CD/PV.1512

Conference on Disarmament English

Final record of the one thousand five hundred and twelfth plenary meeting Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 30 July 2019, at 10.10 a.m. President: Mr. Duong Chi Dung ...... (Viet Nam)

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The President: I call to order the 1512th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, I am very glad to see you again at the beginning of the third part of the 2019 session. I hope that you feel refreshed after the summer holiday and are ready to continue our important work through thematic discussions and exchanges on the draft decision on the programme of work. The plenary meeting today will be devoted to the thematic discussion on agenda item 1 of the Conference on Disarmament – cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. As previously announced, we will hear an address by Dr. Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). We will also hear from Ambassador Aliyar Azeez, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka, and Mr. Robert Müller, Deputy Permanent Representative of Austria. Following the panellists’ presentations, I intend to open the floor for a discussion on the substantive topics of today’s session. Once our discussion concludes, I will open the floor for any other matters delegations would like to raise. Allow me, dear colleagues, to suspend the meeting for a brief moment to welcome Dr. Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for CTBTO. The meeting was briefly suspended. The President: Distinguished delegates, I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt condolences for the passing away – which you may already be aware of from news reports and, officially, from the Office of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Geneva – of the Director General of IAEA, Mr. Yukiya Amano, a man of extraordinary dedication and professionalism. Mr. Amano worked tirelessly for more than a decade for the development of IAEA as an agency at the service of the global community and for the peaceful use of nuclear technology for the benefit of people around the world. He had a long and distinguished diplomatic career in the service of non- proliferation, and his devotion and strong commitment to multilateralism in this field will be remembered by all of us. In order to express our deepest condolences to IAEA, the Government and the people of Japan and his family for this great loss, I would like to invite all Conference on Disarmament member States to hold a minute of silence in memory of Mr. Yukiya Amano. Please stand and observe a minute of silence. *** The President: I would like to extend a warm welcome to our guest, Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization, but before that, I would also like to give the floor to the representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Geneva, Ms. Meena Singelee, to deliver a brief statement. Ms. Singelee (International Atomic Energy Agency): Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the floor. On behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency, I wish to express gratitude to you and member States of the Conference for the warm words of condolence in tribute to our Director General, Mr. Yukiya Amano, over the past week. I thank you again, Mr. President. The President: I would like once again to express our warm welcome to the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty Organization and to thank him for addressing the Conference on Disarmament. You have the floor, Sir. Mr. Zerbo (Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization): Thank you, Mr. President and dear friend. Thank you all for inviting me to address the Conference on Disarmament. Mr. President, we have just observed a minute of silence for our dear friend and colleague, Director General Yukiya Amano. I sent a statement on behalf of the staff of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) a few days ago. Amano was a dear colleague in Vienna, somebody who was deeply attached to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. He will be missed.

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To the staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency, we express our condolences. To you all, we are a family. We are at the Conference on Disarmament to work together not only for the peaceful use of nuclear energy but also for our noble cause: non-proliferation and disarmament. Mr. President, thank you. It is a pleasure to return to Geneva, and especially to the Conference on Disarmament, which is, of course, the forum in which the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was negotiated. It has been 23 years since those negotiations came to a conclusion and the Treaty was adopted by the General Assembly. Everyone in this chamber is aware that times are very different now. Without seeking to minimize the difficulties we all face, I wish to use my time here to highlight some of the real progress that has been made and to look ahead to next year’s Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – in the spirit of asking what we can achieve rather than dwelling on negativity. I am sure we all agree there is more than enough negativity without me adding to it. Let me provide an update on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It has been almost a year and a half since I last spoke to the Conference. In the intervening time, we in CTBTO have continued working on the universalization of the Treaty. One more signature – that of Tuvalu – and two more ratifications – by Thailand and Zimbabwe – have now brought the Treaty up to 184 signatories, 168 of which have ratified. For easily understandable reasons, the focus on adhesion to the Treaty is generally on the status of annex 2 ratifications, but each and every new member should be celebrated. In these days of supposed paralysis where nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are concerned, this is real, ongoing progress, and we should all cherish it. We are, of course, also continuing our work on confidence-building measures and education and outreach with the annex 2 States with the aim of creating an environment that would be conducive for them to sign and/or ratify the Treaty. With this in mind, the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, also known as the Article XIV Conference, has been held every other year to promote the Treaty’s entry into force. The eleventh such conference will be held in New York on 25 September and will give States an opportunity to renew their commitment to the Treaty as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Regarding the Treaty’s verification regime, I am pleased to report that the International Monitoring System is nearing completion. The progressive build-up of the System has resulted in a level of maturity, readiness and relevance that has been demonstrated on numerous occasions and in a variety of circumstances. We have installed or certified several important new International Monitoring System stations in the past several years. Of particular note, the last remaining hydroacoustic station in the Crozet Islands, France, was certified, which was a major milestone on the way to completion of the verification system. Five stations were certified in China – two primary seismic stations and three radionuclide stations. Additional achievements include the certification of an infrasound station and a radionuclide station in the Galapagos Islands, Ecuador, as well as certifications of stations and radionuclide laboratories in the Russian Federation, Ethiopia, the United Kingdom, Italy and France. The establishment and commissioning of the International Monitoring System facility are largely the outcome of the active participation of your colleagues, the Permanent Representatives in Vienna, who have been helping us to achieve this. The International Data Centre continues to process and analyse data registered at monitoring stations, which are shared with 1,300 institutions in 130 countries. Alongside the steady advance of the International Monitoring System, the capabilities of the International Data Centre continue to develop, resulting in a far better detection threshold than many thought would be possible when the Treaty was negotiated. CTBTO is also continuing to prepare for entry into force by strengthening its on-site inspection capabilities through the development of on-site inspection elements, the conduct of field exercises and the evaluation of its on-site inspection activities.

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Last month, we inaugurated our permanent Technology Support and Training (TeST) Centre in Seibersdorf, Austria. It offers a modern, purpose-built location for all the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty technologies and for the future capacity-building and training exercises we will carry out for the benefit of the international community. It is a sign that the Treaty is here to stay and is part of our collective legacy to future generations. Now, turning to the Treaty and non-proliferation and disarmament – since I spoke to the Conference on Disarmament, we have moved much closer to the 2020 Review Conference. We have now had three Preparatory Committee meetings, and, unfortunately, differing viewpoints on key issues have, if anything, seen the gaps between States parties widen. But let us not be fatalistic. All is not lost. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, has proved strikingly resilient in the past. It has also proved open to positive change agents from outside, of which the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a prime example. The intrinsic link between the two instruments is always worth recalling. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contains in its preamble the determination to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and to continue negotiations to this end. On top of that, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has played a critical role in the NPT review process. It has often served as a gauge of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their disarmament obligations under article VI. The conclusion of a test-ban treaty was one of the three key decisions that allowed for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, and furthering the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty was the first of the practical steps for disarmament agreed to by NPT States parties in 2000. At the risk of sounding dramatic, it could be said that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty “saved” the NPT at times of high tension in the past, and it can do so again. As we move towards the 2020 Review Conference and beyond, we must take great care to preserve the integrity of the institutions and instruments we have and to build trust in and around them. This means maintaining and securing the NPT and its entire web of responsibilities – of which the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an integral part. A successful outcome of the Review Conference would be one that recognizes what we have achieved so far in creating the architecture for non-proliferation and disarmament and preserves this for the future, while creating space for dialogue and movement on both “front burner” and “back burner” issues. Building trust and confidence is key. Despite the temptation to focus on the fraying of relationships, there are positives from which we can draw hope. Initiatives and mechanisms – both bilateral and multilateral – that encourage discussions on nuclear issues are to be welcomed. In this regard, the recent resumption here in Geneva of talks between the United States and the Russian Federation is an important step. It is also heartening that the Head of State-level encounter between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the end of June means that progress on the Korean Peninsula remains a possibility. The last time I spoke to the Conference on Disarmament, there was a vague hope that the aftermath of the Winter Olympics could lead to North-South dialogue, but there was no suggestion of the huge strides that were to follow. This goes to show how quickly things can change and how we need to be ready for all eventualities. As I have stated before, within its mandate, and with the approval of our member States, CTBTO stands ready to contribute its expertise, technologies and monitoring assets to any multilateral process aimed at confirming the closure of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. This could be in any format agreeable to the parties – for example, the participation of experts as part of a multinational team. At the same time, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty can help build trust among the parties. If an agreement on verifiable denuclearization is reached, a prohibition on nuclear tests could be included as an interim step pending ratification by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. CTBTO and its verification regime can be explicitly called upon to verify this aspect of an agreement.

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Even if signature and/or ratification is out of reach for North Korea at this stage, the country could still consider becoming an observer to CTBTO, as Pakistan and Cuba have done. With that, it could familiarize itself with technical verification capabilities related to the Treaty and gain access to ancillary benefits, including the use of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty data for disaster prevention and mitigation. And this all, of course, will have to be approved by our Preparatory Commission. Mr. President, distinguished delegates, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical and effective measure for nuclear non-proliferation and a necessary building block for a world free of nuclear weapons. Progress on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty would undoubtedly have a positive impact on the NPT process and help to unlock other challenges, too. The world is already benefiting from the value of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty under the de facto global norm against nuclear testing. But without determined and urgent action, these benefits remain at risk. As representatives and delegates to the Conference on Disarmament, your leadership can make a difference in this regard. As we prepare for the 2020 NPT Review Conference, let us not give in to despair but rather cherish – and complete – the architecture that we have so painstakingly built. I thank you, Mr. President. The President: I would like to thank, Dr. Lassina Zerbo for his statement. I would now like to welcome Ambassador Aliyar Azeez, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka. You have the floor, Sir. Mr. Azeez (Sri Lanka): Thank you, Mr. President. I say good morning to all my colleagues in the hall. And, at the outset, let me thank you for inviting me to make a presentation at the panel discussion on nuclear disarmament today. I should note here that the more I wanted to be out, the more you dragged me into it. Let me also join you and my distinguished colleague and friend, Dr. Lassina Zerbo, in voicing our sentiments of sorrow at the untimely death of Yukiya Amano. In fact, I had the distinct honour of sitting beside him and being guided by him as I chaired the fifty-ninth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in 2014. Let me also extend a warm welcome to Dr. Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, who has come to Geneva to address the Conference. It was a fantastic speech, and I am sure that there are a lot of ideas and perspectives in it for us to digest and reflect on as we move forward. It is an honour and pleasure to listen to you. Of course, I hope that, during the course of this discussion, you may have an opportunity to interact more closely. Mr. President, in the post-Second World War international order, no other security- related subject has remained as complex and sensitive as the issue of nuclear disarmament. That it has managed to course through the vortex of international public concern with few changes in its wake, for decades now, is striking. It is a telling lesson that humanity has painfully learned over the centuries that, while accumulating arms is a trait that manifests itself when human beings face real or perceived threats, disarming is a complicated and protracted exercise. Once armaments are in place, it is human nature to seek to use arms, not just to ensure safety, which provided the immediate rationale for their acquisition or production in the first place, but, often, also to seek to achieve an advantage over others perceived as rivals or competitors. In the present world, which in many ways is intelligence-driven, with several other forces getting into the act, too, it could hardly be argued that all threats on the horizon are always real or perceived ordinarily. Using different terminology, it could be said that some of them may even be a product of “induced perception” or “enhanced perception”. The call for nuclear disarmament or for the elimination of nuclear weapons, as is well known, has been out there since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks in 1945. The years that followed brought out, through an evolutionary dialectic, a few concepts and doctrines relating to the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the use of nuclear energy and technology. The concepts and doctrines diversified over the years,

