nations, op. c i t . , A/886. 23jbid, p. 571.

24The w riter had an interview with Mr. Grimes when the research was in progress. Note e a rlie r references. 209 the United States, whose representative was of the opinion that Italy was entitled to bear its share of the great task of assisting the peo­ ples of Africa in their political and economic evolution.25 Liberia's

"No" vote on the Committee's proposal, however, equalized the situation, thus preserving Liberia's original position.

The Fourth General Assembly's deliberations on Ita lia n Somaliland were concluded following the rejection by 35-19-4, of the Sub-Committee's draft regarding that territory. The draft failed because it did not meet the two-thirds majority requirement.

Eri trea

Opinions advanced in the F irst Committee were predominantly in favor of incorporating part of Eritrea into Ethiopia. Wide disagree­ ment developed, however, regarding the exact areas involved. Independ­ ence was not a serious issue.

Because Liberia's initial position on this issue was almost wholly in accord with Ethiopian claims we shall firs t outline the Ethiopian a tti tude.

I t was during the 2nd part of the 3rd session of the General As­ sembly that the Ethiopian representative, Mr. Ato Abte-Wold Aklinlou, stressed the importance of the question to his country. According to the summary record of the 238th Meeting of the F irs t Committee, the

Ethiopian delegate considered that i t was democratic and lib eral Ita ly which before the days of fascism, had devoted itself to detailed and

25Yearbook of the United Nations, 1949, p. 262. 210

TABLE X

TABLE SAMPLING AFRICAN VOTES ON THE FUTURE OF SOMALILAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY - 3rd SESSION

SOVIET INDIAN IRAQI SUB-COMMITTEE 15 DRAFT DRAFT . DRAFT DRAFT Paragr*aphs A B

1st 1st 1st 1st 1st Committee Committee Commi ttee Commi ttee Commi ttee PI enar.y

LIBERIA AA A A NN

EGYPT YYY Y N N

ETHIOPIA Y A Y N N N

33-14-10 29-19-9 36-12-10 46-4-15 36-17-5 35-19-4 R R R R AD R

For Key to Votes: See Table V. 211 methodical preparation for the invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-1936, by in­ vading Eritrea in 1885, and then invading Ethiopia in 1894-1895 and 1895-

1896. The starting point of the invasion of 1935-1936 lay both in E ri­ trea and in former Ita lia n Somaliland. Ethiopia s t i l l feared Ita ly for its policy of pressure and imperialism already displayed. This consid­ eration and the fact that the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia had a com­ mon historical origin made the union of the two territories the only natural solution. Ethiopia advocated such a move.26

An Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/448) asked that a United Nations

Commission be dispatched to Eritrea to determine the wishes of the peo­ ple regarding unification with Ethiopia. The resolution was rejected,

33-4-20.

Iraq's draft resolution (A/C.1/457) would have the Assembly ap­ point a five-member Commission for ascertaining the real desires of the people as to their political future. This too, was rejected by a vote of 35-12-12.

Provisions approaching those proposed for Libya were contained in a Soviet draft (A/C.1/433 - Rev. 1), with the added provision conceding that Ethiopia have an outlet to the sea through the port of Assab. That was rejected as well by a vote of 31-12-11.

The recommendations (A/C.1/466) of the Sub-Committee contained the following: (a) that Eritrea (not including the western province) be incorporated into Ethiopia under terms and conditions which would include providing adequate guarantees for the protection of minorities

26United Nations, ORGA, First Committee, 238th Meeting, pp. 13-14. 212 and, without prejudice to the sovereignty of Ethiopia, appropiate municipal charters for the cities of Asmara and Massawa; (b) that the western province be incorporated into the adjacent S u d a n .27

When the vote was taken in the First Committee, part one of

Paragraph Three or (a) above was adopted, 36-6-15, while part two or

(b) was rejected, 19-16-21. The voting was somewhat repeated in plen ary. This time the fir s t part was adopted, 37-11-10. Part two was rejected, 28-22-8.

Upon the rejection of the First Committee's draft resolution completely, the General Assembly decided in resolution 287 ( I I I ) to postpone discussion of the item until the fourth regular session.

TABLE XI

TABLE SAMPLING AFRICAN VOTES ON THE FUTURE OF ERITREA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 3rd SESSION

SOVIET INDIAN IRAQI SUB-COMMITTEE 15 DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT PARAGRAPH 1st PARAGRAPH PART . : 2nd PART

1st 1st 1st 1st 1st Commi ttee Committee Committee Committee Plenary Committee Plenary

LIBERIA Y Y A Y Y A Y

EGYPT A A A Y Y Y Y

ETHIOPIA N N N Y Y Y Y

31-12-11 33-4-20 35-12-12 36-6-15 37-11-10 19-16-21 28-22-8 R R R AD AD R R

For Key to Votes: See Table V

27Yearbook, op. c it ., 1949, p. 260. 213

(c) Consideration by the 4th Session of the General Assembly ( 1949)

The Assembly's unfinished business regarding the former Ita lia n colonies were taken up during the 4th Session.

Libya (Solution)

In the First Committee, most member states spoke in favor of s e lf- government for Libya following a brief period of transition. Ambassador

Cooper said that Liberia would support the proposed solution for Libya as i t stood because of its basic interest in independence for Libya,

"notwithstanding the form of its future Government".28 Mr. Cooper also mentioned that the Sub-Committee's recommendations regarding Libya were in conformity with the United Nations Charter and the Peace Treaty with

Ita ly .29

Sub-Conmii ttee 17, appointed by the General Committee to coodinate drafts and suggestions, submitted to the la tte r a draft resolution re­ garding the disposal of the former Ita lia n colonies. With minor amend­ ments, the draft was adopted in Committee by a vote of 50-0-8, with the

28nere Mr. Cooper meant that Liberia had reservations about a pro­ posed unified Libya implied in the draft resolution. In fact, Liberia supported a British amendment that would have le ft the question of gov­ ernmental form entirely up to the people of Libya. Most knowledgeable observers saw the British proposal as an attempt to balkanize an in­ dependent Libya in order to maintain western divided influence. Perhaps Liberia did not see this implication, and so favored the principle that the people of Libya themselves decide their governmental form. This is in line with the idea of non-interference in domestic affairs to which Liberia subscribed. See: Pelt, op. c i t . , pp. 99-102.

29United Nations, ORGA, 314th Meeting of the First Committee, November 7, 1949, p. 204. 214 three African states of Liberia, Ethiopia and Egypt, voting in favor.

This near unanimous acceptance of the proposed solution was repeated during the Plenary Session when the vote was 49-0-9. Because of the importance of resolution 289 (IVA) for Libyan independence, we take the liberty to quote relevant portions:

The General Assembly . . . with respect to Libya, recommends: that Libya, comprising Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan, shall be constituted an independent and sovereign state; that this in­ dependence shall become effective as soon as possible and in any case not late r than 1 January 1952; that a constitution for Libya, including the form of the Government, shall be determined by rep­ resentatives of the inhabitants of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan meeting and consulting together in a National Assembly; that for the purpose of assisting the people of Libya in the fo r­ mulation of the constitution and the establishment of an indepen­ dent Government, there shall be a United Nations Commissioner in Libya appointed by the General Assembly and a Council to aid and advise h im ...30

I t was thus, that the people of Libya were given an opportunity to prepare for th eir independence and determine the shape of th eir fu­ ture state. The implementation of the resolution is not within the scope of this study.31 it will suffice to conclude that once the Uni­ ted Nations had declared on the matter, the mechanism for implementing the resolution was at once set in motion. On the 24th of December, 1951,

Libyan independence was consummated.

Former Italian Somaliland (Solution)

On the question of Somaliland, the 4th General Assembly's discussion

30yearboo_k, op. c i t . , 1949, pp. 275-276, for fu ll text of the resolution.

31 For details on this see the important work of Adrian Pelt who served as United Nations Commissioner for Libya; Pelt, o^. c i t . , es­ pecially beginning with Chapter Two. 215 centered around Section B (Somaliland) of the Sub-Committee's draft resolution (A/C.1/522). It recommended that the territory be an inde­ pendent sovereign state, with independence to become effective at the end of ten years under United Nations Trusteeship with Ita ly as the Ad­ ministering Authority. Responsibility for drafting a Trusteeship agree­ ment for submission to the General Assembly was le ft to the Administer­ ing Authority and the Trusteeship Council.32

No less than seventeen amendments to the draft resolution were proposed in addition to a number of oral amendments. Ethiopia and Li­ beria were highly critical of the draft. Ethiopia warned that to leave the proposed solution as it stood, would give rise to troubles in East

Africa for many years to come.33

During the 314th meeting of the First Committee, the Liberian rep­ resentative registered his country's disapproval of the Sub-Committee's solution. Ambassador Cooper remarked:

...whereas in the case of Libya and Eritrea, the interests and welfare of the indigenous people constituted the guiding prin­ ciple, i t (Somaliland) represented the consolation of Ita ly for the loss of its two former colonies. That had become the para­ mount concept when the future of Somaliland was being considered by the sub-committee. The Liberian delegation was not sure as to whether the Somalis would welcome such a solution despite the many attributes given to the new democratic Ita ly . The represent­ atives of Somaliland did not seem to be impressed by the new t it le given to ftaly since the return of that country to Somaliland sym­ bolized to them the return of foreign rule. The Ambassador as­ sured his audience that Liberia had no quarrel with Italy but that its (Liberia's) policy was guided by the wishes of the inhabitants

^Yearbook, op. c i t . , 1949, p. 266.

33Ibid, p. 279. The Ethiopian delegate had specific reference to the return of Italy to the area. 216

of the territory. Those wishes, as far as Liberia saw them, were not reflected in the sub-committee's r e p o r t . 34

There was no substantial change o f position when the Plenary Ses­ sion took up the question.The British delegate, however, did succeed, to an extent, in reassuring the opposition to the proposed solution, that

Italy was returning to the area “under the arc-lights of international publicity".36

In the end, the "yeas" carried the day. By a vote of 48-7-3, Sec­ tion B of the First Committee's draft resolution was adopted and became

Resolution 289 (IVB). It reads in part as follows:

The General Assembly... with respect to Ita lia n Somaliland recom­ mends: that Ita lia n Somaliland shall be an independent sovereign state; that this independence shall become effective at the end of ten years from the date of the approval of a Trusteeship Agree­ ment by the General Assembly; th at, during the period mentioned in paragraph two, Ita lia n Somaliland shall be placed under the In te r­ national Trusteeship System with Ita ly as the Administering Author­ ity ; that the Administering Authority shall be aided and advised by an Advisory Council composed of representatives of the following states: Colombia, Egypt and the Philippines. ..37

Egypt voted in favor of the resolution, Ethiopia against, and Li­ beria abstained. The Liberian abstention rather than a catagorical "no" vote is not easy to understand. I t perhaps can be attributed to a re­ considered stance in the lig h t of the British assurance above mentioned, despite the rather categorical earlier position.

34united Nations, ORGA, Summary Records, 314th Meeting, First Committee, November 7, 1949, p. 204. 35Liberia's Ambassador C.D.B. King reregistered his country's opposition to the plan at the 247th Meeting of the Plenary Session on November 19, 1949. 36yearbook, op. c i t . , 1949, p. 273. 37ib id , p. 276. 217

Since the resolution's implementation does not here concern us, le t i t simply be recalled that the former Ita lia n Somaliland (to which was attached British Somaliland) became an independent s ta te in 1960.

Eritrea

As for Eritrea, the 4th Session of the General Assembly registered differences of opinion much more pronounced than in e ith e r of the two other cases (Libya and Somaliland). There was, however, a consensus that showed a real desire to respond to Ethiopia's claims.

Section C (E ritre a ) of the Sub-Committee's draft provided for the establishment of a Commission to ascertain more fu lly , the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and to examine the question of its disposal.

A further stipulation was that a report and proposal or proposals be communicated to the Secretary General not la te r than June 15, 1950.

During the debate in the F irs t Committee, Liberia indicated sup­ port for the draft, especially the dispatch of a Commission to verify the desires of the inhabitants of the area. Ethiopia, the state most directly involved, remained opposed to all solutions that fell short of purely and simply placing Eritrea under the Ethiopian Crown.

The proposed d ra ft was carried by a fin a l vote of 47-5-6. Egypt voted in favor, while Liberia and Ethiopia abstained. Liberia abstained probably to show so lid a rity with Ethiopia, fo r she had said that she would support the original draft resolution.

The stipulation in Resolution 289 (IVC) that a Commission be sent to Eritrea to study the situation and make recommendations by the time of the 5th General Assembly, was the note on which the 4th General As­ sembly ended its debate on Eritrea. 218

(d) Consideration of Eritrea b^ the General Assembly 5th Session 1950 (SoTutionl

The United Nations Commission for Eritrea submitted its report in keeping with Resolution 289 (IVC). Being unable to report a unanimous conclusion, the Commission's submissions consisted of two memoranda: one submitted by three of its members (Burma, Norway and South A frica), and the other by the remaining two (Guatemala and Pakistan).38

As the Ad Hoc Political Committee, to which the matter was refer­ red, met to study the question, five draft resolutions were to be sub­ mitted (USSR draft, Iraqi draft, a 14-power draft, Polish draft, and Pakistani d r a ft).39

The Pakistani draft (A/AC.38/L.48) recommended fu ll independence for Eritrea not later than January 1, 1953. Its f ir s t introductory para­ graph was rejected, 26-16-14.

The Iraqi draft (A/AC.38/L.32/Rev. 1) recommended that the ques­ tion of whether Eritrea should enter into some form of federation with

Ethiopia under the Ethiopian Crown or become an independent state, Ethi­ opia being granted suitable access to the sea, be determined not later than July 1, 1951 by a National Assembly duly representative of the peo­ ple of Eritrea. This was rejected, 28-21-11.

The most important d raft resolution perhaps was that proposed by fourteen powers, including the United States and Liberia. Draft reso­ lution A/AC.38/L.37 and Corr. 1, recommended a detailed plan by which

38Yearbook of the United Nations. 1950, p. 363. The memoranda are summarized here.

39Ib id , p. 368. 219

Eritrea would constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia and under Ethiopian sovereignty. The joint draft provided for a transition period not to extend beyond September 15, 1952, during which the neces­ sary constitutional arrangements would be made with fu ll United Nations assistance.40

In his intervention in the debate in the Ad Hoc Political Commit­ tee, the Liberian representative noted that owing to the varying opin-- ions of the Eritrean population, i t was very d iffic u lt to determine the exact wishes of the people. Incidentally, according to the report

(United Nations Commission on Eritrea), the various Eritrean political parties claimed to represent the views of 3,500,000 members, whereas, the total population was estimated at only one mi H i on. 41

After ruling out a plebiscite because of the "backwardness" of the population, the Liberian delegate stressed that considerations other than the wishes of the people must be resorted to . In that regard, he stressed certain facts. One was that a ll members of the Commission had admitted that a sizeable part of the population had a certain affinity with the Ethiopian people. Another fact was that economically Eritrea could not stand alone. This again was a unanimous opinion of the Com­ m ission.^

40Yearbook, op. c i t . , 1950, p. 364.

41 United Nations, ORGA, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 39th Meeting November 10, 1950, p. 235.

42ibid, p. 236. 220

In the light of those ethnic and economic considerations, and in view of the fact that i t was impossible to determine the wishes of the popu­ lation, Liberia felt that the solution of uniting Eritrea with Ethiopia by means of a federation was the most logical. Liberia would lend its very support to the jo in t draft (which i t also sponsored) "provided the federation was carried out in such a manner as to take into account the legitimate claims and aspirations of the Ethiopian Governm ent ".43

The Ad Hoc P olitical Committee at its 55th meeting accepted by a vote of 38-14-8, the fourteen-power draft, in addition to a five-power draft (A/AC.38/L.59) calling for the establishment of a committee (mem­ bers named) to nominate a candidate or candidates fo r the post of Uni­ ted Nations Commissioner for E ritrea. These then, formed the report of the Ad Hoc P olitical Committee to the General Assembly’s Plenary meeting.

With Ethiopia's declared acceptance of the federation plan, the

General Assembly proceeded to endorse the Committee's report. The four­ teen-power d raft, part of resolution A/1561/Add 1, was adopted as a whole by a vote of 46-10-4. I t then became Resolution 390 (VA). The rest of the Comnittee's report became Resolution 390 (VB).

In 1952, when Eritrea was federally attached to Ethiopia, Resolu­ tion 390 (V- A and B) was fu lly implemented.

43united Nations, ORGA, op. c it., November 10, 1950, p. 236. 221

TABLE X II

TABLE SAMPLING AFRICAN VOTES ON THE FUTURE OF ERITREA GENERAL ASSEMBLY - 5th SESSION (1950)

PAKISTANI DRAFT IRAQI DRAFT 14 - POWER DRAFT 1st Paragraph 1st Operative Commi ttee Draft Committee Committee Plenary

LIBERIA NN YY

EGYPT A AYY

ETHIOPIA N N Y Y

29-16-14 28-21-11 38-14-8 46-10-4 R R AD AD

For Key to Votes: See Table V.

Summary

Disagreement among the major powers following the peace settle­ ments was the most immediate and perhaps basic reason why the item of the Italian colonies was placed before the General Assembly. I t is understandable then, that the big power differences which led to the

United Nations being involved in the question, would be reflected in

United Nations deliberations. The positions taken by the Afro-Asian states pointed to two main factors: the interests of the major powers and the individual or collective interests of Afro-Asia.

As for big power interests, it must be recalled that these fell under the gathering shadows of the cold war. I t was during this period 222

(late 1940's, early 1950's), that the Soviet Union's expansion in the

Eastern Mediterranean - Greece, Turkey - lead to American reaction in the form of the Truman Doctrine. Winning over Afro-Asia to th eir re­ spective positions in this war for power and influence became crucial to the American and Soviet blocs.

But the individual or group interests of the Afro-Asian states were c ritic a l determinants as well. For Liberia, i t appears, ending

European colonial rule over Africa was the overriding factor. Through­ out the debate on the disposal of the former Ita lia n colonies, the Li­ berian core position remained directed to rapid independence for the territories concerned, or on solutions with that objective. Whatever the pressure that the big powers exerted on the smaller states.its effectiveness was subordinated to the interests of these small states themselves".44

2. THE QUESTION OF ALGERIA

During the night of October 31 - November 1, 1954, an armed revo­ lution of major proportions broke out in Algeria. This was the conse­ quence of a long-festering confrontation between French nationalism on the one hand, and Afro-Arabic nationalism on the other. The problems posed by the chain of violence that was Algeria were not to be resolved until after eight years of fighting.

