The Illiberal Turn in Indonesian Democracy

Iqra Anugrah

Abstract: Two decades after authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition in 1998, how does the trajectory of Indonesian democracy look? By reflecting on the state of Indonesian politics in the last 15 years, this paper will argue that despite many improvements, Indonesian democracy has experienced a slow process of decline and a deepening of illiberal tendencies. This poses a major challenge Jokowi (left) and Prabowo for the quality of Indonesian democracy in the near future.

It is important to assess other recent trends. Toward the end of Jokowi’s first term, the Introduction parliament, the People’s Representative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat,DPR) The series of mass protests that have rocked attempted to pass several controversial laws Jakarta and other major urban centers in relating to the criminal code, corruption Indonesia in September and October of 2019 eradication, land, labor, mining, and natural resources. The new corruption eradication law, and the state’s repressive response to the despite its name, will actually weaken the protests are indicative of a worrying trend authority of the Corruption Eradication 1 affecting Indonesian democracy. On the Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, surface, formal political processes seem to be KPK). Moreover, the laws on land, labor, working – the 2019 concurrent presidential and mining, and natural resources will pave the legislative elections, despite its massive scale way for capital expansion into the countryside and a deepening polarization among Indonesian at high socio-ecological cost. The proposed new voters, were held peacefully.2 Furthermore, as criminal code has the potential to criminalize a gesture of national unity after a polarizing social movement activists and infringe on civil presidential election, Joko Widodo, commonly and political rights in the name of preserving public order. For example, the code contains known as Jokowi, controversially appointed his several draconian articles on the following vociferous rival for the presidency in both 2014 matters: 1) insulting the head of state and state and 2019 elections, Prabowo Subianto, as the symbols, 2) treason, 3) blasphemy, and 4) defense minister in the new cabinet after consensual cohabitation and sexual activities winning a second term. outside of marriage, among others.3

Such political maneuvering, coupled with the

1 18 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF government’s heavy-handed approach to mass the quality of democracy under each demonstrations in Papua in protest of systemic administration in three arenas: democratic racism have triggered the emergence of practices at the national level, oligarchic perhaps the biggest wave of mass protest since influence in politics, and local agrarian politics. 1998.4 A new generation of university and The fourth section offers concluding remarks. vocational school students, with no memory of and direct experience in the 1998 reform or reformasi movement, have been at the An Analytical Framework to Assess the forefront of this new wave of protest, joined by Trajectory of Indonesian Democracy workers and a variety of civil society groups. Under the banner of #ReformasiDikorupsi (the To better assess the quality of a democracy, it reform era is corrupted), this mass movement is necessary to look at more than just has been protesting against the creeping institutional, attitudinal, and behavioral curtailment of civil, political, and socio-dimensions of democracy. Analyzing these economic rights via the controversial laws. indicators alone might give the impression that Indonesian democracy, generally speaking, is The government has responded to these performing well. There is a regular alternation protests with mass arrests, several killings, the of power via electoral democracy as “the only criminalization of activists, and repressive game in town” with the possibility of not only measures against even emergency medical winning but also losing the elections for responders. The climate of fear created by such competing parties.5 Moreover, public support an approach is unprecedented in the last 20 for democracy remains high.6 However, this is years. just one side of the story.

Although these developments are worrying, In order to evaluate democratic quality more they are just the symptoms of a larger and comprehensively, it is necessary to consider possibly more disturbing trend affectingother dimensions. If democracy is understood Indonesian democracy. While Indonesia can be as an opportunity for the expansion of rights, said to be a functioning electoral democracy, then the notion of democratic quality should there has been a significant contraction of also entail the deepening of political space as democratic space, especially in non-electoral well as the extension of rights to previously realms and in the periphery, accompanied by marginalized groups, such as the lower-classes, the continuing influence of oligarchic power in minorities, and civil society groups.7 Indeed, several policy arenas. Combined together, this while the institutional and electoral aspects of trajectory slowly leads to an increasingly democratic politics are important, it is also illiberal and oligarchic turn in Indonesian imperative to look at the participatory and democracy. social dimensions of democracy.8

The analysis here assesses the trajectory of It is therefore inadequate to merely look at Indonesian democracy over the past 15 years. interactions and conflicts among political The first section lays out the analyticalactors, both among elites and citizens alike. framework to understand this trajectory. The This section will examine the intersection second and third sections discuss the dynamics between electoral politics and the broader of Indonesian politics under Susilo Bambang dynamics of political economy to better Yudhoyono (2004-2014) and Jokowiunderstand the trajectory of Indonesian (2014-2019) respectively. In thesedemocracy. Political economy is defined here as chronological sections, this paper will assess the struggle over political power, especially