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depending on the specific set of strategic interests that individual nuclear-armed States pursued, as well as on the relative strength and geopolitical space of other States that they sought to nullify. As students of international relations, we are aware of occasions during the cold war period when nuclear-armed States threatened to use nuclear weapons against one another. Nevertheless, the cold war, while indirectly contributing to a strategic balance of power on the global scene, created reality – that is, nuclear-armed States generally refrained from actually using nuclear weapons against one another. At particular times during the cold war where a nuclear confrontation became almost a possibility, diplomacy, in the varied persuasions in which it is practised, played a critical role in helping to defuse tensions, thus making the States realize the futility of war triggered or determined by the use of nuclear weapons. With the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency as an autonomous organization in 1957, the emphasis and focus shifted to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and there was recognition of the need for nuclear energy and technology for non-military purposes. Unfortunately, as was witnessed later, the concept carried with it some of the polemics usually associated with the use of nuclear weapons. Yet great understanding and trust among States were still needed to move along the path of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, so that the same sources, material or technology that are designated for peaceful uses were not diverted to develop nuclear weapons. Mr. President, it was against this backdrop that, by 1965, negotiations began on arriving at a treaty addressing different aspects relating to the control of nuclear arms – the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, negotiations for the Treaty took place in a strategic security landscape where the interests of some States determined the way in which the Treaty evolved. The Treaty came into effect in 1970, and the issue of its renewal came up in 1995, when a distinguished Sri Lankan diplomat, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, chaired the Treaty Review and Extension Conference. In the meantime, between 1965 and 1990, the world had witnessed the signing of arms control treaties between the major Powers. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty remained among the key agreements which, by and large, operated to control nuclear weapons, thereby providing some impetus to nuclear arms control initiatives. As we all know, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament constitute the three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and are integral to global efforts to strengthen international peace and security. The Treaty had nonetheless been negotiated in a particular strategic power context – its implementation thus led to varied degrees of compliance by States parties, with a few States deciding to stay outside the Treaty. Like all States that are Members of the United Nations, the latter were conscious of other imperatives regarding international peace and security, even as they remain outside it, as part of their general obligations arising from the specific provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It is common knowledge that the Treaty, as negotiated and concluded, has allowed nuclear-weapon States to retain their nuclear arsenals while making nuclear non- proliferation imperative. It has also provided a path for eventual nuclear disarmament in article VI. Nevertheless, the uneven playing field that emerged from the implementation of the Treaty, partly also from its own structure, and its use or abuse by parties, as well as the approaches taken by States that have chosen to stay outside the Treaty framework, have led to many questions. An important concern arising from the uneven nature of the Treaty’s provisions pertains as well to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which most States, especially the developing States, consider their sovereign right. Practical constraints placed in the path of peaceful uses still deny developing countries the opportunities to effectively realize this right.

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Nonetheless, efforts to ensure peaceful uses have been made through the introduction of a series of measures, especially relating to safeguards, safety and security. It should be conceded, however, that the path to peaceful use has never been smooth and that it is a matter for comprehensive discussion. It is being flagged in the discussion addressing nuclear disarmament today because of the bearing that the subject has on the discussion of the other two pillars, non-proliferation and disarmament. Mr. President, nuclear non-proliferation was in itself a clear concept when it was reflected upon at the time of negotiation of the Treaty. However, treaties, like constitutions, are implemented by countries and peoples, and, more often than not, there are tendencies and impulses to gain strategic space and advantage by using the tools that they consider most vital for survival and advancement. Accordingly, non-proliferation also fell prey to the reality of strategic power rivalries from the outset. This notwithstanding, the realization that when countries possessing nuclear weapons choose to use them against one another, the resulting scenario will be catastrophic consequences, both humanitarian and ecological, through what is known as mutually assured destruction, militates against the reciprocal use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed States. The concept of “no first use”, with all the circumscriptions enshrined into the military doctrines of nuclear-armed States, is essentially a product of this cautious realization. Discussing humanitarian consequences, Mr. President, it is inevitable that the focus will have to turn to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996, where the renowned Sri Lankan jurist, C.G. Weeramantry, a judge and Vice-President of the Court, opined that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with international law and with the very foundations on which that system rests. The relevance of the concept of “no first use”, the realization of the futility of the reciprocal use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed States and the overriding importance of avoiding a nuclear arms race have, over the years, led to intraregional arrangements and understandings in some parts of the world – of course, with a few conspicuous exceptions – on the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons. Welcome as this development may be, it is pertinent to note that subsequent to the end of the cold war, new forces that emerged in the international security landscape took what existed essentially as a strategic balance between major Powers during the cold war period to a new plateau of power competition within specific regional and subregional contexts. This, in part, explains the conspicuous exceptions to the concept of “zones free of nuclear weapons”. It is pertinent to mention at this point that the decision to work towards establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East is an integral part of the consensus package adopted by the NPT Review and Extension Conference of 1995. While there have been varying degrees of progress with regard to both peaceful uses and non-proliferation, thus ensuring the absence of nuclear warfare since 1945, an important call of humanity, nuclear disarmament, however, remains fully unrealized. The intensity of the call continues to grow, despite some progress achieved until the mid-1990s, and then in 2017, when the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted. The importance of the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons cannot be overemphasized. Mr. President, the background and the development that followed, resulting in the establishment of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, are very well known. Recognized at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, the Conference worked through a long and protracted process to make progress in negotiating disarmament-related treaties. However, successes have been noted mostly in disarmament-related areas concerning conventional weapons, including the Chemical Weapons Convention. A significant breakthrough, in the past, towards nuclear disarmament, was the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was negotiated in the Conference and adopted by the General Assembly through finalization of the text in 1996.

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That was the period following the end of the cold war, and in the 1990s, as internal armed conflicts increasingly replaced international conflicts, the prevalent international atmosphere favoured a movement towards the introduction of initiatives addressing different aspects of the disarmament discourse. Mr. President, the earliest example of the manifestation of the commitment and the urge for progress appeared in the Disarmament Agenda of the International Community in 1994 and Beyond, a publication containing the statements of the former United Nations Secretary-General Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. It contained two important components: (1) the address of the Secretary-General to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters of 12 January 1994 and (2) the message of the Secretary-General to the Conference on Disarmament of 25 January 1994. In fact, the Disarmament Agenda, as contained in these two documents, speaks of the security challenges that prevailed in the international peace and security landscape immediately following the end of the cold war and as the United Nations was initiating a series of new international conferences adopting outcomes on broad themes such as women, population, human rights, the environment and social development. It is relevant to note that all these processes invariably referred to peace and security as an essential condition and priority sought by humanity in order to achieve progress. It is ironic, though, that this aspect of the nexus between peace and security and human development and progress, which a decade later emerged as human security, has not gone so far as to connect the dots to complete an essential part of the international security picture – that is, disarmament. When comparing the Disarmament Agenda of the Secretary-General in 1994 with the Agenda for Disarmament launched by the current Secretary-General Mr. António Guterres in May 2018, one can discern the difference in terms of both the scope and the intensity of the challenges that have marked the peace and security trajectory from 1994 to 2018, a journey of nearly a quarter century. The momentum achieved in negotiations within the Conference and the subsequent finalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty did not, unfortunately, manifest itself in other initiatives during the interregnum of almost 25 years, even as the Conference went through an expansion of membership in 1995, making it more representative than it had been before. With the loss of that momentum and the emergence of new strategic parameters globally, especially with the realignment of forces since then, it is all but apparent that the international security landscape has become progressively constrained, despite some successes at the regional levels, especially through the establishment of a few zones free of nuclear weapons – and to offer an international-level example not from the Conference – the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. There are several concerns which emerged with regard to the prospect of achieving sustained nuclear non-proliferation and balanced, comprehensive and progressive nuclear disarmament. These concerns include the vertical and horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the “no first use” concept, confidence-building measures, verification, transparency in armaments, addressing the legal gap arising from article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, effective realization of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, the effectiveness of nuclear safeguards and the question of development of further safeguards as technology advances, steps to act on the negotiated outcomes of the NPT review conferences, those of 1995, 2000 and 2010 in particular, nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones free of weapons of mass destruction and the need for nuclear risk reduction. Other areas of equal or more importance involve negative security assurances, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and new and emerging challenges. The fissile material issue, it should be stated, appears to lie at the intersection of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, or at the core of either, depending on how attempts to unravel the details or specificities of that issue proceed. It is relevant to highlight, at this point, the need for early negotiation and conclusion of a non-discriminatory and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material.

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An integral part of the nuclear disarmament discourse, which should be flagged as an important priority for humanity today, extends to the question of implementation of the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty, as agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the 64-point Action Plan, as agreed in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference. Other priorities are studying the establishment of zones free of nuclear weapons as a way to take effective measures for the prohibition of nuclear weapons and achieving a comprehensive and balanced outcome through an effective and meaningful process of consultations at the 2020 NPT Review Conference, in the year which marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty’s entry into force. Mr. President, three salient points need to be highlighted before proceeding to wind up this presentation today, and I thank you and all the delegations for their patience. First, it is important to emphasize the need for preservation of the existing disarmament structure, which has been developed over decades. This is the call of the United Nations Secretary-General in his Agenda for Disarmament. Establishing this architecture took painful efforts and a vast amount of resources in the form of negotiation, institutionalization and implementation. Under no circumstances should it be left to disintegrate. Second, serious measures have to be taken within the Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, to arrive at a balanced and comprehensive programme of work and move on to substantively addressing other areas of the Conference agenda. The interconnected and interrelated nature of each theme on the agenda should be appreciated, but nuclear disarmament should remain the eventual goal, which should be achieved through negotiation and finalization by making progressive, comprehensive and transparent efforts. Third, a fresh approach needs to be taken to examining how best the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty could complete the universalization triangle connecting ratification, annex 2 and the Provisional Technical Secretariat; I note specifically that, if I am not mistaken, more than 90 per cent of the International Monitoring System is already in place. Despite varied views that are shaped more by strategic considerations or the relativity of regional or global security parameters, the fact remains that, for most countries, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty provides an essential link between non- proliferation and disarmament. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its Executive Secretary deserve our sincere appreciation for the innovative ways in which the provisions of the Treaty are used to benefit humanity in the vital areas of its mandate. The question of article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not providing a sound legal norm for States parties to move towards nuclear disarmament is a critical concern for many. Article VI is, no doubt, a broader avenue for reaching the disarmament goal. The concern that there is a nexus between the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the nuclear security environment is understandable. However, the pursuit of nuclear disarmament cannot be linked, in a one-way traffic mode, to the argument that it cannot be achieved as fast as expected because of the security environment that prevails at a given time. It is important to build confidence, not necessarily to ensure a peaceful environment but to seek to ensure that there is complete and comprehensive disarmament, realized through a step-by-step approach. In this context, even as article VI is taken to signify a legal gap, it is evident that, inasmuch as efforts are made to address the legal gap, other components of article VI that fall within the moral domain need to continue to guide States towards achieving the consolidation of political will and commitment through sustained and constructive engagement. Apart from the above, it is noted that there are two other important points that are often not given a pronounced thrust during deliberations on disarmament-related concerns. Sri Lanka, for example, has highlighted these two points consistently with a view to ensuring that close attention is paid to them and noting that they are critical to defining the