According to Article 60 of the French Constitution of 1946, France considered Algeria as a territorial entity that was a corporate part of

44Farajallah, op. c it., p. 167. 223 the one and indivisible French Republic. Algerian nationalism took the exact opposite stand. I t held the view that the muslim population of

Algeria was not France; " it cannot be France; i t does not want to be

France...; i t does not seek to be France. I t possesses its fatherland whose frontiers are fixed, and this is the Algerian fatherland..."45

The juridical status of Algeria and the numerous other factors that form the crux of the Franco-Algerian conflict are not within the scope of this study.46 The chief concern here is delineating the posi­ tion of the Government of Liberia as that position was taken on the Al­ gerian question within the framework of the United Nations.

(a) The 10th Session (1955)

Basing its e lf on Article 35:1 of the Charter, Saudi Arabia on Jan­ uary 5, 1955, communicated to the Security Council “the grave situation in Algeria", susceptible of threatening international peace and secu­ rity . I t charged, in an accompanying memorandum, that France was em­ ploying brute force to liquidate the nationalist uprising against colo­ nial oppression.47

On the 29th of July of the same year, fourteen Afro-Asian states,

45From Sheikh Ben Baidis as quoted in Charles Gallagher: The United States and North Africa (Harvard University Press, 1963)p. 95.

46The following provide useful insights into the many facets of the problem - M. Bedjoui: La Revolution Algerienne et 1e Droit, 1961, pp. 18-39; Dorothy Pickles: Algeria a~ncT France: From Colonialism to Cooperation (New York, London: F. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1963); Ray­ mond Aron: L'Algerie et la Republique (Paris: Plon, 1958).

47Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955, p. 65. 224 including Liberia, requested that "The question of Algeria" be included on the agenda of the 10th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The debate on the merits and demerits of including the item on the agenda was joined. This largely procedural question was to consume the entire

10th Session's consideration of Algeria.48

France and her western allies based their case on the domestic ju ­ risdiction principle embodied in Article 2:7 of the Charter. As the

General Committee examined the Afro-Asian request, the French represent­ ative made this statement:

The French Government believed that Algerian affairs were essen­ tially within the domestic jurisdiction of France and that neither the U.N. nor the General Assembly was ju stified in intervening in them. Algeria had been united to France by the Ordinance of 1834 and had since formed an integral part of metropolitan France on an equal footing with the Ile-de-France, Brittany or Auverge...49

This French thesis was accepted in whole or in part by the representa­ tives of the United Kingdom ("with conviction"), Belgium ("with passion"), the United States and other states of Western Europe and the majority of

Latin American states ("with deference").

Afro-Asia, supported by the Soviet bloc, based its case on Char­ ter Articles 1:2, 10, 11:2 and 14, among others. The right of self- determination was a fundamental right and no degree of legal pyrotechnics could compromise this right. Unlike the French position, the Afro-Asians felt that the issue was in no way one of intervention in domestic affairs

^ Yearbook, op. c i t . ,p. 65.

49United Nations, ORGA, 10th Session, 103rd Meeting of the General Committee, p. 7. 225

but rather the discussion of plain, straightforward colonial p ro b le m s .50

Before the General Committee took up the procedural question, Li­

beria, during the general debate, had indicated its position in general

terms. Its representative, Mr. J. Dudley Lawrence had said:

...We cannot close our eyes or our ears to the violence, massacres, death and inhumanity raging in the northern parts of the African continent... Neither shot nor shell has been known in history to quell or silence the desire of men to be free. We should be more reluctant in calling names, such as "terrorists" and "rebels1*, when we refer to people whose only crime is the yearning for free­ dom and lib e rty , who desire to have something to say about the government of th eir native land, who nourish an honourable ambi­ tion for themselves and their children that they might enjoy... the better things of life .51

Following preliminary debate in the General Committee, i t was de­

cided by a vote of 8-5-2, not to recommend inclusion of the item on the

agenda.

When the committee's report was submitted to the Plenary Session,

a whole new round of debate followed. Positions remained essentially

the same, but the strength of number was now in favor of the Afro-Asian

position. This would soon be reflected in the vote on adoption of Agenda

Item Three of the Supplementary List A/2942 - "The Question of Algeria".

Before the vote, however, delegates sought to reinforce their re­

spective positions. France clung to the domestic jurisdiction argument.

Dr. Mohmoud Fawzi of Egypt made an eloquent statement sustaining the

Afro-Asian case. At Bandung, where representatives of two-thirds of the human race gathered in early 1955, Dr. Fawzi said that the Algerian item

SOVearbook, op. c i t . , 1955, p. 66.

51 United Nations, ORGA, 10th Session, 527th Session of Plenary, p. 147. 226 was not only placed on the agenda but the cause of Algerian national­ ism was unequivocally supported. The undignified legalistic contor- tionism to which the question was subjected must be terminated so that a debate in the glare of daylight may be undertaken. The French po­ sition sought to dip colonialism "in the liquid of immortality". For­ tunately there existed an Achilles heel and colonialism would not be immortal.52

Liberia, for its part, could not support the recommendations of the General Committee against including the item on the agenda. The

Liberian representative said that inclusion of the item constituted in­ tervention by no stretch of the imagination. Instead, inclusion would provide the United Nations an opportunity "to suggest the urgent neces­ sity of finding an early solution in an amicable and satisfactory man­ ner.. ."53

When the vote was taken, the recommendation of the Committee was rejected, 28-27-5. With the exception of South Africa, a ll African states (Ethiopia abstaining) voted against the Conmittee's report. The

United States voted fo r, while the Soviet Union voted against. The ques­ tion of Algeria was thus added to the agenda of the General Assembly.

France reacted by boycotting the United Nations and its Committees.

(b) The 11th Session ( 1956)

On the 15th of November 1956, the General Assembly included the

Algerian question on its agenda due to urgings from fifteen Afro-Asian

52united Nations, ORGA, 10th Session, 525th Meeting of Plenary, September 7, 1955, pp. 109-110. 53United Nations, ORGA, 530th Meeting of Plenary, p. 187. 227 states. Among other things, these states alleged that France had in­ creased its armed forces in Algeria from 150,000 to over 450,000.

Between February 4th to the 13th, 1957, the First Committee studied the question. Positions were maintained by the states. But France de­ cided to drop its refusal to have the item discussed and agree to the airing of views. The French Government, however, remained opposed to any General Assembly recommendation.54

France indicated its readiness to offer a liberal political solu­ tion achievable in three successive stages: (1) an unconditional cease­ fire ; (2) free elections supervised by both sides and possibly in the presence of observers from genuinely democratic countries; (3) discus­ sion with elected representatives on the future regime of Algeria. While the eventual regime would be worked out in the discussions, France would institute structural reforms that would leave Algeria an individual char­ acter at the same time as i t would maintain certain links with metropol­ itan France. These links would include the retention by France of a per­ manent power of arbitration to insure that there would be no oppression of minority by majority or vice v e r s a . 55

Many Afro-Asians were suspicious of the French offer. Some out- rightly rejected i t as implying a subtle but certain, perpetual French presence in Algeria. The different shades of opinions were crystallized in three draft resolutions submitted to the General Committee.

54Yearbook, op. c it., 1956, p. 118; United Nations, ORGA, 11th Session, 830th Meeting of First Committee, p. 99.

SSyearbook, op. c i t . , 1956, p. 118. 228

An eighteen-power Afro-Asian draft resolution proposed that the

Assembly recognize the right of self-determination for the Algerian peo­

ple, invite the parties to negotiate with a view to ending hostilities,

request France to respond to the wishes of the people, ask the Secretary

General to assist the invited negotiating parties and to report to the

12th General Assembly.

A three-power (Japan, Phillipines and Thailand) draft suggested

that the Assembly be urged to "express hope" that the Algerian people would endeavor through negotiations with France to stem the tide of v i­

olence and bloodshed.

The third or six-power draft resolution was submitted by Latin

American states. This draft proposed that the Assembly, afte r hearing

a ll the arguments, simply express hope that a peaceful and democratic

solution would be found to the problem.56

The foregoing draft resolutions point to a split within the Afro-

Asian ranks. The Liberian representative in a statement in the Commit­ tee addressed himself to the draft resolutions. Liberia was of the con­ sidered opinion that the eighteen-power draft was not of a character that would help lessen tension in the area. The number of "controver­ sial legal issues" implied in the d raft, coupled with a number of sound provisions, left Liberia with no alternative but abstention when the vote came up. As for the other two drafts, Liberia agreed with the "un­ derlying purpose" for i t was compatible with United Nations aims as well

56Yearbook, op. c i t . , 1956, p. 119. for fu ll summaries of these -draft resolutions. 229 as the wishes of the parties. Specifically, the three-power draft sought to end h o s tilitie s and create an atmosphere of calm that would be condu­ cive to negotiations and the restoration of peace. The six-power draft was the next best. The Liberian delegate advised against the adoption of resolutions "unacceptable to at least one of the parties and there­ fore offered no prospect of implementation". The United Nations must not in this way diminish its moral weight.57

When the votes were taken on February 13, 1957, the eighteen-power draft was shelved after much debate. The six-power draft was given pri­ ority by the Committee by a vote of 38-35-3. It was then completely adopted, 41-33-3. Liberia and the United States were among those voting for it, while the rest of Africa voted against it. The three-power draft was entirely adopted, 37-27-13, with Liberia and the majority of Africa voting in favor, and the United States against.

The two adopted drafts, then, constituted the report of the First

Committee to Plenary. In Plenary, an additional nine-power conciliatory d raft was submitted. During the 654th meeting, this conciliatory draft was adopted, 75-0-1. The committee's report was by consensus ignored since i t had been superseded by the adopted nine-power d ra ft. The con­ ciliatory draft expressed "the hope that, in a spirit of cooperation, a peaceful, democratic and just solution w ill be found, through appropriate means, in conformity with the principles of the Charter..."58

57united Nations, 11th Session, 844th Meeting of the F irst Com­ m ittee, p. 199; United Nations Documents A/C.1/L.165, A/C.1/L.166 and A/C.1/L.167. 58united Nations, ORGA, 11th Session, 654th Plenary, February 15, 1957, p. 1105 , A/L. 220. 230

(c) 12th Session ( 1957)

In July of 1957, twenty-two Afro-Asian states proceeded as was now

usual, to request addition of the Algerian question on the agenda of the

General Assembly. In an accompanying memorandum, they recalled the past

and noted the deteriorating situation. On the 20th of September the item

was included on the Assembly's agenda. I t was then referred to the First

Committee.

In the Committee, the French representative said that France was

participating in the deliberations for the purpose of refuting the cal­

umnies directed against i t , and to make known the efforts that were being

undertaken by the French Government for peacefully settling the dispute.

The three pillars of French policy: cease-fire, elections, and negoti­

ations, already mentioned were recalled. The French delegate accepted

self-determination as a principle, but insisted that in the matter of

Algeria i t must stand compatible with morality and the interests of the

international comnunity. Self-determination would be emptied of signif­

icance were i t to be applied without due respect for the protection of minorities, and the gradual preparation of an e lite capable of making valid decisions.59

The opposition countered by referring to the means by which France

acquired Algeria. Territorial acquisition by military conquest was nei­ ther morally right nor in the interest of the world community. The del­ egate of Ceylon called for consideration of the question in the context

59united Nations, ORGA, 12th Session, First Committee, p. 253 and p. 258. 231 of Arab national ism.60

Two draft resolutions were submitted in Committee. The f ir s t , a seventeen-power Afro-Asian d raft, would have the Assembly recognize the right of self-determination for the Algerian people and call for a nego­ tiated settlement in keeping with the United Nations Charter. The sec­ ond, a seven-power draft was of the nature of the nine-power conciliatory draft of the 11th Session.

Two truncated amendments to the seventeen-power draft were rejec­ ted. The f ir s t amendment specified that the Assembly would recognize that the Algerian people were entitled to democratically work out their own future (rather than recognize that the principle of self-determina­ tion was applicable to the Algerian people). The second amendment stated that the Assembly propose effective discussions for resolving the troubled situation in accordance with the United Nations Charter (instead of cal­ ling for a negotiated settlement in accordance with the purposes and prin­ ciples of the Charter).61

Liberia was against the watered-down d raft, as were the other A fri­ can states. On the proposed amendment, however, Liberia abstained, while the other states of Africa voted against.

The seven-power draft was eventually withdrawn by its sponsors.

The First Committee had no draft resolution to recommend to the Plenary session. At the 726th meeting of the Plenary, a fifteen-power

60yearbook of the United Nations, 1957, p. 70; United Nations ORGA, 12th Session, 916th Meeting of Frist Committee, pp. 275-77.

61 Yearbook, op. c i t . , 1957, p. 71. 232 compromise draft was submitted. I t expressed "the wish th a t, in a s p irit of effective cooperation, pourparlers will be entered into and other ap­ propriate means utilized with a view to a solution in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations."62 This draft was unanimously adopted.

(d) The 13th Session ( 1958)

The 13th General Assembly included the Algerian question on its agenda on September 22, 1958. This was done against the wishes of the

French Government which was no doubt fu lly aware of the growing support in Africa for the position of the Algerian nationalists. One needs to recall here, the April 1958 Conference of Independent African States and its unequivocal proclamation of support fo r the rig ht to independences >r of Algeria.

As the debate got under way in the General Committee, to which the item was referred, a number of Afro-Asian delegates noted that France's policy of integration (Algeria and France) had been rejected by the Al­ gerian leaders, and asserted the conviction that an essential starting point for negotiation would be France's recognition of Algerian national­ ism and its aspirations for independence. 63

The Liberian representative, Mr. C.L. Simpson, in his intervention in the debate said that Article 2:7 of the Charter was in no way applic­ able to Algeria. The conflict there posed a real threat to peace in view

62united Nations, ORGA, 12th Session, 726th Meeting of Plenary, p. 568; United Nations Document A/L.239; Res. 1184 (X II).

63Yearbook of the United Nations. 1958, p. 80. 233 of its damaging effects on Franco-Moroccan and Franco-Tunisian relations, not to mention other countries external to the immediate region.64 Con­ tinuing, the Liberian Envoy said:

... that in defiance of the irreversible trends in’the modern*world towards self-determination and independence, one m illion people under French sponsorship in Algeria were attempting to keep down nine million other people... The fact that de Gaulle had invited the Algerians to send representatives to France for negotiations showed that France was fu lly aware that the Algerian leaders and people were opposed to French r u le ... I t was to be hoped that the s p irit of magnaminity France had shown in allowing its colo­ nial te rrito rie s to decide th e ir own freedom and independence by means of a plebiscite would also guide it in its settlement of the Algerian question.

Liberia intended to stand by the unanimously adopted 1958 Accra Confer­ ence resolution "until the objectives of the resolution had been achieved".66

On the 12 of December, seventeen Afro-Asian states including

Liberia, submitted a draft resolution to the Committee that recognized

Algeria's right to independence and indicated the willingness of the

Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (PGAR) to enter into negotiations with France.

Two Haitian-proposed amendments to the seventeen-power d ra ft, con­ siderably altering the d ra ft, were not carried. The seventeen-power d raft as a whole was then adopted by the Committee by a vote of 32-18-30, all of Africa voting in favor, and the United States among those against.

In plenary, draft resolution A/4075, recommended by the General

64United Nations, ORGA, 13th Session, 1021st Meeting of First Com­ m itte e , p. 370.

66Ib id . 234

Committee, not obtaining a required two-thirds majority, failed of adop­ tion by 35-18-28. Liberia voted in favor, while the United States ab­ stained. As a result of this vote in plenary, the 13th Session ended with no compromising of positions and no resolution on the question of

Algeria

( e) The 14th Session ( 1959)

After the Algerian item was included on the agenda, it was refer­ red to the First Committee. There, the French representative outlined a major policy statement from the new French Chief Executive, General

Charles de Gaulle. While retaining its offer of a cease-fire of a year ago, France was further proposing a referendum for the purpose of e lic ­ iting a choice from three possible solutions: (1) secession; (2) com­ plete integration with France; or (3) the Government of Algeria by Al­ gerians, in close union with France in the fields of economic affairs, education, defense, and external relations.66

The debate in the Committee centered on the French pronouncement.

Tunisia applauded the s p irit of the new French offers, while Saudi Ara­ bia's reaction ranged from skepticism to downright hostile criticism.

On December 21, 1958, twenty-two Afro-Asian states submitted a draft resolution that would "urge the two parties concerned to enter into pourparlers to determine the conditions necessary for the implemen- ta ti on as early as possible: of' the' ri'ghtoof; self-determination: for the

Algerian people, including conditions for a cease-fire".67

66Vearbook, op. c it., 1958, p. 52. 67ibid, p. 53. 235

As the debate in the Committee continued, the Liberian repre­

sentative, Mr. Henry Ford Cooper, made a statement on the fu ll range of

the problem. I t should have been realized long ago by the colonial

powers that dependent peoples were resolved in th eir determination to

win freedom and independence, as the colonial powers had themselves

been resolved during the two World Wars. While French recognition of

the rights of the Algerians to determine their own future could have

averted the suffering both peoples were undergoing, de Gaulle was to

be praised for the recent policy statement on the matter. But equally

to be praised were the Algerian nationalists for the manner in which

they kept alive their country's claim to that right. More than the

conditions for ending hostilities, negotiations must deal with politi­

cal guarantees that would insure for the Algerians the right of se lf-

determination.

The Algerian National Liberation Army was not a defeated army to which i t was possible to dictate terms; while i t might not represent the entire Algerian people, the aims for which i t was fighting — self-determination and independence — were unques­ tionably supported by all Algerians.68

Ambassador Cooper's final words to the two parties were that the

Algerians accept the status of self-governing state within the French

Community until sovereignty transfer could be made (and this was for

the French) under United Nations auspices. I t was in the light of the

foregoing considerations that Liberia had joined in sponsoring the

twenty-two-power draft resolution.69 The draft was subsequently adopted

68united Nations, QRGA, 14th Session, 1071st Meeting of First Com- -mittee, December 31, 1959, pp. 236-37. 69lbid. 236

in the Committee by a vote of 38-26-17. The United States was among

those voting against i t .

