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Case 3:19-cv-01764-AJB-DEB Document 49 Filed 04/27/21 PageID.507 Page 1 of 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PADRES, L.P., Case No.: 3:19-CV-01764 AJB (BLM) Plaintiff, 12 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S v. 13 MOTION FOR SUMMARY RIMEL’S LA JOLLA, LLC, JUDGMENT 14 Defendant. 15 (Doc. No. 35) 16 17 Pending before the Court is Defendant Rimel’s La Jolla, LLC’s (“Rimel’s”) motion 18 for summary judgment. (Doc. No. 35.) The motion is opposed by Plaintiff Padres, L.P. 19 (“the Padres”). (Doc. No. 41.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Rimel’s 20 motion for summary judgment. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 This case is a trademark infringement and unfair competition dispute under the 23 Lanham Act brought by the Padres against Rimel’s, a former restaurant which operated a 24 concession stand within the Padres’ stadium. The Padres, L.P. is the owner of the Major 25 League Baseball team, the San Diego Padres. (First Amended Complaint ¶ 6.) Defendant 26 Rimel’s formerly owned and operated a restaurant and a catering business in San Diego, 27 serving potstickers, rotisserie chicken, fresh seafood, and sushi. (Id. ¶ 7.) Rimel’s is no 28 longer in business in San Diego. 1 3:19-CV-01764 AJB (BLM) Case 3:19-cv-01764-AJB-DEB Document 49 Filed 04/27/21 PageID.508 Page 2 of 10 1 In 2004, the Padres began playing baseball at “Petco Park,” located in downtown 2 San Diego. (Id. ¶ 9.) Petco Park showcases elements of local landmarks, including the 3 Western Metal Supply Co. building (“Western Metal Building”): 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Additionally, the Padres developed and used the “Swinging Friar”, depicted below, 12 as a service mark and trade name in various images and in composite designs: 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 The Padres contend that the name “Western Metal Supply Co.” and the “Swinging 22 Friar” have become well-known and associated with Petco Park and the Padres. (Id. ¶ 14.) 23 The Padres registered and own both the “Swinging Friar” and the “Western Metal Supply 24 Co.” name as a trademark or service mark. (Id. ¶ 14.) 25 The Padres allege that Rimel’s and San Diego Ballpark Funding, LLC (“SDBF”), 26 owned by the Padres, entered into a sponsorship agreement (“the Sponsorship Agreement”) 27 on February 28, 2014 for Rimel’s to open a concession stand on the Western Metal Supply 28 Co. rooftop known as Rimel’s Rotisserie. (Declaration of Trevor Coddington, Doc. No. 2 3:19-CV-01764 AJB (BLM) Case 3:19-cv-01764-AJB-DEB Document 49 Filed 04/27/21 PageID.509 Page 3 of 10 1 35-2, Ex. B at 1.) The Sponsorship Agreement was amended on March 15, 2015, to permit 2 another Rimel’s branded concession stand at Petco Park known as Zenbu Sushi. (Id., Ex. 3 C.) 4 During the 2014 to 2016 baseball seasons, Rimel’s denoted its Padres’ sponsorship 5 on its website and social media platforms. (Id., Ex. A at 31:19-21; 39:16-21; 70:5-13; Ex. 6 D.) In addition to indicating Rimel’s Petco Park location, the website displayed the Western 7 Metal Building and Swinging Friar marks. (Id., Ex. A at 18:21-23; 21:4-25.) In 2017, the 8 sponsorship ended, but a graphic (as shown below) inadvertently remained on Rimel’s 9 website showing the former Rimel’s location at Petco Park. (Id., Ex. A at 39:16-21.) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 On January 30, 2018, Rimel’s filed suit against SDBF in state court to recover unpaid 20 royalties due under the Sponsorship Agreement. (Id., Ex. F.) The Padres then commenced 21 the present trademark infringement lawsuit in this Court on September 13, 2019. (Id., Ex. 22 A at 57:3-12.) Because Rimel’s was no longer in business and the graphic had remained 23 accessible inadvertently, Rimel’s immediately shut down its website in response. (Id., Ex. 24 A at 64:2-11.) The First Amended Complaint asserts two claims for relief for (1) trademark 25 infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), and (2) federal unfair competition (15 U.S.C. § 1125). 26 On January 8, 2021, Rimel’s filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Padres 27 opposed. This order follows. 28 // 3 3:19-CV-01764 AJB (BLM) Case 3:19-cv-01764-AJB-DEB Document 49 Filed 04/27/21 PageID.510 Page 4 of 10 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary judgment 3 on factually unsupported claims, and thereby “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 4 determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 5 Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to 6 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 7 is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 8 as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “Where the record taken as a whole could not 9 lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 10 trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 11 A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the 12 absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Where the 13 nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a matter at trial, the moving party need only 14 demonstrate to the Court that there is insufficient evidence to support the nonmoving 15 party’s case. Id. at 325. The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by 16 presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) 17 by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the 18 nonmoving party’s case on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial. 19 See id. at 322–23. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant 20 of summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 21 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 22 Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the 23 burden shifts to the nonmoving party to provide facts showing that a genuine issue of 24 disputed fact remains. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 314. The nonmoving party cannot rest on 25 the mere allegations or denials of its pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by 26 its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 27 designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (citing 28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). When making this determination, the Court must view all inferences 4 3:19-CV-01764 AJB (BLM) Case 3:19-cv-01764-AJB-DEB Document 49 Filed 04/27/21 PageID.511 Page 5 of 10 1 drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See 2 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001). The 3 Court must not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations in evaluating a 4 motion for summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 5 (1986). 6 III. DISCUSSION 7 Rimel’s moves for summary judgment, arguing (1) it may not be held liable for 8 trademark infringement because the Padres and Rimel’s occupy entirely different 9 industries; and (2) the fair use doctrine shields Rimel’s from liability. (Doc. No. 35-1 at 6.) 10 The Court addresses both grounds for summary judgment below but concludes that neither 11 are persuasive. 12 A. Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition 13 The Padres alleges two claims for federal trademark infringement, 15 U.S.C. 14 § 1114(1)(a), and federal unfair competition, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). Both claims are 15 measured by identical standards. See Brookfield Comm., Inc. v. West Coast Enter. Corp., 16 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999). Under these standards, a plaintiff must prove (1) that 17 it has a protectable ownership interest in the mark; and (2) that the defendant’s use of the 18 mark is likely to cause consumer confusion. See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced 19 Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011); 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 20 Here, only the second criteria for trademark infringement and unfair competition is 21 at issue because Rimel’s does not dispute that the Padres own the trademarks for the 22 “Swinging Friar” and “Western Metal Supply Co.” Rimel’s instead focuses on the second 23 “likelihood of confusion” element, arguing that Rimel’s previous use of the marks never 24 caused consumer confusion. Central to Rimel’s argument is that the Padres and Rimel’s 25 are not competitors, and occupy entirely different industries with Rimel’s being in the 26 restaurant business, and the Padres being a MLB team. Based on the dissimilarity of 27 industries, Rimel’s argues it may not be liable for trademark infringement as a matter of 28 law.