2 18 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF state power, and economic resources and Here, this paper tries to offer a more nuanced benefits among competing social forces.view. It is fair to say that Indonesia under Indeed, it has long been posited thatYudhoyono’s 10 year-tenure was in better domination over the commanding heights of shape politically compared to the tumultuous political institutions and economic sectors can early years of the reform period (1998-2001). suppress democratic space and quality.9 However, to ascribe either the slow stabilization of democratic process (2002-2004) This is why it is necessary to challenge some or the institutional stability of Yudhoyono’s existing observations on Indonesian democracy years as “the golden years” of democracy and electoral dynamics. David Adam Stott’s would be an overstatement.13 Such an article in this journal which makes a case for assessment overlooks the complex trajectory of cautious optimism for the second Jokowi post-Suharto Indonesian democracy. Behind 10 presidency. While Stott’s presentation of what the veneer of democratic stability lies a set of he considers the key achievements of Jokowi’s problems with serious consequences for the first term and their broader political, economic, quality of democracy itself. and social context has value, he overlooks certain issues. For instance, how intra-elite Hence, a more political economy-oriented competition masks their social cohesiveness as reading of Indonesian democratic trajectory a class, the long-standing conflict between and quality is needed. In order to do so, this elites and the electorate’s aspiration for more paper will look at three aspects of democratic meaningful popular participation, and the politics in the last 15 years: national political impact of these phenomena on Indonesian trends, oligarchic influence in politics, and politics. He also seems to be ratherlocal agrarian politics. Regarding the first, how preoccupied with macro-indicators rather than the presidents handled the structural providing a more convincing explanation of challenges facing them and exercised their how Jokowi’s second term might disrupt the old agencies amidst existing political constellations patterns of Indonesian politics that cripple its will be examined. With regard to oligarchic democracy. influence in politics, it will be gauged by looking at the interaction between the state, Another assessment is put forward by two the capitalist class and wealthy politicians, and senior Indonesia watchers, Edward Aspinall the influence of these moneyed interests on 11 and Marcus Mietzner. They argue that politics.14 Lastly, the state of local agrarian Indonesia is experiencing a slow process of politics will be used as another important decoupling between religious and cultural yardstick to measure democratic quality and pluralism and democratic norms, where the illiberalism given the close connection between commitment to protect pluralism might rely too rural democratization and the democratization much on arbitrary state power, therebyof the polity more generally.15 Furthermore, jeopardizing democratic norms. Although this there is ample evidence to suggest that elite assessment points to several factors leading to domination over land and rural resources have unhealthy polarization and democratic decline detrimental consequences for democratization in Indonesian politics in recent years, it misses and democratic deepening, a point that is the influence of recent global and national especially pertinent in the Indonesian context.16 dynamics of political economy on democratic decline and rising illiberal populism. This is a surprising omission given their other analyses of Indonesian politics actually pay greater Democratic Stagnation under the attention to political economy.12 Yudhoyono Administration

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A closer look at the trajectory of Indonesian missed the opportunity to implement much- democracy during the presidencies ofneeded structural reforms to deepen Yudhoyono and Jokowi reveals worrying signs. democracy and move the economy forward This is not to say that Indonesian democracy from a commodity boom-driven, oligarchs- was not consolidated throughout this period. benefitting economy.20 It is true that Yudhoyono Again, looking at the major institutionalas president operated under heavy political indicators of democratic consolidation alone – pressures from established political actors, but peaceful transfer of power via elections, his indecisive governing style also contributed commitment to political (but not necessarily to an inability to push for reforms, a consensus social and economic) democracy, and existing shared by many observers of Indonesian protection of basic rights in general – one can politics. safely say that Indonesian democracy has been consolidated. However, its quality has been The impact of this missed opportunity on slowly compromised to the point of reaching a Indonesian democracy is clearly visible in three critical level. To understand this process of sectors: the overall quality of democracy at the quality regression, one needs to look more national level, oligarchic influence in politics, closely at the state of national and local politics and local agrarian politics. At the national level, in the last 15 years, especially the last five while Yudhoyono maintained a degree of years under Jokowi’s first term. democratic stability, his overly cautious approach on pressing issues and penchant for The ten years of the Yudhoyono presidency is appeasing the political class meant that some commonly seen as the period of solidifying hard-gained democratic gains were democratic consolidation.17 While this compromised. assessment is fairly accurate, Yudhono’s tenure of economic and democratic stability actually Such appeasement was most visible in came with a cost, one that also shaped the Yudhoyono’s response to the national course of Indonesian politics under the Jokowi parliament’s attempt to pass a regional election administration. law scrapping direct elections for local government heads towards the end of his Yudhoyono, a consensus-seeker and member of second term in 2014. The proposed law was the late Suharto-era elite, succumbed to the controversial because it attempted to return cartelized tendency of Indonesia’s political the power to vote for local government heads party system, in which parties and politicians back to the regional parliaments – essentially have miniscule programmatic orientations and taking the voting power away from local prefer to share power liberally across political citizens.21 After much public pressure, divisions. He did this by making concessions to Yudhoyono eventually issued a government the political elites by forming a grand coalition regulation in lieu of law (perppu) that cancelled that included both his supporters and some of the controversial measure.22 Although his competitors when he took power after the Yudhoyono eventually succumbed to the public 2004 and 2009 presidential elections.18 He also pressure, his wait-and-see approach and the gave cabinet positions to parties whotug of war that he had with the parliament previously competed against him including showed the tendency among political elites to Golkar, the former ruling party of thebend the rules for their own benefit. As the authoritarian era.19 political analyst Dirk Tomsa pointed out, Yudhoyono had several opportunities to make a However, this moderate political stance and clear stance on this issue, but most of the time mode of governing also means that Indonesia he preferred to take a middle-of-the-road

4 18 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF position until it was clear that the Indonesian other New Order-era elites post-Suharto public did not welcome either the law or his politics: building his own oligarch-backed indecisiveness.23 political party, the Democratic Party Partai( Demokrat, PD).30 Later, he became an oligarch Moreover, Yudhoyono’s refusal to act more himself, extended his influence in politics decisively on several critical political issues, through his party and related media outlets as often for the sake of strengthening his electoral a kingmaker, and finally built his own dynasty base, also contributed to the normalization of by promoting his children into politics – his illiberal tendencies in Indonesian democratic oldest son, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, ran as a politics. This was apparent in the protection gubernatorial candidate in the 2017 Jakarta women’s and minority rights, wheregubernatorial election, whereas his second son, Yudhonoyo’s seemingly reformist rhetoric was Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, has been serving as not consistent with his lack of effort to combat a national Member of Parliament (MP) from PD gender-based discrimination, improve the since 2009.31 livelihood of poor women, and protect religious 24 minorities. Again, this lack of commitment Lastly, the trajectory of local democracy under was mostly a result of his appeasement of more Yudhoyono’s two terms was hardly glowing, as conservative elements within his administration seen in agrarian politics under his presidency. and some religious conservative groups and Yudhoyono branded himself as a champion of vigilantes such as the Indonesian Ulema the rural poor armed with an expertise in rural Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and economy – he holds a PhD in agricultural the Islamic Defenders Front Front( Pembela economics from Bogor Agricultural University, Islam, FPI).25 Yudhoyono himself saw the need a premier university for agricultural and rural for cultivating an Islam-friendly image – he studies in Indonesia. But under his founded a prayers’ association majelis( zikir) administration, Indonesia experienced a steep and tried to build relations with several Islamic increase in instances of agrarian conflict. organizations.26 Yudhoyono’s own view of state- According to the 2014 report from the religion relations was neither secularist nor Consortium for Agrarian Reform (Konsorsium scripturalist.27 But when it comes to dealing Pembaruan Agraria, KPA), there were some with rising Islamic conservatism, his 1500 agrarian conflicts involving almost one administration opted to adopt a wait-and-see million agricultural households and more than attitude, leaving the tensions between religious 6.5 million hectares of land during Yudhoyono’s conservatives and largely progressive civil 32 28 tenure (2004-2014). Furthermore, the same society actors unresolved. Yudhoyono’s report shows that the number of cases of appeasement and indecisiveness eventually agrarian conflicts also increased significantly, contributed to a political climate that was supportive of social conservatism and enabled from 89 in 2009 to 472 in 2014, or more than such conservatism to become increasingly five times. Most of these conflicts were embedded.29 disputes over land ownership and access between local communities versus state and In addition to such lukewarm support for corporate authorities. In addition, the share of democratic norms, Yudhoyono also undermined employment in agriculture also dropped the quality of Indonesian democracy by leaning significantly while the total area of agricultural on oligarchics for support. As a member of the land remained more or less the same in old political elite who had first served in Yudhoyono’s second term, suggesting the parliament under the authoritarian New Order increasing rate of agrarian dispossession in his regime, he chose the route followed by many second term.33