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trajectory towards global efforts for disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular. First, the need for education and training in disarmament and non-proliferation, to help address substantive aspects, including new and emerging issues, is more acute today. The lack of opportunity in the form of training or other forms of exposure may only contribute to the perpetuation of the current impasse. Second, ensuring the full integration of a gender perspective into disarmament and non-proliferation discourse is imperative. Even going by the logic advanced by some States that there is a correlation between nuclear disarmament and the international security environment, the role of gender is still critical both to contributing to that environment and to defining it in terms of the all-inclusive concept of human security. With regard to training, we note with appreciation the initiative undertaken by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to commence an induction programme for young and newly arrived diplomats in Geneva on key areas of disarmament. We urge all stakeholders, including Member States, to enhance their work in both these areas, which are critical to empowering younger generations on disarmament, particularly in the developing world, and to help advance fully informed, well-represented, result-oriented negotiations on most critical issues when the occasion arises or when necessary. And I would like it to arise soon. Mr. President, with the security landscape in most regions, as well as globally, becoming increasingly constrained, as noted earlier, it is ever more crucial and urgent that the Conference take all feasible measures to resume discussions on substantive matters, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation being the foremost among them. Thank you, Mr. President. The President: I would like to thank Ambassador Azeez for his presentation. I would like now to give the floor to Mr. Robert Müller, Deputy Permanent Representative of Austria to the Conference on Disarmament. Mr. Müller (Austria): Mr. President, distinguished delegates – and a warm welcome to our special guest from Vienna today – non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and progress on nuclear disarmament are crucial for international peace and security. Non-proliferation and disarmament regimes are highly interconnected by complementary and mutually reinforcing treaties, including bilateral, multilateral, regional and international agreements. The Conference on Disarmament has a unique mandate and a crucial role to fulfil in this context. Today’s focus on agenda item 1 – cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament – is timely. And I am delighted to address the Conference as a panellist. Already back in 1978 – and some of our distinguished delegates here were not even born then – the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament highlighted the centrality of the need for progress towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons: “Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.” This reasoning demonstrates clearly why the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is also the most prominent agenda item of this body. Like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament recognizes the devastation that would be caused by nuclear weapons. The underlying premise of international disarmament efforts is the prevention of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of a nuclear explosion – be it intentional, accidental or the result of a miscalculation. It is general knowledge that the number of nuclear warheads has been reduced significantly since the height of the cold war. However, today, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, an estimated 13,800 warheads are still operational. Most of these warheads have far more destructive power than the ones the world witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Similarly, delivery systems have become more and more sophisticated. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from a nuclear explosion which cannot be contained by any

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borders and for which no response capacity exists make progress in nuclear disarmament all the more urgent. Today’s panel provides us with an opportunity to take stock of the Conference’s contribution to its primary objective – namely, nuclear disarmament – and for today’s session, perhaps even more pertinent, to try to explore possible commonalities that could help pave the way to putting the Conference back to work and starting negotiations again. Mr. President, since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty have been the most outstanding success under the Conference’s core issue of nuclear disarmament. The Treaty is a key instrument of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, yet more than two decades after the conclusion of negotiations, it has still not entered into force. Its universalization and particular action by the remaining annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay would be crucial for progress in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. I would like to use the opportunity to express our appreciation to Belgium and Iraq for their efforts as article XIV coordinators and to congratulate Algeria and Germany on their designation as Presidents of the next Article XIV Conference. Mr. President, allow me to thank the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Executive Secretary, Dr. Lassina Zerbo, for coming from Vienna and addressing the Conference today. He importantly underlined the contribution of the Preparatory Commission and the International Monitoring System to verifying, upholding and strengthening the global norm against testing. The Preparatory Commission’s technical capabilities strengthen verification of nuclear non-proliferation and support disarmament efforts. It seems only logical to make the best use of this expertise in ongoing international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, including on the Korean Peninsula. Alongside your tireless outreach activities, Dr. Zerbo, I would like to mention that I was personally very impressed by your initiative that led to the launch of the CTBTO Youth Group back in 2016 in Vienna. You understood early on the importance of revitalizing the discussion, raising awareness, involving new technologies and advancing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s universalization and entry into force and building a basis for knowledge transfer to the next generation. A big Dankeschön from our side for your continued efforts in this respect. The work accomplished by CBTBO over the past years is also outstanding when it comes to effective multilateralism and development of synergies. It is well acknowledged that the reliable, high-quality data collected are now also being used by scientists from all over the world for other non-nuclear applications ranging from climate modelling to earthquake early warning systems. Its science and technology conferences regularly serve as a platform for multidisciplinary scientific exchange and contribute to scientific advances. Strengthening the links between the Conference on Disarmament and related institutions and forums further substantiates and informs our work towards putting the Conference back on track. In this context, I also encourage you to continue, if possible, to intensify your outreach to the wider network of Geneva-based institutions, including the World Meteorological Organization and even the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). Fissile material cut-off has been a top priority of this body for a long time. In Austria’s view, this issue is certainly ready to be negotiated without preconditions. Mr. President, against the backdrop of the Conference’s clear but ambitious mandate as a standing disarmament negotiating body, the start of multilateral negotiations on concrete measures of nuclear disarmament beyond the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has unfortunately been blocked. Traditionally, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations often pave the way for negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament. As bilateral relations become more complex, multilateral forums provide a special opportunity to hold discussions and potentially address difficult questions for the security benefit of all.

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The two largest possessor States bear a particular responsibility. In the past, the most important reductions were achieved through United States-Russian bilateral nuclear agreements such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the START treaties. In the area of non-proliferation, the 2015 Vienna agreement on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a historic achievement. Today, many of these important achievements are in imminent danger. A renewed nuclear arms race would not only be against the spirit of decades-long nuclear arms control initiatives but also detrimental to non-proliferation efforts. This is true not only for more and more sophisticated warheads but also for the current modernization, replacement and even new development of delivery capabilities. As tensions rise, it seems all the more important to preserve the bare minimum, the progress achieved, in order to uphold the international nuclear disarmament and non- proliferation regime. Respect for obligations and commitments is key. Calling them into question might lead to substantial questioning of the entire architecture and to unintended severe consequences for international peace and security. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as we all know, is the cornerstone of our nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The year 2020 will be an important year for the Treaty not just because it will mark the fiftieth anniversary of its entry into force. In the upcoming Review Conference, we will evaluate the implementation of the Treaty and of the consensual commitments undertaken during previous review cycles. But this is only part of the task before us. In 2020, we must also agree on further progress towards the Treaty’s ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The 2010 action plan is the common agreed baseline that we must build upon and add to. In the light of the challenges ahead of us and the failure of the 2015 Review Conference, it is imperative that we work together to achieve an outcome that will strengthen the Treaty and its implementation. Austria firmly supports the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world as reflected in the Treaty. The only way to prevent nuclear war and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of these horrendous weapons of mass destruction. Austria shares the view that a world without nuclear weapons is a more secure world for all and is therefore a ratifying State of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It is also generally acknowledged that nuclear-weapon-free zones, which currently comprise more than 100 States, make important contributions to international peace and security. It was encouraging to hear from the Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Dato Lim Jock Hoi, as well as from representatives of the NPT nuclear-weapon States here in the Conference plenary in June about renewed engagement with regard to progress on the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. Mr. President, the observation has been made that some of our discussions here in the Chamber seem circular. Keeping in mind the objective of overcoming the deadlock in the Conference, allow me to try to identify, from my delegation’s point of view, three areas of possible convergence in the area of nuclear disarmament. First, the most striking area of convergence or commonality for my delegation is the shared objective of all approaches – meaning nuclear disarmament and the elimination of the most dangerous class of weapons of mass destruction. Most of us are also legally bound by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue measures towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In the many years the international community has spent pursuing this goal, we have drawn up a thorough list of these needed measures. While the to-do list is ready, there are differences regarding the timing and sequencing of the measures it contains. But this should not prevent us from adopting measures whenever they become possible, as was the case, for example, with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It has always been clear to all of us that, in order to attain and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons, there needs to be a legal prohibition. In my delegation’s point of view, debates about the timing do not seem likely to achieve any meaningful outcome; they serve instead to create further delays. We should turn instead to the to-do list and start working on the measures and instruments needed to

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make progress on nuclear disarmament: work on fissile material verification but also risk reduction measures, for example. Second, we also see a broad understanding that nuclear weapons pose existential risks. The global non-proliferation efforts which my country strenuously supports, and which are also forcefully pursued by nuclear-weapon possessor States, are testimony to that serious concern. We also seem to pay close attention to the question of how to effectively contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I wish to reiterate our concern that non- proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin. Portraying nuclear weapons as essential to one’s national security might lead others to seek to acquire the same weapons for their security. Third, another commonality seems to be that the existence of nuclear weapons concerns or threatens the security of all States, in this room and beyond. At the same time, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrents do not provide an answer to today’s security challenges. My delegation would see value in some form of broad, structured debate on the relationship between nuclear weapons and security. Usually, in multilateral forums there is little time to address these questions and maybe here there could be added value from a discussion in the Conference’s subsidiary bodies. Mr. President, let me end with a quote of the declaration adopted by States at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I hope it still offers useful guidance for our work here: Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on Earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet the arms race continues. Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous consumption of human and material resources. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. Thank you for your attention. The President: I thank Mr. Müller for his speech. I will open the floor to any delegation wishing to speak on today’s topic, but before that, I would now like to take this opportunity to make a few remarks in my national capacity on the topic at hand: cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Speaking in my national capacity, I would like to express our warmest appreciation to the panellists, Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Mr. Aliyar Azeez, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka, and Mr. Robert Müller, Deputy Permanent Representative of Austria, for having shared with the Conference on Disarmament their expertise and views on the topic, one of the core issues on the Conference agenda. The world has twice in its history witnessed the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons. This painful lessons of the past have brought perspectives on the threat to humanity posed by the existence of nuclear weapon stockpiles and any nuclear detonations. For decades, tremendous efforts were made by the international community to build solid multilateral and bilateral frameworks governing the nuclear arms race and fostering comprehensive nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968 is a significant milestone which we will be reviewing in 2020. Nonetheless, in recent years, as a consequence of increasing turbulence in the global security context, multilateral disarmament and nuclear arms control processes have been at a serious impasse. This alarming trend requires the global community to redouble its efforts to strengthen the global disarmament and non-proliferation frameworks. It is Viet Nam’s view that nuclear weapons are neither the pathway to global peace nor a guarantee of the security of each State. The development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, as well as the nuclear arms race, may impact countries’ ability to allocate adequate resources to development and cope with other, less traditional security threats. As

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such, it is Viet Nam’s consistent policy to support all efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race, especially within multilateral and regional frameworks. Viet Nam is a member of all fundamental multilateral agreements on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have also taken part in the negotiation and conclusion of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. Most recently, Viet Nam is the tenth country to have ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We urge countries that have not yet acceded to and/or ratified these treaties to do so and to enhance their cooperation to more effectively implement them, thus meaningfully contributing to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We believe that universal accession to the fundamental legal frameworks on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is crucial to ensuring a world free of nuclear weapons. It is equally important for discussions on reaching that goal to be able to help overcome the current impasse at which multilateral disarmament institutions find themselves. The Conference on Disarmament remains the world’s sole multilateral forum for negotiations on this issue with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Consequently, the Conference should facilitate its substantive discussions, especially with regard to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Such discussions will be vital in furthering progress in all other aspects of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, including negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in space. I would like to thank you all for your kind attention. I would now like to give the floor to the representative of Zimbabwe. Mr. Mushayavanhu (Zimbabwe): I thank you, Mr. President. First, allow me to also welcome colleagues back from the brief summer break. I trust at least some among us have managed to recharge batteries and that we are revitalized to conclude this current session of the Conference on Disarmament on a more promising note – promising and productive, that is. My delegation is happy to have among us the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Dr. Lassina Zerbo. We wish to thank the Executive Secretary for his important and timely address to the Conference. We are also grateful to the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Aliyar Azeez, and the Deputy Permanent Representative of Austria, Robert Müller, for their insights on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, a topic which is dear to us non- nuclear States. As we welcome you, Dr. Zerbo, we note, with sadness, the passing on of one of your colleagues in Vienna, also our friend, Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Mr. Amano served the Agency with distinction for two terms as its Director General and was re-elected for a record third term because of his able stewardship of the organization and the respect which he commanded among the member States. With a lifelong commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, Mr. Amano once walked the corridors of the Palais des Nations as a delegate of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, so he is truly one of our own. On behalf of my delegation, I wish to express our deepest condolences to the Amano family and the Government and people of Japan on the passing on of Mr. Amano. Mr. President, during the second week of February this year, Zimbabwe had the honour to host Dr. Zerbo on the occasion of the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty by my country. On 13 February, Zimbabwe joined the community of nations which have ratified the Treaty. As the President of Zimbabwe, Emmerson Mnangagwa, said on the occasion of our ratification of the Treaty: “The step taken by the Government of the Second Republic was our contribution to promoting the entry into force of the Treaty. We are therefore proud and happy to be the newest member of the CTBTO [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization] family of nations which is saying ‘no’ to the testing of nuclear weapons.” Indeed, we take our international obligations and responsibilities very seriously and our ratification of the Treaty is a practical demonstration of that strong commitment and of the spirit of constructive engagement of the new political dispensation in my country. I am sure the Executive Secretary of CTBTO will agree with me – in fact, he said as much – that

