Mokoro Ltd
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005
Volume 4: Thematic Papers
November 2006
Mokoro Ltd 87 London Rd Headington Oxford OX3 9AA UK Tel: +44 1865 741241 Fax: +44 1865 764223 Email: [email protected] Website: www.mokoro.co.uk
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Volume 4: Thematic Papers
Contents
TP1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
TP2: Infrastructure (Water and Sanitation, Transport and Energy)
TP3: Health and HIV/AIDS
TP4: Capacity Development and Technical Assistance
TP5: Support to Decentralisation
TP6: Accountability and Corruption
TP7: Human Rights, Justice, Conflict, and Civil Society
TP8: Gender
TP9: Private Sector Development
TP10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda
TP11: Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda
TP12: Environmental Aspects of the Danida Programme
TP13: Special Education
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 1 –
Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
Martin Adams
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
Contents
1. Introduction...... 1
2. The situation prevailing in 1987 and the evolution of the sector...... 1 The meeting at Roskilde Folk High School 1985 ...... 1 General performance of the sector and policy developments...... 3 Rural poverty...... 4 Land tenure reform...... 5 Recent developments in government policy towards agriculture ...... 6 Rural Development Strategy...... 8 Institutional arrangements in the agricultural sector...... 8
3. ODA to Ugandan agriculture: 1987–2005 ...... 9 Background to international assistance to agriculture...... 9 Phase 1: ODA to agriculture 1987–1991 ...... 9 Phase 2: ODA to agricultural planning and support services 1991–1998...... 10 Phase 3: ODA to agriculture in the period 1999–2005 ...... 11
4. The rôle of Danida in support of agriculture and natural resources...... 12 Phase 1: Interventions under the Economic Recovery Programme 1987–1990 .13 Phase 2: Recovery through policy development and related investment 1991– 1998...... 16 Phase 3: Danida’s Agriculture Sector Programme Support 1998–2004...... 19 From ASPS- I to II: 2004 to present ...... 24
5. Cross cutting issues and overall assessment ...... 26 Adherence to policy goals concerning poverty...... 26 Gender ...... 27 Participation...... 27 HIV/AIDS ...... 27 Environment...... 27 Assessment of Danida contribution to the agriculture sector (1987–2004)...... 28
Bibliography ...... 35
Boxes Box 1: The macro-economic context ...... 3 Box 2: Danida and coordination of the donor sub-group to the agricultural sector ...... 11 Box 3: Ugandan recollections of the Danida grain drying and storage projects.16 Box 4: An insider’s view of LSRP...... 21 Box 5: Five perceptions of HASP...... 23 date: November 2006 TP1 Page i
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Tables Table 1: Principal Danida projects and programmes in the agricultural sector 1987–2005...... 13
Appendices Appendix 1: Project summaries ...... 41 Appendix 2: Agricultural projects funded by the World Bank IFAD and the African Development Bank in Uganda 1985–2001 ...... 49
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
Acronyms and abbreviations
ABC Animal Breeding Centre ABDC Agri-Business Development Component ADB African Development Bank AEP Agricultural Extension Project AI Artificial Insemination APD Agriculture Planning Department APEP Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program ARTP Agricultural Research and Training Project ASARECA Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa ASMP Agricultural Sector Management Project ASPS Agricultural Sector Programme Support BOU Bank of Uganda BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy CIG Common Interest Group CSO Civil Society Organisation DAC Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD) Danida Danish International Development Agency (before 1991) Danish International Development Assistance (after 1991) DATICs District Agricultural Training and Information Centres (previously known as District Farm Institutes) DC Dairy Corporation DCI Development Cooperation Ireland DFA District Farmers’ Association DFI District Farm Institute DFID Department for International Development (UK) DLT District Land Tribunal DKK Danish Kroner DMP Dairy Master Plan EC European Commission EDF European Development Fund ERP Economic Recovery Programme FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FY Financial Year GOU Government of Uganda ha hectare HASP Household Agricultural Support Programme HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome IDA International Development Association (World Bank) IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IMF International Monetary Fund ISNAR International Service for National Agricultural Research kg kilogramme
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German development bank) LEMU Land and Equality Movement in Uganda LSRP Livestock Systems Research Project MAAIF Ministry of Agric ulture, Animal Industry and Fisheries MAIF Ministry of Animal Industry and Fisheries MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development MOE Ministry of Education MOI Ministry of Industry and Technology MOLG Ministry of Local Government MOP Micro-finance Outreach Plan NAADS National Agricultural Advisory Service NAGRC National Animal Genetic Resources Centre NARO National Agricultural Research Organisation NARS National Agricultural Research Systems NCG Nordic Consulting Group NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NSCG Non-Sectoral Conditional Grant NRM National Resistance Movement ODA Official Development Assistance PAS Primary Agriculture Syllabus PCR Project Completion Report PCU Project Coordination Unit PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan PMA Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture PMB Produce Marketing Board RDE Royal Danish Embassy RDS Rural Development Strategy RFS Rural Farmers’ Scheme RMSP Rural Micro Finance Support Project Sida Swedish international development cooperation agency SRP Sugar Rehabilitation Project SSA Sub-Saharan Africa SWAp Sector Wide Approach T&V Training and Visit TA Technical Assistance/Technical Adviser TOR Terms of Reference UA Unit of Account (ADB) UFRP National Forestry Rehabilitation Project UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNFA Uganda National Farmers’ Association UNFFE Uganda National Farmers Federation USAID United States Agency for International Development WB World Bank WFP World Food Programme
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
1. Introduction
1.1 This paper considers Danida’s contribution to agriculture and natural resource development over the period 1987–2005, during which assistance to the sector has consistently been a major component of Danish aid to Uganda.
1.2 We review Denmark’s contribution to the development of agricultural policy and implementation in the context of issues arising in the sector as a whole and in terms of : a) The situation prevailing in the rural areas in 1987, the general performance of the agricultural sector over the period and the evolution of government agricultural institutions and agricultural policy – moving from economic recovery and rehabilitation to poverty reduction; b) The background to official development assistance (ODA) to agriculture and natural resources in Uganda and in the region, the relative importance of agriculture in donor portfolios and significant policy shifts in aid management modalities – moving from individual projects to sector wide approaches (SWAps) and direct budget support; c) The strategies adopted by Danida , the direct outcomes and less tangible influences, in the context of three main phases of support: from ad hoc projects, to more strategic approaches involving ‘master plans’ for sub-sectors, to more broadly based programmes under the heading of Agriculture Sector Programme Support; d) And, finally we make an overall assessment of Danida’s assistance to agriculture and the sustainable use of natural resources and response to other cross-cutting issues.
1.3 The individual projects and programmes are summarised in Appendix 1 and their impact assessed. Information relating to interventions of the World Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the African Development Bank Group (ADB), the principal external financiers of the agriculture sector, is contained in Appendix 2.
2. The situation prevailing in 1987 and the evolution of the sector
The meeting at Roskilde Folk High School 1985 2.1 In September 1985, at a folk high school near Roskilde in Denmark, a group of Danish and Ugandan scholars joined with others concerned for Uganda. They had gathered to discuss the challenges which the government of Yoweri Museveni faced in putting the country ‘back on the road from decay to development’.1 The proceedings were brought together in a book by Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle .2 It provides insights to the prevailing situation at the beginning of the twenty-year period covered by our review. Several chapters in the book deal with the ‘economic perspectives and the agricultural challenges’ of the time.
1 The conference was sponsored by the Danish Research Council for Development Research, the Danish Social Research Council, Danida and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London University. The assistance of DanChurchAid/Lutheran World Federation is also acknowledged. 2 The full reference is: Hansen, H.B. and Twaddle, M. (1988). Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development. London: James Currey.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
2.2 The first of these chapters points out that most writings on Uganda fail to take into account the ‘spatial dimension’ of the country and pay insufficient attention to variations in socio-economic conditions and in agro-ecology (O’Connor, 1988). Broadly defined, there are five distinct farming systems/areas depending on rainfall patterns, altitude and soil conditions: - the high rainfall area around Lake Victoria with bananas, robusta coffee, and food crops; - eastern Uganda, with two distinct rainy seasons separated by a four-month dry period, where the main crops include millet, cassava and cotton; - Northern Region, where the rainfall pattern restricts cultivation to one season, with the main crops being cotton, maize and millet; - the mountainous areas, where the altitude permits the cultivation of temperate fruits, vegetables and traditional food crops; - north-eastern Uganda, where rainfall is sufficient only for pastoralism and, in favorable years, sorghum and millet.
2.3 These important regional differences are often overlooked in the discussion of the aggregate situation in Uganda. The diversity is not simply the result of variations in natural resource potential (soil fertility, rainfall, etc). It is also the outcome of cultural differences and historical events that together have also greatly influenced population density, land tenure, agricultural systems and rural livelihoods. Later in this review, we return to some of the challenges posed by this diversity for the programming of government support to agricultural development.
2.4 The Roskilde meeting was informed about the efforts made in the second Obote period (1980–85) to restore the rural economy and give priority to agriculture (Edmonds, 1988). With the assistance of donors, attempts were made to reduce inflation and increase exports of cash crops (coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco and maize) by increasing the producer prices of traditional export crops. But success was short-lived. In 1984, the economy was once again faced with damaging inflation. Drawing lessons from this period, the meeting was told that in order to restore the economy more than macro-economic measures were required (Belshaw, 1988). In 1985, the only short-term sources of export earnings were the country’s major cash crops. It was essential to complement macro-economic measures with actions at the local level to reverse the retreat of farmers into the parallel or magendo economy. Uganda had suffered a total breakdown of government-funded agricultural research, seed multiplication, input and output markets, and extension services. National fertilizer consumption fell from 1.4 kg/ha in the 1960s to 0.2 kg/ha at the beginning of the 1990s (Laker-Ojok, 1996). Farmers in eastern and northern Uganda, where animal traction had been well established for 50 years, had suffered tremendous losses of livestock as a result of insecurity and had been forced back into hand-hoe cultivation. In addition to social services, the rehabilitation of the roa d network and water supplies and sanitation, agricultural research and extension all required major investment.
2.5 Paradoxically, contributions by two other participants at the meeting focused on local aspects of the rural economy and expressed less enthusiasm for an export-based, cash-cropping recovery strategy (Nsimbambi, 1988; Whyte, 1988). They drew attention to the resilience of Ugandan farmers during the troubles and their ability to survive and thrive on the production and marketing of food crops. They stressed that this aspect of the farming system should also command attention.
2.6 Now as then, Uganda’s agriculture is better characterised as ‘consumption-driven’. This is a more satisfactory description of the bulk of production, the purpose of which is food sufficiency at household level. It is a system which is finely adapted to a country with an enormous variety of
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources soil, altitude and climate. The more frequently used label ‘subsistence agriculture’ carries a negative connotation and places it on a lower level of the development scale. All farmers, almost without exception, aim to market a ‘surplus’ in a ‘normal’ year.
General performance of the sector and policy developments 2.7 In the period 1986/87–1990/91, the export sector responded to reforms by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government, but the recovery of the economy was constrained by low international prices for cash crops, particularly coffee. The average growth of the economy of 4.9% per annum in the five-year period 1987–91 was generated mainly by an increase in food crop production as a result of stability returning to large parts of the countryside. Food crops include the staple plantain banana , maize, beans, cassava and upland rice, for which demand is rising in towns. At the end of the period, agricultural production was estimated to have reached the levels of the late 1970s.
2.8 Throughout the 1990s Uganda was considered a model for successful structural adjustment, budgetary reforms and the reorientation of public sector programmes towards poverty reduction. The implementation of government’s Agricultural Sector Policy Agenda between 1989 and 1990 set the stage for the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme (ASAP) during 1991– 95, which was supported largely by the World Bank/IMF, USAID, UK and the EC.
Box 1: The macro-economic context • After showing initial promise in the immediate post-independence years, the Ugandan economy declined after 1971 due to mismanagement, political instability and civil war. When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took power in 1986, the economy had collapsed with GDP 20 percent lower than its 1970 peak, high inflation rates, chronic budget deficits, an overvalued exchange rate, significantly lower export earnings and deteriorated infrastructure. The new government launched an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1987 to correct macroeconomic imbalances and promote economic growth. • The sharp fall of coffee prices in 1992 prompted the NRM government to deepen reforms, as seen in the: (i) liberalisation of coffee, tea and tobacco marketing; (ii) liberalisation of the foreign exchange rate; (iii) measures to improve fiscal discipline; (iv) liberalisation of interest rates; (v) measures to deepen financial markets; and, (vi) commitment to end subsidies to state-owned enterprises. Legislative and institutional reforms were also introduced, of which the decentralisation programme – to strengthen people’s participation in decision-making and bring service delivery closer to communities – formed a major part. • The results have been impressive. The Ugandan economy has outperformed other African countries. GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7 percent from 1992–1998, and 6 percent from 1999–2004. Inflation dropped from over 100 percent in the 1980s to 54 percent in 1992, thereafter fluctuating between -0.3 and 10 percent. Fluctuations in food prices, which constitute a significant part of the composite consumer index, have contributed to the recent instability in inflation rates. After the sharp fall in the 1980s of the Ugandan Shilling, the currency depreciated more gradually after 1995. • Growth in GDP has not been even across all sectors. Agriculture’s contribution to GDP dropped from 54 percent in FY 1989/90 to 39 percent in FY 2003/4 The significant drop in the contribution of non-monetary agriculture accounts for much of this change, indicating that the agricultural economy has become more market based. Gains in the share of GDP have been made by manufacturing, construction, transport and communication, and community services. • The structure of exports has changed significantly with the share of traditional export crops (coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco) falling from 80 percent in 1994 to 37 percent in 2004. This is due mainly to the variability in coffee prices, Uganda’s major export commodity, with earnings per tonne peaking in 1995 at USD 2,300 before falling to USD800 in 1999. Although coffee prices have picked up since 2000, the volume of coffee production has not recovered. At the same time, the export of non-traditional exports has increased – particularly fish and fish products, floriculture, and maize. Source: Oxford Policy Management (2005) ‘A Joint Evaluation: Uganda’s Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture’ (p 3).
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
2.9 As noted in Background Paper 1: Economic Development, in the early 1990s, the size of the public sector was reduced through large-scale retrenchments and privatisation. Before the ASAP, marketing of the traditional export crops was under the control of parastatals – Coffee Marketing Board, Lint Marketing Board and Uganda Tea Authority. Producer prices for these traditional exports were determined by the Government and almost all exports were sold with only minimal processing. The formal marketing and pricing of major food crops was under the control of the Produce Marketing Board. However, the controls were generally ineffective because the prices did not even cover production costs, forcing the farmers to sell outside the formal channels and diversify into commodities that were more profitable. Government agencies also had a virtual monopoly on the marketing of agricultural inputs.
2.10 Slow but substantial progress has been achieved in the dairy industry as a whole. It is estimated that 80–90% of the marketable milk goes through informal channels, leaving 10–20% to be processed and packaged before marketing. Uganda’s farmers often raise stall-fed cattle, particularly close to towns. The formal milk market was eventually liberalised in 1994. Since then, more private traders have entered the market supplying up to 80% of the processed and packaged milk, leaving about 20% to the Dairy Corporation, which still survives. Eight modern processing companies are now operational, compared to the single state-controlled Dairy Corporation in 1994.
2.11 Liberalisation increased production of some crops by raising farm-gate prices, but other important factors were the return of security and improved transport infrastructure. Local government reform was expected to support the ASAP, but implementation proved to be a major problem due to lack of staff and financial resources. Among other things , this stymied the implementation of land tenure reform (see below).
2.12 Some 20% of the population still derive their livelihood directly from coffee, 95% as smallholders. Smallholder cotton is no longer a viable enterprise and production has declined by 80% from its former peak. Production of tea for export, mostly on estates in Western Uganda , has been rising since 1999. Vanilla grown by smallholders has become an important export, but the market is volatile. The export of flowers has also increased over the last five years and specialist large-scale enterprises employ increasing numbers. Oilseeds are being promoted under contract- farming out-grower arrangements.
Rural poverty 2.13 Despite some improvements during the 1990s, at least a third of the population continues to suffer food insecurity and/ or has insufficient income for basic needs (see Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring). Poverty is highest in Northern Region following years of insecurity, and exceeds 80% in some other districts. Recent declines have been recorded in the income of rural households , particularly in Eastern Region. Decreasing soil fertility and loss of natural resources is an increasing problem (see Thematic Paper 12: Environmental Issues).
2.14 Rural poverty is increasing both in absolute and relative terms due to a combination of factors: - weak agricultural prices and slow growth in agriculture; - very limited availability of credit for small farmers; - rapid population growth putting increasing pressure on land; - female -headed families with little land and widows being dispossessed by in -laws; - privatisation of communally owned property; - the heavy bur den of disease and poor health; and
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- insecurity in the North and East which is reducing production, limiting access to land and making investment more risky.
Land tenure reform 2.15 Land tenure insecurity is increasingly identified as an underlying cause of poverty in Uganda.3 In 1998 the land issue was at the top of the government’s agenda but has since fallen away. DFID provided project funds for the preparation and implementation of the Uganda Land Act and related work. In 2001, DFID announced that future funding would be through general budget support. Since that date, the funds made available to land administration have been substantially cut. Qualified personnel have been retrenched. Today the recruitment system only accommodates entry-level graduates.
2.16 The current problems relate more to the severe resource constraints encountered at district level – personnel and funds – rather than to the absence of a land policy. Land administration is just one of the functions of cash-strapped district governments. The Uganda Land Act (Cap. 227) of 1998 decentralised land administration to district land boards and other district and sub-county structures (i.e. the District Land Office & Land Registry, the District Land Tribunal and the Sub- County Land Committee). Two Ministries are responsible for the oversight of the law: (a) the new Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development and (b) the Ministry of Justice (District Land Tribunals). The cost of creating the decentralised land administration system in the 69 districts has exceeded the resources available. For this reason, the Land (Amendment) Act, 2004, reduced the number and size of the prescribed institutions. Still, only a small percentage is operational. The Land Boards (where they exist) are not able to cope with the demands placed upon them. Matters which could be sorted out by the Land Boards go to the District Land Tribunal (DLT). There are only 18 DLT circuits for 69 districts. One chairperson has to cover up to 4 or 5 districts. A large backlog of unheard land cases is building up. In desperation people are taking their land disputes to the magistrates’ courts.
2.17 Frequent references are made in the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) Evaluation to problems that women face in gaining access to land (Oxford Policy Management, 2005). Under statutory law, women in Uganda can and do own land. The issue of access (rather than ownership) arises on land where customary law prevails de facto if not de jure. The situation can vary significantly from clan to clan and district to district – the spatial dimension again.
2.18 The decentralisation of land administration as envisaged in the Act has not materialised due to lack of local government resources at District and Sub County level. In the absence of just and equitable land administration (another public good) ‘investors’ and opportunists are reported to be taking advantage of the provisions of the 1998 law relating to the registration and privatisation of customary land. Clauses relating to prior consent of dependants are not being enforced. Women and children are being dispossessed. “People are selling land for drink.”4 In the meantime the legitimacy of customary arrangements for resolving land disputes and protecting dependants is being undermined by the Act, which has had unexpected negative consequences (Hunt, 2004). Although the act recognises customary land tenure systems, it does not recognise the traditional social institutions through which these can be enforced and nor is there political will in the modern legal machinery to support customary arrangements. The result is growing tenure insecurity for women and increasing landlessness. Providing for individual freehold title for women is not, as educated urban women’s rights activists might claim, the answer. The Land and Equality Movement in Uganda (LEMU) argues that the strategy should be to work with
3 See for example Oxford Policy Management, 2005. 4 Judy Adoko of the ‘Land and Equality Movement in Uganda’ (LEMU) http://land-in-uganda.org/
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources customary rights holders and rediscover customary ways and means of resolving issues of women’s land rights. “Our approach is to rediscover traditional values, as a means of finding a way forward and of strengthening family title .” Clan title is probably not enforceable; individual title will disadvantage women; family/household title with real co-ownership has to be the way forward.
Recent developments in government policy towards agriculture 2.19 Until the launch of the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA) in 2000/01, there was no document setting out government’s chosen course of action to address the problems of the agricultural sector and address rural poverty. In the early nineties, Danida contributed to the preparation of a number of sub-sectoral plans (i.e. the Dairy Master Plan, the Animal Breeding Policy and Implementation Plan, the Grain Sector Master Plan) but there was no comprehensive and definitive agricultural policy.
2.20 The process of preparing the PMA stretched over a period of three to four years (March 1996 to early 2000). Beginning with the ‘Tororo Participatory Planning Retreat’ in August 1996, in which Danida participated; its compilation has involved a large number of stakeholders (central government ministries and parastatals, local governments, the private sector, the civil society, educational and research institutions, and development partners, including Danida) (MAAIF and MFPED, 1999).
2.21 The founding document states that: The PMA is part of the Government of Uganda’s broader strategy of poverty eradication contained in the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) of 1997 which has just been revised and updated this year (i.e. 2000). The revised PEAP has 4 main goals: creating a framework for economic growth and structural transformation; ensuring good governance and security; directly increasing the ability of the poor to raise incomes; and directly increasing the quality of life of the poor. Modernizing agriculture will contribute to increasing incomes of the poor by raising farm productivity, increasing the share of agricultural production that is marketed, and creating on-farm and off-farm employment. (ibid.: vi)
2.22 As the recent PMA evaluation points out, the PMA is a framework, not a programme, nor an agricultural strategy (Oxford Policy Management, 2005: 2).5 The framework does, however, include strategic elements. The PMA’s long-term vision is for ‘poverty eradication through a profitable, competitive, sustainable and dynamic agricultural and agro-industrial sector’ and its mission is ‘eradicating poverty by transforming subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture’.
2.23 The PMA is an ambitious effort to involve and coordinate a wide range of stakeholders in the planning and implementation of agricultural development. From an operational point of view, the PMA is at least as good an arrangement as any other in the region. It has certainly focused the attention and support of the donors over the last five years, if not the support of the country’s political leadership. Its objectives are to: - increase income and improve the quality of life of poor subsistence farmers; - improve household food security through the market;
5 It is argued by some that the PMA is not a clear agricultural policy and plan of action. The PMA evaluation acknowledges that there is also need for an agricultural sector strategy, which should be consistent with the PMA. Its emphasis should also be on poverty reduction, but it should also address issues such as the role of commercial farmers, regulation and standards, support for export marketing, and other issues relevant to the agricultural sector as a whole. Further, ‘it is important that the agriculture sector development strategy and investment plan, currently being refined by MAAIF, achieves this balance’ (Oxford Policy Management, 2005: 9).
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- generate gainful employment; and - promote sustainable use and management of natural resources.
2.24 The PMA has seven functional components or ‘priority pillars’: - research and technology development; - national agricultural advisory services; - agricultural education; - improving access to rural finance; - agro-processing and marketing; - sustainable natural resource utilisation and management; and - physical infrastructure.
2.25 To support the implementation of the PMA at district level and below, central government provides a Non-Sectoral Conditional Grant (NSCG) to local government authorities. ‘PMA activities’ are described as ‘any activities, whether national, district or below, public sector, donor funded or NGO, which fall under the seven pillars, or otherwise promote sustainable rural livelihoods’. The PMA structures aim to provide a co-ordinating mechanism for these activities across the length and breadth of rural Uganda.
2.26 The PMA holds to certain principles (MAAIF and MFPED, 1999: 2) - A focus on rural poverty; - Government role limited to public goods, market failure, or regulatory functions; - An emphasis on deepening decentralisation; - Empowerment of the poor and local communities to take decisions in accordance with PMA principles; - Integration of gender and other cross-cutting issues within planning processes; - Encouragement of private sector provision of goods and services; - A multi-sectoral approach to agriculture.
2.27 A new departure under the PMA was the position taken on government’s role in providing agricultural extension and agricultural research services. While the PMA considers animal disease control, regulatory standards and addressing market failure as ‘public goods’, advice and assistance to farmers to improve production and marketing are considered to be private goods.6 The National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) is a semi-autonomous body formed under the NAADS Act of June 2001 with a mandate to develop a demand-driven, farmer-led agricultural service delivery system targeting poor subsistence farmers, with an emphasis on women, youth and people with disabilities. The programme was officially launched in March 2002. NAADS is under the overall supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF). It commenced in a handful of trial districts and will continue to expand until all the districts in the country are covered within the first seven years of implementation. Under ASPS-II, Danida contributes to a basket fund for NAADS.
2.28 The National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO) was established by an act of Parliament in 1992, which amalgamated several research institutions that existed within several Government Ministries. NARO was established with a mandate to undertake, promote and
6 Public goods can be used by all members of society, e.g. defence, law, public parks. In contrast, private goods, if consumed by one person, cannot be consumed by another.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources coordinate research in all aspects of crops, fisheries, forestry and livestock, and ensuring dissemination and application of research results. It aims to contribute to the modernization of agriculture, ensuring food security, alleviating hunger and eradicating poverty. The Board is responsible for policy making while the Management Committee is responsible for the execution of policies determined by the Board. The members of the Board are appointed by the Minister responsible for Agriculture on the grounds of their expertise and office as prescribed by the NARO Statute of 1992. In 2005, Parliament passed the ‘NARS Act’ (National Agricultural Research Systems), which in accordance with PMA principles provides for the future funding of agricultural research through a competitive research fund scheme. Under ASPS-II, Danida is contrib uting to this fund.
Rural Development Strategy 2.29 In FY 2005/06 the MFPED developed and launched the Rural Development Strategy (RDS). This aims to deliver subsidized agricultural support services including agricultural inputs and credit, to pilot areas within certain districts to ‘kick-start’ agricultural development. The RDS interventions will be supply led while those of the PMA are meant to be demand driven. As pointed out in the April 2006 minutes of the PMA Steering Committee, ‘consistency with agreed policies set out in the PEAP [Poverty Eradication Action Plan] and PMA is essential if the environment for economic growth and development that Government has created over the past decade is to continue’ (PMA Steering Committee, 2006).
Institutional arrangements in the agricultural sector 2.30 The PMA Secretariat was established as a new structure which reports to the Permanent Secretary of MAAIF, the de facto secretary to the PMA Steering Committee, which in turn is chaired by the MFPED. Institutionally, this places the PMA – a multi-sectoral programme – under the MFPED.
2.31 The maintenance of good working relations between the PMA Steering Committee and the MAAIF, in particular the Agriculture Planning Department (APD) – which is responsible for policy formulation and strategic planning in the agricultural sector – requires sensitivity on the part of both parties. The APD hosted Phase 1 of Danida’s Agriculture Sector Programme Support programme, before it was placed under the PMA Steering Committee.
2.32 The implementation of the PMA is guided by a Steering Committee (PMA SC) which has executive powers with respect to the planning and financing of PMA programmes. The PMA SC is composed of representatives of key stakeholders, including Danida. Because the number is limited to less than 30 people, a PMA Forum has been created to allow for broader participation of stakeholders in PMA matters.
2.33 Some important functions of the PMA SC are to: - Provide cross-sectoral linkages between the PMA-SC, PMA Forum and the PMA implementing ministries, institutions and agencies, especially those sectors responsible for the functional components or ‘pillars’ of the agricultural system; - Provide cross-sectoral technical and policy analysis – directly or through task groups and /or consultants – to enable the PMA-SC to make informed decisions ; - Monitor and produce performance reports on the implementation of the PMA including monitoring the utilisation of PMA non-sectoral conditional grants; - Carry out decisions of the PMA SC, follow-up and monitor implementation of the PMA - Provide secretariat services to the PMA ;
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- Liaise with donors supporting the PMA cross-sectoral programmes and projects to ensure sustainable funding and reporting on progress.
3. ODA to Ugandan agriculture: 1987–2005
Background to international assistance to agriculture 3.1 In the period under review, Danida has significantly increased its contribution to the agricultural sector in Uganda (see Table 1). This is in contrast to the global trend in aid to agriculture which has fallen dramatically during the past two decades. This fall can be partly explained by changes in policy in favour of more market-led approaches to agricultural development, partly due to the relatively greater emphasis on support to the social sectors (education and health) and in part to general budget support. Some argue that the drop in aid to agriculture could have serious consequences, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where agricultural performance desperately needs to be improved. Others believe that the volume of aid in itself is not the answer, since aid and lending programmes to agriculture and rural development have experienced persistent problems of sustainability and institutional development. They argue that the limitations of aid to agriculture should be recognised.7
3.2 The bulk of ODA to agriculture to Uganda in the period under review has come from international financial institutions, namely the World Bank, IFAD and the ADB. The ma jor bilateral donors are Danida and USAID.
Phase 1: ODA to agriculture 1987–1991 3.3 The most readily available sources of information on agricultural projects funded under the Economic Recovery Programme are the websites of the World Bank, IFAD and the African Development Bank. Data from these are tabulated in Appendix 2 to this paper. (a) Four WB-funded projects became effective during the period: - Forestry Rehabilitation - Southwest Region Agricultural Rehabilitation (jointly with IFAD) - Sugar Rehabilitation - Livestock Services (b) The ADB approved three new projects during the period: - Kakira Sugar Works - Olweny Swamp Rice Irrigation - Rural Farmers Scheme (RFS) - Seed Industry Rationalisation (c) In addition, two projects previously approved by the ADB became effective - Ranch Rehabilitation - Dairy Rehabilitation
7 In SSA, assistance to agriculture increased during the 1970s and 1980s, but declined during the 1990s. The global volume (expressed in 2002 prices) decreased from USD 6.2 billion to USD 2.3 billion between 1980 and 2002. Most of this decrease occurred during the 1990s. However, over the same period, total ODA flows increased by 65% from USD 37.1 billion in 1980 to USD 64.1 billion in 2002. Thus, while the total volume of assistance to agriculture has decreased in real terms, its share of total ODA has fallen even more, from a peak of 17% in 1982 to 3.7% of total ODA in 2002. In SSA, during this period, ODA to agriculture halved. (DFID, 2004.)
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3.4 Two of the interventions, Dairy Rehabilitation and Forestry Rehabilitation were jointly funded by Denmark and other donors. Danida also jointly funded the RFS (also known as ‘Credit for Small Farmers’) through the Uganda Commercial Bank. Only the assistance provided to the grain sector was specific to Danida.8
3.5 Information regarding the performance of the earlier generation of WB projects (1986– 2000) is not readily available. Where they were jointly financed with IFAD, then the latter’s website provides useful documentation on project evaluation. ADB has published a review of its Uganda agricultural portfolio (1974–2000) in August 2002 (African Development Bank, 2002). It concludes that, although relevant (in terms of the DAC guidelines) to Uganda’s development objectives and priorities, a large part of the portfolio performed unsatisfactorily due to inadequate preparation and appraisal and the unstable macro-economic environment and insecurity. A recurring problem was the underutilization of the refurbished capacity of state-run enterprises and the reluctance to follow through with undertakings to privatise. Danida was not the only agency experiencing difficulties persuading the government to reduce its direct role in production during this period. For the most part there is little positive evidence that ODA to the agriculture sector in Uganda during this period had any positive impact, directly or indirectly, neither intended nor unintended.
Phase 2: ODA to agricultural planning and support services 1991–1998 3.6 In the period 1991–98, Uganda’s international partners helped government to take a longer-term view of development opportunities in the agricultural sector – mainly through sub- sectoral planning – and to move to the improvement of agricultural support services in rural areas.
3.7 ADB financed the ‘Meat Production Master Plan Study’ and the ‘Fisheries Master Plan Study’, which had a parallel in the Grain Sector Study and Dairy Master Plan prepared with Danida support. The latter study led to the Dairy Development Project in which Danida gave a new lease of life to a parastatal long after it should have been privatised. In 1998, under the 7th European Development Fund (EDF), the European Commission (EC) funded a six-year regional project ‘Farming in Tsetse Controlled Areas’. This was followed by another regional project in 1999 – ‘Pan African Control for Epizootics’.
3.8 In 1996, the World Bank approved the Agricultural Sector Management Project (ASMP) (Credit 2845 UG) with the purpose of strengthening the capacity of MAAIF’s Agricultural Planning Department to formulate policy, define strategic policies and prepare a national medium term agricultural sector investment programme. However, the USD 11.8 million approved by the Bank in 1996, was cancelled one year later due to the ‘borrower’s failure to fulfil the conditions of effectiveness’ (World Bank, 2004). Elsewhere we learn that the ASMP was “shot down by Parliament” because it had been designed without the necessary consultation and donor dialogue. This played a part in Danida taking a leading rôle in the coordination of ODA to the agricultural sector (see Box 2) (World Bank, 2001).
3.9 In 1990, the World Bank funded the ‘Livestock Services Project’ to reverse the decline in livestock numbers and deal with animal disease outbreaks, as well as strengthen infrastructure and the regulatory role of the Ministry of Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAIF). IFAD under the Smallholders Cotton Rehabilitation Project were subsequently joined by the World Bank in funding the Cotton Sub-sector Deve lopment Project covering all cotton growing areas in Uganda.
8 The 1993 Evaluation of Danish Assistance to Grain Storage and Grain Drying Projects in Uganda notes that German KfW extended a loan of DM 5.5 M to PMB in 1985 for the rehabilitation of four depots (NCG, 1998a: 16).
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IFAD then moved to support the ‘Vegetable Oil Development Project’. These commodity-based loans were complemented by the World Bank’s support to the ‘Agricultural Research and Training Project’ and the ‘Agricultural Extension Project’ (1992–98). In 1992, the Royal Danish Embassy (RDE) supported the Uganda National Farmers’ Association (UNFA) as an alternative to the World Bank extension model (see Section 4).
Box 2: Danida and coordination of the donor sub-group to the agricultural sector In terms of agriculture, the Danish play the coordinating role: “We turned down the Bank.” Donor subgroups formed partly because the Bank tended to ignore other donors and “coordination” increasingly became a dialogue between the Bank and Uganda, while the other donors “picked up the scraps off the table.” The donor subgroup creates a much stronger voice to trample the Bank back into line and say, “No, you're part of the donor group here; you need to talk with us as well. We do not just get the bits of leftovers. We need to act as one unit.” This arrangement has worked relatively successfully, only because, in late 1996, the Bank was “shot down by Parliament on a large project [the Agriculture Sector Management Project, ASMP] and came into line.” That was the starting point for the dialogue between the Bank and other donors (who also had concerns about that particular agricultural project). Other donors have been accused of torpedoing the project, because we were critical. The Danish Embassy chairs the donor sector specialist meeting on agriculture. The group started just over a year ago. Two factors triggered the group meetings: problems of understanding with the Bank, which was leading initiatives that most donors did not agree with or appreciate, and initiatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, with which donors also disagreed. Donors decided to get together to assist the sector, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Bank, and the Ministry of Finance to move forward. To give the Bank their due, there was also no real coordination among any bilateral donors. Donors did not know what other donors were doing. We had to get together to share information, so that we had a common understanding of where everyone was going. The Ministry of Agriculture developed sector development plans but in virtual isolation from the donors. That resulted in an “incredibly weak” sector development plan, which neither the donors nor the Ministry of Finance could support. The donors and the ministry then became involved, and Danida and DFID are funding a project (the PMA) over 18 months, trying to help the ministry and GOU to transform the initial sector development plan into a better document.
Source: World Bank (2001) Uganda Country Assistance Evaluation, Uganda Stakeholder Voices: Perceptions of the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy.
3.10 It is apparent that during this second phase of ODA to the agricultural sector, Danida went with the flow but continued to paddle its own canoe. Danida made a significant contribution to planning in the livestock sector, but then poured funds into a dairy industry which should reasonably have been a candidate for privatisation under the Agricultural Sector Adjustment Programme. Along with other donors, Danida recognised the importance of improving advice and assistance to small farmers, but chose to go overboard with the UNFA , a model which had no parallel outside Scandinavia.
Phase 3: ODA to agriculture in the period 1999–2005 3.11 In this most recent phase, much closer alignment in support of ODA to the agricultural sector is in evidence. The National Agricultural Advisory Services Project (NAADS) funded by the World Bank and IFAD, and co–financed by the EC, Danida, DFID, Irish Aid and Netherlands is evidence of the broad consensus in support of the PMA. The EC, with Stabex funds, has provided EUR 8.3 million to NARO/NARS to spearhead the agricultural research component of the PMA. This is in addition to regional funding provided by the EC for agricultural research. In 2001, under the 8th EDF (national), the EC funded the ‘Forest Resource Management and date: November 2006 TP1 Page 11
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Conservation Programme in Uganda, and in 2003 the ‘Implementation of the Fisheries Management Plan for Lake Victoria’ under 8th EDF (regional). 3.12 Two bilateral interventions worthy of note are Danida’s own Agriculture Sector Support Programme (ASPS) and the USAID’s Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program (APEP) a 5-year project that commenced implementation in 2003. APEP aims to expand rural economic opportunities and increase household income in the agricultural sector by increasing food and cash crop productivity and marketing. USAID operates outside the government system, entirely with the private sector.
3.13 Danida, while continuing to paddle its own canoe , is very much in the mainstream with its direct and indirect support to the so-called PMA pillars and its seat on the PMA Steering Committee.
4. The rôle of Danida in support of agriculture and natural resources
4.1 Over the two decades, there have been three discernible phases of Danish cooperation with Uganda for the development of the agricultural sector: a. An initial period (1987–1990) of ad hoc interventions prior to the establishment of the RDE in Kampala: · bulk grain drying and storage; · farm forestry; · milk collection and processing and training in dairy husbandry; and · farm credit. These projects were complemented by balance of payments support to ameliorate the negative effects of structural adjustment and assist the recovery of the small farm sector. b. A longer period (1991–1998) of support to the recovery, through policy development and related investment: · provision of more dairy infrastructure (Kampala and Mbarara), but within the framework of a dairy master plan which envisaged privatisation of the Dair y Corporation. · the development of a national cattle breeding policy and the provision of support to the rehabilitation of an Animal Breeding Centre and Artificial Insemination service. · assistance to farmers’ organisations in Uganda through the establishment of an apex organisation (the Uganda National Farmers’ Association) and district associations. c. Finally the period since 1998 of greatly expanded and more comprehensive assistance under Danida’s own Agricultural Sector Programme Support (ASPS) Phase I whic h ended in 2004 and Phase II which is ongoing and within the framework of the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture.
4.2 The three phases and the related projects and programmes are listed in Table 1, together with the costs involved.
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Table 1: Principal Danida projects and programmes in the agricultural sector 1987–2005 Period Projects/Programmes File No. DKKm Total DKKm
Phase 1 1988–1991 Support to the Dairy Sector 104.Uganda.27 10.19 159.89 1987–1991 Farm Forestry Project 104.Uganda.20 51.70 1989–1990 Credit for Small Farmers 104.Uganda.31 8.00 1987–1991 Grain Drying & Storage 104.0.27.Uganda.1 90.00 Phase 2 Dairy Master Plan Study 104.Uganda.42 4.84 84.74 1991–1993 Dairy Development Project 104.Uganda.42 25.80 1994–1996 Animal Breeding Project 104.Uganda.50 12.10 1991–20039 Uganda National Farmers’ Association 104.Uganda.49 42.00 Phase 3 1998–2003 Agriculture Sector Programme Support (ASPS) I 104.Uganda.67 294.3010 294.30 1987–2003 Total support to Agriculture Phase 1–3 538.93 2004– ASPS-II (programme ongoing – budget 104.Uganda.805 292.4011 allocation)
Phase 1: Interventions under the Economic Recovery Programme 1987–1990 4.3 Twenty years on, information of these early undertakings is sketchy and our assessment of Danida’s performance must be somewhat tentative. Very few early agricultural documents were traced by the NCG pre-study. The ‘Agreed Minutes’ of the annual bilateral consultations provide an important source of information for this period, supplemented by contemporaneous reports of other donor agencies participating in the same programmes and projects (Uganda–Denmark Development Cooperation Programme: 1989–2003). Interviews with a few Danida consultants and former Ugandan officials provide another link with this period.
4.4 Denmark’s initial assistance to the Entebbe dairy school and related dairy infrastructure was not provided within the framework of a longer-term plan for the industry. This was acknowledged by the Danida Board in December 1989, when the project proposal was approved. It was seen as a foot in the door with the prospect of more worthwhile support to come to the dairy industry. An interim measure, it was linked to an existing UNDP/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) project (also supported by ADB and the World Food Programme (WFP)), to which Danida attached an adviser. What was achieved at the time in rehabilitating the
9 The budgetary allocation by the Finance Committee of the Danish Parliament to the UNFA (10 July 1998, DKK 5.9 million for 1998–2003) was subsumed under the grant for the preparation of ASPS-I. With a further ‘bridging allocation of DKK 4.9 million approved by the Board on 20 July 1998, this would have brought the total to UNFA to DKK 42.30 million. According to the Project Completion Report of ASPS-I, August 2005, Farmers Organisations received a further disbursement of DKK 73.3 million in the course of ASPS I. This would have brought the total funding of Farmers’ Organisations to DKK 94.00. This figure is closer to that mentioned in the NCG pre-study report, in which the total funds allocated to UNFA over the period covered by the review is reported as DKK 91.3 million (Table 3.4 of the Pre-Study Report) (NCG, 2006: 10). 10 MFA Danida (2005) ASPS–I Project Completion Report, which includes DKK 73.3 million to Farmers Organisations, 25% of ASPS-I costs. 11 2004 budget allocation (not included in the total support to Agriculture).
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Dairy School and the related dairy infrastructure was praised by the Uganda government representative in the annual consultations.12 Danida’s contribution is still remembered by the Dairy Board, under whose auspices Danida is once again contributing to the upgrading of the Entebbe dairy – under ASPS-II – for the purpose of leasing the dairy to the private sector.
4.5 Danida’s assistance to the multi-donor Forestry Rehabilitation Project was a brief but troubled affair. It came at a time when the Danish Parliament was keen to support environmentally sound and sustainable management of natural resources, inspired by the World Commission on Environment and Development (Adams , 1988). According to the Board Note of 19 August 1987, Danish assistance to the project was to be channelled to the World Bank which was to administer the funds. In turn, the Bank was to transfer the funds to the Ugandan Government, which was to enter into an agreement with the NGO CARE for the implementation of the programme in five districts. All purchases for the project, including the activities of CARE, were to be managed by the National Forestry Rehabilitation Programme’s central provisioning unit, but these labyrinthine arrangements never worked well. According to the World Bank, during implementation the agreements reached at appraisal regarding financing and accounting were found to be unacceptable by the Ministry (World Bank, 1995). Subsequent approval and disbursement procedures proved unworkable and a large portion of the project was eventually cancelled. These thorny issues were raised and discussed in the annual consultations between Uganda and Denmark in 1990 (Uganda–Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1989– 2003).
4.6 Danida’s records of Credit for Small Farmers funded through the Uganda Commercial Bank’s Rural Farmers’ Scheme are meagre. With the exception of the original Board Note dated 19 August 1987, which recommended that the funding be approved, no documents on this project were traced by the NCG pre-study. According to the Board Note, the intervention was to be seen as a pilot project and the subject of an end-of-year review to be undertaken by Danida. The information on the project contained in Appendix 1 to this chapter is harvested mostly from the records of the African Development Bank, which also contributed. The ADB 2002 evaluation of this and related projects found that the performance of the RFS was ‘highly unsatisfactory’ (African Development Bank, 2002: 22). The project completion report of the Danida-funded component was not traced. It is apparent, however, that the project came to a premature end. Danida undertook no more ventures of this nature in Uganda.
4.7 The NCG pre-study contains no documents on the Grain Drying and Storage Project, but important sources were traced with the assistance of Danida’s Evaluation Department acting on a lead provided by the RDE.13 In the event, and in contrast with other projects of the period, the project was found to be reasonably well documented. The project infrastructure was located at Jinja, Kawempe in the south and Kyazanga in south west Uganda. The undertaking was one of many turn-key, industrial-scale grain projects funded by Danida in developing countries between 1969 and 1992. These were coming to an end, primarily because of world-wide trends in market liberalisation, about the time when the Uganda project was being conceived (NCG, 1998a). The projects usually covered: (i) grain drying and storage on an industrial scale geared to the needs of parastatals operating at national level and (ii) turn-key drying and storage facilities as an integral part of mills. In Uganda, the Jinja and Kyazanga grain silo projects (which fell into the first category) were constructed for the Produce Marketing Board (PMB) and the Kawempe silo plant close to Kampala (which fell into the second category) was constructed for the Uganda Grain Milling Company, and where the rehabilitation of the adjacent maize mill was included in the
12 See Agreed Minutes for 1990 (Uganda–Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1989–2003). 13 Thanks to John Olweny.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources contract. The comprehensive evaluation of Danish assistance to grain storage projects commissioned by Danida in 1993 included a detailed study of these three projects (ibid.). In summary, the study findings were as follows:
4.8 The project was motivated by: - the relatively favourable conditions for grain production in Uganda; - the high potential for export to food deficit countries in the region; - the prospect of Uganda contributing to a regiona l food reserve; - a market niche for export sales to food aid programmes; - the high post-harvest losses of small farmers and limited storage of traders; - price differentials immediately after and prior to harvest.
4.9 The factors which militated against the success of the scheme were: - the abolition of the monopoly of the PMB in 1988, market liberalisation and the collapse of the PMB’s market share and the concomitant financial fallout; - problems faced by PMB in financing grain purchases; - a high level of staffing and the need to lay-off more than 50%.
4.10 Supply side problems: - the 1987 feasibility study was preoccupied with the investigation of ‘projects’ rather than the overall situation of the grain sector in the country; - inadequate consideration of alternative technical options for the Jinja plant; - the rudimentary cost-benefit analysis and over-optimistic assumptions; - questionable procedures adopted for the selection of the contractor; - inadequate construction site supervision at Jinja; - inadequate soil engineering and site investigation at Jinja ; - inappropriate bulk handling facilities for loose rather than bagged grain in the absence of suitable bulk transport (road or rail) and equipment.
4.11 The evaluation team received reports of deep-seated corruption associated with the Produce Marketing Board and World Food Programme (WFP) financial operations, which the initial feasibility studies and the 1993 evaluation by NCG did not to mention. The irregularities are reported by a key local witness to have been entrenched before the completion of the grain storage and drying facilities (see Box 3). The situation would probably have rendered Danida’s investment non–viable, even without the grave technical problems identified by the evaluation. To this day, the Jinja and the Kyazanga grain storage complexes, by far the largest Danida investment of the Economic Recovery Programme period, are seriously underutilised. The silos at Kawempe (pictured on Uganda’s one thousand shilling bank note) are now used by three private firms for maize and beans. Their main customer is the WFP.
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Box 3: Ugandan recollections of the Danida grain drying and storage projects In the late 1980s, at the time of the conception of the Danida-funded bulk grain drying and storage projects, the PMB was the main buyer of grain. Uganda bartered beans, maize and sesame for specified items (e.g. drugs and building materials). At the time, the issue of grain quality was a major concern. Earnings from ‘non-traditional export crops’ (e.g. maize, beans and sesame) were potentially a big forex earner. A modern grain drying and storage facility in Jinja linked by rail to the catchment areas therefore made a lot of sense. In 1989, at the World Bank’s bidding, the barter trade was terminated, but by then PMB was already in serious financial difficulty because it had not been fully paid by Government for the grain exported under the barter trade. Bank overdrafts at very high interest rates were taking their toll on PMB. After liberalisation, PMB lost smaller markets to private suppliers. The PMB’s principal buyer was the WFP, but it was not sufficiently stringent about the quality of grain it purchased. WFP officials were reported to have put more emphasis on their personal gains in issuing contracts than on the grain quality delivered in the region. This opened the door to private sector suppliers to supply WFP. They used more cost-effective but rudimentary methods of drying grain. Another factor was interference by PMB’s board members . Prominent politicians had an indirect hand in the grain trade by working through family members who received grain on credit. Knowing that the PMB could not put pressure on them, they failed to reimburse PMB. The management also contributed to the downfall of the Board. For example, WFP would float a tender for which PMB would prepare a bid, but the quotations would then be quietly released to competitors who would then under quote PMB, which would then supply WFP through the competitor who would fail to reimburse the PMB. The point was reached when banks would no longer provide credit and called in loans. Government lost confidence in PMB and became reluctant to meet commitments made to Danida. In the eyes of Government, the PMB had lost its reputation. Further funding was refused. PMB was beyond saving. Danida provided a financial management specialist (but there were no longer finances to manage) and a pro curement/ marketing s pecialist (when there was nothing to market). The siting of the Jinja complex in a swamp created problems . A lot of electricity was needed to operate the drying process. It never completely dried the grain, which went bad very quickly. Private suppliers came to hire the facilities, but they did not return for a second time. The general location of the Kyazanga facility was wrong. The catchment could never provide sufficient volume of produce for it to run efficiently. There was no justification for a facility of that size. The area could have been served appropriately by Nalukongo (west of Kampala) a huge central depot with five warehouses. Meanwhile the western part of the country remained without adequate facilities. Nonetheless the project continued to have political clout. It was the biggest visible investment of the regime. President Museveni brought Nelson Mandela to see the Jinja complex in 1993. The President may not have known that it was a white elephant, but the Ministry and Board of Directors certainly knew. And the staff knew.
Phase 2: Recovery through policy development and related investment 1991–1998 4.12 During this period, Danida’s principal contribution was to the livestock industry, which absorbed a total of about DKK 45.00 million (see Table 1). Danida contributed to the preparation of the Dairy Master Plan (DMP) and, as an adjunct to this, the rehabilitation of the Dairy Corporation’s Kampala Dairy Plant and the Mbarara milk collection system, and the Animal Breeding Project. Further, Danida was instrumental in providing the assistance which made possible the setting up of Farmers’ Associations in Uganda, through the establishment of an apex organisation, the Uganda National Farmers’ Association (UNFA) in Kampala .
4.13 Assistance to the Dairy Sector: By 1989 it was already clear that Danida saw a major role for itself in Uganda in rehabilitating and developing the system of milk collection from small farms for a centralised milk processing plant in the rapidly growing Capital. For this task, Danida drew on experience from home and abroad. Denmark was already giving support to the dairy industry in Uganda at the end of the 1960s, but it wanted to be assured that its assistance would be an integral part of an up-to-date plan for the industry. 14 Initially it was believed that UNDP/FAO would assist Uganda with the preparation of a plan for the sector. When this did not
14 At a meeting of the Danida Board on 11 December 1989, it was recommended that a grant of DKK 11 million should be set aside for a ‘makeshift’ rehabilitation of the dairy in Kampala and a milk collection system in Mbarara, but this was not disbursed in the absence an overall plan for the industry. See also note to the Chairman of the Danida Board, October 2, 1991 (MFA Danida, 1991a).
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4.14 The DMP was completed by a joint team of Ugandan and Danish consultants in 1993 and published in five volumes. It reviewed and analysed existing and future demand and supply and the options for the production, collection and marketing of milk and dairy products. The DMP is still well regarded within the industry as an important contribution to its sustainable growth.
4.15 The study concluded that the future dairy processing plants should be left to the private sector and that any assistance for the rehabilitation of the Kampala Dairy Plant must be the last major donor-financed project of this nature. This was reminiscent of the circumstances relating to the decision by Danida to proceed with the construction of the grain silos in 1988/89 at a time when the grain sector was being liberalised. Judging by the sequence of events, the decision to proceed with the Kampala milk project was made at least a year before the completion of the DMP, and it must be assumed that Danida believed sufficient groundwork had been done to justify the decision. 15 There can be no doubt that the Uganda Dairy Corporation was pressing for the work to start. In the annual consultations between the two governments (i.e. in April 1992), the Uganda delegation was informed that the Danish Parliament had approved the disbursement of DKK 25.8 million for the rehabilitation of the Kampala Dairy Plant and the Mbabara milk collection system which was completed to a high standard by a Danish company.16
4.16 Animal Breeding Pro ject: The project was rooted in the recommendations of the Dairy Master Plan which provided a set of policy reform proposals, one of which was concerned with the improvement of dairy cattle. However, despite its origin in the DMP and a well formulated Appraisal Report (MFA Danida, 1993b) , Danida support to the rehabilitation of the programme ran into difficulties.
4.17 Artificial insemination (AI) began in Uganda in 1960 and continued to expand up to 1974, but by 1981, AI services had come to a halt. By 1992, considerable improvements had been achieved, with some 32 sub-stations in operation and inseminations recovering to about half the 1974 level. Services were severely hampered by the lack of operational funds, despite the reality that farmers were informally paying a significant proportion of the costs. The Danida-funded project aimed to transform the Animal Breeding Centre (also known as Artificial Breeding Centre) and the sub-centres it served into an autonomous self-financing operation.
4.18 The Agreed Minutes of the annual bilateral consultations for the period 1995–98 mention serious problems with the release of counterpart funds, difficulties with project implementation, including a ban on the import of semen from Denmark (because of the outbreak of BSE in Europe) and expenditures of funds in breach of the project agreement. The project completion report (MFA Danida, 2001) described a modest impact in relation to planned project outputs. It reported attempts to grapple with cost-recovery for AI services in a pilot programme involving seven farmer-breeding associations. This provides a rare glimpse of the practical difficulties encountered in recovering the costs of service delivery from poor farmers, and questions assumptions about the capacity of small farmers’ ability to pay market-related prices.
15 A draft of the DMP was submitted to GOU in November 1992. However, already in October 1991, a note to the Chairman of the Danida Board states that ‘The dairy master plan will provide a basis for an evaluation of the need for further investments within the dairy sector for both national authorities, other donors and Danida. (MFA Danida, 1991a) 16 See agreed Minutes of 1992 (Uganda–Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1989–2003).
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4.19 Primarily as a result of the above-mentioned problems, support to this activity from Danida ceased in October 2000 under ASPS-I. The Animal Breeding Centre has been renamed the National Animal Genetic Resources Centre (NAGRC) and now receives support under the ADB Livestock Improvement Programme. Farmers still by-and-large go about animal breeding without the NAGRC. NARO and some small project initiatives manage localised breeding and distribution activities, mostly of small ruminants and poultry. Farmers do what they have always done with the resources available, trying to secure the best animals for their needs, by breeding, trade or purchase. There is still a moratorium on the import of semen from Europe. There are no national stock books, even for the most important breeds. The AI service relies on local semen production and supplies are reported to be erratic everywhere.17
4.20 Farmers’ Associations: In 1992, Danida decided to support an initiative which was expected to lead to the development of an independent, self-financing agricultural extension system as an alternative to the Training and Visit (T&V) extension model, which was being promoted by the World Bank at the time. The purpose, as expressed in the early documents of the UNFA , was to increase the welfare of members through the mutually supportive activities of an independent association. Emphasis was placed upon the objective of ‘increasing the political influence of farmers’, i.e. protecting members’ interests and giving them ‘a voice’ and an advocacy role. Yet, from the beginning, the alleged non-viability of the World Bank’s T&V model was conflated with the justification for funding the UNFA alternative.
4.21 The project document, referring to the World Bank project (Appendix 2), boldly states: The sustainability of the above mentioned Agricultural Extension Project can be questioned, as it seems unrealistic that GOU will be in a position to allocate the necessary resources after termination of the project. There is need for improved extension service if the agricultural production potential is to be fully exploited. Therefore alternative ways of providing extension service should be found, and i.a. a certain cost recovery should gradually be introduced. ………Therefore the direct participation of farmers in planning, monitoring and financing the extension service is an obvious solution. (page 43– 44)18
4.22 The request for Danida support to the UNFA states (page 46) that the ‘ultimate target beneficiaries are the farm families whose livelihoods depend upon sustainable agricultural production’, and that, by the end of the project implementation phase, a fully staffed and equipped National Secretariat for the UNFA would be established and functioning with District Coordinators operating in each District. UNFA Farmer Training Facilities would be established and functioning at rehabilitated District Farm Institutes in 5 Districts.
4.23 The UNFA Appraisal Report reproduces the text of the aforementioned project document and goes on to further question the viability of the World Bank-funded Agricultural Extension Project (AEP) (MFA Danida, 1993a : 9): The sustainability, however, of such (World Bank) projects, paying government salaries with foreign credits and continuing an extension system which clearly in the past has been a too heavy load on government finances, can be questioned.
4.24 In February 1997, some five years after the establishment of the UNFA, a second project document was prepared which recommended bridging finance until more funding for the UNFA
17 We are grateful to Warwick Thomson for this update on the current status of AI in an e-mail 26 June 2006. 18 This quote is taken from an undated and unnamed document (Agric_ProjDoc_1, 104.Uganda.49), a project formulation report, which was prepared by a team which visited Uganda in July 1992. The first 39 pages of the formulation document (also known as project document) and the title page were not reproduced in the pdf prepared by the pre-study review by NCG.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources became available from Danida under the proposed Agriculture Sector Programme Support in 1998 (MFA Danida, 1997). In motivating the case for more funds, the argument was again used that the Agricultural Extension Project supported by the World Bank was ‘very bureaucratic and the cost of running the project is the biggest impediment’ (MFA Danida, 1997: 11). It further stated that, as a result of the problems with the AEP (due to be closed on 31 December 1998) the Government supported ‘the formation of the UNFA’s demand-driven, cost-recovery agricultural advisory service’, because the organisation already had ‘offices and a district coordinator in 33 districts and demand-driven, cost-recovery agricultural advisory services in nine of these’.
4.25 The apex organisation and the constituent district farmers’ associations ha d relied heavily on Danida from the outset. Less than 10% of the budget ha d come from fees. Farmers associations in a small number of districts with strong leadership, good communications infrastructure and favourable farming conditions may have been able to break even, but in most districts in the north and east of the country, there was little prospect of associations surviving without core funding.
4.26 The situation was made more difficult as the leaders of the UNFA used the organisation as a vehicle for promoting their own political ambitions. Even if this was consistent with the activities of a national agricultural union, it was unacceptable for a bilateral aid agency to fund an organisation involved in national politics. With encouragement from the RDE, restructuring took place in 1997 with district branches of the UNFA becoming independent NGOs under the Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFFE) umbrella.
4.27 Further changes were necessary because the top-down UNFA model tended to assume that farming was the business of farmers and their wives, rather than farmers and their husbands. The question also arose as to whether the project attracted only the better-off farmers. The project activities had therefore to be updated to take proper account of the cross-cutting issues – poverty reduction, gender equality, environmental concerns, human rights and democracy and so on. The last issue was used by the supporters of UNFA/UNFFE as a further justification for Danida’s continuing support. These complexities have increasingly placed at risk the funding of the project. Under ASPS-I, a determined effort was made to down-size the UNFA and channel correspondingly more resources to the district-level farmers’ associations (COWI, 2000). The process has continued under ASPS-II.