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These data reveal not only the severity of democracy successfully consolidated at the cost agrarian conflict under Yudhoyono’sof stagnation. This opened the way for an anti- government but also the contraction of local systemic challenger to attempt to break the democratic space due to the domination of democratic system through authoritarian or rural political and economic resources by elite illiberal means. This was manifested by the rise interests. It is important to note that many local of an oligarchic authoritarian populist, Prabowo regions, despite rapid urbanization across the Subianto, who fought Jokowi in the 2014 country, retain small town and ruralpresidential election.36 characteristics. Hence, the state of local agrarian politics has a major influence on the quality of local democracy. A Dimming Hope under Jokowi’s In these agrarian conflicts, the contraction of Presidency local democratic space occurs mainly through the use of political manipulation andThe fiercely contested 2014 presidential intimidation from state and corporateelection between Jokowi and Prabowo was seen authorities against poor communities in land as a watershed moment in Indonesian dispute cases. This form of soft repression democracy. At that time, the two candidates might be sporadic and overall does notprovided contrasting political visions. The decrease the vibrancy and fairness of electoral former, virtually an outsider in Indonesia’s politics at the local level. Nevertheless, the entrenched elitist politics, had a notable record common deployment of elite-backedin local governance as the mayor of Solo and intimidation creates a sense of fear and the governor of Jakarta and was seen by some vigilance among the local citizenry and civil as a symbol of hope. The latter, by contrast, society actors.34 was a prominent member of the New Order elite with a questionable human rights record, This might seem an unfair assessment of a populist demagogue longing for a return to Yudhoyono’s legacy in local and rural politics. authoritarian rule. After a fierce electoral After all, he implemented several policies battle and a massive last-minute civil society designed to benefit the rural population in far- mobilization, Jokowi won the presidential flung areas, such as conditional cash transfers election, a sign of the continuation of and accelerated land title certification.35 democratic stability and the possibility of However, these policies are best seen as a democratic deepening for many. semi-technocratic way to cushion the negative impacts of market forces and elite domination Soon, however, this hope was dashed. Jokowi in local regions rather than an attempt to might be the popularly-elected president, but promote a more assertive citizens’ participation he faced a hostile parliament as well as vested and seriously address structural political interests in his own political party and economy challenges that limit such popular coalition. In other words, he was held captive participation. Whatever benefits these policies by these political constellations since day one. brought were also offset by Yudhoyono’s Faced by this possible deadlock, Jokowi had neglect of rural livelihoods to the detriment of two options at the start of his first term: either the quality of local democracy. to push for a clean break with the old establishment and further mobilize his voters, In the end, the balance sheet for the quality of who had been galvanized by his civil society- Indonesian democracy under Yudhoyono’s ten- backed campaign, or play the same old game – year presidency is a mixed one: Indonesian capitulating to the oligarchic interests.

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Jokowi opted for the latter option, a move that in Kendeng mountainous region of Central Java disappointed many of his supporters. Upon that dispossessed local communities from their closer inspection, however, this should not land.41 Jokowi stayed silent for the most part come as a surprise: Jokowi, who is part of the when conservative groups tried to silence emerging and increasingly politically-assertive public discussion on the 1965 massacre or middle class, has a penchant for technocratic when members of the army tried to intimidate and developmentalist solutions for political dissenting opinions by labelling them problems.37 This means that while Jokowi’s communist sympathizers. With regard to the realm of action has been indeed limited by the controversial cement factory construction, he political constellation surrounding him, his met some representatives of community policy decisions are also shaped by his own members affected by the construction in agency and political preferences, asKendeng region, but did little beyond hearing demonstrated by his performance at national their complaints and essentially let the and local levels. construction proceed.