In the plenary, the report of the First Committee which included

the draft, was considered. Pakistan, on behalf of Afro-Asia, submitted what amounted to a sligh t revision or rewording of the Committee-recom­ mended draft. It urged the recognition by the Assembly of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and called for a negotiated settlement that took into account point one above.

Lacking a required two-third m ajority, the new d raft was rejected by a vote of 39-22-20. The Assembly's President then decided, without objection, to shelve the committee-proposed d ra ft. While a ll of Africa had voted in favor of the draft, the United States abstained because, in the words of its representative, the draft did not take into account the "forward-looking" declaration of General de Gaulle. Perhaps the UAR delegate was right when he said that the "cold war was sucking into its votex the various problems of lib eratio n". The 15th Session would feel the full effects of the cold war on the question of A l g e r i a .70

( f ) The 15th Session (1960)

The year 1960 saw a change in the context of the Algerian question.

This change was of both an internal and external character, one invari­ ably influencing the other. What made it possible for the Algerian na­ tio n a lis t to now speak of paix n^gocifee was the expressed outside support

70united Nations, ORGA, 14th Session, 815th Meeting of Plenary, pp. 277-279, and 856th Plenary, pp. 749-750. 237

for their position that came from many quarters.

In 1960, the League of Arab States declared recognition of, and support fo r, the PGAR. In that same year, the Soviet Union extended recognition to the PGAR (October 3). The People's Republic of China not only recognized the Nationalists' Provisional Government but offered aid which included the sending of Chinese volunteers to Algeria.71 The obvious cold war implications of these moves lead the West unhesitat­ ingly to the French corner as they now attempted to avoid a rapid solu­ tion of the problem in order to prevent the planting of Communist inter­ ests in North A f r i c a . 72

Of crucial importance for the evolution of the question was the admission en masse of sixteen African States to the United Nations in

1960. This did not mean that Afro-Asia could count on sixteen solid additional votes. In fact, the majority of France's former colonies would not go along with the stance of the Afro-Asian bloc of states.

Most of these francophone states were to vote either with France or ab­ stain. In spite of this, however, there was a substantial shift in the balance of power in the Assembly as a result of the new admissions.

On the request of twenty-five Afro-Asian states, the question was included on the agenda of the 15th Session. In the First Committee, the thesis of the PGAR was presented in a draft resolution. The most important

7lFerhat Abbas of PGAR had visited Peking between September 29 and October 5, 1960, where Chairman Mao personally made the offer. See: Far- ajallah, op. c i t . , p. 274.

72Farajallah , op. c i t . , p. 274 and p. 276. 238 clause read:

(4) decide that referendum should be conducted in Algeria, organized, controlled and supervised by the U.N. whereby the Algerian people would freely determine the destiny of their entire country.

Operative Paragraphs One, Two and Three, in essence, recognized the right of self-determination and independence for the Algerian people and the imperatives fo r effective guarantees fo r that rig h t, a ll to be carried out with some United Nations participation.?3

During the debate that followed, most Afro-Asians f e l t , as reflec­ ted in the draft resolution, that the time had come for the United Nations to go beyond recognizing the right to self-determination for Algeria.

The disputants had already accepted that principle. What was s till out­ standing, as the Tunisian delegate put it, related to creating an atmo­ sphere fo r the true expression of Algerian w ill. Fear on both sides would be allayed by a United Nations presence.

During the debate, the Liberian representative delivered a spir­ ited defense of the Algerian nationalists. Ambassador Cooper said he;

... considered Algeria's independence inevitable, after seven years of war against a great power armed with all the modern weapons. The whole world, except fo r some die-hards in France, realized that Algeria could never be integrated with France... Neither the whip nor the sword, neither prison nor hunger could make a conquered people care less for freedom, as the Nazis had shown. Some Algerian Moslems supported the claims of France, but then every country had its quislings. The world was d i­ vided into two blocs. If the young nations of Asia and Africa had to choose between them, the choice would depend upon th e ir attitude to the peoples of Asia and Africa. French attitude on the question was perfectly reasonable ac­ cording to colonialist ideas. But from the point of view of

73Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 133. 239

democracy, France’s claims were untenable... A free and inde­ pendent Algeria had for seven years resisted the claims of a colonial power. Only a conquered and subdued Algeria would submit to French rule. The facts of the Algerian problem were well known. The General Assembly had to choose between a colo­ nial France and a democratic France which would grant the Al­ gerians the same privileges that i t its e lf enjoyed. The Asian and African countries had made th e ir choice and shown i t in the forty-two-power draft declaration on the granting of independ­ ence to colonial countries and peoples... (subsequently adopted as Res. 1514 XV); th eir conscience would be clear, irrespective of whether they were branded as imperialist stooges or communist lackeys.74

Liberia did not believe that, without outside aid, a divided France could find a solution to the Algerian problem. The United Nations, there­ fore, had a crucial role to play. That role would involve political as­ surances for Algeria as the negotiations got under way. Otherwise, the

French might act dishonorably.

By a roll-call vote on December 15, the twenty-four-power draft was adopted completely by the Committee by a vote of 47-20-28. The spon­ sors and the Soviet Union voted in favor, and the United States was among those voting against. The Brazzaville group or the majority of France's former African colonies abstained.

The draft was then referred to the plenary for final approval.

First to be attacked here, was operative Paragraph Four above quoted.

This was, almost word for word, the position of the Algerian Nationalist

Provisional Government. In two amendments, new wording was proposed for

Paragraph Four. The f ir s t , or Cyprus amendment, suggested that rather than "deciding" that a referendum "shall be held" in Algeria, the General

74united Nations, ORGA, 15th Session, 1124th Meeting of First Com­ mittee, December 9, 1960, pp. 225-226. 240

Assembly should "recommend" that i t be held; rather than be "organized, controlled and supervised by the U.N.", i t should be "under the auspices of the U.N.".75

The second amendment was proposed by the Brazzaville group of states, a ll of which had abstained in the Committee. What they sug­ gested was the replacement of operative Paragraph Four by one that would insure "mutual guarantees for the parties concerned and international guarantees". Both amendments were subsequently rejected.

When the voting on the committee-recommended draft began, opera­ tive Paragraph Four was singled out fir s t. When voted upon by ro ll-c a ll, it received forty in favor, forty against, with sixteen abstentions.

Having failed to gain the required two-thirds majority, i t was not adop­ ted. The resolution, except for operative Paragraph Four, was adopted by a vote of 63-8-27 and became Resolution 1573 (XV). The pattern of voting in the Committee was almost maintained here. The key exceptions were these: The United States shifted from "no" to abstention, while a few states of the Brazzaville group shifted from abstention to either

"no" or "yes". Liberia and Guinea were among those voting in favor of the draft in the Committee, on operative Paragraph Four in plenary, as

.well as the rest of the Committee-recommended draft.

The teeth had been taken out of the twenty-four-power draft reso­ lution, but the 15th Session of the General Assembly was the "mirroir fidele",a fu ll sampling, of the positions of United Nations members,

75Yearbook, op. c i t . , 1960, p. 134. 241

especially the Africans on the question of Algeria. Africa was sp lit between those favoring the position of the PGAR and those against that position. Liberia and Guinea were both with the Algerians, while states of the Brazzaville group en bloc were s t ill suffering from French in­ fluence. The Guinean delegate attributed the defeat of operative Para­ graph Four to the "hostile vote of the countries of the Community" (that is , the French Community), a vote that "was cast in a mood of deep dis- p a ir..."76

(g) The 16th Session (1961)

A resolution of the Algerian problem was clearly in sight as the

16th Session of the General Assembly convened. After the Algerian item was added to the agenda and referred to the First Committee, the Commit­ tee decided to defer discussion for a two-week period during which seri­ ous cease-fire negotiations between France and the Algerian Nationalists were in progress. The purpose for deferring was the desire of the

United Nations to prevent the debates from disturbing the cease-fire talk s.77

Following the two-week self-imposed United Nations moratorium on debating Algeria, the Committee resumed its deliberations on December

14, 1961. Ghana's Alex Quaison-Sackey voiced the feelings of many del­ egates when he said that the discussion of the item was being held in happier circumstances than in the past. Not only had the concerned

76united Nations, ORGA, 15th Session, 956th Meeting of Plenary, December 19, 1960, p. 1430.

77Vearbook o f the United Nations. 1961, p. 97. 242 parties held talks; they had both accepted Algeria's right to decide its own future.78

Earlier in 1961, the Algerian right to self-determination had been affirmed by General Charles de Gaulle. In a press conference, he indi­ cated that France had no intentions of creating difficulties for the

Algerian population when the population decided by universal suffrage to raise its e lf to a state that w ill be sovereign both within and with­ out (souverain au-dedan et au-dehors). France had taken that stand be­ cause i t was d iffic u lt to continue pretending that the Algerian masses wish to be a part of the French p e o p le .79

But there was an element to this new French attitude that was to­ ta lly unacceptable to the PGAR. France desired to separate the Sahara from Algeria and divide the population into two zones - one that wished to remain French and another that wanted complete French departure. The

PGAR insisted on these two principles - "territorial integrity" and "uni­ ty of the people". This Franco-Algerian disagreement led to the failure of the Evian (May 20 - dune 13) and the Lugrin (July 20 - 29) discussions.

When on September 5th, de Gaulle, in another press conference, removed the disagreement, by in effect going along with the position of the PGAR, the way was cleared for accord between the parties.80

78united Nations, ORGA, 16th Session, 1222nd Meeting of First Com­ m ittee, December 16, 1961, p. 315. 79Farajallah, op. c i t . , p. 282. 8QIbtd. The final settlement came in the 1962 Evian Accords be­ tween France and the PGAR. I t insured p o litical independence for Algeria and the safeguard of French interests in the new North African State. See: Alfred Grosser, La Politique Exterieure de la Verne Republique (Paris, Ed­ itions du Seuil, 1965) p. 63. 243

I t was the promise of an impending fin a l agreement between France and the Algerian Nationalists that led the General Assembly to adopt its final resolution on the question of Algeria:

The General Assembly; having discussed the question of Algeria; regretting the suspension of the negotiations entered into by the Government of France and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic; calls upon the two parties to resume nego­ tiations with a view to implementing the rig h t of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence respecting the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria.81

Summary

While the conflict was eventually resolved outside the framework of the United Nations, the role played by the world body, in general, and the Afro-Asian group, in particular, was an important determinant.

The subjection of French policy to the spotlight of international atten­ tion did not leave that policy unaffected. Pressures from the United

Nations and Afro-Asian quarters moved France gradually from the "Algerie francaise" to the''Algerie Algerienne" stance.

Prior to 1958, the position of Liberia on the Algerian question was not easy to understand. About the only clear aspect, during the pe­ riod 1955-1958, was the readiness to have the question included on the agenda and discussed. If one reads the firs t Liberian policy statement on the item, the impression is that the policy pursued, beginning in 1958, was inaugurated in 1955, but the records do not sustain th is .

On the eighteen-power Afro-Asian draft resolution (A/C.l/L. 165) of the 11th Session, essentially calling for United Nations recognition

81Yearbook, op. c it., 1961, p. 99. 244 of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination according to

Charter principles, Liberia decided that its legally controversial na­ ture warranted an "abstention". Again during the 12th Session, Liberia abstained rather than vote "no" on amendments to the seventeen-power

Afro-Asian draft that again spoke of the principle of self-determination being applicable to Algeria. I t must be mentioned, though, that when the truncated version of the seventeen-power d raft was voted upon, L i­ beria joined the Afro-Asians in voting "against".

Beginning the 13th Session, a high degree of consistency becomes apparent in Liberia's Algerian policy. The tone was set by the follow­ ing statement:

Liberia had taken an active part in the Conference of Independent African States, held in Accra in April 1958, at which a unanimous resolution had called for the end of hostilities in Algeria and proclaimed Algeria's right to independence. Liberia was deter­ mined to support that position in the U.N. until the objectives of that resolution had been a c h ie v e d . 82

Thereafter, Liberia's interest in the problem was rooted in its anti-colonial attitude coupled with its perceived need for African soli­ darity on the question. This attitude and need led it to support almost compl etely A1 geri a' s ri ght to se:lf-determinatiOnv ‘ : '

On the prior procedural question of whether or not the United Na­ tions was legally authorized to discuss the question, Liberia's attitude was motivated by its expressed concern about the effect a continuation of the conflict would have on international relations and world peace.

82united Nations, ORGA, 13th Session, 1021st Meeting of First Com­ mittee, p. 370. 245

The United Nations had a prime responsibility in keeping the peace and the world body could not function as i t should were i t to be precluded by the invocation of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter.

The United Nations, in the opinion of the Liberian Government, was to resolve the procedural question by reference to "the immensity and mag­ nitude of the substance involved".83

"The substance" was the principle of self-determ ination, freedom, and independence. Those principles were applicable to a ll colonial prob­ lems, especially in Africa. While Liberia recognized the complexity of the problem (cold war implications, the use of threats by some to influ­ ence the opinions of others),84 i t could not "accept the theory that any portion of Africa is an integral part of any other continent". If the

European minorities in certain parts of Africa had to be protected, that protection could not come at the expense "of the African majorities who are the real owners of the territories".85

3. THE QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA

(a) The Background

Toward the end of the 19th century Great Britain, with the excep­ tion of a small coastal enclave embracing the sole deep-water harbor of the area, decided to forego annexing South West Africa to South Africa.

Germany, profiting from Britain's forbearance, moved into the area and

83|jnited Nations, ORGA, 14th Session, 815th Meeting of Plenary, September 30, 1959, p. 278.

84ibjd 85ibid, p. 279. 246

established a colony. During the firs t World War, the South Africans

at Britain's behest sent an expeditionary force to the territory. Elev­

en months following the August 1914 move, the main German force in the

territory surrendered.86

By Articles 118 and 119 of the Versailles Treaty, Germany for­ mally ceded the area to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. In

a secret agreement, B rita in , France and Japan had acknowledged "special

interests" in certain areas of the German Empire. But public announce­

ment had been made by the Allies to the effect that territorial annexa­

tion as a legitim ate end of victory would not be condoned. The Mandate

System (A rticle 22 of the Covenant) and the many Mandate Agreements sig­

n ified the prevalence of the la tte r view over the f o r m e r . 87

The Territory of South West Africa was placed under the interna­

tional mandate system, and South Africa was designated the Mandatory.

I t was a Class "C" mandate, that is , those applicable to the least de­

veloped, economically and politically, of the former German colonies.

Mandatories were obliged to have th e ir actions reviewed by the Council

of the League and by individual League members. The la tte r could seek

judicial recourse at the Permanent Court of International Justice, if

dispute arose over the Mandate and could not be resolved by negotiation.

86j. Esterhuisse, South West Africa, 1800-1894: The Establishment of German Authority (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1968); and, M. Kerina,"South West Africa, the United Nations and the International Court of Justice"in African Forum (F a ll, 1966) Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 5-22, for background.

^ In tern atio n al Court of Justice, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Docu­ ments, South West Africa Cases, (1966) Vol. I , p. 33. V

247

The essence of the Mandate was that South Africa was under obligation to promote the welfare of the indigenous population. I t became a "sa­ cred trust of civilization". No modification in the terms of the Man­ date could be made without the consent of the Council of the League.

South Africa did not quite keep its trust during the League days, for there were occasional statements by its o fficials indicative of a desire to annex the territo ry or otherwise regard i t as being under

South African sovereignty. The League's Mandate Commission spared no efforts in rebuking the Union for these acts.88

During the second World War, the Permanent Mandate Commission, to which South Africa was obligated to report, did not function. It can be assumed that South Africa's desire to annex the territo ry could have been achieved at no better time than the war years. But the South African leader, Field Marshall Smuts, more than desiring sovereignty over the territory, wished to grant it international recognition. As Hancock put i t in his study of Smuts, "not a dog would have barked" had the Union simply annexed the te rrito ry , but Smuts' "old-fashioned respect for the legal fabric of the Society of Nations restrained".89 It was South Af­ rica's racial policy that would have made international acquiescence to annexation quite difficult. The race policy factor was to be reinforced by the all-out African call for self- determination and independence.

88I. Goldblatt, The Mandated Territory of South West Africa in Relation to the United Nations (Cape Town, 1962).

B9W. K. Hancock, SMUTS, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Enqland: 1962, 1968) Vol. 2: Fields of Force, 1919-1950, p. 467. 248

When the League of Nations became history, the United Nations came into being. The International Trusteeship System set up in Chap­ te r X II of the Charter, was a successor to the Mandate System of the

League of Nations. But the Union of South Africa's rather halting re­ fusal to acknowledge th is , coupled with its apparent determination not to place South West Africa under the United Nations Trusteeship System, created a legal dispute between that Member State and the world organi­ zation almost from the incipience of the latter.

In addition to the juridical aspect of the South West African question, there was a politico-moral aspect. According to this, the

Union's claim and control over the te rrito ry represented an unacceptable perpetuation of colonialism and racial discrimination. It is thus, from both the politico-moral point of view, as well as the legal point of view, that the question interested Liberia and Africa.

(b) In itia l General Assembly Consideration

At the San Francisco Conference that established the United Nations, the South African representative made a suggestion to the effect that the

Union should annex South West A frica. During the Second Plenary meeting of the General Assembly on April 9, 1946, the South African Government was prepared to continue to administer the te rrito ry under the terms of the Mandate of the League of Nations, but the latter was not to be fol­ lowed to the le tte r because of changed circumstances.

When the second part of the f ir s t session of the Assembly convened in the Fall of 1946, the South African Government resubmitted its annex­ ation proposal. The question was referred to the 4th Committee. There, 249

Field Marshall Smuts said that "owing to the physical contiguity of

South West Africa to the Union and its ethnological kinship with the rest of South Africa, the Union of South Africa was legitimately con­ cerned in securing the annexation of that territory..."9°

Liberia's representative, H. Lafayette Harmon, joined the major­ ity of the representatives in the Trusteeship Committee in opposing the

South African proposal. On December 14, 1946, the Assembly adopted Res­ olution 65(1) expressing its inability to accede to the request of South

Africa and recommended that the te rrito ry of South West Africa be placed under the International Trusteeship System.91

In a le tte r (A/334) to the Secretary General dated July 23, 1947, the South African Government indicated its decision not to go ahead with incorporating the te rrito ry . The General Assembly's proposal that the te rrito ry be placed under the Trusteeship System was, however, rejected.