Phase 3: Danida’s Agriculture Sector Programme Support 1998–2004 4.28 In line with the PEAP, first launched in 1997, the ASPS was designed with the overall objective of poverty alleviation in rural Uganda, taking into account the role and functions of the agricultural sector and the need to provide strategic support (MFA Danida, 1998a, 1998b). For ASPS-I, Danida decided that its strategic focus should be the development of human resources and institutional capacity. ASPS-I comprised seven principal components: · Support to MAAIF’s rôle of policy formulation, technical guidance and regulation; · Agricultural Training and Education; · District Agricultural Training and Information Centres; · Livestock Systems Research; · Farmers’ Organisations; · Household Agricultural Support Programme; · Rural Financial Services.
4.29 The ASPS-I was funded only by Danida and not as a SWAp or basket funding mechanism to which other donors contributed. Nonetheless, ASPS-I represented a serious effort to integrate date: November 2006 TP1 Page 19
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Danida’s agricultural assistance under a single Project Coordination Unit (PCU) (also known as Project Support Unit ) in MAAIF to seek complementarities between the various programme components. When planning the ASPS-I, there was no overall agricultural sector strategy in place for Uganda, but the PMA was under preparation and Danida was participating in the planning process. Following the establishment of the PMA as a multi-sectoral agenda, the PCU moved from the MAAIF to the PMA , the Steering Committee of which is chaired by MFPED.19 The Danida Senior Technical Adviser leading ASPS then reported to the Director of the PMA Secretariat.
4.30 In planning the transition from separate projects to a sector programme, some pre-existing activities and modes of finance had to be carried over. Danida made a fresh start with five programme components out of seven. An external task group (MFA Danida, 2000) was funded to monitor performance and to ensure that pro-poor, gender-sensitive and participatory criteria received attention. A serious effort was made to anticipate the problems and constraints likely to be attached to each sub-programme. Hence the detailed analysis in each of the component descriptions accompanying the main project document.20 The project documents clearly spelled out the objectives of each component.
4.31 The management of the project cycle also changed with the adoption of a more incremental approach to joint appraisal, better suited to the management of ASPS while it was going through a transitional phase. The change involved more emphasis on reaching agreement on the results of a joint annual appraisal and less on unilateral pre-appraisal by Danida. This provided scope for adjustment of the content of sub-programmes in line with new circumstances. Suc h adjustments were taken into account and incorporated in annual work plans and budgets.
4.32 Support to MAAIF: The objective of this component was to help the Ministry to review its responsibilities in the light of the PMA, government decentralisation and market liberalisation. The PCR notes that attempts to help the MAAIF to redefine its rôle were frustrated as the Ministry neither approved the reforms nor went ahead with their implementation. The PCR states: These slow rates of public reform and legislative process influenced the choices made on resource allocations to MAAIF in ASPS II. (MFA Danida and GOU, 2005: 5) The ASPS-II has included a provision to support the reform process in the MAAIF, which is conditional on evidence of the Ministry’s transformation having started.
4.33 Livestock Systems Research Programme : The objective of the LSRP was to develop animal husbandry technology through farming systems research; to develop a critical mass of scie ntists and technicians in livestock systems research; and to strengthen research management and technology transfer processes. As evidenced by the PCR and information gathered by the evaluation team, the LSRP achieved its objectives. Fittingly, this happy story begins in 1987 and continues in the same vein to the present. (See Box 4). The LSRP pioneered processes in which farmers had an important rôle in determining the research agenda. The success of this approach is reported to have contributed to the re-orientation of agricultural research in Uganda and the subsequent NARS reforms. Under the LSRP, the required professional skills for livestock systems research were developed in cooperation with the Danish Institute of Agricultural Sciences. In addition, the LSRP has helped in equipping laboratories which are essential for the analyses used in the conduct of the research.
19 The PCU was located in a separate building (Agribusiness House) above the USAID Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program headquarters. This resulted in more autonomy for the ASPS, but the new arrangement did ‘need some selling to the Danida Board’. MAAIF authorities programme are still unhappy with the move. 20 See Appendix 1, Project Summaries, ASPS-I.
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Box 4: An insider’s view of LSRP I returned to Uganda in 1987 after completing my PhD and was posted to Namulonge Agricultural and Animal Production Institute. It had gone back to bush in the course of the war. USAID tried to rehabilitate it. Work started on food crops (maize, soya beans, sunflower) and on cassava and other root crops. It also had responsibility for an Animal Breeding Centre, forage, feed resources and general animal management. At that time, the institute was still under the Ministry of Agriculture. We had a herd of six cattle. Some work was being done on seed multiplication for smallholder dairy development. The challenge was to chart the direction of animal research, to source funds and develop the necessary human resources. At that stage, Namulonge had one laboratory technician, a handful of certificate people, a few BSc and only one PhD. I attended a course at ISNAR [International Service for National Agricultural Research], split between the Netherlands and Tanzania. I was introduced to a systems -wide approach to animal research which took a ‘whole-farm view’ and embraced the practical production and marketing problems faced by farmers. It changed my mindset. When I returned, however, the approach did not catch on. Selling the idea was difficult. When NARO was established as a semi-autonomous agricultural research organisation in 1992, crops received priority and livestock were relatively neglected. A World Bank review concluded that the national research programme was too production oriented and uncoordinated and that it was necessary to adopt a systems - approach. These recommendations were reinforced by the findings of a visiting Danida team appraising support for agricultural research under NARO. Their proposals landed in my lap. A task force was constituted, chaired by a veterinarian with me as the secretary. Danida provided a preparation facility. We brought in all actors in livestock research in Uganda: four NARO institutes (three involved in livestock research and one in natural resources), and Makerere University. Namulonge was responsible for coordinating the programme. Research issues were divided into thematic areas (dairy, poultry, goats, pastures and natural resource management) and decentralised to institutes and the University. Needs assessment sessions were held with farmers. There were two years of farmer consultations involving scientists and extension people. By 2001, researchers were deployed and commenced implementation of our programme. Under ASPS I and II, Danida have been supportive throughout. The time allocated to the systematic preparation of the research was well worth it. We were able to distil what we wanted. We identified problems for which there were already solutions (e.g. with Newcastle’s disease, the solution was vaccination, but farmers were not using the vaccine. How could we get vaccine to the farmers?). There were other problems, for which solutions had been identified, but not yet verified (e.g. for dry -season forage – which forage types and species suited the local ecology, land use and were socially acceptable?) Over this period, high priority was given to training the future research team. Doctoral and masters students identified their research topics in consultation with farmers. We now have 12 PhDs and 7 Masters. There were significant benefits working with Danida. Denmark’s commitment to our programme was outstanding. The ASPS management and the RDE were accessible to us throughout. Compare the World Bank which is distant, negatively bureaucratic, and introduces discontinuities. With Danida, our budget is already agreed with government. It is known and administered on a timely basis with prompt disbursement by the PCU to our own bank account. Guidelines are clear and help is at hand when problems are encountered. This is not a pot of money controlled by government. The bureaucracy can be insensitive to what researchers need. The prospect of switching to the NARS’s competitive basket-funding mechanism has been of some concern in NARO. Under ASPS II, we have tried to anticipate the problems. We believe we are ahead of other programmes. We have planned our research under ASPS-II so that, by 2007, we shall have completed our ongoing work. We are piloting the competitive grant scheme. Under ASPS-I and II, we have developed our capacity. We are writing proposals for grants and winning funds from other sources. We are competing successfully in the East African region for ASARECA [Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa] funds. Without Danida we would not have a coherent and successful livestock research programme. With their support we have developed our capacity and have good infrastructure. We maintain close links with Danish research institutions and, as partners, we jointly bid for funds.
4.34 Farmers’ Organisations : Under ASPS-I, the objective of the component was to increase farmers’ income and welfare through assistance to district-level farmers’ organisations. In addition to the associations which were originally set up under UNFA, a number of commodity
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources associations were also assisted ‘to enable them to deliver efficient extension, training and sometimes input and output marketing services to their members’ (MFA Danida and GOU, 2005). This may account for the very high additional expenditure of this component under ASPS- I (see footnote to this component under Table 1). Individual DFAs were helped to commercialise their operations by creating a business wing (e.g. by opening agricultural-input stores and pooling members’ produce for marketing). For this change, they required legal assistance from the programme.
4.35 The UNFFE and district-level farmers’ organisations continued to receive funds under ASPS-I. According to the PCR (ibid. : 23), this component absorbed DKK 73.3 million, 25% of the ASPS-1 budget of DKK 294.3 million. Funds were channelled through the UNFFE (formerly UNFA), but Danida was clearly increasingly disenchanted with the arrangement: No appreciable progress was made in seeing UNFFE develop as an organisation that could truly …represent the nation’s farmers in the national agricultural lobby. Instead UNFFE remains to a large extent a mouthpiece for nation’s leadership. Support to the UNFFE in the ASPS-II will be against a programme of agreed upon deliverables ………and not as “core” funding to the institution” (ibid.: 8)
4.36 Household Agricultural Support Programme : The objective was to raise the income of poor farmers and households. HASP was piloted in five of a planne d six districts (i.e. one third of the sub-counties in the districts of Kabarole, Rakai, Masaka, Pallisa and Tororo) with a view to targeting the poorer sections of the community through capacity development and the use of participatory methods. These districts were the focus of an independent poverty and gender monitoring study (see Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring). At the same time, the programme sought to develop the capacity of local government structures to respond to their needs and test and demonstrate emerging policies relating to the liberalisation and privatisation of agricultural support services by working with so-called ‘common interest groups’, which numbered over a thousand on completion of the programme.
4.37 Because this component was located in poor districts and/ or worked with poor farmers, especially female -headed households, it was taking into account the ‘spatial dimension’ of poverty, highlighted in the Roskilde meeting. The performance of HASP was rated as ‘satisfactory’ in the PCR. A sample of perceptions of HASP collected by the evaluation team, but by no means a statistically balanced one, collected in the course of our evaluation, is provided in Box 5.
4.38 Agricultural Training and Education: The objective was to support the provision of agricultural training for present and future smallholder farmers. ASPS-I assisted the Ministry of Education to review and revise the content of the certificate and diploma courses for agricultural students, taking account of an assessment of the needs of the market. At the same time, the ASPS assisted the Ministry to partially rehabilitate two agricultural colleges – Bukalasa and Arapai. The programme ended before the necessary restructuring of staff and management of Agricultural Colleges was undertaken.
4.39 For primary education, the programme supported the review and development of the Primary Agriculture Syllabus (PAS) which was approved and launched in primary schools in January 2002. The PAS has a vocational focus and also lays emphasis on acquisition of agri- business skills that have hitherto been lacking. The PCR reports that this enabled the Ministry to harmonise the new syllabus and curriculum with that of Primary Teachers’ Colleges and to produce teachers that can take forward the teaching of agriculture as a technical subject in primary schools. As a first step in popularising the new syllabus, 375 primary schools in six districts successfully established agricultural clubs and school gardens. At the same time , a
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources partnership between the ASPS, Ministry of Education and the ‘Straight Talk Foundation’ established ‘Farm Talk ’, a quarterly newspaper distributed to all primary schools in Uganda.
Box 5: Five perceptions of HASP A District NAADS Coordinator “HASP was a Danida programme, it was limited in extent and spread over 5– 6 districts. To a great extent it was successful and popular with farmers. It started in a small way and made good use of the resources available. It improved the capacity of extension staff to deliver services to community- based, farmers’ groups, mostly poor households, and in turn improved the capacity of farmers (women as well as men) in production and marketing. It was a demand-driven process; the number of groups increased significantly by the time I left. Former HASP groups are now under NAADS, indeed NAADS swallowed them when it was given the mandate to run the extension service.” A District Production Officer “The Household Agricultural Support Programme, a component of ASPS-I, was a source of innovations. More recently groups are writing applications for grants to NAADS. Under HASP, grants were provided to farmers’ groups so that they would make good use of the seed capital and go on to borrow and invest. Although 75% made good use of their HASP grants, very few have sought loans for further investment in agriculture. Why? Because bank charges are wild!” A MAAIF Planner “The HASP was very successful. It was limited in coverage, but this meant that we could see what was being done. ……Government was aware of what was taking place. The policy was provided by the sector. Technical Assistance worked with government.” A former ASPS-I TA “MLG implemented HASP as one of the ways of trail blazing PMA-related activities. HASP was a popular programme, limited to one third of the sub-counties in five districts (Kabarole, Rakai, Masaka, Pallisa and Tororo). It was very important for the sub-counties to have something to show. Over 200 Common Interest Groups (CIGs) were formed, but HASP was killed in its infancy and not followed up in ASPS II. It was felt not to be consistent with the private, service-provider advisory system of the PMA. We cannot expect from farmers in Uganda what we expect from farmers in Denmark. MLG has recently commissioned a study of the HASP initiative.” An ASPS-II Manager Indeed, HASP taught a lot of lessons and made some excellent achievements. But it was also a very expensive project (per unit), running in parallel to government programmes and within the government institutions and often duplicating their work. Prospects for sustainability were nil.
4.40 In an attempt to add substance to the PMA’s agricultural education pillar, a process to develop an agricultural education policy and strategy was initiated by the Ministry with support from the ASPS-I. At the close of the programme a draft policy and strategy document had been completed, but the PCR notes that discussions between the ASPS and the Ministry on the integration of the strategy into the Education Sector Investment Programme had not been successful. The PCR rated the ‘achievement of objectives as less than satisfactory’ (MFA Danida and GOU, 2005).
4.41 District Agricultural Training and Information Centres: The objective was to establish DATICs in the five ASPS pilot districts ‘as well functioning, autonomous, and financially self sustaining district based institutions that carry out activities demanded by the agricultural sector’ (ibid.). Three former District Farm Institutes were rehabilitated and two new complexes were constructed. They were equipped to enable them to function as training centres and commercial farms. The PCR was optimistic of the outcome and rated the initiative as ‘satisfactory’, but by 2006 their future was in doubt as ‘self-sustaining district-based institutions’ (see below, under ASPS-II).
4.42 Rural Financial Services: The objective of this component was to improve equitable access of the economically active rural poor to financial services in a gender sensitive manner. The RFS was the last component of the ASPS to be formulated and the least successful, in reaching poor farmers. A fresh start was made to add substance to the rural financial pillar of the PMA, the Micro-finance Outreach Plan (MOP) the implementation of which started in FY date: November 2006 TP1 Page 23
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2002/2003. The MOP has a vision of supporting the expansion of microfinance into rural areas, this being seen as one of the most important tools for the modernisation of agriculture. The ASPS supported the start-up of this programme, enabling 6 established micro-finance institutions to expand their activities to reach about 7,000 rural clients (72% of whom are women) in the 2003/2004 financial year, covering all the 6 ASPS pilot districts. The PCR was not optimistic about the viability of the future of microfinance for smallholder agricultural production. Microfinance institutions were reluctant to finance agricultural activities due to natural hazards and unstable farm prices and the high interest rates needed to obtain a viable return. The microfinance industry best services petty trade, processing and other actors along the value chain. The PCR noted that poor farmers would be best served by the establishment of small savings and credit societies that primarily mobilise and manage their own resources (ibid.).
From ASPS- I to II: 2004 to present 4.43 These comments on the evolution of ASPS and the lessons which continue to be learnt are not meant to be a full description of the current programme. In any case, it is too soon to pass judgement. Our evaluation of Danida’s twenty-year Uganda programme has allowed only broad conclusions to be arrived at from a distance and with considerable hindsight. Nonetheless, it is apparent that important lessons are being learned and progress being made (see Section 5).
4.44 In June 2003, the RDE drafted a concept note (Royal Danish Embassy, Uganda, 2003) which summarised the changes needed in the transition from phase one to two. ASPS-II was to have a much tighter focus with four (as compared to the previous seven) components, viz. · National Reform Process; · Agricultural Research; · Advisory Services; and · Agri-business Development.
4.45 The last mentioned was a new departure. RDE stated that if ‘subsistence’ farmers were to be helped to move to production for the market, then public -private sector linkages and partnerships had to be strengthened. At the same time, a clear delineation between public and private sector rôles had to be maintained. Further, the transition to market production required significant improvements in technology and therefore a continuing input of technical assistance. Farm credit should be brought under agri-business development and be integrated with broader support for enterprise development. The advisory services provided by farmers’ organisations were also to be strengthened and incorporated under the agri-business component.
4.46 The RDE concept paper identified activities which were to be discontinued; e.g. vocational training for agriculture would be supported through specialised institutions rather than through the schools system. Methodologies developed under HASP would be integrated with NAADS and the government’s decentralised planning and budgeting processes. The performance of HASP was rated as ‘satisfactory’ in the project completion report of ASPS-I, but HASP was judged to be incompatible with the PMA principle of private service-delivery. It was reported to the evaluation team that the useful experience gained by HASP and the staff involved in working with poor farmers continues to feed into the current programme under ASPS-II and into NAADS.
4.47 Unallocated ASPS-II funds were to be spent on assisting the Northern Districts, in the event of the armed conflict being resolved. At the start of ASPS-II in July 2004, the programme scope as it appeared in the Programme Document (MFA Danida and MFPED, 2004) was basically as set out in the RDE concept note of June 2003. As anticipated, the work of ASPS-II in the core agricultural areas of the country was complemented in May 2005 by a plan for the
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources transition from relief to development support in the Northern districts (MFA Danida and MFPED, 2005).
4.48 Under ASPS-II, Danida is still ‘going it alone’, but it is reported that this may change as other bilateral donors (DFID and Netherlands) have expressed interest in contributing to the programme. A portion of the ASPS-II budget is allocated to NAADS and NARS through a basket-fund mode of disbursement. Funds are also channelled to the districts and sub-counties by way of the PMA Non-Sectoral Conditional Grant. These contributions to basket funds continue to provide Danida with its seat on the PMA Steering Committee. Other activities are directly funded and managed by ASPS-II partners (e.g. the Small Business Development Center component), subject to RDE guidelines. The remainder of the budget is handled by the appointed sub- programme managers. In this way, ASPS-II has a foot in the public sector and another in the small-scale private sector. This is in contrast to USAID’s Agricultural Productivity Enhancement Program (APEP), which is exclusively based in the private sector and tends to work with larger commercial entities; or to DFID’s assistance which is through direct budget support.
4.49 The situation regarding UNFFE and DFAs, discussed in ¶4.20–4.27, remains a cause for concern for management. Under ASPS-II, the Agri-business Development Component (ABDC) is continuing with its efforts to wean the 45 DFAs from dependence on Danida core funding. The DFAs are being encouraged to support themselves through the generation of proposals and service contracts that will benefit farmers’ association members and will be funded by ABDC ‘challenge funds’ and/ or NAADS. Help is provided to the DFAs by ABDC to prepare business plans. However, these arrangements are reported not to be working well in the poorer districts of Uganda and there is concern that a decade of investment in farmers’ organisations could end in tears.
4.50 DATICs are also a source of concern. ASPS-II is responsible for five of these institutions. Three were former District Farm Institutes; another two were built from scratch by Danida under ASPS-I. Until 2000, ASPS-I paid only a handful of the staff, but ASPS-II now carries the full burden of responsibility for them. Danida is trying to find solutions to enable the DATICs to become self-financing. They are being encouraged to use their land to raise revenue, but four out of five have failed to cover the cost of inputs. One-year certificate courses are provided for some thirty students per year, per DATIC to enable them to become self -supporting. A good percentage of the young graduates are able to apply what they have learnt, but they do not have access to agricultural inputs or sufficient land to enter into farm production on their own. A handful has obtained employment with other producers. The average cost of a one-year course is estimated at USD 500.00 per student. Some NGOs have sponsored students, but not enough to provide sufficient income to the DATICs. Certificates obtained at the DATICs do not fit within the national hierarchy of qualifications. DATICs have no anchor in the government structure because the MoE is not geared to non-formal adult training. This experiment seems to have come to the end of the road, unless there is a preparedness on the part of Government to maintain a policy of subsidised vocational training and provide for accreditation.
4.51 Although still at an early stage, the Agri-business Development Component of ASPS-II is the subject of considerable optimism. Its implementation is subcontracted to a Scandinavian company. Its activities include: · Introduc ing producers (individuals or groups) to market outlets · Helping to solve technical marketing problems (e.g. quality control, seed certification, meat inspection) faced by exporters · Sorting out technical problems in the dairy industry · Introducing potential bulk buyers to farmers’ organisations (e.g. sunflower seed). date: November 2006 TP1 Page 25
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4.52 These might involve simply providing information or bringing in a consultant with the required expert knowledge. The programme is particularly interested in developing well-tried and tested appr oaches to contract farming (or out-grower schemes) involving the supply of inputs and provision of technical advice by the potential buyer (company or farmers’ organisation) linked to a guaranteed purchase price for a quality product, e.g. sunflower seed for the Uganda cooking oil market. Milk collection is another example. Cheese making linked to milk collection was important because ‘it gives the farmer a little bit of money everyday’. Farmers’ organisations can help by reducing the transaction costs for the buyer.
5. Cross cutting issues and overall assessment
5.1 Cross-cutting issues include: gender, environment, participation and HIV/AIDS. In the following paragraphs, performance in addressing these issues is assessed in the context of agriculture, but first a general observation is made regarding adherence to policy goals regarding poverty alleviation.
Adherence to policy goals concerning poverty 5.2 Not until the publication of the PEAP in 1997 did Danida’s support to the agricultural sector receive a strong and explicit poverty reduction focus. However, the alleviation of rural poverty was high on Danida’s agenda in the first phase of assistance in the period 1987–90. Examples of projects which were conceived and planned with poverty alleviation in mind were the Support to the Dairy Sector and milk collection schemes, the Farm Forestry Project and Credit for Small Farmers.
5.3 In the period 1991–98, there was less explicit attention to poverty alleviation. The project documents for the Dairy Market P lan and the Dairy Development Project made only brief reference to the importance of the dairy industry for ‘agricultural growth and poverty alleviation’. Likewise, in the initial 1993 UNFA project document and appraisal report there are no specific references to the contribution of the project to poverty alleviation. In 1997, a second project document was drafted to motivate funds for a ten-month bridging period, until ASPS-I came on stream. At that juncture, with the imminent publication of the PEAP, the UNFA assumed a modest poverty-alleviation objective, namely ‘the improved livelihood of Uganda’s farmers’, but the scope of the programme was not significantly change d.
5.4 As stated above, the ASPS-I was designed in 1998 fully taking into account poverty issues raised in the PEAP and with the specific objective of poverty alleviation. Each of the components, were conceived, planned and implemented accordingly. The HASP directed a major effort towards assisting resource poor households, including female -headed households (most vulnerable to food insecurity), women’s groups and youth groups, to achieve increased food security and/or increased incomes from sales of produce. The District Poverty Profiles aimed to determine whether a link could be detected between programme activities and poverty trends.
5.5 Under ASPS-II, with the assistance being provided to the recovery of the war-torn northern districts, the poverty reduction element is still strong, but the emphasis on poverty reduction is not so prominent. The scope of the components has narrowed and there is less opportunity for direct involvement with poor farmers now that support to NAADS is via basket- funding. By its nature, the agri-business component is likely to pay less attention to poor households than HASP.
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Gender 5.6 Similar observations can be made about gender equity as a cross-cutting issue. In the first four-year phase of development assistance to the agricultural sector, 1987–90, there appears to have been greater awareness of the gender issue than in the subsequent phase. However, by the third phase, beginning with ASPS-I in 1998, gender became the subject of special attention in planning and implementation. For example, the LSRP-I project document committed the livestock research programme to conducting preliminary socio-economic research to ensure that recommendations did not lead to gender bia sed outcomes (e.g. detracting from women’s traditional share of the benefits from livestock husbandry, or depriving dependants of livestock products). The HASP component was explicitly designed to be gender sensitive , as was the rural credit programme, alt hough the former was more successful when it came to implementation. The UNFA project document component contained a 3-page annex on ‘gender policy’, but with the emphasis on ‘gender equality’ rather than ‘gender equity’. It was not ‘mainstreamed’ as was the case with the other components. Under ASPS-II, a renewed commitment has been made to gender awareness, which has been mainstreamed into the programme. For example, in the case of the ABDC component, diagnostic surveys of proposed interventions routinely examine possible gender implications.
Participation 5.7 Along with the concern for poverty alleviation and gender awareness, comes sensitivity to the importance of involving local people in the planning and the implementation of the actions necessary to meet their needs. Again, there is little evidence of this issue receiving attention until the mid-nineties, perhaps because the nature of the projects undertaken did not lend themselves to the adoption of a participatory approach. However, once participatory methods were endorsed by the PEAP in 1997, and the nature of development assistance to the sector changed, then a participatory approach was adopted under ASPS-I. The Livestock Systems Research Programme (see Box 4) provides a good example of the benefits of this approach. HASP provides another.
HIV/AIDS 5.8 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS notes that, in line with Danida policy, the issue was mainstreamed within the agriculture programme. There was no separate programme component as such, but some 4 per cent of expenditure was set aside to HIV/AIDS prevention. Under ASPS-II, the ABDC component that works with farmers organisations throughout Uganda has the greatest outreach and has been used as a vehicle for the distribution of condoms.
Environment 5.9 As noted in Thematic Paper 12: Environment, the environmental impact of Danida’s development cooperation can be viewed from two standpoints: a) the significance of projects and programmes which aimed directly to contribute to the sustainable use and conservation of Uganda’s natural resources; and b) the indirect environmental consequences of projects and programmes funded by Danida. With regard to the first standpoint, with the exception of an early contribution to farm forestry in 1988, as part of the multi-donor Forestry Rehabilitation Project, the issue of environmentally sound and sustainable management of natural resources has been absent from Danida’s portfolio. The issue has not been neglected by other donors and since the mid-nineties both multilateral and bilateral funding has been received for natural resource conservation, namely from the World Bank, ADB, EC and Sida.
5.10 With regard to the second standpoint, concern for the environment – like the advancement of women – should not be a subject for separate consideration, but should be an integral part of the development process. This policy is based on the appreciation of the close relation between development and environmental issues. For example, the removal of vegetation and the date: November 2006 TP1 Page 27
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources degradation of soils, among other practices, arise in the context of underdevelopment and with an immediate impact on future economic prospects. Like so many problems of underdevelopment, it is cyclical. Rising poverty both causes and results from environmental problems ; it increases the pressure on natural resources as more people are forced to rely directly upon them. Environmental degradation will not be halted by miscellaneous ‘environmental projects’ (e.g. tree planting, terracing of fields, closing the range to livestock). This would be merely treating the symptoms, rather than the underlying disease which is that poverty is caused by problems with food production, rising population, a resource base declining in both relative and real terms, and a world economic order which continues to reinforce these trends (Adams, 1988).
5.11 The principal focus of Danida’s assistance to the agricultural sector under the guidelines of PEAP and the PMA is and should remain poverty alleviation. Provided this objective is realised, Danida’s assistance should result in more sustainable use of natural resources. At the same time, it is important that the direct impact of the various components of ASPS do not have negative consequences. The evaluation team has been assured that diagnostic surveys routinely examine the environmental implications of interventions. However, a more pro-active ‘strategic environmental assessment’ of the programme should have been undertaken. The lack of attention to environmental issues of the PMA was a major issue raised by the recent PMA evaluation: 8. Environment issues are not being effectively addressed as a cross-cutting issue, particularly by NAADS. This should be addressed as part of a broader review of enterprise provision under NAADS. (Oxford Policy Management, 2005: v)
5.12 The ASPS-II management recognises that with a modest investment, more could be done to make the programme ‘carbon neutral’ and respond to climate change. “The shifting of focus on which crops receive most extension and research effort is one thing that could be done at short notice. The ASPS has a pearl millet initiative, which is seeking to meet the needs of the semi-arid areas and responds to this kind of call and is fortunately picking up interest.”21
Assessment of Danida contribution to the agriculture sector (1987–2004) 5.13 Phase 1 (1987–90): With the exception of the initial support to the dairy industry, it is evident that Danida’s contribution to the agricultural sector in the period was not effective. The difficulty of managing the programme from the RDE in Nairobi was probably a contributory factor. The Forestry Rehabilitation Project and the Rural Farmers’ Scheme (RFS) were linked to the ongoing activities of the ADB and the WB which were both facing problems of operating in Uganda. At the same time, the government service was still very weak. There are references in the Danida documents to a lack of serious participation by government agencies over this period. Keeping activities going in Uganda in the late 1980s without an embassy was clearly very challenging. The available sources suggest that Danida’s early development assistance to Uganda had little if any positive impact on Uganda’s economic recovery. Three of the four projects scored very poorly in terms of the DAC evaluation criteria, namely: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability.
5.14 In this period, most of the ODA to the agricultural sector in Uganda went to ‘rehabilitation’, often of parastatal enterprises. The overhaul of decentralised support services to rural areas, recommended in the 1985 Roskilde meeting, was not in evidence. Decentralised
21 Comment by Warwick Thomson on an earlier draft of this report.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources support to rural recovery may not have been feasible until the basic ele ments of a government administration had been re-established. However, the prevailing notion among donors that direct investment in government parastatals would be a fast track to economic recovery was clearly mistaken.
5.15 Denmark’s assistance to the grain storage and drying infrastructure absorbed 56% of the agriculture sector budget during this phase. The comprehensive evaluation of worldwide assistance to grain storage projects commissioned by Danida in 1993 revealed many of the supply-side problems common to Danish support to grain marketing parastatals at a time of rapid market liberalisation, including those in Uganda. Being close to the event, the 1993 evaluation did not reveal the depth of corruption dragging down the Produce Marketing Board at the time, which has been unearthed by the evaluation team twenty years later. Nonetheless, the general level of corruption associated with state marketing boards was sufficiently well understood by donors in the mid nineties when the PMB was wound up as part of the ASAP.
5.16 Phase 2 (1991–1998): Danida’s assistance to the agricultural sector in the period 1991– 98 focused on the development of the livestock sub-sector and farmers’ associations under the UNFA. Again, it is evident that the four projects funded by Danida over this period scored very poorly in terms of the DAC evaluation criteria .
5.17 With regard to the assistance to the livestock sector , it is apparent that what started as a well planned and professional study of the dairy sector was overtaken by another instance of Danida investment in a parastatal, before the Dairy Master Plan was completed in 1993. The balance of evidence is that the funding of the rehabilitation of the Kampala Dairy Plant and the Mbarara milk collection system was driven by political and financial considerations. The grant, strongly backed by Uganda’s Dairy Corporation, was made despite the fact that the Danish Parliament was informed that there was no certainty that the Corporation would be privatised. The decision to proceed was swayed by the assurance that the investment would be good for bilateral relations and would generate substantial return flows.
5.18 The grant was to be made to the Uganda Government for on-lending to the Dairy Corporation at commercial rates (Finance Committee, Danish Parliament, 1992). Reportedly, not all the funds were on-lent. A sum was transferred to the Dairy Corporation in the form of a conditional grant. This aspect remains a source of contention between the two governments. At the root of the dispute is an understanding reached in 1993 that a significant part of Denmark’s financial contribution to the rehabilitation of the Kampala Dairy and the milk collection system, would be ‘redistributed’ to small-scale milk producers as share equity at the time of privatisation, or else returned to Danida. Some fifteen years later, the Dairy Corporation has yet to be privatized. 22 The long delay in the restructuring of the parastatal has spoiled the prospects for the meaningful involvement of smallholder milk producers in the privatization of the industry. It has resulted in the run-down of the collection, cooling and transportation network that Danida and other donors helped to rehabilitate.
5.19 Slow but substantial progress has nonetheless been achieved in the dairy industry as a whole. The formal milk market was eventually liberalized in 1994. Since then, more private traders have entered the market supplying up to 80% of the processed and packaged milk, leaving
22 According to the New Vision on 25 May 2006, the Cabinet approved the lease of the Uganda Dairy Corporation to Sameer Agriculture and Livestock, a local company. Although the government had signed a MOU, the Dairy Board was still hesitant to sign the lease agreement, saying the company was not locally registered. In 2005 the Government halted another lease agreement after irregularities were discovered in a draft agreement that was to be signed between the Dairy Corporation and Pan African Foods, a local company, instead of Malee, a Thai firm.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources about 20% to be processed and packaged before marketing. Eight modern processing companies are now operational, compared to the single state-controlled Dairy Corporation in 1994. More and more small producers are benefiting from a steady income from milk production, made possible by the growing collection network and milk coolers introduced by Denmark. The successful emergence of private-sector dairies has also been greatly facilitated by Danida’s support to private business development.23 The Dairy Industry Act of 1998 established the Dairy Development Authority as a corporate entity and national regulatory body under MAAIF. Indirectly then, Danida’s assistance to the dairy sub-sector seems to have contributed some elements of sustainability to the industry.
5.20 Another important Danish intervention of the time, the establishment of the UNFA, deserves attention in this evaluation because of the high costs involved (over DKK 90 million) , because it continues to be a headache and because it has had policy repercussions , which ten years later are attributable to Danida.
5.21 It is now generally acknowledged by Danida’s agricultural advisers and programme personnel in Uganda that the optimism with which the UNFA was promoted as an ‘alternative extension service’ in the early 1990s was improvident. Since its inception, the financial viability of the farmers’ associations has remained a major issue, just as it has been with the World Bank’s T&V extension model which the associations were meant to replace. The district farmers associations under the UNFA were expected to survive by recovering the costs of the services they offered, but it was difficult to recover costs from poor members, especially when they were still able to receive free services from a government extension service running in parallel and, in places, from donor-funded NGOs. These difficulties were also experienced by the Animal Breeding Project, also funded by Danida in the same period. It is clear that the expectation that the UNFA would be able to charge for services was unrealistic while other services were not privatised. Even if they had been privatised, it is very doubtful that the majority of farmers would have been able to afford the costs involved.
5.22 So what drove the project in the first place? The early UNFA documents state that the proposal to set up the organisation originated from model farmers from districts all over Uganda who won the 1st and 2nd position in an annual competition and went on international study tours (including a trip to Denmark). They developed their constitution and recruited members and then looked for sponsors after a 3-day meeting in Mukono District near Kampala in January 1992. 24 However, it is evident that the idea of using the UNFA as a vehicle for launching a new type of extension service came from Danida’s consultants, probably those close to the cooperative sector in Denmark. That is the recollection of the authorities in the RDE at the time which approved the interim funding of the UNFA to keep the pot on the boil while longer-term funding could be mobilised. By March 1992 the UNFA had an agreement in principle for financial assistance from Danida. One month later the topic was raised in the annual discussions between Denmark and Uganda, a project formulation team arrived in July 1992 and a grant was recommended by the Danida Board in January 1994, in time for the second ‘general assembly’ of the UNFA in the same month.25
23 For example, Danish expertise was brought in by Jesa Farm Dairy. Farm production of 7,000 l/day is supplemented by 3000 l/day from outlying contract farmers. The operation has succeeded because it addressed the issue of dairy management. 24 This is referred to as the ‘first general assembly’ of the UNFA on page 44 of project document ((MFA Danida, 1997). The Appraisal report states that the first General Assembly took place in 1993. 25 The Project Document (MFA Danida, 1997: 44) states that Danida financed the general assemblies in 1992 and 1993, tours to Denmark and office running costs. This was also stated in an address to a World Bank Workshop in June 1999 by the National Chairman: ‘UNFA's major donor from the very beginning (1992) has been Danida’……. ‘Danida has provided large amounts of finance to UNFA since 1992’ (Nsamba, 1999). See also Finance Committee, Danish Parliament, 1998: 25.
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5.23 On what foundation was this new national programme launched and a large headquarters staffed and funded? Why was the concept not piloted in a few districts over a trial period? Was Danida being impulsive or was there an agenda which we have not understood? Perhaps the initiative owes something to Denmark’s own history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centur y and its deep-rooted belief in the necessary pre-conditions for agrarian change.26 The project document makes explicit reference to the need for UNFA members to be exposed to ‘the Danish experience in farmers’ mobilization …….made available through a collaborative programme of country visits’ (MFA Danida, 1997: 53).
5.24 The initiative has been beset by a confusion of aims: ‘an alternative extension service based on cost recovery’ or ‘an independent association to increase the welfare of members, their political influence and voice’. One or other objective has been opportunistically brought to the fore to match wider shifts in development thinking: e.g. market-based assumptions; popular participation; wider democratisation and governance. For example, the imme diate objective of the support to farmers’ organisations was to: ‘Increase farmers’ welfare through activities from their own organisations’ and ‘to support capacity building activities initiated by farmers through their organisations in order to increase income’.
5.25 Unfortunately, the problems of cost recovery and the privatisation of agricultural extension services have not gone away. Danida advisers were involved in discussions with Government and other donors that led to the drafting of the PMA in Tororo in August 1996, in which ideas for demand–led service provision and cost recovery were further developed. ‘This approach inspired the development of NAADS, the public funded extension programme’ (MFA Danida and GOU, 2005).
5.26 Phase 3 (1998–2005): The most recent phase of ODA to the agricultural sector (ASPS-I & II) represents a sea-change in Danish assistance to the agricultural sector. While adopting a go- it-alone approach, the scope and content of the ASPS is in line with the PEAP, first launched in 1997. It adheres to the Government’s current guidelines for the sector , as set out in the PMA, and is designed with the overall objective of poverty alleviation. The programme , which may well be joined by other bilateral donors, is therefore relevant taking into account the role and functions of the agricultural sector , global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies. Issues of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability are still to be resolved.
5.27 There is no doubt that a great deal of careful thought and hard work has been invested in making ASPS much more successful than previous interventions in the agricultural sector by Danida. It is difficult to imagine what more could have been done in conceptualising and planning ASPS-I, and then learning from the lessons of the first phase programme and going on to plan and implement ASPS-II. Micro-finance was one example of lesson learning which was problematic under ASPS-I but following a redesign has proved quite innovative and successful in increasing access to micro finance products to rural farmers and so forming the basis for present support under the Microfinance Outreach Plan of ASPS-II. The ASPS team were generous with the time they allocated to the evaluation team while in Uganda and in reviewing an earlier draft of this report. They have been forthright about their expectations and concerns relating to ASPS-II and the PMA.
26 In Denmark, in the 18th and 19th century, there was a gradual and peaceful transition from village bondage to small independent property-owning farmers, which had its roots in the age of enlightenment. Peasants obtained ownership of their tenancies with state funds channelled through a land bank. Social reforms, particularly in primary and adult education, women’s emancipation and farmers’ co-operatives, were accompanied by an agricultural revolution involving a conversion from grain to dairy and pig production on small, family farms. Until recently, this history was firmly implanted in Danish consciousness through the school curriculum.
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5.28 One long-running saga which ASPS-II is determined to bring to a close is the UNFA initiative which started in 1991. For too long, the rôle of Danida-supported farmers’ associations as an alternative to the moribund, state-funded agricultural extension service has remained an issue. Government authorities envisage that the farmers’ groups formed by the District Farmers’ Associations will be taken over by NAADS and that DFA officials will become service providers contracted by NAADS, which Danida funds through its contribution to the NAADS basket. Danida take the position that the poorer groups may fall into the lap of NAADS. Others will sustain themselves and are already well able to do so. If and when this happens, Danida will be able to withdraw from 15 years of subsidising farmers’ associations. Before this is possible, a number of problems with NAADS will need to be resolved.
5.29 The PMA Evaluation notes that one of the weaknesses of the PMA is that insufficient attention has been paid to the differences between sections of the population which it aims to serve. More needs to be done to take account of the different categories of farmers within districts and between districts (i.e. male and female, poor and less poor). It states that the PMA ‘identifies subsistence farmers as its main target group’ but in practice NAADS has adopted a different classification and is ‘targeting the economically active poor, who, because of greater assets, are assumed to be able to adopt riskier enterprises that may be inappropriate for poorer farmers’. (Oxford Policy Management, 2005: 28). A number of problems with NAADS will need to be resolved which amount to problems of design. For example it is reported that: · Poor farmers have limited capacity to demand services or specify the services they need. · They are not aware of the requirements or the potential of external markets or what is available in the way of agricultural inputs. · The needs-identification process for the contract extension system tends to assume a high degree of homogeneity among farmers and overlooks the needs of minority groups (Obaa et al., 2005). · Matching the extension advice to the needs and expectations of poor farmers requires familiarity with local agricultural systems and the locality and the lack of continuity in the relationship between farmers and private service providers is a major problem. · There is a mismatch between the time-bound contracts for service providers and the lengthy and complicated enterprise selection process, leading to service providers short- circuiting the process on a number of occasions (Obaa et al., 2005). · There is no routine follow-up of the work of service providers by over-stretched NAADS coordinators. · The NAADS advisory services are dependent on a collection of private sector service providers with no clear strategy for their training and development.
5.30 According to the PMA evaluation (Oxford Policy Management, 2005: 7, Annex B1), in Arua in one sub-county, a NAADS group evaluation report prepared by the community development worker showed that NAADS groups suffered from: · weak group leadership, · inability to pay membership fees, · high drop-out rates in groups/ decreasing membership, · low attendance of members in group meetings, · poor quality inputs and/or inappropriate services provided, · inadequate capacity to cost-share (matching 2%), · high expectations of credit provision by NAADS, and
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· insufficient monitoring.
5.31 The PMA Evaluation states that the provision of advice and assistance to farmers to improve production and marketing cannot be considered a public good, although for the time being agricultural extension remains publicly funded (ibid.: 29). The PMA Evaluation acknowledges that ‘the short run costs of implementing (the strategy) may be high and have probably been under-estimated’. …..the current ‘approach taken by NAADS and some NSCG activities, namely government funding of private sector activities, places high demands on contract management and monitoring’. Civil society organisations report that challenges of subcontracting fall into two broad categories (Twijukye et al., 2005).
5.32 Dealing with government systems and procedures: · low technical competence of committee members at sub-county le vel; NAADs farmers are not quite sure of their TOR and are not sufficiently empowered to deal with them; · government reporting and payment requirements are very bureaucratic and complex and where there are difficulties there are no clear procedures for redress; · some payments are not made at all.
5.33 Lack of transparency and accountability: · awarding authorities ask for kickbacks to award contracts; · bribes lead to shoddy work; · before the certificate of completion is signed it is necessary to bribe a chain of officials; · part of the remuneration to the service provider has to be paid to the sub-county administration; · NAADS sub-counties prefer to work with individuals rather than organisations as the former are more likely to give bribes; · politicians give out contracts to their supporters; · CSOs are created entirely for the purpose of accessing government contracts.27
5.34 A further issue is that former agricultural extension workers are still employed by district governments and have not been retrenched as expected. It must be asked how the idea of recovering the cost of agricultural extension services from the majority of Uganda’s poor farmers organised into NAADS groups or DFAs has gained the credence that it has. Cost recovery for the advice and assistance provided to commercial farmers may have been accepted in economically advanced countries in the early and mid-1980s, but not in sub-Saharan Africa, where agricultural extension (non-formal adult education) should remain, for the time being at least, a public good, as is the case with formal education.
5.35 Where cost recovery has been successfully applied, for example in South Africa, it has been largely dependent on a statutory (and easily enforceable) single -channel marketing system involving contract farming. No developing country has successfully recovered the costs of multi- purpose extension services where the scope for levy funding of basic staple crops is not feasible (Beynon et al., 1998). It is accepted that the state should withdraw from financing specialised extension services to commercially-oriented farmers and that a case can be made that even the poorest farmers should be required to make some contribution, provided that the costs of collection do not exceed the costs of the revenues generated. It will be a long time before this can
27 ‘Government inspired NGOs’ (GINGOs), a phenomenon described elsewhere, e.g. the Philippines.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources be achieved across the length and breadth of Uganda. The organisation and funding of the agricultural extension function seems to remain the single most problematic PMA issue yet to be resolved. If this PMA pillar continues to fail, the whole edifice could tumble. As pointed out by a reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper: “Ultimately, the case will probably be made for a publicly-financed extension system for these poorer areas with little ability to pay, and a farmer- owned extension system for those who increasingly can – NAADS and UNFFE-DFAs respectively.”28 Important regional differences must not be overlooked in the discussion of the future of agricultural extension in Uganda.
5.36 This issue is not for ASPS-II alone to resolve. Danida currently contributes to the programme through basket funding for NAADS, together with the World Bank and IFAD, and co–financed by the European Commission (EC), DFID, Irish Aid and Netherlands. With H.C. Andersen’s story in mind, Danida should not be deterred from re-examining the concept of a demand-driven extension service for the whole of rural Uganda, funded through cost recovery. The emperor’s wonderful suit of clothes also had many admirers.
28 We are grateful for this observation by Warwick Thomson.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Project summaries ...... 41 Appendix 2: Agricultural projects funded by the World Bank IFAD and the African Development Bank in Uganda 1985–2001 ...... 49
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
Appendix 1: Project summaries
Danida File ref. no. Rehabilitation of dairy machinery at Entebbe Dairy School, and supply of milk churns and milking pails; and Project Name(s) 104.Uganda.27 Description 1988–91, DKK 10.19 million Overall objective: To contribute to Uganda’s Economic Recovery Programme through the diversification of exports and import substitution (this emerges from the Agreed Minutes as the overall objective; otherwise not explicit) Immediate objective : to improve the teaching facilities for better conduct of courses to various levels in dairy technology, maintenance and management of milk plants, dairy extension and in dairy husbandry for farmers. Geographical scope: Urban southern areas and south west Components: training, supply of milk cans for milk collecting centres (Toro, Kigezi and Mbarara) and dairy machinery for renovation of the Entebbe Dairy and TA/consultancy Key documents No independent review is available in NCG-listed documents. (including reviews and Support based on Livestock Development Policy Document 1988 (document not located). PCRs) Status Report 1991 by Carl Bro is attached to bottom of Board Note on NCG CDROM. Implementing agency Carl Bro consultants contracted by Danida; FAO in collaboration with the Ugandan Dairy Corporation Other donors involved UNDP/FAO, WFP, ADB Issues raised in 1990: Following the success of the project, Denmark requested to support additional elements in the dairy sector, e.g. rehabilitation of the Agreed Kampala milk processing plant but it was agreed that new investments should await the preparation of a Dairy Master Plan (DMP) by Minutes of Annual FAO/UNDP in Bilateral 1991. Denmark took over the task of the DMP and work on Kampala milk plant went ahead with Denmark’s assistance. Consultations Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: C; Poverty reduction aspects were subsumed by the ERP goal of rehabilitation of agro- industry and balance of payments, etc. Rehabilitation of milk collection in Mbarara, Toro and Kigezi probably benefited small farmers. Ugandan Dairy Corporation was the major beneficiary Adherence to cross-cutting issues: (gender, environment, popular participation) C; Relevance: B; The assistance raised the profile of Danida, which was important at the time for bilateral relations. Effectiveness: B; Probably a significant contribution to the beginnings of the recovery of the processed milk market Efficiency: B; Probably a justifiable use of resources Sustainability: C; If the dairy industry had been privatised and restructured promptly, the benefits of the project could have been saved and performance could have been rated satisfactory. Poverty reduction: C; Probably no significant impact in rural Uganda Lesson Learning and Accountability: B; The positive and negative lessons learned with this early assistance to the dairy industry fed into the preparation of the Dairy Master Plan The performance indicators are rated on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from A to D, with A indicating highly satisfactory performance and D indicating highly unsatisfactory performance. date: November 2006 TP1 Page 41
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
Danida File ref. no. Farm Forestry Project, part of National Forestry Rehabilitation Program (UFRP) 104.Uganda.20 and Project Name(s) Description 1987–93 DKK 51.7 million Overall objective: To help the rural population of Uganda to become self sufficient in timber and fuel and construction, thereby contributing to the protection of natural forest Immediate objectives: to improve the technical capacity of the Forestry Department in farm forestry and identify future training requirements Geographical scope: 5 districts Components: Buildings for GOU’s farm forestry operations, vehicles, allowances and wages; TA and CARE’s operating and supervision costs Key documents Only one document (Board Note, August 1987 with 2 of 6 pages missing on NCG CD-ROM). (including reviews and (1) Staff appraisal report, Uganda Forestry Rehabilitation Project. World Bank, May 1987. (2) UFRP, Staff Appraisal Working Paper 2, Farm PCRs) Forestry Program, World Bank, May 1987. (3) Uganda Village Forestry Project. Evaluation, November 1986. CARE/USAID. (4) Uganda Village Tree Planting Project. Implementing agency CARE with the Uganda Forestry Department. The GOU entered into an agreement with CARE/USAID for the implementation of three 2-year programs in a total of 5 districts Other donors involved Funded by Danida through a grant channelled through the World Bank Project – National Forestry Rehabilitation Program (Project ID: P002937) IDA/DANIDA/NORAD/EEC/UNDP/CARE
Issues raised in Agreed 1989: Mention is made of concerns about the implementation and the sustainability of the project. (e.g. the nurseries). The Danish delegation Minutes of Annual said that Danida would participate in the supervision mission of the project in July/August 1989. Bilateral Consultations 1990: Serious problems with tendering and the disbursement of project funds through the Bank of Uganda were identified Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: B ; (small farmers were the primary target) Adherence to cross-cutting issues (gender, environment and popular participation): C; The project had a strong environmental objective but information on other issues not available. Relevance: C; (The rationale and objectives were appropriate but fundamental weaknesses in project preparation and design) Effectiveness: D; Project came to a premature end Efficiency: D; Implementation arrangements flawed Sustainability: D; See above Poverty reduction: D; No documentary evidence available to the ET, but given the implementation difficulties, the impact of the project on poverty reduction is likely to have been negligible Lesson Learning and Accountability: D; No documentary evidence of any evaluation or PCR. Danida undertook no more ventures of this nature in Uganda. The performance indicators are rated on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from A to D, with A indicating highly satisfactory performance and D indicating highly unsatisfactory performance.
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Danida File ref. no. and Credit for Small Farmers; 104.Uganda.31 Project Name(s) Description August 1989 for one year; DKK 8.0 million Project objective : to give small holders access to credit and inputs to enable them to increase their production. Immediate objectives: Danida also aimed to ameliorate negative effects of structural adjustment through balance of payments support. General import support through the WB; industrial reconstruction credit through the EADB and the provision of steel to the Chillington Tool Company for agricultural implements. Geographical scope: countrywide Components: Individual loans equivalent to ca. DKK 4000 per season @ 70% bank rate. 20% in cash & 80% in farm inputs Key documents Danida Board Note August 1989 (Styrelsesnotits 15/08/1989) (including reviews and African Development Bank (2002) ‘Uganda: Review of the Bank Group Assistance to the Agriculture and Rural Development Sector in PCRs) Uganda’, Study Final Report, Implementing agency The project ‘piggy-backed’ on the Uganda Commercial Bank’s ‘Rural Farmers’ Scheme’ (RFS). Other donors ADB, WB Issues raised in The agreed minutes of 1989 refer to support (DKK 8 million) for the Rural Farmers Scheme of UCB. The funds were to be used for the Bilateral Consultations procurement of agricultural inputs and were to be monitored by the Delegation of the European Community on Danida’s behalf. Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: C; Designed to target poor farmers, there were complaints of loans given under political pressure to unintended clients. Adherence to cross-cutting issues (gender, environment and popular participation): C; objective of 33% of loans to women Relevance and quality at entry: C; whereas the project may have been relevant and consistent with Uganda’s overall strategy in targeting poor farmers, it had poor ‘quality at entry’ due to inadequate preparation, and performed unsatisfactorily Effectiveness: C; failed to reach the target population of small farmers in sufficient number Efficiency: C; Data to determine what outputs were obtained are lacking. The RFS had a loan recovery rate ranging from 38% to 45% largely due to poor administration by over-stretched credit staff. The RFS inefficiently allocated resources to the intended beneficiaries. The Revolving Loan Fund, intended for smallholders, was unutilised and moved to the Bank of Uganda when the scheme was closed.. Crop farmers who constituted the majority (74%) were allocated only 19% of the credit, while livestock farmers (14%) received 33%, fisheries (11%) received 22% and housing (unknown number of beneficiaries) received 26%. Sustainability: D; The RFS introduced in Uganda the concept of lending on the basis of character and familiarity of the enterprise, instead of collateral. The highly unsatisfactory performance of the RFS left no institutional capacity to administer this type of credit. Poverty reduction: C; The project was designed to target small farmers particularly women. In practice performance was poor. Lesson Learning and Accountability: D; No documentation on this project was traced by NCG except Styrelsesnotits 15/08/1989. Board Note stated that a review would be undertaken at the end of the first year by Danida as this was a ‘pilot project’. The performance indicators are rated on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from A to D, with A indicating highly satisfactory performance and D indicating highly unsatisfactory performance.
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Danida File ref. no. and 104.0.27.Uganda.1; Grain drying and storage project Project Name(s) Description (Period, 1987–1993 (installed plant handed over in 1991; unresolved disputes between Danida and contractor and PMB still ongoing in 1993); value, DKK 90.0 M approved by the Parliamentary Finance Committee in 1987. objectives, geog. scope, Project objective : A contribution to Uganda’s Economic Recovery Programme through the diversification of exports (this emerges from the components) Agreed Minutes as the overall objective; otherwise not explicit in project documents) Immediate objectives: as narrowly defined were: Extension of the procurement network of the PMB; enlarged transportation, handling and storage system; improved drying, cleaning and storage facilities to reduce post-harvest losses. Components: Turnkey facilities were constructed at three locations: Jinja Silo Complex; Kyazanga Silo Plant; Kawempe Silo Plant Followed up with TA and a Master planning exercise for the grain sector Key documents No mention in the Pre-Study by NCG. No project-related documents on the CD ROM. (including reviews and ‘Evaluation of Danish Assistance to Grain Storage and Grain Drying Projects’ October 1993 by NCG (Ref. No. 104.Dan. 4/52-16. Evaluation PCRs) was obtained from Danida’s Evaluation Department. A Master Plan for the grain sector was completed in 1993 by Carl Bro (not seen by this review) Implementing agency Turnkey project and tied grant: Danish contractor supervised by Danish consulting engineer. The counterpart organisation was the parastatal PMB which reported to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry but MFPED was the holder of the share capital Other donors involved No other donors directly involved. Relatively little external assistance has been made available in this field except by Danida Issues raised in Agreed 1989: “A continued involvement in the rehabilitation of silos and mills will …..depend on the outcome of a master plan which considers inter Minutes of Annual alia decentralized and on-farm storage.”; 1990: Construction of Jinja Silo delayed for unspecified reasons. Danida asked to finance the rail link Bilateral Consultations between the silo and railway station; 1991: Discussions relating to getting the plant operating without further delay; 1992: Danes express concern about the underutilisation of the silo complex following liberalisation of the grain trade; 1993: Danes express disappointment at delay in completing the railway line. Due to underutilisation PMB should consider selling or leasing the Jinja storage complex; 1994: Danes concern that railway line to the Jinja complex was still not completed Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: D; the focus should have been on better drying and storage at farm level) Adherence to cross-cutting issues: (gender, environment, etc.): D; (no obvious direct adverse environmental impact) Relevance: D; (Jinja complex was “an island of bulk handling and distribution entirely within a sea of bags” p.33 Danida Evaluation) Effectiveness: D; no significant contribution to the ERS Efficiency: D; Contracting and supervision inadequate. Jinja chronically underutilised since commissioning. Kawempe and Kyazanga both underutilised Sustainability: D; fundamental changes in the grain sector immediately rendered facilities obsolete Poverty reduction: D; The direct beneficiary of the project was PMB; the development of better grain drying and storage facilities at the farm level would have been of greater benefit to the rural poor. Lesson Learning and Accountability: B; The 1993 ex post Evaluation of Danish Assistance to Grain Storage and Grain Drying Projects’ and the Grain Master plan provide valuable insights for future assistance to the sector. However there is evidence that Danida was aware of the folly of the Jinja investment by 1989 (see quote in italics above from Agreed Minutes for that year) The performance indicators are rated on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from 1 to 4, with 1 indicating highly unsatisfactory performance and 4 indicating highly satisfactory performance.
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Danida File ref. no. 104.Uganda.42 Dairy Master Plan Study and Project Name(s) Description 1991–92 (Draft finalised in 1993) DKK 4.84 million Overall objective: Support growth of the agricultural sector and contributing to poverty alleviation. Immediate Objectives: Provide recommendations on necessary policy and institutional changes and an investment and action plan required to achieve the wider national objectives. The dairy master plan will provide a basis for an evaluation of the need for further investments within the dairy sector for both national authorities, other donors and Danida. Geographical scope: Countrywide Components: Consultancies, expenses Key documents 1. Agri Board Chair Note October 1991. This proposes a study of the Dairy Sector and links the various Danida initiatives in the sector in a coherent one-page statement. 2. TOR for Dairy Master Plan Study, 1991 3. PCR Dairy Master Plan Study 1991–93 (The 1995 project completion report very instructive) 4. Master Plan for the Dairy Sector in 5 volumes – (not seen by evaluation team) 5. ‘White paper on government Dairy Sector Policy’ relating to future developments was approved by Cabinet (not seen) Implementing agency Carl Bro Int. reporting to MAIF later the MAAIF; MEPD, MMC, Makerere, Dairy Corporation on Steering Committee Donors involved Technical/Steering Committee: UNDP/FAO Dairy Development Team, World Bank, FAO, WFP, USAID, EEC Issues raised in 1991 urgency of DMP stressed by the Uganda delegation; 1992 Progress with the DMP approved; 1993 Progress noted and the preparation of the Agreed Draft Act discussed; 1994 MAAIF informed the meeting that the ‘Dairy Industry Act’ (bill?) had been drafted and awaited the finalisation by the Minutes of Annual MoJ before presentation to Parliament; Agreed minutes for 1998 report no progress on the bill; Agreed minutes for 1999 once again confirm the Bilateral DC has still not been privatised; In the agreed minutes for 2000. Denmark were informed that the head of the Dairy Development Authority had Consultations been appointed and the issue of Danida funds lent to the DC would soon be resolved. 2003 Head of the Danish delegation informed that the DC has still to be privatised. Impact summary A major conclusion of the study is that the future establishment of dairy processing plants should be left to the private sector. Danida’s assistance for the rehab of the Kampala Dairy Plant should therefore be the last major Danida financed project for dairy plants Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: C; Failure of GOU to privatise the DC undermined project in the long-term Adherence to cross-cutting issues: C; Lack of serious involvement of the small-farmers in the planning and implementation Relevance: B Effectiveness: B Efficiency: B Sustainability: B Poverty reduction: B Lesson Learning and Accountability: B The performance indicators are rated on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from A to D, with A indicating highly satisfactory performance and D indicating highly unsatisfactory performance.