At the national level, this interplay between Another step that Jokowi took that contributed structural forces of political circumstances to the deeper illiberal turn in Indonesian around Jokowi and his own agency is reflected politics was his heavy-handed response to the in two areas. First, Jokowi chose to form a increasingly combative Islamist mass protests grand coalition cabinet, a pattern that he surrounding the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial carried on from his predecessors.38 He decided election.42 This mobilization, which was to include some of the opposition parties into triggered both by the comment regarding the his cabinet. This implies not only the continuing use of Koranic verses for political gains by the decline of check and balance mechanism, but then governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja also the repetition of what has been termed Purnama or Ahok, and his massive urban 'promiscuous' power sharing among political eviction policy, was a reaction born out of elites.39 Secondly, Jokowi quickly ignored social and economic marginalization that took elements of civil society-supported human increasingly nativist and racist undertones. rights and social justice agenda in his election While this wave of Islamist populism was campaign and subsequent policies and instead indeed illiberal, the government’s response focused on a pro-investment, pro-toward it was also illiberal, indiscriminately infrastructure, and pro-stability agenda.40 While prosecuting Islamist and populist figures, a massive push for economic growth and social including those who express their dissent stability is needed for a middle-incomepeacefully. In the words of the veteran economy such as Indonesia, such a push can Indonesia analyst Marcus Mietzner, “Jokowi’s only become sustainable if it also promotes administration pursued a criminalization popular participation among the lower classes strategy against populists that violated and a social democratic, redistributionist established legal norms. As a result the agenda. Unfortunately, these participatory and government’s attempt to protect the redistributionist elements have been absent in democratic status quo from populist attacks Jokowi’s developmentalism. turned into a threat to democracy itself.”43

An example of this is Jokowi’s refusal to take Moreover, Jokowi also did very little to balance decisive action on a number of contentious oligarchic influence in politics. It is true that he issues, such as public debates surrounding the promoted an expansion of basic public services, legacy of the 1965 massacre and thesuch as the public healthcare system and controversial construction of a cement factory education expansion.44 However, he did little to

7 18 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF promote a more redistributive development policy influence of ordinary citizens and civil agenda. In fact, his first term coincided with society by tilting the balance of power even growing inequality between both the rich and further in favor of powerful established the poor and also between urban and rural interests. This leaves little or no room for more areas. A report from Oxfam, a leading poverty progressive candidates from civil society to eradication organization, shows that in 2016 contest elections. Jokowi was initially seen as “the wealthiest 1 percent of the population such a candidate but has himself been co-opted owned nearly half (49 percent) of total wealth” by oligarchs having entered national-level and in the same year “the collective wealth of politics It also means the continuation of the the richest four billionaires was…more than the same pattern of freewheeling patron- total wealth of the bottom 40 percent of the clientelism in which the “free market” logic of population.”45 The same report also shows that vote buying reigns, connecting politicians and unequal access to basic electricity services and voters in a non-programmatic, transactional road networks between rural and urban areas relationship. as well as land ownership domination by corporations and wealthy individualsLastly, Jokowi’s record in agrarian politics also exacerbate rural-urban inequality.46 Other contributes to the deterioration of local analyses have also echoed these findings and democracy. He claimed that his flagship underlined how increasing inequality might agrarian policies – land titling, social forestry hurt economic growth in the long run.47 His and budget allocation for village governments – emphasis on macroeconomic stability, an area would solve the many problems that local in which he scored pretty well, overlooks how communities face. However, these policies do socio-economic inequality and dispossession not address the structural inequality in land can translate into further politicalownership and access and the contraction of marginalization of middle-class and lower-class democratic space that it creates, not to mention citizens. that are merely just the continuation of Yudhoyono’s agrarian policy package.50 Nowhere is this more visible in the influence of Jokowi's pro-capital orientation in rural oligarchs on both local and national elections in development also outweighs the supposed recent years. Numerous civil societybenefits of his agrarian policies, as organizations and coalitions report that mining demosntrated by the continuing eruption of and energy corporations, plantation estates, agrarian conflicts, many of which emerged in and oligarchs with ties to them have been the protest at his signature infrastructural projects primary source of campaign financing for many during his first term.51 In many cases, Jokowi's candidates in local executive head elections. administration has responded to these rural These are the local politicians that have the protests rather repressively, thereby reviving power to grant licenses for mining andthe climate of fear that limits the development plantation operations once they enter office.48 of a more assertive and autonomous rural civil At national level, such corporations andsociety in local democratic spaces.52 oligarchs also provided a large part of campaign financing for both Jokowi and Herein lies the irony of the Jokowi presidency: Prabowo in both the 2014 and 2019elected as a political outsider with a pro-reform presidential elections.49 platform, he has succumbed to pressure from oligarchs and other conservative elites. Such oligarchic influence, combined with Admittedly, Jokowi’s position within his own Jokowi’s emphasis on political andpolitical party, the Democratic Party of macroeconomic stability, confines the scope of Indonesia-Struggle Partai( Demokrasi

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Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P) has been surprised many especially those active in civil tenuous, as he had to secure support from the society. Prior to the parliament’s passing of long-time matriarch of PDIP, Megawatiseveral controversial laws, the government Soekarnoputri, for his nomination as aarrested several activists in a workers’ presidential candidate in 2014.53 demonstration criticizing the pro-capital direction of the proposed revisions of the Inadvertently, this capitulation to elite vested existing law on labor relations and at another interests paved the way for the resurgence of protest demanding the end of militarism in illiberal tendencies in Indonesian politics and Papua and racism against Papuans.55 In both led to perceptions of a decline in Indonesian cases, the police arrested the protesters on democracy. This also meant that the 2019 dubious pretexts and by doing so might have presidential election was conducted in a undermined the rule of law and civil rights of different atmosphere to that of 2014: far from the demonstrators.56 being a battle for a more democratic future, the 2019 presidential election represented an intra- The situation then worsened when the oligarchic competition, albeit couched in parliament proposed several laws that would pluralistic or populist rhetoric. weaken the power of the KPK and the broader anti-corruption campaign, substantively limit