South Africa declared that she would maintain the status quo.

The second session of the General Assembly referred the question to the 4th Committee. At the 33rd meeting of the Committee, the Liber­ ian representative, Mr. Gabriel L. Dennis, expressed his country's op­ position to the incorporation solution proposed by South Africa. In so doing, he was in agreement with the views of the representatives of India, the Soviet Union, Haiti and others. Regarding the alleged desire of the inhabitants of South West Africa to join the Union, Mr. Dennis said that

9QUnited Nations, ORGA, 4th Committee, Part i , F irst Session, 1946, p. 63.

91 Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-48, p. 142. 250

desire was confined to a minority of an alien race which wished to rule and exploit the majority.92

In 1948, the Union began openly denying its obligations under the

Mandate. Mr. Eric Louw, South Africa's spokesman, said in the 4th Com­

mittee of the General Assembly that "certain political parties" in the

territory had agreed to " a closer association and integration of South

West Africa with the Union of South Africa along the lines envisaged in

the previous Mandate, since expired".93

During the debate in the 4th Conmrittee at the Fourth Session of

the General Assembly, the Liberian representative alluded, in his in te r­

vention, to the judical aspect of the question. He said that i t was

the view of South Africa that the League's demise did not give the

United Nations any competence to deal with the question. In other words,

since there was no longer a League of Nations, the body to which South

Africa was responsible for the territory, South Africa could now make

decisions on the future of the territo ry as i t saw f i t . But, stated the

Liberian delegate, "the U.N. had the right to determine whether such a measure was legally ju s tifie d .94

The question had a moral aspect as w ell, in the view of the Liber­

ian delegate, for the human rights of the people of the Territory were

subject to respect by a ll states including United Nations Members.

92united Nations, ORGA, Second Session of General Assembly, 4th Committee, 33rd Meeting, 1947, p. 17. 93International Court of Justice, Documents, 1966, op. c i t . ,p. 47. 94united Nations, ORGA, 4th Committee, Fourth Session, November 22, 1949, 132nd Meeting. 251

(c) The Advisory Opinions

To General Assembly Resolution 65 ( I) of December 14, 1946, the following were added, up to 1949 - 141 ( I I ) of November 1,1947, 227 ( I I I ) of November 16, 1948, and 337 (IV) of December 6, 1949. In combination, these resolutions recommended that South West Africa be placed under the

International Trusteeship System and that the terms of agreement be pro­ posed by the United States. South Africa did not heed these recommen­ dations. In 1949, its resentment of criticism from the Trusteeship Coun­ c il led i t to stop sending reports to the Council. Instead, the Union offered to send reports to the three Allied powers— France, the United

Kingdom and the United States-r-but s t ill refused to have them brought before the United Nations. Systematic non-cooperation with the United

Nations continued unabated. From reports obtained from independent sources, i t seemed South Africa was making the necessary administrative moves fo r incorporation. The Union Government announced that the people of South West Africa had by "Referendum" agreed to incorporation. But a witness, Reverend Michael Scott, suggested that the people were tricked by asking them to choose between joining the Chinese, the Russians, the

Portuguese, etc. They voted without knowing the issue.95

Upon the strength of an oral hearing allowed to Reverend Scott on behalf of the Herero people together with the South African posture of non-cooperation with the United Nations, the General Assembly adopted

Resolution 338 (IV) of December 6, 1949. By its terms the International

95Michael Scott: A Time to Speak, in M. Hadayatullah, The South West Africa Case (London: Asian Publishing House, 1967), p. 13 252

Court of Justice was requested to give an advisory opinion on the fol­

lowing questions '(Resolution 338/IV of December 6, 1949):

What is the international status of the Territory of South West Africa and what are the international obligations of the Union of South Africa arising therefrom, in particular: (a) Does the Union of South Africa continue to have international obligations under the Mandate fo r South West A frica, i f so what are those obligations? (b) Are the provisions of Chapter X II of the Char­ te r applicable and, i f so, in what manner, to the Territory of South West Africa? (c) Has the Union of South Africa the competence to modify the international status of the Territory of South West Africa, or, in the event of a negative reply, where does competence rest to determine and modify the international status of the Territory?

The Court replied in this wise: On the general question i t unan­

imously upheld that the Territory retained its international status in

keeping with the December 1920 League of Nations Mandate. As to ques­

tion (b) firs t part and question (c), there was affirmative unanimity.

On question (a) it was affirmative by a majority of twelve to two and

on question (b) second part, negative by a majority of eight to six.96

Certain principles were set forth in the 1950 Advisory Opinion:

th at in keeping with the Mandate there could be no annexation or trans­

fer of sovereignty. To the principles of non-annexation and non-trans­

ferability of sovereignty was added the principle of promoting the well- being and development of the indigenous people. These were the maxims by

which the General Assembly was to be guided in its future dealings with

the question.

96International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders. International Status of South West A frica, Advi­ sory Opinion of July 11, 1950, pp. 144-145. 253

Considered at the 5th Session of the General Assembly, the Advi­ sory Opinion was accepted in a resolution on November 30, 1950. For the implementation of the Advisory Opinion, the resolution provided for the establishment of a committee of three who were to confer with South

Africa in regard to measures for implementing the Court's opinion and the General Assembly's resolution that endorsed i t . South Africa's re­ fusal to cooperate meant that there was no progress between the 1950

Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and the 1955 re­ quested opinion.

The General Assembly continued to concern its e lf with the question of South Africa based specifically on the following statement of the

1950 opinion:

The competence of the General Assembly of the U.N. to exercise such supervision and to receive and examine reports is derived from the provisions of Article 10 of the Charter, which author­ izes the General Assembly to discuss any questions or any matter within the scope of the Charter and to make recommendations on these questions or matters to the members of the U.N.97

The second requested Advisory Opinion grew out of the question of which voting procedure should be followed by the Assembly, in making de­ cisions on matters relating to reports and petitions concerning South

West Africa. According to the 1950 Opinion "the degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly should not therefore exceed that which applied under the Mandates system, and should conform as far as possible to the procedure followed in this respect by the Council of the League...98

97international Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of July 11, 1950, op. c i t . , p. 137. 98lbid. 254

But a 1954 committee of the General Assembly had drafted a set of

rules, Letter F, which said: "Decisions of the General Assembly on ques­

tions relating to reports and petitions concerning the Territory of South

West Africa shall be regarded as important questions within the meaning

of Article 18, paragraph two, of the Charter".99

The question put to the Court, then, was whether there was a dis­ crepancy between the sentence quoted from the 1950 Opinion and Rule F above cited. The General Assembly wished to know whether decisions had to be by a simple or two-thirds majority, or by unanimous agreement.

The Court in its Opinion of June 7, 1955, upheld Rule F of the General

Assembly's committee as corresponding to a correct interpretation of the

1950 Opinion.

On June 1, 1956, the International Court of Justice handed down

its last Advisory Opinion on the South West Africa question before con­ tentious proceedings were instituted. The General Assembly wished to know the following: "Is i t consistent with the Advisory opinion of the

International Court of Justice of 11 July 1950 for the Committee on South

West Africa, established by General Assembly resolution 7494 (V III) of 28

November 1953, to grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters relating to the Territory of South West Africa?''^00 By a majority of eight to five, the Court decided in the affirmative.

99M. Hadayatullah, op. c i t . , pp. 18-19.

IQOlbid, p. 19. 255

td) The Contentious Proceedings

I t has already been pointed out that South Africa's refusal to co­

operate with the United Nations concerning the fate of South West Africa,

led to the requested Advisory Opinions. However, the strength of the

Opinions against the South African position and the series of United Na­ tions resolutions calling for South Africa's cooperation, unfortunately did not change the South African attitude.

But certain developments cast the problem in a new lig h t. F irst,

African frustration over South Africa's non-cooperation grew. Secondly, the rise in African membership in the United Nations between 1946 and

1960, meant more African voices would be added to the cry against colo­ nialism and racialism manifested in South Africa's hold on South West

Africa.

The immediate stimulus that led to proceedings against South Af­ rica was a decision of the Second Conference of Independent African

States meeting in Addis Ababa in June of 1960.101 Before considering that decision, it seems appropriate to furnish the background to the

June 1960 deliberations.

In June of 1957, the United Nations General Assembly had requested the United Nations Committee on South West Africa to look into the avail­ ability of legal action that would ensure South Africa's fulfillment of

its obligations under the Mandate of the League of Nations. A working

lOlfhe participating states were: Liberia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the UAR. 256

group was appointed by the Special Committee on South West Africa con­

sisting of the United States, B razil, and Finland to study the question

and report its findings to the Committee. On the basis of the working

group's conclusions the Special Committee advised the General Assembly that "there would be little doubt that the right to invoke Article 7_ of the Mandate is enjoyed at any rate by those former members of the League which were members at the date of dissolution of the League and which

are now members of the United Nations". 1°2

But the move was not made immediately. Perhaps the question of the appropriate state or states for instituting proceedings was being debated. In the meanwhile, the General Assembly continued its attempts but without success, to reach an agreement with South Africa which would

at the least "continue to accord to the Territory of South West Africa an international status". In this vein, the Assembly established a Good

Offices Committee (United States, United Kingdom and B razil). At the end of 1959, the Committee reported that i t had been unable to find "a basis for an agreement under its terms of reference". As Mr. Ernest

Gross put it, "the end of the road of political action had clearly been r e a c h e d " .R e s o r t to the Court seemed the next logical step.

According to the account of the Legal Counsel for Liberia, he was

102Report of United Nations Special Committee on South West Africa as quoted in Ernest Gross: "The South West Africa Case: What Happened?", Foreign A ffairs, Vol. 45, No. 1, October 1966, p. 39. Underlining is the writer's.

103ibjd, p. 40. Gross was the American International Lawyer who acted as Legal Counsel for Ethiopia and Liberia. 257 contacted by the Liberian Government prior to the June 1960 Addis Ababa

Conference, and engaged to prepare a memorandum of law in regard to the

South West Africa question for advance circulation to African Govern­ ments.^^

I t was this memorandum, which no doubt contained the findings of the 1957 United Nations working group, that formed the basis of the

African discussion of the question in Ethiopia.

In a statement before the conferees, the Liberian Secretary of

State referred to his Government's special interest in the South West

Africa question. He said:

...In the light of the resolutions passed at the last session of the U.N. Assembly, my Government, as a former member of the League of Nations at the time of its dissolution, has already indicated its determination on behalf of all the African states, to pursue further action to get this territory placed under the Trusteeship provisions of the Charter. We are pleased to know that in this we have the support and cooperation of other Af­ rican States. This matter w ill be discussed a t this conference and it is hoped that final decision for further action will be taken before we adjourn.105

After a full discussion of the item, a resolution was unanimously adopted on June 23 setting forth "... that the international obligations of the

Union of South Africa concerning the Territory of South West Africa should be submitted to the International Court of Justice fo r adjudication in a contentious proceeding"; and " ... that the governments of Ethiopia

lO^Gross, op. c i t . , p. 40.

105International Court of Justice, Documents, 1966, op. c i t . , p .82; see also: "Second Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, 14-26 June 1960" published by the Ministry of Information of the Imperial Ethiopian Government (1960), p. 32. 258 and Liberia have signified their intention to institute such a pro­ ceeding...!06

The foregoing clearly explains how Liberia and Ethiopia became the states that would take the case of Africa and the United Nations

(which was equally theirs) to the International Court of Justice. There were quite a few other "former members of the League which were members at the date of dissolution of the League", but none would be as inter­ ested as these two African states. While Egypt (UAR) may have been as interested, i t is lik e ly that her preoccupation with the Arab-Israeli conflict led to the decision to lim it the formal applicants to Ethiopia and L ib e ria .!0?

This decision by the African states to take South Africa to Court was both as a result of "frustration" over the Union Government's intran­ sigence and "of a sense of responsibility1' for the unfortunate Africans of South West Africa. "The objective was not to resolve doubt concerning the jurisprudence of the Mandate, which had its firm foundation in the

Advisory Opinion of 1950, but to transform a dishonored, though author­ itative, opinion into an enforceable Judgment..."!08

(1 ) 1962: What Happened

On November 4, 1960, Liberia and Ethiopia, respectively, filed ap­ plications instituting contentious proceedings against South Africa

l°6international Court of Justice, Documents, 1966, og. c i t .,p.82.

l°7For a recent analaysis of Egypt's African policy see: T.G.Ismael, The UAR in Africa, Egypt's Polic.y Under Nasser (Northwestern University Press, 1971). !°°Gross, op. c i t . , p. 40. 259 regarding "the continued existence of the Mandate for South West Africa and for the duties and performance of the Union as Mandatory, there­ u n d e r ..." ^ The principal claims of the applicants was that the Man­ date was a treaty in force within the meaning of Article 37 of the Stat­ ute of the Court and that South Africa was subject to the international obligations outlined in Article 22 of the Covenant, and. Articles 2, 4,

6 and 7 of the Mandate AgreementIn a word, the applicants desired to know whether the Mandate was being violated by the Mandatory by its introducing apartheid into the Territory.

Challenging the applicants' standing to bring the suit and the

Court's jurisdiction "to hear or adjudicate upon the questions of law and fact raised by the Applicants", South Africa filed objections. The objections were overruled by a vote of 8 to 7 .^

By this vote, the Court was at variance with the South African claim that the demise of the League of Nations meant a demise of Article

7 of the Mandate, ending thereby the jurisdiction of the Court.

^ In te rn a tio n a l Court of Justice, Documents, 1956, op. c i t . , p. 32 and p. 211.

^ °A rtic le 7 provided that " If any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations re­ lating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the Mandate, such dispute- if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations".

^Hadayatullah, op. c it., p. 21.

T^ Ib id , pp. 21-24. 260

The 1950 Advisory Opinion touching this matter was cited:

The authority which the Union exercises over the Territory is based on the Mandate. I f the Mandate lapsed, as the Union Gov­ ernment contends, the la tte r's authority would equally have lapsed. To retain the rights derived from the Mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could not be ju s tifie d ... The obligation incumbent upon a mandatory state to accept inter­ national supervision and to submit reports is an important part of the Mandates system. When the authors of the Covenant created this system, they considered that the effective per­ formance of the sacred trust of civilizatio n by the mandatory powers required that the administering of mandated territories should be subject to international supervision... It cannot be admitted that the obligation to submit to supervision has dis­ appeared merely because the supervisory organ has ceased to exist...113

(2) The Road to July 18, 1966

We are at the point at which the Court, in its 1962 judgment, agreed that it had full jurisdiction to hear "the merits" of the dis­ pute. The procedural questions were thus resolved. Pleadings and re­ corded evidence in relation to facts were invited by the Court. During

44 months, the parties file d 16 volumes of written pleadings and ap­ peared in 100 separate Court sessions.H4 i t was the President of the

International Court of Justice who, on opening the oral proceedings in

March 1965, said: "The Court is assembled today to deal with the merits of the South West Africa cases between Ethiopia and Liberia on the one hand and South Africa on the other." Every action of the Court related

"to the validity of the claims as distinguished from its admissibility".H5

H3Hadayatullah, op. c it., pp. 21-24.

H4"Shock From the Hague" in Newsweek, August 1, 1966, pp. 42-47: and, Gross, op. c i t . , p. 44.

H^Gross, op. c it., p. 44. 261

All of the foregoing did not, in the Court’s mind, preclude the resurrection of the procedural question of admissibility. Accordingly, the right of the applicants to institute the proceedings was once more examined. This time, by "judicial alchemy" the dissenting voices of

1962 were transmuted into the 1966 Judgment.116 on July 18, 1966, with the Court evenly divided and the President therefore casting the second vote to break the tie , i t was decided that Liberia and Ethiopia had no locus standi under th eir terms of reference to sue South Africa. With­ out further ceremony, the Court dismissed the case.

As Faye Carroll observes, most United Nations members fe lt that only two alternatives were opened to the Court: to agree in whole or in part with either the Applicants or the Defendant. By resorting to a legal technicality - "no interest, no action" - and also by going back on its 1950 advisory opinion and its 1962 judgment, "the Court found a third alternative which resolved nothing" but instead le ft uncertainty and confusion.H7

This third alternative was, in this writer's opinion, essentially a political, not a judicial move. It is probable that the concurring

Judges made personal p olitical judgments that questioned whether the world community would have been ready to face up to the consequences of a decision favorable to the applicants. Only after this decision was

HSGross, o]3. c i t . , p. 45.

H 7Faye Carroll, South West Africa and the United Nations (Lex­ ington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967) p. 96. 262

made that the legal technicality was researched and found.

Had the Court upheld the applicants, the position of the African

states and other anti-colonial-anti-racial forces would have been con­

siderably strengthened. And South Africa would have been subjected to

no small embarrassment. The Security Council would have been called in

under Article 94 to enforce the decision of the Court were South Africa

to refuse compliance. But this does not mean that victory would have

continued to be the lo t of those- fu lly opposed to the South African po­

sition. As Le Monde reported so tellingly, there was great relief in

London and in Washington following the 1966 judgment.^8 "Would not

condemnation of apartheid in South West Africa have required a return

to the policy of sanctions against South Africa with which the Anglo-

Saxons have such close economic tie s " .119

The 1966 Judgment while denying to individual states (Liberia and

Ethiopia in this case) the right to sue South Africa, does not deny this

right to international bodies. In fact, the General Assembly could ask

for the Court's adjudication on the compatibility of apartheid with the

international obligation "to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory"

(A rticle 2 of the Mandate). But the foes of South Africa's presence in

South West Africa were uninterested for the moment. Their only thought was that political action must be resorted to once again, now that

H^The reporter showed bias by omitting Paris and only referring to Anglo-Saxon capitals.

H gLe Monde, July 20, 1966. 263

Judicial remedy had not produced the desired effe ct.