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Danida File ref. no. 104.Uganda.50 and Project Name(s) Animal Breeding Project Description 1994–99 DKK 12.1 million for first phase. Extended for 2 years (1998–2000). In 1998, the project was to be taken over by the ASPS. Overall objective: To increase the supply of milk and beef in Uganda, thereby achieving national self sufficiency and initiating export of livestock products. Project outputs: A national cattle breeding policy document; improved delivery of semen and liquid nitrogen to AI sub-centres by the Animal Breeding Centre (ABC); An expanded and efficient AI field service operating on the principles of cost recovery (partial or full) and privatisation (where feasible within the project period); Improvements in farm management, particularly with regard to heat detection, reduction in calving intervals of improved cattle and simplified herd/milk recording. Geographical scope: National Components: Formulation of the National Cattle Breeding Policy (completed in 1997); Improvement of the AI service; Professional training of inseminators; Cattle selection programme; etc Key documents Appraisal Report and Project Document (1993) subsequent documentation is fragmentary. The PCR indicates serious difficulties with implementation: problems with importing semen because of BSE and the allocation of funds in breach of the project agreement. Implementing agency Directorate of Animal Resources, Department of Animal Production and Marketing Donors involved No direct link with other donors, although AI previously funded by UNDP/FAO in the late the eighties and early nineties Issues raised in 1994 search for TA to the project Agreed 1995 Slow progress with AI activities was expressed by Danish delegation; problems with release of counterpart funds. Minutes of Annual 1996 Still problems of late release of counterpart funds. Difficulty related to failure to accord the ABC self-accounting status. Bilateral 1997 Continuing problems with counterpart funds. Problem of import of semen from Denmark because of mad cow disease scare. Cost recovery Consultations principle of the project undermined by MOA’s promises to provide AI services free. 1998 Tense discussion re Uganda’s ban on use and import of Danish cattle semen. Danish delegation complained that DKK 1 million of expenditure had taken place in contravention of the project agreement. Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: Cost recovery, privatisation, and commercialisation theme recur. Adherence to cross-cutting issues: C Relevance: B Effectiveness: C Efficiency: D Sustainability: D Poverty reduction: D Lesson Learning and Accountability: B; Danida withdrew support from the activity. Negative lessons were learned The performance indicators are rated on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from A to D, with A indicating highly satisfactory performance and D indicating highly unsatisfactory performance.
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Danida File ref. no. 104.Uganda.49 Assistance for Uganda National Farmers’ Association (UNFA) and Project Name(s) Description Initially support was meant to be for 5 years 1994–99 Initially DKK Grant of DKK 20.7 million but increased to a total of DKK 91.30 million. Overall objective: Increase farmers’ welfare through activities of independent farmers’ associations, unions, cooperatives’. An important underlying objective was increasing the political influence of farmers (but what farmers?). Another frequently cited objective was to set up an alternative to the government extension service Immediate Objectives: Immediate objective: ‘the establishment of a national UNFA Secretariat and District representation and to enable UNFA to undertake training of, and information dissemination to, its members’ Geographical scope: Countrywide Components: At first Danida contributed to the cost of general assemblies including a study tour to Denmark and recurrent costs of the secretariat. Subsequent expenditure included building construction, equipment, vehicles and motorbikes; operating costs, topping up local wages; education and training; Danish Farmers’ Union expenses; Technical Assistance; Consultants, etc. Within 10 years, the UNFA aimed ‘to take over all the recurrent costs of the project’. Key documents 1. Appraisal Report: Assistance for Uganda National Farmers Association 1993 somewhat optimistic about the role of land reform, credit and technology transfer through an advisory service. 2. Board Note 1994 (2 of 6 pages missing fro m PDF), 1997, 1998. 3. Project Agreement 1993 4. Draft Project Document (PDF begins on page 40 thus date and authorship obscure, probably 1992) It sets out in great detail how the UNFA will operate. Some of the proposals on role and responsibilities of voluntary village level officials and the arrangements for cost recovery overly optimistic. Implementing agency In theory, the implementing agency was UNFA but in practice the process seems to have been steered by Danida Donors involved Danida (In recent years Farmers’ Associations at district level have attracted funding from bilateral agencies Issues raised in Agreed The topic of UNFA was raised in the 1992 annual consultations and the fielding of an expert on Farmers Associations was agreed. A Team visited Minutes of Annual 5 districts chosen for pilot project. Links made with the Danish Farmers Union. Bilateral Consultations In 1994 and 1995, discussions about availability of land/ building in Kampala for an HQ for UNFA and Govts role in providing it.
Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: From the start, the intervention was marked by a confusion of aims. Adherence to cross-cutting issues: These issues were eventually addressed by the project Relevance: B Effectiveness: C Efficiency: C Sustainability: D Poverty reduction: C Lesson Learning and Accountability: C The performance indicators are rated on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from A to D, with A indicating highly satisfactory performance and D indicating highly unsatisfactory performance.
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Danida File ref. no. 104.Uganda.64 Agriculture Sector Programme Support (I) and Project Name(s) Description DKK 310 million 1998 – June 2004 Overall objective: Increased income from farming with special focus on poverty reduction and improved food security with emphasis on household level food security. Time perspective 20 years and national ownership of the programme is emphasised. Immediate Objectives: Increased and sustainable production and productivity as a means to improve the livelihood of small scale farmers in particular. The situation of women in agriculture should be given special attention. Geographical scope: Country-wide, with focus districts, resource-poor farmers’ groups and households Components: Support to MAAIF’ new rôle of policy formulation, provision of technical guidance and regulatory functions. Livestock Systems Research; Farmers’ Organisations; Household Agricultural Support Programme; Agriculture Training and Education; District Agricultural Training and Information Centres; Rural Financial Services; External task group to monitor poverty and gender issues. Key documents 1. Agriculture Sector Programme Support to Uganda, Main Document, June 1998 (Agric_ProDoc_1998_1) 2. Component Descriptions: Farmers Organisations, June 1998 (Agric_CompDes_1998_1); Livestock Systems Research Programme, June 1998 (Agric_CompDes_1998_1); Household Agricultural Support Programme, June 1998, (Agric_CompDes_1998_3); Agricultural Education, June 1998 (Agric_CompDes_1998_4); Institutional Strengthening, June 2000 (Agric_CompDes_2000_1); Appraisal of Rural Financial Services Component, Final Report, November 2000, (Agric_ApprRep_2000_2). 3. Appraisal of the Agricultural Sector Programme Support (ASPS) for Uganda, 20 February 1998 (Agric_AppRep_1998_1.pdf) Implementing agency MAAIF and PCU which constituted the secretariat to the Sector Programme Advisory Committee; National implementing partners: MAAIF; Ministry of Education and Sports; M of Local Government; NARO; UNFFE and Farmers Organis ations; Bank of Uganda; MFPED Donors involved MFA/Danida Issues raised in Agreed Minutes of Annual Bilateral Consultations Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: B; Serious effort to respond to the PEAP Adherence to cross-cutting issues: B; Relevance: B; Effectiveness: B; results of the various components were mixed. HASP and LSRP performed very well; education and institutional reform components much less successful Efficiency: B; Sustainability: B; Poverty reduction: B; Lesson Learning and Accountability: B; Lessons taken into account in design of Phase II The performance indicators are rated on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from A to D, with A indicating highly satisfactory performance and D indicating highly unsatisfactory performance.
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Appendix 2: Agricultural projects funded by the World Bank29 IFAD and the African Development Bank30 in Uganda 1985–2001
Date Agency Project Amt Appvd & Amt Disbursed Key Intermediate Outputs/ Project Current Status Approved Source (US Dm) Components and Objectives [For ADB Projects, the Current (US Dm)31 Status is as of Aug. 2002] Sept. 1982 African Lugazi Sugar USD 21.44m USD 21.36m i) Factory rehabilitation, distillery installation *Operating at 55% of capacity [Effective Develop- Industry BANK ii) Plantation-9000 ha rehabilitated utilization but increasing Date: ment iii) Social & physical infrastructure, including 19/05/85] Bank housing, roads, etc (ADB) iv) Outgrowers Scheme June. 1985 ADB Seed Farms and USD 1.49m USD 1.46m *Report on Seed Farms and Food Crops *Study resulted in the Seed Food crops African Industry, Rationalisation Project, Study Development financed by Bank Group in 1991 Fund (ADF) / Technical Assistance Fund (TAF) Dec. 1986 ADB Olweny Swamp USD 22.38m USD 21.36m i) 760 ha of rice farms developed at Itek/Okile & * Being developed by MAAIF & [Effective Rice Irrigation ADF 50 ha developed at Agwata site in Olweny Lira DLG Date: Project Swamp, East Lira district *Problems with pumping water 02/12/87] ii) infrastructure-headquarters, stores, roads, out of fields in Agwata buffer dams, channels, etc *Environmental design problems at Itek/Okile Nov. 1987 ADB Agric. Line of USD 18.72m- USD 17.18m *Rural farm credit system consisting of: Initially *Co mpleted project, Status of [Effective Credit to Uganda ADF 25 but increased to 52 UCB branches, 8 regional benefits cannot be established Date: Commercial USD 2.63m offices, input supply system, housing because project had no 25/03/88] Bank (UCB) ADF/ TAF improvements databases. (Rural Farmers' Scheme)
29 Source: World Bank Projects database http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,menuPK:115635~pagePK:64020917~piPK:64021009~theSitePK:40941,00.html 30 Source: ADB/ADF (2002) Uganda: Review of the Bank Group Assistance to the Agriculture and Rural Development Sector in Uganda, Study Final Report. (Annex 1) available at: http://www.afdb.org/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB_ADMIN_PG/DOCUMENTS/EVALUATIONREPORTS/EN_UGANDA%20REVIEW%20AGRICULTURAL.PDF 31 The Figures for ADB projects regarding Amount Approved and Amount Disbursed were provided in the ADB Unit of Account (UA). This has been converted to USD equivalents using the UA:USD exchange rate: 1:1.42920 (the exchange rate as of the 01/01/2006).
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Date Agency Project Amt Appvd & Amt Disbursed Key Intermediate Outputs/ Project Current Status Approved Source (US Dm) Components and Objectives [For ADB Projects, the Current (US Dm)31 Status is as of Aug. 2002] Dec. 1987 ADB Kakira Sugar USD 9.80m USD 9.80m i) Factory and plantation rehabilitation including *Operating at 75% of capacity [Effective Works (KSW) BANK USD 10.49m irrigation utilization Date: USD 10.49m ii) Outgrowers scheme-3,666 ha 07/10/88] ADF iii) Social infrastructure Jan.1988 World The Southwest USD 10.00m No disburse- The project includes: (a) adaptive research and Closed. 29 Feb 1996 Bank Region World Bank ment details for extension; (b) agricultural input supply; (c) rural (WB) Agricultural USD 12.00 m the project access roads; and (d) management, monitoring And IFAD Rehabilitation IFAD available. and evaluation. The project will increase Project production of food by smallholders, resulting in (P002948) increased incomes and nutrition. Reductions in transport costs from improvements in rural access roads will increase producer prices through improved access and competition in the food market. Mar.1988 WB Sugar USD 24.90m No disburse- The SRP aims to restore efficient agricultural and Closed. 31 Mar 1995 Rehabilitation ment details for processing operations at the Kakira Sugar Works Project (SRP) the project (KSW) through (i) the physical rehabilitation of (P002921) available. lands, factory and associated infrastructure; and (ii) technical assistance to strengthen KSW management and staff. The agricultural development aspect of the project includes the rehabilitation of the irrigation system and the reestablishment of an outgrower production scheme to augment can supplies to the factory. The project intends to strengthen the Ministry of Industry and Technology's (MOI) role in monitoring the performance of the sugar industry and advising the Government on industry policy matters. The project will, over a six year period: (i) restore KSW's sugar production from present zero level to historical levels (85,000 tsy) and save foreign exchange used for imports; (ii) strengthen MOI's management of the sugar sector; and (iii) provide a mechanism for liberalizing sugar marketing and pricing. file: DUE-TP1-Agric(final).doc TP1 Page 50
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Date Agency Project Amt Appvd & Amt Disbursed Key Intermediate Outputs/ Project Current Status Approved Source (US Dm) Components and Objectives [For ADB Projects, the Current (US Dm)31 Status is as of Aug. 2002] Nov.1989 ADB Agricultural USD 0.39m USD 0.30m *Report on the feasibility of Establishing an Project completed with no Finance ADF/TAF Agricultural Finance Institution. follow-up. Agricultural Finance Institution Study Institution was considered not feasible Dec.1989 ADB Wheat & Barley USD 3.76m USD 3.63m *Recommendation to expand wheat production No follow-up on implementation Devt Study ADF/TAF based on 3 wheat varieties that were tested and of recommendations to expand found to be viable. wheat production. May.1989 WB Agricultural USD 26.00m USD 20.17m The ARTP II seeks to a) increase the efficiency Active. Closing 30 June 2007. Research and and productivity of the dominant crop, livestock, Training Project fisheries, and forestry farming systems of II (ATRP II) Uganda; b) increase farm household income and (P044695) improve family welfare; and c) enhance the management of natural resources for the protection of the environment. 3 project components: 1) Technology development and adaptation 2) Outreach, extension, and technology dissemination. 3) Institutional development.
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Date Agency Project Amt Appvd & Amt Disbursed Key Intermediate Outputs/ Project Current Status Approved Source (US Dm) Components and Objectives [For ADB Projects, the Current (US Dm)31 Status is as of Aug. 2002] Sept.1990 WB Livestock USD 21.00m USD 18.78m This project has two objectives: a) to reverse the Closed. 30 Sept 1998 Services Project decline in livestock numbers by dealing with the (P002930) alarming animal epidemic disease situation; b) to bring about improvements in the Ministry of Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAIF) which will lead to a smaller, more cost effective organization able to discharge its responsibilities to the livestock sector in an efficient, and effective manner. Project components: 1) a national animal disease control program; 2) tsetse fly control program in the Luwero, Mubende, Masindi and Hoima districts (areas not covered by other donors); 3) forage development through seed production and services covering about 7,500 milk producing farms, 12,000 ha of communal and ranch areas and 10,000 km of grass strips to protect terraced cultivation in the southwest; 4) credit and training to assist in the establishment of private veterinary practices; 5) institutional development, 6) project management support to MAIF in the areas of financial management and procurement. Sept.1992 WB Agricultural USD 15.79m USD 15.60m The project provides assistance for: (a) Closed. 31 Dec 1998 Extension strengthening of the delivery of extension Project services through the provision of transport, (P002991) equipment, rehabilitation of facilities, and incremental operating costs; (b) improvements in training capacity and skills; (c) strengthening of management systems in the MAAIF; and (d) studies on: (i) the rationalization of the training institutes of colleges of MAAIF; (ii) the efficiency and impact of alternative technology transfer mechanisms; (iii) a Mid-Term Review and assessment; and (iv) the design of a follow- on project. file: DUE-TP1-Agric(final).doc TP1 Page 52
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Date Agency Project Amt Appvd & Amt Disbursed Key Intermediate Outputs/ Project Current Status Approved Source (US Dm) Components and Objectives [For ADB Projects, the Current (US Dm)31 Status is as of Aug. 2002] Dec.1992 WB Agricultural USD 25.04m USD 25.19m The project will support the government's Closed. 30 Sep 2000 Research and strategy for improving productivity and Training Project diversification in the agricultural sector through (ATRP) the development and transfer of improved (P002938) technology. It will provide financial assistance to support four broad sets of activities. 1st, support to the institutional development of the National Agricultural Research System.2nd, the project will support the rehabilitation of research institutes at Serere, Tororo, Jinja and Kifu, and provide the requisite vehicles and research equipment. 3rd, it will support the implementation of the high-priority research programs by providing payments for incremental recurrent operating costs. 4th, the project will support strengthening agricultural education and training capabilities at Makerere University.
April.1993 ADB Kakira USD 0.55m USD 0.52m * Report recommending expansion of * Project Implemented and Sugarcane ADF/TAF Outgrowers' scheme. financed by Kakira Sugar Works Outgrowers Ltd. Scheme Study July.1993 ADB Small-Scale USD 0.86m USD 0.69m Project document on NorthWest Smallholder * Livestock Devt. Project now Agriculture ADF Development Project. being implemented by MAAIF. Study July.1993 ADB Meat Production USD 0.97m USD 0.50m * Feasibility Study Report, and Project *Livestock Devt. Project Master Plan ADF/TAF Preparation Document for Livestock prepared in October 2001 & Study Development Project. awaiting appraisal in early 2002. Nov.1993 ADB Fisheries Master USD 0.78m USD 0.50m * Report on Project Preparation Document on Fisheries Development Project. Plan Study ADF/TAF Fisheries Devt. Project Approved & is awaiting implementation.
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Date Agency Project Amt Appvd & Amt Disbursed Key Intermediate Outputs/ Project Current Status Approved Source (US Dm) Components and Objectives [For ADB Projects, the Current (US Dm)31 Status is as of Aug. 2002] 1993 IFAD Smallholders USD 10.0 m USD 10.0 The main objective of the project was to provide Closed 1996 Cotton the basis for re-establishing commercial cotton Rehabilitation production, with emphasis on full participation of Project smallholders in disadvantaged areas that were traditionally important cotton-producing areas. The project worked to reduce poverty by supporting: cotton developing, by breeding, seed multiplication, improved production practices and the introduction of integrated pest management; animal traction, by developing appropriate technologies and support services to restore the use of animals in cultivation; savings and credit, by developing credit lines so farmers can take advantage of development opportunities offered by the project; institutional strengthening, by assisting the MAAIF.
May.1994 WB and Cotton Sub World Bank USD 13.775m The Cotton Subsector Development Project was Closed. 31 Dec 2001 IFAD Sector USD 14.00m IFAD provide financial assistance to support three Development IFAD USD 12.5 m broad sets of activities; (i) reconstructing the Project USD 12.5m cotton industry through (a) revision of the legal (P002977) framework, liquidation of Government regulatory and marketing agency and establishment of an industry based regulatory body, and support of operations of the regulatory body; (b) transformation of Cooperative Union owned ginneries into creditworthy operators, including strengthening management and technical training to the industry; and (c) support of Government oversight of the subsector reform.
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Date Agency Project Amt Appvd & Amt Disbursed Key Intermediate Outputs/ Project Current Status Approved Source (US Dm) Components and Objectives [For ADB Projects, the Current (US Dm)31 Status is as of Aug. 2002] 1998 IFAD Vegetable Oil USD 14.4 m ongoing This 8 yr project is supporting the government's Ongoing to 2009 Development growth strategy by revitalizing and increasing the Project production of domestic vegetable oils. In this way, smallholders’ dependence on imports will be reduced and opportunities will emerge for them to increase their cash income. Project activities are being implemented in two locations: Bugala Island in the Kalangala District and Bwamba County in the Bundibugyo District.
Nov.1999 ADB Rural Micro USD 18.58m *Micro finance Support Centre Ltd *Ongoing finance Support ADF *Capacity building for 80IEs in 56 Nationwide Project (RMSP) Dec.1999 ADB NorthWest Small USD 25.15m USD 0.00m *Five key components: Production enhance- *Ongoing holder ADF [As of August ment, Market opportunities, Rural Infrastructure, Development 2002] Micro-credit, Coordination and Management. Project Sept.2000 ADB Area-Based USD 13.82m USD 0.00m *Four key components: Agricultural commer- *Not yet launched by the time of Agricultural ADF [As of August cialisation, Rural Infrastructure (700 km of study. Modernisation 2002] feeder roads), Community mobilisation, Programme Programme facilitation.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
Date Agency Project Amt Appvd & Amt Disbursed Key Intermediate Outputs/ Project Current Status Approved Source (US Dm) Components and Objectives [For ADB Projects, the Current (US Dm)31 Status is as of Aug. 2002] 2000 IFAD District USD 12.6 m ongoing Follow-up to the ongoing Hoima District Ongoing, closing date 2006 with Development Integrated Community Development Project Belgian Support financed by a grant from the Belgian Survival Survival Programme Fund. The project has been extended to cover Fund Kabarole District and aims to address the socio- economic problems of an extremely poor population in a post-conflict situation. More specifically, the emphasis is to: raise household and rural incomes through support to traditional cash crops (coffee and bananas) and other income -generating activities; improve overall health through the provision of clean water and sanitation and primary health care; improve food security through crop production support; and revenue collection and local governance to enhance the long-term sustainability of public services.
Feb.2001 WB and The National USD 45.0 m ongoing The components will: 1) provide agricultural Ongoing. Closing Date for WB IFAD Agricultural USD 17.5 m advisory services to farmers. 2) foster linkages funding: 30 June 2008. (co- Advisory among farmers, advisers, and researchers, 3) financing Services Project develop a regulatory framework, by setting with EC, (P044695) standards for qualification, and performance, DCI, including technical auditing of service providers; Nether- 4) finance training to service providers, to lands, establish a program for assistance in private Danida, sector institutional development, to include DFID and national representatives, institutions, and public IDA) extension staff; and, 5) provide program management, and monitoring, facilitating financial management, auditing, reporting, and management information systems.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources
Date Agency Project Amt Appvd & Amt Disbursed Key Intermediate Outputs/ Project Current Status Approved Source (US Dm) Components and Objectives [For ADB Projects, the Current (US Dm)31 Status is as of Aug. 2002] 2002 IFAD Area-Based USD 13.2 m ongoing This 6-year IFAD-initiated programme is Ongoing, closing date 2006 Agricultural designed to increase incomes among poor rural Modernization households in S.W. Uganda by stimulating Programme economic activity and contributing to the modernization of smallholder agriculture. It will consolidate the achievements made under the completed Southwest Region Agricultural Rehabilitation Project. Specifically, the programme aims to: increase the involvement of the private sector in further commercialization of smallholder agriculture; help economically active smallholders organize themselves so that they can gain better access to rural services, such as technical, financial and marketing services; improve rural infrastructure, especially road networks; increase the public sector's ability to respond to production needs identified by rural households 2004 IFAD Rural Finance USD 18.4 m ongoing The 7 year programme will support the efforts of Ongoing, closing date 2011 Services the government and donors to create a strong Programme rural finance system. The goal is to offer rural poor communities the opportunity of higher, more stable incomes, thus alleviating poverty. Programme activities aim to: expand the outreach and services of the rural finance system; build capacity of rural microfinance institutions (MFIs) and clients; strengthen and upgrade the rural finance system; support programme administration, monitoring and evaluation. To help promote a rural business, the programme will support smallholders and entrepreneurs in moving from subsistence towards participation in the market economy.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 2 –
Infrastructure (Water and Sanitation, Transport and Energy)
Milton Ogeda
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure (Water and Sanitation, Transport and Energy)
Contents
1. Introduction...... 1
2. Starting Point and Evolution...... 1 Water and Sanitation Sector ...... 1 Transport Sector ...... 3 Energy Sector ...... 6
3. What have donors in general been doing? ...... 6 Water and Sanitation Sector ...... 6 Transport Sector ...... 9 Energy Sector ...... 10 Summary of donor interventions ...... 12
4. What has Denmark in particular been doing?...... 12 Introduction...... 12 Water and Sanitation Sector ...... 13 1987–1989: Emergency support through UNICEF...... 13 1989–1998: Support through discrete projects...... 13 Water for Production ...... 17 Transport Sector ...... 17 1991–1999: Interventions in the Road Sector in Rakai District...... 19 1995–1997: Feeder Road Component under the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme ...... 20 1998–2002: Road Sector Programme Support – Phase 1 (RSPS1)...... 21 2003–2007: Road Sector Programme Support – Phase 2 (RSPS2)...... 22 Energy Sector ...... 24
5. Outcomes and assessment of Danida’s contribution...... 25 Water Sector ...... 25 Transport Sector ...... 26 Energy Sector ...... 26 Institutional and Capacity Strengthening...... 27 Addressing of Cross-Cutting Issues ...... 28
6. Overall Assessment and Conclusions ...... 29 Relevance...... 29 Effectiveness ...... 30 Efficiency...... 30 Sustainability...... 30 Alignment and Harmonisation...... 31 Accountability Issues ...... 31 Learning and Innovations ...... 32 Geographical and Social Incidence of Benefits ...... 33 Capacity Development and Institutional Strengthening...... 34
Bibliography ...... 36 date: November 2006 TP2 Page i
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Boxes Box 1: Case Study – The Story of Labour-based Road Works ...... 23 Box 2: Adjustment in Implementation Strategy ...... 32 Box 3: Experiences from earlier phases of SPS...... 33 Box 4: The Effects of Predictability or Lack of it! The Case of Kyegegwa– Kyenjojo Road...... 35
Figures Figure 1: Rural Water Supply Coverage 1991–2005 ...... 25 Figure 2: Poverty Headcounts by District 1992 ...... 34
Tables Table 1: Investments in the Transport sector in Uganda 1986–1995 ...... 10 Table 2: Investments in the Energy sector in Uganda 1987–2005...... 11 Table 3: Danida Support Approved from 1989–2003 ...... 13 Table 4: Transport Sector Programmes/Projects funded by Danida: 1988–2005 . 17
Appendices
Appendix 1: Project Summaries...... 41 Appendix 1a: RUWASA 1 ...... 41 Appendix 1b: RUWASA 2...... 43 Appendix 1c: Water Action Plan ...... 45 Appendix 1d: RSPS 1...... 47 Appendix 1e: RSPS 2 ...... 49 Appendix 1f: Renovation of Entebbe Airport...... 51 Appendix 1g: Port Bell Ferry Terminal Rehabilitation...... 53 Appendix 1h: Wagon Maintenance Project...... 55 Appendix 1i: Feeder Roads Component under NURP ...... 57
Appendix 2: Water and Sanitation Sector Budget...... 59 Table 2a: Share of Donor and GOU Contribution to the Water and Sanitation Sector Budget...... 59 Figure 2a: Contribution of Donors and GOU to the Water and Sanitation Budget ...... 59 Table 2b: Percentage Contribution of the Donors and GOU to the Water and Sanitation Sector Budget...... 60 Figure 2b: Percentage Contribution of the Donors and GOU to the Water and Sanitation Sector Budget...... 60
Appendix 3: Timeline, Programmes and Major Projects 1987–...... 61
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure (Water and Sanitation, Transport and Energy)
Acronyms and abbreviations ADB African Development Bank ADF African Development Fund BADEA Arab Bank for African Development CAA Civil Aviation Authority CIDA Canadian International Development Agency Danida Danish International Development Agency (before 1991) Danish International Development Assistance (after 1991) DFID Department For International Development (UK) DKK Danish Kroner DUCAR District, Urban and Community Roads DWD Department of Water Development DWSDG District Water and Sanitation Development Grant EC European Commission ECU European Currency Units ECWSP Eastern Centres Water and Sanitation Project EDF European Development Fund ERA Electricity Regulatory Agency ERP Economic Recovery Programme ERTP Energy for Rural Transformation Programme FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FY Financial Year GEF Global Environmental Fund GOU Government of Uganda HEP Hydro-Electric Project HFA Health For All ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization IDA International Development Association (World Bank) ILO International Labour Organization JICA Japanese International Cooperation Agency JPF Joint Partnership Fund km kilometre kV kilovolt LaBCAU Labour-based Contractors’ Association of Uganda LG Local Government LGA Local Governments Act LVEMP Lake Victoria Environment Management Project LWF Lutheran World Federation M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MAAIF Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries MELTC Mt. Elgon Labour-based Training Centre, Mbale MIS Management Information System MOLG Ministry of Local Government MOWHC Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications MOWT Ministry of Works and Transport MVA Megavolt-ampere date: November 2006 TP2 Page iii
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
MW Megawatt MWLE Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment NDF Nordic Development Fund NGO Non-Governmental Organisation Norad Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation NRM National Resistance Movement NURP Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme PAF Poverty Action Fund PCR Project Completion Report PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan PMS Policy and Management Support PRSC Poverty Reduction Support Credit PSRPS Power Sector Restructuring and Privatisation Strategy RAFU Road Agency Formation Unit RDP Rehabilitation and Development Plan RDDP Rakai District Development Programme RSDP Road Sector Development Programme RSPS Road Sector Programme Support RTWSP Rural Towns Water and Sanitation Programme RUWASA Rural Water and Sanitation RWSS Rural Water and Sanitation Sector Sida Swedish international development cooperation agency SIP Strategic Investment Plan SPS Sector Programme Support STWSP Small Towns Water and Sanitation Project SWAp Sector Wide Approach SWRMD Support to Water Resources Management Department SWIP South West Integrated Project TA Technical Assistance/Technical Adviser TRP Transport Rehabilitation Project TSU Technical Support Unit UEB Uganda Electricity Board UEDCL Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited UEGCL Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited UETCL Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited UGS Uganda Shillings UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund URC Uganda Railways Corporation USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollars WAP Water Action Plan WES Water and Environmental Sanitation WRAP Water Resources Assessment Project WRM Water Resources Management WRMD Water Resources Management Department WSPS Water Sector Programme Support WSS Water and Sanitation Sector
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure (Water and Sanitation, Transport and Energy)
1. Introduction
1.1 This paper is an intermediate output for the evaluation of the Danish Uganda Country Programme covering the period 1987 to 2005. The paper is based on the review of documents and interviews with key informants who were involved in the infrastructure sectors during the period under consideration and those who are currently responsible for the management of the sectors.
1.2 Denmark has been heavily involved in infrastructure development over the last 20 years. Although infrastructure has been developed in one form or another in all the sectors supported by Denmark, this paper focuses only on the transport, energy and water and sanitation sectors. It has not addressed infrastructure developed under health and agriculture. These have been dealt with under the respective thematic papers. While the support to the energy sector was a one-off intervention, support to the transport (especially roads) and the water and sanitation sectors has been more substantial and longer-term, evolving from projects to sector programmes. The paper also covers the upgrading of the Rakai to Kyotera road which falls under the transport sector as well as the road projects under the Rakai District Development Programme (RDDP). In this paper, the projects/programmes supported are assessed in light of their contributions to the overriding objectives and strategies of the Government of Uganda (GOU) and Denmark’s aid programme, i.e. poverty eradication, the implementation process as well as the extent to which they helped to set the agenda for policy and institutional reforms. The individual projects and programmes are summarised in Appendix 1.
2. Starting Point and Evolution
2.1 At the time when Denmark resumed its bilateral assistance in 1987 the infrastructure in Uganda was in a deplorable state with most of the facilities broken down and in a condition of disrepair. This was a result of protracted wars which raged in various parts of the country from 1978–1986, the neglect and inadequate investment in the previous 15 years under the Amin and Obote II governments. In the light of this, the new National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government gave high priority to restoration of infrastructure under its political and economic framework (the 10 Point Programme) and the first Recovery Strategy (Economic Recovery Programme) and Investment Plan (Rehabilitation and Development Plan – 1987 to 1991). In the NRM 10 Point Programme the sixth item was the rehabilitation of social infrastructure. The commitment of the new government was also evident in the RDP whereby, out of a total budget of USD 1,289 million for the first four years, transport infrastructure received the highest allocation of 29.4%, social infrastructure was allocated 17.2% while mining and energy (which also includes aspects of infrastructure) received 6.9%.
2.2 Given that the initial context and evolution of each of the three infrastructure sectors varied, these have been addressed separately in the sections that follow.
Water and Sanitation Sector 2.3 In 1987, information on the state of the water and sanitation sector was very scanty and unreliable. In fact, a Danida Appraisal Mission fielded during the same year noted “a depressing absence of data and documentation…..” Nevertheless, the rural safe water coverage in 1987 was estimated to be at 12% (MFPED, 1987). Unfortunately, no estimates were available for urban date: November 2006 TP2 Page 1
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure water and sanitation coverage. Since then, the sector has undergone major changes which can be categorised in three distinct periods: · 1987–1991: Emergency rehabilitation. · 1991–1997: Major projects, legal and policy reforms initiated. · 1997–2005: Poverty eradication launched, implementation of decentralisation and privatisation policies intensified, Sector Reforms undertaken and emergence of Sector Wide Approach.
2.4 During the emergency rehabilitation period (1987–1991) interventions in the water sector were inspired by three major factors. First, it was the closing years of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1980–1990). Secondly, the global programme for health for all (HFA) by the year 2000 was gaining momentum; and thirdly, and more importantly, the new NRM Government wanted to make a quick impression in restoring social services to the nation following years of conflict which left the soc ial and economic infrastructure in ruins. Examples of interventions during this period include the Emergency Relief and Resettlement Programme in the Luwero Triangle where 475 boreholes were drilled and 200 old ones replaced between March 1986 and March 1987, and the South West Integrated Project (SWIP) which invested USD 3.7 million in water and sanitation activities. In the conflict-stricken region of northern Uganda, though, where the idea of a reconstruction programme was first raised around 1991, implementation did not begin until a year later; over USD 15 million was invested in the provision of Water and Sanitation facilities in rural areas and seven urban centres.
2.5 Owing to the low clean water coverage in both rural (18%) and urban areas (less tha n 50%), GOU intensified the drive to increase clean water coverage throughout the country from around 1991. With financial support from donors, a number of projects were launched and implemented and preparation of others was initiated. In the rural water sub-sector, two key projects came on stream – the Water and Environmental Sanitation Project under UNICEF co- funded with the Swedish international development cooperation agency (Sida) and Rural Water and Sanitation (RUWASA 1) financed by Danida. In the same year, preparation of the Rural Towns Water and Sanitation Programme (RTWSP) under the urban sector began.
2.6 While the projects were being implemented, the need to have a national framework for developing and managing water resources on a sustainable basis was recognised. As a result, the Water Action Plan (WAP) was prepared from 1993–1994 to provide such a framework. As part of WAP, the need for a strong legal, regulatory and institutional framework to implement the plan also emerged. This triggered work on legislation which culminated in the Water Statute, 1995. The enactment of the Statute also required a policy framework to guide the operation of the law and as a result work on a new water policy was initiated, which came to fruition in 1999 with the approval of Cabinet.
2.7 Around 1997 a number of significant developments with implications for the governance and development direction and priorities took shape. First was the enactment and coming into force of the Local Governments Act (LGA). Second, GOU launched the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) as the comprehensive development policy and framework. The PEAP identified five priority areas of action (Priority Programme Areas) which included rural water and sanitation. These developments had far-reaching implications on the way services were delivered. The LGA redefined functions and responsibilities of Central and Local Governments (LGs) whereby the LGs were assigned responsibilities for service delivery while central government undertook policy formulation, strategic planning, regulation, technical support, supervision and monitoring. The adoption of the PEAP resulted in increased appropriation of resources to the water and sanitation sector especially in rural areas. About the same time, the
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure policy of privatisation was taking root and being emphasised. It is worth noting that RUWASA 2 and Eastern Centres Water and Sanitation Project (ECWSP) pioneered the decentralised implementation of water projects as well as privatisation of construction.
2.8 Towards the end of the 1990s, GOU embarked on comprehensive reforms of the water sector. The reforms, funded by Danida under the Policy and Management Support (PMS) component of the Water Sector Programme Support 1 (WSPS 1), covered all the four sub-sectors, namely rural water and sanitation, urban water, water for production and water resources management. The reforms were triggered by a number of factors including the need to realign investments, service delivery, responsibilities, management etc. with the new legal, policy, institutional and strategic frameworks. In addition, there was a dire need to rethink some strategies that were not working, e.g. relating to the challenges of operating and sustaining water facilities. The reforms culminated in the formulation of the Strategic Investment Plan (SIP) for a 15-year period (2000–2015). The reform document also contained a number of recommendations including the need to adopt a sector wide approach (SWAp) as a framework for bringing together the stakeholders in the sector for a more coordinated and concerted action to realise the goals of the sector. The SWAp framework was adopted in 2002. Within this arrangement a five year investment framework 2003–2007 was also agreed.
2.9 The SWAp process gave birth to the Water and Sanitation Sector (WSS) which comprises the four sub-sectors listed above, namely: rural water and sanitation, urban water, water for production, and water resources management. Some of the initial results of this move include, joint fina ncing of some activities, policy dialogue with all key stakeholders under the aegis of the Water and Sanitation Sector Working Group, common reporting and monitoring arrangements. With regard to reporting and monitoring, the stakeholders have adopted ten indicators – the so called “golden” indicators – which monitor aspects such as access, functionality, investment, hygiene and sanitation, water quality, water for production, equity, community participation and gender.
2.10 Finally, the preparation of a follow-on five-year (2008–2012) phase of the strategic investment plan is under way. The next phase known as “Joint Water and Sanitation Sector Programme Support” is being formulated with financial support from Danida, Sida and Austria under the new donor cooperation framework. The Joint Assistance Strategy is expected to be funded under the budget support modality.
Transport Sector 2.11 The transport infrastructure in Uganda comprises: about 34,000 km of roads, out of which the national road network is 10,000 km; district roads 21,000 km; and urban roads 3,000 km; (there are also some 30,000 km of community access roads); the railway system which includes about 1,250 km of which only 266 km are operational; wagon ferry services on Lake Victoria and air transport facilities including one international airport and eleven domestic air fields. Road transport is the dominant mode and it caters for approximately 90% of total passenger and freight traffic.
2.12 By 1986, due to armed conflict and political and economic mis management, all modes of transport in Uganda were inadequate and in a sorry state. The infrastructure and facilities were completely run down, making travel extremely difficult and costly. For instance, travel times by road to most parts of the country were three times longer than in the period after rehabilitation. This situation was exacerbated by the inefficient management of public transport services such as Uganda Transport Company Limited (for bus services), the defunct Uganda Airlines Corporation,
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure and Uganda Railways Corporation (URC). However, from this low ebb, a number of changes have since taken place in the sector, with mixed results.
2.13 In the road sub-sector, the evolution has proceeded in three broad phases as follows: · 1986–1995 Emergency Rehabilitation · 1996–2002 Road Sector Development Programme Phase 1 · 2002–2010 Road Sector Development Programme Phase 2
2.14 Between 1986 to 1995, the focus of Government was to improve the transport and communication infrastructure for accelerated development, revamp the economy and consolidate national unity and regional cooperation. As noted earlier, substantial investments were made in transport infrastructure, especially roads. Following these interventions, the condition of the road network improved from less than 10% in a good state of repair in 1986 to approximately 70% for the main roads and about 40% in the case of feeder roads by 1995.
2.15 Road improvements were undertaken within the context of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and the Ministry of Local Government’s (MOLG’s) Feeder Roads Rehabilitation Programme/Strategy (1992–1996). However, the rehabilitation programme which had an estimated budget of USD 171.3 million proved unaffordable and was only partly implemented. Moreover, the rehabilitated roads were also not properly maintained.
2.16 Another milestone in the roads sub-sector occurred in 1996 when the GOU with the assistance of development partners formulated the ten-year Road Sector Development Programme (RSDP 1) covering the period 1996/97–2005/06. RSDP1 was formulated as a strategy aimed at providing cheap, efficient, and reliable road transport services. Its main objectives were to develop a national road network capable of meeting present and future traffic demands while integrating road safety and environmental protection requirements; developing and strengthening road administration; and enhancing the local construction industry. It is also worth noting that, in light of the PEAP, GOU progressively aligned the road sector priorities to address specific pillars of the PEAP.
2.17 The first phase of the RSDP focused, among other things, on delivering longstanding institutional reforms in order to streamline road sector management and ensure sustainability of national road rehabilitation and maintenance. As part of this effort, in the interim period, a Road Agency Formation Unit (RAFU) supported by the World Bank was established in September 1998 to form the nucleus of a permanent road authority. However, some of the anticipated outputs such as the creation of the National Road Authority and restructuring of the Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications (MOWHC) progressed very slowly and did not realise the expected outputs within the timeframe which was set. Besides the delays in institutional reforms, respondents also pointed out that implementation of a number of civil works contracts under RSDP1 have been disappointing, such as the Jinja –Bugiri and Busunju–Kiboga road contracts.
2.18 In 2002, the RSDP 1 was reviewed and revised to become what is now known as RSDP 2 covering the period 2001/02–2010/11. Key elements of RSDP 2 include the integration of the District, Urban and Community Roads (DUCAR) strategy, emphasis on road maintenance and mutation of the RSDP into a ten-year plan.
2.19 Turning to the rail transport sub-sector, the evolution has been fraught with major challenges. Right from the beginning of its rule, the NRM Government identified the railway sub- sector as key priority area. It strongly promoted rail transport in order to provide a cheap means of international and local transport. To this end, the Government embarked on revamping the rail
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure and water transport infrastructure particularly on Lake Victoria and also on creating an alternative route to the sea through Tanzania in the light of the then periodically uneasy relationship with Kenya.
2.20 The rehabilitation of rail infrastructure attracted strong support from Government and resources were allocated under the RDP. However, the operation of URC has been plagued with inefficiency and mismanagement. The major developments in the railways include the following: · Basic repairs on the Kampala –Kasese and Kampala –Malaba lines were carried out in the late 1980s and early 1990s. · To increase capacity for haulage, new wagons were purchased and existing wagons in a reasonable state were repaired (part of the funding for repair of wagons was provided by Danida between 1992 and 1994). · In 1992 there was a temporary suspension of passenger services on western, eastern and Busoga lines. · Eventually the Kampala –Kasese line, Tororo–Pakwach line and the Busoga loop were closed because they were uneconomical, and insecure in the case of Tororo– Pakwach. · Because of inefficient operations, most clients preferred the more efficient, though costly, road transport. Because the volume of business for URC continued to decline, the corporation was restructured and downsized leading to the loss of 1,200 jobs in 1997 and a further 200 in 1999.
2.21 To reverse further decline and decay, GOU under the Utility Sector Reform has now decided to contract the management of Uganda Railways to a South African firm on a concession basis. This firm also manages Kenya Railways. The concessionaire’s operations are expected to commence in August 2006 for a period of about 25 years.
2.22 In the air transport sub-sector, the aim of GOU was to improve the transport infrastructure in order to encourage tourism and air freighted exports and imports and hence increase foreign exchange earnings and boost the economy. The evolution in air transport sub- sector progressed as follows during the period: · During the civil unrest of 1985–86, there was major damage to terminal buildings at Entebbe International Airport. · The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was founded in 1991 and took over the management and regulation of air transport in Uganda including air transport infrastructure across the country including Entebbe International Airport. · Through a USD 21.4 million export promotion loan from the Government of Spain, the main terminal building at Entebbe International Airport was renovated. · USD 27.3 million from Danida was used on airport improvement, navigation aids (CAT1), rehabilitation of the runway 17–35, new fire stations, apron, flood fighting etc. · A new access road to the new cargo and cold storage area was developed. · Uganda Airlines was also liquidated in the late 1990s.
2.23 The rehabilitation programme which took about ten years to complete brought about a remarkable improvement in the country’s air transport industry. At its inauguration in 1991, CAA date: November 2006 TP2 Page 5
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure found the industry in a sorry state, with very poor infrastructure. With assistance from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Spanish and Danish governments, the industry has not only been revamped, but was also set on an average annual growth rate of 5%.1
Energy Sector 2.24 In the 1980s energy from biomass was estimated to provide 95% of Uganda’s total energy requirements. Biomass also produced 75% of the nation’s commercial energy, petroleum products, 21%, and electricity only 3%. Today, this trend has not changed appreciably. Because of the massive environmental destruction that reliance on biomass has caused, Government has over the period relentlessly promoted alternative energy sources especially for the rural population including solar, thermal, biogas and electricity (MFPED, 1991). Because Danida’s intervention was within the electricity sub-sector, the rest of the review focuses exc lusively on that sub-sector.
2.25 The key challenges in electric power have been inadequate generation, huge losses during transmission and distribution, inefficient management and poor delivery of services. To address these challenges GOU planned and executed a number of investments (this is discussed further in Section 3 – What have donors in general been doing?) and reforms.
2.26 In terms of policy, in 1999, the GOU adopted a new policy framework for the electricity sector, the Power Sector Restructuring and Privatisation Strategy (PSRPS), which emphasises private sector participation as a driver for efficiency in the sector. To implement this policy change, Parliament enacted the Electricity Act in 1999. The Act also provided for the promotion of rural electrification. To this end, a Rural Electrification Fund, Database and Agency were set up. In addition a ten-year strategic plan was developed to improve rural electricity coverage from a figure of 1% in 2000 to a target of 10% in 2010. The huge shortfall in power supply has given an added impetus on the privatisation of the sector especially in the development of small power plants. To date the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) has granted permits to 11 firms to develop small plants. Examples include the West Nile Electrification Project which was granted a permit to develop a 3.5 MW plant at River Nyagak in West Nile.
2.27 With regard to the institutional weaknesses and poor service delivery, this has also been addressed through the 1999 Act which provided the legal framework for the unbundling of the electricity sector that had previously had all these functions in one organisation – Uganda Electricity Board (UEB). As a result two companies were created, the Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited (UEGCL) and the Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited (UEDCL). ERA was established by the 1999 Act as a regulator and licensing authority.
3. What have donors in general been doing?
Water and Sanitation Sector 3.1 In terms of financial support, the de velopment partners have been contributing and continue to contribute the largest share of the Water Sector budget. For instance, between FY 2000/01 and 2005/06 their contribution ranged from 59–77%.2 Apart from financial support, donors have been very active in shaping policy and promoting reforms.
1 http://www.sovereign-publications.com/caa-uganda.htm 2 See Appendix 2, Table 2b.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure
3.2 In the rural water sub-sector donors were active at various times during the period. Throughout the 1980s, UNICEF was the most prominent. Its focus was on borehole replacement and drilling and installation of new ones under the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. In the early days of NRM rule, other donors supported the sub-sector under the emergency relief and resettlement programme that targeted the Luwero Triangle which had just emerged from war. The Government of India financed the procurement of 12 drilling rigs under a grant with GOU in 1983. At the same time the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) was involved in borehole drilling in Karamoja region and later in Moyo district. By 1987, LWF had drilled 70 boreholes in Karamoja before moving to Moyo.
3.3 In the late 1980s Sida, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Norad supported the South West Integrated Project (SWIP) with a budget of USD 12 million for Primary Health Care, Community Development and Water and Sanitation. Out of this, USD 3.4 million was earmarked for water and sanitation.
3.4 Between 1996–2001, a programme known as the Water and Environmental Sanitation Programme (WES) was implemented nationwide by UNICEF with co-funding from Sida. From 2001 onwards, UNICEF’s priority under water and sanitation shifted to meeting needs in the Internally Displaced People’s camps.
3.5 Denmark has been another major player in the rural water sub-sector. She initiated a bilateral programme in 1987 with an appraisal mission which recommended supporting the rural water sub-sector. This culminated in the formulation and implementation of the RUWASA project (1991–2001).
3.6 From the mid 1990s the European Commission (EC) and the Dutch Government were also involved in the sub-sector where they co-funded a Gravity Flow Scheme. Japanese development cooperation (JICA) started to contribute around 2000 and have continued to date in the districts of Mubende, Kiboga and Mpigi.
3.7 Apart from the above mentioned donors, others that supported the rural water sector at different times during the period were: WaterAid, ActionAid, the International Labour Organization (ILO), Italy, West Germany and Yugoslavia.
3.8 In the Urban sub-sector, the first major donor intervention was the seven towns (Kampala, Entebbe, Jinja, Mbale, Mbarara, Masaka and Tororo) water project financed under a credit of USD 28 million from the International Development Agency (IDA). In parallel, Phase II of Kampala Water Supplies project financed to the tune of European Currency Units (ECU) 15 million by the EC and IDA was initiated. In addition, the sum of 15 million UA (Units of Accounts) was secured from the African Development Fund (ADF) for rehabilitation and expansion of water and sewerage systems in Mbarara, Kamuli, Kaberamaido, Gulu and Lira.
3.9 Between 1990–1994, the GOU with funding from IDA formulated the RTWSP as a framework for providing improved and sustainable water supply and sanitation in small towns and rural growth centres on the basis of demand-driven community-based services. The programme identified a total of 250 small towns and rural growth centres.3 Out of these 60 were
3 Towns/Urban Centres with a population of between 5,000 and 50,000 while Rural Growth centres are settlements with a population of between 500 and 5,000. date: November 2006 TP2 Page 7
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure prioritised for support. Within the framework of RTWSP, a number of donors have supported projects in different towns across the country, including: · World Bank/IDA: Small Towns Water and Sanitation Project (STWSP), 11 towns, USD 21 m. · France: Mid Southern Towns Water and Sanitation Project (1992–1994), FF 30 m, approximately USD 4 million. · ADB: 7 towns (USD 5 million prepared in 1993 but implementation started in 2000 and still ongoing). · Austria: South Western Towns Water and Sanitation Project (1996/97 and still ongoing). · Danida: Eastern Centres Water and Sanitation Project – 11 small towns, DKK 102 m (approximately USD 17 million), Phase 1 from 1996/97–2001. Follow-up phase with a budget of USD 6 million now under the Joint Partnership Fund. · BADEA: North Eastern Towns Water and Sanitation Project (2000/01 and still ongoing). · European Union: Mid Western Towns Water and Sanitation Project – 3 towns, USD 20 million. First phase started in 1996/97 and ended 1999. The second phase commenced in 1999/00 and will go on until 2008.
3.10 Outside the RTWSP framework, between 1993–1997, IDA funded the rehabilitation/development of urban water systems in Soroti, Dokolo, Arua, Pallisa, Kitgum, Kumi and Moyo under the Northern Ugandan Reconstruction Programme (NURP) to the tune of USD 3.9 million.
3.11 Overall, by end of 2005, out of the 180 small towns in the country, 97 had functional water supply systems while 24 and 44 were at construction and design stages respectively. It should be noted that there has been a significant growth in the number of Rural Growth Centres (781) which are not included in these figures. (MWLE DWD Urban Water Supply, 2006)
3.12 The evaluation of the STWSP showed a substantial increase in the water coverage in the towns targeted (World Bank, 2003). Out of the estimated 126,000 new beneficiaries, the actual number of people who had access to clean water under the project was reported to be 161,000 plus another 30,000 who had poor services at inception but which improved under the project. However, the sanitation component performed less impressively. The objective of reducing environmental degradation through better waste management was rated as marginally satisfactory.
3.13 At national level the trend in urban water coverage has been fluctuating. From a figure of 75% access in 1991 (MFPED, 2004), it rose to nearly 90% in the mid-1990s then fell to 54% in 2000 and rose again to 68% in 2005 (MWLE, 2005). The probable explanation for this trend is the rapid growth in the population of urban centres which has outpaced the investments in water systems.
3.14 Another major development aimed at increasing effectiveness and efficiency of the sub- sector is to separate asset ownership and operation of the systems. To this end, as at the end of 2005, up to 96% of the completed water systems were under the management of private operators.
3.15 Urban water systems in large towns (which are considered to be financially viable) under the management of the National Water and Sewerage Corporation have made good progress. From seven towns in 1987, the number has grown to 15.
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3.16 In the Water Resources Management (WRM) Sub-sector, Denmark has been the most significant and consistent donor, supporting the following interventions: · The development of the Uganda WAP (1993–1994) for a sum of DKK 11.56 million. · The strengthening of Water Resources Monitoring and Assessment Services (1996– 2001) DKK 38.6 million. · Under the WSPS 2, Danida is currently supporting WRMD with a sum of USD 4.2 million. Sida is contributing USD 1.0 million to the same component within the framework of the Joint Partnership Fund (JPF).
3.17 Besides the Danish support, other donor initiatives in the WRM sub-sector included: · Mitigation of Lake Kyoga Floods project, funded by the Egyptian Government. · Lake Victoria Environment Management Project (LVEMP) funded by the World Bank and the Global Environment Fund (GEF) for restoring the lake eco-system. · Nile Basin Water Resources Project (funded by Italy and executed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)). · The regional Nile Basin Initiative launched in 1999 which is coordinated by the World Bank and co-sponsored by a number of donors including Canada, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Finland, Italy, France, USA, Germany, the World Bank, EC and African Development Bank (ADB). The FAO and UNDP contributions are in the form of technical assistance. The current financial commitment to the initiative is approximately USD 134 million.
3.18 Following the adoption of a SWAp in the sector, donors have been involved in a number of ways. First, they are providing resources for financing various activities in the sector. For instance, the World Bank, Danida, Sida, and DFID provide the Rural Water and Sanitation Sector (RWSS) funds through the budget support modality and this is channelled directly to the districts as a District Water and Sanitation Development Grant (DWSDG). In addition, four donors – Danida, DFID, Sida and Austria – have pooled funds under JPF and are supporting the implementation of four central programmes/components namely: a) Technical Support Units, b) Water and Sanitation Services in Small Towns, c) Water Resources Management; and d) Sector Capacity Development. The JPF was considered an interim measure while arrangements and agreements are reached to adopt sector budget support.
3.19 In addition to providing resources, donors have also participated in the Water and Sanitation Sector Working Group, a forum where discussions on the strategic direction on the sector and on priorities for resource allocation are held. They are also actively involved in the Joint Annual Reviews.
Transport Sector 3.20 Donors provided substantial financial support to the transport sector throughout the period under evaluation. While the World Bank has been a lead donor in this sector, other donors such as EC, ADB, USAID, UNDP/ILO, among others, have also made important contributions. Some of the major projects/programmes implemented between 1987 and 1995, i.e. before the formulation of the RSDP1, are summarised in Table 1.
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Table 1: Investments in the Transport sector in Uganda 1986–1995 Programme/Project Key Components Cost (USD) Funding Agency Third Highway Project § Maintenance of 1,600km of national 58.00m IDA (1984–1987) (classified) roads § Development of Local construction Industry § Technical Assistance to Ministry of Works and Transport (MOWT) § Preparation of future Road Maintenance Programme Fourth Highway § Rehabilitation/Strengthening: Kampala–Jinja 18.00m IDA Project (1984–1987) Road (24km) & Mbarara–Ishaka (60km), § Pilot rural road maintenance program (190km) in eastern Uganda, § Feasibility Study and Design of Soroti–Lira road Northern Uganda § Rehabilitation of 364km of national gravel - Total NURP IDA Reconstruction Project roads Budget was (NURP): 1992–1997 § Rehabilitation/resealing of 93km of national USD 71.2m paved roads - Approx. 10% was for transport component Second Economic § Feeder Road Rehabilitation Equipment 5.0m IDA Reconstruction Credit (1988) Railways § Institutional Capacity Building 7.00m IDA Rehabilitation Project § Minor rehabilitation component (1992–1993) Transport § Main Roads – Kampala–Entebbe (32km) Rehabilitation Project strengthening, bituminising Mbarara–Ibanda 75.0m IDA (TRP) 1995–1997 (66.5km), 4.6m Nordic § National Roads Rehabilitation Development § Feeder Road Rehabilitation Fund (NDF) § Railways (Capacity building & ferry spares) § Transport Sector Planning (National Transport Database and Container Terminal Study) Source: World Bank , Transport Rehabilitation Project Appraisal Document (1994).
3.21 From 1996, most of the donor investments were undertaken under the framework of RSDP. The RSDP1 budget estimate over a 10 year period was USD 1.5 billion. A number of development partners have committed funds towards the programme including IDA, European Development Fund (EDF), ADB, Danida, JICA and BADEA. The contrib ution of different donors has been as follows: (i) EDF with USD 223 million, and (ii) IDA with USD 356 million. The IDA commitment financed the phased Road Development Programme (RDP) for up to USD 282 million, USD 74 million was used under the Transport Rehabilitation Project and the El Nino Emergency Road Repair Project as well as the ongoing Road Sector Institutional Support Technical Assistance Project; Danida’s contribution of DKK 1072.0 million through Road Sector Programme Support (RSPS) has been provided under the framework of the RSDP.
Energy Sector 3.22 The World Bank has been the lead donor in the electricity sub-sector. Where other donors have participated, they have done so as co-financers of components of the projects.
3.23 From 1985 to date, donor support to the electricity sub-sector has included the following major projects:
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Table 2: Investments in the Energy sector in Uganda 1987–2005 Programme/ Objectives, Components and status Cost Funding Project Agency Power II § Rehabilitation and upgrading of generators at the Owen Falls USD IDA Project Dams which at that time had only four out of 10 generators 28.00m (1989–1994). functioning. The project raised the power output from 60 MW in 1986 to 180 MW upon completion. Power III § Following the severe deterioration in the power infrastructure, USD IDA Programme the programme was formulated to: (a) develop the country’s 191.00m (1991–2003). hydropower resources; (b) expand the transmission and distribution system; and (c) provide technical assistance to UEB and the Ministry of Energy and Minerals. § The project components included: civil works and installation of generators no. 11 and 12 and transmission line § Generator unit no. 13 was financed by Sida and Norad during DKK Danida the transition from Power III to Power IV. 119.2m Power IV § The project is to meet the increasing demand for power in the USD IDA Project (2001 country. 62.00m – still § The major component is the installation of two 40 MW units ongoing) at the Kira Power station. The units have been installed but have not passed the commissioning tests. The other component of the project was to strengthen the capacity of Government to manage the power sector reform and privatisation process. Energy for § The aim of ERTP is to develop Uganda’s rural energy and Phase 1: IDA Rural Trans- information and communication technology sectors, so that USD GEF formation they make a significant contribution to bringing about rural 123.31m Sida Programme transformation. The programme is implemented in phases Private (ERTP). Developers GOU The Bujagali § This was initiated in 1994 when Government signed a Yet to be Funding Hydropower Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a private determined mobilisation Project. company AES Nile Power Limited to develop a 200 MW still in process plant. The actual construction was due to begin in January 2003 but this was delayed after vocal protests by environmentalists and residents of the area. Construction of a power plant at Bujagali was eventually suspended and the World Bank group withheld its financing after corruption investigations by the US Justice Department and by the World Bank's Fraud and Corruption Unit. In 2003, AES announced that it was pulling out of the project for economic reasons. The GOU has revived the project despite its problems and drawbacks. The Aga Khan Foundation is expected to take over the development of the Plan. The Karuma § This project is at advanced stages of design and GOU has also Yet to be Funding Hydroelectric indicated its commitment to develop it in parallel with determined mobilisation Project Bujagali. still in process Source: World Bank (2001); Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development.