civil and political rights, restrict workers’ right to strike and ease the expansion of corporate The 2019 Presidential Election and Its investment in rural areas. The parliament also Aftermath refused to approve an anti-sexual violence bill The popular enthusiasm that animated the and a domestic workers’ rights bill, two draft 2014 presidential election and the early days of laws seen as crucial for many in civil society. the Jokowi presidency now have been replaced This, coupled with parliament’s lack of by increasing cynicism across Indonesia’s transparency in discussing the laws, soon political spectrum. In the regional context is triggered a cross-class protest movement, one especially noteworthy that the logistically of the biggest mass protests since the fall of the challenging election was held successfully and authoritarian Suharto regime in May 1998. peacefully. Moreover, the mass mobilization of the Indonesian public to participate in the 2019 The Jokowi government responded to these concurrent presidential and legislativemass protests repressively, in a manner not elections demonstrates the depth of popular seen since the anti-Suharto protests of 1998. support for the post-Suharto democraticHowever, this response also escalated the process. According to Saiful Mujani Research initially sporadic protest movement into a and Consulting (SMRC), a leading pollster in nationwide campaign to return to the heyday of Indonesia, the voter turnout rate reached 80 the 1998 post-Suharto democratic reforms. The percent, well above the 2014 elections (69 movement made several demands of the percent for the presidential election and 75 government – to uphold the hard-earned percent for the legislative election).54 However, achievements of democratic reforms; end as in 2014 the electoral process was marred by militarism and criminalization of activists misinformation and fake news, and wasincluding in Papua; address corporate-led noteworthy for the lack of substantive policy environmental degradation; and resolve human 57 debates between the Jokowi and Prabowo rights violations. This movement garnered camps. substantial public support and sympathy. A recent empirical study shows that Indonesians What came after the election, however,across the political divide support tougher anti-

9 18 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF corruption measures and feel unrepresented by Indonesian Businesspeople and a self-made the existing political class, a sentiment shared entrepreneur focusing on natural resources, by many who active in the massbecomes the new head of the investment demonstrations.58 Indeed, the protestcoordinating board. Jokowi also surprisingly movement, at least in its initial stage, was appointed Nadiem Makarim, the young founder backed by a wide range of groups that typically of the ride-hailing service start-up,Gojek, as do not get along with each other in politics. the new education minister, presiding over a ministry which, critics argue, is the symbol of It is not difficult to gauge the logic behind the the deepening of market logic in the education government’s repression of the protesters. It is system. simply the extension of Jokowinomics: political stability through electoral means and economic Other appointments potentially threaten the growth driven by a commodity andpractice of participatory politics. For instance, infrastructural boom. Bitter quarrels between Jokowi appointed Tito Karnavian, the national the president and an assertive parliament have police head who had gained notoriety for his been replaced by a coalescing of interests and handling of various mass demonstrations, as governing notions between the two that also the internal affairs minister. He also tapped reinforces the dominance of the oligarchs. another former general, Fachrul Razi, as the Jokowi also stressed that he will not issue a religious affairs minister. These appointments government regulation in lieu of law or a are controversial because these are supposed perppu regulation to replace the newly-passed to be held by civilians. The appointment of corruption eradication law that hampers the former high-ranking military and police officers work of the KPK, despite criticism from the to these portfolios violates the spirit of civilian public and civil society.59 While Indonesia still supremacy and harks back to the Suharto era. has a robust electoral politics, this growing reactionary conservatism nonetheless shows By far the biggest surprise has been the the longevity of what the late Benedictappointment of Prabowo Subianto as the Anderson called “bourgeois electoralism.”60 defense minister. This is alarming not only from a human rights viewpoint, but also from an Jokowi’s new developmentalism is alsoaccountability perspective – what was the point reflected in the make up of his new cabinet.61 of having an election if the leader of the While some old faces remain, some of his new opposition accepts a major appointment in the ministerial appointments have sparked intense government instead of performing the role of public debate.62 The former general-turned- watchdog from outside the government? businessman, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, retains Prabowo’s appointment also nullifies the his portfolio as the coordinating minister of rationale of supporting Jokowi as the lesser-evil maritime and investment affairs, suggesting between the two, since the lesser-evil has now that he will continue to serve as the unofficial appointed his authoritarian rival to his cabinet. political adviser for the president. The market- Prabowo’s fiery persona, military background, friendly economist, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, also and familiarity with international affairs might continues as finance minister, showing Jokowi’s help Jokowi’s handling of defense affairs, but commitment to macroeconomic stability. But his brashness might also pose a challenge to Jokowi also appointed some new figures. Some Jokowi’s dream of stable governance.63 new appointments show Jokowi’s continuing Observers have rightly warned that Prabowo commitment to a stable investment climate. For might overstep the boundaries beyond his example, Bahlil Lahadalia, the currentministerial portfolio in his attempt to dominate chairperson of the Association of Youngsecurity affairs and prepare his political

10 18 | 8 | 1 APJ | JF comeback.64 The omens for Jokowi’s second endurance of its patronage politics.68 term and, more importantly, Indonesian democracy, are not good. However, stability itself does not guarantee that democratic quality will remain stable and unchanged. This is the point of this article. While post-authoritarian Indonesia has not Concluding Remarks produced a Rodrigo Duterte, Hun Sen, Jair Bolsonaro, or Viktor Orbán, Jokowi is not a A reassessment of Yudhoyono’s legacy and committed pluralist and reformist democrat. Jokowi’s track record shows how the long slow His track record so far shows that he is more process of democratic stagnation, increasing than happy to discard democratic norms for ad illiberalism, and declining quality unfolds over hoc technocratic solutions and political time. Initially there were high hopes for the appeasement. This approach, a result of improvement of democratic quality under the enduring intra-oligarchic competition, supposedly pro-reform president, Jokowi. Alas, ultimately contributes to a further decline in these turned out to be empty hopes. Jokowi Indonesian democratic quality. Viewed from capitulated to oligarchic and conservative interests instead of pushing for bold reforms both regional and global perspectives, that characterized his term as JakartaIndonesia is part of the new wave of illiberal governor. He has matured as a politician, but populist mobilization in both established and 69 not as a reformer that many expected him to newer democracies. be. Worse, his administration countered It might be too soon to predict the trajectory of illiberal Islamist mobilization with its own Indonesian democracy under the second Jokowi version of nationalist and statist illiberalism. Therefore, in the span of five years, Indonesia presidency. However, looking at the current went from an energized democratic polity to a political situation, it seems that state elites and low-quality democracy. For example, from an their associated economic backers are institutionalist perspective, the Freedom House positioned to promote their own narrow self- annual report now ranks Indonesia as a “partly interests at the expense of popular free country.”65 This erosion of the institutional participation, as shown in the government’s quality of democracy is a sign of the broader repressive handling of mass protests of October democratic decline stemming from structural 2019. This deepening of oligarchic and illiberal issues affecting Indonesian politics. currents in Indonesian politics – two sides of the same coin – is likely to continue throughout Indonesia still performs relatively wellthe remaining period of Jokowi’s second term. compared to many of its regional neighbors and The proof? The government’s proposed pro- other Asian democracies. After all, Indonesia capital omnibus laws that aim to promote has twice elected Jokowi as president rather investment expansion by sidelining public than someone like the Hindu nationalist Modi participation, a move that triggered another in India.66 There is a degree of truth in this wave of demonstrations by labor unions and assessment. Indeed, with the notable exception civil society organizations.70 of enduring anti-Chinese sentiment and its uncivil political implications, the politicization Students, activists, and members of various of ethnic sentiments for illiberal political ends community organizations and unions have has largely subsided.67 Indonesia also fares already expressed grave concern about the better than some other Asian democracies, future of democratic rights in Jokowi’s second despite – or perhaps because of – theterm. I am afraid that they might be right.