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the universalization of the Treaty is not about annex 2 States alone. Indeed, we are aware that we need the remaining annex 2 States to ratify the Treaty for it to enter into force. However, we need all States on board to achieve global universalization. My delegation therefore hopes our action will help to generate the required momentum and inspire other countries, especially the remaining annex 2 countries, to do the same, so that we can achieve the entry into force of the Treaty. Of course, our ultimate goal is the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and we believe the Treaty contributes to that objective. Mr. President, a treaty that is negotiated by diplomats but archived in libraries or various educational institutions is of limited value and utility if it lacks practical applications to improve society. In that regard, Zimbabwe notes with satisfaction and encourages the efforts deployed by the Executive Secretary and his colleagues at CTBTO to engage civil society in their outreach programmes. As part of its inclusive agenda, we note the Organization’s keen involvement with the scientific community, academia, women, youth and other stakeholders through programmes and initiatives such as the CTBTO Youth Groups and the CTBTO Science Diplomacy Symposiums, which, we think, are helping wider society to appreciate the civil and scientific application of CTBTO technologies. Finally, Mr. President, the presence today of the Executive Secretary of CTBTO in the Council Chamber to address the Conference on Disarmament is a happy reminder of what the Conference was capable of achieving some 23 years ago and before then. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an eloquent testimony of what the Conference can accomplish in the fulfilment of its mandate. The presence of Dr. Zerbo today is also, unfortunately, a sad but timely reminder of the long stalemate that has prevented the resumption of substantive work since 1996. To a great extent, it appears that many of the challenges standing in the way of the Treaty’s entry into force are a reflection of what is also affecting the work of the Conference. As I conclude, let me say that we hope that the visit by the Executive Secretary signals a future relationship of heightened engagement between CTBTO and the Conference on one hand and between CTBTO and member States without physical diplomatic representation in Vienna on the other. The President: I would like to thank the Ambassador of Zimbabwe for his statement. Before I give the floor to the next speakers, I would like also to encourage the speakers to take advantage of the presence of the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the members of the panel to share comments, views and ask questions of the panellists. I give the floor to the delegate of Finland, speaking on behalf of the European Union. Ms. Kemppainen (Finland): Mr. President, I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The candidate countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania, as well as Ukraine, align themselves with this statement. At the outset, I would like to express the European Union’s deepest condolences to the relatives of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Amano and to the IAEA staff and pay tribute to his legacy. Mr. President, we are delighted to welcome Executive Secretary Dr. Lassina Zerbo to the Conference on Disarmament and would like to commend him for the outstanding work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Provisional Technical Secretariat, which the European Union continues to support politically and financially. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, negotiated in this very chamber, is one of the key pillars of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture contributing to global peace and security. Although the Treaty has yet to enter into force, it has established the de facto norm against nuclear testing, as demonstrated by the fact that only the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has conducted nuclear tests in the twenty- first century. The Treaty’s strong legitimacy and vital importance for our collective security are manifested in the annual United Nations General Assembly resolutions. The European

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Union will continue to voice support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and CTBTO in multilateral forums, including at the 2020 Review Conference. Mr. President, the efforts to promote the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s entry into force and facilitate signature and ratification remain a priority. All European Union member States have ratified the Treaty and are abiding by their obligations. We reiterate our call for all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in annex 2, notably China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States, to sign and ratify the Treaty without any preconditions or further delay. In the meantime, we call on all States to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. We call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to give effect to its stated intention to end nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the Treaty. Following the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear tests, the quick, reliable and independent data provided by CTBTO enabled the international community to respond appropriately and swiftly. In this context, CTBTO and its expertise could make an important contribution to complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. We welcome the latest ratification – by Zimbabwe, the incoming President of the Conference on Disarmament – which increases the number of ratifications to 168. We appreciate the work carried out by Belgium and Iraq as the outgoing article XIV coordinators and look forward to working together with Algeria and Germany as the incoming coordinators to conclude a strong final declaration at the next Article XIV Conference in New York on 25 September. We encourage all States, signatory and non- signatory alike, to attend the Article XIV Conference at the highest political level. We encourage the Provisional Technical Secretariat to continue to proactively promote the Treaty and join forces with civil society. In this context, we applaud the work of the CTBTO Youth Group. The European Union reiterates its full confidence in the ability of the Treaty’s verification regime to ensure that a nuclear test explosion anywhere on the planet would be detected. CTBTO has provided the world with a truly global, high-tech monitoring system for nuclear explosions, something that no single country alone would be able to do. It has demonstrated its ability to provide independent and reliable data that help deter non- compliance with the Treaty and respond to threats to international peace and security. We welcome the near completion of the network of the International Monitoring System and urge all States signatories that must still establish stations to cooperate with the Provisional Technical Secretariat to that end and relevant States signatories to assist with this process. The installation, certification and operation of all stations prior to entry into force of the Treaty are imperatives. We note that problems with data availability and data quality at some International Monitoring System stations persist and invite the host States to address the issues without delay. With International Monitoring System construction ongoing for over twenty years, there is no excuse for further delay in certifying and operating all stations. In addition to the Treaty’s obvious contribution to international peace and security, the integrated capacity-building offered by CTBTO assists States in using International Monitoring System data, and the International Data Centre supports civil and scientific applications and research associated with Treaty-related verification technologies, including tsunami and volcanic ash cloud warnings. To make best use of its collective investment, the European Union supports and contributes to developing countries benefiting from such CTBTO services. We look back with satisfaction on the Science and Technology Conference, the largest scientific conference on Treaty verification technologies and their spin-off benefits for disaster warning and science, which took place from 24 to 29 June 2019. We would like to thank the Provisional Technical Secretariat for the organization of this successful event and stress the importance of the ongoing cooperation of CTBTO with scientists worldwide. However, maintaining a highly sophisticated verification system, including further development of on-site inspection operational capabilities, and related capacity-building activities require substantial financial input. CTBTO can carry out its mandatory functions only if provided with the necessary funding to support the completion and the sustainability

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of these tools. We therefore call upon all concerned States to honour their financial obligations and step up their political support for the Treaty and CTBTO. Since 2006, the European Union has provided CTBTO with voluntary contributions of more than €23 million to fund a variety of technical projects to strengthen the verification regime and build capacity in developing countries. Last year, a new decision, concerning funding of more than €4.5 million, was adopted by the Council of the European Union in order to continue the European Union’s long-standing support for the strengthening of CTBTO’s monitoring and verification capabilities. As a further sign of our commitment, the European Union has decided to become a supporter of four actions on the United Nations Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, including the action on promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We will continue to use every opportunity to advocate the prompt entry into force and universalization of the Treaty in relevant international forums and in meetings with countries that have not yet signed or ratified it. The President: I thank the delegate from Finland for her statement. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Argentina. Mr. Foradori (Argentina) (spoke in Spanish): Thank you very much, Mr. President. Since this is the first time that my delegation is taking the floor during your presidency, please allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the role. We also wish to thank the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Mr. Lassina Zerbo, for his words. His presence at this meeting reflects the importance to nuclear disarmament of that treaty. Mr. President, we are aware that the larger international community is following our work and has every right to expect firm proposals from us concerning an irreversible, verifiable and transparent disarmament process. Argentina is receptive to those demands, in accordance both with our long-standing position in favour of general and complete disarmament and with article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We must not undermine the validity of that article, which provides for the obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons through general and complete disarmament and thereby implies the concept of a prohibition. For Argentina, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is the clearest and most urgent goal. It is therefore a positive sign that more and more States are signing and ratifying it every year. However, in all likelihood, the entry into force of the Treaty will require a gesture on the part of the annex 2 States. It is not easy to understand the arguments in favour of a gradual approach to disarmament that does not foresee the early entry into force of the Treaty. The implementation of unilateral moratoriums by the nuclear-weapon States may serve to confirm the status of this instrument as a jus cogens norm in international law; moratoriums are not enough, however, given that we already have a full treaty. Mr. President, the forthcoming 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons offers a clear opportunity to make a universal call for the entry into force of this treaty, as it will take place at a unique moment when we can truly say that not a single State is conducting prohibited tests. We must take advantage of this situation to consolidate our progress by imposing binding obligations. Driven by the belief that progress towards the elimination of nuclear weapons is achievable, the steps that we take must be subject to robust control systems to ensure that they are verifiable, irreversible and transparent. We must support all efforts to put these systems in place. Whether political, legal or of any other nature, our commitments regarding disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are only of relative value if they are not backed up by a neutral, professional and robust verification system. To that end, appropriate and sufficient capacities need to be developed. Initiatives such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the establishment within the United Nations of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, in addition to the discussions on verification that are expected to continue within the Group of Governmental Experts on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, can be seen as positive steps in that regard. The Agenda for Disarmament announced by the Secretary-General is another step in the right direction.

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Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to express my country’s sorrow at the news of the death of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ambassador Yukiya Amano, and to extend our condolences to Mr. Amano’s family and to the Government and people of Japan. We would like to acknowledge the work of Director General Amano in actively promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the peace and development of all nations, in articulating his vision of the Agency’s role in realizing its motto of “atoms for peace and development” and in ensuring that it is fully prepared to help member States, and particularly developing countries, to use nuclear technology to address the many development challenges in the fields of health, agriculture, industry and environmental protection. The President: I would like to thank the Ambassador of Argentina for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished delegate from the Russian Federation. Mr. Belousov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): At the outset, I would like to thank all the panellists for their contributions to today’s meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In particular, I would like to thank the distinguished Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) for his participation in the Conference and to express the full support of the Russian Federation for the efforts of the Technical Secretariat to universalize this important Treaty and for the efforts being made to improve and strengthen the Treaty mechanisms. The topic of today’s meeting has already been discussed on a number of occasions in this chamber during this session of the Conference. There have been so many various positions, perspectives and views expressed that this forum has long since become a routine exercise. Some observers unversed in arms control and non-proliferation issues might even think that nuclear disarmament is being addressed in our plenary meetings to fill the time. In part they would be right given the current state of nuclear disarmament affairs, which some States regard as locked in stalemate or showing zero progress. Indeed, from a distance, there appears to be no sign of a breakthrough or decisive step towards achieving the goal unanimously declared by the international community of building a world free of nuclear weapons. However, the situation is far more complex than it looks. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted in July 2017, did not give impetus to further reductions of nuclear arsenals, although its catalysing role was presented as one of the key arguments in favour of the Treaty. I will not go into its merits at this point. I would only like to point out that tackling the issue of restarting efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons lies not in prohibiting or delegitimizing them, which in itself contradicts the provisions of the Treaty, but in ensuring the military security interests of specific States, including the Russian Federation. Russia, as one of the States with the largest nuclear arsenals, is subject to increased requirements for nuclear disarmament. Emphasis has been placed on our particular responsibility for efforts towards nuclear demilitarization of our common home, if you will. We certainly do not take this responsibility lightly and remain committed to our pledges to contribute fully to the creation of a world without nuclear weapons; we are meeting the obligations that we have undertaken under relevant bilateral and multilateral treaties and would like yet again to express our openness to substantive discussion on an issue of such critical importance for international security. However, recently we are having growing doubts as to whether our constructive position is drawing the right response from our American colleagues. Moreover, it is becoming more and more apparent from the approaches taken by the United States that there is a fundamental change of course with regard to strategic stability, peace and international security. We have seen the return of Washington to a strong-arm model for safeguarding its security interests. It does so despite, and sometimes to the detriment of, the vision that the international community has shared over the past 50 years. I have in mind ensuring security by reducing the level of armed conflict through progressive arms reductions. The main instrument used to pursue this new yet long-standing course of the United States consists in the unlimited development of strategic potential, involving both offensive and defensive components (nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missile systems). The United States is thus seeking to gain an enormous military advantage over its military, political and economic rivals.