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Summary of donor interventions
Water and Sanitation 3.24 Donors played a major role in the Water and Sanitation Sector in Uganda during the period of the evaluation. The interventions took the form of support for increased access to clean water and sanitation services; support for reforms to ensure more efficient use and sustainability of the water resources and institutional capacity building. In the emergency recovery period, UNICEF was the major player especially in the rural sub-sector. In the 1990’s, Danida made a major contribution in the rural sector, in promoting reforms and in building the capacity of the government institutions responsible for delivery of water and sanitation services. More recently, Sida has become a major player in the sector. On the other hand, the World Bank, ADB, France and Germany have contributed significantly to the urban water and sanitation sub-sectors. Key issues in the sector remain sustainability and the inadequate capacity of the institutions responsible for delivery of water and sanitation services.
Transport Sector 3.25 Most of the donor activity in the transport sector has been in the road sector. The World Bank has been the lead financier in the sector with the EC, ADB, JICA, Danida and BADEA also making important contributions. The emerging issues in the road sector include the slow pace of institutional reforms and weak donor coordination as well as inadequate resources from Government for maintenance of the road infrastructure.
Energy Sector 3.26 The focus of donor interventions in the energy sector has been on the supply of electric power. This was initially undertaken through rehabilitation and expansion of the only hydro electric power station in Jinja. And more recently, plans are underway to exploit other viable sites downstream along the river Nile namely Bujagali and Karuma. The projects have been fraught with implementation challenges resulting in major delays (Owen Falls extension) and cancellation (Bujagali). More recently, the drastic fall in the level of Lake Victoria and the River Nile has brought into question the viability of the Owen Falls extension project.
4. What has Denmark in particular been doing?
Introduction 4.1 The rationale for Danish interventions has been shaped by Denmark’s development policy/strategy at the given time and the GOU’s development framework. At the beginning (1987) of Danish bilateral assistance the goal of support was to “further economic growth, to reconstruct the physical infrastructure, and to strengthen institutions, which will further democratic development and respect for human rights” (Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1990). Based on these general policy guidelines, Danida supported three categories of project: (a) the reconstruction and development of Uganda’s productive base i.e. the country’s physical infrastructure, its agriculture and industry; (b) the reconstruction and development of social infrastructure, mainly health and water; and (c) development of institutions that would further democracy, development and human rights.
4.2 The second framework of support was under the Strategy 2000 which became effective around 1995. It should be noted that this was a Danida-wide strategy covering all the programme countries. Under this strategy, the aim was to promote sustainable economic growth, achieving
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure poverty alleviation, promoting greater gender equity, and promoting democratisation and respect for human rights. The key words of the Strategy 2000 were: concentration on fewer sectors, partnership and capacity building. The sectors selected at the time included health, water and sanitation, agriculture and infrastructure. Commitment was also made to continue supporting the furtherance of democratic development and development of civil society. The third framework was Partnership 2000. Under this strategy the overriding objective was poverty reduction. This was also in consonance with the GOU’s development framework – the PEAP.
4.3 Based on these frameworks, interventions 4 were formulated on a sectoral basis but interwoven with the cross-cutting aspects such as gender, capacity building, governance etc. Details of specific Danish interventions in the infrastructure sectors now follow.
Water and Sanitation Sector 4.4 Denmark’s support to the Water and Sanitation sector occurred in four phases. · 1987–1989: emergency support to the water sector through UNICEF · 1989–1998: support through discrete projects · 1998–2001: Water Sector Programme Support 1 (WSPS) under a bilateral arrangement · 2002 to date: WSPS 2 under a SWAp in collaboration with other donors
1987–1989: Emergency support through UNICEF 4.5 Documentation on Danish support during this period is scanty. However, according to Department of Water Development (DWD) staff, who were present at the time, Danish support was channelled directly to UNICEF within the contexts of the emergency rehabilitation programme and the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade – 1980–1990.
1989–1998: Support through discrete projects 4.6 At the inception of her bilateral programme with Uganda, Denmark prioritised support to the water sector. Between 1989 and 1998, Denmark approved five projects in the sector with a combined budget of DKK 886.8 million.
Table 3: Danida Support Approved from 1989–2003 Project Name Period DKK million Pilot and Planning Phase of RUWASA 1989–1990 11.6 RUWASA 1 1991–1995 209.0 Support for Development of the WAP 1993–1994 11.6 RUWASA 2 1997–2002 250.0 Strengthening of the Water Resources Monitoring and 1997–2002 38.6 Assessment services Eastern Centres Water and Sanitation Project 1997–2002 366.0 Water Sector Programme Support 1* 1997- 2002 32.0 Water Sector Programme Support 2 2003 – 2007 300.0 Total for the Period 1,218.8
* This amount covers only Policy and Management Support (PMS) and the unallocated reserve for WSPS 1. It excludes RUWASA 2, ECWSP and Strengthening Water Resource Monitoring and Assessment services which were part of WSPS 1 but had separate grant agreements.
4 A schematic presentation of the timeline of programmes and major projects financed by Danida is attached as Appendix 3. date: November 2006 TP2 Page 13
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RUWASA 1 4.7 The project started with a planning and pilot phase which ended in December 1990. The pilot phase facilitated the gathering of information on safe water and sanitation coverage and technology options. In addition, experiences and lessons emerging from the water decade and UNICEF’s operations around the world were tested, including community mobilisation, training, technology choice and sustainability.
4.8 The development objective of RUWASA was to improve the quality of life of the population in seven districts in Eastern Uganda namely; Mukono, Jinja, Kamuli, Iganga, Tororo, Mbale, Kapchorwa. However, during Phase 1, only Mukono, Jinja and Kamuli were comprehensively covered. Interventions in Tororo and Mbale were limited to rehabilitation of boreholes only. Activities in the focus districts included protection of water supplies, promotion of sanitation and improved hygiene behaviour both at household level and in schools, latrine construction in institutions (primary schools and health centres) and setting up systems that enhance ownership by carrying out operation and maintenance of facilities provided.
4.9 Because it was designed before the decentralisation era, implementation was a centrally directed turn-key operation with the Ministry of Natural Resources through DWD as the lead implementation agency with technical support from a Danish consultancy firm. The Ministries of Gender, Labour and Social Development and of Health also took part in the mobilisation and hygiene education respectively. The downside of this arrangement was that staff were removed from their mainstream functions and put in a separate organisation.
RUWASA 2 4.10 The second phase with a budget of DKK 250 million commenced in 1996. The objectives and scope of interventions were similar to that of Phase 1. However, implementation arrangements were modified. The design of this phase was influenced by the policies of decentralisation and privatisation that were taking root in the country at the time. Accordingly, significant responsibilities were transferred to LGs including planning, implementation, supervision and contracting of small works involving low -cost technologies. In addition, in line with the policy of privatisation, DWD sold off most of its drilling rigs to the private sector and the bulk of the construction works were therefore contracted out. This transition was however a slow process which slowed down the pace of implementation.
4.11 In 1998, as a result of the change in Danida’s aid delivery strategy from a project approach to Sector Programme Support, RUWASA 2 was subsumed in the Water Sector Programme Support 1 under a financing agreement signed between GOU and the Kingdom of Denmark in February 1998.
4.12 In terms of results, the project contributed to a 20% increase in safe water coverage which was in consonance with the anticipated target (MWLE, 2005). The hygienic latrine coverage of users of water sources reached 33.3% compared to a target of 35%. The thir d and final objective was to provide pit latrines to 732 (50%) primary schools in the project area. 639 schools were provided with them, representing 87% achievement of the Phase 2 target.
4.13 Respondents submit that the RUWASA project model has had a huge influence on the current design and implementation arrangements of the rural water and sanitation sector.
Uganda Water Action Plan 4.14 The overall purpose of the Water Action Plan (WAP) was to create a basis for a coordinated development and utilisation of Uganda’s water resources and the administration of
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure these, taking account of national, regional and international needs and agreements. The motivation for supporting this project was based on Denmark’s international experience in promoting the design of guide lines for development and use of water resources in developing countries in the context of the Global Environmental Plan of Action adopted in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 (MFA Danida, 1993c).
4.15 The project was implemented in two phases. Interventions focused on assessment of water resources in the physical and management context, drafting proposals for management procedures and administrative arrangements, designing a database for water resource management, preparation of draft regulations, preparation of outlines for training and capacity building projects and preparation of a draft policy and legislation.
4.16 The preparation of the WAP had a profound impact on the direction taken in water resources management and use. As the framework for sustainable management and use of water resources, the WAP informed the formulation of the water policy which was approved by Cabinet in 1999. In addition, owing to its import, key elements of the WAP were included in the Water Act, Cap 152, which is a legally binding document. Moreover, it also provided a number of tools and mechanisms for water resource management such as databases, guidelines, cross-sectoral coordination bodies and the establishment of a Unit within DWD responsible for implementation of activities for operationalising the WAP.
Strengthening of Water Resources Monitoring and Assessment Services in Uganda 4.17 One of the priority recommendations from WAP was the “strengthening of water resources monitoring and assessment in Uganda”. This project was therefore conceptualised as a follow-up to this recommendation. The overall aim was to contribute to sustainable use of the nation’s water resources through establishment of capacity and a system in WRMD to monitor the water resources of Uganda in terms of quality and quantity and to undertake water resource assessment studies. Key outputs would include updated information, a functional laboratory, a database with relevant information, results of various studies, and trained staff. A sum of DKK 38.6 million was appropriated for the project. The project later became the Water Resources Assessment Project (WRAP) which was implemented between 1996 and 2000 as part of the WSPS 1. Again, informed by the sector programme support (SPS) approach, the support was broadened to include all the activities in the department under the Support to Water Resource Management Department (SWRMD). One of the fundamental outputs of the SWRMD was the institutional and functional analysis which led to the restructuring of the Department with units such as regulation and permit being elevated to Divisions. The restructured Department was approved in 2003 and implementation is under way with relevant staff being recruited.
Eastern Centres Water and Sanitation Project (ECWSP) 4.18 ECWSP was formulated as an integral part of RTWSP. Prepared by GOU between 1990– 1994 with financial support from IDA, the RTWSP broad objective was to create a framework for providing improved and sustainable water supply and sanitation in small towns and rural growth centres on the basis of demand-driven community-based services. The choice of rural growth centres in Eastern Uganda for support was dictated by the need for synergy and sharing of resources with the then ongoing RUWASA project.
4.19 Other considerations for the design of ECWSP were the SPS guidelines, which were already available at the time of project design. The experiences from the pilot phase of STWSP as well as lessons from RUWASA were also useful. In light of these, ECWSP modified the policies and guidelines of RTWSP to take account of the experiences and the SPS requirements. Areas where modifications were made included upgrading of service standards, and a clearer
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure specification of the responsibilities of key stakeholders and the expected contributions of the consumers.
Water Sector Programme Support 1 (WSPS 1) 4.20 The agreement for WSPS 1 was signed in February 1998. WSPS 1 comprised four components: i) Rural Water and Sanitation in Eastern Uganda (RUWASA); ii) Water Resources Assessment Project (WRAP); iii) Eastern Centres Water and Sanitation Project (ECWSP); and iv) Policy and Management Support (PMS). Except PMS, the other three components were carried over from the project era.
4.21 The shift from project approach to sector support followed Danida’s adoption of a new strategy for Bilateral Aid in the programme countries which was first announced during the 1994 Uganda–Danish Consultations on Development (Uganda–Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1994). According to the new strategy, Danish Bilateral development assistance would be concentrated on 20 programme countries and within each country activities could be concentrated on a few sectors. And within each sector the focus of assistance would change from project to sector programme support. It should be noted that Danida’s move to sector focus happened well before Government adopted the SWAp process and in this respect it was a very innovative move.
WSPS 1 Bridging Phase 4.22 The project for the bridging period between WSPS 1 and WSPS 2 was implemented from January to December 2002 with funding (DKK 20 million) from the balance of RUWASA 2 (44%), additional funds from Danida (44%) and contributions from districts and communities (12%). The overall objective of the bridging period was to maximise the capacity of the districts to continue implementing activities in the water and sanitation sub-sector and to ensure that the targets of RUWASA 2 and ECWSP were achieved. The phase was also to ensure that the completion strategy would be compatible with and contributory to the SWAp approach and to preparation of the next phase.
WSPS 2 4.23 The WSPS 2 (2003–2007) was designed when the SWAp process for the WSS sector was in place. This provided the framework for the support to be fully aligned with the SWAp. WSPS 2 has three components which are fully integrated in the SWAp, and also provides support to the Water Resources Management Department. • Component 1 – Water Sector Capacity Development The component is contributing to enhanced sector capacity amongst key stakeholders at all levels to plan, implement, monitor, manage, and report on sustainable water supply and sanitation development. • Component 2 – Rural Water Supply and Sanitation and Rural Growth Centres including capacity support to districts to implement water and sanitation through Technical Support Units The aim here is to ensure sustainable safe water supply and sanitation facilities, based on management responsibilities and ownership by the users, within easy reach of 65% of the rural population by the year 2005 with 80–90% effective use and functionality of facilities. Then eventually to serve 95% of the rural population by the year 2015. Danida is contributing to this component through the District Water and Sanitation Sector Development Grant which is earmarked budget support channelled via the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) by the participating development partners.
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• Component 3 – Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation The objective of this component is to improve living conditions in the core and fringe areas of small towns achieved through the provision of water supply and sanitation services in a cost effective, sustainable and gender responsive manner. This is to be carried out through supporting development of sustainable water facilities for about 50,000 people in small towns and their fringes. In addition, the focus of this component is to capacitate all key institutions in the sub-sector to carry out their responsibilities especially with respect to regulations, operation and maintenance, and sanitation, among others.
Water for Production 4.24 Responsibility for water for production was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) to the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment (MWLE) at the end of 1998. Water for production refers to water for agricultural production especially irrigation, water for livestock, water for fish farming (aquaculture) and water for rural based industry.
4.25 Due to lack of a long-term strategy and investment plan, the activities of the sub-sector have been undertaken on an ad-hoc basis. However, the sub-sector reform study and the formulation of a strategic investment plan co-financed by Danida, Sida and GOU have now been finalised. The Strategic Investment Plan over a ten-year period is estimated to cost USD 393 million. To kick-start the implementation of the plan, Danida has committed USD 2 million from the unallocated funds under WSPS 2.
Transport Sector 4.26 Danish support to the transport sector in Uganda is summarised in Table 4.
Table 4: Transport Sector Programmes/Projects funded by Danida: 1988–2005 Project Name Period DKK Milliona Port Bell Ferry Terminal 1988–1988 101.32 Wagon Maintenance Project 1992–1994 13.90 Renovation of Entebbe Airport 1994–1996 352.00 Roads under Rakai DDP 1991–1999 40.50b Tarmacking of Rakai–Kyotera Road 1996–1997 23.90 Northern Uganda Reconstruction Project – Feeder Roads 1995–1997 27.30 Component RSPS I 1998–2002 398.50 RSPS II 2003–2007 260.00 Source: Danida Project Appraisal, Project Description and Completion Reports. Notes: a - The figures are allocated grants (budgets). b - This includes the allocation for second phase (DKK 17.5 million) which covered activities other than roads.
Port Bell Ferry Terminal 4.27 This was the first project to be funded in the railway sub-sector. The main objective of the project was to support the development of Uganda’s infrastructure and thereby contribute to the export market. The main component was the rehabilitation of the Port Bell Ferry terminal at a cost of DKK 101.32 million including rehabilitation of the railway line between Kampa la and Port Bell.
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4.28 The project, initiated in 1988, was completed in 1991. The contract experienced some delays in piling the harbour. By 1992 the rehabilitated terminal was in use. The project improved the terminal and facilitated better handling of freight to and from Port Bell.
4.29 However, the benefits from the improved terminal were short-lived due to the “invasion” of the terminal by water hyacinth in 1996, which affected the landing site causing ferries to ram into fenders and the link span systems. By 1997 the link span and fender systems had been seriously damaged because of this problem. The situation required emergency repairs to the fenders. Attempts to secure further funding from Danida for these repairs were delayed by the condition that URC had first to clear the water hyacinth before its request could be considered. Although the water hyacinth problem was later solved, through a combination of measures including mechanical and biological control, the weed has recently reappeared.
4.30 Notwithstanding the problems encountered, the project was very relevant in supporting a low-cost transport alternative and an alternative route for transporting Uganda n exports and imports.
Wagon Maintenance Project 4.31 The project was initiated in 1989 and in the same year an agreement was signed between Danida and URC. In the agreement, Danida agreed to provide DKK 13.9 million for the rehabilitation of 1,050 wagons. The major objective of the project was to improve railway transport by ensuring that wagons were readily available to the transporters. The appraisal which commenced in 1990 was completed in 1991 with some delays. The contract for the repair of wagons was signed in 1992. The annual review carried out in 1994 revealed substantial progress. Project implementation was strengthened by two Danish advisors who provided technical advice to URC managers in the first twelve months after project completion in 1994.
4.32 In terms of project results, Danida’s contribution to the repair of railway wagons was sizable. Out of a total of 1,350 wagons, Danida’s support financed the repair of 1,050 wagons (78%). The project was a tremendous boost to the railway sub-sector where some of the wagons were 13 years old and were in urgent need of repair.
4.33 However, the problem of operation and maintenance reared its ugly head again. Whereas the 1994 annual review confirmed that sustainability had been taken care of at design, three years down the road (in 1997) there was already a backlog in the maintenance of the wagons. This implies that the anticipated sustainability did not materialise. Furthermore, URC’s request to Danida in 1997 for a follow-up project was turned down because Danida’s External Assistance Strategy had shifted to Health, Agriculture and Roads.
4.34 The major lesson learned is that adequate sustainability measures need to be put in place at design and must be monitored during and after implementation in order to make the necessary adjustments to ensure sustainability.
Renovation of Entebbe Airport 4.35 The project was implemented during the period 1994–1996 at a cost of DKK 165 million. It aimed at improving the air transport infrastructure in order to encourage tourism and air- freighted exports and imports, and hence increase foreign exchange to boost and sustain Uganda’s economic growth. The objective would be achieved by making Entebbe Airport an International Airport with improved and commercially sustainable airport services catering for wide-bodied aircraft in accordance with ICAO requirements (MFA Danida, 1996f)
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4.36 The major components of the project included: rehabilitation of the Runway 17–35 and taxiways and sealing of Runway 12–30, buildings, sewerage and drainage systems, power supply, airfield ground lighting, aerona utical, telecommunications and meteorological installations (MFA Danida, 1994a). The project was completed on time, i.e. between 1994 and 1996 and within the budget. This was despite delays faced by the contractor in acquiring tax-exempted materials due to the bureaucratic government procedures.
1991–1999: Interventions in the Road Sector in Rakai District 4.37 Danida’s interventions in the road sector in Rakai District were undertaken under the Rakai District Development Programme (RDDP) implemented during the period 1991–99. The interventions were in two categories: · District/Feeder Roads – Rehabilitation and maintenance; and · Tarmacking of Kyotera–Rakai Road.
1991–1999: Rehabilitation and Maintenance of District Roads 4.38 Due to incomplete documentation of expenditure, the 2000 RDDP Evaluation Report (Working Paper 7) did not give a complete picture of what was spent on the district roads component (School of Public Policy University of Birmingham, 2000). However, the planned figures were DKK 23.1 million for Phase 1 (28.3% of total project cost of DKK 81.7 million) and for Phase 2, DKK 17.4 million (28% of the total programme cost of DKK 62 million). It should be noted that the amount for Phase 2 was for “income generation” which included economic infrastructure where roads are included.
4.39 The RDDP Evaluation Team estimated that up to one third of the total expenditure of RDDP was spent on road rehabilitation and maintenance. The emphasis on roads was based on the priority set by the District leadership right from project formulation. The evaluation confirmed that maintenance of the road network was still a District priority. This is because all weather roads were perceived as a pre-condition for any development.
4.40 In terms of outcomes, the evaluation report states that there was a measurable economic growth in Rakai evidenced by the expansion of businesses and an increase in the construction industry which had taken place in small towns, most especially Rakai itself, as well as continuing construction of improved housing along the District Road network (School of Public Policy University of Birmingham, 2000). The report attests that the major contributor to this development was improved access on the one hand for producers, agriculturalists, pastoralists and fisher-people to markets both within and outside the District and on the other for extension agents of the District and for other projects providing advice and assistance to the same producers. Improved roads have also improved accessibility of social welfare services to many people.
4.41 On the other hand, it was reported that road construction may have had negative effects on the environment, in particular on water catchment systems. It was also noted that improved accessibility may also have resulted in increased exploitation of natural resources, such as fish or forests which, if uncontrolled, will ultimately irretrievably destroy them.
4.42 In terms of sustainability, there was little optimism at the time of the evaluation that the investments made in the road sector would be sustained simply because of lack of adequate resources of money, manpower and machines in the Works Department. Moreover, political interference, limited staff and high staff turnover all contribute to weaknesses in the Works Department. Following the introduction of the Poverty Action Fund in 1999, the issue of inadequate funding for maintenance was partly addressed. Districts now receive up to 85% of the ir budgets for routine maintenance of district roads. date: November 2006 TP2 Page 19
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure
4.43 It is important also to assess whether or not the interventions made in the road sector under different projects/programmes “talked to each other”. In the early 1990s the labour-based rehabilitation was piloted in Rakai District under the UNDP/ILO project, but was abandoned in favour of mechanised methods reportedly because the results proved sub-standard. However, the labour-based methods attempted in Rakai district. are not referred to in the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme documents. The only reference to labour-based efforts was to the IDA/NDF project in eastern Uganda. Notwithstanding the lack of documentary evidence, some within Danida believe that the attempts at labour-based methods in Rakai through employing groups of women might have inspired the NURP programme designers to try even harder with these innovative methods.
4.44 The last years of RDDP overlapped with RSPS 1. During this period, issues of classification of roads, labour-based maintenance, addressing of cross-cutting issues and strengthening of district capacity to plan, implement and supervise road rehabilitation and maintenance were addressed. There is no evidence that experiences from RSPS were shared with Rakai. In fact, with regard to cross-cutting issues, the evaluation report states that environmental issues were not being addressed.
4.45 To sum up, the interventions in the road sector under RDDP achieved the expected outputs and produced the expected outcomes in terms of opening up access to markets and services. But they failed to put in place a system for sustainability of the investments and operated in isolation from what was happening elsewhere in the country under the same sector.
1996–1997: Tarmacking Kyotera–Rakai Road (20km) 4.46 The objectives of this project were to improve accessibility, reduce vehicle operating costs, reduce travel time, and promote agricultural production. The project involved upgrading 20km of gravel road to bitumen standard at a cost of DKK 23.9 million. In addition to contributing to realising the above objectives, the project added to the stock of paved roads in the country whose total length was about 2,000km in 1997 according to MOWT.
1995–1997: Feeder Road Component under the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme 4.47 Danish support to the road sector started in 1996 with the feeder roads component under NURP. The component covered four districts in Northern Uganda, i.e. Gulu, Kitgum, Lira and Apac, and focused on feeder road rehabilitation/maintenance and strengthening the districts’ technical and financial capacities for feeder road maintenance.
4.48 NURP was a USD 110 million IDA funded multi-sectoral programme for reconstructing various sectors in 7 districts in northern Uganda. Unlike other sectors which were benefiting from NURP, the feeder roads had been left out due to insufficient funds. Danida’s funding to the feeder roads during that period was therefore very timely. The expected project outputs were: 200km of feeder roads rehabilitated in the four districts, the capacity for road network planning and management in each of the four district works departments strengthened, and the Districts would be committed to adequate and timely provision and funding of the human and physical resources necessary for the management and maintenance of the feeder roads (MFA Danida, 1996c).
4.49 The feasibility studies for the component and formulation were completed in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Danida approved the project in January1996 and activities commenced in the same year beginning with the safer districts. Mobile force account gangs were used instead of labour-based contractors. The main reason for using force account mobile gangs was the belief
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure that districts required more experience before introducing labour-based contractors. Despite interruption by the insecurity in the project districts, by the end of the project period the component had achieved most of the expected outputs. Improved accessibility from rehabilitated/maintained feeder roads during the period was very vital for socio-economic development activities in the four districts.
4.50 An important feature of the component is that unlike the ADB feeder roads rehabilitation programme (in the 24 districts during the same period) which focused exclusively on technical aspects of road improvement, the component focused on both the technical and institutional aspects, particularly strengthening road management and funding capacities of the project districts. This approach was crucial for sustainability. Additionally, experience of implementing the feeder roads component was useful during the design of the Danida-funded follow-up phase, namely RSPS1.
1998–2002: Road Sector Programme Support – Phase 1 (RSPS1) 4.51 The RSPS1 was formulated within the framework and in support of the GOU’s Road Sector Development Programme (RSDP). It had three main components, namely: (i) Institutional Support for Coordination of the RSDP Implementation; (ii) Trunk Road Rehabilitation of the Kampala – Fort Portal Corridor; and (iii) Support to District Road Networks in the six Districts of Apac, Lira, Gulu, Kitgum, Kotido and Moroto.
4.52 The first component focused on institutional strengthening for implementation of RSDP. Key activities under this included establishment of an independent Road Agency and the transformation of the Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications from direct management of the sector to the roles of policy maker and regulator. As mentioned earlier, the process of restructuring and institutional capacity building did not progress at the expected pace and the life of the temporary institutions put in place and supported by the RSPS had to be extended.
4.53 The Trunk Road rehabilitation component covered: bituminising of Mubende–Kyegegwa road (38.3 km), upgrading to first class gravel standard of Kyegegwa–Kyenjojo road (51.5 km) and resealing of Mityana–Mubende Road (85 km). Through the paving of the 38.3 km (Mubende–Kyegegwa road), the RSPS1 contributed to increasing the stock of paved roads in the country.
4.54 The scope of work for District Road Networks covered rehabilitation of about 415 km of feeder roads in six districts and rehabilitating and equipping of Mbale Labour-based Training Centre and a Community Access Programme in Lira District. Four (Gulu, Kitgum, Lira and Apac) of the six districts had been covered by the NURP Feeder Roads component. The expected outputs also included putting in pla ce prioritising procedures for feeder roads rehabilitation and maintenance and strengthening of the feeder roads planning capacity in the districts.
4.55 All the expected outputs under this component were realised. The stock of district roads in good/fair conditions increased from 50% to 70%. The Management Information System (MIS) for prioritisation of roads was put in place and various manuals for road planning were produced. Given that the identification and prioritisation of infrastructure projects, including roads , is a politically sensitive issue, a tool such as the MIS is very useful in dealing with this problem. However, whether this is being applied objectively remains to be established. The Labour-based Training Centre in Mbale contributed to the promotion of labour-based methods of road maintenance through the various trainings that it conducted for an expanding range of trainees. During the second phase, this has covered District Engineers from 20 districts, plus two contractors and two consultants from each of the districts. The MOWHC field engineers have
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure also been trained to equip them with knowledge and skills in labour based methods and on how to address cross-cutting issues.
2003–2007: Road Sector Programme Support – Phase 2 (RSPS2) 4.56 RSPS2 is the second phase of the Danida Road Sector Programme Support (RSPS). The first phase was implemented during the period 1998–2002.
4.57 The development objective of RSPS2 is “creation of sustainable road administrations and funding mechanisms for developing and maintaining all levels of roads in support of economic and social development”. The RSPS2 seeks to reduce transportation costs and improve accessibility to economically productive and/or socially important areas by supporting road network systems with sustainable maintenance ultimately financed by the GOU. The immediate objective of RSPS2 is “to improve the capacity in the private and public sectors for the planning and implementation of rehabilitation and maintenance of road works using labour-based methods”
4.58 To achieve these objectives, the project design included the following five components. · Component 1: National Road Sector Institutions (DKK 41.3 million). · Component 2: National Labour-based Training (DKK 33.4 million) · Component 3: National Gravel Roads (DKK 74.2 million). · Component 4: District Roads (DKK 58.5 million) · Component 5: Community Access (DKK 25.0 million).
4.59 The implementation of the components has progressed at different rates and encountered different challenges. The key achievements, challenges and issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.
4.60 In the National Road Sector Institutions component, commendable progress has been made with respect to strengthening LGs' capacity to plan and manage community roads, coordinating activities of RSDP implementers and donors through quarterly RSDP steering committee meetings and annual transport sector reviews, and monitoring of the national road projects including technical and financial audits. Respondents admit that, compared to other sectors, harmonisation within the sector has not progressed significantly as donors are still using the project approach. The other major challenge has been the delayed formation of the Uganda National Roads Authority. Although the Act establishing the Authority has been passed by Parliament, the establishment is not expected to be completed until the end of 2006. This implies that restructuring of MOWT will as a consequence be delayed and may be extended beyond the life of RSPS2 (2007).
4.61 The implementation under Component 2, Mt. Elgon Labour-Based Training Centre in Mbale, has proceeded satisfactorily. The Annual Sector Review team of October 2005 was satisfied with the work done by the graduates from the centre (Royal Danish Embassy and MFPED, 2005). However, one of the challenges facing the component is that GOU is yet to have a national policy on labour-based methods. At the same time, the existing labour laws in Uganda do not cater for non-formal jobs such as those carried out by labour-based contractors. Overall, the investment in labour-based road works has been innovative and promises to be a success story. The case study in Box 1 gives further insights on labour -based methods.
4.62 Having succeeded with district roads, Danida’s support to the National Roads Component aimed at extending and piloting labour-based methods with national roads as a viable
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure implementation option, building the capacity of consultants so that they can offer appropriate services to MOWHC and to maintain, improve and sustain 480km of national roads for year- round vehicle accessibility.
4.63 The progress of this component has been disappointing. To date, only DKK 10 million (14%) has been disbursed out of a budget of DKK 70 million. Reasons for delays include insecurity in the northern districts where the selected roads were located and delays in procurement by MOWHC (consultants and contractors). In fact, a decision was made to select roads from outside the programme areas so that activities under the component could be carried out.
Box 1: Case Study – The Story of Labour-based Road Works
Danida’s involvement in labour-based road maintenance dates back to the Northern Reconstruction Programme in the mid -1990’s. Under the Programme, the feeder roads component was designed in the traditional way involving use of heavy equipment. However, when Danida was requested to fund the component, the appraisal team modified the scope of work to focus more on complementing ongoing roadwork activities by mechanised units with a labour-based programme coupled with institutional capacity building. At this time the labour-based methods were being piloted in four eastern districts under the IDA/NDF funded Transport Rehabilitation Project. Since knowledge and skills on the labour-based approach were limited, the GOU availed the National Technical College Mbale to become a centre for training in labour-based methods. Under Component 2 of RSPS (District Roads), Danida stepped up its support for the labour-based approach by financing training and capacity building for contractors to undertake road maintenance and for MOWHC and District Engineering Departs to plan, award and supervise labour-based contracts. The component also covered putting in place the operational framework and strengthening the capacity of Mt Elgon Labour-Based Training Centre (MELTC), Mbale. As a result of these investments, the impact of labour-based road works is beginning to make itself felt. The training of contractors and district staff as well as the use of labour-based periodic maintenance have expanded from the initial four districts to over 56 today. The analysis of the relative cost-effectiveness of labour-based methods in comparison to equipment-based methods shows that while it costs USD 13,000 to rehabilitate 1 km of gravel road using labour-based methods, the corresponding figure for the equipment-based approach is USD 15,000. In terms of employment, 60% of the labour-based expenditure (USD 7,200) is for unskilled labour which is normally sourced from the local community while the corresponding wage component of the equipment-based approach is only 8% and the vast majority are skilled labourers who come from outside the community. Furthermore, because of the emphasis on gender equality in the recruitment of labour, women are major beneficiaries of the labour-based approach. Hence, the labour-based method is not only cost-effective, but also creates more employment in the local community in a gender-responsive manner. Additionally, the profile and voice of the labour-based contractors are beginning to be heard. Recently, the contractors who have been trained at MELTC formed an Association called the Labour-based Contractor’s Association of Uganda (LaBCAU). However, not everyone is happy. Respondents pointed out that there is a lot of disquiet among the big equipment-owning contractors. This is not unexpected in the light of the loss of opportunities for contracts . MOWHC also says that the speed of scaling up the approach is out-stepping their capacity for supervision.
4.64 The component has been negatively affected by insecurity which led to the pre-identified roads being abandoned. The selection of other roads has taken a long time, culminating in some of the funds being reallocated to another component.
4.65 The fourth component, District Roads, which aims at strengthening the capacities of 15 Districts in northern and eastern Uganda to maintain their roads is a follow-up of a similar date: November 2006 TP2 Page 23
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure component under RSPS1. Interventions have included rehabilitation of district roads (770 km), training of works staff, mainly in managing labour-based contracts, and provision of vehicles, equipment and offices for the District Works Departments.
4.66 The pace of road rehabilitation has been slowed down by insecurity in some districts. The division of some districts leading to the creation of ten new ones in the component area at the end of 2005 implies that the project will not cater for the capacity building of the ten new districts because of insufficient funds.
4.67 The District Roads component included provision of technical support through the Technical Support Units (TSUs). These have been instrumental in providing technical support to the component districts. However, given that they are not part of the district established posts, MOWT and Local Governments need to devise alternative means of providing technical support to the Districts after the expiry of the TSUs’ contracts in line with its transitional status , even as recognised by the strategy for DUCAR.
4.68 Finally, the fifth component – the community access roads – aimed at ensuring that sustainable community travel and transport systems were improved in a number of districts in northern Uganda in order to contribute to the reduction of poverty through better access to social and economic services. The design of the component was based on experience from the pilot Community Travel and Transport Project carried out in Lira District in 2002–2003 under RSPS1. Following the pilot, the guidelines for Community Access have been developed and are to be applied nationally. In addition, generic models/designs have been developed and will be used for capacity building as part of the training curriculum of MELTC. Furthermore, innovations in non- road access have been developed under the component. For example, in Sironko district ladders have been designed on steep mountain slopes which cover a distance of 700 metres instead of constructing an access road of 8 km.
4.69 In sum, although insecurity has affected the implementation of national and district roads in some districts in the north and delays have been experienced in the establishment of national road institutions, overall the progress so far indicates that the programme is on the right track and is likely to achieve its objectives by the expiry date of 2007.
Energy Sector 4.70 Danida’s involvement in the energy sector was limited to one project for the construction of a new transmission line from the Owen Falls Dam in Jinja to Lugogo and Mutundwe in Kampa la. The project also included the rehabilitation of the old 132 KV transmission line from Owen Falls Dam to Mulago in Kampala and the associated connections between the new and the old line as well at a river crossing to the eastern part of the River Nile where the new power station extension was located. The Danida support was part of the five-year Power III programme for power extension at the Owens Falls Dam funded by the World Bank. The Danida component was justified on the grounds that the bulk of the power consumers were located in the Kampala area, yet substantial energy was being lost during transmission through the old 132KV line and even then the old line was inadequate.
4.71 Although financed and implemented directly by Danida, the project had a problematic implementation. The major setback to the project was its linkage to the completion of the new power station. The construction of the new power station encountered serious delays owing to the termination of the first contractor and procurement of another. The completion of the crossings was inevitably delayed and there was also a cost overrun of DKK 8 million.
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4.72 Despite the problems, when the power line eventually came into operation, there was a significant improvement in the availability of power in Kampala. This had a multiplier effect in terms of increased economic activity, employment and social wellbeing for residents of the city and the nation at large.
5. Outcomes and assessment of Danida’s contribution
5.1 While some outcomes of Danida assistance are sector-specific, others are more cross- cutting. In the case of the former, the assessment will be done by sector while the analysis of the latter will be done in a thematic manner.
Water Sector 5.2 Danish support to the Water and Sanitation Sector has contributed immensely to increased access to clean water and sanitation by the community. Through the projects financed and implemented between 1991–2002, an estimated 1.5 million people directly accessed clean water in rural areas and rural growth centres (MFA Danida, 2002e). Based on the 2002 rural population of approximately 21 million, this translates into a contribution of 7% on a national scale. Furthermore, in RUWASA 2 areas, it is estimated that clean water coverage increased by 20%. The national clean water coverage trend is shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Rural Water Supply Coverage 1991–2005
100% 90%
80%
70% 60%
50%
40% 30%
20%
Rural Water Supply Coverage (%) 10%
0% 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
DWD-MIS (Revised 2005) Functionality assumed to be 100% for all sources DWD-MIS (Revised 2005) Functionality assumed to be: springs - 100%; handpumps - 70%; GFS taps - 90% UNHS (Uganda National Household Survey) UDHS (Uganda Demographic and Health Survey) District Situation Analysis Source: Water and Sanitation Sector Performance Report 2005 (MWLE, 2005).
5.3 Based on 100% functionality, Figure 1 shows that between 1991–2005, clean water coverage increased by about 40% over a 14 year period. This works out at a growth rate of 2.8% per year. With population growth of 3.3% (UBOS, 2005) , this means that unless the investments are stepped up substantially, the increase in coverage will barely keep pace with population growth, leading to decline in service delivery.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure
5.4 The sanitation coverage has also been improving but at a slower pace than clean water. A national survey carried out in 1999 as part of the rural water and sanitation reform process indicated that while clean water coverage was at 55%, environmental sanitation measured in terms of the presence of acceptable quality pit latrines was 5% lower at 50%. Again, in 2004 when the clean water coverage was at 60%, the sanitation coverage was estimated to be around 57% (MWLE, 2005). It is important to step up promotion of sanitation and hygiene as its lack can undermine progress in clean water coverage.
Transport Sector 5.5 Depending on the type and kind of intervention, indicators for measuring the outcomes of interventions in the transport sector may include: change in the number of passengers and/or volume of goods transported, the cost of transport, time of travel and the number of operators. Robust data on these indicators are a bit scanty but information from various reports (MFA Danida, 2003b) and respondents shows that positive changes did take place after these interventions.
5.6 In the case of the upgrading of the Mubende–Kyegegwa road, the project completion report (PCR) notes that there were increased traffic volumes along the road, reduced travel time and reduction in passenger fares (MFA Danida, 2003b). In addition, the inclusion of the Socio- economic Development Fund contributed to the impact of the Trunk Road. The Fund financed small-scale projects such as community roads, water sources directly linked to the road construction, surface water run-off, HIV/AIDS, and market development and improvements. According to the PCR, the fund was successful in mitigating possible negative social effects of the trunk road construction which had been experienced elsewhere. In particular, the construction of new markets contributed to increased business activities.
5.7 With respect to the project for renovation of the runway at Entebbe International Airport, there was a big boost to the air transport sub-sector. After the completion of the project, three new airlines namely; Alliance, Air India and Air France, started to fly to Entebbe. The volume of fish and flower exports increased substantially on completion of the project. The facilities also attracted a number of private service providers for handling and catering which boosted the revenue of the Civil Aviation Authority. The number of passengers passing through Entebbe International Airport also improved dramatically during the period. From a figure of 135,000 in the early 1990s the number of passengers in 2004 was 543,098 (300% increase) (UBOS, 2005). However, this needs to be interpreted with caution since other factors could have been contributed to this trend. For example, besides the rehabilitation of the runway and other infrastructures, the positive image of the country in the international scene and other factors could have played a part in these results.
Energy Sector 5.8 According to an official from the Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited, when the transmission line from Owen Falls complex to Kampala was completed, the following outcomes were realised: · Transmission load transfer capacity from Owen Falls to Kampala and the Western part of Uganda increased. · The power supply availability and reliability to Kampala and the Western region also improved. · There was a reduction in transmission technical losses from 6% to 4.6%.
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· Due to increased availability more business establishments, commercial buildings and residential buildings were connected to the electricity grid.
5.9 However, due to the delays in the completion and the commissioning of the power house arising from termination of the contract for the initial contractor for the dam construction, it was not possible to increase the supply to Kampala and Western Uganda at the time the transmission line was completed until a much later date (in the year 2000). Also, more recently, due to the shortages in the power generated in recent years (2003–2006) caused by hydrological conditions, there has been an increase in power rationing thus affecting economic growth and service delivery.
5.10 From the angle of sustainability, two developments pose a threat to the benefits accruing from the investment. First, the double circuit 132 kV transmission line from Owens Falls Power plant to Lugogo substation in Kampala with a capacity of 180 MVA can only be loaded up to 100 MVA. Although UETCL has tried to identify the problem, so far it has not been successful. Secondly, there is a widespread problem of vandalism of the structure tower members. Policing and preventing this problem has been a major cost to UETCL.
Institutional and Capacity Strengthening 5.11 Weak human and institutional capacity has been a major challenge in most of the organisations in the infrastructure sectors. In the water sector, the first Danida Appraisal Mission fielded in 1987 identified capacity constraints at all levels including community, district and national (Water Development Department) levels. Subsequent reviews and evaluations also pointed out this shortcoming. Similarly, the road sector has been grappling with capacity deficiencie s. The NURP Project document affirmed that “the development of planning and institutional capacity ….. is necessary before a feeder roads rehabilitation/maintenance programme can be implemented”.
5.12 In light of the above, Danida’s interventions in the infrastructure sectors have in almost all cases included capacity development and institution building. This is also the reason why WAP included an explicit policy statement on the need to address capacity issues: “sector interventions should strengthen the capacity of sector organisations”.
5.13 Danida’s approach to building of human and institutional capacity has involved three major interventions: training, technical assistance and provision of working tools (vehicles, offices, laboratories, etc).
5.14 In general, the outcomes have been positive. Under NURP, it contributed to the strengthening of LG capacity to plan for district road rehabilitation and maintenance. This theme was also maintained in all the follow-on programmes – RSPS 1 and 2. As part of the capacity building drive, a very elaborate and systematic system for planning, implementation and supervision of road rehabilitation and maintenance has been developed with clear documentation in the form of manuals. Commenting on the manual, a district engineer from one of the programme districts said “it has simplified our work and made it more systematic”. In addition, the water sector has received considerable support in institutional and capacity strengthening. Significant contributions have been made to water resources management and institutional reform. One DWD respondent said “the Ugandan WAP and Policy are the best in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Also, noticeable improvements have taken place in the capacity of the Directorate of Water Development and the Water Resources Management Department (DWD/WRMD). Furthermore, the capacity of districts, sub counties and towns in the eastern area of Uganda has
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure increased appreciably as has the capacity of private sector contractors and communities to develop and operate safe water and sanitation facilities. Respondents who were RUWASA 1 employees accept that the first private sector operators in the water sector were those who had worked with the project.
5.15 With respect to the use of TA, the input at the beginning was sometimes too heavy for a meaningful transfer of skills and knowledge. For example, during the preparation of the WAP, 16 Danida experts were involved compared to five local counterparts. The balance of the implementation team was therefore skewed in favour of the TAs to the extent that the PCR refers to DWD’s role as having shown “interest and support”. Fortunately, Danida learnt from this challenge and started to reduce the input of long-term experts.
Addressing of Cross-Cutting Issues 5.16 Danida has been promoting the four cross-cutting themes of gender, environment, HIV/AIDS, and democratisation and human rights.
5.17 Beginning with the support for the development of the National Gender Policy, Danida has been relentless in ensuring that principles and actions are implemented in the various sectors. Key achievements in addressing gender issues in the infrastructure sectors have include the development of the gender strategy for the water sector, and guidelines for the road sector especially the district and community roads. In the earlier projects such as RUWASA and ECWSP, attempts were made to address the imbalance between men and women by awarding contracts for casting latrine slabs and sanplats exclusively to women’s groups. Moreover, to ensure that women have a voice in decision making, at least 50% of the membership of the Water User Committees and Associations were reserved for women. Similarly, in the road sector particularly under the labour -based contracts for district roads, contractors are required to ensure that women are part of the labour force and are offered flexible times to undertake their tasks in the light of their other domestic responsibilities. A noteworthy achievement in gender responsiveness was also made under the National Road Component of RSPS 1. At the peak of the construction of the Mubende–Kyenjojo road, 17% of the employees were women out of which 14% were employed in non-traditional tasks. This achievement is attributed to the posting of a Gender Advisor to the field where the contract was being executed.
5.18 Danida also emphasised compliance with environmental requirements. Although it is considered a Category 3 intervention, with minimum environmental impact, Danida ensures that environmental concerns are still pursued vigorously in the water sector. In some projects, it is a requirement that actions necessary to comply with various environmental laws and regulations be applied before funding is approved. Actions have also been taken in the road sector. In addition to the production of the environmental guidelines for the district roads, Danida has been providing funding to ensure that negative environmental impacts are mitigated. Similarly, in the only project in the energy sector, the Jinja to Kampala Transmission line, the appraisal made it a precondition for project effectiveness that Environmental Impact Assessment recommendations are followed and that Danida should reassess to confirm that Environmental Impact Assessment mitigation measures are acceptable.
5.19 With regard to HIV/AIDS, interventions have only started more recently. For instance, the water sector formulated its HIV/AIDS mainstreaming strategy in 2004 and plans for its implementation are still being worked out. In the roads sub-sector, it is the policy of governme nt that HIV/AIDS issues are mainstreamed in the planning and implementation of projects and interventions in the sub-sector. Accordingly, HIV/AIDS issues have been integrated in the district roads manual. Beyond this, more practical results have also been recorded during the
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure implementation of the district roads component of the RSPS 2. A respondent from the District Engineering department indicated that they disseminate HIV/AIDS information at every public meeting they conduct for planning and implementation of road works.
5.20 Finally, with respect to good governance, democratisation and human rights, some attempts have been made to bring these issues into the planning and management of the road sector. According to the RSPS 1 Project Completion Report (2003), MOWHC strategies for sustainable maintenance of district, urban and community access roads included strong emphasis on community participation through their participation in prioritisation of road works, promotion of use of labour-based methods and gender balance in implementation of road works. The district and urban local governments, which have a mandate for development and maintenance of district and community access roads, are encouraged to involve communities in the planning, programming and execution of road works. On the other hand, however, the central government has absolute control on the prioritisation and implementation of trunk roads.
6. Overall Assessment and Conclusions
6.1 The overall assessment in this section is based on the DAC evaluation criteria, namely relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability. In addition to these, the assessment will cover implementation issues and approaches, specifically alignment and harmonisation, accountability and corruption, learning and in novations, geographical incidence of social benefits, capacity building and institutional strengthening and predictability of resources.
Relevance 6.2 From the inception of Danish Bilateral Cooperation with Uganda in 1987 to date, GOU has pursued two overarching development policy frameworks. Between 1987 and 1996 the major thrust was reconstruction of infrastructure and achieving minimum economy recovery. Then from 1997 onwards the national development objective and strategy has been poverty eradication. Denmark’s support has also been premised along these lines. From 1987 to 1995 Denmark’s support focused on social and economic infrastructure and capacity building. Then under Strategy 2000 (1994–1999) and Partnership 2000 (2000–2004) the major thrust was poverty reduction through sustainable development. It should be noted that the Danish focus on poverty alleviation even predates the PEAP. This is evident from the language of the Danish delegation during annual consultation before the PEAP was adopted where poverty reduction was always mentioned.
6.3 Given the interventions implemented in the infrastructure sectors vis-à-vis the frameworks and the needs of the population, it is clear that Danish interventions are not only supportive of GOU development objectives but also address the needs of the population. For instance, support to rural water and sanitation as well as districts roads falls within the Programme Priority Areas of the PEAP. In the RUWASA 1 project, the conclusion of an independent evaluation of the poverty reduction impact concluded that the project had a significant impact on poverty (COWI, 1996) , but this could have been even higher had it not been for over ambitious physical and financial targets and insufficient attention to equity issues.
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Effectiveness 6.4 The development objectives of the projects in the infrastructure sectors could be collapsed into one that says “is the country, population and institutions better off as a result of the interventions?” With 1.5 million people spared the risk of contracting water-borne diseases through provision of clean water; with increased access to markets in areas where roads have been opened; with expansion in the tourism industry and increased export of high value commodities as a result of the renovation of the airport; and with various groups including communities, staff of different institutions, and private sector operators acquiring knowledge, skills and attitudes, there is evidence that the interventions under the infrastructure sectors were effective in contributing to social, human and economic wellbeing of Ugandans.
Efficiency 6.5 At the institutional level, the respondents at DWD overwhelmingly submitted that Danida’s support has delivered more efficiently compared to other donors. The reason for this assessment is that Danida has completely integrated its support into the Government structures and that disbursement of its funding is more predictable and timely.
6.6 At programme/project leve l, there is evidence that attempts were made to encourage efficiency considerations. In the rural water and sanitation sub-sector, for instance, the shift to contracting drillers instead of implementing it themselves reduced the unit cost of a borehole from approximately DKK 46,000 to DKK 34,500 particularly where the contracts were large e.g. 100–200 units (MFA Danida, 2002d). In the transport sector, as stated earlier, efficiency has also been realised through the labour-based approach where a saving of up to 25% is possible when compared to the equipment-based approach.
6.7 However, on a regional basis, there is still cause for concern about efficiency. According to the 2004 tracking study,5 which compared the average cost of providing water in Uganda with some neighbouring countries (for a sample of centrally managed projects), the results showed that in Uganda, the average per capita cost is UGS 85,000–170,000; Kenya, UGS 68,000–136,000; and Tanzania, UGS 68,000–119,000. The results therefore show a much lower efficiency in Uganda. However, there may be exogenous factors such as taxes which must be discounted before a definitive conclusion can be drawn.
Sustainability 6.8 Perhaps more than any other criterion, sustainability is critical for any infrastructure investment. In order for benefits of an infrastructure project to continue flowing to the intended beneficiaries, it is imperative that spare parts are available, staff are in place and funds for recurrent costs are available to keep the services running.
6.9 Danida-funded investments are known for being elaborate in addressing the issue of sustainability. Evidence of this is obvious not only from the comprehensive planning that appears in the project documents but also in terms of concrete actions taken to ensure sustainability. In the water sector, this has been pursued through charging water-user fees as well as putting in place appropriate institutions to assure sustainability such as the WUC and the WUA, and training and equipping of pump mechanics to carry out preventive maintenance and small repairs. On the project for renovation of Entebbe International Airport, Danida funded a two-year contract for ICAO maintenance experts to train staff of CAA to maintain the airport facilities.
5 MWLE, Tracking Study, Ministry of Water Lands and Environment, 2005
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6.10 Despite these efforts, the issue of sustainability still remains a major problem in infrastructure projects. In the Water and Sanitation Sector, the problems of operation and maintenance have been a consistent challenge. This has been true not only at the facility level but also in areas where local governments and central government have responsibility. It has also been the case with facilities like urban water where management of facilities has been contracted to private operators. The perpetual problem of sustainability is partly the reason why the reforms were launched, in order to ensure that users take greater responsibility6 for financing of the services provided. The urban water sector reform strategy was more forthright – “the sector cannot sustain itself, service its debts, raise capital for new infrastructure, and fund renewal or growth, despite adequate tariffs”. The problem was also acknowledged during the first joint GOU-donor review and as a result the mission emphasised the need to focus on operation and maintenance in subsequent interventions.
6.11 The challenge of sustainability is also an issue in the Road Sector. While the GOU had made a commitment in 1996 to provide additional resources amounting to at least USD 4.0 million every year for maintenance, this figure was reduced to USD 2.0 million in 2002, and this commitment has not been fulfilled.
Alignment and Harmonisation 6.12 Right from the outset, Danida showed commitment to aligning its support to national policies, strategies and frameworks. This was evident during the appraisal of the RUWASA project where the team noted that “to ensure that the recommendations from the appraisal were in accordance with the policies of the GOU, meetings were also held with Ministry of Planning and Economic Development” (Danida, 1987). Additionally, one of the objectives for having a bridging period after WSPS 1 between January and December 2002 was to “to phase out in a way compatible and contributory to SWAp” (MFA Danida, 2003a).
6.13 Under the SWAp, agreement was reached to integrate donor-supported investments for rural water and sanitation into the Poverty Action Fund as earmarked sector budget support and also to pool funds for sector-wide capacity building into a basket fund. Danida has been part of this arrangement and according to senior officials from DWD, Danida funding is the most harmonised and aligned of bilateral donors.
Accountability Issues 6.14 Respondents from the infrastructure sectors acknowledged that accountability and corruption are major issues in the infrastructure sectors especially with respect to procurement. The World Bank Policy Note on the Poverty Reduction Sector Credit (PRSC) Budget Support Instruments confirms this state of affairs (World Bank, 2005). The report observes that procurement is neither transparent nor effective. Moreover, the report adds that conflicts of interest amongst technical staff undermine supervision, leading to poor quality and putting the sustainability and efficacy of water supply at risk. In addition, depending on the mode of implementation, there have been cases of outright diversion or misuse of funds, materials and equipment.
6 The long-term objective of the rural water supply and sanitation sub-sector reform states: ‘To ensure that the services are provided and managed with increased performance and cost effectiveness, and to decrease governments burden while maintaining the government’s commitment to sustainability and equitable development in the rural areas’ (MWLE, 2000). date: November 2006 TP2 Page 31
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6.15 Danida has been addressing issues of accountability with utmost seriousness and an uncompromising stance. Many cases have been documented but two examples will suffice. First, in the case of fuel diversion and theft of spare parts supplies during RUWASA, Danida pursued this during Annual Bilateral Consultations for five years (Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1994–1998). Secondly, in the Road sector, when Apac District misappropriated funds, it was excluded from accessing funds under RSPS for a number of years until recently when the conditions for resumption of support were fulfilled.
6.16 In the recent past, additional measures to combat corruption and misuse of resources have included greater transparency about the use of funds and about results, involving user groups, financial audits, performance-based payment and value-for-money audits (ibid.).
6.17 The emphasis of Danida on accountability and zero tolerance on corruption is therefore very well known and documented. However, its own credibility could have been undermined by lack of transparency in some situations. The practice of directly paying contractors and consultants without providing information to the implementing agency is a case in point. Under the roads component of RDDP, for instance, Danida paid contractors and consultants for contract supervision directly but without passing the information to Rakai District (School of Public Policy University of Birmingham, 2000). This then formed the basis of complaints by the District to Danida in Kampala. The District had demanded full documentation of such expenditures in order to complete their accounts.
Learning and Innovations 6.18 There is evidence that Danida learnt from experience and also promoted some innovative ideas. Under the RUWASA project, the report on Evaluation of Poverty Reduction in Danish Programmes and respondents point out that the project was implemented in a very flexible way allowing for lessons to be learnt and integrated as execution continued (Box 2) (COWI, 1996).
Box 2: Adjustment in Implementation Strategy “Much experimentation and adjustment has taken place during the implementation of Phase I and further major changes are planned for Phase II. Danida has not used a blueprint approach, nor used the initial logical framework as a straitjacket, but has been quite flexible in accommodating many fundamental changes in strategies and procedures. The strategies and procedures for Phase II seem to reflect lessons learnt from Phase I as well as major changes in the policy environment, particularly the increased emphasis on the private sector.”
Source: COWI Evaluation of Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance, Country Study, Uganda (1996).
6.19 In addition to the move to privatisation during Phase II, the other fundamental change was decentralisation of implementation to Local Governments. Furthermore, as observed earlier in this paper, the design of the ECWSP was informed by a learning pr ocess. The design was informed by experiences and lessons from STWSP funded by IDA and RUWASA 1.
6.20 More recently, during the era of SPS, there is evidence that the transition from one phase to another is informed by learning. Box 3 is an excerpt from the statement of the Danida Board Chairperson when highlighting the experiences and lessons that have emerged from the implementation of the SPSs in Uganda and Ghana during a meeting to consider WSPS2 on 2nd October 2002 (MFA Danida, 2002b).
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Box 3: Experiences from earlier phases of SPS i) experiences from earlier phases were incorporated and set the base of preparations for the next phase ii) clearer and more systematic use of target and indicator management iii) decentralisation as part of the foundation for sector reforms was a hit iv) stronger donor cooperation and work allocation between donors (common reviews, basket funding etc.) v) a shift of emphasis from capacity building to focusing on reaching the target groups and seeing results.
6.21 In terms of innovations, perhaps no other intervention is more striking than the labour- based road works. The systematic piloting of labour-based methods from community to district and now to national roads was an innovative effort. Moreover, the adapting of access and travel options depending on the circumstance is a notable example of innovation. One case in point here is the choice of a 700 metre ladder instead of an 8 km community road in the hilly terrain of Sironko district.
Geographical and Social Incidence of Benefits 6.22 Except for the national level type projects such as the renovation of Entebbe International Airport, Portbell Ferry Terminal, Wagon Rehabilitation Project and the rehabilitation/upgrading of Mityana–Kyenjojo road, the bulk of the infrastructure projects were implemented in Eastern (Water and Sanitation) and Northern Uganda (Roads).
6.23 According to the 1992 Integrated Household Survey (IHS), the majority of the districts in Northern and Eastern Uganda were below the poverty line. The map in Figure 2 below shows that the poverty headcount index (percent of individuals living below the poverty line) in the districts of Northern Uganda and Eastern regions were all above the poverty line of 56% except for Jinja and Kapchorwa. The fact that most of Danida’s social and economic interventions were implemented in Northern and Eastern Uganda provides evidence of a strong poverty focus.
6.24 More specifically, in the case of water and sanitation (RUWASA), the Appraisal Team justified their choice of Eastern Uganda in these words: “Based on a regional comparison of water supply and sanitation coverage, water resources, prevalence of water related diseases, socio-economic condition and population density, the districts of Jinja, Iganga, Kumi, Tororo, Mbale, and Kapchorwa present areas in strong need for improvement of water and sanitation facilities” (Danida, 1987).
6.25 With respect to the choice of Northern Uganda for road projects, the other consideration was that the area was a conflict/post conflict region. Again, this implies that areas with high levels of poverty were targeted.
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Figure 2: Poverty Headcounts by District 1992
Capacity Development and Institutional Strengthening 6.26 Danida has relentlessly supported capacity development in all programmes and at all levels. These efforts have borne good fruit. For example, the quality of staff at DWD and the districts it supports, the improved institutional capacity of WRMD to fulfil its functions, the presence of community structures to operate and maintain water facilities, the growth of private sector operators in the water sector, and the improved capacity of districts to plan, implement and supervise interventions in district roads are all testimony that the Danish contribution in this area has been outstanding.