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Iqra Anugrah is a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University. His main research interests deal with questions of democracy, development, statecraft, social movements, and political theory, with a focus on agrarian politics in contemporary Indonesia. He thanks the reviewers for the critical and constructive comments on the manuscript. The writing of this article was made possible by institutional and financial support from JSPS.

Notes

1 Devina Heriyanto, “No, Indonesian students are not taking to the streets only to fight sex ban”, The Jakarta Post, 27 September 2019 (https://www.thejakartapost.com/community/2019/09/27/no-indonesian-students-not-taking-to -streets-only-to-fight-sex-ban.html). 2 Ben Bland, “Indonesia’s incredible elections: why Indonesian elections are unlike any other in the world”, Lowy Institute, 2019 (https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/indonesia-votes-2019/); Ben Bland, “Indonesia: don’t over react to Jakarta violence”, The Interpreter at Lowy Institute, 24 May 2019 (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-don-t-over-react-jakarta-violence). 3 For more details, see Addi M Idhom, “Isi RUU KUHP dan Pasal Kontroversial Penyebab Demo Mahasiswa Meluas”, Tirto.id, 25 September 2019 (https://tirto.id/isi-ruu-kuhp-dan-pasal-kontroversial-penyebab-demo-mahasiswa-meluas-eiFu). 4 On mass protests and riots in Papua, see Marchio Irfan Gorbiano and Karina M. Tehusijarana, “Jokowi sidesteps riots, human rights on Papua trip”, The Jakarta Post, 28 October 2019 (https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/28/jokowi-sidesteps-riots-human-rights-on-pap ua-trip.html). 5 On the notion of democratic stability understood as democracy becoming the only game in town, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 (1996): 14-30, especially 15-16. On the idea of democratic consolidation as the system where parties lose power, see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10. 6 Saiful Mujani, R. William Liddle, and Kuskridho Ambardi, Voting Behavior in Indonesia since Democratization: Critical Democrats (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 7 Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 12. 8 Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens. “The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions,” Comparative Politics 29, no, 3 (1997): 323-342. 9 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956) and John T. Sidel. “Economic Foundations of Subnational Authoritarianism: Insights and Evidence from Qualitative and Quantitative Research,” Democratization 21, no. 1, (2014): 161-184.

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10 David Adam Stott. “Indonesia’s 2019 Elections: Democracy Consolidated?” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 17, no. 6 (2019): https://apjjf.org/2019/06/Stott2.html 11 Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner. “Southeast Asia’s Troubling Elections: Nondemocratic Pluralism in Indonesia,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (2019): 104-118. 12 For instance see Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot, Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2019) and Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia: Why Democratization Has not Reduced Corruption,” in Handbook on the Geographies of Corruption, ed. Barney Warf (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 350-364. 13 Keep in mind, for example, that the Megawati presidency (2001-2004) relaunched a massive counterinsurgency effort against the separatist Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) in Aceh Province, a policy that caused substantial internal displacement of local residents and numerous human rights violations. On this issue, see Husein Abdulsalam, “Catatan Kekerasan HAM pada Zaman Megawati Berkuasa,” Tirto.id, 8 September 2017 (https://tirto.id/catatan-kekerasan-ham-pada-zaman-megawati-berkuasa-cwbD). 14 For key references on oligarchic interests in Indonesian politics, see Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London and New York: Routledge, 2004) and Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). On the importance of measuring the influence of money in democracy, see Adam Przeworski, “Capitalism, Democracy, Science,” in Passion, Craft, and Method in Comparative Politics, eds. Gerardo L. Munck and Richard Snyder (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 456-503. 15 Jonathan A. Fox. “Editor’s Introduction-The Challenge of Rural Democratization: Perspectives from Latin America and the Philippines,” Journal of Development Studies 26, no. 4 (1990): 1-18. 16 See for example Frances Hagopian, “The Politics of Oligarchy: The Persistence of Traditional Elites in Contemporary Brazil” (PhD Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986) and Adaner Usmani. “Democracy and the Class Struggle,” American Journal of Sociology 124, no. 3 (2018): 664-704l. 17 Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa, “The Moderating President: Yudhoyono’s Decade in Power,” in The Yudhoyono’s Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation, eds. Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa (Singapore: ISEAS, 2015), 1-21. 18 On cartelistic tendencies among Indonesian political parties, see Kuskridho Ambardi, Mengungkap Politik Kartel: Studi Tentang Sistem Kepartaian di Indonesia Era Reformasi (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2009) and Dan Slater. “Party Cartelization, Indonesian Style: Presidential Power Sharing and the Contingency of Democratic Opposition,” Journal of East Asian Studies 18, no. 1 (2018): 23-46. 19 Dan Slater and Joshua Wong. “The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 3 (2013): 729 and BBC News Indonesia, “SBY perkuat Koalisi, Aburizal jadi ketua harian,” 8 May 2010 (https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2010/05/100508_sbyperkuatkoalisi). 20 On Indonesia’s commodity boom under Yudhoyono’s presidency especially in coal and palm oil sectors, see Hal Hill, “The Indonesian Economy during the Yudhoyono Decade,” in The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation, eds. Edward Aspinall,