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This would explain the decision of the United States to exit the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), the lengthy silence over whether it will extend the New START Treaty, which expires in February 2021, the failure to respond to the Russian proposal to reaffirm the Gorbachev-Reagan statement on the prevention of nuclear war, a war that cannot be won, and the refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The foregoing cannot be described other than as the undermining of the architecture of international arms control agreements that had been built over decades. Such a destructive process began not one or two years ago but rather back in 2002 with the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty, which introduced a shift in the strategic balance. For the past 10 years, Russia has been trying through political and diplomatic measures to limit the damage to strategic stability and international security that this irresponsible step has caused. However, our efforts over the years have been in vain, forcing us to seek an appropriate military response to the obvious threat to our country’s security presented by the implementation of American missile defence plans. The response came in the form of the latest weapons presented by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2018. I would like to stress that such new weapons are a defensive response made under duress to the United States development of elements of its global ballistic defence so close to our western border. The technological groundwork done with American missile defence system and its European segment in particular makes us seriously doubt the declared purpose of the system; it also raises questions about the claims made in United States military and political circles that it is not directed against Russia. No sooner were the records of Russian-American negotiations on missile defence about to be consigned to the archives than the United States mounted a propaganda campaign around the INF Treaty. It mainly consisted in groundless and unsubstantiated accusations that Russia was in breach of its obligations under the Treaty. The United States took such a step in complete disregard for our legitimate claims against it concerning compliance with this instrument, which is a cornerstone of European and international security. I would like to note that, since 1999, not only have our American colleagues failed to properly address the concerns we have raised, they have also, for no reason, refused to discuss them within the framework of the Treaty mechanism. Only in 2015 were the first meaningful consultations held on the concerns that the parties had. However, it is now clear that, even then, the United States was contemplating signing the death warrant on the INF Treaty in the near future and all subsequent bilateral contacts, ostensibly to ease concerns, were staged to conceal its misguided plans to exit the Treaty. I would like to draw attention to the fact that such a course of events would have been difficult without the tacit consent to and even support for Washington’s plans on the part of its NATO allies, which, out of transatlantic solidarity and “bloc discipline”, refused to take an objective and unbiased view of the situation surrounding the INF Treaty. What is the outcome so far? After 2 August, bans will be lifted on the development and general deployment of two classes of previously banned missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The United States has, in effect, received tacit “permission” to continue to violate its treaty obligations. Thanks to the support of its allies, even a public censure of Washington for this will be extremely difficult. The very existence of the current arms control and non-proliferation arrangements that has ensured international security and strategic stability over the years is called into question. We may be entering a new era in which past achievements in arms control and non-proliferation are set back to zero. As a result, we risk ending up in a less predictable international environment in military and political terms, characterized by growing mistrust and tension among States. It is very doubtful that future generations will be grateful to our American colleagues for this. Unfortunately, the backdrop for such a scenario to be played out is already in place. What kind of trust can there be when our American partners refuse to meet their obligations under the START Treaty in accordance with the procedures stipulated by the Treaty? For our part, such crafty American expectations of “trust” on the part of Russia made it

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impossible to confirm that, as of 5 February 2018, the United States had converted and withdrawn about a hundred strategic bombers and submarine ballistic missile launchers, which, according to Russian experts, can give the United States a serious strategic advantage. The issue of conversion made it difficult to resolve the question of extending the Treaty. We have told our American colleagues on a number of occasions that, without resolving that issue, it would be very difficult to decide favourably on extending the Treaty. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the United States has rejected specific proposals of ours for measures based on mutual transparency that could put our concerns to rest. The fate of yet another agreement of vital importance for the maintenance of strategic stability has thus been jeopardized by the United States. I should also like to draw attention to the situation surrounding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which continues to be an important instrument of nuclear non- proliferation and a deterrent to the development of military nuclear capabilities. The Russian Federation, having completed in 2000 all the necessary procedures for full adherence to the Treaty, has thus backed up its voluntary commitments not to conduct nuclear tests undertaken back in 1991. Since then, my country has stringently and completely fulfilled its obligations under both the Treaty and the moratorium. However, our concerns about the future of this Treaty are only growing. This is primarily due to the refusal of the current United States administration to ratify it. We believe that the United States bears a particular responsibility for the future of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a country that was originally behind the Treaty and claims to be a leader in international nuclear disarmament efforts but which, at the same time, possesses one of the largest nuclear arsenals and maintains a nuclear test infrastructure that can be ready to carry out nuclear tests in short order. In this context, I note that the United States was the first to test and the only country to use nuclear weapons. It has repeatedly been stressed that a moratorium on nuclear testing is an interim measure and cannot replace obligations under the Treaty. At the same time, we believe that partial, interest-based participation in the activities under the Treaty is insufficient and even destructive, as it prevents the Treaty mechanisms from being fully utilized and some of the mechanisms from being put into effect. We see in this the desire of the United States to benefit from such participation without assuming specific treaty obligations. We would like to make one more point. The six-month readiness of the infrastructure for nuclear testing cannot but raise doubts as to the reliability of the American moratorium. We are at a loss over the attempts by American colleagues to justify their refusal to ratify the Treaty with baseless claims regarding the compliance of Russia with the Treaty. In our view, such unfounded accusations against us form a pattern that has already been applied to the INF Treaty. It would appear that, through propaganda about alleged violations on the part of Russia, the United States is attempting to prepare international public opinion for the withdrawal of its signature on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in order then to put the blame on Russia. I can assure you that that such a ploy will not work again. Russia continues to be committed to the spirit and letter of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, as a responsible State, together with other parties to the Treaty, will pursue efforts to ensure its entry into force. We call on the United States to reconsider its position and to demonstrate to other States by example a responsible approach to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which requires their ratification if it is to enter into force. Mr. President, distinguished colleagues, these three examples alone compel us to take a critical look at the state of nuclear disarmament. In our view, it is no longer appropriate to talk about a lack of progress, but about a real backsliding in this area. In this regard, the international community, while continuing to work on possible ways and means to encourage further reductions in nuclear weapons, should now see to it that measures are taken to prevent a new, more costly arms race that poses a greater threat to international security. In addition, measures to preserve and strengthen the existing system of arms control and non-proliferation are urgently needed. Moreover, it is already necessary to think carefully about steps to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, which is a possibility that, according to American policy documents, the United States not only does not rule out, but

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even countenances. Neither does our shared historical experience with the American bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki rule this possibility out. Russia stands ready to cooperate with all concerned countries in order to take on these difficult tasks. By unconditionally fulfilling our treaty obligations, we contribute to strategic stability, the maintenance of peace and global security. Russia is ready to exercise as much restraint as possible in the current circumstances, as President Vladimir Putin said on 2 February. We expect a similar approach from American partners and their NATO allies. We have consistently advocated for constructive dialogue with the United States as part of the strategic agenda and take a positive view of the bilateral contacts that have taken place in recent months in this regard. However, our American colleagues will have to work hard to convince us, despite our bitter experience in trying to engage with the United States on strategic stability issues, that they are able to negotiate. By this we mean, first and foremost, conducting negotiations on the basis of mutual consideration of each other’s interests, concluding bilateral agreements with guaranteed subsequent ratification, clearly fulfilling our treaty obligations, and renouncing “public rally” diplomacy in favour of using agreed mechanisms for settling disputes and addressing concerns. In conclusion, I would like to express the condolences of the Russian Federation to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the relatives of the distinguished Mr. Amano on the occasion of his death. I thank delegations for their attention and patience, and the interpreters for their professional work. The President: I thank the delegate from the Russian Federation. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea. Mr. Lee Jang-keun (Republic of Korea): Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning, colleagues. First of all, I would like to join other colleagues in expressing my deepest condolences to the family of the late International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano, the staff of IAEA and the people of Japan. The passing of Mr. Amano is a huge and sudden loss for the whole international community. His dedicated service and tireless efforts for nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy will be remembered and appreciated by all of us. Mr. President, my delegation would like to welcome today Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty Organization. We appreciate his comprehensive and thoughtful remarks and also the presentations by the other panel members, Ambassador Azeez and Mr. Müller. I would also like to thank you, Mr. President, for giving us this meaningful opportunity to engage with Dr. Zerbo in our thematic discussion on nuclear disarmament this morning. As was repeatedly emphasized, including by Dr. Zerbo himself, the three pillars of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – namely, nuclear disarmament, non- proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy – are closely intertwined, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an imperative part of the interrelated web of responsibilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The former treaty is essential to preventing qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons and bears great importance in both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As one of the strong supporters of that treaty, and having served as the Chair of the Preparatory Commission recently, Korea is of the view that its entry into force as early as possible should be a top priority. My delegation, once again, urges the early accession to and ratification of the Treaty by all annex 2 countries. It is in this context that we also support the strengthening of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime, which will play an important role in monitoring countries’ compliance with the Treaty when it enters into force. Taking this opportunity, my delegation would like to recognize and welcome the positive role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in efforts to universalize the Treaty, with all ASEAN members joining the Treaty as of last year. We also hope that the Asian countries can set an example for other regions in advancing the international nuclear disarmament agenda. In this context, we also welcome the declaration