African reaction to the 1966 judgment of the International Court of Justice was understandable, one of utter bitterness. Characterizing the Court's 1966 decision as "tinged by racism and the old regime of colonialism", President Tubman remarked:

The decision of the Court that applicants had no legal interest in the case... and after.its previous determination in December 1962, that applicants did have a legal interest and the Court had ju risdictio n to determine the case on its merits, savour of cauistry and legal pyrotechnics which is, to say the least, most surprising and puzzling. In fa c t, i t generates unpleasant sus- pisions about the Court... The one thing to the credit of the Court in this case, and I am happy that one thing does exist, is that i t has proved that a ll members of the Court have not bowed their knees to Baal [reference to the dissenting opinions]...120

Thus the bitterness was especially true in the case of Liberia, a country dedicated by history and temperament to the rule of law. But dedication to the law did not mean that Liberia would not avail herself of other avenues to accelerate the end of South A frica's control of South West

Africa. As Mr. Grimes put i t in the 1961 general debate in the General

Assembly, Liberia (and Ethiopia) had brought a contentious action against

South Africa in the International Court of Justice "but welcomes further action that the General Assembly may take..." to restore self-determin­ ation and human dignity to South West AfricaJ21 it was, therefore, in this light - pursuit of a legal battle as well as the pursuit of the

120R. E. Townsend and A. Bowen Jones (Eds) The O ffic ia l Papers of W.V^. Tubman, President of the Republic of Liberia (London: Longman Greens and Company, L td ., 1968).

statement of His Excellency J. Rudolph Grimes, Secretary of State of Liberia before the Sixteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (General Debate), p. 14

* 264

politico-moral battle - that Liberia continued to act on the matter.

One must point out here that this attitude was by no means unique to

Liberia. In a sense, all other African states held this position on the question.

This African attitude was fu lly reflected in the General Assembly

almost immediately after the contentious proceedings were instituted.

Impatient with the snail's pace at which the principles of self-deter­ mination and human rights were extended to dependent areas and peoples

in Africa, the General Assembly, essentially on African urgings, moved

from a policy of conciliation in the matter to one of action. First to

come was the encompassing Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514, XV, 1960). Then the specifics followed. The Committee on South West Africa made a c ritic a l report on the African territo ry administered by South Africa on the

"basis of apartheid and white supremacy". Upon South Africa's refusal to cooperate with the Committee on the grounds that the dispute was sub judice (before the Court), the General Assembly was urged to look into the possibility of terminating the Mandate over South West A fric a .122

Other moves made by the Assembly in regard to the question included these: In 1961, the Committee on South West Africa was replaced by a

"Special Committee" charged with devising ways and means for preparing

122l)riited Nations, ORGA, 16th Session, Supplement No. 12A (A/4926) 1961, pp. 3-22. See also Amry Vandenbosch: South Africa and the World: The Foreiqn Policy of Apartheid (University of Kentucky Press, 1970] p. 220. 265 the territo ry for independence. The Special Committee was dissolved in

1962, and its functions transferred to the Committee of Twenty-Four (re­ sponsible for implementing Resolution 1514, XV).

In response to some of the developments in the United Nations the

South African Government appointed, in September of 1962, a Commission of experts to draft a five-year plan for the material and social progress of the inhabitants of South West Africa. Frans H. Odendaal, Administra­ tor of the Transvaal, was its Chairman. The Odendaal Commission, as i t came to be known, recommended what amounted to the Bantustan p o l i c y 123

(practiced in South Africa) being extended to the Territory. South Af­ rica was urged by the Committee of Twenty-Four not to implement the Commission's recommendations.124

(e) The Return to Political Action

When the "shock from the Hague" came in 1966, the General Assembly took fu ll note and, in a sense, fe ll back to its 1960 position. This is to say that the Assembly resumed the vigorous political action that i t had temporarily scaled down during the period of concurrent juridical and political actions.

The Assembly considered the matter from September 23, 1966 to Oc­ tober 27, 1966. The debate covered the Court's pronouncements, the rig ht, of the people of the territory, and the policy and attitude of South Af­ rica vis-a-vis South West Africa.

123otherwise known as the "homelands" policy, i t sought to create "White and Black spots" of African and non-African areas in South West Africa. 124vandenbosch, op. c i t . , p. 222. 266

States of Africa together with a few others, united in urging other actions in the matter since the political and legal avenues were exhausted. The opinion prevailed that South Africa had not been exon­ erated by the Court, but that Ethiopia and Liberia had been denied the right to activate the Court. As a United States Government declaration of July 28, 1966, put it :

The Judgment of July 18 has not diminished the legal authority of these Advisory Opinions (1950, 1955, 1956). They remain basic and authoritative statements of the ICJ on important substantive legal questions, including the existence and scope of South Af­ rica's obligations and rights of inhabitants of South West Africa. They provide essential legal guidance for the conduct of a ll con­ cerned.

Secretary Grimes agreed that "the 1966 Judgment leaves the Court's ru l­ ings in the Advisory Opinions of these issues unimpaired and unshaken"

On a move in itia te d by Ghana on September 17, 1966, and joined by

52 Afro-Asians, the General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring that

South Africa, having failed "to insure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa", and having "in fact disavowed the mandate", i t henceforth would cease to ad­ minister the territory. With the mandate terminated, South West Africa was brought "under the direct responsibility of the United N a t i o n s " .^ 6

125united States Statement quoted by Liberia's Secretary of State, Mr. Grimes, in his 1966 Statement in the General Assembly in reply to the Statement of the South African representative on South West Africa, October 7, 1966, p. 4.

United Nations, ORGA, 21st Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/6316), Resolution No. 2145 (X X I), October 28, 1966, pp. 2-3. 267

Eventually a United Nations Commission was set up to administer the te r­ ritory with a view to preparing the inhabitants for rapid self-deter­ mination and independence.

A number of other resolutions were passed, both by the General As­ sembly and the Security Counci 1, all tending in the direction toward implementing and furthering the provisions of Resolution 2145 (XXI) of

October 28, 1966. By Resolution 2372 (XXII) of June 12, 1968, the As­ sembly changed the name of South West Africa to that of Namibia "in accordance with the desire of its people".

But South Africa had taken a strong stand regarding the United

Nations administration of Namibia. South Africa's Premier, Mr. John

Voster, consistently refused to permit the entry of any United Nations

Official into the territory. In a declaration, he said: "We shall adopt a strong attitude because I am convinced that i f we show the slightest sign of weakness, they w ill chase us t i l l we can run no more, and this the people of South Africa w ill never do." The opposition leader, S ir de V illie rs Graaf, fu lly supported this position by commenting - "to hand over the territory was unthinkable".127

What has clothed the South African position with even greater sig­ nificance is the fact that in almost all of the Namibia key resolutions,

France, the United Kingdom and the United States followed a policy of

127The Star (Johannesburg) Weekly Air Edition, March 30, 1968 (for the Prime Minister's Statement) and October 28, 1967 for the opposition leader's comment. Both of these are mentioned in Vandenbosch, o jd . c i t . , pp. 223-224. See also United Nations Monthly Chronicle, November 1966, pp. 20-26 268 systematic abstention.

(f) The Continuing United Nation Debate

The most recent debate on the question of Namibia took place in the Security Council in the Fall of 1971. The primary purpose of the meeting was to examine the June 1971 Advisory Opinion of the Interna­ tional Court of Justice on the question of Namibia.

I t must be recalled that the General Assembly had by Resolution

2145 (XVI) terminated South Africa's Mandate over Namibia. To ensure

South Africa's compliance, the cooperation of the Security Council was enlisted by virtue of A rticle 11:2 of the United Nations Charter. The

Council upheld the Assembly's action in its Resolution 264 (1969), and reaffirmed in "Resolution 276 (1970), the essence of the resolution of the Assembly and referred to i t as the decision of the United Nations

"that the Mandate of South West Africa was terminated". In operative

Paragraph 2 (Res. 276), the Security Council declared that "the contin­ ued presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is ille g a l" , and that as a result, all acts taken by the Government of South Africa

"on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are ille g a l and in v a lid "J 28

The June 1971 Advisory Opinion of the Court came in response to a question put to i t by the Security Council in accordance with Article

96:1 of the Charter and A rticle 65 of the Statute of the International

128"Advisory Opinion of the ICJ" in Objective: Justice, preprint from Vol. 3, No. 4, October 1971, 18 pages (a United Nations Publication). 269

Court of Justice. In Security Council resolution 284 (1970), the fo l­ lowing question was asked: "What are the legal consequences fo r States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding

Security resolution 276 (1970)?" The Court replied in this wise:

(1) th a t, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being ille g a l, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the T erritory; (2) that States members of the U.N. are under obligation to recognize the ille g a lity of South A frica's presence in Namibia and the in v a lid ity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Na­ mibia, and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recog­ nition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to , such presence and administration; (3) that i t is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the U.N. to give assistance, within the scope of sub-paragraph (2) above, in the action which has been taken by the U.N. with regard to Namibia.129

When the Security Council convened in September 1971, before i t was the report of the Ad Hoc sub-committee on Namibia - S/10330, con­ taining the Court's Advisory Opinion among other things. Also before the Council were notes (S/10326) from a number of African Governments, including Liberia, requesting participation in the discussion of the item without the voting right.

At the 1585th Meeting on September 28, 1971, the Liberian Secre­ tary of State intervened in the debate. After making pointed legal ar­ guments to refute the contentions of South Africa and other Governments not far from its position on the international status of Namibia and the

129Quoted in Objective: Justice, Vol. 3, No. 4, October, November, December 1971, p. 48. A fu ll analysis of the Advisory Opinion is found on pp. 30-50. 270 competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council in termin­ ating the Mandate, Mr. Grimes came down to the politics of the problem.

No amount of "legal pyrotechnics" could conceal the fact that

South Africa's Mandate over Namibia had been legally terminated due to that Government's repeated failu re to live up to its responsibilities.

There was equally no way of keeping secret the fact that South Africa had persisted in its defiance o f, and contempt fo r, the United Nations because of encouragement from "a variety of external influences". This encouragement, of an economic and p olitical nature, came chiefly from the major powers of the Security Council. I t was those powers, upon whom the United Nations Charter had placed the primary responsibility for keeping the peace, that were "indirectly supporting South Africa through investment and trade, in defying the w ill of the international community" J 30 The point was illustrated by reference to an article in

Afrika: "A Review of German-African Relations", Vol. 12, No. 4, 1971.

The review reports the following: Total American private investment in

Sub-Sahara Africa was about $1,500 million with "$700 million in South

Africa alone". South African statistics show that the Soviet Union ex­ ported in the fir s t six months of 1969, $500,000 worth of goods, and that following the 1963 arms embargo on South Africa, i t received from the USSR "auxiliary equipment such as instruments, electronic testing appliances, spare parts and explosives". Between 1960 and 1969, French

130United Nations, S/PV 1585, September 28, 1971, pp. 3-13. 271

trade with Pretoria doubled. The perhaps startlin g revelation was that the People's Republic of China (then not a United Nations Member, but nevertheless bound by United Nations decisions under Charter Article

2:6) traded with Pretoria to the tune of 15 million United States dol­ lars by 1969.131

Secretary Grimes concluded by calling upon the Secretary General to "collect and circulate" data on South Africa's trade relations with

Member States of the United Nations. Economic sanctions against South

Africa under Article 41, he fe lt, were called for as a means of giving some teeth to United Nations resolutions respecting the territory of Namibia J32

In his second statement before the Security Council, Mr. Grimes appealed for a unanimous vote on draft resolution S/10372, jointly spon­ sored by the African members of the Council. The draft resolution in essence upheld the Court's Advisory Opinion.

Unanimity was asked fo r because there were no legal doubts: "The

General Assembly made a determination, this Council fo rtifie d that de­ cision of the Assembly, and the International Court of Justice supported the decision of the Assembly and this Council, and outlined the legal consequences of the situation." That much had been accepted by "the

Government of Liberia and all other States of the Organization of African Unity",133

131 United Nations, S/PV 1585, September 28, 1971, pp. 14-16.

132 lb id , pp. 28-30. 133united Nations, S/PV 1594, October 14, 1971,. pp. 6-18. 272

There were no doubts as to the facts of the matter either. There was ample evidence that South Africa had by her policy of systematic racism denied herself the "sacred trust of civilizatio n ".

At the 1598th meeting on October 20, 1971, the Security Council adopted draft resolution S/10372/Rev. 1, reaffirming "that the Territory of Namibia is the direct responsibility of the United Nations and that this responsibility includes the obligations to support and promote the rights of the people of Namibia in accordance with General Assembly res­ olution 1514 (XV) ..." In operative Paragraph 5, the Council "takes note with appreciation of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971", and "endorses the Court's opinion expressed

in paragraph 133 of the Advisory Opinion" (this is the specific reply to

the question asked by the Security Council and quoted above). Finally the Council declared in operative Paragraph 9 of the resolution "that

any further refusal of the South African Government to withdraw from

Namibia could create conditions detrimental to the maintenance of peace

and security in the region. .."134 The vote was 13-0-2, France and the

United Kingdom being the abstainees.

Summary The question of Namibia (South West Africa) remains unresolved de­

spite the many resolutions of the United Nations that have now been en­

dorsed by the June 1971 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of

Justice. The key element at this juncture is the refusal of the

134underlining is the writer's. 273

Government of South Africa to accept either the verdict of the United

Nations or the "legal guidance" that the recent Advisory Opinion repre­ sents.^ All of this is buttressed by both covert and overt encourage­ ment from the big powers of the United Nations its e lf.

From the inception of the United Nations, Liberia has been op­ posed to South Africa's attempts at violating its obligations under the

League of Nations. Liberia was equally critical of South Africa's re­ fusal to join other administering authorities in placing mandated ter­ rito ries under United Nations Trusteeship. When the possibility for instituting proceedings against South Africa presented its e lf , Liberia seized this opportunity to work actively in behalf of African freedom.

Together with Ethiopia she labored for no less then six years in the e ffo rt. The end result was fa r from encouraging. The International

Court of Justice by its 1966 judgment remitted Liberia and other foes of colonialism and racism " ... to the abitrament of power". The way out remains as uncharted as the way out of the apartheid dispute. As

Faye Carroll observed, "a solution, when i t does come, w ill have to turn on the heart of the problem which is politics and race, not law"J36

135jn a radio broadcast to his people following the June 1971 Advisory Opinion, Premier Voster called the Opinion a product of "po­ lit ic a l maneuver" and pressures, and said that South Africa would con­ tinue to administer the area "with a view to self-determination for a ll population groups". See New York Times, "World Court Rules Against South Africa on Territory". June 22, 1971, p. 3.

136carroll, o£. c i t . , p. 112. CONCLUSIONS

What may one conclude about Liberian foreign policy as revealed

in the foregoing United Nations case studies? The first"observation

is that the cases confirm the most prominent facets of Liberia's pol­

icy which are: (1) oscillation between the principle of nonalignment

and de facto alignment with the "free world", and (2) anticolonial ism.

Traditionally, Liberia's foreign policy has been of a diploma­

tic a lly defensive nature. This was so because of the apparent hostil­

ity of the milieux (local and external) in which the nation emerged.1

All energy was amassed in what seemed one great effo rt to safeguard

political independence. In the pursuit of this objective, Liberia

sought and obtained sporadic assistance from her historical mentor,

the United States. Contacts on both the official and unofficial levels

marked the relationship over the years. During and following the sec­

ond World War, the relationship, especially at the official level, was

intensified. Throughout the Tubman period, Liberia strove to remain

"a strong, healthy, trusted and tried ally of the Free World", but often

^iebenow has listed the following as sources of the hostility: Indigenous Liberians (local), the French and British Colonialists who were Liberia's immediate neighbors, and occasionally freebooting slave traders. See G. J. Liebenow: "Which Road to Pan African Unity? The Sanniquellie Conference, 1959", pp. 1-32 in G. Carter (ed), Politics ln Africa, 7 Cases (1966); and Liberia, the Evolution of Privilege TTthaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969) p. 189. Robert Smith and other authors have dealt with these sources under different headings. See R. Smith, We Are Obligated: An Interpretative Analysis of Twenty-Five Years of Progressive Leadership (Hamburg: Hanseatische Druckenstalt, 1969) pp. 50-51. 275

strayed from this stance on questions of colonialism and racialism.

Relations with Africa were almost non-existent prior to the onset

of organized African nationalism. While anti-colonialism in Liberian

policy may be traceable to the ideals embodied in the nation's basic

documents - the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution - as

well as her a ffilia tio n s with international organizations beginning with the League of Nations, Liberia's commitment to "fight for total

liberation"^ of Africa is rather recent.

All sorts of dates have been advanced for the start of this com­ mitment or the elevation of African liberation to a key foreign policy

concern on the part of the government. Liberian O fficials would trace

it to the late 1940's, when Liberia began to make financial and other

forms of contributions to aspiring African nationalists. There are

those who would date i t to the 1955 Bandung Conference, when Afro-Asian

solidarity was first formalized. S till others would point to the April

1958 Accra gathering following Ghana's independence. All of the above

purported dates bear some significance, but overshadowing them a ll is the fact that practical anti colonial ism was for Liberia a means of

neutralizing a tra d itio n a lly hostile environment and thus avoiding the woes, almost inevitable, of isolation in Africa. If in the past Liberia was perforce more concerned about establishing ties with entities ex­ ternal to Africa, the transformation that the second world conflict has

2The phrase is Tubman's. See his Fifth Inaugural Address, Janu­ ary 1964 in R. E. Townsend and A. B. Jones (Eds), The O ffic ia l Papers of W. V_. :S. Tubman, President of the Republic of Liberia (London: Long mans Green and Company, Ltd, 1968) p. 105. 276

wrought on the international community made necessary to create special

relationships, not only with the political entities of the new Africa,

but also with many states of the generic "third world".

The cases on international peace do not confirm United States-

Liberia policy a ffin ity across the board. Only on the question of the

representation of China is there a clearcut confirmation of the policy

a ffin ity . The primary reason for this was the congruence of Tubman's

declared h o s tility to the concept and practice of Communism with the

American policy of containing Communism. This policy congruence led

to another development: The American use of "foreign aid" in the pur­

suit of containment - and this idea is closely linked to Taiwan's aid

to Africa - was fu lly acceptable to an economically developing Liberia

committed to the ideal of Western democracy and the free enterprise

system. I t was in this lig h t that Liberia supported, to the very end,

the United States policy on China which developed over the years from one of a moratorium on discussing the item to one of quarantining the

Peking regime.