6.27 However, capacity development and institutional strengthening in the infrastructure sector is still unfinished business. One key respondent put it this way: “capacity at district level is still an unresolved problem. Decentralisation created problems”. In recognition of this problem the current investment programme (2003–2007) has included a major intervention being funded with resources under the Joint Partnership Fund (JPF). In the road sector, the capacity of MOWT which has taken a long time to address because of delays in restructur ing is another item of unfinished business.
6.28 As discussed earlier, Danida emphasises and practices efficient implementation. However, one case has threatened to undermine this credibility (Box 4).
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Box 4: The Effects of Predictability or Lack of it! The Case of Kyegegwa– Kyenjojo Road The Kyegegwa–Kyenjojo road section (51.5 km) formed part of the Mityana–Mubende–Kyegegwa– Kyenjojo Road Contract financed by Danida under RSPS1. This project comprised: (i) Resealing Mityana–Mubende road (86km); (ii) Upgrading Mubende Kyegegwa road (39 km); and (iii) Stage construction to sub-base level of Kyegegwa– Kyenjojo section (51.5 km). Although the original plan was to follow up after 2 to 3 years and complete the Kyegegwa– Kyenjojo section (51.5 km) up to bitumen standard under RSPS2, the Danida Development Assistance priorities changed and the project was stopped in June 2002 after Danida had injected close to 70% of the total project cost. The deletion of the proposed continuation of rehabilitation of the Kampala–Fort Portal corridor project from the previously agreed priorities for RSPS2 could probably be attributed to the adjustment of the annual country frame for Uganda by the new Danish government in November 2001. The sudden loss of funding for this project has a number of repercussions. Since roads are highly politically sensitive assets, it may have created a loss of confidence in the then ruling government by the road users and residents of the area for failure to deliver on their promises. Similarly, the Government of Uganda could have lost confidence in the ability of the Danish Government to deliver on its promises, leading to suspicion of a Development Partner (Denmark) that has invested substantially in all sectors in Uganda in the last 20 years. Other than affecting the good relationships between the two countries, there was also economic loss in terms of wear and tear on the sub-base since the gravel sub-base was acting as a wearing course for a period of about 1½ years (from June 2002– December 2003) before GOU engaged another contractor to complete the project. The physical wearing of the sub-base is estimated at about USD 2.2 million based on the approximate cost it took a new contractor to restore it to its original end of RSPS1 status. The cost does not include the loss to the vehicle owners, road users and residents who suffered negative environmental effects. What is soothing, however, is that GOU intervened by engaging another contractor using its own resources and the works were completed in July 2005. The evaluation team has not been able to estimate the total monetary value of the loss arising out of dropping the project from RSPS2, but it could be substantial. This could serve to guide decision-makers on how to respond if a similar situation arises in future in order to ensure that if changes must be introduced mid way, the process is carried out in a very sensitive way that minimises economic, political and social losses.
6.29 Overall, Danish support in the infrastructure sectors in Uganda has been responsive to the needs of the nation and population, has contributed to social and economic wellbeing of the population, has built human and institutional capacity, and has been delivered in a relatively efficient manner
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Thematic Paper 2: Infrastructure (Water and Sanitation, Transport and Energy,) Appendices
Contents
Appendix 1: Project Summaries...... 41 Appendix 1a: RUWASA 1 ...... 41 Appendix 1b: RUWASA 2...... 43 Appendix 1c: Water Action Plan ...... 45 Appendix 1d: RSPS 1...... 47 Appendix 1e: RSPS 2 ...... 49 Appendix 1f: Renovation of Entebbe Airport...... 51 Appendix 1g: Port Bell Ferry Terminal Rehabilitation...... 53 Appendix 1h: Wagon Maintenance Project...... 55 Appendix 1i: Feeder Roads Component under NURP ...... 57
Appendix 2: Water and Sanitation Sector Budget...... 59 Table 2a: Share of Donor and GOU Contribution to the Water and Sanitation Sector Budget...... 59 Figure 2a: Contribution of Donors and GOU to the Water and Sanitation Budget ...... 59 Table 2b: Percentage Contribution of the Donors and GOU to the Water and Sanitation Sector Budget...... 60 Figure 2b: Percentage Contribution of the Donors and GOU to the Water and Sanitation Sector Budget...... 60
Appendix 3: Timeline, Programmes and Major Projects 1987–...... 61
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Appendix 1: Project Summaries
Appendix 1a: RUWASA 1
Danida File ref. no. and Rural Water and Sanitation in East Uganda (Phase 1) RUWASA Project Name(s) 104.Uganda.24 Description Pilot phase from mid 1989 to end of 1990; DKK 11.6 million
Phase 1, 1991–1995; DKK 209 M Development objective: To improve the quality of life of the population in 7 districts of Mukono, Jinja, Kamuli, Iganga, Tororo, Mbale, Kapchorwa. Intermediate: Sustainable reduction of water related diseases; Immediate: Sustainable water and sanitation facilities and hygiene awareness established and sustainable adequate utilisation assured; human resources department in Organisation & Management in the governmental and NGO water sectors. The project focused on protection of water supplies, promotion of sanitation and improved hygiene behaviour both at household level and in schools, latrine construction in institutions (primary schools and health centres) and setting up systems that enhance ownership by carrying out operation and maintenance of facilities provided.
Key documents Pilot Phase: (including reviews and 1. An Appraisal Report on Water Supply and Sanitation in Uganda, Pilot Phase, Danida October, 1987 PCRs) 2. Board Note, Water and Sanitation Project in East Uganda, Pilot Phase, August 1989. 3. Board Note, Water and Sanitation Project in East Uganda, Pilot Phase, June 1990 Phase 1: 4. Board Note, Water and Sanitation Project in East Uganda, September 1990 (Phase 1) 5. Agreement on Rural Water and Sanitation Project, January 1991 (Phase 1) 6. Joint Review Mission, RUWASA, October 1992 (Report July 1993) (Phase 1) 7. Joint Review Mission, RUWASA, October 1993 (Report April 1994) (Phase 1) 8. Project Completion Report RUWASA December 1995 (Phase 1)
Implementing agency Ministry of Natural Resources – Directorate of Water Development (Carl Bro International A/S in association with I-Kruger A/S, Dan Education Consulting and Center for Development Research) Other donors involved Issues raised in Agreed 1989: The basic objective of the Danish support was stated as: rehabilitation of infrastructure and improvement of the living conditions of the Minutes of Annual poor rural population. Priority areas for support included provision of drinking water and sanitation in rural areas. It was agreed that Denmark Bilateral Consultations would provide additional funds for pilot activities during the pilot stage. Agreement was also reached on financing of consultancies for preparation of national rural water programme and Technical Assistance for the Water Development Department. 1990: GOU requested Technical Assistance for WDD and support for provision of water and sanitation to rural growth centres in Eastern Uganda. 1991: The start-up of RUWASA 1 was welcomed. However, concerns were raised on the slow initiation of the sanitation component, delays in choosing the type of pumps to be used, i.e. between U2 and U3 pumps and fact that the pilot phase did not establish a monitoring and evaluation date: November 2006 TP2 Page 41
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unit. Agreed to establish the sanitary component and M&E Unit as soon as possible. 1992: Noted that all components were in operation and good progress was being made. The excellent cooperation between the expatriate TA and Ugandan counterparts was applauded. 1993: The difficulty in securing the secondment of hydrogeologists to the project was raised and it was agreed that the Department of Geology would be approached to provide the required staff. Delays in clearance of imported goods by Customs was noted as a persisting problem in the project. The importance of ensuring that staff sent for further studies abroad return home was stressed. 1994: The importance of training was stressed in light of the high demand for staff with qualifications as those found in RUWASA. Denmark undertook to favourably consider training staff from institutions that seconded staff to the project if a training programme was drawn up. The contribution of the Chief Technical Advisor to the restructuring and development of the Directorate was noted and the Danish delegation was informed that the extension of his contract was being processed. 1995: In light of reports and investigations on the allegation that PVC pipes procured for the project were on sale in the open market, the need for strengthening controls was emphasised. 1996: Results of investigations and actions taken on various cases of irregularities under RUWASA experienced since the 1995 were noted. It was also agreed that materials not required for Phase II would be sold through a local firm M/S General Machinery Limited. 1997: GOU was urged to speed up the outstanding court cases on misappropriation and thefts of funds under the project.
Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: B Adherence to cross-cutting issues: B Relevance: B Effectiveness: B Efficiency: C Sustainability: C Poverty reduction: B Lesson Learning and Accountability: B
The performance indicators are rated on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from A to D, with A indicating highly satisfactory performance and D indicating highly unsatisfactory performance.
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Appendix 1b: RUWASA 2
Danida File ref. no. and Rural Water and Sanitation in Eastern Uganda (RUWASA) Phase II Project Name(s) 104.Uganda.24 Description Phase 2 1996–2001. DKK 250 million It served 12 districts in eastern Uganda and was a follow-up of the first Phase, which began in 1991 and ended in 1995.
Development objective: To contribute towards better living conditions in the project area, a reduction in the burden of work for women and children and provision of the necessary conditions for behaviour change which can lead to long-term reduction in water-related diseases.
Immediate: For the districts of Mukono, Kamuli and Jinja: The benefits from water and sanitation installations established during Phase I of the project maximised. For Iganga, Pallisa, Tororo, Mbale and Kapchorwa: · A 29% increase in the proportion of the total population using and managing protected water sources by the year 2000. · 70% of the users of water facilities provided by the project have hygienic latrines, and 80% of those regularly use hygienic latrines and have improved their personal hygienic practices. · In 50% of the primary schools in the project area, children’s awareness of hygienic practices has been raised through the provision of hygiene education and adequate sanitary facilities.
The project focused on protection of water supplies, promotion of sanitation and improved hygiene behaviour both at household level and in schools, latrine construction in institutions (primary schools and health centres) and setting up systems that enhance ownership by carrying out operation and maintenance of facilities provided. Key documents 1. RUWASA Phase 2, Project Document July 1995 (including reviews and 2. Board Note, Water and Sanitation Program for Districts in East Uganda, Phase 2, January 1996 PCRs) 3. Project Agreement, RUWASA, Phase 2, May 1996
Implementing agency Ministry of Natural Resources – Directorate of Water Development Other donors involved Issues raised in Agreed 1995: The Danish delegation noted that decentralisation and privatisation would be major and most important components of Phase II. To prepare for these, Minutes of Annual trials on privatisation and training of district officials to take on planning and implementation as well as preparing of work plans for 1996 and identification of Bilateral Consultations office facilities in Mbale was emphasised.
1996: The approval by the Danida Board of support amounting to DKK 300 for two projects (RUWASA II and ECWSP) was reported by Danida, making water and sanitation the second largest priority sector . The need for transparency and accountability in the second phase was emphasised as well the addressing of environmental issues.
1997: It was mentioned that RUWASA would be the vehicle for providing safe and clean water in the rural areas of most of Eastern Uganda under the Water Sector Programme whose formulation was nearing completion. Other issues affecting implementation of project included slow pace of privatisation (selling of rigs) and inadequate personnel in LGs in qualitative and quantitative terms.
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Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: B Adherence to cross-cutting issues: B Relevance: B Effectiveness: B Efficiency: C Sustainability: C Poverty reduction: B Lesson Learning and Accountability: B
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Appendix 1c: Water Action Plan Danida File ref. no. and Uganda Water Action Plan Project Name(s) 104.Uganda.46 Description 1993–1994 DKK 11.56 million
The goal of the WAP was to manage and develop the water resources of Uganda in an integrated and sustainable manner, so as to secure and provide water of adequate quantity and quality for social and economic needs.
Key documents 1. Board Note, WAP, Phase 1 1993 (including reviews and 2. Project Document, WAP, January 1993 PCRs) 3. Appraisal Report, WAP Phase 2, July 1993 4. Board Note, WAP Phase 2, 15 September, 1993 5. Project Document, WAP Phase 2, September 1993 6. Project Completion Report, WAP, October 1995
Implementing agency Ministry of Natural Resources – Directorate of Water Development
Other donors involved None Issues raised in Agreed 1992: The Danish delegation noted that the identification team was in the country and that the preparation of the WAP was a follow-up to the international Minutes of Annual conferences held in Copenhagen and Dublin. The delegation noted further that Uganda would be the first country to embark on preparation of a WAP before the Bilateral Consultations Rio conference due in June of that year.
1993: It was reported that formulation of the first phase would be complete by end of May of 1993 and that the draft report for Phase 1 would be presented in the East African Water Resources Seminar due later that year.
1994: It was noted that WAP would be ready by early June 1994 and that a National Seminar would be held towards the end of June.
1995: It was agreed that the WAP document would be made available to all those to be involved in its implementation and DWD was therefore requested to prepare a proposal for printing and distribution
1996: The Danish Delegation commended the formulation and implementation of the WAP which they said was consistent with Danida’s water sector strategy.
Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: B. The project contributed to developing the framework for sustainable use of one of the most important resources for poor people and therefore adherence to policy goals concerning poverty. Adherence to cross-cutting issues: B. The project addressed environmental concerns related to water use and preservation. Although there was no explicit reference to gender, one of the principles that guided the formation of the WAP was that women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water. Relevance: B. The project addressed the problem of indiscriminate and uncoordinated exploitation of water and disposal of polluted water. In that context it was very relevant. Effectiveness: A. The project realised all its objectives and outputs. Efficiency: C. Although the project was implemented on time and on budget, it was achieved with a heavy input of expensive expatriate staff and also date: November 2006 TP2 Page 45
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favourable top-up allowances for local staff way beyond what Government officials get. Sustainability: B. The resulting actions and recommendations were translated into legal and policy instruments and mainstream government institutions. This therefore guarantees the sustainability. Poverty reduction: B. As a productive and a social resource, putting in place a framework for proper use and protection of water resources contributes to poverty reduction. Lesson Learning and Accountability: C. Lessons were learnt on the need to stagger TA inputs so that they can be absorbed and not to insist on very senior officers as counterparts as these are not always available and the opportunity for transfer of knowledge is foregone.
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Appendix 1d: RSPS 1
Danida File ref. no. and Road Sector Programme Support (Phase 1) RSPS1 Project Name(s) 104.Uganda.815 Description Phase 1, 1998–2002; DKK 398.5 million
Objectives: The RSPS1 supported the GOU Road Sector Development Programme (RSDP) whose objectives are (i) to provide an efficient, safe and sustainable road network; (ii) to improve managerial and operational efficiency of road administration; and (iii) to develop the domestic construction industry as part of the key measures to promote growth and eradicate poverty. Components: RSPS1 had three main components, namely: § Institutional Support for Coordination of the RSDP Implementation; § Trunk Road Rehabilitation of the Kampala – Fort Portal Corridor; and § Support to District Road Networks in six Districts of Apac, Lira, Gulu, Kitgum, Kotido and Moroto. The first component focused on institutional strengthening for implementation of RSDP. The Trunk Road rehabilitation component covered: bituminising of Mubende–Kyegegwa road (38.3km), upgrading to first-class gravel standard of Kyegewa–Kyenjojo road (51.5km) and resealing of Mityana–Mubende Road (85 km), while the District Road Networks covered rehabilitation of about 415km of feeder roads in 6 districts and rehabilitating, equipping of Mbale Labour-based Training Centre and a Community access programme in Lira District. Key documents 1. An Appraisal Report on RSPS Phase 1, Danida October, 1998 (including reviews and PCRs) Implementing agency Ministry of Works, Housing and Communication, Other donors involved World Bank was supporting the development of the Ten Year District Road investment Programme Issues raised in Agreed 1997: The Memorandum of understanding was signed between GOU and Danida for funding the RSPS1. Minutes of Annual Bilateral Consultations 1998: Danida agreed to provide financial support for RSPS1.
1999 The following issues were raised on RSPS1: § RAFU and Feeder roads desk were not yet established. GOU promised that they would be in place by June 1999. § Management Committee and Steering Committee not yet operational. Assurance by GOU was that they would be in place shortly. § Compensation on Mubende–Kyenjojo road had delayed and detours had not been included in the contract. § Mechanisms for payment of taxes and duty by the contractor were not adequately developed and were causing delays GOU promised to address all the above issues.
2000 Institutional support § Delayed recruitment of staff of RAFU was noted and GOU promised to address it § Support on the Preparation of the District Roads Strategy Paper was appreciated by GOU. date: November 2006 TP2 Page 47
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Trunk roads § Kyegegwa–Kyenjojo Road section was to be done to 1st class gravel road standard under RSPS1 with a possibility of bituminising under RSPS 2. § The issue of taxes and duties was negatively affecting the speed of project implementation. § The socio-economic fund component was appreciated by GOU and it was recommended for duplication elsewhere. § Valuation of property by third party (MWLE) was delaying the compensation process. District Road Networks § Mt. Elgon Labour-based Training Centre had been finished and was operational. § Equipment was delayed due to delayed funds for taxes. § Maintenance funding had been budgeted for by MOWHC. 2001 § MOWHC reported that the trunk road section was due to be completed ahead of schedule. § Danida reported that it was had not been possible to fund bituminising of Kyegegwa–Kyejojo section in the Phase 2 of RSPS due to insufficient funds. § Taxes: It was reported that GOU was doing its best to sort out the problem of delayed payment of taxes and one of the proposals being pursued was the releasing of funds for taxes to MOWHC monthly instead of quarterly. 2003 § It was reported by the Danish Delegation that the Danish Parliament had approved the RSPS2 in 2002. § Insecurity in Northern Uganda was negatively affecting the speed of the feeder roads component. A possibility of replacing the insecure districts with new ones was to be explored and presented by GOU for Danida’s approval. § On failure by Gulu District to provide funds for trial contracts for the contractors trained in Mt. Elgon Labour-based Training Centre, MOWHC informed the Danish Delegation that funds would be included in the budget for the FY 2003/04. § On the issue of fuel thefts on Mubende–Kyenjojo road, GOU promised to follow up and ensure that the cases are handled expeditiously. Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: C. Poverty reduction aspects addressed by rehabilitating trunk and feeder roads, rural agricultural producers could benefit from lower input prices and higher prices for their produce arising out of reduced transport costs and improved accessibility. Adherence to cross-cutting issues: (gender, environment, popular participation) C. (Both the trunk road and feeder roads components addressed the cross- cutting issues. For example the labour-based methods have strongly emphasised involvement of women in maintenance of rural roads. Relevance: B. (Assistance provided by Danida is a key contribution in both the infrastructure and institutional related aspects of the ongoing GOU’s RSDP). Effectiveness: B. The project contributed to providing a safe and efficient road network, expanding the local construction industry especially through training and contracting labour- based contractors. Institutional strengthening at local level was also achieved to a large extent. However, institutional reform at national level was less effective. Efficiency: C. (Other than the Institutional support component whose activities experienced delays, the other two components were implemented on time and within the estimated budgets. However, the defects liability period for the trunk road component, i.e. Mubende–Kyegegwa section, was 3½ years instead of the usual 1 year due to insufficient compaction on earthworks and low standard culvert pipes with resulting cracking already identified). Sustainability: D. (This is still a challenge and will be addressed when GOU is able to raise sufficient local revenue to sustain the investment. However, the training carried out, road design and planning manual produced contribute to the sustainability efforts). Poverty reduction: C. (As long as there is regular maintenance of roads and supplementary measures are put in place to encourage agricultural production, investment in roads has a high potential for facilitating poverty eradication initiatives). Lesson Learning and Accountability: B. (Institutional reforms in the road sector have taken longer than anticipated to an extent that the Roads Authority and Restructuring MOWHC are yet to be accomplished. Trunk road rehabilitation requires supplementary measures to curb the negative effects of road upgrading such as overloading and increase in road traffic accidents).
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Appendix 1e: RSPS 2
Danida File ref. no. and Road Sector Programme Support (Phase 2) RSPS2 Project Name(s) 104.Uganda.815 Description Phase 2, (2003–2007) DKK 266.1 million RSPS2 is a follow-up programme of the Danida funded RSPS1 implemented during the period 1998–2002.
The development objective of RSPS2 is “creation of sustainable road administrations and funding mechanisms for developing and maintaining all levels of roads in support of economic and social development”. The RSPS2 seeks to reduce transportation costs and improve accessibility to economically productive and/or socially important areas by supporting road network systems with sustainable maintenance ultimately financed by the GOU.
The immediate objective of RSPS2 is that capacity in the private and public sectors for the planning and implementation of rehabilitation and maintenance road works using labour-based methods is expanded
Components: RSPS2 has five main components namely: § Component 1: National Road Sector Institutions (DKK 41.3 million). § Component 2: National Labour-based Training (DKK 33.4 million) § Component 3: National Gravel Roads (DKK 74.2 million). § Component 4: District Roads (DKK 58.5million) § Component 5: Community Access (DKK 25.0 million).
The Government Agreement was signed by the Government of Uganda and the Government of Denmark in December 2002. Implementation of the Components’ activities commenced in 2003 and ends in 2007. Key documents 1. An Appraisal Report on RSPS Phase 2, Danida, October 2002 (including reviews and 2. Component Description for each of the five components, 2002 PCRs) 3. RSPS1 Project Completion Report, 2003 4. Annual Reviews Aide Memoires, 2003–2005 Implementing agency Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications Other donors involved World Bank is supporting the studies for upgrading some District roads to national road standard from the programme area Issues raised in Agreed 2005 Minutes of Annual The JASR 2005 recommendations are summarised as follows (Annual Review Aide Memoire, October, 2005): Bilateral Consultations · Continued support during 2006 should be provided to MOWHC and MFPED at the current level, but new coordination mechanisms should be considered in light of the reform process; · The business plan for MELTC should be finalised incorporating outreach services for districts that have not had the opportunity for comprehensive training; · Package 1 and 2 of the National Gravel Roads Component should be implemented, but Package 3 should be given up and surplus budget reallocated to the District Roads Component; · District roads budget should be increased through reallocation from the National Roads Component and unallocated funds; · The community access concept needs to be clarified and the current project portfolio reviewed in order to ensure consistency with the concept; and · The functions of the Technical Support Unit should be reviewed and clarified.
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2004 The main recommendations of the JASR 2004 (Annual Review Aide Memoire, October, 2005) are that: · Continued support should be provided to MOWHC and MFPED, anticipating that the reformed institutional set-up will basically be in place during 2005; · The high reliance on long-term consultancy input should be scaled down to enable the partner institutions to take over increased responsibilities; · The capacity development efforts in labour-based methods at Mount Elgon Labour-based Training Centre should be continued – emphasising its national role; · The efforts to introduce labour-based contracting methods for national gravel roads should be continued; · The district roads maintenance and rehabilitation concept should be further consolidated; and · The community access concept based on identical methods for district roads should be promoted in selected districts.
Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: C. Poverty reduction aspects are being addressed by use of labour-based methods, and by rehabilitating trunk and feeder roads, rural agricultural producers could benefit from lower input prices and higher prices for their produce arising out of reduced transport costs and improved accessibility. Adherence to cross-cutting issues: (gender, environment, popular participation) B. (Most components are addressing the cross-cutting issues. For example, the labour-based methods have strongly emphasised involvement of women in maintenance of rural roads. Relevance: B. (Assistance provided by Danida is a key contribution in both the infrastructure and institutional related aspects of the ongoing GOU’s RSDP). Effectiveness: C. Although the project is still ongoing indications point to effective outcomes. Outcomes from labour training, district roads and community roads are promising. Although behind schedule, support to national road sector institutions and national gravel roads is also beginning to pick up momentum. Efficiency: C. (On average most components are being implemented in the allocated time frame apart from the National Roads component which is lagging behind and some of its funds had to be allocated to the District Roads Component. Insecurity has also contributed to delays especially on the District Roads Component where some districts had to be replaced due to insecurity). Effectiveness: Sustainability: D. (This is still a challenge and will be addressed when GOU is able to raise sufficient local revenue to sustain the investment. Hopefully the training carried out will contribute to the sustainability efforts. In addition, sustainability is being assured through the political commitment by GOU to continue with the road sector reforms and to increase maintenance funding gradually until fully funded by GOU in 2007/08). Poverty reduction: C. (As long as there is regular maintenance of roads and supplementary measures are put in place to encourage agricultural production, investment in roads has a high potential for facilitating poverty eradication initiatives). Lesson Learning and Accountability: B. (Institutional reforms in the road sector have taken longer than anticipated to an extent that the Roads Authority and Restructuring MOWHC are yet to be accomplished. While labour-based methods have a potential in poverty eradication there is need for more time to sensitise those who are still sceptical, as well as to put in place enabling policies to support labour-based methods).
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Appendix 1f: Renovation of Entebbe Airport
Danida File ref. no. and Renovation of Entebbe Airport Project Name(s) 104.Uganda.52 Descripti on Renovation of Entebbe Airport 1994–1996 (DKK 165 million)
The project aimed at improving the air transport infrastructure in order to encourage tourism and air freighted exports and imports, and hence increase foreign earnings to boost and sustain Uganda’s economic growth. The objective would be achieved by making Entebbe Airport an International Airport with improved and commercially sustainable airport services catering for wide-bodied aircraft in accordance with ICAO requirements. The project was implemented during the period 1994–1996 and covered the following components as detailed in the Appraisal Document of June 1994 and the Project Completion Report of 1997: rehabilitation of the Runway 17-35 and taxiways and sealing of Runway 12-30, buildings, sewerage and drainage systems, power supply, airfield ground lighting, aeronautical, telecommunications and meteorological installations.
Key documents 1. An Appraisal Report on Airport Rehabilitation Project, Danida June 1994 (including reviews and 2. Airport Rehabilitation Project Completion Report, October 1996 PCRs) 3. Annual Reviews Reports, 1994–1998 Implementing agency Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications, and Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). Other donors involved Spain (Main Terminal Building Rehabilitation) and USAID (A Cold Store constructed). Issues raised in Agreed 1994 Minutes of Annual § Satisfactory appraisal had been done Bilateral Consultations § Agreement was to be signed before October 1994. § Construction to start thereafter.
1995 § Project was to start on 9th January 1995 § Project office had been established in the main Terminal Building.
1996 § Works were expected to be completed in May. § Delays experienced with asphalting the runway. § Need to give attention to maintenance capacity in order to ensure sustainability. § Delays experienced by the contract on processing import declaration documents in the Bank.
1997 § Works were completed in August 1996. A Review held in September 1997 revealed the following: § Maintenance capacity of CAA needed strengthening as it was necessary for sustaining the facilities provided by the Danida project. § The need for Staff Training for proper management and maintaining project facilities such as Navigation Facilities was emphasised. § Funding: CAA was advised to identify other sources of funding to ensure sustainability of the Airport operations. § Sustainability had not been adequately addressed in the design and during implementation; its discussion was however deferred to the next annual review.
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1998 § Delays in Handling an Arbitration case were raised by Danida whereby the Contractor was demanding payment of an extra 20 m DKK for extra works done. The review report of 1997 had raised the issue of the need for additional funding for maintenance. GOU promised to address the two issues expeditiously. § All claims arising out of the failure for GOU to meet its obligations were to be met by GOU. § The outstanding repair works on the apron (drainage and sealing of joints) were still expected to be carried out as part of the existing grant obligations. § Maintenance support challenges and other works were to be supported by a limited grant funding from Danida
Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: C Poverty reduction aspects were being addressed indirectly i.e. the rehabilitated airport is expected to facilitate an increase in traffic for trade (exports) and tourism. GOU gets increased revenue from trade and tourism for injecting in poverty reduction interventions. Adherence to cross-cutting issues: (gender, environment, popular participation) C. (The key cross-cutting issue was environment and the contractor adhered to the contractual obligations regarding the environment) Relevance: B. (Assistance provided by Danida was relevant in that the airport facilities had been run down due to economic and political mismanagement. On completion of the rehabilitation works, three new airlines started using the airport. It was also revealed (though with no statistical evidence) that both passenger and freight traffic volumes increased after rehabilitation. This implies that there was suppressed demand due to poor infrastructure and facilities at the airport before rehabilitation). Effectiveness: A. The infrastructure was improved significantly, passenger traffic and volume of exports increased. Efficiency: B. (On average most components were implemented in the allocated time-frame and cost apart from civil works on the apron that required additional funding. There was proper coordination and collaboration between the relevant implementing agencies, i.e. CAA, Contractor, MOWT and Danida. Effective supervision was enhanced by MOWT appointing a full-time Civil Engineer as a Project Coordinator who was stationed at the Airport) Sustainability: D. (This is still a challenge and will be addressed when GOU is able to raise sufficient local revenue to sustain the investment. Hopefully the training carried out will contribute to the sustainability efforts. In addition, sustainability is being assured through the political commitment by GOU to continue with the road sector reforms and to increase maintenance funding gradually until fully funded by GOU in 2007/08.) Poverty reduction: C. (As long as some of the high value goods such as fruit and fish exported through the rehabilitated airport are produced by the poor, then investment in air transport improvement has some potential for reducing poverty.) Lesson Learning and Accountability: B. (Maintenance capacity of CAA was weak by the end of the project. Therefore, Infrastructure improvement projects should always have a component for Institutional strengthening of the relevant implementing Agencies to enhance sustainability. Proper coordination between the Implementing Agencies (CAA & MOWT), Contractors and the Donor (Danida) provided for effective supervision leading to project completion on time and relatively within cost).
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Appendix 1g: Port Bell Ferry Terminal Rehabilitation
Danida File ref. no. and Port Bell Ferry Terminal Rehabilitation Project Project Name(s) 104.Uganda.23 Description Port Bell Ferry Terminal Rehabilitation Project 1988–1991 (DKK 101.32 million)
§ This was the first project funded in 1988 in the transport sector (railway sub-sector) in Uganda. § The main objective of the project was to support the development of Uganda’s infrastructure and thereby contribute to the export market. § The main component was the rehabilitation of the Port Bell Ferry terminal § The project which was initiated in 1988 was completed in 1991. § The contract experienced some delays in piling the harbour. § By 1992 the rehabilitated terminal was in use. § The evaluation team was not able find the data on its utilisation after repair due to inadequate record keeping. However, the improved terminal facilitated better handling of freight to and from the Port Bell.
§ The benefits from the improved terminal were short-lived due to the water hyacinths that invaded the terminal in 1996. § Water hyacinths affected the proper landing of ferries causing them to ram into fenders and the link span systems. By 1997 the link span and fender systems had been seriously damaged due the problem of water hyacinths. The situation required emergency repairs on the fenders yet Uganda Railways Corporation (URC) did not have the funds for the repairs. § The evaluation team established that URC’s request for a follow-up project in 1997 was not supported by Danida due to a change in strategy to supporting other sectors such as: Health, Agriculture and Roads.
Key documents 1: Annual Reviews Reports, 1989–1997 (including reviews and PCRs) Implementing agency Uganda Railways Corporation (URC) Other donors involved EU Issues raised in Agreed 1989 Minutes of Annual § Agreed between GOU and Danida to embark on Rehabilitation of the Ferry Terminal at Port Bell. Bilateral Consultations 1990 § Contract negotiations for the terminal rehabilitation were making good progress.
1991 § Danida expressed concern on delays in piling the harbour by the contractor and GOU promised to follow up to ensure that the contractor completed the piling of the harbour.
1992 § Danida requested Information on utilisation of Ferry terminal from GOU.
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1996 Water Hyacinths problem to the rehabilitated Ferry Terminal: § Caused ferries to ram into fenders and link span system. § Facilities were being damaged hence a long-term solution proposed by Danida. § Emergency repairs recommended on the fenders
1997 § Link span and fender systems had been seriously damaged due the problem of Water hyacinths. § Additional Support from Danida was subject to URC clearing Ferry Terminal yet URC did not have the capacity to clear the area. § Short-term technical assistance was to be considered by Danida
Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: D. Poverty reduction aspects were being addressed indirectly i.e. the rehabilitated Ferry Terminal was expected to facilitate an increase in freight traffic for exports and imports. Increased revenue from trade would be injected in poverty reduction interventions. Adherence to cross-cutting issues: (gender, environment, popular participation) D. (The key cross-cutting issue was environment – URC did not have the capacity to address the Water Hyacinths problem). Relevance: B. (Assistance provided by Danida was relevant in that the Ferry Terminal had been run down due to economic and political mismanagement. On completion of the rehabilitation works, freight volume increased (though with no statistical evidence). This implies that there was suppressed demand due to poor infrastructure and facilities at the Ferry Terminal before rehabilitation). Effectiveness: C. The immediate results of increased traffic were positive but were undermined by external factors e.g. water hyacinth infestation. Efficiency: D. (Delays were experienced by the contractor in piling the harbour) Sustainability: D. (This was a challenge because it could have not been thought about at design. However, the challenge of the water hyacinth from 1996 onwards was an external factor that negatively affected the terminal operations beyond the capacity of URC to handle. Perhaps a follow-up project could have enhanced sustainability). Poverty reduction: C. (This depended on whether the rehabilitated Ferry Terminal was used for exporting agricultural produce from the poor farmers. The evaluation team could not access data for verification purposes). Lesson Learning and Accountability: C. (Maintenance capacity of URC was weak by the end of the project. Therefore, Infrastructure improvement projects should always have a component for Institutional strengthening of the relevant implementing Agencies to enhance sustainability. External Factors such as the Water Hyacinths problem can hinder realisation of the project objectives. While it is difficult to predict external factors, at project design summarising the project using a logical framework matrix helps to highlight potential external factors in the assumptions and risks column of the log frame).
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Appendix 1h: Wagon Maintenance Project
Danida File ref. no. and Wagon Maintenance Project Project Name(s) 104.Uganda.41 Description 1992–1994 (DKK 13.9 million)
The project was initiated in 1989 and in the same year an agreement was made between Danida and URC whereby Danida provided financial support to the tune of DKK 13.9 million for the rehabilitation of 1,050 wagons.
The major aim of the project was to improve railway transport by ensuring that wagons were readily available to the transporters
Objectives: § To assist URC to obtain by the end of the project an active fleet of well-maintained wagons capable of handling the required tonnage and load varieties such that this would assist URC in establishing the capability for continuing to maintain that fleet by URC’s own effort § To re-establish an effective wagon maintenance and repair and organisation for and with URC.
Expected outputs were: § The depots of Kampala and Tororo refurbished and equipped with a running stock of spare parts and tools. § Management supervisors and staff of the organisation trained to run the organisation correctly. § Approximately 1,050 wagons of assorted types examined and/or repaired.
The appraisal which commenced in 1990 was completed in September 1991 with some delays. The contract for the repair of wagons was signed in 1992.
§ The annual review carried out in 1994 revealed substantial progress. Project implementation was strengthened by two Danish advisors who provided technical advice to URC in the first twelve months after project completion in 1994. § In terms of the project results, the contribution for Danida for repair of railway wagons was substantial in that 1,050 out of 1,350 freight wagons (78%) were repaired. The project was a boost to the railway sector since some of the wagons were as old as 13 years and many were in urgent need of repair. No information was available to the evaluation team on how much the repairs increased freight volume.
Key documents 1. Agreement between GOU and Danida, 1st May 1992 (including reviews and 2. Annual Reviews Reports, 1989–1997 PCRs) Implementing agency Uganda Railways Corporation (URC) Other donors involved EU (145 New Wagons), KfW ( Support to Nalukolongo Locomotive Workshop), ADB (Proposal for Carriage and Wagon workshop) Issues raised in Agreed 1989 Minutes of Annual § Danida agreed to GOU’s request to provide financial support for rehabilitation of 1,050 Railway Wagons. Bilateral Consultations 1990 § Appraisal had been delayed and Danida argued URC/consultant to speed up the appraisal process.
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1991 § Appraisal of the project was completed.
1992 § Contract signed for the rehabilitation of the wagons.
1994 § Review of the project noted substantial progress. § Sustainability had been taken care of at design. § Two advisors were to visit twice in the first 12 months to orient the managers that were to take over.
1997 § URC requested a follow-up project due to backlog maintenance. § Project not approved due to change of focus to other sectors of health, agriculture and roads.
Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: D. Poverty reduction aspects were being addressed indirectly i.e. the rehabilitated wagons were expected to facilitate an increase in freight traffic for exports and imports. Increased revenue from these imports and exports would be injected in poverty reduction interventions. Adherence to cross-cutting issues: (gender, environment, popular participation) D. (It is not clear whether any cross-cutting issues were taken care of by the project). Relevance: B. (Assistance provided by Danida was very relevant in that some wagons as old as 13 years were in urgent need of repair, yet URC did not have the required funds for the repairs). Effectiveness: B. The URC wagon fleet were brought into service and a maintenance system was put in place. Efficiency: B. (The project was completed within the planned period and estimated cost.) Sustainability: D. (Sustainability had been taken care of at design. However, on completion of the project it was realised that there was backlog maintenance. This implies that the anticipated sustainability of the project by URC had not materialised. Perhaps a follow-up project could have enhanced sustainability). Poverty reduction: C. (It is possible that the rehabilitated wagons could have been used for exporting agricultural produce from the poor farmers. This could have contributed to poverty reduction. However, the evaluation team could not access data for verification purposes). Lesson Learning and Accountability: C. (Maintenance capacity of URC was not enhanced despite the project interventions. Therefore, Infrastructure improvement projects should always have a component for Institutional strengthening of the relevant implementing Agencies to enhance sustainability).
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Appendix 1i: Feeder Roads Component under NURP
Danida File ref. no. and Feeder Road Component under the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme Project Name(s) 104.Uganda.54 Description 1995–1997 (DKK 27.3 million)
§ Danish support to the road sector started in 1996 with the feeder roads component under the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP). § The overall development objective was the short and medium-term reconstruction of essential and social infrastructure in the secure areas of the north to restore the economic productivity of the region. § The immediate objective was the development of road planning and maintenance in the district administrations of Gulu, Kitgum, Lira and Apac. Feeder roads in the region were in a very poor state arising out of the past neglect. The situation in the north was worsened by insecurity that had brought most government services almost to a stand-still. § The component covered 4 districts in northern Uganda, i.e. Gulu, Kitgum, Lira and Apac, and focused on feeder road rehabilitation/ maintenance and strengthening the districts’ technical and financial capacities for feeder road maintenance
Key documents 1. Danida– Project Appraisal Document of July,1996 (including reviews and 2. Agreement between GOU and Danida, 4 July 1996 PCRs) 3. Annual Reviews Reports, 1993–1996 Implementing agency Ministry of Local Government Other donors involved IDA’s Economic Recovery Credit (Feeder Road Rehabilitation Units in each of the 4 districts), ADB (Feeder Roads Rehabilitation in 24 Districts) Issues raised in Agreed 1993 Minutes of Annual § Request for project financing made to Danida. Bilateral Consultations § Feasibility completed
1994 § Formulation completed.
1995 § Project start up had been delayed due to instability in some of the project districts. § The project was expected to be approved in June and start in August 1995.
1996 § Project approved at a total cost of DKK 27.3million in January 1996. § Effectiveness was in July 1996. § The project concentrated on safe districts.
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Impact summary Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: 2. Poverty reduction aspects were being addressed indirectly, i.e. the rehabilitated roads were expected to facilitate an increase in agricultural production, leading to poverty reduction among the households in the project districts). Adherence to cross-cutting issues: (gender, environment, popular participation) C. (Gender issues could have been adequately addressed if labour-based methods were used instead of mobile road gangs. The concept of labour-based methods was still being developed). Relevance: B. (Assistance provided by Danida was very relevant in that the feeder roads needed rehabilitation). Effectiveness: B. The road planning and maintenance capacity in the project districts were strengthened and identified roads were repaired and maintained. The use of gangs also prepared the ground for introduction of labour based maintenance methods Efficiency: C. (The project could have been completed within the planned period and estimated cost if it was not for insecurity in the project area). Sustainability: D. (Sustainability was greatly undermined by insecurity in the project area). Poverty reduction: C. (The project’s main focus was on poverty reduction in that by rehabilitating feeder roads, the poor farmers were being facilitated to produce more. However, insecurity could have undermined increased agricultural production). Lesson Learning and Accountability: C (Maintenance capacity of URC was not enhanced despite the project interventions. Therefore, Infrastructure improvement projects should always have a component for Institutional strengthening of the relevant implementing Agencies to enhance sustainability).
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Appendix 2: Water and Sanitation Sector Budget
Table 2a: Share of Donor and GOU Contribution to the Water and Sanitation Sector Budget
Financial Year Donor GOU Total 2001/02 106,305 54,040 160,345 2002/03 163,335 48,750 212,085 2003/04 87,267 60,371 147,638 2004/05 109,909 46,844 156,753 2005/06 97,692 58,680 156,372
Source: MWLE, 2005
Figure 2a: Contribution of Donors and GOU to the Water and Sanitation Budget
180,000 163,335 160,000
140,000 106,305 120,000 109,909 97,692 100,000 87,267 Donor 80,000 GO 54,040 48,750 60,371 58,680 U 60,000 46,844 40,000 20,000 Budget (UGS Millions) - 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
Source: MWLE, 2005
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Table 2b: Percentage Contribution of the Donors and GOU to the Water and Sanitation Sector Budget
Financial Year Donor GOU Total 2001/02 66% 34% 100% 2002/03 77% 23% 100% 2003/04 59% 41% 100% 2004/05 70% 30% 100% 2005/06 62% 38% 100%
Source: MWLE, 2005
Figure 2b: Percentage Contribution of the Donors and GOU to the Water and Sanitation Sector Budget
90% 77% 80% 70% 66% 70% 62% 59% 60% 50% Donor 34% 41% 38% 40% 30% GOU 30% 23% 20% 10% 0% 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
Source: MWLE, 2005
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Appendix 3: Timeline, Programmes and Major Projects 1987–
Task Name Start Finish 86 87 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Water Tue 1-1-91 Mon 31-12-07 Water
RUWASA Tue 01-01-91 Sun 31-12-00 Uganda Water Action Plan Mon 01-02-93 Tue 31-01-95 Water Resources Services Sat 01-06-96 Wed 30-05-01
WSPS I Wed 11-02-98 Mon 31-03-03
WSPS II Sat 01-03-03 Mon 31-12-07
Transport Thu 1-12-94 Mon 31-12-07 Transport
Renovation of Entebbe Airport Thu 01-12-94 Sat 31-08-96 86 87 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 Northern Feeder Roads Tue 01-10-96 Thu 30-09-99
RSPS I Thu 01-01-98 Mon 31-12-01
RSPS II Wed 01-01-03 Mon 31-12-07
Energy Wed 1-11-95 Sat 01-08-98 Energy
Transmission Line Owen Fall to Kampala Wed 01-11-95 Sat 01-08-98
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 3 –
Health and HIV/AIDS
Veronica Walford
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS
Contents
1. Introduction...... 1
2. Starting point and evolution of the health sector...... 1
3. What have donors in general been doing? ...... 3
4. The scope and an assessment of Danida support ...... 5 1987–1993 Essential Drugs Supplies and Restoration of the Supply System...... 6 a) What has Danida been doing? ...... 6 b) Outcomes and assessment of Danida contribution in the early phase...... 7 1993–2002 Institutional Development, District Support, Health Sector Programme Support Phase 1 (HSPS 1)...... 8 a) What has Danida been doing? ...... 8 b) Outcomes and assessment of Danida contribution: Institutional Development for Drug Sector, District Support, HSPS 1...... 9 2002–2005 Health Sector Programme Support Phases 2 and 3 (HSPS 2 and HSPS 3)...... 12 a) What has Danida been doing? ...... 12 b) Outcomes and assessment of Danida contribution: 2002–2005 HSPS 2 and HSPS 3...... 13 Support for HIV/AIDS ...... 16 a) What has Danida been doing? ...... 16 b) Outcomes and Assessments of Danida’s Contribution: Support for HIV/AIDS. 17
5. Overall assessment and conclusions ...... 18 Danish Contribution to the Sector – Relevance and Value ...... 18 Aid Instruments and Approaches ...... 20 Implementation...... 21
Bibliography ...... 24
Tables
Table 1: Government and PNFP Facilities 1992 and 2001...... 1 Table 2: Danish Support Linked to the Evolution of the Health Sector ...... 6
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Annexes Annex 1: Summary of Danida Support to Health & HIV/AIDS 1987–2005...... 28 Table 1.1: Major projects and programmes considered in this review ...... 28 Table 1.2: Smaller projects (not looked at in detail) ...... 32 Annex 2: Health Sector Performance ...... 34 Table 2.1: Selected indicators, from the Annual Health Sector Performance Report 2004/05...... 34 Figure 2.1: Comparison of infant mortality rates (Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania) ...... 34 Figure 2.2: Comparison of equity in outcomes and access to services (Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania)...... 35
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS
Acronyms and abbreviations
ADB African Development Bank AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome AMREF African Medical and Research Foundation ARV anti–retroviral CBHC Community Based Health Care CMS Central Medical Stores (precursor of National Medical Stores) Danida Danish International Development Agency (before 1991) Danish International Development Assistance (after 1991) DKK Danish Kroner DFID Department for International Development (UK) DHS Demographic and Health Survey DHT District Health Team DISH Delivery of Improved Services for Health DRC Danish Red Cross EC European Commission EDF European Development Fund EDP Essential Drugs Programme GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation GFATM Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria GOU Government of Uganda GTZ German Technical Cooperation Agency (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) HPAC Health Policy Advisory Council HIV/AIDS Human Immuno-deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome HMIS Health Management Information System HSPS Health Sector Programme Support (Danish support) HSSP Health Sector Strategic Plan (National sector programme) KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German development bank) MAP Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Programme for Africa (World Bank) MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development MOH Ministry of Health MOU Memorandum of Understanding NDA National Drug Authority NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NMS National Medic al Stores PAF Poverty Action Fund PCR Project Completion Report PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (President Bush) PHC Primary Health Care PNFP Private Not For Profit STI Sexually Transmitted Infection SWAp Sector Wide Approach TA Technical Assistance TASO The AIDS Support Organisation
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
TB Tuberculosis TYP Three Year Health Plan Frame (Ministry of Health) Sida Swedish international development cooperation agency UEDMP Uganda Essential Drugs Management Programme UEDSP Uganda Essential Drugs Support Programme USD US Dollars UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development WB World Bank WHO World Health Organization
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS
1. Introduction
1.1 This paper is one output from the evaluation of the Danish Government’s support to Uganda from 1987–2005. The evaluation study is taking place from April to September 2006. This paper reflects work on Danish support to the health sector and on HIV/AIDS. The work is based on a review of documents from the period, intervie ws that took place during a two-week visit to Uganda in early June 2006, and telephone interviews with key players who are no longer based in Uganda.
1.2 Denmark has provided substantial support to the health sector over the period of the evaluation and has been one of the largest bilateral donors to the sector. This paper focuses on the major bilateral support during the period. It also looks at the major allocatio n related to HIV/AIDS which was support for The AIDS Support Organisation (TASO), a Ugandan non governmental organisation (NGO ). There are some other projects with NGOs which have not been looked at in detail. Annex 1, Table 1. 1 provides a description of the main projects and programmes and Annex 1, Table 1. 2 gives brief summaries of other interventions.
2. Starting point and evolution of the health sector
2.1 By 1986 the health system in Uganda was in disarray. Public sector services were near collapse, with dilapidated facilities, few staff in post and inadequate funding and supplies to operate with. The private not-for-profit (PNFP) services, which are mainly church-run health services, were in a slightly better state and were the only functioning service pr oviders in many areas of the country. The PNFP health services were and continue to be a substantial source of health care in Uganda, as indicated in the figures for numbers of facilities in Table 1 below. Their importance in the late 1980s and 1990s was greater than these numbers suggest as they often had higher utilisation than Government services (despite typically charging higher fees to patients), because of better availability of staff and drugs.
Table 1: Government and PNFP Facilities 1992 and 2001
1992 2002 Type of facility Government PNFP Government PNFP Hospital 55 40 55 42 Health Centres & smaller units 1,032 318 1,924 564
Total 1,087 358 1,979 606
Sources: MOH Three Year Health Plan Frame 1993/4 –1995/6, 1993; Lochoro et al, 2006. Notes: excludes private for profit providers.
2.2 Key steps in the evolution of the health sector include: § In the late 1980s and early 1990s the focus was on rehabilitation of facilities, restoring functionality to deliver public services, and starting to develop health policy and the capacity of the Ministry of Health (MOH) to plan for the sector and coordinate donors and NGOs in health. date: November 2006 TP3 Page 1
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS
§ This resulted in development of the Three Year Health Plan Frame (TYP) in 1993 for the period 1993/941 to 1995/96. This plan frame provided a guiding strategy for allocation of resources and for district health plans. The TYP had two main strategies: focus on restoring the functionality of health services by increasing their quality through recurrent funding (avoiding building too many new facilities while existing ones were not operational) and expanding coverage of cost-effective services for major diseases such as malaria and AIDS, through a primary health care approach. § The plan frame approach was designed to fit with the increasing decentralisation to districts of more responsibility for service delivery, which was phased in from 1993/94–1995/96. This included delegated responsibility for hospitals and employment of medical staff, in addition to their previous roles in primary health services. This required greater planning and management capacity and substantially increased financial resources at district level. The role of MOH had to change to become more supportive, and to deal with quality assurance, rather than direct service delivery. MOH supported districts to develop plans consistent with the TYP. This included allowing districts to introduce user fees for public health services as a means to increase the funding base and to formalise informal charging. 2 § By the late 1990s, there was growing recognition of the role of the private sector , especially PNFP services, as part of the health system and of their financial interdependence wit h GOU services. During the mid-1990s some early contracting arrangements were put in place for districts which only had a PNFP hospital, but there was a focus within MOH and districts on ‘our own’ facilities. The PNFP sector was approaching collapse in the mid-1990s in the face of rising service delivery costs, falling external funding, and the need to keep user fees affordable while serving some of the poorest areas of the country (Lochoro et al., 2006). In response, the Government agreed to provide subsidies, in the form of conditional Poverty Action Fund (PAF) grants to PNFP health services in districts. § From 1997 the MOH initiated work on developing a health policy and strategy, and presented this to donors. This was developed with inputs from de velopment partners over a three-year period. The policy included greater decentralisation of management to Health Sub-Districts (county level) and expansion of facilities based on the administrative structure (Murindwa et al., 2006). § This culminated in the 2000/01–2004/05 Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP), which was introduced as part of a sector wide approach (SWAp). The strategic plan prioritised the delivery of a National Minimum Health Care Package, an approach popular internationally at that time. It also included expansion of health centres, a nationally defined strategy that is consistent with international thinking on services ‘close to the client’ (as in the report of the Commission for Macroeconomics and Health, for example). In the first few years to 2003/04, this showed good results in terms of outputs, supported by increased health budgets especially to district level. Annex 2 provides some health sector performance indicators. There were increasing allocations for PAF health budgets. However, the estimated cost of implementing the minimum health package in Health Sector Strategic P lan I (HSSP I) was USD 28 per capita per year, but the funding achieved was less than half of this.
1 The Government of Uganda (GOU) financial year runs from 1 July to 30 June. 2 These policies were consistent with the global thinking among development partners at that time in favour of both decentralisation and user fees for social services. However, decentralisation was very much a nationally driven agenda in Uganda. Allowing districts to set user fees for services was consistent with national decentralisation, and more politically acceptable (as the decision was made by local politicians). It was implemented in the face of some pressure from the World Bank to introduce fees on a national basis.
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§ The second HSSP (HSSP II) was developed and the programme started implementation from 1 July 2005. The policy directions were consistent with those in the first HSSP. However, from 2005–2006 sector progress has slowed. The Government health budget has stagnated and budget releases in 2005/06 have been delayed (and are as yet incomplete), as discussed further below. This has negative impacts on service delivery and relationships with partners.
3. What have donors in general been doing?
3.1 Development partners have provided substantial support for health and for HIV/AIDS in Uganda over the period. Per capita spending was estimated for 2000/01 as USD 18.3 per capita of which USD 3.3 was from Government, USD 5.0 from donors and USD 10.0 from private sources (80% of this from households, the rest from NGOs) (MOH Uganda, 2004b).3
3.2 In the early stages, donor support focused on rehabilitation of infrastructure (projects funded by European Development Fund (EDF), World Bank (WB) First Health Project, African Development Bank (ADB) to make services functional). Alongside this was support for recurrent costs and training, a major component being essential drug supplies (funded by Danida), and also including supply of Family Planning commodities (with funding from USAID, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), KfW); support for immunisation, respiratory infection and diarrhoeal disease programmes (supported by United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) with bilateral funding). There was support to some individual districts, where donors provided support, at times through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to various aspects including district planning and management, rehabilitation of facilities and training. The projects for district support varied in level of support and the approaches taken. Danida provided support for Mukono District during the period, with others such as the German aid agency (GTZ) and the European Commission (EC) working in other districts.
3.3 In the mid-1990s, the MOH took a stronger role in setting the framework for planning (the Three Year Plan Frame 1993–95) and assisting districts to plan within this, with the aims of bringing more consistency to external support, aligning it to Government priorities as well as more district ownership. MOH had also started to take a lead in donor coordination to ensure a better allocation of donor support and more consistency with the national strategy, with some success. From the donors, there was an increased focus on district services support and strengthening in line with decentralisation (e.g. World Bank (WB)/Sida District Health Services Project, EC in West Nile, DFID in Eastern Uganda, as well as long-running support to certain districts from e.g. Italy and GTZ). In this period Danida decided to support health in three Northern districts and became increasingly active in Rakai.
3.4 In parallel there was an expansion of specific AIDS projects, some of which were managed through the health sector, including funding from the WB (Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) project) and USAID (Delivery of Improved Services for Health project). The STI project included funding for NGOs to deliver HIV related services. It also provided medicines for STIs and condoms, although this input was poorly coordinated with other sources of drug supplies leading to wastage (Danish Red Cross, 2001).
3 See also NHA estimates by World Health Organisation of USD 20 per capita in 1994, of which USD 6 was public spending by Government and donors, with private spending of USD 14. This had increased from an estimated USD 15 (of which USD 4 public) in 1998. date: November 2006 TP3 Page 3
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3.5 Other donors funded NGOs directly to work on AIDS, including support to TASO from four donors in addition to the Danish (DFID, USAID, Sida, EC). In 1999 it was agreed to harmonise the support and align behind TASO’s strategic plan by providing basket funding with shared reporting arrangements. It was reported that Danida played a leading role in getting agreement on this appr oach which reduced the administrative burden on the NGO and enabled more flexible and efficient use of funds.
3.6 The development of the first HSSP was initiated by Government with World Health Organization (WHO) playing a role in coordinating the external partners and developing consensus on the plan. The donors were supportive of establishing a SWAp in health to support HSSP I. In-country partners and their colleagues from headquarters were involved in formulating the policy and strategy.
3.7 From 2000/01 HSSP I implementation started, with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between GOU and development partners signed in 2000. Some funding was provided as budget support into conditional health grants for districts; other donors have increased their funding through general budget support. The MOH encouraged donors to provide support through budget support so that the funds could be provided to districts in an integrated way. A Partnership Fund was set up with pooled funds at central level to enable preparation for implementation of HSSP. It was intended to fund technical assistance, government participation in reviews and costs for the Health Policy Advisory Council (HPAC) secretariat (see next paragraph) , and has continued as a mechanism to fund costs such as printing annual sector reports.
3.8 There was some success in increasing use of Government systems as a result. The numbers of projects declined during the HSSP I period. New policy review, coordination and monitoring mechanisms were introduced and seem to have worked well, including joint review missions originally held twice a year; a joint mid-term review; and a HPAC involving partners to discuss policy and progress. Health Development Partners also held monthly meetings.
3.9 However, there were additional monitoring activities beyond the joint review. This was because development partners continued to agree their funding with Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) and included in this their own conditionalities; some of these involved separate monitoring and evaluation activities as required by their headquarters (Ortendahl and de Loor, 2005). Hence there was only partial alignment with shared processes.
3.10 By 2003 a review of the Danish health sector programme concluded: There is now much greater predictability of both government and donor funding of the sector, after taking into account the average disbursement rate of donor funds (65% to 70%). The pattern of funding has also changed, with GOU contribution (including donor budget support) accounting for the greater part. Nine health development partners (Belgium, Denmark, European Union, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the World Bank) have moved to budget support (central or district), as compared to five health development partners at the onset of implementation of the HSSP. (MFA Danida, 2003: 19).
3.11 A new generation of AIDS projects and disease-focused programmes emerged in the early 2000s with the advent of the President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) funded by the US Government, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) and the World Bank Multi-country AIDS Programme (MAP) dominating in AIDS. These included the provision of anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs, more expensive malaria drugs , and other commodities. In addition the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations (GAVI) offered
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS countries supplies of new vaccines and Uganda opted to introduce the pentavalent vaccine (which has greatly increased the costs of immunisation). These funds provided mainly support in kind (e.g. GAVI) or were managed in parallel to SWAp structures and the sector plan (GFATM had its own management unit set up, PEPFAR funding was largely implemented by American and national NGOs).
3.12 HSSP II started in July 2005 following similar arrangements to HSSP I. However, there has been a decline in confidence among the partners in the SWAp process and the number of projects is reported to be increasing again. Several factors seem to have contributed to this , including: § The growth of global programmes providing targeted support for health and AIDS (GAVI, GF, PEPFAR) which arose because of international concern to increase funding for addressing major diseases. These became available after the strategy was agreed and were managed outside the sector programme. Whilst this led to an expansion of resources for health and AIDS, some see them as “undermining the SWAp” as they bypassed the mechanisms for coordination and planning. § Disappointment with the stagnation in levels of GOU funding for health. § Turnover in development partner staff as well as the Minister and other key players in MOH seems to have led to less commitment to SWAp principles and to a different leadership style (MFA Danida, 2005a : 12). § Policy issues between Government and development partners, e.g. a controversial proposal from the MOH in 2005 to introduce DDT spraying for malaria reduction. § Delays in MOH e.g. in production of the draft budget framework for 2005/06. § Delays and reduced levels of budget execution/releases prior to the election. § Problems in the management of the GFATM grants, culminating in suspension of the funds and subsequent exposure of misuse of funds.
4. The scope and an assessment of Danida support
4.1 Danish support to health and AIDS can be seen in three main phases, plus the support for HIV/AIDS; it is discussed under these phases below : § 1987–1992: initial support for drug supplies and rehabilitation of the medical stores; § 1992–2002: continued drug supply alongside institutional strengthening in the drug sector, plus strengthening district services in selected districts backed up by support to the central level MOH roles. The various projects were brought together into the first Danish Health Sector Programme Support (HSPS 1) from 1996–2002. § From 2003 with the second Health Sector Programme Support (HSPS 2), Danish support was more closely linked with the sector plan and processes including funding for district health services through the PAF; contributing to medicines funding through the credit lines (also PAF); and support to central functions and 17 northern districts. The third Danish HSPS started in July 2005 to coincide with the Government sector planning cycle and HSSP II. It covers similar areas to HSPS 2. Since it is in the early stages of implementation it is only touched on briefly here. § In parallel, from 1993 the country programme provided support for innovative HIV/AIDS interventions delivered by Ugandan NGOs.