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Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa (Singapore: ISEAS, 2015), 281-302. 21 Michael Buehler, “The reassertion of the state,” New Mandala, 30 September 2014 (https://www.newmandala.org/the-reassertion-of-the-state/) 22 Sabrina Asril, “Batalkan Pilkada Tak Langsung, Presiden SBY Terbitkan 2 Perppu!” Kompas.com, 2 October 2014 (https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/02/21435921/Batalkan.Pilkada.Tak.Langsung.Pres iden.SBY.Terbitkan.2.Perppu.) 23 Sabrina Asril, “Batalkan Pilkada Tak Langsung, Presiden SBY Terbitkan 2 Perppu!” Kompas.com, 2 October 2014 (https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/02/21435921/Batalkan.Pilkada.Tak.Langsung.Pres iden.SBY.Terbitkan.2.Perppu.) 24 Melani Budianta, Kamala Chandrakirana, and Andy Yetriyani, “Yudhoyono’s Politics and the Harmful Implications for Gender Equality in Indonesia,” in The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation, eds Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa (Singapore: ISEAS, 2015), 199-216 and Robin Bush, “Religious Politics and Minority Rights during the Yudhoyono Presidency,” in The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation, eds Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa (Singapore: ISEAS, 2015), 239-257. 25 Robin Bush, “Religious Politics and Minority Rights during the Yudhoyono Presidency,” 245-254. 26 Liputan 6, “Majelis Zikir SBY Berdoa buat Bangsa,” 11 February 2005 (https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/95426/majelis-zikir-sby-berdoa-buat-bangsa). 27 Sasaki Takuo, “The Politics of Moderate Islam: From the Rise of Yudhoyono to the Ahmadiyah Decree,” in Islam in Contention: Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia, eds Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki, and Ahmad Suaedy (Jakarta/Kyoto/Taipei: Wahid Institute, CSEAS Kyoto, CAPAS, 2010), 255-281, especially 266-268. 28 See for instance Abubakar Eby Hara, “Pancasila and the Perda Syari’ah Debates in the Post- Suharto Era: Toward a New Political Consensus,” in Islam in Contention: Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia, eds Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki, and Ahmad Suaedy (Jakarta/Kyoto/Taipei: Wahid Institute, CSEAS Kyoto, CAPAS, 2010), 35-75, especially 60 and Abdur Rozaki, “The Pornography Law and the Politics of Sexuality,” in Islam in Contention: Rethinking Islam and State in Indonesia, eds Ota Atsushi, Okamoto Masaaki, and Ahmad Suaedy (Jakarta/Kyoto/Taipei: Wahid Institute, CSEAS Kyoto, CAPAS 2010), 121-138, especially 133. 29 Secular or religiously-moderate politicians’ appeasement to Islamist pressure and agenda is not unique to Yudhoyono. They feel the need to do so because they perceive that Islamic groups with conservative agendas have the ability to mobilize voters. Whether these groups really have mass bases might not matter so much; what matters is the aappearance of it. For a thorough treatment on this topic, see Michael Buehler, The Politics of Shari’a Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 30 Jeffrey Winters. “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia,” Indonesia 96 (2013): 11-33, especially 27-28. 31 John McBeth, “SBY’s dynastic ambitions,” The Strategist, 27 February 2017

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(https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/sbys-dynastic-ambitions/) 32 Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, Catatan Akhir Tahun 2014: Membenahi Masalah Agraria – Prioritas Kerja Jokowi-JK Pada 2015 (Jakarta: Sekretariat Nasional Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, 2014). 33 On these agricultural statistics, see Pusat Data dan Sistem Informasi Pertanian, Statistik Lahan Pertanian Tahun 2010-2014 (Jakarta: Kementerian Pertanian, 2015). 34 This sentiment is confirmed by many members of peasant unions and agrarian activists in various regions whom I interviewed during fieldwork in Indonesia from mid-2015 to mid-2017 and from late-2018 to mid-2019. 35 On Yudhoyono’s conditional cash transfer and land title certification policies, see Chris Manning and Riyana Miranti, “The Yudoyono Legacy on Jobs, Poverty and Income Distribution: A Mixed Record,” in The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation, eds. Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and Dirk Tomsa (Singapore: ISEAS, 2015), 303-324, especially 313-316 and Noer Fauzi Rachman, “The Resurgence of Land Reform Policy and Agrarian Movements in Indonesia” (PhD Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2011, especially chapter 4) respectively. 36 On Prabowo’s profile and oeuvre, see Edward Aspinall. “Oligarchic Populism and Economic Nationalism: Prabowo Subianto’s Challenge to Indonesian Democracy,” Indonesia 99 (2015): 1-28. 37 For further elaboration on the social base of Jokowi’s political ascendancy and his developmentalist orientation, see Max Lane, Decentralization and Its Discontents: An Essay on Class, Political Agency and National Perspective in Indonesian Politics (Singapore: ISEAS, 2014) and Eve Warburton. “Jokowi and the New Developmentalism,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 52, no. 3 (2017): 297-320 respectively. 38 Dan Slater. “Party Cartelization, Indonesian Style.” 39 On the notion of promiscuous power sharing, see Dan Slater and Erica Simmons. “Coping by Colluding: Political Uncertainty and Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia,” Comparative Political Studies 46, no. 11 (2012): 1366-1393. 40 Eve Warburton. “Jokowi and the New Developmentalism.” 41 See for instance Vedi R. Hadiz. “Indonesia’s Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism?” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 53, no. 3 (2017): 261-278 especially page 274 and Ihsanuddin, “Bertemu Jokowi, Petani Kendeng ini Menangis Tuntutannya Tak Dipenuhi,” Kompas.com, 22 March 2017 (https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/03/22/15154681/bertemu.jokowi.petani.kendeng.ini. menangis.tuntutannya.tak.dipenuhi?page=all). 42 Tom Power. “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 54, no. 3 (2018): 307-338. 43 Marcus Miezner. “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs 91, no. 2 (2018): 261-282, especially page 261. 44 David Adam Stott. “Indonesia’s 2019 Elections: Democracy Consolidated?” 45 Luke Gibson. “Toward a More Equal Indonesia,” Oxfam Briefing Paper, February 2017, 1-47, especially 2. 46 Luke Gibson. “Toward a More Equal Indonesia,” 2. 47 Matthew Wai-Poi, “Rising Divide: Why Inequality is Increasing and What Needs to be