The new American policy move of attempting to seek accommodations with Peking, even while the United Nations debated the representation question, seemed to have left unaffected the position of Liberia.3

Even while the United States experienced some d iffic u lty in trying to

3Illu s tra tiv e of the mood of the United States Government was this comment of a United States O fficial: "We have to fight the good fight, but if we lose, I don't think we'll suffer much damage". Quoted in Newsweek, August 16, 1971, pp. 31-32. 277

convince its e lf about a two-China attitude, especially at the 26th Ses­

sion of the General Assembly in 1971, Liberia continued to adhere to

the traditional line.

This was so unlike Guinea, which upon acceding to independence

in 1958, declared fo r, and continued to sustain, a policy of seating

Peking and expelling Taiwan. One must, in a ll fairness, however, ap­

preciate the factors that condition Guinea's policy. After a ll, the

sudden break with France that necessitated a turn to "radical" govern­ ments for assistance, could not leave unaffected the political outlook

of the Guinean regime. Beyond th is, there is a rather sharp contrast between the political philosophy of Tubman and that of Tour§. In much

of Africa, the conviction of the leader plays a key role in the nation's

political orientation.

At another level of analysis, Guinea's China policy could be judged as more realistic because it is directed to joining forces with the nations and peoples who share her problems - the third world. In this regard, Liberia's policy continued to be traditional - directed to closeness with the United States, irrespective, i t seems, of possible damages to Afro-Asian solidarity.

On the apartheid question, Liberia's opposition to racism is af­ firmed. Unlike the Congo question, where policy a ffin ity with the United

States is ultimately confirmed, i t is d iffic u lt, i f at all possible, to find instances of Liberian equivocation on the apartheid issue. Here one could conclude that radicalism has marked Liberian policy. This means that there has been an identity of views between Guinea and 278

Liberia on the question of apartheid. Even when Africa seemed s p lit on the issue of "dialogue" with the Pretoria regime, Liberia and Guinea re­ mained united in opposing any accommodation with apartheid until the white supremists were w illing to activate, in the words of the Lusaka

Manifesto, an "internal dialogue" with the majority of their fellow citizens.

The United States, i t must be noted, does not support apartheid as such. But the South African policy of Washington is so riddled with internal contradictions that one is led to infer from the issue of race relations in America, that the United States has opted for walking a p olitical tight rope to a policy that would, at the least, hit Pretoria where it hurts - economics. Liberia's and Africa's pol­ icy advocating mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa is dismissed by the United States and its friends as impractical.

Of the three questions of international peace, the Congo Crisis seemed the most complex. Whereas, in the case of China, i t seemed a rather clearcut cold-war issue, and in the apartheid case, one of pro­ moting human rights in order to avert racial bipolarity, the Congo was a case of neo-colonialist threat to the territorial integrity of a new

African state enmeshed in the cold war. The conditioning influence of the cold war on the positions of the states introduced more complexi­ ties . Support for the United Nations Forces in the Congo (ONUC) did not, for instance, represent unreserved support for the United Nations, because ONUC its e lf was subjected to the pressure of international pol­ itics. In spite of the complexities, however, the positions of Liberia 279 vis-a-vis that of the United States, and of Guinea are discernible as set forth in the case study.

Most United Nations members supported the creation of ONUC and desired a neutralist role for the United Nations in the Congo. Events

leading to the constitutional crisis resulted in a fundamental revision of policies. With the world and Africa split as to which of two lead­ ers to support - Joseph Kasavubu or Patrice Lumumba - there seemed to emerge, slowly but surely, a United States-Liberia policy a ffin ity .

Lumumba was branded a Communist by the Western press while Kasavubu retained a pro-Western image. Once the constitutional crisis was re­ solved in favor of Kasavubu, the West had won. Only the problem of

Katanga remained outstanding.

The East-West battle was transferred to the Katanga issue. While the East wanted Katanga's secession ended in order to help Lumumba-

Gizengist elements regroup for the political battle of control of the central government, the West wanted i t ended in order to deal better with "the diversionary activities of Antoine Gizenga".^ ONUC (and L i­ beria claims policy a ffin ity here) wanted Katanga's rebellion ended so that peace could be established with the Congo having its territorial integrity restored.

When temporary peace did come with the end of the Katangese

^The expression is United States Under Secretary of State George B all's. See his "The Elements of our Congo Policies", Department of State Publications (Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office De­ cember 1961) No. 7326, p. 19. 280

secession, the Congolese political faction in control continued to be

pro-West. Shortly afterwards, the secessionist Tshomb6 was restored

to respectability for a brief period, by being named Prime Minister of

the Central Government. There was then no doubt as to where the Congo

stood, at least, ideologically. If only by default, the United States-

Liberia policy a ffin ity was confirmed in the Congo c ris is , fo r in the

end Western, not pan-African nationalist, influence remained pervasive.

The three colonial questions - the former Italian colonies, Al->

geria, and South West Africa examined above, confirm Liberia's an ti-

colonial stance. But pressures, possibly from the United States, were made manifest at certain points. In addition to the American pressure

factor on Liberian anti-colonialism there was the African pressure factor.

While Liberia's position on the disposal of the former Ita lia n

colonies was overall one of positive anti-colonialism, there was at least one instance of equivocation in the Liberian attitude. Prior to the final voting on the fate of Somali 1land, Liberia had indicated its opposition to the designation of Italy as the Administering Authority for the territory. Rather than casting a categorical "no" vote in the end, Liberia abstained and Ethiopia voted against. This Liberian vote was perhaps a direct response to British reassurance that Ita ly was re­ turning to Africa under the light of international publicity. Ought there be much d iffic u lty in linking this to mild pressures from the

United States?

The Algerian question showed an undecided Liberia up to 1958. 281

This was probably a reflection of the pro-French attitudes of the Eisen­ hower administration as those attitudes were brought to bear on a L i­ beria floating in the ocean of European colonialism in Africa. From the Fall of 1958 onwards, Liberia adhered to the majority position of

Afro-Asia - unreserved support for the Algerian nationalists and th e ir rightful claims to self-determination. The fact that pressures from

Africa led to this clearcut Liberian position in 1958, was echoed in a statement by a Liberian spokesman in the United Nations.

Liberia had taken part in the Conference of Independent African States, held in Accra in April 1958, at which a unanimous reso­ lution had called for the end of hostilities in Algeria and pro­ claimed Algeria's right to independence. Liberia was determined to support that position in the U.N. until the objectives of that resolution had been achieved.5

Because of the racial facet of the South West Africa question, the position of Liberia was consistently in harmony with that of the majority of Africa. In fact, Liberia's role in the African attempt to wrest the mandated te rrito ry from its South African Mandatory has been pronounced. It was Liberia (together with Ethiopia), who took South

Africa to court on behalf of Africa and the world of decent people.

The political, rather than juridical, 1966 judgment of the Internation­ al Court of Justice led to great disappointment fo r the anti-colonial

- an ti-racial forces. Since then, the United Nations has attempted to place the territory under its direct jurisdiction, and in this it has received the blessing of the 1971 Advisory Opinion of the World Court.

5united Nations, 0R6A, 13th Session, 1021st Meeting of First Committee, p. 370. 282

But the problem of Namibia remains outstanding, primarily because i t is so closely tied in with the apartheid issue.

President Tubman started out in 1944, by establishing a foreign policy guideline for Liberia that aligned her, rather unequivocally, with the Western World. In this he was following Liberia's general traditional policy. As the independence movements in Africa gathered momentum, he took a step forward, or perhaps deviated s lig h tly , and committed Liberia to "fight for total liberation" of Africa "as long as the ... continent remains partly free and partly under foreign mi­ nority domination". This was the new departure in Liberian policy.

This new policy departure was to be pursued vigorously on racial is ­ sues, but its pursuit was not as clearcut on colonial issues enmeshed in power politics.

In the prosecution of her anti-colonial policy, Liberia collab­ orated with the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, the principal forum of the decolonization debate. There is no need fo r confusion regarding Western-oriented Liberia's a ffilia tio n with a declared non- aligned Afro-Asia. Liberia is a fringe, not an "in-group" member of the Afro-Asian bloc.® This also may be true of a number of other mem­ bers of this loose caucusing group.

®Hovet says that during the 13th General Assembly Liberia (and Ethiopia) opposed the majority of the African component of the group in 9.0 percent of the votes, a percentage he characterizes as compar­ atively high. See Thomas Hovet, Jr. Africa in the United Nations, (Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 12B-137). 283

But Liberia's non-conformist tendencies do not decrease her need to associate with the Afro-Asian group. She cannot,iMgo i t alone". In order that her participation in international parliamentary diplomacy be effective, Liberia needs the group. And so we find her, in all of the case studies except for the China question, working with the group for policy outputs generally reflective of the interests of Africa, the third world, and the international community.

Is there a conflict in the two major facets of Liberia's policy?

Can one figh t for "total liberation" of Africa at the same time that one remains in de facto terms, aligned to those who, from th eir vantage point, perhaps see no need for "total liberation"? Is one then s t ill totally committed to liberation?

Since i t is the residue of Western European colonialism that one is fighting, would not a policy of genuine nonalignment better serve the national interest? It seems that one could then, more effectively do battle against colonialism's remnants at the same time that one ob­ tains from any ideological camp, loans and other necessities for eco­ nomic development.7 To do this would be to tie one's.-destiny with A

A frica's, rather than with a people who have for too long, i t seems, taken Liberia and Liberians for granted, a people who, whatever pre­ dilections may be entertained, are going to alter their international

^As a result of her new links with Asia and Europe, not to men­ tion the new ties with Africa, Liberia has greater maneuverability in the drive for external material assistance. This w riter is of the opinion that the refusal to risk the loss of privileged American as­ sistance sprang from the need on the part of the regime (not the State) to maintain itself in power indefinitely. 284 relationships to suit their changing interests, even if this means shedding tried and tested allies of the "free world".8

There was perhaps ample justification for a pro-American or pro-

Western leaning in Liberian policy during the colonial era. No such justification exists today. Indeed the post-war era is conducive to a more pro-African or independent Liberian leaning. The adoption of the la tte r attitude would add speed to the decolonization process underway in the colonial residues,for Liberia's voice is not without echo in

Africa. The alienation that a more independent Liberian policy would cause the West could, i f s k illfu lly managed, modestly increase the in­ stance of African oneness.

The new administration of President William R. Tolbert has yet to indicate any change in either the substance or the emphasis of L i­ berian foreign policy. The way this regime balances Liberia's tradi­ tional pro-Western leaning with her African solidarity w ill not leave unaffected the international relations of Africa.

8Liberia should begin to draw lessons from United States policy moves regarding the China/Taiwan issues, as well as the American dis­ engagement from Vietnam. A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Farajallah, Boutros. Le Groupe Afro-Asiatique Dans Le Cadre Des Nations Unies. Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1963.

Townsend, E. Reginald (ed). President Tubman of Liberia Speaks. Lon­ don: Consolidated Publications Company, LtH*., 1969, 2nd Edition.

______and Jones, A Bowen, (eds). The O fficial Papers of W. V. S. Tubman, President of the Republic of Liberia. London: Longmans Green and Company, Ltd., 1968.

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Aron, Raymond. L'Algerie et la Republigue. Paris: PIon, 1958.

Azikiwe, Nmandi. Liberia in World P o litics. New York: Negro Univer­ sities Press, reprinted 1970.

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Barros, Romeo Julius. African States and the United Nations Versus Apartheid: The Efforts of the African States to Affect South Af­ rica's Apartheid Policy Through the United Nations. New York: Carlton Press, 1967.

Bedjoui,M. La Revolution Algerienne et le Droit. BrussellesEditions de 1'Association International des Juristes Democrates, 1961.

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Behr, Edward. The Alqerian Problem. New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1962.

B ixler, Walter R. The Foreign Policy of the United States in Liberia. New York: Pageant Press, In c ., 1957.

Blum, Robert, Edited by A. Doak Barnett. The United States and China in World A ffa irs. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966.

Blyden, Edward W. C hristianity, Islam and the Negro Race. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1967.

Boczek, Boleslaw A. Flags of Convenience: An International Legal Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.

Boreham Gordon F. Economic Aid: A Sino-African Case Study. Taipei: China Publishing Company. (No date!

Bose, Robert. Le Tiers Monde dans la Politique Internationale. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1968. 292 Brown, George. The Economic History of Liberia. Washington, D. C.: r . . TheoAsspciarted Publishers,., 1941. :1 ^ ! : .p .r5

Brzezinski, Zbigniew (ed). Africa and the Communist World. Stanford University Press, 1963.

Buell, Raymond L. Liberia : A Century of Surviv a l. 1847-1947. Phila­ delphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947.

Burton, John W. (ed). Nonalignment. London: Andre Deutsch, Ltd. 1966.

Carey, M. Reflections on the Causes That Led to the Formation of the Colonization Society. Philadelphia: William F. Geddes, PuETisher, 1832.

Carrol1, Faye. South West Africa and the Uni ted Nations. Lexi ngton: University of Kentucky Press, 1967.

Carter, G. M. (ed). Liberia in Africa:' One Party State. Northwestern University Press, 1962.

Cassel1, C. Abayomi. Liberia: History of the First Afri can Republic. New York: Fountainhead Publishers, Inc., 1970.

Castaneda, Jorge. Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.

Cervenka, Zdenek. The Organization of African Unity and its Charter. New York, London: F. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969.

Clower, Robert W. et a l. Growth Without Development: An Economic Sur­ vey of Liberia. Northwestern University Press, 1966.

Chome, Jules. La Crise Congo!aise. Brussels: Editions de Remarques Congo!aise, 1960.

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Crabb, Cecil V. Jr. The Elephant and the Grass: A Study of Nonalign­ ment. New York, London: F. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965.

Crumwell, Alexander. The Future of Africa. New York: Scribner's Sons, 1862.

Cunard, Nancy and Padmore G. The White Man's Duty: An Analysis of the Colonial Question in the Light of the Atlantic Charter. London: W. H. Allen and Company, L td., 1942.

Emerson, Rupert. Africa and United States Policy. New Jersey: Pren- tice-Hall, 1967. 293

Esterhuisse, JJ. South West A frica, 1800-1894: The Establishment of German Authority. Capetown: C. Strutk, 1968.

Frankel, Joseph. The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

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Goldblatt, I. The Mandated Territory of South West Africa in Relation to the United States. Capetown: C. Struik, 1967.

Grosser, Alfred. La Politique Exterieure de la Jeune Republique. Paris: Editions du Senil, 1965.

Hadayatullah, M. The South West Africa Case. London: Asian Publish­ ing House, 1967.

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Ismael, T. G. The United Arab Republic in A frica, Egypt's Policy Under Nasser. Northwestern University Press, 1971.

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Kay, David A. The New Nations in the United Nations^, 1960-67. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 294

Larus, Joel (ed). From Col 1ecti ve Securi ty to Prevent! ve Pi piomacy: Readings in International Organization and the Maintenance of Peace; New York: Johnliiley and Sons, '1965.

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Liebenow, Gus J. Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969.

M arinelli, Lawrence A. The New Liberia. New York, London: F. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964.

McLaughlin, Russel U. Foreign Investment and Development in Liberia. New York, London: F. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966.

Mori son, David. The USSR and Africa 1945-1963. Oxford: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1964.

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Neil sen, Walemar A. The Great Powers and Africa. New York, London: F. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969.

African Battleline. New York: Harper and Rowe, Publishers. 1969 .

Nkrumah, Kwame. The Challenge of the Congo. New York: International Publishers, 1967.

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Pickles, Dorothy. A1geria and France: From Colonialism to Cooperation. New York, London: F. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1963.

Pomeroy, William J. Apartheid Axis: United States and South Africa. New York: International Publishers, 1971.

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Romulo, Carlos P. The Meaning of Bandung. Chapel H ill: The Univer­ sity of North Carol i na Press, ”15B6”. 295

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Shurki, M. The Concept of Self-Deterriri hati oh i h the Uni ted Nati ons. DamascusTadidan Press, 1965

Simpson, C. L. The Symbol of Liberia, Memoirs. London: The Diplo­ matic Press and Publishing Company, 1961.

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Smith, Robert. We Are Obligated:. An Interpretative Analysis of Twenty- Five Years of Progressive Leadership. Hamburg: Hanseatische, 1969.

Thian, Doudou. La Politique Etrangere des Etats Africains. Paris Presses Universitaires de France, 1963.

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Vandenbosch, Amry. South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid. Lexington: The Universityof Kentucky Press, 1970.

Walters, F. P. £ History of the League of Nations. London: Oxford University Press, 1952. "(Vol. 2) Wauters, Arthur. Le Monde Communiste et Crise du Congo Beige. Brussels: Editions de r in s t it u t <3e Sociologie Solway, 1961.

West, Richard. Back to Africa: A History of Sierra Leone and Liberia. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970.

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2. Books: Parts of Series

Good, Robert C. "The Congo Crisis: A Study of Post-Colonial Politics." Martin, Lawrence (ed). Neutralism and Nona!ignment. New York; London: F. A. Praeger, Publishers, 1963.

Hoskyns, Catherine (ed). Case Studies in African Diplomacy. No. 1, "The OAU and the Congo Crisis, 1964-657n Published for the In­ stitute of Public Administration, University College Dawes Salaam. London: Oxford University Press, 1969. 296

Huherich, Charles. A Political and Legislative History of Liberia. New York: Central Book Company, In c ., 1947. Vol. I I . Liebenow, Gus J. "Which Road to Pan-African Unity? The Saniquelli Conference, 1959" in G. Carter (ed). Politics in Africa - 7 Cases. 1966.

______"Liberia" in Coleman, James S. and Roseberg, Carl G. (eds). Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa. Berkley: University of California Press, 1970.

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3. Pub!ications of the Government, Learned Societies and Other Organizations

Acimovie, Ljubive (ed). Nonalignment in the World Today. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1969.

B a ll, Margaret H. "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly". Interna­ tional Organization, February 1951, Volume 5, No. 1, pp. 3-31.

Bunche, R. L. Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories in the Charter of the United Nations. United States Department of State B u lletin , Volume 17. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Chronique de Politique Etrangere. "La Crise Congolaise", X III, Nos.4-6, July-November 1960; "Evolution de la Crise Congolaise", XIV, Nos. 5-6, September-November 1961; "L'O.N.U. et le Congo", XV, Nos. 4-6, July-November 1962. Brussels: In s titu t Royal des Relations In te r­ nationales.

Dalton, George. History, Politics and Economic Development in Lib eria. Program of African Studies; reprint Series No. 3. Evanston: North- western University, 1966, pp. 569-591.