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4.2 Annex 1 summarises the projects and programmes of support. Table 2 shows how the Danish support was linked with the evolution of the health sector described above.
Table 2: Danish Support Linked to the Evolution of the Health Sector
Year Ugandan health policy Danish support 1987/88 Recovery, restore basic services, Essential drugs programme providing drug 1988/89 rehabilitate facilities kits, managed by Danish Red Cross; repair of 1989/90 Medical Stores; support health information; 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 Decentralisation to districts, Three Year Essential drugs supply; institutional support 1994/95 Plan to improve service functioning, expand for National Medical Stores and National 1995/96 coverage of primary care for major diseases Drug Authority; Mukono district project; further construction at NMS; training in environmental health; support to TASO 1996/97 HSPS 1 1997/98 Develop Health Strategy, health sub-district Support to selected districts and central 1998/99 approach, negotiate SWAp, introduce functions including NMS 1999/00 subsidies for PNFP providers 2000/01 HSSP I Continue support for TASO and Straight Talk 2001/02 Removal of user fees 2002/03 Shift of donor funding into budget support HSPS 2 2003/04 to districts Some funds via PAF to districts, medicines 2004/05 SWAp mechanisms introduced such as credit line; extra funds for 17 northern HPAC and joint annual reviews districts; fund central activities Meanwhile, global initiatives come in Continued support for TASO et al (Global Fund, PEPFAR) 2005/06 Start HSSP II – 1 July 2005 Start HSPS 3 – 1 July 2005
1987–1993 Essential Drugs Supplies and Restoration of the Supply System a) What has Danida been doing? 4.3 Danish support to the Uganda Essential Drugs Management Programme (UEDMP) started in 1985 with an initial phase (1985–87) to supply drugs, managed by the Danish Red Cross (DRC). This built on work in the 1980s by the DRC in drug management and supply. The support was expanded and sustained in four further phases until 2001.
4.4 The support included supply of drugs for use in Government health facilities and in PNFP facilities. The drugs were mainly provided in the form of ‘drug kits’ that were procured and packed by DRC in Copenhagen. These were delivered to health facilities (initially some 600 facilities, rising to 1,200 by 1996) where the opening of kits was supervised by local community members. In the phases to 1990 there was also funding for repair of the Central Medical Stores (CMS) storage facilities, Technical Assistance (TA) for CMS in drug policy, training in rational drug use and work on the health information system. The Uganda Red Cross was supported to provide education to the public on essential drugs.
4.5 DRC established its own office and its own staff and procedures within the CMS to manage drug supplies. This separate structure was seen as necessary because of the lack of managerial and technical capacity in MOH to engage in matters around drug policy, procurement and supply (Danish Red Cross, 2001). Formally the counterpart for the support was the deputy director of medical services in the MOH.
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4.6 In 1990 a review indicated that there was a need for a longer-term approach to developing institutional capacity and become more developmental in approach. This would include transfer to Ugandan authorities and evolution to a support rather than a management programme. Support for a further 10 years was suggested, instead of ending in 1993 as previously envisaged. In the bridging period of 1991/92 the institutional proposals to make CMS a semi-autonomous institution – National Medical Stores (NMS) – and establish a National Drug Authority (NDA) were developed.
b) Outcomes and assessment of Danida contribution in the early phase 4.7 The Uganda Essential Drugs Management Programme (UEDMP) achieved a rapid and sustained improve ment in the availability of essential drugs and got these safe and basic drugs out to lower level units in rural areas where the poor live. This made a major contribution to restoring functionality of the health services.
4.8 The programme was poverty focused in ensuring that the drugs reached the poor and rural areas, to the extent these had health units in place. The drugs were selected to treat common diseases and these affect the poor. Although it was widely known that there was leakage and informal charging for the drugs once they reached the health units, at least it enabled access by the local population to safe medicines. The leakage before reaching health facility level was reported to be much lower than when drugs were sent not in sealed kits.
4.9 The policy of providing drugs to both the public sector and PNFP providers expanded the reach of the programme and its impact. The idea of working with the non-Government providers as part of the health system has become widely accepted in the last decade, but at the time was a forward-thinking approach to enhance impact of Danish support.
4.10 The approach to managing the programme – contracting its management to a Danish NGO (the DRC) – was a model that had been developed for emergency response and arguably was appropriate in the mid-1980s when it started. With hindsight, and in the light of current thinking on building sustainable capacity, more could have been done to build the involvement of Government and links with national structures earlier in the programme. An evaluation of the programme in Uganda and comparison with a drug programme in Ethiopia commissioned by the DRC itself concluded: In conclusion the UEDMP provided an appropriate response to a desperate situation with no drugs in the country. It established an efficient project organisation and management set-up. It tried from the very beginning to engage in general improvement of drug management with less success, partly because there was no plan ….. for these peripheral activities in the CMS although technical assistance was provided. The management set-up, although efficient, was inherently less geared towards collaboration with national institutions within a development perspective. In that sense the UEDMP can be seen as an emergency response where the management set-up could be justified with reference to the situation per se and the technical and managerial weakness of national institutions. The question is whether more could have been done ……. to incorporate national institutions from the beginning. (Danish Red Cross, 2001).
4.11 This reflects the challenge of transition from emergency to development modes of support that continues to be a topic of debate. Notwithstanding this, the contribution of providing safe drugs alongside training in rational treatment was significant and relevant to current debates on how to support health in fragile post-conflict states.
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4.12 In parallel with establishing the drug supplies system the support also helped to develop basic systems for storage (repairs to Central Medical Stores), health information and logistics. These have brought substantial benefits across the health system, for various programmes.
1993–2002 Institutional Development, District Support, Health Sector Programme Support Phase 1 (HSPS 1) a) What has Danida been doing? 4.13 Institutional reforms in the drug sector to make CMS a semi-autonomous institution, the National Medical Stores (NMS), and establish a National Drug Authority (NDA) to lead on drug policy and regulation moved forward in the mid-1990s. The resulting legislation meant that the NDA was less closely linked to MOH than originally envisaged, leading to drug policy being in the hands of a semi-autonomous agency rather than Government. This approach of establishing semi-autonomous agencies to carry out such functions was standard in development approaches at that time; it was the detailed implementation that left drug policy outside the MOH that has since been considered a mistake and was later reversed. Danida provided support to the NDA including TA and running costs until it became established with its own funding sources.
4.14 In the mid-1990s Danida also funded a significant construction programme at NMS, in parallel with the support via DRC. Its support to information systems continued with development of a more management focused Health Management Information System (HMIS), seen by the MOH as a key component of the system development. Earlier support was extended to increase capacity and develop institutional structures for equipment maintenance and environmental sanitation.
4.15 In addition Danida provided support to individual districts – initially to Mukono (near Kampala), then to three poor Northern districts (which subsequently were subdivided into five), including staff training, repair of health facilities, strengthening of planning and management and funding for district plans. International NGOs were involved in delivering this support.
4.16 In 1996 Danida shifted to provide its support through a Health Sector Programme Support (HSPS). This fit with the general Danish policy at the time of sector programme support, and covered only the Danish support; it was separate from the move to a sector wide approach between different donors and Government in health. The HSPS essentially aggregated the existing areas of support under the programme with a long-term adviser managing the programme, based in a programme office. Drug procurement was managed by Government under the programme, with DRC continuing to provide institutional support to NMS and NDA. Human resource development was supported. There were also funds to facilitate support from the central MOH to districts.
4.17 It was reported that Danida was a key player in encouraging development of the health sector strategy and sector approach in this period, which culminated in the first Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP). There was some disappointment from the Government side that the Danish did not then join others in providing sector budget support through the conditional health grants in the PAF to districts in the early stages of the first HSSP. This seems to reflect concerns about accountability. There had been several problems in the health sector with financial management and lack of accountability, including in the support to the Health Management Information System. Secondly, an audit commissioned by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) indicated that only a minority of funds was accounted for properly. This led to deterioration in relations between the Danish TA and the MOH as well as to concerns in Danida centrally that budget support was inadvisable. A fraud scandal in the NMS (not related to Danish
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS funds) contributed to a lack of confidence in Government financial management. The timing of the project cycle was perhaps also a factor as the first HSPS was under way before HSSP I started. b) Outcomes and assessment of Danida contribution: Institutional Development for Drug Sector, District Support, HSPS 1 4.18 In this phase there were more conscious efforts to develop systems and build capacity of institutions. There were two major targets for institutional capacity development – the NMS and NDA.
4.19 On NMS: the Danish support helped to introduce the change in legal status from CMS to NMS and provided substantial technical and financial assistance to NMS operations. Many commentators welcomed the sustained Danish support to NMS in the face of the challenges and setbacks. The challenges relate to the large amounts of public funds involved in drug procurement and the value of items bought and handled, in the context of governance standards and realities of corruption in Uganda. The challenges also relate to the behaviour of other donors, who were at times unwilling to pay the costs of NMS for storing and distributing the drugs and supplies they brought in, or recruited its staff. In addition there were cases of inadequate planning by government, which placed additional demands on NMS that were not fully funded or led to wastage (e.g. STI drugs, GFATM supplies). Despite its efforts to make NMS self-sustaining, these factors have meant that Danida has been asked several times for further support to recapitalise the NMS and provide TA.
4.20 The Danish support envisaged a particular parastatal model for NMS, whereby the organisation would operate on a semi-commercial basis, raising its income through the sale of drugs. This was planned at the same time as decentralisation was being developed in Uganda, with Danish support to policy and to its implementation. In retrospect there should have been better linkage across the different areas of Danish support, so that more thought was given to the implications of decentralisation of budgets to district level for the NMS model, and hence whether the NMS model and legislation was most appropriate. There is a basic inconsistency in approach between the decentralisation to districts for allocation and procurement decisions and the emphasis on a public sector drug provider with a social remit. There is not an obvious solution to this in Uganda or elsewhere; the situation reflects the enthusiasm for decentralisation at the time with limited experience of how to maintain core elements of the health system.
4.21 In Uganda the issue has been addressed creatively with several measures – conditional grants partly earmarked for drugs; guidelines from MOH to districts that they should buy from NMS whenever possible; and more recently the medicines credit line. But the policies were in development at the same time and would have benefited from addressing these issues at the start. There was not ‘joined up’ thinking on this within the Danish programme, with separate programmes, run by an NGO in health, exacerbated by the lack of Danish capacity in country to make the policy links between decentralisation and health support at that time. A decade later, the policies for how NMS should work with districts are still not entirely clear and consistent.
4.22 There have also been broader policy debates around NMS, including the proposal to privatise it which has emerged several times. This was seen in the original proposals as an option, but has been opposed by Danida in recent years, with a concern about the risk of lack of transparency in the sale of the NMS and about the social role of NMS. It has been suggested to the evaluation team that Danida was not adequately engaged in the policy debates to influence more the thinking on the role of NMS and its status. The TA provided strong technical support to the ‘project’ of strengthening NMS, but there was not the level and calibre of policy engagement to tackle some of these high level issues in the face of pressure from the World Bank and other date: November 2006 TP3 Page 9
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS interests. There have also been issues on the governance structures including responsibility of the Board, and potential conflicting roles of the Health Minister, that could perhaps have been addressed at an earlier stage.
4.23 There is some consensus that the kit system of drug provision went on for too long, and that an earlier transition to a “pull” system (whereby health facilities and districts order the drugs they need) would have had benefits for capacity building as well as efficiency. The Project Completion Report (PCR) for HSPS 1 says “Prolongation of the kit supply system worked against the development objectives at NMS” (MFA Danida, 2003: 3). The report suggested that NMS could have become involved more in assembling kits and spent less time on maintaining a separate system for managing and tracking the kits. It is unclear why it took so long to change over.
4.24 Despite these comments it is also clear that performance of NMS improved over the period. The PCR also found that NMS was achieving favourable prices for drugs procured through international tender (ibid.: 32) , which is part of the justification for having a central drug procurement function. The vast majority of those interviewed felt that Danish support for NMS had made a major contribution to its capacity, even if there remains scope for improvement.
4.25 The NDA seems to have been more successful experience of developing new institutions on a sustainable basis (although the 2003 PCR raised concerns over NDA’s funding and the need for further reforms). The NDA has a key role in the health system of any country in protecting public health, and the success in establishing such an institution from scratch, which is seen as a model by others in Africa, is congratulated. The challenges were less than those for NMS in that there was less funding involved, but it is still an area where there is scope for corruption and political interference. There has been recognition that the law combining drug policy and regulatory functions in NDA was not appropriate; arguably Danish expertise could have identified this and recommended a more appropriate model early on. It has been addressed in HSPS 2 and HSPS 3 with support to strengthen drug policy functions within MOH.
4.26 The second major area of support was to district health services. This included repairs to facilities as well as planning, management, training and recurrent funding for activities.
4.27 The choice of Northern districts for support in HSPS 1 seems to have reflected concerns over poverty and their capacity to provide health care, due to continuing instability. The support was intended to systematically strengthen district planning, management and services. The mode of support was seen by some as having an overly project style, at a stage when the GOU was trying to shift to budget support through a single funding channel. However, the support was provided to develop a comprehensive district plan, not just for project-funded activities, and the resources were substantially greater than would have been allocated to those districts through the PAF district allocation formula. The TA at district level was not well integrated into strengthening district capacity and there were issues over their institutional position (whether they were responsible and reporting to the MOH ‘project’ or to the district politicians). There were also difficulties arising from the advisory role of construction advisers that limited their ability to support implementation. Lessons were learnt from this and the approach to district TA was changed in HSPS 2, with just one adviser based in the MOH Planning Unit. This was clearer in institutional terms.
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4.28 Service delivery indicators improved over the period for Kotido, one of the districts, for example. The PCR concluded: Although the UHSSP I districts are probably considered to be the most disadvantaged and difficult districts in Uganda, the support has made a significant difference. Under extreme circumstances, change in health service delivery and improvement in mortality and morbidity have taken place. (ibid.: 1.) It is, however, hard to identify how far this can be attributed to Danish support relative to other changes, especially increased conditional grants and abolition of user fees in the period.
4.29 Danish support to Rakai district covered similar issues to those supported in HSPS – it supported district planning and management, repaired and rebuilt facilities, etc, but was comprehensive across sectors and other district administration functions. However, there was not a clear mechanism to link the work in Rakai which was relevant to health and AIDS with other efforts in the health sector at MOH or district level. The Rakai support was focused in the district and linked to the Ministry of Local Government and the Decentralisation Secretariat, with little connection to the health sector (except when there was debate over the plan to build a hospital in the district, under a World Bank programme that had been planned before decentralisation). It is considered that there could usefully have been better linkage between the health programme and the Rakai programme.
4.30 Another area of support was establishing medical equipment maintenance workshops at regional level. These are recognised as having strong technical skills and the project was judged successful in the Project Completion Report. However, there was some feedback that they are not seen as providing good service to districts. Their financing has been assured by direct/earmarked funding, but this creates an incentive structure that does not make them responsive to district needs. This may reflect a wider issue of good technical approaches that have not taken enough account of the incentives in place within the decentralised context.
4.31 The support to central MOH, especially for developing the HMIS and for quality assurance to enable MOH to support districts, was intended to strengthen core systems in the sector. Accountability problems led to interruptions in funding that slowed implementation, and created tension and resentment that has taken time to repair. The PCR raised questions over the quality of data from HMIS. Support for quality assurance helped MOH to establish standards and the concept of quality assurance although it was not implemented as planned.
4.32 There was also support for environmental health in this phase, refle cting the MOH responsibility for promoting hygiene and encouraging local development of simple sanitation schemes. Danida support was initially mainly training through an NGO , and then aimed to support the MOH Environmental Health Division; however the PCR for HSPS 1 indicated that following some support to strategy development, the support dwindled to provision of a vehicle, computer and their running costs. The PCR concluded that there was insufficient analysis at the design stage, and that it was not useful to support an area that had such low priority in the MOH.
4.33 The transition from a set of projects managed in various ways to sector programme support (HSPS) seems to have been somewhat haphazard. There was lack of clarity in the process (for example, two project documents were prepared in parallel for support to NMS). There were also tensions in implementation, due in part to personalities (Danish Red Cross, 2001: 45) and in part to accountability problems. The HSPS 1 was more like a set of projects with a common management unit than a coherent programme. It had its own management office while the reporting arrangements for the TA – to Danida or to MOH – were unclear. Funds were managed and accounted for by a separate Support Unit. The funds were under an MOH Project
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS manager in principle but supporting activities outside the MOH remit (e.g. in districts). As the PCR concludes: Although [the] original choice of support strategy had a clear sector approach, UHSSP I was implemented as a MOH/Danida managed programme with discrete individual projects. Accounting of funds was only gradually, and then primarily towards the end of the programme period, turned over to MOH. There are good reasons for this considering the many accounting and accountability problems experienced during implementation, especially in the support given to central MOH. As such the chosen strategy was politically correct at the time but not pertinent.
4.34 One issue was the combined role of the lead TA – both as project manager accountable to Danida and as chief TA to MOH. In retrospect, it may be that separation of the technical advisor and programme management roles would have helped, with strong TA to contribute to strategy development.
4.35 Overall HSPS 1 was judged a success by the external reviewers who said in the Project Completion Report: It is the overall conclusion that [HSPS I] has achieved its objectives and largely its outputs. Implementation was marred with accounting and accountability problems, particularly in the support given to central MOH. These problems have tended to overshadow the major progress and achievements made in the other components. The support given to the National Drug Authority (NDA) and the National Medical Stores (NMS) has meant that they are now well established organisations that are respected in society and considered to be well functioning and cost-efficient.
2002–2005 Health Sector Programme Support Phases 2 and 3 (HSPS 2 and HSPS 3) a) What has Danida been doing? 4.36 The appraisal mission for the next phase of HSPS, HSPS 2, recognised the preference from Government for funds to be channelled through Government systems. 20% of the Danish funding was allocated to the sector budget support for district health (PAF conditional grants); this was reported to be the maximum budget support allowed by the Danish MFA. In addition the medicines credit line was introduced which provided a new mechanism to finance basic drugs to districts. Districts were given a notional credit line that they could draw down in kind from NMS (for government providers) while a corresponding arrangement was made for PNFP providers at the Joint Medical Stores (the church-managed equivalent of NMS for PNFP providers). This enabled NMS to have funds to purchase essential drugs at large scale, while assuring drug quality for providers. The credit lines are financed jointly by Danish and GOU funds within the MOH budget.
4.37 In addition to the support for district health through PAF and the medicines credit line, HSPS 2 also included: § support for Northern districts (17 of them, soon to be subdivided to over 20); § funds for training in PNFP nurse training schools in understaffed districts; § funds and TA for specified areas of work wit hin MOH.
4.38 HSPS 2 was originally expected to run until mid-2006. At the November 2003 Joint GOU and Health Development Partners’ Mid-Term Review Mission, the MOH confirmed that the Health Sector Strategic Plan II (HSSP II) would be formulated in 2004 and its implementation would begin in July 2005. Danida decided to shorten the duration of HSPS 2 from 3½ to 2½ years so that HSPS 3 would be fully aligned with the framework and implementation schedule of HSSP II.
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4.39 HSPS 3 continued with broadly the same components as HSPS 2. In addition, § following a review of NMS performance, which identified that key staff had left the institution and other management concerns, TA for NMS was brought back at the request of MOH, to strengthen procurement and financial management capacity. § Funding for contraceptive supplies was added. § The programme included expansion of pharmacist training as well as enrolled nurse training. § Support to special needs in Northern districts was planned to phase out in two years, in line with a strategy to influence the national allocation of GOU fund (including budget support) allocation to these districts from PAF funds. § Some funds were reserved to enable rapid support for restoration of services in conflict-affected districts if peace is achieved.
4.40 HSPS 2 and HSPS 3 were managed using SWAp processes in terms of using coordination and reporting arrangements for the sector. There was no project steering committee; rather, the HPAC provided guidance on activities and performance was reviewed in jo int reviews in the sector. However, there continued to be a project management arrangement for the non PAF funds (i.e. the funds for northern districts, nurse training, central MOH activities etc.). The MOH Director of Planning was project manager, supported by the senior TA provided by Danida. There were separate financial management arrangements managed by the HSPS Support Unit located in MOH offices but with its own accountant and financial procedures. The case for keeping separate financial management was said to relate both to Danish concerns with accountability and to the fact that specific procedures required for Danish project funding were seen as too onerous to give to MOH given the weakness of MOH accounting section. In addition, some recipients of HSPS funds would not normally be funded directly by MOH (such as funds for districts and PNFP training schools).
4.41 One result of this is that the senior Danish TA ended up playing a project management rather than a technical role. There were still some problems of accountability with funds provided. (Changes are being introduced in 2006 to rely on MOH systems for approval of expenditure and accounting for HSPS funds spent within MOH. This reflects a new senior TA and a new person in the Embassy health officer post since late 2005 who want to place more reliance on MOH systems.)
b) Outcomes and assessment of Danida contribution: 2002–2005 HSPS 2 and HSPS 3 4.42 Danish support during this phase became more consistent with other donors in funding partly through the sector budget support mechanism for channelling funds to districts. This was seen by MOH as a sign of confidence in the SWAp process. Continuing concerns on accountability from Danida management limited the extent of this shift. In deciding how to support HSSP II, and hence the content of HSPS 3, the decision was made that there would be no advantage to increasing the proportion of funding channelled through the district PAF funds due to the budget ceilings applied by MFPED. In terms of achieving additional resources for the health sector, this was a realistic response, although it does not support the broader concept of leaving Government to make the allocation decisions.
4.43 In addition, work funded by the HSPS in MOH has supported SWAp processes (e.g. production of annual reports and studies under the Partnership Fund) and enabled central support
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS to districts, (e.g. area teams of MOH staff visiting districts). Funds and TA at central level are valued by MOH staff, who are happy for some project type support so long as it is under the oversight of HPAC. The recurrent support has helped MOH to deliver its work-plan, even when GOU budgets have been delayed. The transparency of Danida in reporting has been commented on and praised, favourably compared to some other donors. On the other hand, some donors and one GOU respondent were critical of the continued earmarking and consequent visibility of Danish support (e.g. vehicles).
4.44 The management arrangements for HSPS 2 and HSPS 3 are better linked to sector processes by linkages to HPAC, sharing common reporting arrangements, and being based within the MOH. There is still a considerable project management role, however, because of the project components of funding. The Danish policy on TA is now more explicit that they should support government rather than service Danida needs. This is a challenge for the TA as they still have a role in managing the programme funds.
4.45 A new mechanism which provides support on budget through Government systems, encourages a government contribution for health and assures quality drug supplies is the medicines credit line approach. This has been welcomed: for example, the HSPS 3 identification mission (MFA Danida, 2004a) found: The most remarkable achievement has been the creation of the drug credit line to supplement the Primary Health Care (PHC) Conditional Grant to the districts (Poverty Action Fund). This has contributed to the increase in availability of drugs at health centres and hospitals from 40% to 70% (MOH Uganda, 2003a) and improved utilisation of health services.
4.46 Danida sees this as part of its budget support, and it can be considered as budget support in so far as the funds are managed by Government, including procurement and accounting, and pooled with the MOH matching funding in the medicines budget. It is not general budget support in terms of allowing the Government to decide how the funds will be allocated, as the funds are tightly earmarked for drugs and supplies.
4.47 Although the credit line approach reduces the flexibility of districts to allocate their budgets, there is a good case for treating drugs as a special case in procurement terms – due to economies of scale in procurement, the need often for international procurement, and the safety issues involved (risk of fake or spoiled drugs). The medicines credit line is an innovative approach that - enables funding of the NMS and Joint Medical Stores to allow them to procure pharmaceuticals on a substantial scale - at the same time the districts control the budget and can choose the drugs they need, - the allocation formula supports equitable distribution of resources between districts - by establishing a mechanism within the government budget system, this should be a sustainable mechanism for earmarking funds for districts, that could be applied in other cases too.
4.48 Human Resource development and capacity building are a key constraint in health in Uganda. Following the review of HSPS 1 which concluded that: The support to human resource development could probably have been more focused at the policy level but the rehabilitation of training institutions and the general and district specific scholarship programme has meant that many have been given basic and post-basic training (MFA Danida, 2003: 1). HSPS 2 and HSPS 3 have focused on improving facilities and supporting recurrent costs for training nurses and for pharmacists.
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4.49 The support for training nurses locally within Northern districts is a constructive approach to tackling the difficulties of attracting staff to work in these areas, and to providing staff able to pr ovide basic services for the poor. It seems to have helped address shortages there, although there have been delays in appointing qualified staff (at the time of the HSPS 1 PCR, 25% of those trained had not been recruited in four of the districts, due to administrative delays and insufficient budgets). However, there is an improvement in the indicators for heath worker posts filled in Karamoja. There may be a case for longer-term follow-up of whether these staff stay in post.
4.50 There has been coordination of efforts in support to basic training between the donors involved (Danida, EC and Ireland) with Government. However, this support has been implemented in project mode with each following their own approach; as the current Danish TA noted, there are incons istencies in the approach and levels of support to health worker training between different donors, which could be addressed by developing a common and more systematised approach. This would enable a more equitable approach that could be institutionalised and perhaps funded through the budget.
4.51 Respondents were positive about Danish support to Northern districts, including saying that Danida provided support ‘before they became fashionable’. Certainly these are the poorest districts that have been unable to benefit from much wider systems development efforts due to their circumstances.
4.52 However, the results seem to have been limited. By 2004 when HSPS 3 was being designed, the identification mission concluded (MFA Danida, 2004a): The targeted support to the district health systems in Northern and North-Eastern Uganda has not yet shown the expected results. This is partly due to the short duration of implementation, the on-going conflict and poor coordination of support among International NGOs.
4.53 There have been questions raised over the efficiency of the use of funds in Northern districts, for example comments that funds are used for workshops and fuel with limited impact on health. It is difficult to assess impact as Danida funds are used alongside others for the district work plan and the problems facing these districts are so major that it is hard to assess what would have happened without the support.
4.54 The activities funded by Danida in these districts are identified and accounted for separately, which imposes a reporting burden on districts, especially as other donors do the same and the numbers of donors working in these districts has increased.
4.55 The HSPS 3 in any case envisages a phasing out of special funds for Northern districts once the resource allocation formula gave greater weighting to their needs. It was reported that the formula has been adjusted but the change has not been implemented; the reason given was the lack of additional funds under the district PAF to allocate in their favour. This seems a better approach in the long term to supporting needy districts than a special fund with separate accounting arrangements, although it relies on political will to increase the national budget for health and to maintain an allocation formula in favour of these districts. In the short term, the support to Northern districts helped to maintain the focus on their extra needs and may also have helped the Embassy to argue in its broader dialogue on the conflict.
4.56 MOH and development partners felt that Danish participation in sector processes has been constructive. They have been willing to coordinate with other partners and to take a lead in some areas.
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Support for HIV/AIDS a) What has Danida been doing? 4.57 On AIDS, Danish support has focused on support for NGOs that are demonstrating innovative and effective models. The largest beneficiary has been The AIDS Support Organisation (TASO), a Ugandan NGO established in the early 1990s in the context of discrimination and fear around HIV/AIDS. TASO developed preventive, counselling and care services, and provides training to other NGOs. TASO is well known in the AIDS world as a model for AIDS organisations in Africa. It has become increasingly institutionalised as part of the health system, with TASO offices located within the grounds of Government hospitals in several locations. With the advent of PEPFAR, it has also become heavily involved in delivering ARV treatment. This has expanded its annual budget from around USD 5 million planned to USD 22 million actual.
4.58 Danida initially provided a small grant in 1993, the year after TASO started. Danish support was provided as it was “considered a very bold move and tota lly new approach”.4 Following a small initial grant Danida continued funding and was a core and substantial donor, until recently when overshadowed by PEPFAR support including ARV drugs. Danida helped to promote and encourage others to join in the model of basket funding for TASO to implement its strategic plan. They also provided comments on the strategic plan and have chaired the TASO donor group.
4.59 Danida has provided predic table funding based on the five-year plans and funding agreements with TASO. This was questioned by TASO which felt Danida could have been more responsive to providing additional funds during the plan period in the light of their needs for increased funding.
4.60 Danish support has also funded two other innovative Ugandan NGO initiatives at national level: § Straight Talk, which provides written and radio coverage on AIDS targeted to various groups of young people. § Hospice Africa, which specialises in palliative care, both delivering care and training health workers.
4.61 In addition there has been support via Danish NGOs and within district initiatives including in Rakai district.
4.62 The rationale for Danish support in AIDS is not clearly specified in the documents reviewed, until the May 2005 project document for HSPS 3. This clearly states: It was not recommended to give direct support to the National HIV/AIDS programme, as it is sufficiently funded from several sources such as PEPFAR, GFATM and the World Bank. However, Denmark will continue to support two major HIV/AIDS Non Government Organisations (NGOs) as well as ensuring mainstreaming HIV/AIDS.
4.63 The Danish health officers in the Embassy have participated in AIDS-related meetings including the specific development partner meetings on HIV/AIDS. There were diverse views from partners on how effective these contributions were, although there was consensus that the Danish input supported a harmonised approach to reproductive health.
4 Danish MFA official, personal communication.
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4.64 Danish policy is also to mainstream HIV/AIDS across sectors. Danida has estimated that some 4% of agriculture sector programme support is allocated to AIDS, as well as smaller amounts in roads and private sector support. There was little practical evidence of systematic mainstreaming identified by the evaluation team looking at different sectors. b) Outcomes and Assessments of Danida’s Contribution: Support for HIV/AIDS 4.65 The strategy for Danish support in HIV/AIDS has been to focus on strengthening the health system so that it can cope with the implications of AIDS, and to support mainstreaming. There has not been a substantial support for the national AIDS programme. Given the substantial inflows of support earmarked for AIDS-related activities and commodities (from World Bank, PEPFAR and GFATM in particular), this seems to be a reasonable strategy. Danish support to the health system has contributed to the AIDS response through the impact on skills, commodities, drug storage and logistics, information, planning and management.
4.66 There has been substantial support for selected NGOs to deliver services that cover the spectrum of prevention, care and mitigation. The NGOs selected offer innovative approaches and are recognised internationally as making a positive contribution to AIDS prevention and care. Danish support has been predictable (in tranches of several years) and in the case of TASO, supported a shared programme approach that enabled expansion of a coherent approach and better alignment with the national AIDS strategy. These are good features of Danish support that demonstrate a practical approach to harmonisation and alignment while working with non Government providers.
4.67 As with any donor support that is largely recurrent funding for service delivery, there are questions over the sustainability of the supported NGOs. There is scope for funding NGO services from the district and national budgets (that include budget support) as well as short-term sources such GFATM. But it is not clear how far the funding would be sustained if direct bilateral funding was cut back. Danida and the other donors engaged with these NGOs need to consider for the longer term how far they wish to continue separate, direct funding for NGOs; how feasible and likely would be continuing public funding from national and district budgets, and whether to build structural links with nationa l budgets (it is unlikely the NGOs will be able to finance themselves from user payments, given their clientele).
4.68 Institutional support to the NGOs has been limited and appears to have been adequate for TASO at least, which has developed substantial capacity itself, as well as providing support to smaller organisations. However, TASO will face challenges if its funding declines rapidly, especially when PEPFAR support ends.
4.69 It is less clear that there has been much impact in terms of mainstreaming. It is difficult to assess impact in mainstreaming as it is typically intended to be integrated into programme approaches rather than separate activities and strategies. This evaluation has not identified significant influence in other sectors, but it would require a more focused study to make a full assessment of this. The contribution to policy dialogue around HIV and AIDS was seen as constructive and supportive of harmonisation but seems also to have been limited, perhaps reflecting the focus of support on NGO services.
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5. Overall assessment and conclusions
Danish Contribution to the Sector – Relevance and Value 5.1 It is widely acknowledged by Ugandans and development partners that the Danish contribution to the Ugandan health sector over the evaluation period has been substantial.
5.2 The contribution to the drug sub-sector is most often noted and respected – both the supply of drugs that helped to restore basic health services across the country since the late 1980s, and the long-term commitment to developing institutional capacity of NMS, the MOH policy department and the NDA. People recognise the challenges of the drug sector and appreciate the sustained efforts from Danida, and willingness to try again when there are setbacks.
5.3 The evaluation team shares this view. The provision of safe and effective drug supplies, and mechanisms to re -establish capacity to manage, distribute and procure drugs, were a valuable contribution to the recovery of Uganda’s social services in the post conflict setting of the late 1980s. The continued financial support for medicines and supplies, alongside the move to a more developmental approach with development of the policy and regulatory framework and national institutions, has helped to sustain the system and enable its improved performance.
5.4 Danida has also been supportive of the SWAp for health. Although the share of funding that is managed through budget support or pooled funding mechanisms is limited, there has been support in terms of engaging in sector processes, using shared planning and reporting mechanisms and supporting SWAp structures such as annual reports and the Partnership Fund. The availability of resources to facilitate activities at national and district levels has contributed to progress in the sector. There has been substantial growth in capacity for planning and managing the sector, as shown by outputs such as the annual health sector performance reports, which demonstrate an impressive level of analysis and information.
5.5 Overall the focus on building the health system, including the capacity for planning, supporting and managing district services, has been appropriate. In recent years there has been a tendency among the aid community working in health to focus on specific programmes or diseases (especially HIV/AIDS) with less focus on health systems strengthening. It is now recognised that there needs to be a better balance in support with more attention to ensuring the basic health system works , with qualified health workers, logistics and supplies in place etc.5 In Uganda , Danida has maintained its systems support in the face of these shifts in fashion and this is to its credit.
5.6 This has meant limited support to AIDS – some support to innovative NGO services, but not to vertical AIDS control programmes or national institutions. Given the number of other agencies and the amounts of funding dedicated to AIDS, this seems a reasonable decision on the allocation of Danish resources.
5.7 Danish support has been poverty focus ed in terms of providing medicines and supplies for basic services, which are most likely to be used by the poor; ensuring medicines get out to rural areas and remote facilities where the poor live; providing support also to the PNFP sector which are the main health service providers in some areas; and targeted support to Northern districts.
5 For example, in the June 2006 discussions in Tunis among key donors to health.
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5.8 If there had not been Danish support for the drug sector, it seems likely that other donor and government funds (including budget support) would have been allocated to purchase medicines, although there would probably have been more uncertainty and disruptions in the supply in the early years. The sustained support to the institutional development of the drugs sub- sector, and the willingness to come back again to address emerging and re-emerging problems , is something that might not have been matched by other donors. This would probably have resulted in less efficient systems for drug procurement and distribution as different players would tend to set up their own systems, and less control and ownership by Government over drugs policy and regulation. Furthermore, Danida has supported essential drugs in several countries in East Africa and this has enabled them to build up practical experience, learn lessons across countries, test different ideas and develo p a group of experienced consultants, in a way that other donors have not. Danida’s contribution is thus judged to have been substantial and build on comparative advantage.
5.9 Danish support in other areas has been significant in developing systems capacity. It is possible that others would have increased their support to areas such as HMIS, nurse training in PNFP hospitals , and TA at central level if Danida had not done so. But the Danish approach has been useful as a complement to the behaviour of other donors: § their willingness to continue support for several funding cycles and not say “we have funded this for 10 years, that must be long enough” is an asset in the face of complex systems development needs and the low starting base in Uganda. § Their inputs have increasingly been well aligned with sector plans and strategies; § The fact that much of the support is earmarked and not in general budget support provides a useful balance to those who have shifted to general and sector budget support, in an era when Government allocations to health have stagnated. § They have maintained support to strengthen health systems over a period when some donors have moved away from this to more disease-focused responses, although the international consens us is now (2006) returning to the importance of systems again.
5.10 In terms of the cross-cutting issues, there was some attention to environment in terms of the support to environmental health in the 1990s , but this withered in the face of lack of priority to the issue in MOH. The issue has received more attention under the SWAp and MOH reports show steady improvements in latrine coverage during the first HSSP period.
5.11 Another environmental issue is the safe disposal of expired medicines which has arisen in the context of Danish work in the drugs sector. During HSPS 1 this was an issue of contention between MOH and Danida. In HSPS 2 it was agreed to develop a disposal facility under NDA, as well as continuing support to improve district management of drugs. However the issue was still not resolved by 2005, when NDA reported it had land but lacked funding for the necessary environmental assessment and equipping the facility (MOH Annual Sector Performance Report, 2005). The issue is not addressed in the HSSP II. A third issue arose in 2005 over the use of DDT; Danida was engaged in the debates on this as chair of health development partners. Thus environment issues are addressed as they arise, but they have not been simple to resolve.
5.12 On gender, Danida has provided inputs to encourage mainstreaming of gender in the SWAp. This included a particular emphasis on gender in the support to Northern districts in HSPS 2 as well as in a budget line to support gender mainstreaming under the support to central MOH in HSPS 2 and HSPS 3. A gender strategy is an integral part of the national strategy, HSSP II, and identifies how gender will be mainstreamed. Thus there has been progress in mainstreaming gender into national strategies, and this is reflected too in continued priority to date: November 2006 TP3 Page 19
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS sexual and maternal health. Danish support has also increased for contraceptives as a key input for reproductive health.
Aid Instruments and Approaches 5.13 Danish concerns about accountability led to some conservatism in design of support. For example, the relatively slow move from providing sealed drug kits to national procurement and a responsive pull system, and the requirement for a separate programme support unit to manage the HSPS funds, gave a sense of reassurance that the funds could be monitored, but deferred the needed strengthening of national systems. However, even where there are project- type funding procedures, there can be accountability problems. Recent moves (in 2006) to transfer to greater use of MOH accounting processes have started to address this, but arguably there could have been more reliance on Government systems at an earlier stage, in the spirit of alignment and strengthening public financial management.
5.14 The support has included some development of infrastructure and human capital, but also substantial recurrent support. This enables short-term improvements to services and has been an important source of funding for the sector. Danida was willing to provide recurrent funding (especially for medicines) at a time (early 90s) when other donors hesitated to do so, and focused their support on capital inputs such as repairing buildings, despite the clear needs for recurrent funds to operate the health system. This demonstrates a practical approach to assessing needs and design of support.
5.15 However, recurrent support always raises concerns for sustainability. The Danish programme has made efforts to address this by building in funding mechanisms – initially by expecting a contribution to drug kits from Government, and more recently the credit line mechanism for medicines that is jointly funded by GOU and Danish funds. In addition there have been efforts to reduce reliance on budget releases by developing revenue sources such as fees for NDA, and charges for medicine distribution by NMS. Working at the national policy level provides opportunities to build in experience and mechanisms to the national systems. Thus Danida has made various efforts to address this issue of sustained funding for health services, at sector level as well as in broader dia logue.
5.16 The Danish programme has evolved with thinking in aid circles on aid instruments. § The early response was to contract an NGO to deliver services, at a stage when Government was seen as having insufficient capacity to take on the functions required. This was a standard approach to delivery in a post conflict setting at that time. § During the 1990s there were increasing moves to work directly with government, develop capacity and get the NGOs to strengthen Government systems rather than to deliver services directly in the health sector. This reflected the broader consensus on the importance of national ownership. § The move to sector programme support reflected emerging thinking on the importance of moving away from fragmented projects and their relate d transaction costs, and of linking to national policy processes, although the implementation was still largely along project lines. § Since 2002 there has been an increasing involvement in shared sector processes and mechanisms as well as budget support, in line with broader development thinking among European bilaterals.
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§ The adaptation of HSPS 3 to match the timing of the health sector programme (HSSP II) is a good example of alignment with Government processes, consistent with the harmonisation and alignment agenda.
Implementation 5.17 The feedback on the quality of implementation has generally been positive. In terms of predictability, funds have generally been available as promised. For example, amongst all the donors, the Danish expenditure was the closest to that budgeted in 2004/05, at 84% of budget delivered (MOH Uganda, 2005a).
5.18 There is considerable flexibility within the areas identified for funding, with activities usually specified by the Government counterpart (MOH department or district).
5.19 However, there have been some areas where the implementation could have been stronger: § There was limited engagement in wider policy debates when this could have been helpful. An example of this was the early debates in the 1990s around privatisation of NMS where the Danish view was not represented in the policy debates, for example with World Bank. This probably reflects the delegation to an NGO to deliver the drugs programme at that stage. The NGO found it difficult to engage in the policy debates, partly because of its status and also perhaps because of the technical focus of those involved. Meanwhile there was not a consistent engagement in the higher level policy debates (partly because of lack of capacit y at Embassy level at that time). § In general the Danish provided TA in the MOH, NMS, NDA and the Embassy was considered to be competent and valued, with some variation especially in the level of inter-personal skills. The continuity provided by Ugandan officials at the Embassy has been helpful. § In the HSPS approach, the combined role of the lead TA as both manager accountable to Danida for a substantial and complex programme, as well as TA to MOH has caused problems in the relationships with the MOH as well as limiting the adviser’s capacity to carry out a full TA role. The location in a separate part of the office in the ‘Health Sector Programme Support Unit’ also emphasised that the role was not comparable to other TA. The recent policy from Danida on TA has clarified that the primary role is to support Government but there remains a substantial management role in the senior TA post. § Whilst there is considerable flexibility in use of funds within the areas specified in the programme, there seems to be limited flexibility to adapt the programme during implementation in the light of evolving circumstances (although there was additional funding for NMS proposed during HSPS 2 to address its needs for capital and TA). This partly reflects Danida regulations but may also be the understanding of programme managers who were not involved in the design stage. This can be seen as a drawback given the rapidly changing and unpredictable context in countries like Uganda, (including the actions of other donors). § The strict approach to accountability with funds frozen if an irregularity is detected, has earned Danida some respect and a reputation for strictness. However, an abrupt response can also severely disrupt planned activities – which may not be desirable or productive. It can also damage relationships with Government in ways that take time to heal, and may not ultimately contribute to Danish influence.
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5.20 The efficiency of Danish support compares well to most donors, as assessed by the MOH. Some 10% of Danida funding is classified by MOH as outside national HSSP priorities. This compares with some 56% overall for donor support in 2004/05.6
5.21 There seems to have been little linkage across the Danish country programme. The main example of this is the work on developing NMS that took place in parallel with the work on decentralisation. The NMS design work was apparently not aware of the changes to funding flows envisaged with decentralisation. There was also little linkage to use relevant experience from the multi-sectoral programme in Rakai to help the development of the health sector.
Lessons 5.22 Danish support to health in Uganda has been tailored to conditions and the roles of other donors in the country, as it should be. The following may be seen as broader lessons:
• In a post conflict setting it is an appropriate response to provide support for basic drugs as a critical input to basic health care. This will be pro poor if there is appropriate selection and distribution of medicines, as in Uganda. The Ugandan experience shows the importance of working with Government institutions from the start to develop their capacity and restore or remodel old systems, not invent new systems from scratch. This includes developing capacity to select and procure medicines, rather than continuing with externally procured and packed drug kits for too long. This lesson reflects particular features of drugs as inputs to health services: the ir high import content (in most cases); the potential for economies of scale in bulk procurement; and the safety issues. It also recognises the crucial need for recurrent support in restoring social services.
• Sustained support for areas within a sector is good and welcomed. There is a value in the accumulated experience and institutional memory, as well as in cross–country experience of a particular issue. Danida’s niche in health clearly was the drugs area, and partners (government, NGOs and development agencies) welcomed Danida’s willingness to persist in strengthening this area. There is a risk however if it is seen as one donor’s responsibility or patch – as indicated by the problems faced by NMS in getting other funders to pay for storage and distribution costs at a reasonable rate. There has been a tendency to rely on Danida solving the problems at NMS, rather than a shared approach to making the system work. It may be helpful to develop a better shared understanding of the strategy and needs among MOH, Ministry of Finance and development agencies, and perhaps to agree on a more standardised approach for managing drugs and supplies. This requires commitment and cooperation from other agencies, which have not been willing to do so in the past. GOU could also play a stronger role in insisting on better budgeting and planning for supplies management where supplies are provided in kind. There are moves currently for subgroups of donors to specialise in specific areas – this could help the drug sub-sector, but still needs a commitment by the relevant players to support procedures and systems that are developed.
6 In the Annual Health Sector Performance Report Financial Year 2004/5, (MOH Uganda, 2005a: 59) the HSSP priority items are those reflected in costing the HSSP, and exclude management costs and TA.
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• Danida has provided support to core systems within the health system – including pre- service training; management information; drug distribution, and equipment maintenance, through a period when this type of support has been out of fashion. Recent thinking internationally recognises the importance of these basic systems and Uganda’s experience can be useful to learn from, including the long-term nature of support required and the need to adapt continuously to the evolving incentives in the wider system (such as the impact of decentralisation).
• Danida has been working with PNFP providers as well as Government recognising their crucial role in service delivery in many areas. The holistic view of the sector is important (including the ‘for profit’ private sector too). There are some useful models in Uganda for how NGOs and Government can work together and complement each other, not least in TASO’s services closely linked to Government hospitals, and in NGOs’ role in human resource development.
• With the development of a sector wide approach in health it has been important to have capacity to engage in sector dialogue. The technical capacity and credibility of the person is critical in this and Danida has recognised this in funding the post for a technically qualified health and AIDS adviser in the Embassy as well as input from specialists from headquarters level and ongoing support from Ugandan staff. If Danida stays engaged in health then this type of technical input will continue to be needed.
• The role of TA has been clarified formally but there remains a considerable workload of project management in the current role. Danida may want to consider how it can release the TA from this while also increasing reliance on Government systems, in order to maximise the value of the technical input provided.
• The lack of flexibility to make major adjustments during programme implementation has been noted – once a programme is approved there seems to be little scope to adjust to changing circumstances (although there is considerable flexibility within the specified areas of exactly how funds are used). This is a broader issue for Danish aid management. It could be addressed by leaving more open ended the allocation of some funds to adjust during implementation, or by scope for a major review during implementation.
• Finally, the evaluation brought out examples where there was little cross linkage between different aspects of Danish support (Rakai experience/health sector, and Decentralisation and NMS planning). This partly related to the way aid was managed at the time (delegation to NGOs for implementation, and no health person in the Embassy). But it also suggests scope for better cross-disciplinary working and learning within the country programme.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS
Bibliography
CDF Evaluatio n Secretariat (2002). CDF Evaluation: Uganda Case Study – Health Annex. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Danida, DFID and TASO (1998). Joint External Review of the Aids Support Programme Organisation (TASO) Uganda: "Building the Ship while Sailing".
Danish Red Cross (2001). Historical Review of the Implementation of Essential Drugs Programmes in Uganda (UEDSP) and in Ethiopia (EDP).
Euro Health Group (2004). Technical Review of National Medical Stores. Project Number 903.
Kironga, C. et al. (2006). Health Systems and Reform in Uganda: Processes and Outputs.
Lister, S. et al. (2006). Uganda Country Report, Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994– 2004. London: DFID.
Lochoro, P. et al. (2006). Public Private Partnership in Health: working together to improve health sector performance in Uganda. In Tashobya, C.K., Ssengooba, F. and Oliveira-Cruz, V. (eds.) (2006). “Health Systems Reforms in Uganda: processes and outputs.” London: Health Systems Development Programme.
MFA Danida (1996). Strategy for Bilateral Development Cooperation with Uganda. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1999). Evaluation of Danish Assistance to Health. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2002). Appraisal of TASO Strategic Plan 2003–2007.
MFA Danida (2003). Completion Report – Uganda Health Sector Support Programme (UHSSP I) October 1996–December 2002.
MFA Danida (2004a). Concept Paper for HSPS III. (September 2004). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2004b). Uganda Denmark Partnership – Strategy for Development Cooperation 2004– 2008. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2005a). Danida Health Sector Programme Support Phase III (July 2005–June 2010) to Uganda Health Sector Strategic Plan Phase II (2005/06–2009/10). Project Document.
MFA Danida (2005b). Strategy for Denmark's Support to the International Fight against HIV/AIDS. Copenhagen: MFA.
MOH Uganda (1993). Three Year Health Plan Frame, 1993/4 –1995/6 . Kampala: MOH.
MOH Uganda (2000). Memorandum of Understanding for Sector Wide Cooperation in Health . Uganda: MOH.
MOH Uganda (2003a). Annual Health Sector Performance Report Financial Year 2002/3. (October 2003). Uganda: MOH.
MOH Uganda (2003b). Health Sector Strategic Plan 2000/1–2004/5 Mid -term Review Report. Uganda: MOH.
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MOH Uganda (2004a). Annual Health Sector Performance Report Financial Year 2003/4. Kampala: MOH.
MOH Uganda (2004b). Financing Health Services in Uganda 1998/9–2000/1 . Uganda: MOH.
MOH Uganda (2005a). Annual Health Sector Performance Report Financial Year 2004/5. Kampala: MOH.
MOH Uganda (2005b). Health Sector Strategic Plan II. Kampala: MOH.
MOH Uganda and MFA Danida (2005). Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark regarding Health Sector Programme Support Phase III. (July 2005).
Murindwa, G. et al. (2006). Meeting the challenges of decentralised health service delivery in Uganda as a component of broader health sector reforms. In Tashobya, C.K., Ssengooba, F. and Oliveira-Cruz, V. (eds.) (2006) : “Health Systems Reforms in Uganda: processes and outputs.” London: Health Systems Development Programme.
Ortendahl, C. et al. (2005). Energising the SWAp – proposals for Ugandan Development Partners working year 2005/6. HLSP.
Sundewall, J. et al. (2006). Translations of Health Sector SWAps – a comparative study of health sector development cooperation in Uganda, Zambia and Bangladesh.
TASO (2006). Annual Report 2005. The AIDS Support Organisation.
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS Annexes
Contents
Annex 1: Summary of Danida Support to Health & HIV/AIDS 1987–2005....28 Table 1.1: Major projects and programmes considered in this review ...28 Table 1.2: Smaller projects (not looked at in detail) ...... 32 Annex 2: Health Sector Performance ...... 34 Table 2.1: Selected indicators, from the Annual Health Sector Performance Report 2004/05 ...... 34 Figure 2.1: Comparison of infant mortality rates (Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania)...... 34 Figure 2.2: Comparison of equity in outcomes and access to services (Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania)...... 35
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS
Annex 1: Summary of Danida Support to Health & HIV/AIDS 1987–2005
Table 1.1: Major projects and programmes considered in this review
Project name Purpose, period, value, geographical Implementation Documents, issues Assessment on DAC criteria scope, main components raised Essential Drugs 1985–2001 Danish Red Cross DRC Historical Review Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: A Support Phase I (1985–87) DKK 64.6m (DRC) of The Implementation Programme Phase II (1987–90) DKK 99.9m of Essential Drugs Adherence to cross-cutting issues: B (not explicit) Bridging (1991/92) DKK 51.0m No other donors Programmes in Uganda Phase III (1992–96) DKK 168.5m (Uganda Essential Relevance: A Phase IV (1996–01) DKK 180.4m Drugs Support Effectiveness: B Total DKK 564.4m Programme – UEDSP) Efficiency: B Initially delivered drug supplies; then and in Ethiopia Sustainability: C restored the National Medical Stores to (Essential Drugs Poverty reduction: B functioning. Later phases to help Programme – EDP), Lesson Learning & Accountability: B develop Government systems and 2001 capacity for drug procurement, equipment maintenance and drug regulation (National Drug Authority). Rehabilitation of 1995–1997 Contract with PCR explains relatively Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: B NMS DKK 15.4 m budget COWI Consult minor changes in Rehabilitation of NMS – civil works design etc. Adherence to cross-cutting issues: C (limited relevance)
Relevance: B Effectiveness: B Efficiency: B Sustainability: C Poverty reduction: B Lesson Learning & Accountability: B
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Project name Purpose, period, value, geographical Implementation Documents, issues Assessment on DAC criteria scope, main components raised Uganda Health Oct 1996–Dec 2002 Project Project Completion Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: B Sector Support Budget DKK 209m Implementation Report April 2003 is Programme Actual DKK 171m Unit linked to generally positive, Adherence to cross-cutting issues: C (HSPS 1) 1. National Drug Authority MOH. some issues. 2. NMS Proposal (WB) for Relevance: B 3. Drug supplies (kit system) NGOs provided privatising NMS Effectiveness: C 4. Set up medical equipment workshops TA in Northern unresolved. Efficiency: C 5. Training support Districts Fragmentation of drug Sustainability: B (substantial institutional development) 6. HMIS supply recognised, Poverty reduction: B 7 Environmental health (very little donors said to be Lesson Learning & Accountability: C done) addressing in SWAp 8 Support to deprived districts (Kitgum, context. Kotido and Moroto districts, that Improved health became 5 districts) – TA, renovation, indicators in districts training, extra funds for district plans though 25% of trained staff not recruited despite shortages. MOH – HSPS 2 2003–05 DKK 255m budget HSPS 2 set up its Prog doc in folder 810 Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: B Support to SWAp for HSSP 1 (2000/ 01 own Support Unit Note this ended one – 2004/05) based in MOH. year early to fit with Adherence to cross-cutting issues: B 1. Support to district PHC (thro PAF) Project Manager timing of HSSP II. (19%) is MOH Director Danida procures Relevance: A (well linked to national health strategy) 2. Support central MOH esp. health of Planning & directly over Effectiveness: B planning capacity Development DKK 10,000. Efficiency: B 3. Support northern districts, including Sustainability: B capacity building via nurse training Other donors Component 5 – Support Poverty reduction: B schools supported HSSP I for NMS – added in Lesson Learning & Accountability: B 4. Drug sector support inc. drug including funds 2004 in response to the supplies (28%) and capacity building directly into the review of NMS and 5. Capitalisation (DK 12 m), warehouse PAF for health. GOU meeting repairs and TA for NMS conditions therein 6. Unallocated funds to use as needed (DKK 20.7m – 9%)
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 3: Health and HIV/AIDS
Project name Purpose, period, value, geographical Implementation Documents, issues Assessment on DAC criteria scope, main components raised MOH – HSPS 3 2005–2010, DKK 416m budget As for HSPS 2, Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: B includes 5 long-term TA. HSPS 3 has its own Support Unit Adherence to cross-cutting issues: B Danish support to the national Health based in MOH. Strategic Plan phase 2 (HSSP II). Project Manager Relevance: A (supports national health strategy) Components are: is MOH Director Effectiveness: B 1. Support to PHC via PAF of Planning & Efficiency: B 2. Support for special needs of North Development. Sustainability: B and NE districts (now 17, becoming Poverty reduction: B over 20 districts) for up to 2 years, with Other donors Lesson Learning & Accountability: early days further post conflict support if peace support HSSP II holds in various ways 3. Support MOH capacity to plan and including funds backstop services into the PAF, but 4. Training capacity for enrolled nurses not co-funding (upgrade schools in NFP hospitals, with Danida. bursaries to fund running costs etc.) 5. Drug sector support including · Medicines credit lines to fund essential drugs for districts and NPFP services (30%). · Reproductive health supplies (contraceptives and equipment). · Strengthen NMS and MOH drug policy capacity (inc TA). · Upgrade pharmacist training school at Makerere.
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Project name Purpose, period, value, geographical Implementation Documents, issues Assessment on DAC criteria scope, main components raised TASO 1993–94 USD 742,000 In the second TASO Joint reviews Adherence to overall policy goals concerning poverty: B 1995–98 DKK 19.8 m (USD 3.3m) phase Danida 1999–02 DKK 16m funded specific Danida PCR for both Adherence to cross-cutting issues: B 2003–07 DKK 30m budget activities 1995–98 and 1999–02 alongside phases. Relevance: A For the 1995–98 phase, Danida funded USAID, DFID, Effectiveness: A specific activities including training Sida and others. Appraisal of 2003–07 Efficiency: C counsellors for TASO and other NGOs, Danida largest Strategic Plan. Sustainability: C construction, based on a 1993 proposal donor (USD 4m Poverty reduction: B by TASO. of total USD 11m USAID has become by Lesson Learning & Accountability: B for 5 years) far the largest donor, For 1999 onwards Danish funding for funding ARV drugs and TASO is in a basket with other donors From 1999 treatment in addition to to support their strategic plan. following a 1998 basket support. Throughout, activities mainly provision joint review, of counselling services, counsellor moved to basket training, community AIDS care and funding with prevention. This included support for USAID, DFID, education of orphans and food Sida, EC. TASO supplements. credits Danish with helping get USAID into the basket
Source: various project documents and reviews; consultant assessment. Notes: The performance indicators are rated on a four-point ordinal scale, ranging from A to D, with A indicating highly satisfactory performance and D indicating highly unsatisfactory performance.
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Table 1.2: Smaller projects (not looked at in de tail)
Project name Purpose, period, value, Implementation Documents, issues geographical scope, raised Community based Phase 1: 2000–02 DKK 14.5m Danish Red Cross health Phase 2: 2000–05? DKK 17.3m programmes Improvement of health of the most vulnerable communities through capacity building and service delivery in project areas – accident prevention, blood safety, reduced water borne disease Mukono District 1990–1992 African Medical & In first phase most Health Services budget DKK 18.7m Research Foundation rehab funds were used Project 1993–98 DKK 6.4m (AMREF ) to repair the hospital, Phase 1: improve PHC by build District Medical renovation of health units; build Officer’s office and management capacity of DHT; staff houses, instead of establish community based health rural health units as care (CBHC) with communities. planned. Hence need Phase 2 – complete rehab; hand for more rehab in phase over more to DHT; extend CBHC 2. coverage and assess as a pilot approach. Appraisal team recommended more GOU staff at district level, rather than project staff. Environmental 1990–1992 DKK 4.3m AMREF In second phase, Health Unit appraisal team project 1993–1998 DKK 2.4m recommended phasing out separate Environmental Health Unit set up Environmental Health to train field staff of MOH, water Unit project structure division and RUWASA in low tech by year 3 so MOH water and sanitation approaches. Environmental Health Included strengthening Mbale division can take over. training school. Phase 2: continued training for water and sanitation Choice of districts – field staff, headquarters and district not served by other staff and NGOs. Support for 5 water and sanitation districts: Mpigi, Luwero, programmes plus Mubende, Kiboga and Mukono. Mukono (link to other AMREF project). Straight Talk 2000 [?]– present Straight Talk Foundation 2004–06 budget DKK 5.8m Foundation – a Ugandan NGO. Produces printed newsletters and radio programmes geared to Also funded by DFID, various groups of young people Sida, EU, UNICEF, and adolescents (primary school, Ireland aid, Ford and secondary school, out of school Gates Foundations etc) and their teachers, in various Plus US funding for Ugandan languages. Focuses on specific projects. improving understanding of sexuality and reproductive health and preventing early pregnancy and AIDS.
