Kenneth Macksey. Kesselring: German Master Strategist of the Second World War. London: Greenhill Books/Lionel Leventhal, 1996. 264 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-85367-256-9.

Reviewed by Stephen G. Fritz

Published on H-German (December, 1997)

A caveat is in order as the frst item of busi‐ leader, one able to control a battlefeld, squeeze ness: any reader expecting a new treatment of the most from his men and resources, and deal ef‐ Field Marshal will be greatly fectively with his often difcult Italian ally. But he disappointed in this book, for it is merely a re‐ was hardly a military genius, as his errors in judg‐ print of Macksey's 1976 book, Kesselring: The ment certainly equaled his successes, and had a Making of the Luftwafe. It contains no new intro‐ greater impact on the overall negative develop‐ duction, nor a chapter where the author discusses ment of the war from Germany's perspective. new and relevant sources. Neither does it provide A few examples should sufce to illustrate any citations or an extensive bibliography. And if this point. During the Battle of Britain, for exam‐ all of this were not frustrating enough, the large ple, while he was still actively commanding Luft‐ number of typos and other mistakes completes wafe forces, Kesselring made the grievous mis‐ one's irritation with the book. take of shifting the focus of German aerial activi‐ Still, the larger problem with the book, as ties from the destruction of RAF airbases to that of with the original, is Macksey's hagiographic treat‐ the bombing of London, and then compounded ment of Kesselring. Indeed, in his conclusion the this error in judgment by persisting in attempts, author opines that Kesselring deserves "an exalt‐ with a seriously depleted force, to destroy the RAF ed position among the highest of the past military by day while at the same time bombing the air‐ hierarchy" (p. 249), with only the likes of Scharn‐ craft industry and London by night. As Macksey horst and Moltke of comparable brilliance. Evalu‐ admits, dilution was the result of this inability to ating military leadership is, of course, notoriously set priorities, and when Kesselring fnally realized difcult and controversial, with constantly shift‐ the obvious, he sought to rectify the situation by ing parameters as to what constitutes "brilliance." resorting to wholly inefective methods, such as And without doubt Kesselring was a highly skilled using fghter-bombers to deliver bombs on British and efective leader. No, the problem is that Mack‐ factories and cities and then engaging in aerial sey's own evidence, much of it ironically coming combat with RAF fghters. And while Kesselring from Kesselring's memoirs, doesn't sustain his proved competent in commanding a Luftfotte thesis that Kesselring was the German master during Operation Barbarossa, the major tactical strategist of World War II. innovation, namely spreading activity against en‐ Leaving aside his contributions to the cre‐ emy artillery over time as well as space, was actu‐ ation of the prewar Luftwafe, the picture of ally forced on him by . Moreover, Kesselring that emerges is of a highly competent although this hardly sets him apart, it should also H-Net Reviews be noted that Kesselring seems neither to have alized as early as late 1943 that the war was lost, doubted the German ability to defeat Soviet Rus‐ but refused to countenance any talk of surrender sia, nor the urgent need to do so. Hardly the stuf until after Hitler was dead; a man concerned of military genius or an independent imagination. about his troops but whose stubborn actions in Although efective in Russia, Kesselring clear‐ prosecuting the war needlessly cost lives. Further‐ ly had not distinguished himself in the Battle of more, there are in Kesselring's statements and ac‐ Britain. Nor did he particularly impress in North tions tantalizing hints that he might have had Africa, although admittedly he had to deal with a more than a personal oath of loyalty to Hitler, that stubborn and difcult rival in , pla‐ he saw in the Fuehrer the man who could and cate the Italians (who could be even more ob‐ was building the new Germany, of which he evi‐ structive), and prosecute a campaign on limited dently approved. In summary, then, this is a frus‐ resources. For all his success through 1942, how‐ trating book, one that is interesting for many as‐ ever, his stubborn refusal to see the obvious in pects of Kesselring's career and activities, yet curi‐ North Africa and recommend to Hitler, with ously lacking in analytical substance. whom he had considerable infuence, a timely Copyright (c) 1997 by H-net. All rights re‐ withdrawal from the Tunisian pocket led to the served. This work may be copied for non-proft destruction and capture of some of the fnest educational use proper credit is given to the au‐ troops in the German army. Moreover, one is left thor and the list. For other permission contact H- with the impression that he chose to hang on in [email protected]. Tunisia only because Rommel, his great rival, was urging withdrawal. Again, as in the Battle of Britain, his one failure of judgment outweighed his tactical successes. Finally, even in the Italian campaign, from which his reputation largely springs, his undeniable success at improvising a strategy that perfectly negated Allied aims, as well as his ability to control the explosive political situ‐ ation, begin to seem less illustrious when one re‐ alizes that for most of that campaign German forces actually were equal to or larger than Allied forces (in a region perfectly suited to defensive warfare), and that by Spring 1944 at the latest Italy had largely been written of by the Allied high command as a dead end. Macksey's glowing assessment of Kesselring thus seems strangely at odds with his own evi‐ dence. Nor does he deal in any substantive way with key issues of Kesselring's personality. Here was a man who prided himself on his active intel‐ ligence, yet who never seemed to question the di‐ rection of the war; a man who was staunchly loy‐ al to Hitler to the end, but who dallied at the edges of the July 20 plot; a man who evidently re‐

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Citation: Stephen G. Fritz. Review of Macksey, Kenneth. Kesselring: German Master Strategist of the Second World War. H-German, H-Net Reviews. December, 1997.

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