Djermakoye, I . The United Nations and Decolonization. New York:, 1970

Duroselle, Jean-Baptist et Meyrait, Jean. La Communaute Internationale Face Aux Jeunes Etats. sous la direction de Centre D'Etude des Relations Internationales, Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, No. 126, Paris: L ib ra irie Armand C ollin, 1964.

Politiques Nationales Envers les Jeunes Etats, No. 131. Paris: L ib rairie Armand- C o llin , 1964. 297

Duroselle, continued.

LesNouveaux Etats Dans les Relations Internationales, No. 121, Paris: Librairie Armand Collin, 1962.

Emerson, Rupert. Self-Detefmi hation ReVised in the Era of Decoloni- zation. Center of International Studies, Cambridge: Harvard University, 1965.

______Colonialism, Poli ti cal DeVelopmerit and the Uni ted Nati ons. International Organization, Summer, 1965.

Esterhuisse, J. Second Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, 14*26 June 1960. Ministry of Information of the Imperial Ethiopian Government, 1960.

Hoffmann, Stanley. In Search of a Thread: The United Nations in the Congo Labyrinth. International Organization, Spring, 1962.

Imishue, R. W. South West Africa, An International Problem. London: Pall Mall, 1965.

Jacobsen, Kurt. "Some Aspects of United Nations Voting Patterns". Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association. Tall berg, Sweden: June 17-19, 1967, pp. 315-346.

Kay, D. A. The Impact of African States on the United Nations. Inter­ national Organization, Winter, 1969.

______The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations Political Process. International Organization, Autumn, 1967.

Karefa-Smart, John. Africa and the United Nations. International Or­ ganization, Summer, 1965.

Karunakaran, K. (ed). Outside the Contest: A Study of the Foreign Policy of Some Nonaligned Countries. New Delhi: Peoples Publish- ing House, 1963.

Keiser, Robert L. Liberia: A Report on the Relations Between the United' States and Liberia. Washington, D. C.: Government Pnntinq Office, 1928.

Laufer, Leopold. Israel and the Developing Countries: New Approaches to Cooperation. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1967.

League of Nations Report. C.658, M.272, VI. Geneva: December 15, 1930. 298

Lefever, Ernest W. Crisis in the Congo. Brookings Institute, 1965.

Leiss, Amelia C. (ed). Apartheid and the United Nations Collective Measures. New York: Carneqie Endowment for International Peace, 1965.

Munde, George Alfred. Domestic Politics and United Nations A c tiv itie s : The Cases of Rhodesia and South A frica. International Organi­ zation. Volume 21, No. 1, Winter, 1967.

Newcombe, Hanna, et a l. United Nations Voting Patterns. International Organization, Volume XXIV, No. 1, Winter, 1970.

Pollock, Alexander J. South West Africa Cases and the Jurisprudence of International Law. International Organization, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, Autumn, 1969.

R ivlin, Benjamin. The United Nations and the Ita lia n Colonies. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950.

Sady, Emil J. The United Nations and Dependent Peoples. Brookings Institute, 1956.

United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970. A Report to the Secretary of State, Department of State Publication 8575, General Foreign Policy Series 254. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, March 1971.

V ita l, David. The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.

4. Periodicals

Ake, C. "PanAfricanism and African Governments", Review of P o litic s , October 1967.

"Apartheid and Imperialism: A Study of United States Corporate In­ volvement in South Africa", Africa Today, Vol. 17, No. 5, Sep- tember-October 1970.

Arese, Franco. "La Politique Africaine des Etats Unis", Neuchatel, Editions de la Baconniere, 1945,.

Armstrong, 0. K. "Free China Gives Africa a Helping Hand", The Reader's Digest, Vol. 95, No. 571, November 1971.

Ayara, 0. "Africa's Dilemma in the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Pan- African Journal, Vol. 1, No. 273, 1968, p. 112. 299

Baily, Sydney. "United Nations Voting: Tyranny of the Majority", World Today, June 1966.

Bastid, Suzanne. "L1affaire du Sud-Oest Africain devant la cour international de justice", Journal du Droit International, 1967 (3), pp. 571-584.

Chalk, F. "The Anatomy of Investment: Firestone's 1927 Loan to Liberia", Canadian Journal of African Studies, 1 (1 ), March 1967, pp. 12-32.

"Chalk, DuBois and Garvey Confront Liberia: Two Incidents of the Cool- idge Years", Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, Npvember-December 1967.

Cole, Henry B. "Liberia's Role in a Changing West Africa", Journal of Human Relations, Vol. 8, Nos. 3-4, 1960, p. 612.

Davidson, Basil. "Pretoria vent rompre son isolement mais sans re- noncer a 1 'apartheid", Le Monde Diplomatique, No. 207, June 1971.

Decraene, Philippe. "Dix Ans d'Independences Africaines", Le Monde, 18-19 ju in , 1970, p. 5.

______"Liberia 1969: naissance d'une nation", Le Monde, 19 et 20-21 ju ille t , 1969, p. lo.

Dodge, D. "African Voting Cohesion in the United Nations", Afri can Report, October 1967.

Duggard, John. "The Revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 62, 1962, p. 78.

Dubois W. E. B. "The World and Africa* New York, 1947.

"Liberia, the Leaque and the United States", Foreiqn A ffairs, July 1933.

Ellis, G. W. "Liberia in the New Partition of West Africa", Journal of Race Development, 9, 1909.

Fox, Annette Baker. "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969", International Journal, (Toronto) Vol. 24, No. 4, Autumn 1969, pp. 715-764.

Gross, Ernest. "The South West Africa Case: What Happened?" Foreiqn A ffa irs , Vol. 45, No. 1 ,''October. 1966.

Heathcote, Nina, "United Nations and Nation Building" International Journal, (Canada) No. 1, Winter 1964-1965. 300

Higgins, R. "The International Court and South West Africa", Inter­ national A ffa irs , (London), October 1966.

Hoskyns, Catherine. "The African States and the United Nations: 1958- 1964", International Affairs, (London), July 1964.

Kerina, M. "South West Africa, the United Nations and the Internation­ al Court of Justice", African Forum, Vol. 2, No. 2, Fall 1966.

"Liberia: Tubman Par Lui-Meme", Jeune Afrique, No. 378 du le r au, 7 a v r il, 1968, p. 18.

Mackay, Mercedes. "Liberia Today", Contemporary Review, Vol. 206, No. 1190, March 1965, pp. 142-144.

Majerik, Avrahm G. "Colonialism and the United Nations: Decolonization Declaration, Committee of Twenty-Four, Neo-Colonialism, Border Questions, Africa's Colonial Heartland", International Review Service, New York, 1964.

Marof, A. "International Community and Crisis in Southern Africa", Pan-African Journal, Summer 1968.

Meyers, B. "African Voting in the United Nations General Assembly", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1966.

Nincie, Djura. "The United Nations and Non-Alignment", Review of International A ffa irs , Vol. 20, No. 468, October 5, 1969, pp. 7-8.

Pradham, R. G. "OAU and the Congo C risis", Africa Quarterly, January- March, 1968.

Rowe, Edward T. "The Emerging Anti-Colonial Consensus in the United Nations", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 8, 1964.

Schachter, Oscar. "Legal Aspects of United Nations Action in the Congo", American Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, 1961.

Siawecki, Leon, M. S. "Two Chinas in Africa", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 2, January 1965.

Sim, Yawsoon. "Taiwan and A frica", Africa Today, Vol. 18, No. 3, July 1971.

"Un Veteran du Pouvoir (Liberia)", Afrique Nouvelle, No. 1066, 1968.

Vandenbosch, Amry, "Small States in International P o litic s ", The Journal of P o litic s , May 1964. 301

Wesley, C. H. "The Struggle for the Recognition of Haiti and Liberia as Independent Republics", The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 2, October 1917.

5. Encyclopedia Articles

Porter, P. W. and Stanley, W. R. "Liberia", Encyclopedia Britannica, 1970. (Excerpt)

6. Published and Unpublished Materials

Barnard, Toye C. "The Position of Liberia on Major Issues Before the United Nations". Unpublished Master's Thesis, Western Reserve University, 1962.

Brown, Janet W. "Burmese Policy in the United Nations: An Analysis of Five Selected P o litical Questions". American University Library.

Clark, Melvin. "Relations Between the United States and Liberia". Unpublished Thesis, Clark University, 1930.

Jones, Hannah A. B. "The Struggle for P olitical and Cultural U nifi­ cation in Liberia, 1847-1930". Unpublished Doctor's Thesis, Northwestern University, 1962.

Jore, L. "La Republique de Liberia". Published Doctor's Thesis, University of Paris, 1911.

Lane, Robert B. "The United Nations Committee on South West Africa: 1953-61". Unpublished Master's Thesis, American University, 1963.

M itchell, John P. "America's Liberian Policy". Unpublished Doctor's Thesis, The University of Chicago, 1955.

Norris, Parthenia E. "United States and Liberia: The Slavery C risis, 1929-1935". Unpublished Doctor's Thesis, Indiana University, 1961.

Sherman, Charles D. "Economic Effects of Foreign Loans and Concessions in Liberia." Unpublished Master's Thesis, The American University, 1948.

Sun, A. Nusret. "La Discrimination Raciale et L'Organization des Nations Unies". These de Doctorat, Universite de Paris, 1954. 302

7. Newspapers

Baldwin, Hanson H. "Keys to French Struggle: A Man, An Army and the M ilitary Mind", The New York Times, February 22, 1962.

Fryklund, Richard. "Algerie Francaise, France is Stuck With a Slogan." The Evening Star. Washington, February 23, 1950.

Grimes, J. Rudolph. "Peace and Friendship are the Cornerstone of L i­ beria's Foreign Policy." The New York Times, July 25, 1965, Section I I .

Noyes, S. Crosly. "Algeria is Most Vexing of French Africa Issues." Sunday S tar, February 17, 1956. APPENDICES

I. Cooperation Agreement Between the United States and Liberia (1959)

I I . Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States and Liberia (1959)

I I I . 'Voice of America' Agreement (1959)

IV. Countries in which Liberia Maintains Diplomatic Representation as of 1970

V. United Nations Specialized Agencies of which Liberia is a Member

VI. Statement of the Liberian Representative Dr. T. 0. Dusumu-Johnson Before the Twenty-Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations • - ... 303

~ APPENDIX I ...... : " ......

TREATIES AND OTUER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 4303

COOPERATION

i 1 , ■ i

Agreement Between the U nited States of America i and Liberia

Signed at 'Washington July 8, 1959 APPENDIX I (continued)

LIBERIA

r 1. ' . . : Cooperation

Agreement signed at Washington July 8,1959; Entered into force July 8, 1959.

AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERN­ MENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE . GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA The Government of the United. States of America and the Govern­ ment of Liberia, Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations ;[l] Affirming their right to cooperate for their security and defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations; Recalling the unique relationship which has obtained between the peoples of the United States of America and Liberia for more than one hundred years; Considering that the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Liberia are founded upon similar constitutional principles; Considering further that the peoples of the United States of America and Liberia share a common democratic heritage; Recalling that the Government of the United States of America has traditionally regarded itself as the next friend of the Government of Liberia; and Reaffirming the historic interest of the Government of the United States of America in the preservation of the independence and terri­ torial integrity of Liberia; Have agreed as follows: A irriC L E I In the event of aggression or threat of aggression against Liberia, the Government of the United States of America and tlxe Government of Liberia will immediately determine what action may be appropriate for the defense of Liberia.

‘ TSO W ^O Stat, 1031. 40002—DO. (1) TIA S 4303 , . 305 APPENDIX 1 (continued) 2

A r t ic l e II The Government of the United States of America, in accordance with . applicable laws of the United States of America and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the Govern­ ment of tlie United States of America and the Government of Liberia, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish the Government of Liberia such assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the Govern­ ment of the United States of America and the Government of Liberia, in order to assist the Government of Liberia in the effective promotion of its economic development and .in the preservation of its national independence and integrity.

A r t ic l e III ?[ This Agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signa­ ture and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Government of written notice of the intention of the other Government to terminate it. i ...» ... D o n e at Washington, in duplicate, this eighth day of July, 1959.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

t - D o u g l a s D i l l o n

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF LIB ERIA:

G e o . P a d m o h e

T IA S 4303 tHO o rrK iiiiti 306 *

APPENDIX II* ' •

TREATIES AM) OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 2450

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE

Agreement between the

U nited States o f America

and L i b e r i a

• Effected by Exchange of Notes Signed at Washington November 16 and 19,1951 • Entered into force November 19,1951 307

APPENDIX I I (continued) ■0 .u :

■ -1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Publication4 6 8 3 - [Literal print}

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.Government P r in t in gOffice Washington 25, D.C. : Price 5 c o m

' ie

0 APPENDIX I I {co n tin u ed )

The Acting Secretary of State to the Liberian Ambassador

D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e W a s h in g t o n Nov 161961

E x c e l l e n c y : I have the honor to inform Tour Excellency that the Government of Liberia has been declared eligible to receive from the Government of the United States of America reimbursable military assistance under the provisions of Section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, 81st Congress), [*] as amended by Pub­ lic Law 621, 81st Congress, [2] and by the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (Public Law 165, S2nd Congress). [3] The provisions of these laws and the policy of the United States Government require that cer­ tain assurances be received before completing any transactions under ’ Section 408 (e) of the Act. It is the understanding of the United States Government that the Government of Liberia is prepared to accept the following under­ takings: 1. The Government of Liberia agrees to use any assistance furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, to further the policies and purposes of that Act which are to foster inter­ national peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations [’*] through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the principles and purposes of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles. The Government of Liberia further agrees to furnish equipment and materials, services, or other assistance, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the United States or to and among other nations eligible for assistance under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act to further the policies and purposes of this Act, as set forth above, and as may be mutually agreed hereafter. 2. The Government of Liberia is prepared to assure the United States Government that such equipment, materials, or services as may

a 63 Stat. 720. *0 4S ta t. 3 76 . *65 S ta t 373. . . ■ . * Treaty Series 993; 50 S ta t 1 03 1. iail 280 52 — 152 (1) APPENDIX I I (continued) T IA S 2450 2 be acquired from the United States under the provisions of Section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, are required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate, in the defense of the area of which it is a part, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state. 8. The Government of Liberia will not relinquish title to or posses­ sion of any equipment and materials, information or services fur­ nished under Section 40S (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as amended, without the consent of the United States Government. 4. The Government of Liberia will protect the security of any arti­ cle, service or information furnished under Section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. 5. The Government of Liberia understands that, prior to the trans­ fer of any item or the rendering of any service under this Act, the United States Government retains the right to terminate the trans­ action. 6. The Government of Liberia is prepared to accept terms and con­ ditions of payment for any item or service which may bo furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, which are in accord with the provisions of Section 408 (e) (2) of this Act. I have the honor to propose that this note, together with your reply confirming these assurances, constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Liberia, effective on the date of your note. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest considera­ tion. J a m e s E. W e b b His Excellency . C h a r l e s D. B. K i n g , . Ambassador of Liberia.

TAe Liberian Ambassador to the Acting Secretary of State

EMBASSY OF LIBERIA WASHINGTON NOVEMBER 19, 1951 M r . S e c r e t a r y : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency’s note dated November1 6 , 1 9 5 1 , conveying the happy information that the Government of Liberia has been declared eligible to receive from the Government of the United States of. America reimbursable mili- 3 -1 0

APPENDIX I I (continued)

3 TIAS 2450 taiy assistance under the provisions of Section 408 (e) of the Mutual. Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, 81st Congress), as amended by Public Law G21, 81st Congress, and by the Mutual Se­ curity Act of 1951 Public Law 105, 82nd Congress); and that the provisions of these laws and the policy of the United .States Govern­ ment require that certain assurances be received before completing any transactions under Section 408 (e) of the Act. In reply I have the honor to state that having telegraphically com­ municated to my Government, in Monrovia, the full text of Your Excellency’s note I have been instructed to convey to the American Government through you, the grateful appreciation of the Govern­ ment of Liberia for having been declared eligible to receive from the Government of the United States of America reimbursable military assistance under the provisions of Section 408 (e) of the Mutual De­ fense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, 81st Congress) as amended by Public Law 021,81st Congress, and by the Mutual Secur­ ity Act of 1951 (Public Law 1G5, 82nd Congress), with the under­ standing that the Government of Liberia is prepared to accept the undertakings specifically mentioned and numerically set out in Your Excellency’s note. I am further instructed to make known to Your Excellency the acceptance of the Government of Liberia of the undertakings specifi­ cally mentioned and numerically set out in Your Excellency’s note, and to assure the Government of the United States of America, of its strict observance of and complete compliance with said undertakings, as long as it is receiving from the Government of the United States of America reimbursable military assistance under the provisions of Section 408 (e) of the Mutual Defense Act of 1949. Your Excellency’s suggestion that your note, together with my reply covering the assurances required, constitute an agreement be­ tween the Government of the United States of America and the Gov­ ernment of Liberia, effective on the date of my reply to your note meets with the approval of my Government. Therefore, in this sense, my reply to Your Excellency’s note is to be so regarded. Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the renewed assurances of my highest esteem and consideration.

C . D . B . K i n g C. D. B. King Ambassador His Excellency T h e A c t in g S e c h e t a b y o r S t a t e Washington, D. C.

IT. I. CQYCRHMtJlf PRINTING OPPICCt

/ 311

APPENDIX I I I

LIBERIA

Telecommunications: 'Voice of America' Radio Relay Facilities

Agreement signed at Monrovia August 13, 1959 Entered into Force August 13, 1959

AGREEMENT

VOICE OF AMERICA RADIO RELAY FACILITIES

In consideration of their mutual interest in furthering international understanding and cooperation by promoting the exchange of information, the Government of the Republic of Liberia and the Government of the United States of America agree as follows:

Article 1^

The Republic of Liberia grants and extends to the United States of Amer­ ica the right and privilege to construct, operate and maintain radio facilities for the purpose of relaying programs and information in var­ ious languages to areas throughout the world.