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Done,” 31 May 2016 (https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/rising-divide-why-inequality-is-increasing-and- what-needs-to-be-done/) and Asep Suryahadi, “Is Higher Inequality the New Normal for Indonesia?” 27 November 2018 (https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/is-higher-inequality-the-new-normal-for-indone sia/). 48 Koalisi Bersihkan Indonesia, Coalruption: Shedding Light on Political Corruption in Indonesia’s Coal Mining Sector (Jakarta: Koalisi Bersihkan Indonesia, 2018). 49 Jaringan Advokasi Tambang, “2019 Election is Driven by Mining and Energy’s Business Interest,” 12 February 2019 (http://www.jatam.org/2019/02/12/2019-election-is-driven-by-mining-and-energy-s-business-int erest/). 50 Iqra Anugrah, “Movements for Land Rights in Democratic Indonesia,” in Activists in Transition: Progressive Politics in Democratic Indonesia, eds. Thushara Dibley and Michele Ford (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 79-98. 51 Iqra Anugrah, “Farmers, fishers and local folk a casualty in Indonesia’s embrace with vested interests,” Channel News Asia, 22 June 2019 (https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/farmers-fishers-local-folk-interested-in-i ndonesia-elections-11535260) 52 On Jokowi’s handling of rural protests, see for example Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, Masa Depan Reforma Agraria Melampaui Tahun Politik: Catatan Akhir Tahun 2018 Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria (Jakarta: Sekretariat Nasional Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria, 2019). 53 Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner. “Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy’s Close Call,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 50, no. 3 (2014): 347-369. 54 “Indonesia Sees Record Turnout in Historic Election, Braces for Fallout,” The Jakarta Globe, 17 April 2019 (https://jakartaglobe.id/context/indonesia-sees-record-turnout-in-historic-election-braces-for-fa llout). 55 Personal conversation with activists in Jakarta, August 2019. 56 See Akbar Ridwan, “Satu Buruh dan 8 Mahasiswa Masih Ditahan Polisi,” Alinea.id, 16 August 2019 (https://www.alinea.id/nasional/satu-buruh-dan-8-mahasiswa-masih-ditahan-polisi- b1XkZ9m2S) and KontraS, “Bebaskan Semua Tahanan Politik Papua dan Wujudkan Perdamaian di Papua Berdasarkan Undang-undang Otonomi Khusus Papua,” Kontras.org, 13 September 2019 (https://kontras.org/2019/09/13/bebaskan-semua-tahanan-politik-papua-dan-wujudkan-perdam aian-di-papua-berdasarkan-mandat-undang-undang-otonomi-khusus-papua/). 57 Devina Heriyanto, “No, Indonesian students are not taking to the streets only to fight sex ban.” 58 Eve Warburton, “Indonesia’s pro-democracy protests cut across deep political cleavages,” New Mandala, 3 October 2019 (https://www.newmandala.org/indonesias-pro-democracy-protests/). 59 Stanley Widianto, “Indonesia president says no plan to drop controversial anti-graft bill,”

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Reuters, 1 November 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-corruption/indonesia-president-says-no-plan-to- drop-controversial-anti-graft-bill-idUSKBN1XB43K). 60 Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World (London and New York: Verso, 1998), 267. 61 For a full list of Jokowi’s new cabinet, see Marchio Irfan Gorbiano, “Breaking: Jokowi announces his new Cabinet. Here’s the line up,” The Jakarta Post, 23 October 2019 (https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/10/23/breaking-jokowis-new-cabinet-announced- here-is-the-lineup.html). 62 Liam Gammon, “What was that election for again?” New Mandala, 25 October 2019 (https://www.newmandala.org/what-was-that-election-for-again/) 63 Curie Maharani and Evan A. Laksmana, “Prabowo’s Uphill Tasks as Indonesia’s New Defense Minister,” The Diplomat, 31 October 2019 (https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/prabowos-uphill-tasks-as-indonesias-new-defense-minister/). 64 Aaron Connelly and Evan A. Laksmana, “Jokowi Offers Prabowo a Piece of the Pie,” Foreign Policy, 31 October 2019 (https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/31/indonesia-democracy-general-jokowi-offers-prabowo-a-p iece-of-the-pie/). 65 See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/indonesia. 66 Dan Slater and Maya Tudor, “Why Religious Tolerance Won in Indonesia but Lost in India,” Foreign Affairs, 3 July 2019 (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-07-03/why-religious-tolerance-won-indone sia-lost-india). 67 Edward Aspinall. “Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses,” Journal of East Asian Studies 11, no. 2 (2011): 289-319. 68 Edward Aspinall. “The Surprising Democratic Behemoth: Indonesia in Comparative Asian Perspective,” Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 4 (2015): 889-902. 69 On this point, see Joshua Kurlantzick, “Southeast Asia Recap 2018: Democracy Continues to Suffer,” Council on Foreign Relations, 21 December 2018 (https://www.cfr.org/blog/southeast-asia-recap-2018-democracy-continues-suffer), Robert R. Kaufman and Stephen Haggard. “Democratic Decline in the United States: What Can We Learn from Middle-Income Backsliding?” Perspectives on Politics 17, no. 2 (2019): 417-432, and Vedi R. Hadiz and Angelos Chryssogelos. “Populism in World Politics: A Comparative Cross-Regional Perspective,” International Political Science Review 38, no. 4. 70 Jefferson Ng, “Jokowi’s Macron Moment: Moving Fast of Moving Together?” New Mandala, 29 January 2020 (https://www.newmandala.org/jokowis-macron-moment/).