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on discontinuing nuclear tests made last year by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its willingness to accede to the international desire and efforts for a total ban on nuclear tests. We urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to continue to abide by its commitment and look forward to continuing support and encouragement from the international community for our efforts towards denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Mr. President, as many of us agree, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non- proliferation are two sides of the same coin and are also inseparable from the international security environment. With this mind, efforts to create an environment for nuclear disarmament are required not only from nuclear-weapon States but also from every corner of the international community if sustainable progress in nuclear disarmament is to be achieved. In this vein, my delegation welcomes and supports the recent initiatives which aim to build trust and enhance diplomatic engagement and dialogue among nuclear States and non-nuclear States alike, such as the step-by-step approach by Sweden and the inaugural working group meeting held by the United States for the initiative Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament. Korea is actively participating in these endeavours in order to contribute to substantive progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. At the same time, my delegation believes that the leading role of the P5 States, the five nuclear-weapon States with permanent seats on the Security Council, is particularly important in advancing nuclear disarmament. In this context, my delegation welcomes the ongoing cooperation and dialogue process among these States. Regular updates to the Conference on Disarmament on what this group of States has been discussing and trying to accomplish collectively in the coming months and years will also contribute to enhanced understanding and trust between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Last but not least, the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiation forum, also needs to focus on what it can and should do in the field of nuclear disarmament. My delegation believes that one of the Conference’s priorities should be commencing negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty at soon as possible. The President: I thank the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea for his statement. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Australia. Ms. Mansfield (Australia): Thank you very much indeed, Mr. President. And Australia, like many others of us, wishes to acknowledge the huge loss for the international community with the passing of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano. And while the focus, of course, has been on his contribution to international security through his IAEA role, he also served in the Conference on Disarmament, including during the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. My delegation offers its deepest condolences to Mr. Amano’s family, friends and Agency colleagues and thanks him for his contribution to international security over many years. Mr. President, it is a great honour for the Conference to have been able to hear from Dr. Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and I thank him for his contribution and for his optimism, but also his realistic comments about where we are going next. I think his suggestions in terms of the way the Organization can further support member States are really important. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime remain central to the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. This point was underlined repeatedly during discussions at the recent session in New York of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty was the last treaty negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. We are interested in perspectives on how the Treaty is operating and how we can help to strengthen it and work more towards its entry into force. It is always really valuable also to connect the Geneva and Vienna communities and to think broadly about the tools at our disposal, including, of course, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). While we are disappointed that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is not yet in force – and I noticed on CTBTO’s website, Mr. Zerbo, that you have posted a comment by a former Australian Foreign Minister, made, I think, after he left office, to the

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effect that although he had heard a lot of excuses, he had never heard a convincing argument against the Treaty – it is nonetheless worth recognizing that it has created a really powerful norm against nuclear testing. Its world-class verification system is largely operational and has proved its worth. The International Monitoring System is a global collaborative endeavour that we can take pride in, I think. We also admire your work to educate and encourage youth engagement in that area, as it is particularly important, as, indeed, is diversity, which you also pointed out. I thank you for that. Mr. President, we need to remind ourselves of the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, of its verification regime and of the need to bring the Treaty into force. We must invest the time and effort needed to ensure that the Treaty’s verification system is fully effective and complete – that all International Monitoring System stations are operational and that the data the System generates are available to all member States. Australia is really proud that our over 20 stations have been certified, including in Antarctica, and we welcomed the Executive Secretary’s visit last November, during which that significant achievement was celebrated. Civil and scientific applications of the verification system extend the value of our important work beyond the international security domain and into areas that can benefit the daily lives of our citizens. It also helps to maintain the high levels of support for the verification system that in turn help to ensure it remains in good health. Australia welcomed the Science and Technology 2019 Conference, which presented yet another opportunity to build links with the international scientific community. And, Mr. President, following the meeting of the Group of Friends of the Treaty in New York last year, we now look forward to this year’s Article XIV Conference in September. Entry into force of the Treaty is of utmost importance, and we continue to support the efforts of all parties as we strive towards that goal in a collaborative and a constructive manner. We congratulate Zimbabwe for ratifying the Treaty earlier this year. And, once again, we call upon all States yet to do so – particularly annex 2 States – to ratify the Treaty without delay. We call upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to sign and ratify the Treaty as part of its overall commitment to denuclearize. Mr. President, one of the ways Australia supports efforts for entry into force is through the General Assembly’s annual resolution on the Treaty, which we run with our partners New Zealand and Mexico in the First Committee, and we encourage countries to support this year’s resolution. The President: I thank the Ambassador of Australia for her statement. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Egypt. Mr. Youssef (Egypt): Thank you very much, Mr. President. Since this is the first time I am taking the floor under your presidency, I would like to start by congratulating you on assuming the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to assure you of my delegation’s full support and cooperation in fulfilling your mandate. I would also like to welcome Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization and to thank him for addressing the Conference. Mr. President, I thank you for convening this meeting and for dedicating it to agenda item 1 on nuclear disarmament. Our thanks are extended to the panellists Ambassador Azeez and Mr. Müller for their valuable contribution to the discussion. My delegation fully associates itself with the statement of the Group of 21 on nuclear disarmament that was delivered by the delegation of Iraq in the plenary meeting on 20 June. Mr. President, nuclear disarmament remains a top priority for Egypt on its disarmament agenda. Egypt has consistently sought to advance global efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in other forums. Our priority is to negotiate in the Conference a universal, non- discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear weapons convention establishing a world free from nuclear weapons within an agreed time frame.

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Non-nuclear-weapon States have called consistently for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty to ensure the realization of the total and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons in a transparent and verifiable manner. Unfortunately, to this day nuclear weapons have continued to exist in staggering numbers, with an increasing role in the military and security policies, concepts and doctrines of nuclear-weapon States. Regrettably, nuclear- weapon States have placed the concept of nuclear deterrence above the objective and purpose of the Treaty for over five decades, disregarding their commitments under article VI and the unequivocal undertaking towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Mr. President, Egypt acknowledges the contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It is for this reason that Egypt has been adamantly working to establish such a zone in the Middle East. In 2018, the United Nations General Assembly adopted decision 73/546, by which the Secretary-General of the United Nations was entrusted to convene a conference to elaborate a treaty on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. As stated in this decision, the conference will take all its decisions by consensus and will address in a non-discriminatory manner all the relevant concerns of all States of the region, in order for them to reach arrangements freely. The three co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the other two nuclear-weapon States received invitations to participate in the conference in order to contribute to the achievement of a common regional aspiration to ensure the collective and collaborative security of all States of the region without discrimination, which would enhance international peace and security and represent a historic contribution to disarmament efforts worldwide and would definitely contribute to the advancement of the efforts on nuclear disarmament. It is important to note that this conference provides a historic opportunity to establish a comprehensive and sustainable security architecture in the Middle East, addressing all its chronic security challenges. Mr. President, Egypt continues to believe that the goals envisioned by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty are essential to achieving the long-sought objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. We believe that it is of utmost importance to continue to combat both vertical and horizontal proliferation as well as to reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons entirely. As consistently reaffirmed by successive NPT review conferences, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has an essential role within the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Egypt believes that nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take steps that would contribute to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. As outlined in the 2010 NPT Review Conference, positive decisions taken by nuclear- weapon States in this regard would have a beneficial impact, and nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. In this regard, the regional state of affairs in the Middle East continues to have implications for the prospects for entry into force. It is essential to address the significant imbalance in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments undertaken by States within the region in order for all parties to move forward on the basis of equal commitments. We find it necessary to point out again that the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization was established for a very particular purpose – to carry out the necessary preparation for the effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty upon its entry into force and to prepare for the first session of the conference of States parties to the Treaty. Any activity or initiative undertaken by the Commission and its Provisional Technical Secretariat must closely adhere to its mandate and purpose, as defined by the resolution establishing the Commission. Mr. President, since Egypt was mentioned by name in the statement delivered by Finland on behalf of the European Union, I would like to clarify the following. My delegation notes with deep regret the newly emerging trend as part of which some delegations name all remaining non-ratifying annex 2 States. This places all annex 2 States on an equal footing, reflecting a shocking lack of recognition of the realities of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Egypt is a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with its nuclear infrastructure under comprehensive

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International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and no history of nuclear testing. Egypt has always supported the goals and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It cannot be equated to other annex 2 States with differing situations or those that have a special responsibility in relation to ratification of the Treaty, as recognized at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Mr. President, we would like to reiterate our appreciation for your efforts and we stand ready to engage with Conference on Disarmament members in a constructive and interactive manner to resume the substantive work of the Conference. The President: I thank the Ambassador of Egypt for his statement and kind words addressed to the President. I now call on the Ambassador of France. Mr. Hwang (France) (spoke in French): Thank you, Mr. President. To begin with, I would also like to extend my delegation’s condolences to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the people of Japan on the death of Mr. Amano. His passing leaves a great void. France fully aligns itself with the statement of the European Union, to which I would like to add a few remarks in my national capacity. First of all, I would like to welcome the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Mr. Lassina Zerbo, and thank him for his eloquent statement, which my delegation fully endorses. I would also like to thank the other speakers for their contributions to this debate. As you know, France is very committed to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime. Although it was concluded over 20 years ago, the relevance of that instrument remains intact to this day. The universalization of the Treaty is within our reach, with only eight States still to ratify it. The serious threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems remains a major challenge that must be met by multilateral action. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, although only a provisional mechanism, has already proved its relevance and effectiveness by accurately detecting all the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We call on that State to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay. France has been firmly committed to that instrument since its adoption. It was one of the first States both to sign it, in September 1996, and to ratify it, in April 1998. Our commitment to the Treaty has been demonstrated through firm, concrete action. In 1998, we permanently and transparently dismantled our Pacific nuclear test site. France remains, to this day, the only State to have taken such a step. We have significantly reduced our nuclear arsenal and have permanently stopped plutonium and uranium production for nuclear weapons. Our priority today is to open negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. That instrument and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty are complementary insofar as they help to constrain the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear arsenals, a process without which the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons remains unattainable. Through its actions, France has demonstrated that, in order to meet the commitments of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is resolutely committed to working towards disarmament through a realistic, step-by-step approach based on tangible results. More than ever, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty constitutes a crucial step in the pursuit of that goal. The President: (spoke in French): I thank the Ambassador of France for his statement. (spoke in English) I now call on the Ambassador of the United Kingdom. Mr. Liddle (United Kingdom): Thank you very much, Mr. President. And let me thank you very much for organizing this debate this morning. Indeed, I thank our panellists

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for their contributions. It is a particular pleasure, as others have said, to have Dr. Zerbo with us once again today. While the United Kingdom aligns itself with the statement delivered by the European Union, I would also like to pay tribute in my national capacity to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and to the crucial importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty itself to the strength of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at its heart. The United Kingdom remains a strong supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty and CTBTO politically, financially and technically and views its entry into force as an essential step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. As Dr. Zerbo said, we should use the upcoming Article XIV Conference in September to underline our collective support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and CTBTO and to reinforce the call for all non-ratifying States, in particular the remaining annex 2 States, to sign and ratify the Treaty. Mr. President, I have asked for the floor today primarily to draw the attention of the Conference on Disarmament to a recent inquiry into rising nuclear risk, the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty and nuclear disarmament conducted by the United Kingdom Parliament’s House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations. The inquiry was launched in November 2018 and was designed to examine and inform the policy of the British Government ahead of the NPT Review Conference and the fiftieth anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2020. The inquiry heard evidence from government ministers and officials, from representatives from other States and from academia and civil society. The Committee’s report was published in April, and the Government’s response was published on 4 July. The House of Lords also debated the report and the Government’s response on 16 July. The reports and the Government’s response can found on the website of the House of Lords. The Government of the United Kingdom, although it does not agree with all the report’s conclusions, believes it to be a useful contribution to the debate around the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ahead of next year’s Review Conference. It is also an excellent example of democratic scrutiny of the Government’s policy in this important area. The Government’s response sets out the United Kingdom’s position on many issues we are discussing this morning. It emphasizes the centrality of the Treaty and its enduring value as a central pillar of the rules-based international system. The Treaty continues to offer a framework which is central to our shared goal of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons. However, the United Kingdom believes that significant further disarmament is difficult to foresee in the current security environment. Some countries are expanding their nuclear arsenals and pursuing a reckless path of breaching arms control and disarmament treaties, as well as developing destabilizing new delivery systems for nuclear weapons. Since the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation has raised it, let me be clear that the United Kingdom, like all our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, considers that the Russian Federation is solely responsible for the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, thanks to its development and deployment of a system prohibited under that treaty. Its talk of unswerving compliance with arms control and disarmament treaties is empty rhetoric not borne out by the evidence. We must remain resolute in working to deter such threats and to face down those who are seeking to undermine decades of progress. Against this complex security backdrop, the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear deterrent remains essential both to our security and that of our NATO allies for as long as the global security situation demands. Even in this challenging context, though, we are making progress towards verifiable treaty-based disarmament. Part of this requires us to understand and overcome the challenges in verifying nuclear disarmament, so that all States can have confidence in the process. The Committee welcomed the leading role the United Kingdom has played in developing verification tools and techniques working alongside nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States, and in its response the Government underlined its commitment to continue this work. Looking ahead to next year’s NPT Review Conference, it is clear to us that the Treaty remains as relevant and important now as it ever has been. This is a view widely shared around the world. However, we also know that even a treaty as important as this