Article I I

These facilities shall consist of the following:

a) A receiving station comprised of receivers, recording and play-back equipment, a power generating plant, antennas, communications and link equipment and other ancillary build­ ings, installations and equipment.

b) A transmitting station comprised of several transmitters of up to 500 KU power each, a power generating plant, antennas, communications and link equipment and other ancillary build­ ings, installations and equipment.

c) Such housing, recreation and other fa c ilitie s as may be nec­ essary to accommodate the personnel employed and their de­ pendents. 312

APPENDIX I I I (continued)

Article III

The Republic of Liberia shall assist the United States of America in the acquisition of the necessary land rights for these fa c ilitie s .

Article IV

All radio frequencies used for transmission at these fa c ilitie s shall be submitted to the Republic of Liberia for approval.

Article V

Materials, equipment, parts and supplies, including motor vehicles, may be imported for these fa c ilitie s or exported free of any customs duties, import or other taxes, or other restriction.

Article VI

The Government of the United States of America is desirous of u tilizin g Liberian Nationals to the greatest extent possible in connection with the construction, operation and maintenance of these facilities. I In furtherance thereof, an employee training program shall be conducted.

Article VII

The Government of Liberia shall afford such import privileges and ex­ emptions from Liberian taxes as may be appropriate with respect to personnel to be employed in connection with the construction, opera­ tion, maintenance, and supervision of these fa c ilitie s . Such p riv i­ leges and exemptions shall be the subject of a supplemental agreement to be negotiated between the Government of Liberia and the United States of America.

Article VIII

This agreement is effective upon execution for a period of forty (40) years.

Done at Monrovia in duplicate this 13th day of August, AD 1959. 313

APPENDIX I I I (continued)

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA:

Paul L. Guest J. Rudolph Grimes Charge d'Affaires ad interim Acting Secretary of State

SEAL APPENDIX IV

COUNTRIES IN WHICH LIBERIA MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION AS OF 1970

Belgi um Cameroon Denmark Ethiopia France Germany Ghana Togo Guinea Haiti Israel Ita ly Ivory Coast Japan Kenya Tanzania Uganda Netherlands Sierra Leone Spain Sweden Swi tzerland United Arab Republic United Kingdom United States of America (The United Nations) (The Vatican) Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa) 315

APPENDIX V

UNITED NATIONS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES OF WHICH LIBERIA IS MEMBER

International Labor Organization (ILO)

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

World Health Organization (WHO)

International Development Association (IDA)

International Bank For Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

International Finance Corporation (IFC)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

Universal Postal Union (UPU)

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 316

APPENDIX VI

STATEMENT OF THE LIBERIAN REPRESENTATIVE DR. T. 0. DOSUMU-JOHNSON BEFORE THE TWENTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL AS­ SEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

A/PV.1970

Mr. Dosumu-Johnson (Liberia): But for the importance we attach to this question I would have been very b rief. The United Nations is called upon to make the most momentous decision in the 26 years of its existence.

We are being asked to expel a founding Member and a founding father of this Organization on purely ideological grounds and because of the pre­ ponderance of the practitioners of that ideology in this Organization,

The United Nations. I t is one of those disadvantages that small States are heir to in the arena of world politics.

The so-called rightful place of China in this Organization can be claimed only by, and belong to , the Republic of China. I t was they who signed China into the United Nations; i t was their China that was ac­ cepted as a democratic state by the allied Powers at the end of the Se­ cond. 1 World War. I t was regard for them as leaders of a democratic

China that induced President Roosevelt to press acceptance of China as a permanent member of the Security Council. As they s t ill live and ad­ minister a portion of China with 14 million people, any attempt to expel them without cause, from an Organization which they suffered to estab­ lish, would be a travesty of the principles of the purest justice.

Whether there are 14 million people or 2 million or 1 m illion, as long 317 as they administer a territory de facto and de jure they are considered to be a state and it is begging the question to say that they do not rule a ll of Formosa.

This novel and revolutionary attempt to expel a sovereign State without due process is an infringement of the internal affairs of that

State. Any intervention in any of its forms by propaganda, by subver­ sion, by diplomacy, by ideology or by boycott is ille g a l. The Republic of China, havingasatisfieditheerfequinements ofh then international commu­ nity, is entitled to the support of every Member of this Organization in the maintenance of its national and sovereign continuity.

As we attempt to expel one of our members on ideological and/or economic considerations, we must bear in mind that there are no fixed positions in statecraft much less diplomacy. Today i t is Taiwan, to­ morrow i t may be your State. I t is a precedent that w ill undermine the

Charter of the United Nations which is the Magna Carta of a ll African and small States against the encroachment of big-Power p olitics.

Knowing that there is not a Member here who would wish the State he represents to be expelled for any reason whatsoever from this Organ­ ization, we should therefore act in no way contrary to our conscience and good judgment and establish any precedent to our future detriment.

The trouble with the United Nations today is that justice and truth have been subordinated to ideological expediency and to economic considerations, and Members without conspicuous or arrogant ideological beliefs are often too shy to speak out lest they lose their friends.

I implore you to do unto others as you would that they do unto 318 you. A few years ago many of us were head over heels in friendship with the Republic of China. I t gave aid and assistance to many States here today. I do not want to mention th eir names for delicate reasons.

Today, you are saying, "crucify them, down with Taiwan", forgetting a ll that i t has done for you in the past. But how immoral can men become?

Whatsoever you sow, remember, you w ill reap, sooner or later.

We are committed to the solution of an important socio-political problem, but in our opinion no problem can be resolved in an arena of ideological inconsistencies. Today we are one thing, tomorrow we are another, along the same lines.

There comes a time in every international organization when mem­ bers become tired of clichfe agitators and long for peaceful progress and security. They then must take measures to consolidate and secure th eir organization against troublemakers. This institu tio n , the United

Nations, can survive only so long as each Member strives to preserve its collective responsibility for justice and fair play. Some people are prone to parade th eir weaknesses as i f they were virtues. Some of us are moved by every wind of caprice that blows and thus mortgage our dignity and respect.

All of us here know that expulsion within the meaning of the Char­ ter is an important question. I t is so important that only the p o liti­ cally inept will trifle with it.

The Republic of China was here before many Members here gained independence. I t voted for the admission of many of them; i t also voted for the many organs, commissions, and committees now functioning under 319

the umbrella of the United Nations.

If its presence here is illegal and illegally maintained, as you

are wont to say, then a ll its actions since its membership are presumed

illeg al and therefore the Members whose admission i t has voted for and

a ll the Commissions and Committees validated by its vote are null and void and must therefore cease to function forthwith. All Members which

are not founding Members of this Organization that Taiwan voted for are here illegally and must therefore be expelled forthwith. "When you draw

rope, you draw bush" is a cogent African adage. Let us beware of the

ides of March.

The proponents of expulsion are asking the General Assembly to

undermine the security of the United Nations, and by precedent to lay the foundation for further expulsions of any one of us. By expelling the Republic of China without any ju s tifia b le cause and on ideological

or economic national interests, is to establish a precedent whose grava­ men transcends our present standard of sense. An uncritical acceptance of this projected ideological expulsion w ill arrest the peaceful conti­ nuity of this Organization. The motive, being purely punitive, is con­ sonant neither with logic nor with our sovereign national interests.

In this connexion, le t me implore representatives to dispel from their minds a ll previous conceptions and prejudices, until they have made an accurate assessment of the implications of the expulsion of a sovereign

State from this Organization... and then, and only then, come to a just and independent conclusion.

We are confident that a ll reasonable Members w ill treat this strange 320 principle of expulsion with detachment from ideological a ffin ity , with historical understanding, with scholarly perspective, and declare i t an important question, which i t is , and w ill always remain unless Members are under some form of duress.

The question of China's representation in the United Nations is one of the perennial issues before the General Assembly. But the signs are that it may soon become history. The delay in resolving this ques­ tion for almost 25 years has been due to the ideological imbalance.

The People's Republic of China is communist controlled, supported by and within the communist bloc, despite recent rifts in relationship.

The Republic of China, on the other hand, is democratic within the Wes­ tern bloc and strongly supported by the United States. Here you have the whole issue of the question - socialist imperialists versus capi­ talist imperialists.

The People's Republic of China has a population of about 700 m il­ lion people and has been in virtual control of the mainland since the c iv il war. The Republic of China controls the island of Formosa with a population of 14 m illion. Notwithstanding the disparity in size and population, the Republic of China continues to occupy, law fully, the seat that has been assigned to China in the United Nations for over 25 years. Situations in the coup government that some representatives have referred to are not analogous to the China situation. The attempt to equate them is a fallacy and perhaps a fallacy ad homihem.

The most significant aspects of this question are: F irs t, Formosa, i t is conceded by the proponents of expulsion, is a province of China, 321 and ipso facto a part of China. Second, the Republic of China is s t i l l on Chinese soil. Third, it was divided by a civil war into two diamet­ ric a lly opposite social and p o litic a l systems - one communist and the other democratic republican - and by this fact, consists of two separate and distinct States, like the two German States, the two Korean States and the two Vietnam States - one country divided into two by civil war.

This is the same thing that happened in China, civil war divided the country. One side went over here and the other side went over there.

Fourth, the Republic of China has met a ll the Requirements of State sov­ ereignty, and of the international community. Fifth, it has achieved phenomenal growth since i t became a Republic. Sixth, i t is exporting to and exporting from many States. Seventh, it is a signatory to many international treaties and has diplomatic relations with many States and has given substantial aid to many States in this Organization which now turn against it in its hour of need. Eighth, because the Republic of

China w ill not yie ld to the so-called embourgeoisement theory of com­ munism, the Assembly is being asked to expel i t from this Organization.

I f i t were communist, none among those who now try to expel i t would ; have lifted a finger against it.

Times have changed. I t is now clear that an Organization whose goal is universality cannot rest content to bar one-fourth of the world's population from its membership - hence some form.ofcompromise.

The question - - mark my words — is not which Chinese Government should represent China at the United Nations. The Republic of China is already in the United Nations, and only power politics and injustice can 322

put i t out of the Assembly.

The decision to support the admission of the People's Republic of

China ia an unavoidable consequence of re ality. The People's Republic

of China is both populous and of great power and commercial potential.

The only bugbear in the question is the attempt made by some Members

to sacrifice 14 millions of Nationalist China which has legally occu­

pied the seat since its allocation, and has remained a peace-loving

democratic nation, supporting all the provisions of the Charter with­

out blemish.

I f you were in this position would you want to be expelled from

this Organization? The friends of Peking would make our task very easy

i f they separated the admission clause from the expulsion part of their

draft resolution. We are a ll agreed to have Peking here — there is no

question about that — but not at the expense of the Republic of China.

We must have both of them here to somplete the deal for a ll time and

thus move from polarism to pluralism.

The concession by all to admit Peking without expelling Taiwan

is one of those things, a compromise dictated by bigness and a sense of

reality. We are willing to go along with this. But if legality is the

desideratus, as some of Peking's friends have indicated, they must fir s t make application to the International Court of Justice for an Advisory

Opinion as to which China had the right claim at the adoption of the

Charter in San Francisco, before final action by the General Assembly

and the Security Council. There is much to be gained by a quid pro quo.

The two China-for-one-llnited-Nations-seat argument is a subterfuge 323 to carry the point for expulsion. We are at a loss to see how people who advocate universality can in the same breath advocate the expulsion of 14 millions. The 131 members of this Organization are its masters.

By th eir votes they can make any provisions for two Chinas of different political systems by any variation and procedural modalities they think reasonable in the circumstances. We can call one Mainland China and the other Island China, or we can say Mainland and People's Republic of

China and Island Republic of China. We can call them whatever we want; we are the masters of this Organization and we can do anything we want to do with it.

The assumption that Peking w ill not come in i f Taiwan is retained as a Member is beside the point. We shall cross that bridge when we come to it. There is a great danger in allowing any State to dictate its own terms of admission to this august body. I f tomorrow i t should refuse to meet its obligations under the Charter, it could not be com­ pelled to do so because i t is here on its own terms. Peking alone can­ not overwhelm 131 States including the United States of America and the

Soviet Union, whatever its stockpile of bombs.

Let us think seriously of what we are about to do. To expel the

Republic of China would be to set the stage for another world war. From all indications, the United States will not abandon its commitments to the defence of Taiwan. After expulsion Peking might be tempted to in­ vade Taiwan and some States would immediately go to its rescue to main­ tain peace in the area. In his recent message to President Chiang Kai- shek, President Nixon wrote, as reported in the press: 324

"We w ill weaken no cherished associations; we w ill break no promises. Our defence commitment remains in fu ll force and we w ill continue to support the fu ll participation of the Republic of China in the international community."

Throughout my political life I have been a firm believer in the principle of open diplomacy and the open society as a democratic way of lif e . I shall therefore be happy when statesmen adopt such a policy in their dealings with this world body. Prevarications and double talks which leave members in the dark as to what they w ill do i f certain po­ sitions are pursued, are immoral and dangerous, to say the least. The history of the Second World War te lls us that i f Von Ribbontrop had been told by a certain great Power that i t would go to war i f Poland were attacked, H itler would not have gone to war.

Slowly yet unmistakable the strains and irrita tio n s engendered by the so-called Buckley threat, which some of us say we do not lik e , are being accepted as the American way of life . I t is a tempest in a tea­ pot. The only serious threat to the United Nations is the attempted expulsion of China. Buckley was being re a lis tic . " If you put my friend out to bring in your friend, you must support your friend without my as­ sistance." That is the logic of i t . This has been the attitude of some

Members of this Organization regarding the Congo, the Middle East and other questions.

This is a period of great diplomatic activity among great and re­ nowned leaders of the world. The small States focus th eir attention on the United Nations for the amelioration of th eir d is a b ilitie s , but the greatest problem we face is secret diplomacy and deceptive silence and polarization and big Power manipulations. 325

If the States which have withheld contributions for various rea­ sons had made known th e ir intentions in advance, when projects were being discussed, the Secretary-General would certainly not have gone ahead with those projects, and thus the financial insolvency which the Organi­ zation is in at the moment would have been averted.

The two-China people want to build a stronger United Nations. The expulsion group wants to break up the United Nations. On which side are you? On our side, I hope.

Therefore, as we contemplate the long and d iffic u lt road towards the financial solvency of our Organization, i t behooves us to think con­ structively, and where possible, compromise on measures that tend to curtail the usefulness and effectiveness of the United Nations as an in­ strument of international cooperation and peace. The Secretary-General

U Thant te lls us that we are in a state of hopeless insolvency, with debts totaling $180 million and insufficient cash in sight to cover next month's salaries. It w ill, in the opinion of my delegation, be very un­ wise to antagonize the sure, the tested and the certain for the untried and doubtful.

To keep Taiwan, the Republic of China, in this Organization while admitting the People's Republic of China w ill contribute immeasurably to the immediate solvency of the United Nations.

This Organization is particularly in the interest of small nations in survival. Let us not allow pride or ideological attachment or d u ll- mindedness, or commercial interest to induce us to sacrifice the integ­ rity and solvency of th is , man's only hope fo r survival in our time. It provides us a forum to air our displeasure and solicit collective guidance in periods of stress and strain. The great Powers, on the other hand, do not need this Organization for their defence. They see i t as an impediment to th eir freedom of action in some areas of the world and are gradually trying to get out of it. Walter Sullivan tells us, in a recent a rtic le , that eight nations — the point is for us Af­ ricans to see how close together they are, that is why i t appeals to me

— the United States, the Soviet Union, East Germany, West Germany,

Great Britain, France, Italy and Poland are setting up an International

Institute of Applied Systems Analysis under an American director and a

Soviet deputy director somewhere in Vienna. Do you realize what this means? We must do nothing to hasten their convergence out of this Or­ ganization. The expulsion of China w ill offer a pretext to that end.

The Republic of China is not a government in ex ile , as some of us are inclined to say. I t is not a liberation movement based somewhere outside of China. I t is a sovereign State with fu ll authority over that part i t now holds and over which i t exercises external authority.

Any person to and from there must travel with its imprimatur.

For many years since the Communist revolution and the civ il war which brought the People's Republic of China into being, the two States accepted their division as an accomplished fact, and existed side by side in the eyes of the whole world as distinct sovereign entities. After 2.5 years of active membership in the Organization of States, how can these gentlemen te ll us that the Republic of China is not a

State within the accepted norms of international law? I think their 327 redress is at the International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion.

My elementary studies way back in the twenties te ll me that ac­ cording to requirements, the Republic of China is a State. I w ill refer some of my friends for refresher to Raymond Getell, one of the leading exponents of political science and government, for an idea on this.

My delegation co-sponsored the draft resolutions contained in doc­ ument A/L.632 and A/L.633, not because of China per se but because the

United Nations is dear to our hearts and we shall vote for them in this frame of reference and as a matter of national self-interest.

I implore you, rny friends — even you, my enemies, i f there are any among you — to vote for the two-China resolution, and also for the

"important question" draft resolution. Having voted the admission of the two Chinas, your task is ended. The People's Republic of China w ill find its way into this Organizations out of the coldness of isolation.

Compromise, Gentlemen, I say, compromise i f necessary. Half a loaf is better than none. It is the rule of civilized diplomatic prac­ tice.

Now, the expulsion of any Member is an important question withjn the meaning of A rticle 18, paragraph 2 of the Charter, expressed in un­ mistakable language. It requires a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting. We have proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that the Republic of China was, and is , a sovereign State, notwithstanding the sophistry of its detractors.

As a compromise,let us vote the admission of Peking, and vote against expulsion of Taiwan. 328

We must oppose vigorously any attempt to expel Nationalist China.

Abstention is tantamount to being absent.

If after overtures with the proponents of the Albanian resolution, the expulsion clause is tied to the admission 'part of the Albanian draft resolution (A/L.630), we must not only abstain but vote against i t as a matter of benevolent self-interest.

Let not history record that the representatives to the twenty- sixth session of the United Nations were the architects of a third world war which, as I have pointed out, is bound to follow as a consequence of the expulsion of China from the community of nations — a war in which there will be no winners but all losers.

The values and the peace we envisage cannot be achieved by the wholesale slaughter of 14 million men, women, and children; but by nego­ tiating a system of co-existence that will ultimately lead to the peace­ ful unity of the whole Chinese people.

With your permission, Mr. President, I beg to end this statement with some of the didacticism of Alexander Pope:

"Hope springs eternal in the human breast; Man never is , but always to be blessed. Honour and shame from no con­ dition rise; Act well your part, th e r e in the honour lies."

Let us give hope, faith and love to the people of Taiwan. By this shall all men know that you are interested in the welfare, the solidar­ ity and continuity of the United '.Nations.