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Project name Purpose, period, value, Implementation Documents, issues geographical scope, raised Hospice Africa 2003 – present Hospice Africa (NGO) 2004–06 budget DKK 3.5m Also funded by Ireland, Provides home-based care for USAID, and various people with AIDS and cancer. NGOs Also provides training for doctors, clinical officers and nurses in palliative care. DAR – 2005–2008 Danish Red Cross Development DKK 9m budget assistance for Mainly AIDS, in Nebbi, Arua, refugee hosting Masindi and Hoima districts areas in Uganda
Source: project documents.
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Annex 2: Health Sector Performance
Table 2.1: Selected indicators, from the Annual Health Sector Performance Report 2004/05
Baseline 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2004/5 1999/2000 achieved achieved achieved achieved achieved target Outpatient 0.40 0.43 0.60 0.72 0.79 0.9 0.7 utilisation Vaccine 41% 48% 63% 84% 83% 89% 85% coverage % posts 33% 40% 42% 66% 68% 68% 52% filled % without 33% 40% 35% 65% stock outs of key drugs % GOU 7.3% 7.5% 8.9% 9.0% 9.6% 9.7% 10% budget to health USD / capita USD 4.8 USD 6.4 USD 7.4 USD 7.2 USD 7.8 USD 8.0 USD GOU & 10.0 donor HIV Sero- 6.8% 6.1% 6.5% 6.2% 6.2% 7.1% 5.0% prevalence Source: Annual Health Sector Performance Report 2004/5
Figure 2.1: Comparison of infant mortality rates (Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania)
120 100 80 Uganda 60 Ghana IMR 40 Tanzania 20 0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Year of DHS survey
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of equity in outcomes and access to services (Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania)
The rich:poor ratio shows the relative levels of a basket of health outcomes (light blue bar) and access to selected basic health services (dark maroon bar) for the richest quintile compared to the poorest. This suggests that Uganda was doing better on this measure of equity than Ghana but less well on access to services than Tanzania, in the mid-1990s.
Equity in Outcomes and Access to Services within Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania Source: DHS Ghana 1993, Tanzania 1996, Uganda 1995 3
2.5 Outcomes Access
2
1.5 rich:poor ratio
1
0.5
0 Uganda Ghana Tanzania
Source: DHS Ghana 1993; Tanzania 1996; Uganda 1995.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 4 –
Capacity Development and Technical Assistance
Richard Johnson
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 4: Capacity Development and Technical Assistance
Contents
1 Introduction ...... 1 Scope of the paper ...... 1 Issues in assessing Capacity Development and Technical Assistance ...... 1 The way the paper is organised ...... 2
2 Context for Capacity Development in Uganda ...... 3
3 Trends in Donor Approaches to Capacity Development ...... 3 International developments ...... 3 Deve lopment of Capacity Building and TA in Danida’s Global Strategies ...... 4
4 Capacity development in Danish-Uganda aid ...... 5 Capacity Development in Danida Country Strategies in Uganda ...... 5 Capacity Development in Practice ...... 7 Ministry of Women/Gender ...... 7 Rakai District Development Programme (RDDP)...... 8 Judiciary...... 9 HUGGO ...... 10 Health ...... 11 Agriculture ...... 12
5 Overall Assessment / Conclusions ...... 14 The Achievement...... 14 Commitment to Capacity Development ...... 14 Appropriate engagements to deliver the changes in capacity required for programme objectives ...... 14 Institutional Support to foster local ownership, harmonisation and alignment ...... 14 Engagement with state and non-state actors ...... 14 Enterprise: a determination to listen, willingness to take risks, and to invest in long- term commitment ...... 15 Issues...... 15 Use of International and Local Technical Assistance ...... 15 Balancing Control and Risk ...... 16 Managing for Results ...... 16 Ownership and Self-Awareness...... 17 Managing Dependency and Exits ...... 17 Open system perspectives...... 17 Overall Assessment ...... 17
Bibliography ...... 19
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 4: Capacity Development and Technical Assistance
Acronyms and abbreviations ASPS Agricultural Sector Programme Support CAO Chief Administrative Officer CD Capacity Development DAC Development Assistance Committee of OECD Danida (since 1991) Danish International Development Assistance (up to 1991) Danish International Development Agency DKK Danish Kroner DMP Dairy Master Plan DRC Danish Red Cross GBS General Budget Support GOU Government of Uganda HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficienc y Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome HRD Human Rights and Development HSPS Health Sector Programme Support HSSP Health Sector Strategic Plan HUGGO Human Rights and Good Governance Liaison Office LGDP Local Government Development Programme LSRP Livestock Systems Research Programme MAAIF Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries MFPED Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development MOH Ministry of Health NCG Nordic Consulting Group NDA National Drug Authority NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NMS National Medical Stores NRM National Resistance Movement NSA Non-State Actor OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan PMA Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture PNFP Private not-for-profit RDC Rakai District Council RDDP Rakai District Development Programme RDE Royal Danish Embassy ROACH Results Oriented Approach to Capacity Change SWAp Sector Wide Approach TA Technical Assistance/ Technical Assistant/Technical Adviser
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 4: Capacity Development and Technical Assistance
1 Introduction
Scope of the paper 1.1 Promoting sustainability and strengthening institutional capacity have been key components of Danida’s programme. Danida’s 1996 Uganda country strategy (MFA Danida, 1996) asserted that these were already features of almost all projects, and capacity development has stayed high on Danida’s agenda, locally and internationally, as a cross-cutting feature of its programme. In some cases, capacity development has been more than a component: capacity development has been a prime objective in several programmes.
1.2 Capacity development refers to many types of interventions and results, in many different settings. It includes such interventions as training, establishing and developing organisations, and technical assistance. However, capacity development is not confined to such interventions , and each of them has to be seen in the context of their intended and actua l result. This result is important because capacity development refers not solely to interventions and processes, but to a change of state in the capacity and behaviours of people, organisations or institutions.
1.3 This paper identifies themes across the experience of capacity development within the Danida programme in Uganda. It draws from the evaluation team’s research across different interventions , and also, crucially, on the perceptions of stakeholders in the programme. The paper does not deal directly with the capacity of Danida’s own institutions in Denmark or Uganda. The suitability and adaptability of these to the needs of the programme are subjects for Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda.
Issues in assessing Capacity Development and Technical Assistance 1.4 ‘Capacity’ has been described as “the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully,” and ‘capacity development’ as “the process by which people, organisations and society as a whole initiate, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time” (OECD, 2006: 113, Chapter 5, Technical Co-operation).
1.5 One reason that capacity development (CD) is difficult to evaluate is the variety of interventions , results, and settings in which it takes place. However, more than that, CD is difficult to evaluate because of the uncertainty inherent in any attempt to change capacity. Any body which sets about intentional capacity change, whether directed to itself or another, is making a commitment to great complexities and uncertainties. Whether the ambition of the initiator is to maximise the scope and impact of change, or conversely to limit change to a small, defined area, it is likely to find that CD is not a single linear process, but a complex of social and political as well as technical processes, whose results are perceived differently according to the pos ition of the stakeholder.
1.6 Capacity change is not confined inside organisational boundaries, but affects and is affected by people and institutions outside them. Danida’s own recent work on capacity change highlights the importance of considering capacity change within “open systems” and not within organisational boundarie s (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2005). Therefore, this paper understands capacity development as occurring not simply within defined organisational borders but as taking place in interaction with the institutional settings in which those organisations are located.
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1.7 Nor is there any ideal time or way to observe the success of capacity development: it is hard to pin down changes in capacity to particular initiatives because people and organisations interact with many other factors. Also, because an outcome of successful capacity development is often greater capacity for self-development, it is hard to know what future benefits will flow from a past capacity development process.
1.8 In this paper, capacity development is the result of a number of processes. Some of these processes are traditional capacity development initiatives: particularly training, education, exchanges and technical assistance. However, many other processes result in capacity change. The establishment of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), improved access to justice, and greater alignment with government by donors, are all examples of changes in capacity. To the degree that these are the results of intentional interventions, they are regarded here as the results of capacity change or capacity development. Therefore, while the paper does not discount the significance of training and technical assistance, these are only part of the story.
1.9 In particular, although technical assistance (TA) is an important component of CD, it is only part of the means of effecting CD. The term “technical assistance” is used in a variety of ways with different meanings, and therefore needs to be used with care. “TA” sometimes refers to the very many ways in which donors contribute to capacity development, including assistance by local and foreign advisers, exchange visits and the provision of other services or equipment. At the other extreme technical assistance may be used to refer solely to an individual technical assistant or adviser, often a foreign national, working with an organisation in development. Furthermore, such a person is not necessarily engaged in capacity development, but may be primarily employed to control resources, liaise between donor and government, fill gaps or manage aid processes on behalf of the donor.
1.10 This paper reviews a number of interventions in Uganda, to reflect the range of capacity development initiatives undertaken by Danida. Support to the Ministry of Women/Gender is an example of Danida’s support to a ministry, with long term TA involvement. Rakai District Development Programme exemplifies many aspects of the Danida programme, including decentralisation and infrastructure development. HUGGO represents engagement with a wide range of actors outside the Government of Uganda (GOU). Danida’s work with the judiciary is one of the long-standing components of Danida’s programme, and has involved North-South exchanges. Finally, Danida’s support to health and agriculture have both included a wide range of capacity-related interventions, at organisational level, and across wider government institutions.
The way the paper is organised 1.11 This paper considers · the context in Uganda for capacity development; · trends in donor approaches to capacity deve lopment; · capacity development in practice in Danish Uganda aid.
1.12 Finally, it provides an overall assessment, and identifies issues for consideration within the Synthesis Report.
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2 Context for Capacity Development in Uganda
2.1 The course of Danida’s capacity development work in Uganda has to be set in the context of Uganda’s emergence from the chaos that preceded the coming to power of the NRM in 1986. At the start of the period, the Ugandan state as well as its economic and social infrastructure were in collapse. The NRM instituted an agenda of wide-ranging political and institutional reform. There was acknowledgement by government and donors that a high investment was needed in capacity development if the NRM’s reform objectives were to be achieved.
2.2 For most of the period under review, Uganda enjoyed the confidence of donors and benefited from high levels of external financing of development programmes and considerable support to build the capacities needed to implement them. The emerging consensus over policies and strategies between the Government of Uganda and donors provided an exceptional opportunity for collaboration, including to rehabilitate government institutions and to re-build capacity for service delivery.
2.3 Uganda was able to develop its civil service cadre from a relatively strong educational base, and this has facilitated a very great range of capacity building initiatives in government (Freeman, 2005: 11–12 Table 4.1). Government recognised that a lean well-qualified and well- remunerate d civil service lay at the heart of other reform initiatives. One of the first initiatives on which it sought donor support therefore was to fund the costs of retrenchment from the civil service in order to be able to develop the expertise and professional ethics of the cadre that remained. The government also used donors to assist in revitalis ing service delivery, particularly in health and education, and developing decentralised governance. Government looked to donors to help develop the framework of local government in the 1990s, and selected Danida for support in conceptualising and thereafter implementing decentralisation, both through financing and through building capacity in local councils. Similarly, as sector approaches emerged during the 1990s, donors, including Danida, provided expertise to assist line ministries to develop these.
2.4 Uganda’s heavy reliance on donor funding has given donors a major interest in all stages of programmes for capacity development – their funding, design, implementation, utilisation and assessment. With public servants in short supply, there has been considerable reliance on expatriate advisers. Critics have argued that such inputs have been excessive and poorly coordinated (ibid.: 14).
2.5 Since the late 1990s, the context for capacity development has become less favourable. The government’s commitment to reform appeared to slow down. The civil service reform programme went into reverse, and the number of people employed in government service began to rise again.
3 Trends in Donor Approaches to Capacity Development
International developments 3.1 With the emergence of poverty reduction as the goal of donors’ development assistance during the 1990s, capacity development came to be seen as a critical component of strategies for overcoming poverty and achieving economic development. The evolution of donor approaches to capacity development reflects broader international concerns with the control and ownership of development, with governance, and with achieving greater effectiveness from coordinated
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strategic effort. Just as donors sought to increase their effectiveness by focusing efforts within national and sectoral programmes, rather than in scattered project inputs, they sought to move on from providing individual technical assistants and supporting isolated capacity development initiatives to a more strategic approach.
3.2 DAC’s 1991 Principles for New Orientations in Technical Cooperation (OECD DAC, 1991) expressed emerging policy in the period. The Principles called for a programmatic rather than project-by-project approach, providing greater local ownership of development processes, better support for governance, making more use of existing local systems and expertise, and more focused use of external advisers as facilitators and trainers, rather than as gap-fillers. The 2005 Paris Declaration (OECD DAC, 2005) continued this trend with clear operational commitments to the ownership of capacity development by partner countries, and to harmonisation and alignment of capacity development policy by donor countries. It also makes practical commitments to the removal of project implementation units, run by donors as parallel structures.
3.3 Use of international technical assistants has attracted particular attention, arising from dissatisfactions with the efficacy and cost of TA. Learning theorists have argued that wide differentials between the authority, discretion, and benefits available to expatriate TAs and those available to their local counterparts result in serious problems of personal demotivation and institutional dysfunction, including a loss of local ownership of capacity developme nt (MacLachlan and Carr, 2005).
3.4 Oxford Policy Management’s “TA Vision” proposes that in states emerging from conflict or failure, there is a case for strong control of TA by donor institutions, but that otherwise host institutions need to acquire, in succession, the capacity: to establish development policies; to formulate and manage budgets; to specify needs; and finally to procure and manage TA services themselves, sourcing a flexible range of products and services on local and world markets (Williams, G. et al., 2003: 26).
3.5 Comparatively, Denmark and other countries with high bilateral spending per capita on development aid spend a smaller proportion on technical assistance than countries with a low bilateral spend; they also spend less in Africa than in Asia, according to a survey for the 2005 OECD Development Cooperation Report (OECD, 2006: 153 Chapter 5 and Statistical Annex). The report also shows that Danida reduced its overall spend substantially between 1993 and 2003/04.
Development of Capacity Building and TA in Danida’s Global Strategies 3.6 Three major developments in Danida’s policy for capacity development occurred during the evaluation period.
3.7 Danida’s global strategy of 1994, A Developing World (MFA Danida, 1994) , reflected international trends, by emphasising capacity building in the context of Danida’s move towards sector-wide approaches. Danida sought to make more flexible use of local TA, reducing both the number and scope of long-term international TA. The publication of Knowledge and Attitudes in 1998 (MFA Danida, 1998) built on A Developing World by providing guiding principles for the “personnel assistance” it proposed.
3.8 Towards the end of the period, from 2000, Danida commissioned research into capacity development and technical assistance, some of it conducted in Uganda (Boesen, 2001). This reflected both the centrality of capacity development (or the more value-neutral “capacity
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change”) to broader development, and a concern that Danida was having difficulty in reducing its overall spend on international TA.
3.9 Danida’s Results Oriented Approach to Capacity Change (ROACH) treats organisations involved in development as open systems, rather than closed organisations. These systems need to be seen in relation to their external institutional context. Capacity development needs to appreciate social and institutional factors outside the system even when these factors cannot be influenced by interventions within the organisations undergoing development (Boesen and Therkildsen, 2005). ROACH focuses on the achievement of organisational results, rather than just the processes of capacity development; on the social and political context; and on the primacy of local actors in setting and managing CD.
3.10 Complementing ROACH, Danida’s 2005 TA policy puts Technical Assistance at the heart of its development policy. Of the two goods which Danida can offer, “money” and “ideas”, Technical Assistance is the means by which ideas and experience are exchanged (MFA Danida, 2005: 4).
3.11 The overall principles of the 2005 policy are · partnership between donors and (host) partners for the delivery of TA · alignment of TA to local development aspirations, policy, culture and practice · ownership by hosts, by careful adaptation to circumstances · flexibility in the modalities of TA to match local circumstances.
3.12 The policy resists a standardised approach to technical assistance, but rather offers “principles” and “points of orientation”. Strengthened local ownership is achieved by clear involvement of local partners in organisational analysis, identifying need, defining tasks, planning supervision and performance indicators, and through transparent budgeting processes. A clear division of responsibilities is considered in relation to the location and supervision of TA within local institutions, TA contributions to policy dialogue, and reporting to Danida. Provision is also made for increased flexibility, and improved monitoring.
3.13 Under the new policy, local and regional TA will be recruited locally. Danida HQ will continue to recruit international TAs. “The main advantage of international advisers is that they bring valuable experience from elsewhere and can provide independent advice” (ibid. : 15).
4 Capacity development in Danish-Uganda aid
Capacity Development in Danida Country Strategies in Uganda 4.1 Capacity development has been a fundamental component of Danida’s programme in Uganda. It features not solely in formal policy, but permeates annual discussions, as well as programme documents and discussions.
4.2 In 1990, Danida and GOU re-affirmed their 1987 principles that strengthening institutions 1 was as important as economic growth and reconstructing infrastructure: “Danish Aid to Uganda is provided to further economic growth, to reconstruct the social and physical
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infrastructure, and to strengthen institutions , which will further democratic development and respect for human rights” (Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1990: 2).
4.3 TA was not normally separately reported in Uganda Danida accounts before 2006, when a budget of DKK 20m was included. There is no indication of the cost of local, as distinct from international, TA, but it is currently stated by RDE to be small.
4.4 Issues around the employment and payment of Ugandan and international technical assistance staff feature in annual consultations throughout the period (Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1993: 3), (Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1995: 10), (Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1997: 20), (Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1999: 19). In 1993 and 1995 Danida expressed concerns about the sustainability of topping-up payments to Ugandan staff, but noted that it had little alternative if it was to engage in institutional development. It voiced concerns about civil servants also being paid for consultancy in 1997. Topping up by donors was again identified as an unresolved issue in 1999.
4.5 Danida’s international TAs received positive recognition in Annual Minutes, but Danida also recorded its preference for local expertise. In 1994 Danida informed the Ugandan government that Danida globally now intended to put more focus on local capacity building and therefore to reduce the use of long-term foreign advisers (Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme, 1994: 7). At this stage, this did not imply great cuts in the use of foreign advisers in Uganda : “The planned shift away from long-term foreign advisers would only affect Uganda very little as this strategy had already been implemented in Uganda” (ibid. : 8).
4.6 A clear statement of capacity development intent comes in the 1996 Uganda country strategy (MFA Danida, 1996). It sees the relevance of capacity development extending beyond immediate project and organisational horizons to institutional and sectoral achievement that is sustainable beyond the life of a project. “Promoting sustainability and strengthening institutional capacity are key elements of Denmark’s revised development assistance programme and constitute the central components of the above-mentioned assistance programmes [in its focus areas of health, water, agric ulture, infrastructure and democracy]” (ibid. : 22). The strategy also recognises the role of the World Bank in capacity development.
4.7 The strategy allows only a limited role for international Danida advisers, in addition to consultants and 12 NGO advisers. It prefers employment of local expertise and consultancy financed mainly by project appropriations , increasingly under the control of local actors. “The advantage of following such a strategy instead of employing long-term Danish advisers is that a higher degree of “ownership” will be achieved by Uganda (ibid. : 23–24). The NCG Pre-Study report records a total of 184.45 person-years of long-term Danida TA in Uganda between 1990 and 2004, representing an estimated 60-90 Advisers (Annex F4). This policy is in line with emerging global trends. Danida can also claim that its spend on TA has been quite modest, in relation to its overall spend. Data on Danida’s spend on TA in Uganda has not been separately recorded, but Danida’s global spend on technical cooperation is modest.
4.8 Danida’s Strategy for Development Cooperation 2004–2008 in Uganda refers to the ways and circumstances which allow transfer of decision-making and resource management of aid to Ugandan partners within the context of the PEAP. It acknowledges capacity limitations affecting the implementation of the PEAP, in particular the need to develop the ability and knowledge of local government administrations, and the need for better coordination of sector ministries’ efforts (ibid. : 16). It recognises “occasional” problems in aid relationships, but sees these as
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related to individuals rather than to institutional weaknesses in Ugandan systems (MFA Danida, 2004: 9).
4.9 It foresees a move from project support to budget support as national programmes and polic ies are supported by proper procedures and demonstrate positive results. There is also a critical perspective on capacity building around sector support, based on experience to date ; in particular, that institutional reforms are essential to the susta inability of sector programmes. It acknowledges the limitations of capacity building so far. “Even where capacity building has been an integral part of the sector support, this does not necessarily yield sustainable results, because it was too supply-driven, donor-driven and/or fragmented” (ibid. : 9-10).
Capacity Development in Practice Ministry of Women/Gender 4.10 As discussed in Thematic Paper 8: Gender, Danida’s support to the Ministry of Women/ Gender included two long-term Technical Advisers assigned between 1991 and 1997. A key objective for Danida support was to develop the institutional capacity of the Ministry, which at that time was only three years old: its mandate – to mainstream gender across government programmes – was particularly challenging and its staff were inexperienced in work related to policy development and women’s issues.
4.11 Danida’s capacity building had three main approaches: (i) ‘learning by doing’, (ii) in- house training and (iii) opportunities for training in Denmark. Opportunities for overseas training were described as being a real incentive for staff to return and implement what they had learned in their work. The content of capacity building was not just gender policy development and gender mainstreaming, but also gave attention to instilling a professional work culture, and to developing planning, management, negotiating and team-working skills. The Gender Advisers are even reported to have tried to introduce an effective vehicle management system for the Ministry.
4.12 These learned skills are reported to have strengthened the Ministry organisationally. They were also important resources for staff in assisting other ministries to develop their skills in mainstreaming gender in sector programmes. During the 1990s, Danida’s support to the Ministry was very visible , in part due to the effectiveness and presence of the TAs, who were very active in meetings with other Ministries and seen as making “a big difference to the way certain things were achieved”. A key contribution was in developing methodologies, systems and skills that linked the Ministry to international thinking on gender policy. The contribution that the Technical Advisers made to capacity building in the Ministry enables them to share much of the credit for the Ministry’s achievements, particularly in promoting gender within the policy arena.
4.13 The Ministry remains weak, however, and there is a perception that Danida wound up its support too quickly before the Ministry was well established. The following is typical of the comments made to the evaluation about this: “Danida left us when we were still in need.” A particular concern expressed was that the TAs’ support to gender mainstreaming should have continued longer in order for the message be taken on board more widely in government circles. As a result gender perspectives have not adequately informed government, in particular the work of macro-economists in MFPED.
4.14 In the light of these comments, questions need to be asked about Danida’s exit strategy from the Ministry and about whether the Ministry was too dependent on Danida and the TAs. Danida’s investment in capacity building for the Ministry also brings sharply into focus the importance of thinking about capacity development in its institutional context. Within a few years date: November 2006 TP4 Page 7
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of being established, the Ministry faced problems of declining resources and political support, and of repeated restructuring and down-grading. Even if Danida support and technical assistance had continued for a much longer period, it is unlikely that this could have compensated for the fact that government support has clearly not been sustained.
Rakai District Development Programme (RDDP) 4.15 RDDP’s overall goals were economic and social development. From the outset, capacity development has been seen as integral to all three phases of the programme. The practice of the programme, as much as its formal policies, reflect the very great commitment of the programme to build the capacity of the district to manage its affairs and to own RDDP. Although the 2000 evaluation found that this was achieved with only partial success, the ambitions and achievements of the programme are nevertheless considerable.
4.16 In the first two phases (1992–1995 and 1995–2002), plans for strengthening district administration sat alongside immediate concerns with infrastructure and delivering services. Phase III (2002 to 2006), however, focused primarily on capacity building: to improve Rakai District and sub-county local governments’ capacity for service delivery, to increase the sustainability of the infrastructure created with Danish support under the earlier phases, to improve local government revenue generation, and to improve engagement with NGOs.
4.17 There has been extensive TA provision to Rakai, including resident advisers. Resident TA was withdrawn, but subsequently re-introduced after the financial irregularities of 1998. Interviewees noted many positive features about working with TAs, not just for the technical skills that they br ought, but for different ways of working, thinking and relating. However, there were concerns that much depended on individual relations between a TA and the management team. Local staff noticed very different strengths and styles in each of their TAs, to which the local team had to adjust.
4.18 The 2000 evaluation of Rakai (School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, 2000a) concluded that RDDP had largely achieved its reconstruction objectives, and had created a working Rakai District Council, though the lower levels of government were less well developed. Despite this impressive achievement, and the physical and human resources invested in it, institutional development was found to be less successful. This was attributed to the lack of a strategic perspective on organisational development, the absence of an orientation to outcomes and performance, and the interruption to the programme caused by embezzlement of funds in 1998. Some of the attempted interventions, such as the population databank and the application of social appraisal surveys, may also have been applied inappropriately.
4.19 Investment in institutional development focused more on the Rakai District Counc il (RDC) organisation, than on other areas, such as lower level tiers of government, enterprise development groups and NGOs. These might have had higher priority, given their importance for sustainable social and economic development. In our discussions with CAOs and officials from other districts in Uganda, we noted a greater enthusiasm for engagement with formal and informal businesses, and with other actors, and for considering the social and economic dynamics of districts and towns beyond the walls of the local government office. NGO representatives in Rakai commented, having felt ignored during Phases I and II, that they started to receive more attention from RDC during Phase III, which they attributed to Danida’s expected departure. There is a concern therefore that the programme’s focus on RDC may have tended to marginalise actors who will be crucial to sustainability.
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4.20 Our own discussions in June 2006, in the last month of Danida’s support,2 indicated that RDC had not been able to address the shortcomings in institutional development identified by the 2000 evaluation, and would have difficulty in dealing with changes ahead. We found little preparation by RDC for Danida’s imminent exit. Staff showed great dependency on Danida: they were “in lamentations” about Danida’s departure, and unable to cope with the financial loss of Danida’s assistance. This had been unexpectedly compounded by GOU’s abolition of local taxation, which Danida had encouraged RDC to collect. Staff expected phones to be cut off, transport to be garaged, courses to be cancelled. RDC had an extensive training programme, but nothing on planning for change, raising funds from new sources or other topics that might have helped it prepare for Danida’s absence; this supported the 2000 evaluation’s assessment that capacity development within RDDP lacked strategic direction.
4.21 The current situation of Rakai highlights the difficulty of achieving the correct ownership of the capacity – material, financial, organisational, cultural – created by development programmes. It also shows how capacity development is vulnerable to hazard. Rakai’s loss of local tax income would challenge the resilience of any organisation, and it is a particularly tough test for RDC at this time.
4.22 Rakai’s problems of maintaining ownership of financial assets are well known. Based on the success of Phase I, Phase II provided budget support to Rakai District Council for recurrent and development expenditure. This reflected a deep partnership and a level of trust between Danida and RDC that the evidence of corruption proved to be unsustainable. The reversion of Rakai to “project-mode” funding in its third phase was indicative of a loss of ownership by RDC.
4.23 The ownership of physical infrastructure is also problematic. We found a difference between perceptions about ownership by people in Rakai, and by Danida. From Danida’s point of view, it had avoided “rolling in big-time”, and had worked carefully with stakeholders from its initial consultation meetings to build local ownership. Yet, despite Danida’s concern to transfer ownership, we were told that “everything is Danida”, even the chairs we were sitting on. In assessing what Danida was leaving behind, people referred to physical assets, furniture, buildings, ambulances and roads, rather than the less tangible assets of institutions. Despite Danida’s perceptions of its own modesty, Danida’s material contribution may tend to dominate local thinking.
4.24 Danida’s bold ambitions to build local institutions that could be owned by local people have therefore not yet all been fulfilled. These are still, however, the first days in Rakai’s development after Danida’s departure. It is anticipated that national sector programmes should now deliver funds and assistance to Rakai. In addition improved capacity in the RDC has qualified it to access funding from the LGDP.
Judiciary 4.25 As discussed in Thematic Paper 7, support to the judiciary is one of Danida’s longest- standing commitments, with the first small grant being made in 1989. A substantial programme for support to the judiciary was initiated in 1995 and is continuing. The programme has always had a strong focus on the development of the judiciary as an institution under three components: rehabilitation and development of physical infrastructure to enable the courts to function; rationalisation of case management; and training for all levels of legal and administrative staff. There was an early perception in Danida that members of the judiciary were overly concerned
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with the physical infrastructure component, and in the later phases of the programme Danida pushed the components addressing management capacity and training somewhat harder.
4.26 Danida’s approach to capacity development has involved a combination of regular short- term inputs by international and Ugandan consultants, and local and overseas training. The rationalisation component included advice from an international expert on setting up computerised case management systems supported by training in computer use and database management. Danida’s support also enabled the judiciary to set up its own training infrastructure including a committee to review training needs and prepare annual training plans in relation to a national policy for judiciary training. A Judicial Training College has also been established and relevant curricula developed. The judiciary is cited by Danida as a case where a small number of high-level advisors – including a high court judge – have had more impact than arguably a much larger number of international consultants and TAs would have done.
4.27 There is a general perception that the support that has been provided to the judiciary has had a positive impact in improving the effectiveness of the courts system and raising the level of confidence that the public has in the judiciary as a whole. This is partly due to the fact that Danida’s support extended the presence of the courts throughout the country, brought order into court systems, enabled the judiciary to plan on the basis of a strategic plan (described as the only one of its kind in Africa) and de-mystified the judiciary, which had previously been seen as “closed and reclusive”.
HUGGO 4.28 HUGGO is discussed more extensively in Thematic Paper 7. Since 2000, Danida has managed its support to governance interventions through the Human Rights and Good Governance Liaison Office (HUGGO). HUGGO is a form of Programme Support Unit located outside the embassy and employing a large number of Ugandan professional staff under the direction of a Danish Chief Technical Adviser.
4.29 Capacity development has been a major element of HUGGO’s support to NGOs. In line with Danida’s intention to develop more strategic approaches to capacity development, the objective has been to develop capacity in the civil society sector and not just in single NGOs. HUGGO has therefore prioritised funding for NGO networks and coalitions, and has helped to develop capacity in new NGOs by ‘housing’ them initially in established ones that are able to provide administrative support and financial accountability. A key component of Danida’s support to civil society is to build capacity in the sector outside Kampala, through providing funding for District NGO Networks. HUGGO’s strategy for developing capacity in the Networks focused initially on funding human and physical resources for their Secretariats. This approach was criticised for placing too much emphasis on infrastructure and too little on analysing capacity needs in relation to what District Networks were set up to do and how they related to their me mbers.
4.30 Another element of Danida’s support to civil society has been HUGGO’s ability to provide financial oversight of NGO programmes. Danida considers the appointment of a Financial Management Adviser in HUGGO as an important turning point in being able both to monitor partners’ expenditure and to build their capacity in financial management. However, several NGOs interviewed during the evaluation considered that HUGGO’s demands for financial accountability were unreasonable, particularly in comparison with other donors, and that they frequently caused avoidable disbursement delays.
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4.31 Danida’s decision to set up HUGGO was prompted by the increasing importance of Danida’s support to governance in Uganda, and by Danida’s wish to put some institutional and physical separation between governance programmes and the embassy in the context of a difficult political operating environment. Its success has also attracted other donors to use it to manage their relations with NGOs.
4.32 Danida is, however, aware of concerns that HUGGO’s role as a Danida-led institution is inconsistent with Danida’s policy to reduce the number of its TAs and Project Implementation Units. Danida has expressed an intention to “anchor” HUGGO more effectively in Ugandan institutions in the future. Because support to governance involves diverse interventions and multiple governmental and non-governmental partners, this is not a simple undertaking. Danida has handed over much of the management of District Network support to an NGO body. It is also investigating, with like-minded donors, the potential for setting up an autonomous foundation to manage support to human rights NGOs.
Health 4.33 This section draws on Thematic Paper 3, which addresses Health and HIV/AIDS. Here, we do not refer to Danida’s pr ogrammes in HIV/AIDS.
4.34 Danida’s capacity building in the health sector displays innovation, leadership and pragmatism, but has also thrown up great challenges, some of them unresolved.
4.35 Like many of the Danida programmes, Danida’s involvement in health can be seen in three phases, each of which had a different approach to capacity development. · The first phase (1987–1993) focused on emergency needs, especially essential drugs and supplies. · The second phase (1993–2002) provided for deeper institutional deve lopment for drugs and supplies, decentralisation, and the formulation of a sectoral approach, Health Sector Programme Support (HSPS). · The third phase (2002–2005) built on the second, deepened the use of Sector Wide Approaches, and extended human resource development, especially in Northern Uganda.
4.36 Capacity development in Phase 1 was limited because Danida chose to fund drug kits through the Danish Red Cross (DRC), rather than through Ugandan institutions. This was, however, an appropriate emergency response, given the severity of needs and the chaos of the public service. Notably, DRC supplied private not-for -profit (PNFP) health services, as well as state services, which was an effective approach given the important role of PNFP in service delivery. At the same time, Danida provided support to the Ugandan Red Cross on public education, and funded repairs and training for the Central Medical Stores. Following a review in 1990, Danida recognised that its work in health would require a longer-term approach than originally envisaged, and Danida started to work with Central Medical Stores (CMS) to conceptualise a new National Medical Stores (NMS), and National Drug Authority (NDA).
4.37 The development of NDA and NMS were major achievements of Phase 2. Both organisations received long-term TA and funding from Danida. The NDA has become an international model, despite considerable pressures, and difficulties in establishing an appropriate legal framework.
4.38 Development of capacity of the NMS has been more problematic, but Danida’s work is widely recognised for its value in greatly increasing drug availability across Uganda. Financial date: November 2006 TP4 Page 11
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accountability for large amounts of public funds and supplies, corruption, the behaviour of other donors, coordination with decentralised health management and other issues have continued to hold back NMS. Danida also re-introduced TA into NMS at the request of MOH, in order to improve management and control. NMS still depends on support from Danida, for whom there is still no clear exit plan. Danida has also supported (mainly in terms of funding) the work of the independent Joint Medical Stores, which supplies many PNFP services, a pragmatic decision which has increased the diversity and security of sources of supply, and provided a valuable comparator on price and quality.
4.39 Danida’s institutional development with the Ministry of Health was a major focus of the second and third phases. Initially it provided support in developing systems for information, equipment maintenance and environmental sanitation. Its support to institutional development has subsequently evolved to support key central functions including planning, drugs policy, gender mainstreaming, health management information and SWAp processes in the central MOH; strengthen training institutions for nurses and pharmacists; and special support to selected Northern districts.
4.40 Danida has worked closely with MOH to help develop its role in the context of decentralisation. This has included helping MOH provide support to district pla nning and information as well as the innovative medicines credit line mechanism. However, earlier in the period under evaluation, Danida does not seem to have drawn lessons from its involvement in the planning or implementation of decentralisation and rela ted them to the development of NMS, which was adversely affected by decentralisation of drug purchasing.
4.41 Danida has been a key player in encouraging the development of a health sector strategy and sector wide approach, even though Danida’s own first Health Sector Programme Support (HSPS) was as much a collection of projects as an integrated programme. HSPS 2 and HSPS 3 have been more closely linked with the national sector-wide approach and its processes for consultation and reporting. HSPS 2 was terminated early, in order to align the third HSPS fully with MOH’s Health Sector Strategic Plan II from July 2005.
4.42 Despite its involvement in sectoral development, Danida has been reticent about using MOH financial accounting systems for implementation. It has restricted budget support under HSPS 2 and HSPS 3, for various reasons. This has required a high level of senior TA involvement in project management rather than advisory roles. This is currently under review
Agriculture 4.43 This section draws on Thematic Paper 1.
4.44 In the first phase of its support to agriculture, 1987–1990, Danida did not approach capacity development within the agricultural sector in any systematic manner. As in all sectors at this time, the prevailing chaos no doubt made it difficult to identify strategic partners. Danida had some success with Entebbe dairy school and infrastructure, and this provided an initial base for its later wider involvement in the dairy industry. The grain storage and drying project failed to take adequate account of its organisational, sectoral and market context; as a result the project encountered difficulties related to staffing, contracting, corruption, and market conditions. Two other interventions were undertaken: the forestry scheme was cancelled, and the credit for small farmers scheme proved unsatisfactory.
4.45 Danida’s second phase, from 1991–1998, built a broader base in the livestock sector. Danida could draw on a history of support to Ugandan dairy industry in the 1960s, its experience
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in Entebbe, and on Danish experience. It also demonstrated a greater engagement with Government and Ugandan resources. It seized the opportunity to support production of the Dairy Master Plan (DMP), along with contributions to dairy facilities in Kampala and Mbarara. The DMP was produced by a joint Ugandan and Danish team, and approved by the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries (MAAIF). Although the dairy industry has had mixed success, the DMP was an important contribution. The Animal Breeding Project was also based on the DMP. Danida’s commitment to Farmers’ Associations, however, was less successful, requiring high inputs from Danida and Government.
4.46 Danida’s third phase of involvement was the Agricultural Sector Programme Support (1998–present). ASPS-I (1998–2003) started to draw together Danida’s disparate projects, and was the first attempt to work jointly with MAAIF on a sector-wide basis. ASPS-II has continued this process, focusing more tightly on reform, research, advice and agribusiness developme nt. Both ASPS programmes have been managed through a Programme Coordination Unit (PCU), and have been solely funded by Danida, though other bilateral funders have expressed interest in joining them.
4.47 Danida’s commitment to capacity development is reflecte d in its support to development of MAAIF and to the separate development of the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), which was led by MFPED. ASPS-I was formulated in the absence of a MAAIF strategy, but in the context of the 1997 PEAP. The slow pace of policy development and reform within MAAIF has been disappointing, burdened by weak government support and poor staff incentives. but is perhaps not untypical of efforts to reform central government ministries. However, the PMA has borne some fruit, particularly in the establishment of the National Agricultural Advisory Service, NAADS.
4.48 Individual projects within ASPS have had varied fortunes. The Livestock Systems Research Programme (LRSP) has been particularly successful in developing animal husbandry technology through farming systems research, and in developing a critical mass of scientists and technic ians, and has been influential across Uganda in strengthening research management and technology transfer processes. LSRP started from a very weak base, but has built good links with farmers, researchers, Makerere University, and national, regional and international institutions. It has had Danida support since 1992, as well as support from Danish expertise. It continues to receive Danida funding, through government, but is winning funds from other sources (see Thematic Paper 1, Box 4). By contrast, interventions in the District Farmers’ Associations, District Agricultural Training and Information Centres, and the Ugandan National Farmers Federation have been less successful to date, with questions over their sustainability and appropriateness.
4.49 Overall in agriculture, Danida has progressed, as in health, from individual projects to sectoral programmes that seek to engage with wider governmental institutions. It has responded to opportunities, successfully with the Dairy Master Plan and LSRP, but some of its interventions have portrayed a weak analysis of socio-economic contexts and sustainability. It has made good use of Danish links and expertise. Its early links with MAAIF were limited, possibly because there was little to link to. Danida’s capacity development work with a MAAIF has been less successful than with a smaller, simpler organisation such as LSRP, where the project was starting from a low base, and where Danida’s long-term support has been critical to success.
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5 Overall Assessment / Conclusions
The Achievement Commitment to Capacity Development 5.1 Danida has consistently sought to set appropriate objectives for institutional development in Uganda, and has demonstrated commitment to these objectives in its practice throughout the evaluation period. In this it has reflected the evolution of international policy, including Danida’s own contributions.
Appropriate engagements to deliver the changes in capacity required for programme objectives 5.2 Danida has tried to avoid overloading its partners with supply-led capacity development services. Rather, it has identified and committed itself to appropriate engagements with its partners that have focused on achieving results: capacity changes that enable institutions to function effectively and achieve programme objectives. There is strong evidence of such changes in all the cases reviewed in this report.
5.3 Danida’s interventions have been well considered, and well paced, to reflect the state of development of Ugandan society and its institutions. Across most sectors, Danida has matched its contributions to CD to realistic assessments of its partners’ needs. Thus, supply of medical kits through an NGO was addressed before the development of policies for essential drugs and, later, the design of sectoral health programmes (although some argue that the capacity development in drug management could have happened earlier and more quickly).
5.4 Danida has been enterpr ising and creative in the terrain that it used for capacity development. Danida’s investment in Rakai as a model for decentralisation, its support to a national drug authority, and its support for the judiciary have all indicated a willingness to engage in diverse but essential aspects of Ugandan society.
5.5 Danida has been equally creative in the processes that it has used. It has mixed on-the-job training, local and foreign courses, and foreign exchanges. It has invested in systems and structures, drawing on experience in Denmark and elsewhere in the Danida programme. It has encouraged Ugandans to see international perspectives on gender, health and other topics. TAs have been used creatively, and in many cases been well received. Even in some cases, where international TA roles have had major control over resources, they have received positive recognition by Ugandan partners.
Institutional Support to foster local ownership, harmonisation and alignment 5.6 Danida’s support to programmes has made consistent efforts to achieve donor harmonisation and local ownership of policy – particularly in sectoral working and SWAps. It has funded institutional development to enable ministries to formulate programmes and sectoral policies. This has complemented the work of RDE staff in developing relations with Ugandan and donor stakeholders.
Engagement with state and non-state actors 5.7 Danida has been willing to integrate state and non-state actors in new ways , thereby enhancing the capacity of both. In health it worked from the outset with PNFP service providers, and later was sensitive to the impact of its work with the National Medical Stores on its independent competitor Joint Medical Stores.
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Enterprise: a determination to listen, willingness to take risks, and to invest in long-term commitment 5.8 The generic strengths of Danida identified in our interviews have particular relevance for Danida’s work in capacity development. They may be summed up as enterprise: a determination to listen, to take risks, and to invest in long-term commitment to partners, projects and programmes. All these attributes received wide recognition by stakeholders. The success of individual capacity development interventions is also a reflection of these qualities, and they may be of value in themselves to Ugandan institutions.
Issues Strategy for Capacity Development 5.9 Danida notes in its 2004–08 strategy that capacity development has been somewhat fragmented, supply-driven and donor-driven in Uganda. There was less evidence of donor harmonisation in the design of approaches to capacity development, than in other aspects of their work with each other and government – for instance, in the formulation of sectoral approaches.
5.10 One element of this fragmentation is a failure to capitalise effectively on opportunities to build links across government. Linkages between different programmes supported by Danida were tentative – more experience might have flowed from RDDP to other districts, or from the Ministry of Gender to inform gender perspectives within MFPED.
5.11 Danida has been successful at identifying opportunities for capacity development from an early stage in the programme: the National Drugs Authority and the Dairy Master Plan are examples. However, there have also been many attempts with weaker outcomes, for instance the grain storage project and support to farmers’ associations. While some problem factors might have been harder to take into account (such as the full loss of local tax income in Rakai), others might have been foreseen.
5.12 While Danida has been extensively involved in capacity development, the strengths of Danida’s programme have often been to identify and respond to opportunities within particular programmes. We have not seen a clear strategic perspective taking account of the needs of Ugandan institutions across the board, the actions of other contributors, and Danida’s own potential for contribution. Danida might benefit from a more far-reaching strategic approach to capacity development, that nevertheless allowed it to continue to identif y and respond to opportunities, as it has done in the past.
Use of International and Local Technical Assistance 5.13 Danida is aware that its practice in relation to TA differs from its policy. The number of international TAs has not declined greatly since the 1990s. It is aware of the long-standing critique that international TAs are ineffective, expensive and reduce local ownership. Danish TA reached a peak in 2001 with nearly 250 Danida-contracted Advisers, and has since then gradually reduced in number to less than 200 in 2005.
5.14 However, Danida does not need to feel discomfort about using international TA where the required technical skill, comparable experience and independence are not available locally, and the programme cannot be designed otherwise. MOH’s request for international TA at NMS is a good example.
5.15 The overall spend on TA should not, perhaps, be a cause of undue concern, in the context of Danida’s relatively modest spend, compared with the size of its overall budget. However, date: November 2006 TP4 Page 15
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Danida may need to consider whether it is doing enough to develop alternatives to international TA. Danida has made efforts in this area, including for instance its work with ULGA (Uganda Local Governments Association). RDE told us that it was not possible to identify the cost of local TA in the Danida programme. This suggests that it needs more serious consideration and investment. Danida may need to consider its strategy for the development of local professionals and services, able to provide short and long-term assistance.
Balancing Control and Risk 5.16 The use of Programme Implementation Units, the use of international TAs in control positions, and, to an extent, the establishment of HUGGO, can all be seen as against the spirit of local ownership of development programmes. However, as with other issues related to TA, Danida is right not to be swayed by dogma or fashion, and needs to be confident that implementation structures are appropriate for circumstances, bearing in mind the problems of accountability and corruption.
5.17 Danida’s practice has been to invest boldly in challenging projects and programmes, and to do so in ways that require strong partnership and trust. It has also chosen to invest in programmes entailing considerable financial exposure, such as drug supply and construction of infrastructure. Danida has not been averse to such risks, and Danida has been willing to accept that a degree of uncertainty is inevitably involved in efforts to develop mature organisations , which are capable of managing vulnerable assets, managing contracts and accepting decentralised responsibilities.
5.18 However, Danida’s approach created the possibility that, when things went wrong, Danida would become risk-averse, and make less challenging investments, or exercise excessive caution in implementation.
5.19 Danida needs to consider whether the Uganda programme maintained an adequate risk assessment. Such a risk assessment might have shown that Danida’s chosen stance in the 1990s , of partnership and trust in relation to finance and assets, was likely to result in adverse events – even though the exact nature of these was uncertain – that would necessarily entail a response by Danida towards greater control. This has indeed been Danida’s response, coupled with a requirement for high accountability to RDE, and from RDE to Danida, closely monitored by KVA. While Danida’s response has been appropriate, the resulting turmoil that affected RDDP and others may have undermined Danida’s credibility, may have made it more difficult for Danida to exit, and may have reduced programme sustainability to some degree.
5.20 There have been compelling developmental reasons why Danida has adopted rela tions of partnership and trust. These are no less important now than in the period under review. However, the Ugandan environment is one of considerable internal risks; Danida also seeks to maintain a high accountability to both Ugandan and Danish stakeholders. Danida should not seek to eliminate uncertainty from its programme. On the contrary, its boldness, creativity, and willingness to test new partnerships ha ve been a strength of the programme. However, in this context, Danida needs a thorough approach to risk assessment and risk reduction to minimise the damage to the programme and all involved in it when, inevitably , things go wrong.
Managing for Results 5.21 Danida has worked hard to build a methodological framework for a results-based approach to capacity change. Danida needs to develop a similar framework for assessing the institutional outcomes of capacity change that is compatible with its strong commitment to results-based management. Danida’s ability to do this will lie in its capacity to develop
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programme indicators that sufficiently allow for uncertainty in outcomes; for open-system and institutional perspectives, rather than solely organisational views; and for longer-term views. Building consensus within Danida around risk may be important for this.
Ownership and Self-Awareness 5.22 Although Danida has exerted great efforts to ensure that its programme is owned by local stakeholders, it does not always seem to have been aware of the impact of its own “footprint” and perspectives. This might occur where the scale of a major intervention, like the RDDP, dominates the local terrain and economy, or where Danida’s suppor t for networks of NGOs affects the ways in which they organise and others see them. Danida’s position as a funder may also mean that honest feedback is difficult to obtain from its partners. The current exercise, particularly the Perception Study, may encourage Danida to seek more systematic feedback from partners, particularly in relation to how its management of programmes impacts in the local setting.
Managing Dependency and Exits 5.23 Danida’s experiences with NMS, RDDP and the Ministry of Gender have indicated a degree of dependency within the relationship, and a difficulty in making a successful exit. Danida’s consistent commitment to its programmes and sectors has resulted in long-term relationships. The management of exits from these is therefore a cons iderable undertaking: Danida and its partners need to consider not only the timing and manner of that exit, over a number of years, but also whether some forms of continuing support or engagement may be justified after the termination of funding.
Open system perspectives 5.24 Danida has worked hard to broaden government and donor perspectives, and to see the linkages between ministries and other structures. Danida also showed it could work in partnership with Danish and Ugandan voluntary organisations as well as Ugandan statutory organisations to deliver drug kits. In other programmes, however, there were concerns that Danida’s chosen point of contact and influence, such as the Rakai District Council, has been over-emphasised to the detriment of engagement wit h other stakeholders who are just as crucial to economic development and reduction of poverty.
Overall Assessment 5.25 Danida has already made remarkable steps in respect of the principles it set forth in 2005. It has demonstrated a commitment to partnership with Ugandan stakeholders, to alignment of its own policies and those of other donors with GOU; to ownership of development policy, programmes and processes; and to flexibility in adapting its programmes to the requirements of local stakeholders.
5.26 Danida has demonstrated: · A consistent commitment to capacity development throughout the period. · Appropriate engagements to identify and deliver the changes in capacity required for development programme objectives including long-term support to some institutions. · Institutional support to foster local ownership, harmonisation and alignment. · Engagement with state and non-state actors. · Enterprise: a willingness to listen, take risks, invest, and make longer term commitments.
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5.27 There are, however, a number of areas where Danida may be able to improve its approach to capacity development. It may need to: · Develop a more strategic approach to capacity development with other partners, providing the context within which it continues to identify and pursue opportunities for capacity development. · Consider how to develop alternatives to international TA, including maximising the contribution by Ugandan people and institutions in capacity development. · Consider how to balance control and risk, in order to avoid inconsistency in implementation, and to prevent Danida becoming too risk-averse to sustain its record of innovation. · Learn to make a more realistic assessment of the impact of its own footprint on local economies, funding relationships and organisations. · Learn to address problems of dependency and exit processes, especially in long-term programmes. · Develop the application of “open system” perspectives in all programmes, to prevent too tight a focus on single organisatio ns.
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Bibliography
Boesen, N. (2001). Advisers in Danish Bilateral Cooperation. Copenhagen: MFA.
Boesen, N. and Therkildsen, O. (2005). A Results-Oriented Approach to Capacity Change. Copenhagen: MFA.
Freeman, T. (2005). Capacity Development for Growth, Service Delivery, Empowerment and Security in Africa, The Case of Uganda. Ottawa: GGI.
MacLachlan, M. and Carr, S. (2005). The Human Dynamics of Aid. OECD Development Centre, Policy Insights No. 10, 2005. Paris: OECD.
MFA Danida (1994). A Developing World - Strategy for Danish Development Policy towards the year 2000. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1996). Strategy for Danish Bilateral Cooperation with Uganda. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1998). Knowledge and attitudes. Strategy for personnel assistance. (November 1998). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2004). Uganda-Denmark Partnership Strategy for Development Cooperation 2004- 2008. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2005). Technical Assistance in Danish Bilateral Aid . Policy Paper, Department of Business Cooperation & Technical Assistance. (December 2005). Copenhagen: MFA.
OECD DAC (1991). Principles for New Orientations in Technical Cooperation. Paris: OECD.
OECD DAC (2005). Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. High Level Forum, Paris. Paris: OECD.
OECD (2006). 2005 Development Co -operation Report. Chapter 5, Technical Co-operation and Statistical Annex. Paris: OECD.
School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham (2000a). Evaluation of Rakai District Development Programme, Synthesis Report. Copenhagen: MFA.
School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham (2000b). Evaluation of Rakai District Development Programme, Volume 3: Report No. 4: Social and Economic Development; Report No. 5: Participatory Development. 2000/3. Copenhagen: MFA.
Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme (1990). Agreed Minutes. (April 1990). Kampala: Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme.
Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme (1993). Agreed Minutes. (May 1993). Kampala: Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme.
Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme (1994). Agreed Minutes. (May 1994). Kampala: Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme.
Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme (1995). Agreed Minutes. (April 1995). Kampala: Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme.
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Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme (1997). Agreed Minutes. (April/May 1997). Kampala: Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme.
Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme (1999). Agreed Minutes. (April/May 1999). Kampala: Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme.
Williams, G. et al. (2003). A Vision for the Future of Technical Assistance in the International Development System: Final Report (Revised). Oxford: Oxford Policy Management.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 5 –
Support to Decentralisation
Wilson Baryabanoha Stephen Lister
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 5: Support to Decentralisation
Contents
1. Introduction and Overview...... 1 The Importance of Decentralisation...... 1 Danish Support...... 1
2. The Rakai District Development Programme ...... 2 Introduction...... 2 RDDP Phase I...... 2 RDDP Phase II...... 2 RDDP Phase III...... 3 Perspectives on RDDP ...... 3 Capacity Develoment through RDDP ...... 4 Issues in Local Revenue ...... 5
3. Support to the Decentralisation Process...... 5 Origins...... 5 The first phase of Danish support ...... 5 The second phase of Danish support ...... 6 Subsequent Institutional Support ...... 6
4. Concluding Comments ...... 7
Bibliography ...... 8
Annexes Annex A: General Budget Support and Decentralisation...... 12 Annex B: Programme Details ...... 14 Rakai District Development Programme ...... 14 Support to Decentralisation in Uganda ...... 17
Boxes Box 1: Budget Support and Corruption in Rakai (extract from Annual Minutes) 3 Box 2: Origins of Danida's Involvement in Decentralisation...... 6
Tables Table 1: Main Danida Funding for Decentralisation...... 2
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 5: Support to Decentralisation
Acronyms and abbreviations
CAO Chief Administrative Officer D Danida informant DKK Danish Kroner DS Decentralisation Secretariat FDS Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy GOU Government of Uganda HRD Human Rights and Democratisation LG Local Government LGDP Local Government Development Programme MOLG Ministry of Local Government ND Non-Danida informant NRM National Resistance Movement PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan PFM Public Finance Management PGBS Partnership General Budget Support PRSC Poverty Reduction Support Credit RDC Rakai District Council RDDP Rakai District Development Programme SWAp Sector Wide Approach TA Technical Assistance/Technical Assistant
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 5: Support to Decentralisation
1. Introduction and Overview
The Importance of Decentralisation 1.1 Decentralisation has been one of the main political and administrative themes of the Museveni era in Uganda. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) had set up local Resistance Councils in the areas it took over, and when it became the government it saw democratic local government as an antidote to Uganda's unhappy history of political strife and division at national level (see Background Paper 2: Political and Social Context). After taking power in 1986, the NRM issued a ten-point programme aiming at the reconstruction of Uganda n society. The first of these points was the creation of a local government system that would encourage democratic, participatory, efficient and development-oriented local government structures.
1.2 It was not until November 1993, however, that the National Resistance Council (NRC) passed The Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute, 1993; the date of commencement of the Statute was 31 December, 1993. The new Constitution of the Republic of Uganda of 1995 provided for decentralisation reforms by highlighting principles of transferring functions, powers and responsibilities from the Government of of Uganda (GOU) to local government units. The new Constitution also drew attention to the need for people’s participation and democratic control in decision making as well as the need for a sound financial base for local governments with reliable sources of revenues. Local government (LG) reforms were subsequently embedded in the Local Government Act of 1997.
Danish Support 1.3 Danida had strong empathy with this interest in democratic decentralisation. It is committed to the principle of participatory development, and, from the beginning, institutional development was one of the main strands of Danida's programme in Uganda. Moreover, Denmark itself has a highly decentralised local government system.
1.4 Denmark made two distinctive contributions to the process of decentralisation: through the Rakai District Development Programme (RDDP), and as the government's main donor partner in the development of the institutions for decentralisation during the 1990s. The main expenditures for these interventions are shown in Table 1 below. At about DKK 300m, they amount to less than 6% of all Danida expenditures over the period;1 nevertheless, decentralisation is one of the activities with which Danish aid is most strongly identified.
1.5 Decentralisation and Danish support to it have been extensively documented (see Bibliography below for principal references; conclusions on decentralisation from the evaluation of General Budget Support are reproduced as Anne x A to this paper). This paper provides a brief outline of Danish support and notes some of the key issues to be taken into account in the evaluation of Danish aid. The next sections discuss the two centrepieces of Danish support to decentralisation – the Rakai District Development Programme, and overall support to the decentralisation process. (Annex B provides more details on the project phases). These are discussed sequentially, but it is important to note that they were implemented in parallel, and that
1 Decentralisation does not appear as a separate category in the records of Danish spending (as compiled by the NCG Pre- study for this evaluation). RDDP expenditures are distributed among various sectors (e.g. roads, health etc) and support to decentralisation institutions appears mainly under the heading of Human Rights and Democratisation (HRD). date: November 2006 TP5 Page 1
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 5: Support to Decentralisation there were many interconnections between them. In many ways the Rakai programme served as a test-bed for models of decentralisation which were later rolled out across the country.
Table 1: Main Danida Funding for Decentralisation Project/Programme Period DKK million Rakai District Development Programme (RDDP) Phase I 1992–1995 86.9 Phase II (extended from 1999 to 2002) 1995–2002 62.0 Phase III 2002–2006 18.1 total 167.0 Support to Decentralisation in Uganda Phase I 1993–1997 4.9 Phase II 1998–2003 71.1 Phase III 2003–2007 54.7 total 130.7 TOTAL 297.7 Source: Danida files (see Annex B).
2. The Rakai District Development Programme
Introduction 2.1 In 1990 GOU requested Danida to investigate the possibilities for supporting the development of Rakai District. The district was one of the least developed in the country and, in addition, there was a high prevalence of AIDS, which had further aggravated the poor economic and social conditions in the district.
2.2 A project identification mission fie lded by Danida in October 1990 concluded that there was a basis for Danida support. It was recommended that long-term assistance was necessary and that a district development support programme to be financed by Danida should be planned as a process approach, and on the basis of the district’s own priorities. In April 1991 a District Planning Workshop was held, and constraints and potentials for development in the district were discussed and prioritised.
RDDP Phase I 2.3 Phase I of RDDP took place from January 1992 to September 1995. RDDP I was more of a reconstruction phase and mainly focused on civil works with an objective of increasing the standards of living of people in the area who had been hard hit by the after- effects of war and the unfolding HIV/AIDS crisis. It focused on the social sectors of health, education, trade and production as well as strengthening the district administration.