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requires constant nurturing to ensure that it remains effective. That is why we are working with international partners to ensure that the Review Conference reinforces our shared interests and seeks to advance its goals. We recognize that achieving consensus at the Review Conference will be challenging, but we will invest all our energies into achieving a positive outcome. And let me welcome Dr. Zerbo’s optimism in this regard, which I think we can all draw inspiration from. As part of our preparation, between now and the Review Conference, we will chair the dialogue that was established a decade ago by the United Kingdom to build mutual trust and confidence between the nuclear-weapon States designated under the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty. We also plan to engage in discussions on transparency and risk reduction with all States parties. The Government of the United Kingdom remains committed to multilateral disarmament, and we will continue to work tirelessly to uphold the Treaty and to explore practical ways to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. The President: I thank the Ambassador of the United Kingdom for his statement. I now give the floor to the Ambassador of Myanmar. Mr. Tun (Myanmar): Thank you, Mr. President. At the outset, I would like to join others in expressing our deepest condolences for the passing away of Director General Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since this is the first time that I take the floor under your presidency, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We are proud that a fellow ambassador of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is presiding over the Conference. I assure you of the Myanmar delegation’s full support and cooperation throughout your presidency. Let me express my sincere thanks for the tireless efforts of your predecessors Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela in striving to ensure the swift beginning of the substantive work of our forum. Mr. President, the Conference, as the single multilateral negotiation forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of multilateral agreements on disarmament-related matters. The world is looking to the Conference, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiation forum, with high expectations. The twenty-year wait for things to happen in the Conference on Disarmament has been too long. For different reasons, consensus on a draft programme of work has been elusive. Mr. President, although the first and foremost priority for the Conference on Disarmament is the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work with a negotiation mandate, the Myanmar delegation is of the view that substantive discussions on all items on the Conference agenda give us a better level of understanding of each other’s priorities and security concerns. They might also lead to common ground for a programme of work of the Conference and put the Conference back in action in the years to come. Against this backdrop, Myanmar always welcomes and supports every effort made by your delegation and successive presidencies as an important step in the right direction. Mr. President, I would like to thank you and your delegation for the draft programme of work and efforts to move the work of the Conference forward. I would like to express my deep appreciation to you for the manner in which you have been carrying out consultations with member States to listen to their opinions and suggestions. Mr. President, nuclear disarmament has been a principal objective for the United Nations since the adoption of the first General Assembly resolution. With this, I wish to express our appreciation to the President for organizing the discussion on nuclear disarmament. I would like to thank the panellists Ambassador Azeez and Mr. Robert Müller for their informative presentations and thoughts. As my delegation has clearly stated on many occasions, I would like to reaffirm that nuclear disarmament is our top priority for the whole global disarmament agenda. This is also the undisputed position of the Group of 21. Myanmar attaches paramount importance to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

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At the same time, we are equally committed to other important issues, such as a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the prevention of arms race in outer space and negative security assurances. Mr. President, we all aim for a world without nuclear weapons. We are of the view that the flexibility of nuclear-weapon States and the constructive approaches of all other States can maintain and contribute to global peace and security. As world peace and security are seriously challenged by various threats, maintaining healthy relations among major countries, in particular nuclear-weapon States, is of utmost importance to the settlement of global strategic problems. Despite growing calls for nuclear disarmament by the international community, achieving a world without nuclear weapons remains a distant goal. Bold and swift actions, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, are needed to achieve that goal. Myanmar firmly believes that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The NPT Review Conference which will take place next year will provide us another opportunity to discuss the issue. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We would urge States listed in annex 2 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty which have yet to ratify it to demonstrate renewed political commitment to achieving the earliest entry into force of this important treaty. Taking this opportunity, I would like to thank Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) for briefing this Conference on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty and the work of CTBTO. We congratulate Zimbabwe for becoming the 168th State to ratify the Treaty. Mr. President, bearing in mind our main goal of a world without nuclear weapons, Myanmar, together with like-minded member States, will present again the annual resolution on nuclear disarmament at the forthcoming seventy-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We look forward to receiving support from all Member States of the United Nations. Mr. President, let me conclude by underlining that getting back to substantive work in the Conference clearly depends on genuine political will of member States and their flexibility. We all have to take matters seriously if we are to move the substantive work of the Conference in a positive direction. Responsibility for the failure or success of the Conference lies with all members of the Conference. The world is watching us. The President: I thank the Ambassador of Myanmar for his statement and his kind words for the Presidents. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan. Mr. Jadoon (Pakistan): Thank you very much, Mr. President. I would like to begin by expressing our heartfelt condolences on the sad passing away of a very accomplished Japanese diplomat and a principled director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Yukiya Amano. We thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this meeting on the issue that is the raison d’être of the Conference on Disarmament and the top priority of the majority of its members. My delegation also thanks the distinguished panellists for their thoughtful remarks and valuable contributions. We would particularly like to thank Dr. Lassina Zerbo, the distinguished Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission for his presence and for his remarks. We take note of his optimistic message. Given his presence in the Conference today, I would like to begin with a few remarks regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Pakistan participated actively and constructively in the Treaty negotiations, held in this very chamber, and we voted in favour of the Treaty’s subsequent adoption by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996. We have since been voting in favour of the annual Treaty resolution in the First Committee and at the General Assembly. As noted by Dr. Zerbo, Pakistan is also

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an accredited observer State of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and regularly attends its meetings. Pakistan is observing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. As we have noted on many occasions, Pakistan was not the first to test in South Asia and would not be the first to resume testing. Our decision to sign the Treaty would be guided by our regional security dynamics. We believe that regional and global efforts complement each other and should be pursued in parallel. In the context of our region, Pakistan has proposed a bilateral arrangement to India on a nuclear test ban. It would go a long way towards strengthening the global norm against nuclear testing and also promote regional stability. The debate in the Nuclear Suppliers Group on membership criteria for States not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty affords the Governments participating in the Group another opportunity to strengthen the norm against testing. Mr. President, to turn to the topic of today’s discussion, the very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 established a commission with the task to make proposals for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament recognized nuclear disarmament as the highest priority. The Final Document of that session established general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the final objective and recognized the time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons as the immediate goal. It was agreed by consensus at the first special session that, in the adoption of disarmament measures, the right of each State to security should be kept in mind, and at each stage of the disarmament process the objective would be undiminished security for all States at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. Over time, however, there has been a progressive erosion of the international consensus on nuclear disarmament. The prime objective of the disarmament process – which is the attainment of equal and undiminished security for all States – is being ignored. A select few States are persisting with the goal of perpetuating the unequal status quo to their continued strategic advantage. They carry on diverting attention from the non- fulfilment of their obligations and commitments on nuclear disarmament to the conclusion of additional self-serving, horizontal non-proliferation measures only. These States continue to undermine the non-proliferation regime by exercising double standards and applying the established rules and norms in a discriminatory manner, suiting their political objectives, thus harming regional and global strategic stability and undermining progress in the Conference. Mr. President, on the other end of the spectrum lies the more recent initiative that trivializes national security concerns. In highlighting the humanitarian and moral imperatives, it ignores the vital strategic considerations that underpin nuclear disarmament. While we completely understand and sympathize with the frustrations and disappointments that propel such initiatives, the fact remains that, whether we like it or not, nuclear disarmament cannot progress without addressing the security concerns of States that rely on nuclear weapons. Mr. President, Pakistan remains committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. We believe that nuclear disarmament can only be achieved as a cooperative and universally agreed undertaking, through a consensus-based process involving all the relevant stakeholders and resulting in equal and undiminished, if not increased, security for all States. The eventual objective must be the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a re-energized collective security system. We need approaches that unite us in our common endeavour towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, not those that create additional fissures. We will have to recognize and address the key motivations that drive States like Pakistan to possess nuclear weapons. These include: (1) threats from larger military forces both nuclear and conventional; (2) the existence of disputes with more powerful States and the failure of the United Nations to implement its own resolutions to resolve such disputes; (3) the failure of the United Nations collective security system to deter aggression and military threats; and (4) discrimination in the application of international norms and standards. These legitimate motivations are different from those of States that retain nuclear weapons as a matter of prestige, either to maintain or to attain the status of a global power.

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Mr. President, Pakistan notes the recent initiative – Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament – launched by the United States. We took part in the plenary meeting of the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament working group earlier this month and shared our perspectives, which were also elaborated on during the Conference meeting of 26 March. Progress on arms control and disarmament cannot be delinked from the security concerns which force States to resort to nuclear deterrence for self-defence. As a result, a dialogue on creating an environment for nuclear disarmament and addressing the underlying issues which hamper this objective is indeed an essential one, and we welcome it. We see it not as a precondition or a prerequisite for progress on nuclear disarmament in the Conference but as an unavoidable part of that process. Going forward with the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament initiative, it is important to ensure an inclusive and transparent process in which the views of all stakeholders, along with all relevant factors, are fully taken into account on a consensus basis. The President: I thank the delegate of Pakistan for his statement. I now call on the delegate of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Mr. Ju Yong-chol (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): Thank you, Mr. President. My delegation expresses its gratitude to you for organizing a series of thematic discussions that contribute to our sharing views on given subjects. However, our discussions should not be used by certain speakers to name and point fingers at specific countries to justify their arguments. We heard several references to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the statements of the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the representative of the European Union and other delegates made with regard to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in an attempt to portray the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as the main obstacle to the entry into force of the Treaty, even though there are other States outside the Treaty. It is not surprising that every time nuclear disarmament is discussed in this chamber, some speakers find it amusing to raise the issue of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or the Korean Peninsula, while ignoring other critical issues related to global nuclear disarmament. Maybe they think the elegance of the language of their speeches cannot be fully appreciated without a phrase about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. My delegation strongly rejects these statements intended to pressure the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea into joining the Treaty. Accession to any international treaty depends on the sovereign rights of individual States, because every country has its own national priorities and security needs. Mr. President, it is the firm position and will of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to build a lasting and durable peace regime and move towards complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as clearly noted in the statement signed jointly by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States in June last year. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea declared that it would no longer test nuclear weapons, use them or contribute to their proliferation. Accordingly, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has taken various practical measures. The President: I thank the delegate from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea for his statement. I now call on the Ambassador of China. Mr. Li Song (China) (spoke in Chinese): Mr. President, the Chinese delegation welcomes Mr. Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Provisional Technical Secretariat, to address the Conference on Disarmament. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty is a landmark international arms control treaty achieved by the Conference on Disarmament, and is of irreplaceable significance for promoting the process of nuclear disarmament and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I witnessed the start of negotiations on the Treaty in this conference room, and have been a part of those negotiations. I feel more and more that the current situation in international security strategy is becoming increasingly complex, with global strategic stability under challenge and relevant countries taking negative positions with regard to the Treaty. Under these conditions, the important role of the Treaty can only be strengthened, not weakened.

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As one of the first signatories of the Treaty, China firmly supports its purposes and objectives, actively participates in international efforts to promote its entry into force, and strongly supports the work of the Preparatory Committee of the CTBTO. China is willing to work with all parties to continue efforts to promote the early entry into force of the Treaty and further contribute to the preparatory process for its implementation. I would also like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, to express our deep condolences on the death of Director General Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and extend sincere condolences to his family. Director General Amano’s important efforts to promote the development of the world’s peaceful use of nuclear energy, prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote cooperation between China and the International Atomic Energy Agency will be remembered by his Chinese friends and colleagues. Mr. President, today, I would like to take this opportunity to introduce everyone to the new white paper on national defence issued by the Chinese Government last week. This is the tenth white paper on defence issued by the Chinese Government. It is also the first comprehensive white paper on defence to be issued by China since Xi Jinping took office in 2013 as President of the People’s Republic of China and chairman of the State Military Commission. The new white paper lays out the views of the Chinese Government and military on the current international security situation. For the first time, it provides a comprehensive introduction to the deep and wide-ranging institutional and structural reforms undertaken by the Chinese military in response to current development needs, and offers an authoritative, systematic and all-inclusive exposition of the defensive national defence policy of China in the new era. The white paper points out that, as economic globalization, the information society and cultural diversification develop in an increasingly multipolar world, peace, development and win-win cooperation remain the irreversible trends of the times. The pursuit of peace, stability and development has become the universal aspiration of the international community, with the forces for peace far exceeding the growth of war factors. At the same time, global and regional security issues are on the increase, destabilizing factors and uncertainties in international security are becoming more prominent, the international security system and order are under attack, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become more complicated, and the international non- proliferation mechanism is facing new challenges. As the world’s second-largest economy, China has consistently adhered to a defensive national defence policy in the face of this complex and severe international situation. According to the white paper, the nature of China as a socialist country, its strategic decision to follow the path of peaceful development, its independent and sovereign foreign policy of peace, and its cultural tradition of considering peace as precious, have determined that China will unswervingly pursue a defensive national defence policy. The distinctive feature of Chinese national defence in the new era is a refusal to seek hegemony, expansion or spheres of influence. Through this declaration of policy, the white paper profoundly reveals that China will never follow the old path of pursuing hegemony as the root of national strength. No matter how it develops in the future, China will never threaten anyone, nor will it seek to establish spheres of influence. The white paper points out that the fact that, since its founding 70 years ago, the People’s Republic of China has never initiated any war or conflict, has consistently striven to promote world peace and has taken the initiative to reduce its military forces by more than four million, stems precisely from this defensive national defence policy. China has long advocated partnerships, not alliances, does not join military groupings, stands against aggression and expansion and opposes casually resorting to the use or threat of military force. China not only creates favourable conditions for its own development through maintaining world peace, but also promotes world peace through its own development. It sincerely hopes that all countries will choose the path of peaceful development and jointly prevent conflicts and wars. In the section concerning Chinese nuclear policy, the white paper points out in particular that China pursues a nuclear strategy of self-defence, with the goal of ensuring national strategic security by deterring other countries from using or threatening to use

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nuclear weapons against China. China has always adhered to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, unconditionally renouncing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear- weapon-free zones and advocating the ultimate complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The white paper reiterates that China will not engage in a nuclear arms race with any country, and will always maintain its nuclear power at the minimum level required for national security. It points out that Chinese national defence construction and development have always been geared to match its international status and the development of its national security interests. The Chinese military follows the concept of a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, upholds the concept of correct justice and interests, and is committed to the fulfilment of its international responsibilities. The Chinese military has always held high the banner of mutually beneficial cooperation, actively participated in international peacekeeping, maritime escort, humanitarian rescue and other operations, strengthened international arms-control and non-proliferation cooperation, constructively participated in the political solution of hot issues, jointly maintained the security of international channels, worked cooperatively to address global challenges such as terrorism, cybersecurity and major natural disasters, and actively contributed to building a common destiny for mankind. However, the security environment in which China finds itself cannot be ignored. China is the only major country in the world that has yet to be completely reunified, and is also one of the countries with the most complex peripheral security environments in the world. The Chinese military faces serious challenges in safeguarding national sovereignty, territorial integrity and maritime rights. Chinese military modernization is still lagging behind in comparison to what is needed to guarantee its national security and needs, and remains at a far lower level compared to the world’s most advanced militaries. For this reason, China is comprehensively promoting the modernization of its national defence and armed forces, thoroughly deepening national defence and armed forces reforms, and making every effort to resolve institutional obstacles, structural contradictions and policy issues. This new white paper provides a wide-ranging introduction to the measures and achievements of Chinese military reform, along with a comprehensive and detailed disclosure, for the first time, of the new post-reform Chinese military command system, the categories of its military forces and their composition, and its military policy systems. A special section of the white paper focuses on national defence spending, including the overall level, scale and composition of such spending compared with those of the countries whose defence expenditures are the world’s highest, as percentages of GDP, of Government fiscal expenditure, and of national defence expenditure per capita. The data from 2012 to 2017 reflect the relatively low level of Chinese defence spending, whether in the percentages of GDP and Government fiscal expenditure, or in terms of per-capita and per-service-person defence spending, with several of these categories being the lowest among the five nuclear powers. The white paper stresses that Chinese defence spending is open and transparent, and that its expenditures are reasonable and moderate. China has always exercised restraint in armaments development. Although its defence spending ranks second in the world, that level of expenditure is determined by the needs of Chinese national defence, the size of the Chinese economy and the defensive nature of its national defence policy. In terms of overall expenditures, Chinese defence spending in 2017 was less than one quarter of that of the highest-spending countries. A wide gap remains between Chinese defence spending and the requirements for safeguarding its national sovereignty and security rights and interests, for fulfilling its responsibilities and obligations as a major power, and ensuring its own construction and development. In line with its national economic development level, Chinese defence spending will continue to maintain moderate and stable growth. The publication of the new white paper is the latest effort and major measure undertaken by China in the area of national defence transparency, amply demonstrating that Chinese national defence construction and development always remain focused on meeting its legitimate security needs, and always on increasing the forces for world peace. A peaceful, prosperous and stable China presents opportunities and benefits for the world. The Chinese military will always be a staunch force for world peace, stability and the construction of a community with a shared future for humanity.

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The white paper has been published in both Chinese and English. Interested colleagues are welcome to consult it on the website of the Chinese Ministry of Defence and the website of the Permanent Mission of China in Geneva. The President: I thank the Ambassador of China for his statement. I now give the floor to the delegate from Indonesia. Mr. Bektikusuma (Indonesia): Thank you very much, Mr. President. At the outset allow me to join other delegations in conveying my delegation’s heartfelt sympathy and condolences on the passing away of Mr. Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency. My delegation would also like to thank you for organizing this thematic debate; in addition, I wish to take this opportunity to welcome Dr. Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and thank him for the comprehensive briefing on recent developments in the Organization. I would also like to recognize our two other panel members, Mr. Aliyar Lebbe Abdul Azeez, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka, and Mr. Robert Müller, Deputy Permanent Representative of Austria. Mr. President, to respect our time constraints and the commitments of the delegations outside this chamber, my delegation will submit its written statement to you and your delegation. The President: I thank the delegate from Indonesia for his cooperation and now give the floor to the delegate from Mexico. Mr. Martínez Ruiz (Mexico) (spoke in Spanish): Thank you very much, Mr. President. I would like to begin by expressing my regret at the death of Ambassador Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and by extending my delegation’s condolences to his family, to all his colleagues at the Agency and to the Government and people of Japan. Mr. President, we appreciate the step taken to progress the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, without disregarding our insistence that progress must also be made on developing its negotiating mandate. Like the Indonesian delegation, we will submit a full written statement regarding today’s thematic discussion on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. However, I would just like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the valuable contributions made by all the panellists at this meeting and, in particular, to Mr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, for reminding us that the conclusion of the Treaty was fundamental to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that it serves as an example of the significant instruments that this Conference on Disarmament is capable of developing. Mexico strongly condemns nuclear testing by all actors and under all circumstances, and reiterates the need for all States to refrain from conducting nuclear tests, including explosive tests and relevant non-explosive tests, since such testing runs counter to the spirit of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We wish to acknowledge the technical work of the Preparatory Commission in bringing into operation the International Monitoring System of the International Data Centre and facilitating on-site inspections. Its perseverance and professionalism during the provisional application period prior to entry into force are vital in demonstrating the impartiality, robustness and credibility of the System. It all goes to show that there is no justifiable reason to delay the entry into force of the Treaty. Lastly, like the delegation of Australia, we wish to note that we sponsor the General Assembly’s annual resolution on the Treaty, and we remind all delegations that they will be able to support the resolution at the next session. The President: I thank the delegate from Mexico for his statement and now give the floor to the Ambassador of the United States of America. Mr. Wood (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President. First, let me express my sincere condolences to the family, friends and colleagues of the late Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano. I had the honour and privilege to have worked closely with him during my time as Deputy Chief of Mission in

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Vienna. His leadership will be greatly missed. I also wish to welcome my good friend Dr. Lassina Zerbo here and thank him for being here to address the Chamber. I did not intend to take very much time at the microphone, but I think I have to respond to the sort of crafty Soviet-like propaganda that was espoused earlier in the meeting by our Russian colleague. We have to remember this is Russia we are talking about; this is a country that has flouted its Budapest Memorandum commitments – it has violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). The United States engaged in over 35 meetings with Russians at different levels to try to resolve this issue, but we could not. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was very clear in speaking out as to who was to blame for the violation of the INF Treaty. Russia’s actions include its illegal invasion and annexation of Crimea, its redrawing of borders in Europe by force, its cyberattacks and its efforts to weaponize outer space. Most important for many of us here was President Putin’s 1 March 2018 speech in which he outlined a number of systems that are of growing concern to a number of countries in this room. He unveiled some new types of what we will call strategic offensive arms, although it has been very difficult in our conversations in the Bilateral Consultative Commission to hear from Russia an explanation of its criteria for determining what a strategic offensive arm is. I say that only because our Russian colleague started to speak in detail about conversations we have had in the Consultative Commission despite an agreement on confidentiality that clearly Russia does not adhere to. Our Russian colleague raised questions about America’s moratorium on nuclear testing, and we have made very clear that we will abide by our nuclear testing moratorium. Again, we call on all States possessing nuclear weapons to declare and maintain a moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. We have been very clear on that. Let me just say, finally, without taking too much time – and I say this to our Russian colleague in all seriousness: Russia’s stale propaganda is ineffective; it reflects desperate efforts to deflect focus away from his country’s very threatening build-up of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. And this, colleagues, has been under way for well over ten years. Our Nuclear Posture Review is a very clear response to Russia’s build-up of its strategic and non-strategic forces, as well as the build-up by other countries that are in strategic competition with the United States. If Russia was as serious about arms control with the United States as it is about rolling out what it believes to be witty statements blaming the United States for everything bad that happens in the world, including, unfortunately, probably heavy, severe snowfall in Siberia, then maybe it would be possible for us to make progress. I will end my comments there, then, Mr. President. The President: I thank the Ambassador of the United States of America for his statement. It is now 1.05 p.m., and we have to finish this morning’s meeting. There are no plans for another meeting this afternoon. On my list of speakers, I still have Belarus, India, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ukraine, Japan, Germany and now the Islamic Republic of Iran. I would like to propose that we use this list of speakers in the first part of our plenary meeting tomorrow afternoon. We do not have enough time now. If this is the consensus of the Conference on Disarmament, that is how I will proceed. Distinguished delegates, before adjourning this morning’s plenary meeting, I would like to express our great appreciation, on behalf of the Conference, to Dr. Lassina Zerbo, as well as to Ambassador Azeez and Mr. Müller, for their very enriching and eloquent contributions to today’s thematic discussion. We wish you all the best, Dr. Zerbo, in your endeavours, including your tireless efforts in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty. Once again, I would like to thank you very much for your contribution to the discussion for today. This meeting is adjourned. The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

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