RDDP Phase II 2.4 Phase II of RDDP was implemented from September 1995 to September 2002. RDDP II shifted from the reconstruction of Phase I to capacity building and institutional development. During this phase a specific poverty focus was built into the programme objectives. The programme made budget support available to the district (i.e. unearmarked funding to be allocated through the District's planning and budget process). However, the discovery that funds had been misused led to a withdrawal of budget support (see Box 1). The situation was further complicated when the Chief Adminstrative Officer (CAO), who had been interdicted as one of the consequences of the affair, secured election as a councillor and became chair of the District Council.
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Box 1: Budget Support and Corruption in Rakai (extract from Annual Minutes)
The minutes of the 1999 Annual Consultations between Denmark and the Government of Uganda include the following passage: Democratisation and good governance Danida’s support to Rakai District focuses on increasing the administrative and political capacity of the district through rationalised and more democratic routines at all levels. During the financial year 1998/99, non-earmarked support to the district was discontinued pending fulfilment of some changes linked to the loss of project funds and the need to strengthen the financial administration function in the district. The annual review of the Rakai District Development Programme was conducted in April 1999, and it was found that the conditions made for full resumption of the programme activities had been met by the district apart from the replacement of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), who is currently suspended. It was agreed that the Ministry of Local Government would expedite the process to replace the suspended CAO by putting it on the priority list to be handled by the tribunals scheduled to sit and review such cases. The Head of the Danish delegation advised that no budget support (non-earmarked funds) shall be released to Rakai district by Danida, until the procedure for replacing the former CAO has been completed. [AM 1999, p15]
2.5 An evaluation of the RDDP in December 1999 (School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, 2000) gave a generally positive assessment and recommended further support. According to the evaluation, Phases I and II had a very positive impact on the economy mainly through road construction and credit facilities and social sector support. However, the evaluation found the programme less successful in institutional capacity building of LG systems.
RDDP Phase III 2.6 RDDP Phase III was implemented from October 2002 to 2006. It had largely the same focus as Phase II but with the clear understanding that the third phase would be the last phase of the programme, to be used to complete “unfinished business”.
Perspectives on RDDP 2.7 It is important to recall that, when it was initiated, the RDDP was a significant innovation. As noted in the Perception Study (see Volume 2), both Danida and non-Danida informants consider that Danida took risks in undertaking the RDDP: - They were also the first to come in … when other donors were hesitant. Especially with decentralisation “nobody wanted to put their money far from the bank, in the forest”. (Non-Danida informant – ND)
2.8 According to Danida perceptions, the genesis of the Rakai programme was Danida’s keenness to get local experience before taking developments to a higher level. There is a perception that Rakai was a component of Danida’s Uganda programme that needed persuasion within Danida, as district development projects had fallen out of favour: “the Danida establishment was against it”. (Danida informant – D) This was related to adverse experiences with such district-level activities, in neighbouring Kenya where the Danida-funded Rural date: November 2006 TP5 Page 3
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Development Fund had been overtaken by corrupt practices and had to be closed, and also in Bangladesh where it is perceived that “Denmark had burned its fingers”. (D) There was also a concern to ensure the involvement of local people in planning the actions which would meet their needs. The low-key approach to sustainable social and economic development in the district over a period of 20 years was deliberate: “Rolling in big time with experts would be disastrous”. (D)
2.9 Although Rakai was the pioneer of district planning, there were fluctuations in the degree of discretion accorded to the district authorities, and particularly in Danida's willingness to fund the district budget directly. Informants (Danida and non-Danida) cite the corruption uncovered at the centre of the RDDP in 1997 as a turning point. Many informants consider that the RDDP concept then changed significantly as Danida tried to bring the programme under control with an emphasis on strict accountability.
Capacity Development through RDDP2 2.10 RDDP’s overall goals were economic and social development. Capacity development was seen as integral to all three phases of the programme. The practice of the programme, as much as its formal policies, reflects the very great commitment of the programme to build the capacity of the district to manage its affairs and to own RDDP. Although the 2000 evaluation found that this was achieved with only partial success, the ambitions and achievements of the programme were considerable.
2.11 In the first two phases (1992–1995 and 1995–2002), plans for strengthening district administration sat alongside immediate concerns with infrastructure and delivering services. Phase III (2002–2006), however, focused primarily on capacity building: to improve Rakai District and sub-county local governments’ capacity for service delivery, to increase the sustainability of the infrastructure created with Danish support under the earlier phases, to improve local government revenue generation, and to improve engagement with NGOs.
2.12 There has been extensive technical assistance (TA) provision to Rakai, including resident advisers. Resident TA was withdrawn, but subsequently re-introduced after the financial irregularities of 1998. Interviewees noted many positive features about working with TAs, not just for the technical skills that they brought, but for different ways of working, thinking and relating. However, there were concerns that much depended on individual relations between a TA and the management team. Local staff noticed very different strengths and styles in each of their TAs, to which the local team had to adjust.
2.13 The 2000 evaluation of Rakai (School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, 2000) concluded that RDDP had largely achieved its reconstruction objectives, and had created a working Rakai District Council (RDC), though the lower levels of government were less well developed. Despite this impressive achievement, and the physical and human resources invested in it, institutional development was found to be less successful. This was attributed to the lack of a strategic perspective on orga nisational development, the absence of an orientation to outcomes and performance, and the interruption to the programme caused by embezzlement of funds. Some of the attempted interventions, such as the population databank and the application of social appraisal surveys, may also have been applied inappropriately.
2.14 Our own discussions in June 2006, in the last month of Danida’s support,3 indicated that RDC had not been able to address the shortcomings in institutional development identified by the 2000 eva luation, and would have difficulty in dealing with changes ahead.
2 See Thematic Paper 4: Capacity Development and T echnical Assistance for a more extended discussion.
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2.15 The current situation of Rakai highlights the difficulty of achieving the correct ownership of the capacity – material, financial, organisational, cultural – created by development programmes. It also shows how capacity development is vulnerable to hazard. Rakai’s loss of local tax income would challenge the resilience of any organisation, and it is a particularly tough test for RDC at this time.
Issues in Local Revenue 2.16 Danida was consistently concerned to strengthen the revenue base of local government, and provided targeted support to the revenue collection capacity of Rakai District Council. However, these efforts were frustrated by wider policy decisions. Whereas Danida had sought a 50% contribution from local revenue, the standard requirement that was adopted (e.g. as embodied in LGDP requirements) was only 10%. Moreover, the principal local revenue source – the Graduated Personal Tax, GPT – was first undermined by political reluctance (on a national scale) to enforce its collection, and then formally suspended in the run-up to the 2006 elections.
3. Support to the Decentralisation Process
Origins 3.1 Danida provided initial technical support to the Ministry of Local Government in the early years of the evaluation period, and established a special relationship as the leading donor supporter of the decentralisation process (see Box 2). As in other sectors, ad hoc technical support led on to more formal programmes. Danida became the main supporter of the Decentralisation Secretariat within the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG), and provided capacity building support to the local government associations of Uganda. It also supported a donor coordination unit within MOLG.
The first phase of Danish support 3.2 The first formal phase of Danida’s support (1993-1997) was implemented through a Decentralisation Secretariat (DS) of the Ministry of Local Government. The role of the DS was to spearhead Government efforts to devolve functions, powers, services and to provide for decentralisation at all local government levels in order to ensure good governance and democratic participation.
3.3 The DS was a special unit within MOLG This enabled it to offer enhanced pay and conditions to its Ugandan personnel, and also to insulate them from the rapid transfers to which regular civil servants are liable. Operating in this way was crucial to the DS's early effectiveness. Later, when Danida considered that it was time for its functions to be integrated into the Ministry, it was kept in being for some years without direct Danida support.,
3.4 Another achievement of the first phase was Financial Management Capacity Building to Local Governments. The support to MOLG and the DS provided guidance and training to Local Government staff and elected Councillors in budgeting accounting, planning and financial regulations, and thus improved financial accountabilities of Local Government.
3 It is recognised that this was a particularly difficult moment for the RDC team. The long-term success of RDDP should not be judged by views at the moment of Danida’s departure. date: November 2006 TP5 Page 5
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Box 2: Origins of Danida's Involvement in Decentralisation Government informants make clear that Danida's initial involvement in decentralisation was somewhat fortuitous. Government had already embarked on its decentralisation process and was looking for technical advice and support. The Permanent Secretary of the MLG had worked in Zimbabwe with a British consultant, whose work there had been financed by Danida. MLG approached the Danish embassy in Kampala to see if they would fund the same individual. But there were also considered reasons for seeking Denmark's assistance in particular. MLG were already committed to real devolution, not the colonial tradition of local government. They felt that neither an ex-colonial power, nor the World Bank would be on the right wavelength. They came to see Denmark's decentralisation experience as being highly relevant: a Ugandan team visit to Denmark (which included meetings with local authorities and the Danish local authorities association) was reportedly convinced that Denmark’s approach was what Uganda needed. - “We picked the Danish type, because it involved real devolution (which was already the de facto position in Uganda).” There was a World Bank proposal; this had more focus on the financial management of resources at local level – “the financial management minus the political devolution aspect". … “[We] rejected the World Bank approach”. “After that the World Bank tended to withdraw. The President sided with us.” (ND) - The Danes were chosen because “we were looking for a different approach” [not the UK colonial model] … felt Denmark was a … country that had decentralised a great deal, and so would understand our situation”. (ND) - “We were quite impressed [after a team visit to Denmark] and convinced that what they had was near to what we needed.” (ND)
Source: Drawn from the Perception Study (Volume 2 of this evaluation).
3.5 Government informants attribute the success of the relationship very definitely to the style of working that was adopted by Danish experts and Danida-funded consultants (see Annex 2B of the Perception Study in Volume 2 for a detailed review of perceptions on decentralisation). The background of Denmark's own experience with decentralisation was helpful, but it was also important that the Danish-funded personnel were not dogmatic but prepared to listen to GOU and respond to their requirements.
The second phase of Danish support 3.6 The second phase of Danida support (1998–2002, extended to March 2003) focused primarily on the development of the institutional framework for decentralisation which included Ministry of Local Government and other stakeholders the Auditor General, the two Uganda Local Government Associations (ULAA and UAAU), and the Local Government Finance Commission. These organisations increased the degree of public and financial accountability in decentralisation process however, may not have reduced the level of corruption. The Local Authorities Association has gained significance in the decentralisation process as negotiating partners with central government on behalf of the Local Governments.
Subsequent Institutional Support 3.7 The third phase of Danish support to Decentralisation (from 2003 to 2007) is aimed at the support to capacity building for Local Development and to the National Institutional Framework for Decentralisation. 4 Decentralisation support is increasingly seen within the context of broader support to reform of public administration.
4 Annual Review of Danish Support to Decentralisation Reform in Uganda (Phase III 2003 – 2007) Feb. 2005.
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4. Concluding Comments
4.1 Danida is still seen as having a special interest and expertise in decentralisation. However, from the mid-1990s a number of other donors also sponsored district-level programmes. After the Local Government Act of 1997 and the introduction of the Poverty Action Fund in 1998 there was an upsurge in the provision of basic services through local governments. The Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) led by the World Bank set a common pattern and a harmonised donor approach to district support.5 Denmark became one of a number of co-financiers of LGDP, but also retained a leading role within the donor group concerned with decentralisation.
4.2 Recent events, including the abolition of the districts' main revenue base and the re- centralisation of the appointment of district CAOs, are seen as threats to the essence of decentralisation. The continued fragmentation and proliferation of distric ts as a vehicle for political patronage also tends to undermine districts' viability (compare the two maps at the end of Volume 1 of this study). Although the future of decentralisation is thus subject to some uncertainty, the Danish contribution to the decentralisation process can be seen as very positive.
5 The LGDP evolved from an approach that was piloted by UNCDF. date: November 2006 TP5 Page 7
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 5: Support to Decentralisation
Annexes
Contents
Annex A: General Budget Support and Decentralisation...... 12 Annex B: Programme Details ...... 14 Rakai District Development Programme ...... 14 Support to Decentralisation in Uganda ...... 17
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Annex A: General Budget Support and Decentralisation
The evaluation of general budget support in Uganda (Lister et al 2006) included a detailed case study of relationship between partnership General Budget Support (PGBS) and decentralisation (ibid. Annex 6, prepared by Jesper Steffensen). Its main conclusions are reproduced below.
1. PGBS has strongly facilitated an increase in funding of LG services and service delivery, particularly in the PAF areas, which would not have happened to the same extent with alternative aid modalities. The combination of PGBS, the PAF ring-fencing of funds, the SWAps and the inter- governmental fiscal transfer system provided both sector ministries and the donors with sufficient confidence that funds will be channelled through the LGs towards service delivery.
2. This was supported by progress towards harmonisation and alignment with GOU procedures and improved coordination of capacity building to LGs. This has enabled the LGs to fulfil many of their service delivery responsibilities as stipulated in the 1995 Constitution and the 1997 LG Act.
3. On the negative side, there have been problems with LG autonomy and lack of flexibility, questions over long-term sustainability, increasing dependency due to lack of an overall strategy and measures to improve LG own-source revenues, a tendency to focus on upward accountability (a kind of a deconcentration mode promoted by the strong SWAps and PAF conditionalities).
4. However, important measures including the Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) and the Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy (FDS) are addressing the difficult tasks of combining the adherence to national PEAP targets, confidence in the safeguarding of funds and minimising of risks, on the one hand, with, on the other, the aims of ensuring devolution in accordance with the original decentralisation objectives on local empowerment.
5. Recent policy initiatives, by making senior LG personnel more directly accountable to the centre, will have a severe governance impact. However, these recent events should not overshadow the past 10 years’ experiences of a system that has gradually built up capacity at the local level to respond to service needs, gradually, although slowly, improved the weak interaction with the citizens, gradually provided more openness in administration (e.g. publication of transfer figures, planning and budgeting conferences etc.), and innovative initiatives such as the LGDP and the FDS to improve the LG performance incentives and the LG planning and budgeting autonomy and performance. PGBS has had a positive impact on this process, but development of efficient tools to improve downward accountability continues to be a future challenge.
6. Some recent developments have been of a highly political nature. But it has been acknowledged that the lack of an overall strategy, the fact that the PEAP has not sufficiently addressed the decentralisation issues, and the absence of a SWAp with a clear strategy, structure, funding arrangements and policy and review process, has made it easier to “swing the pendulum”.
7. Dissonance between the “decentralisation group” (the Ministry of Local Government, the Local Government Finance Commission, the Uganda Local Authorities Association and the “like-minded" donor representatives) on the one hand, and the main sector ministries on the other, has been mitigated – but there is still a long way to go in mutual recognition and coordination.
8. In future, there is a need for better linkage between the decentralisation reform agenda and sector reform work, public administration reforms, PFM reforms, and the PRSC framework, including the dialogue on actions and prior actions (policy matrixes). date: November 2006 TP5 Page 12
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9. Stronger emphasis on strengthening of downward accountability and involvement of citizens in local decision making and supervision is needed.
10. Furthermore, there is a need for a high policy-level coordination of the overall decentralisation reform process. The Joint Annual Review of Decentralisation (JARD), as undertaken in 2004 and 2005, is a promising initiative, but needs more prominence and follow-up. The Local Government Strategic Framework and LG Investment Plan, developed in late 2005, are also important steps. It is crucial that these initiatives avoid movements in various (conflicting) directions, and involve common initiatives across stakeholders to ensure that decentralisation gets a stronger role in the overall reform process. PEAP3 has highlighted a number of the future challenges, particularly the need to increase LGs’ own-source revenues towards a more sustainable system.6
6 Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2004/05–2007/08), Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, p. 118 and p. 235, where it is stated that the LG revenue, as a share of the total LG budget, should increase from 6% in the baseline year, 2002/03, to 9% in 2007/08. With the abolition of the Graduated Tax, it is hard to see how this will be fulfilled.
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Annex B: Programme Details
Rakai District Development Programme Danida File ref. No. and HRD_ ApprRep_ 2001_ 1, HRD _ ASRR _ 2004 – 1 Project Name(s) RDDP I
Description (period, value, From January 1992 to September 1995. objectives, geog, scope components) Value: A budget of DKK 86.9 millions
Objectives: RDDP I was more of a reconstruction phase and mainly focused on civil works with an objective of increasing standards of living of people in the area, that had been hard hit by the after effects of war and the unfolding HIV/AIDS crisis, focused on the social sectors of Health, Education, Trade and Production as well as strengthening the district administration.
Immediate objectives: · To strengthen the administrative and political capacity particularly at district and sub-county levels in accordance with the policy of democratic decentralisation. This includes capacity building, advice on institutional arrangements and training of political and civil servants. · To improve the economic sustainability of the private sector, particularly agriculture, through grants for community projects and loans to small farmers and business persons and through extension services. · To assist the District with the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, including road rehabilitation and maintenance, rehabilitation of staff houses and offices for the administration, and establishment of water, power and communications to the District Headquarters. · To support the educational sector with rehabilitation and construction of primary schools, school production units, vocational schools, boarding facilities, a teacher training programme and study of the school fees system. · To improve the critical health situation by funding a number of smaller projects carried out by various NGOs including health education, AIDS information, training of Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs), registration of orphans etc. · Strengthening of the human resource base by funding community projects through the District Development Fund (DDF).
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Danida File ref. No. and HRD _ ApprRep – 2001 - 1, HRD ASRR – 2005 – 1. Project Name(s) RDDP II
Description (period, value, Initially designed to cover a four year period September 1995 to September 1999 extended till September 2002. objective s, geog, scope components) Value: A total budget of DKK 62 millions
Objectives: RDDP II shifted from reconstruction of Phase I to capacity building and institutional development. During this phase specific poverty focus was built into the programme objectives. The programme made available budget support to the district.
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Danida File ref. No. and HRD _ ASRR _ 2005 – 1, HRD_Appr Rep - 2001 – 1, HRD_Appr Rep – 2004 – 1. Project Name(s) RDDP III
Description (Period, value, From October 2002 to 2006 objectives, geog, scope components) Value: Total budget of DKK 18.1 millions7.
Objective: Largely the same focus as phase II but with clear understanding that the third phase would be the last phase of the programme, to be used to complete “Unfinished business”
Immediate objectives: (a) Improve capacity for District and Sub-county Local Governments in Rakai District in participatory and transparent development planning and management for improved service delivery – especially to the poor and marginalised groups. (b) District, Sub-county and private sector capacities for infrastructure maintenance improved. (c) Local Governments’ local revenue generation increased, made more transparent and progressive. (d) Improved use by District Local Government of NGOs in service delivery to poorer sections of the population.
Programme components: · Support to Rakai DLG (Components 1 – 5) Component 1 - Preparing Rakai DLG for LGDP Component 2 - Infrastructure maintenance Component 3 - Revenue enhancement Component 4 - Lower Local Government Capacity Building Component 5 - Rakai DLG – HRD management.
· Support to NGOs and Private Sector Organisations (Components 6 and 7) Component 6 - Support to (6a) RAIN and (6b) Kitovu Mobile (HIV/AIDS related programmes). Component 7 - Support to OCBO – for bursary scheme. Component x - Credit scheme via Centenary Rural Development Bank. Component y - Credit schemes via Victoria Building Society. Component z - Supervision of NGOs and Credit institutions by Rakai DLG
· Programme Management and Programme Support Component 8 - Core consultant, consultancies and backstopping support.
7 Total budget figures from Annual Review report (2004) – Ref 104. Uga.39. file: DUE-TP5-Decentralisation(final).doc TP5 Page 16
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Support to Decentralisation in Uganda Danida File ref. No. and HRD _ ProjDoc_ 1993 _ Project Document, support to the Decentralisation in Uganda – May 1993. Projects Name(s) Support to Decentralisation in Uganda, Phase I.
Description (Period, value, Date: 1993 to 1997. objectives, geog, scope components) Value: DKK 4,900,000 millions (Danish Contribution), Government of Uganda Contribution USD 150,000.
Main objective: The project to contribute towards efforts of the government of Uganda to implement the policy of decentralisation, i.e. transferring power from central government to local authorities (following cabinet memorandum CT – 1991/9).
Immediate objective: (1) Strengthening of the capacity of decentralisation. (2) Leaders at central and local level understand decentralisation.
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Danida File ref. No. and HRD _ Appr Rep _ 1991_1; HRD _ Prodoc _ 1997_ 1 Project Name(s) Support to Decentralisation Reform, Phase II.
Description (Period, value, Date: 1998 – 2002 with extension to March 2003 objectives, geog, scope components) Value: Total budget of DKK 71.1 millions.
Project objectives: The overall of the reforms was to build up a democratic structure of Local Governments institutions capable of providing much needed services at the local level, and functioning through budgetary transfers from central government as well as through local revenue.
Immediate objectives: · The decentralisation process is effectively guided; · All institutions competently sustain decentralisation; · An attitude of accountability and transparency prevails; · The revenue base and access to development funds is enhanced; · The requirements for women’s participation are fulfilled; · A balanced local government financial system is operational; · The knowledge of the Local Government Statute (97) is widespread; · The local government associations are key partners; · The decentralisation affects the poor sections of society; · The principle on non-subordination of local governments is acknowledged.
Major components of the programme: (a) Continued, but phased support to the Decentralisation Secretariat; (b) Strengthening of donor co-ordination within the field of local government support through the set-up of a local government donor co-ordination committee and with the MoLG’s donor co-ordination unit as secretariat; (c) Gradual strengthening of the Ministry of local government’s out-reach functions and overall supervision; (d) Establishment of a Uganda local development fund (ULDF) to extend the experiences gained through the Rakai District Development Fund; (e) Support to the functions of the local government finance commission (LGFC); (f) Strengthening of the Auditor General (AG); (g) Support to the Uganda Local Authorities’ Association (ULAA) and the Urban Authorities’ Association of Uganda (UAAU); (h) Support to sensitisation and training at all levels of local governments, with particular support to the human resource development administration at district/municipality level; (i) and supporting framework component including short term consultancies as identified in the component description for the various supported organisations, which are to be fielded during the course of the programme.
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Danida File ref. no. and HRD_ Proj Doc _ 2002 _ 2 pdf. Ref. No. 104. Uga. 47 October 2002. Project Name(s) Danish Support to Local Development and Decentralisation – Uganda Phase III.
Description (Period, value, Period: July 2003 to December 2007. objectives, geog, scope components) Value: Total budget of DKK 54.7 million DKK.
Objective: The objective of the programme is to improve the living standards of the poor, while the more immediate objective is to strengthen local governments to deliver targeted, pro-poor services in an efficient, transparent, democratic, accountable and sustainable basis, as well as strengthening the capacity for local government. During the implementation of phase 3, the crosscutting issues of gender mainstreaming will be pursued by e.g. targeting women councillors for capacity building activities.
The overall objective of the programme is poverty alleviation in Uganda; the means to reach the objective is capacity building initiatives for improved local development, whereby the local governments will be able to fulfil their role as providers of pro-poor services at the local level in Uganda. The programme will be linked to the planned phase II of the local government development programme (LGDP II), which will provide grants to all districts in Uganda for infrastructure projects; primarily smaller projects in the social sector at district and especially sub-district level.
Components: Phase 3 has two components. Component 1 covers the support to capacity building for local development and will include support to a) a national framework for capacity building for decentralisation, b) human resource development (HRD) functions in districts/municipal councils, c) enhanced capacity building grant (CBG), and d) local revenue enhancement. Component 2 covers the support to the national institutional framework for decentralisation and will include support to a) the Ministry of Local Government, b) the Uganda local Government Associations, and c) the Local Government Finance Commission.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 6 –
Accountability and Corruption
Stephen Lister
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 6: Accountability and Corruption
Contents
1. Introduction...... 1
2. Corruption in Uganda since 1987...... 1
3. Accountability Issues for the Danida Programme in Uganda ...... 3 Introduction...... 3 Agreed Minutes 1992 ...... 3 Agreed Minutes 1993 ...... 4 Uganda Country Strategy 1996 ...... 4 Agreed Minutes 1996 ...... 5 Agreed Minutes 1997 ...... 5 Agreed Minutes 1998 ...... 5 Agreed Minutes 1999 ...... 6 OECD DAC peer review, 2003 ...... 7 Uganda Country Strategy 2004 ...... 7
4. Danida Support to Accountability Agencies in Uganda...... 8
5. Concluding Observations ...... 9
Bibliography ...... 11
Boxes Box 1: Observations of the General Budget Support Evaluation (Uganda) on Corruption ... 3 Box 2: Perceptions on Accountability and Corruption ...... 10
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 6: Accountability and Corruption
Acronyms and abbreviations
AM Agreed Minutes CSO Civil Society Organisation DKK Danish Kroner DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo GBS General Budget Support GDP Gross Domestic Product GOU Government of Uganda HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries IGG Inspector General of Government MoLG Ministry of Local Government MoFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development NMS National Medical Stores NGO Non Governmental Organisation NRM National Resistance Movement PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan PGBS Partnership General Budget Support PPA Participatory Poverty Assessment PRSC Poverty Reduction Support Credit RDDP Rakai District Development Programme RUWASA Rural Water and Sanitation SWAP Sector Wide Approach UJAS Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 6: Accountability and Corruption
1. Introduction
1.1 Danida has had both broad and narrow concerns about accountability and corruption in Uganda. The narrow concern has been to ensure the proper use of, and full accounting for, Danish aid resources. The broader concern, also present from the beginning of Danish engagement with the Museveni regime, has been to help strengthen national Ugandan systems of accountability.
1.2 This Thematic Paper is a background note for the evaluation of Danish aid to Uganda since 1987. Successive sections: · give a brief overview on corruption under the Museveni regime, and note the main donor responses; · draw on country strategies, the minutes of annual consultations and other sources to illustrate the recurrence of corruption and accountability issues directly related to the Danish aid programme; · note the main elements of Danish support to accountability institutions of government, and related support to civil society organisations; · provide some concluding observations.
2. Corruption in Uganda since 1987
2.1 Corruption has been a serious problem for Uganda throughout the period under review. It takes a number of forms, ranging from "petty corruption" – which may be the form most often directly encountered by the poor – to "grand corruption" involving the looting of public resources by the politically powerful. Although there is no doubt about the pervasiveness of corruption in Uganda, it is inherently more difficult to be certain of trends, since reporting reflects freedom to report as well as the underlying situation, and most statistics on corruption are based on perceptions.
2.2 Corruption includes the ‘leakage’ of resources in local government, corruption in military procurement, and other cases involving senior politicians in the privatisation of state-owned enterprises (Lister et al., 2006). Uganda’s position on the various indices of corruption improved after 2001, when it was ranked by Transparency International as the third most corrupt country in the world. Between 2001 and 2004, the country’s ranking rose and in 2004 it was placed joint 102nd out of 146 countries surveyed. The following year, Uganda’s ranking again slightly worsened. The Ugandan public and donors still perceive corruption to be increasing.
2.3 The influence of competitive democracy on corruption is ambiguous. In principle, elected bodies hold the executive to account. In practice, the need to finance political activity may itself act as a spur to corruption (and the extent of corruption at local government level is a special concern in view of Uganda's radical decentralisation strategy). Background Paper 2 (in Volume 3 of this study) notes that the ‘no-party political system’ has encouraged patronage and the diversion of public resources.
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2.4 The incoming government in 1986 had an anti-corruption agenda (one of the points in the NRM's 10-point programme), and donors were keen to work with GOU to address the issue. Over time, however, there has been a loss of confidence in the Government's commitment. As noted in Background Paper 2: Corruption was one of the NRM's 10 priorities when it took power and in its statements the government has given a high priority to anti-corruption measures. These initially involved strengthening the existing oversight institutions, such as the Auditor General’s Office, and creating new ones, like the Inspectorate General of Government and Directorate of Ethics and Integrity. Successive PEAPs have also included anti-corruption measures within the governance pillar. The original momentum of reform has not been maintained, however. Government anti-corruption initiatives have been under-resourced and a loss of political commitment is apparent in a low rate of prosecution and the failure to follow up on high profile corruption scandals. There is a general perception that the current incentives for corruption are too high and law enforcement too weak for substantial improvement to occur. (Tangri and Mwenda, 2001, 2003; Robinson, 2004)
2.5 Corruption is pervasive in local government, and is a particular source of disquiet given the central role assigned to decentralisation in democratisation and poverty reduction. Corruption is reported to be particularly high in procurement and where sales of goods are involved, for example in human and veterinary medicines. ‘Over-invoicing’ is an endemic problem. A recent (2005) assessment of voters’ perceptions of governance found a universal perception that corruption at senior levels on local councils is widespread and involves influence peddling, vote buying, nepotism, diversion of public funds and embezzlement. The people surveyed also believed that government was not seriously addressing corruption – for example, civil servants who were discovered to have been corrupt were not prosecuted and were often simply transferred to other government jobs (Makerere University Uganda and Royal Roads University Canada, 2005). These findings are consistent with those reported in larger studies, including Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs).
2.6 Increased use of government syste ms, including the trends towards sector and general budget support, has led donors to focus more directly on fiduciary risk and on strengthening those systems. The Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) points to areas of improvement: Progress has been made in strengthening the systems of public financial management to reduce opportunities for corruption. The 2004 Country Integrated Fiduciary Assessment shows that between 2001 and 2004 performance improved in seven of the 18 areas assessed, although overall fiduciary risk remained high. Compared with other HIPC countries, Uganda’s system of public financial management is relatively strong. The IMF/World Bank 2005 comparative assessment of public financial management in 26 HIPC countries ranked Uganda fifth overall with “some upgrading required.” Its ranking was ahead of 19 countries where “substantial upgrading is required.” Nonetheless, Uganda’s performance slipped slightly, as it met only eight of 16 benchmarks in 2004 compared with nine in 2001. (World Bank 2005: ¶24)
2.7 At the same time UJAS notes: The government is taking action to combat corruption. It has established the institutions required to fight corruption and prepared a credible anti-corruption strategy. But these measures have yet to yield tangible results. The government has failed to successfully prosecute a single high-profile case of corruption following various commissions of inquiry. This raises questions about the government’s commitment to genuinely fight the problem. Strong political will and adequate financing of anti- corruption agencies are both required to combat corruption. (World Bank 2005: ¶23)
2.8 Box 1 extracts the main observations about corruption from the Uganda country study of the GBS evaluation.
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Box 1: Observations of the General Budget Support Evaluation (Uganda) on Corruption
From the outset, prior actions in the Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) have included measures to tackle corruption (the Leadership Code first featured in PRSC1), but the demanding and technical legislation that has resulted was probably not commensurate with the political and technical context in Uganda – in short they required too much change too early on to yield significant impact. At the same time, the dialogue around Partnership Ge neral Budget Support (PGBS) has been the main opportunity to address such issues in a systematic way. Much less spectacular work has been done to strengthen financial and procurement management systems, to increase transparency, to improve the management of a variety of public services. Thus, budget support (and the earlier HIPC initiative) have resulted in much more attention to fiduciary standards in the management of public resources, but there is a sense of disappointment among at least some donors that there has not been more dramatic progress in reducing corruption. Miovic (2004) observes: There has also not been a notable improvement in the level of perceived corruption in Uganda, which should have resulted from the introduction of stronger processes in public tendering, financial management, transparency and accountability. The continuing problems of corruption reported at a local government level are especially troubling because moving governmental initiatives to the local level is an essential part of the poverty reduction strategy. On the other hand, many of the anti- corruption initiatives are fairly recent, and it may take some time for benefits to emerge. It will also require a sensitive tracking process that both detects changes in corruption, at the same time as identifying the emergence of more opaque corruption techniques, and any unintended but dysfunctional consequences resulting from these reforms. In any event, as long as the incentives that encourage corruption remain strong, and follow-through on the law enforcement side remains weak, it is unlikely that rules, improved procedures and policing, without parallel socio-economic improvements, will radically change the situation. Corruption poses a number of threats to PGBS. The biggest is probably its ability to influence donor sentiment against budget support. This has two related sources: first, perceptions of high-profile corruption and of waste undermine public support for aid in donor countries. Second, there is an assumption that project aid is immune to fungibility in ways that budget support is not. Barkan, for example, takes this as axiomatic (see Barkan et al., 2004), although it is not at all self-evident that project aid is immune to corruption or to direct or indirect diversion, while there are significant safeguards built into the transparency of GOU budgeting, and the agreement on budget composition as a basis for budget support. What experience does seem to show is that budget support is more vulnerable than other forms of aid when the quality of the relationship between government and a donor deteriorates and the donor wishes to distance itself from the regime. This creates a contradiction between the long-term systemic effects sought through PGBS and its immediate political vulnerability. This is likely to be a continuing challenge for Uganda’s aid partners. Source: Lister et al., 2006.
3. Accountability Issues for the Danida Programme in Uganda
Introduction 3.1 This section draws chronologically on various programme documents to illustrate Danida's stance on corruption and accountability and the ways the issue has featured in the dealings between Danida and GOU. This is not an exhaustive review but it demonstrates the persistence of the issues, and the consistency of the Danida response.
Agreed Minutes 1992 3.2 The 1992 agreed minutes included the following comments on accountability and corruption: One aspect of good governance is accountability. Mr Riis -Jørgensen raised incidents of misuse of development assistance funds experienced within Danida financed projects. Public support in Denmark for assigning 1% of the Danish GDP for development assistance obviously depended also on the proper use of funds. Danida will in the future rely on external auditing to a significant degree while date: November 2006 TP6 Page 3
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at the same time standing prepared to assist in strengthening accountability routines of government institutions. The responsibilities of Danida financed advisors were explained by the Danish delegation. [AM 1992, p4] The Danish Delegation further mentioned that a number of irregularities in the management of the programme [of cement imports] had been uncovered and that there was need to follow up and prosecute all those involved in the irregularities which had been unearthed. [AM 1992, p10]
Agreed Minutes 1993 3.3 The 1993 Agreed Minutes refer to the high profile case of irregularities related to the Constitutional Commission: First of all the problem of lack of accountability registered in several Danish supported projects was mentioned. The case concerning the Constitutional Commission had been of great concern to the Danish Minister of Development Cooperation. Although the Government of Uganda seemed to have taken proper action in this case it was regrettable that it took so much time before the government intervened. It was very disturbing that the assumed culprits had continued to work four months after having admitted their crimes to the authorities. The head of the Danish Delegation expressed satisfaction with the Government of Uganda’s firm commitment to transfer the missing funds to the Commission. The case regarding the support to the Constitutional Commission was not the first case of mismanagement of Danish development assistance. Corruption and misuse of donor as well as Government funds in the public sector seemed to be a rather general problem. On this background there was an urgent need for the Government of Uganda to take action to counteract the problem. The strengthening of institutions such as the Inspector General of Government, the Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee was, in the view of the Danish Delegation, necessary. Danida would certainly consider positively requests to support these institutions and had decided to initiate a system of external audit of all the Danish supported projects in Uganda. [AM 1993, p6]
Uganda Country Strategy 1996 3.4 The 1996 country strategy referred to the record of "constructive dialogue" with the Ugandan authorities, but also noted: However, cases of corruption and misappropriation of funds on the part of the Ugandan administration have been established. As a consequence, all Danish financed initiatives are being implemented with a high degree of control while at the same time establishment of new or parallel organizational structures is avoided as far as possible. (MFA Danida 1996)
3.5 The same document noted some related capacity issues and ways in whic h Danida sought to address them: Many projects are suffering from a shortage of qualified accountants and an administrative set-up that can adequately manage the accounting and administrative demands inherent in Danida appropriations. The Embassy has on a number of occasions requested auditing firms to evaluate an organization's ability/capacity to administer a Danida appropriation and assist individual projects by establishing routines and procedures to ensure that funds are administered in compliance with Danida's demands. Besides accountancy problems in individual projects it must be stated that generally there is a strong will on the part of the Ugandan authorities to comply with Danida's accounting and audit demands. The need for accountancy supervision, instruction and follow-up remains considerable. Consideration will be given to the advisability of decentralizing accounting procedures for a number of major projects, where these projects would produce monthly reports on the utilization of funds. This would facilitate improved control and allow for specific demands to be put forward on accounting procedures. More funds should be set aside for accounting and administration units within project appropriation. Donor funds are perceived by the Ugandan authorities as public funds and as such the Ugandan Auditor General is responsible for auditing. The Auditor General receives Danida support. (ibid., §6.8)
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Agreed Minutes 1996 3.6 The 1996 minutes record new accountability issues that have arisen and also Danida's persistence in following up previous cases: The Danish delegation expressed concern on the subject of accountability and explained that the present high level of cooperation can only be maintained if there is a very open and transparent and efficient cooperation on accountability. Within the last year the programme has experienced a number of frauds, embezzlements and thefts in different projects, and it is unfortunately the impression that the follow up on such cases is given insufficient attention from the Ugandan side. The largest single project, RUWASA,1 experienced serious problems which endangered the second phase. Such cases force the Danish side to be much more restrictive on monitoring the use of Danish funds and also to insist on more vigorous actions from the Ugandan side not only with a view to recovering embezzled funds, but also to punish the culprits and in this way prevent recurrence of incidents. [AM 1996, 13] The Danish delegation stated that this project [cement imports from Tanzania] should have been long completed if it were not for the following outstanding issues yet to be settled: · The reimbursement of funds by Tanga Cement Company Ltd to Danida equivalent to the cost of 74 tons of cement recorded as shortlanded throughout the project life. · The payment to the project of Ushs. 29 mill. to cater for approximately 165 tons of cement registered as unaccounted for by Uganda Cement Industry. · The withdrawal from the Bank consortium of approx. Ushs. 7.69 billion, proceeds from sale of cement, for utilisation as stipulated in the Government agreement. [AM 1996, p15]
Agreed Minutes 1997 3.7 The 1997 minutes summarise the respective Danida and GOU delegations' perspectives on the extent of corruption in Uganda: The Danish delegation stated that corruption and misuse of funds represent one of the greatest threats to international development assistance. Denmark maintains a very high level of development assistance with one percent of GDP transferred to developing countries and international organizations. In order to preserve public support in Denmark to this venture a very strong effort by the recipient governments is needed to curb corruption in Danish and other programmes. In view of this the Danish delegation demanded an improved and strengthened follow-up of corruption and misuse generally and in relation to Danish development assistance funds. The Ugandan delegation agreed that corruption should be pursued with vigilance. Good governance was an important precondition for business growth. But it stressed that it did not believe corruption constituted a widespread or growing problem in Uganda. In fact, it was of the opinion that corruption was a decreasing problem in Uganda. There were several factors explaining this: a strong and independent press, an active Inspectorate of Government, an active Parliamentary Accounts Committee, and an independent Judiciary. [AM 1997, pp9-10]
Agreed Minutes 1998 3.8 In 1998, Danida was experiencing serious setbacks in relation to corruption in several of its flagship projects, including the Rakai programme and support for essential drugs. The minutes deal extensively with these issues: The Head of the Danish delegation emphasised that corruption in a broad sense (including fraud and mismanagement) was considered to be a serious and growing problem. As part of the discussion regarding the development cooperation programme a list of cases involving Danida supported activities was to be handed over. The Ugandan government needed to take the issue much more seriously and be pro-active and take immediate steps whenever cases of mismanagement of funds were detected. The Danish delegation expressed that a lack of resolve in these areas could have consequences for the development programme.
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The Ugandan delegation acknowledged that corruption is a problem and explained that the Government was developing an action plan to address the issue in a serious manner. Privatisation and liberalisation was reducing possibilities for corruption. Whether the problem is growing may be debated, but press coverage had definitely increased. (AM 1998, p4-5) The [essential drugs] programme was highly appreciated and well known far and wide, as drugs today reached health units all over the country. Problems of “drug leakage” existed, but this was mainly at unit level. It had to be emphasised that drugs reached patients in need, even if informal user fees were paid. The Danish side expressed dismay that efforts over the last twelve years had not resulted in the drug leakage to be contained. The Auditor General in Denmark had therefore been informed, as public funds were involved. [AM 1998, 13] …..The Danish side added that lack of resolve to reduce the drug leakage could lead to a cessation of support for drug kits. The Danish delegation expressed its dismay about the National Medical Stores (NMS) fraud case, as some of the capacity building efforts of recent years have been wasted. The Ugandan side regretted the incident and provided an update of the case: all people involved had been apprehended and/or charged; a corporate lawyer was following the case closely; banks had made mistakes and might want to settle out of court; both police and a detective firm were investigating the details. It was likely that 1.1 billion Ushs. could be recovered. However, the Danish delegation urged the Government to make sure that the law is being applied and that the remain ing 0.4 billion Ushs. are recovered. [AM 1998, p14] [Re the Gender and Development Programme] The Danish delegation informed that the incentives for staff had been suspended for three months to recover the money that was stolen from a minor project, which the Ministry was responsible for implementing. [AM 1998, p15-16] Referring to the earlier discussion with sector ministries the Head of the Danish delegation handed over a list of cases of mismanagement involving Danida funded activities. He emphasized the necessity of the Government of Uganda to take a firm line towards persons involved in mismanagement of funds. It was not sufficient to inform the Inspector General of Government or the Police. Suspects needed to be suspended with immediate effect so they could not tamper with evidence. Disappointment was expressed that firm action in several cases had only been taken after Danida’s involvement (e.g. in Rakai and the Ministry of Health). Concern was expressed with regard to the bail system. It appeared as if suspects even in cases involving large amounts of money only had to pay a small amount to be set free on bail, thus having the possibility to influence or collaborate with other persons implicated. The two delegations agreed that a review of the judicial system was needed to secure improvements, which would speed up the processing of cases. [AM 1998, p17]
Agreed Minutes 1999 3.9 The Danida delegation returned to the topic in1999, with specific mention of Danida's reluctance to move towards budget support when corruption was an evident risk: The Head of the Danish delegation noted that Uganda is one of Denmark’s main partners in development, and vice versa. In 1998, Uganda was the largest recipient of Danish bilateral development assistance. The assistance provided in 1998 amounted to a total of 466.6 million DKK. He explained that a broad section of Danish society is involved in the cooperation with Uganda, e.g. Danish companies and NGOs. Developments in Uganda are followed with keen interest in Denmark, e.g. resulting in questions being raised in the Danish Parliament. He stressed that the continued high level of Danish development assistance in general and in particular to Uganda also needed to be seen against the political context in Denmark. Issues in focus were the actual contribution of development assistance to reduction of poverty and the level of corruption. The Head of the Danish delegation expressed concern about the substantial and increasing level of corruption in Uganda. Efforts by the government of Uganda to combat corruption appeared inadequate, and actual verdicts of corrupt civil servants were few. The Head of the Uganda delegation acknowledged that corruption was a problem, but did not agree that it was growing. Instead, he felt that the free press, an open debate in Parliament and transparent governance made the problem seem more prominent. Prior to the liberalization of the economy administrative controls had provided numerous opportunities for corruption. He maintained that over the last few months a number of high-level civil servants had been charged with corruption cases. In the recent past, 3 ministers had resigned because of suspicion of corruption.
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While the Head of the Danish delegation acknowledged these important steps, he explained the concern it caused, when prominent people seemed able to acquire considerable resources illegally, and even if they lost office, no effective legal action was taken, nor did they loose [sic] the resources acquired. He felt that the situation called for great prudence regarding budget support, e.g. in the health sector, as budget support required firm confidence in control mechanisms actually being effectively enforced. It was agreed to discuss the issue of corruption in more detail, particularly with respect to ‘Danida cases’ in additional meetings during the visit of the Danish delegation. [AM 1999, p4] [re the health sector] The Head of the Danish delegation commended the Government of Uganda for putting in place a draft health policy and a draft strategic plan, the documents that were the basis for the SWAP in health. It was, however, emphasised that for Danida and other donors, the preparatory process over the next year, which would need to specify procedures and roles of the different institutions involved, was equally important as the draft documents. It was hoped that the process ahead would be the focus of the discussions at the up-coming meeting on support to the Ugandan health sector on 26-27 May 1999 in Geneva. The Danis h delegation informed that Danida was reluctant at this stage to move towards budget support, since it was felt that the procedures that would ensure transparency and accountability needed to be developed, and capacity built to effectively utilise the procedures. [AM 1999, p12-13] In order to improve management of future possible cases of misuse, agreement was reached to include the following article in new government agreements, and for the article to become an addendum to on- going agreements: ‘if misuse of funds within the programme/project is discovered, appropriate authorities i.e. Criminal Investigation Department or the Inspectorate of Government will be asked to investigate the case. The Government of Uganda will, if and when this is deemed appropriate, take action against the suspects including immediate interdiction or suspension of such persons from work, to avoid their interference with investigations.’ [AM 1999, p18-19]
OECD DAC peer review, 2003 3.10 The latest OECD DAC peer review describes Danida's strong line on accountability and corruption policy as follows: As Danida moves further from project support to closer collaboration with national authorities, the issue of local corruption is seen in the context of overall Danish efforts at sustainable development. Corrupt practices are of specific relevance to the provision of Danish sector and budget support funds. Drawing inspiration from the Partnership 2000 pledge to promote “… administrative practices free of corruption as an essential element in the creation of pro-poor growth”, Danida recently generated a five-year draft Action Plan to Fight Corruption (2003-2008), the country response to which will figure prominently in each Country Strategy. The Action Plan seeks to balance Danida’s concern about fiduciary risk with its focus on the developmental aspects of combating corruption and promoting good governance. To control corruption relating to Danish aid, Danida has a “zero tolerance” policy in relation to all persons, companies or partner institutions that manage Danish development funds. In a more developmental direction, Danida is expected to maintain a regular dialogue with all partners. It actively works to identify issues of institutional corruption and to help build capacity within the partner systems and to reform the national policies needed for effective corruption prevention and control. (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2003a)
Uganda Country Strategy 2004 3.11 The 2004 strategy (MFA Danida 2004) included the following comments: Difficulties have occasionally arisen in the Danish cooperation with the Ugandan Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) and with the transport section in the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED). However, such problems were primarily related to individuals and not as a result of Ugandan systems or politicians. There have also been examples of abuse, for example in connection with a local government administration’s settlement of payment to the construction firm responsible for road maintenance. An agreement has been reached whereby the MoFPED is required to keep Denmark indemnified in such situations. Another challenge centres on reducing corruption, which is a serious obstacle to economic growth and poverty reduction. The Ugandan authorities are aware of the consequences of corruption and have accordingly made the fight against corruption one of the goals in the country’s poverty reduction date: November 2006 TP6 Page 7
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strategy. A number of institutions have been established for the purpose of combating corruption, and there is a lively and open debate taking place in civil society and in the media on the issue of corruption and its consequences. The Danish and Ugandan governments have concluded an agreement whereby in the event of fraud or misuse of Danish funds, Uganda must repay the funds to the relevant programmes and projects. An agreement has also been reached that persons suspected of misusing funds are to be prosecuted by the Ugandan authorities. Based on lessons learned from previous individual Danish interventions, a new anticorruption programme has been launched in 2004. The support will go partly to capacity building within institutions involved in fighting corruption, including the Inspector General of Government. The support given to the Inspector General of Government is targeted at enhancing the institution’s capacity to carry out assessments more effectively and to ensure the implementation of more thorough investigations. Emphasis is placed on the ability of the Inspector General of Government to institute prosecution proceedings in more cases on the basis of the ongoing, intensified investigation of the tax returns of approx. 17,000 Ugandan leaders. The support given to fighting corruption must also contribute to enabling civil society to more effectively undertake its role as “watchdog” in the fight against corruption. Lastly, support is expected to be given to the modernisation and streamlining of Uganda’s taxation system with the aim of making the process of tax collection more transparent, effective and efficient. Among the donors, increasing priority is being attached to the fight against corruption. A donor group on anti-corruption has been established with active Danish participation. The group has three objectives: 1) to strengthen the political will to combat corruption; 2) to reduce the opportunities for and incitement to corruption; and 3) to support the legislative work that will contribute to exposing and reducing corruption. The donor group engages in close and open cooperation with the Ugandan authorities. A steering committee composed of representatives of the relevant authorities, donors and the Embassy will be established with the aim of ensuring the proper implementation of the Danish initiatives. The Danish support in several areas will be channelled through multi-donor trust funds, where both the UK and the Netherlands will also be contributors.
4. Danida Support to Accountability Agencies in Uganda
4.1 In the first years of the NRM government, donor support was directed almost exclusively to state institutions rather than non-state actors such as NGOs. This was largely because the national context was seen to favour donor engagement in institutional reform. President Museveni demonstrated a high personal commitment to reform and donors were impressed by the fact that this commitment was backed up with government resources in the form of finance and the deployment of relevant competent expertise for reform initiatives. Combating corruption was an explicit part of this agenda (cf. Ruzindana et al., 1998).
4.2 Strengthening governance, including combating corruption, has remained a prominent element in GOU strategies, so that improved governance is now one of the principal pillars of the current Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). A National Plan of Action to Fight Corruption was published in July 2000, and a revised Leadership Code was promulgated in 2002 (replacing an earlier, 1992, version).2 However, as donors have become less confident of GOU performance in this area, they have balanced support to GOU's accountability agencies with support to NGOs and civil society (in effect supporting the demand as well as the supply side of improved accountability ).
2 Implementation of the Leadership Code Act (2002) suffered a setback in 2004, when after legal challenges, presidential advisers were, in effect, exempted from its provisions. The High Court ruled that IGG rulings could not override Presidential prerogatives: the implication was that the IGG should not have the power to order or even recommend the President to dismiss his employees.
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4.3 Danida's own interventions have followed this pattern. It was an early supporter of the Inspector General of Government (IGG) and has continued to be its most prominent donor. Approximately DKK 57.74 million was budgeted for the IGG between 1988–2003. Support to the Office of the Auditor General was also significant. In both cases the practical nature of support (e.g. in helping to ensure basic facilities and operating costs are available) has been appreciated. More recently, there has been increased prominence for support to CSOs in this area. Echoing the trend towards more integrated approaches, current support has been folded into an overall anti-corruption project which embraces the latest phase of support to the IGG, support to other GOU institutions concerned with procurement and revenue (including components for the Uganda Revenue Authority and the public procurement agency), and support to CSOs and the media. The CSO strand of support, in particular, is backed by HUGGO (the Human Rights and Good Governance Liaison Office). Thematic Paper 7 provides a description and appraisal of this arrangement, and of Danida support to NGOs in general.
4.4 As noted in Thematic Paper 7, Danida's support has been instrumental in making the IGG and the Office of the Auditor General more effective agencies than they would have been without such support. However, it is clear that Danida and similar donors place a higher value on these agencies than does the government itself. Their effectiveness is constrained by the limits to the political support they receive. On the other hand, donor persistence may pay in the long run, by helping to ensure that the necessary institutional machinery is in place as and when the political environment becomes more favourable.
5. Concluding Observations
5.1 Concerns to tackle corruption and to ensure accountability for Danish funds have had a strong influence on Denmark's aid relationship with Uganda. Thus: (a) As noted in Section 4, Danida has, over long periods, provided support to accountability agencies of government, including the IGG and the Office of the Auditor General, and to NGO anti-corruption advocates. (b) As illustrated in Section 3, Denmark has applied diplomatic pressure and advocacy via annual consultations and other forums. The topic regularly recurs in the minutes of annual consultations, which, among other things, also record the energetic follow-up of any discovered misappropriations of Danish aid. The cut in country framework aid levels after 2001 was linked to Denmark's concerns about Uganda's intervention in the DRC, in which military corruption was a salient feature. (c) There have been "crisis" episodes in various projects (e.g. Rakai, the NMS, the Constitutional Commission) when corruption is discovered. Sometimes the vigour of Danida's reaction has caused significant "collateral damage" through the disruption of the services provided by projects. (d) In the process, Danida has established a strong reputation for its intolerance of corruption. This was very evident from the perception study, from which relevant extracts are reproduced in Box 2. (e) Danida's concern for accountability of Danish funds has led to some conservatism in its choice and design of aid modalities, so as to retain strong oversight of disbursements. This has been reflected, for example, in Advisers' dual role as watchdogs for Danish funds (see also Thematic Paper 4).
5.2 There is much admiration for what is seen as a principled stand by Danida. However, there is also criticism at two levels. First, the resources used to pursue redress may be date: November 2006 TP6 Page 9
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 6: Accountability and Corruption disproportionate and some reactions have excessively disrupted programmes. Second, and more seriously, Danida is committed in principle to using, monitoring, and strengthening national systems; in practice, its accountability concerns, allied to a model of ex ante controls on expenditure, tend to result in persistence of parallel disbursement and accounting arrangements, with consequent transaction costs, arguably less direct effort at strengthening the core national systems, and a constraint on Danish participation in joint donor arrangements (where these involve disbursement via government systems).
Box 2: Perceptions on Accountability and Corruption From the Perception Study in Volume 2 of this report: Danida informants hold the perception that an important characteristic of Danida, which enables it to hold a strong line on ethics and integrity, is its “zero tolerance” approach to corruption and an emphasis on strict accountability. - “While the Danes are relaxed on [some] things, they are very tough on certain things for example, corruption. … People say that the Danes listen; also [that they are] very strong on ethics and integrity. People say ‘You have to be very careful when you’re working with the Danes.’ If someone steals, it’s not enough for the Danes for him to pay it back; they expect him to be taken to court. The Danes are less interested in getting the money back than in seeing due process.” (D) - “Denmark is very strict on accountability – complete zero tolerance about anything to do with mismanagement of funds.” (ND – local government) There are non-Danida informants who regard Danida’s approach to corruption and accountability as being good, with the main reason cited that it is helpful in building up the culture and processes of accountability. - The Danida attitude “is a very big help”. “[In cases where we are weak] it's a help to be able to say 'there's a donor agreement, so we can't compromise.” (ND – central government) - Because of emphasis on accountability, the oldest vehicle in [district] is one provided under a Danida funded education project. “If this becomes a culture it will be very useful.” (ND – local government) - “Generally speaking I think Danida have helped the country – and [we] really value Danida’s support. Maybe they also have a point. African countries have never been very accountable – why should we get money from their taxpayers to mismanage or steal it. The country will eventually become corruption-free.” (ND – local government) However, other non-Danida informants believe that Danida’s zero tolerance stance is not the most productive strategy. A very senior government official perceived that “Danida’s weak spot is that they have been too concerned with corruption” (ND – central government) and unrealistic in their expectations. It is perceived that because of this preoccupation with corruption, Danida overprotects its funds and, as a result, is often less efficient than it perceives itself to be, as well as being overly-cautious of using government systems: - One perception is that as a requirement from HQ and the Danish parliament, Danida’s accountability to Danish tax-payers has been stronger than Danida’s accountability to partner governments, and the result has been that Danida has used Government planning but not Government accounting.3 - “[Danida] invest so much to stop their shilling getting lost.” (ND – central government) - As lead agency of a basket fund, a perception is that Danida had more stringent rules than the other donors. Discussions “of the rules and regulations always seemed to dog the relationship, always seemed to be the most important issue”. (ND – central government)
Source: Perception Study, Chapter 2, ¶3.18, ¶3.19 and ¶3.21. Note: D = Danida informant; ND = non-Danida informant.
3 Cf. the case noted in Thematic Paper 2: The emphasis of Danida on accountability and zero tolerance on corruption is therefore very well known and documented. However, its own credibility could have been undermined by lack of transparency in some situations. The practice of directly paying contractors and consultants without providing information to the implementing agency is a case in point. Under the roads component of RDDP, for instance, Danida paid contractors and
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Bibliography
Lister, S. et al. (2006). Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support: Uganda Country Report. S. Lister, W. Baryabanoha, J. Steffensen and T. Williamson. (May 2006). Glasgow: DFID.
Makerere University Uganda and Royal Roads University Canada (2005). An Assessment of Civic Literacy In Uganda’s Local Government. (December 7 2005). Victoria: School of Peace and Conflict Management.
MFA Danida (1996). Strategy for Danish Bilateral Development Cooperation with Uganda. (February 1996). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2004). Uganda-Denmark Partnership: Strategy for Development Cooperation 2004– 2008. Copenhagen: MFA.
Miovic, P. (2004). Poverty Reduction Support Credits in Uganda: Results of a Stocktaking Study. (June) Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Robinson, M. (2004). The Political Economy of Governance Reforms in Uganda. (May 2004). Brighton: IDS.
Ruzindana, A., Langseth, P., and Gakwandi, A. (1998). Fighting Corruption in Uganda: The Process of Building a National Integrity System. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham (2000). Evaluation of Rakai District Development Programme, Vol. I Synthesis Report and Vols II-IV. Copenhagen: MFA.
Tangri, R. and Mwenda, A.M. (2001). Corruption and cronyism in Uganda’s privatization in the 1990s. African Affairs. 100. pp. 117–133. London: African Affairs.
Tangri, R. and Mwenda, A.M. (2003). Military Corruption and Ugandan Politics since the late 1990s. Review of African Political Economy Volume 30 No. 98, pp. 539-552. Review of African Political Economy.
Uganda Debt Network (2004). A Call for a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Corruption in Uganda. Revised Edition of the Statement of Members of Civil Society attending a Workshop on Transparency and Accountability, organised by the Uganda Debt Network, at Cardinal Nsubuga Leadership and Training Centre, Kampala, 27–29 October 2004. Kampala: Uganda Debt Network.
Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme. Agreed Minutes (annually, 1989–2003). Kampala: Uganda-Denmark Development Cooperation Programme.
World Bank (2005). Joint Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Uganda 2005-2009. Report No.34310-UG. African Development Bank, Government of Germany, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Government of Norway, Sida, DFID, World Bank Group. (December 14 2005). World Bank.
consultants for contract supervision directly but without passing the information to Rakai District (School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, 2000). This then formed the basis of complaints by the District to Danida in Kampala. The District had demanded full documentation of such expenditures in order to complete their accounts. date: November 2006 TP6 Page 11
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 7 –
Human Rights, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society
Trish Silkin
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 7: Human Rights, Justice, Conflict Resolution and Civil Society
Contents
1. Introduction...... 1
2. Origins and evolution of Danida’s support to human rights and democratisation in Uganda ...... 1
3. Donor support to human rights and democratisation in Uganda ...... 3
4. Danida’s programme 1989–2005...... 6 Overview ...... 6 Judiciary...... 7 Uganda Human Rights Commission...... 9 Ugandan NGOs...... 10 Danish NGOs ...... 12 Conflict resolution and peace building...... 13
5. Overall Assessment ...... 13 Challenges in assessment ...... 13 Danida’s choice of interventions ...... 14 Implementation...... 15 Coherence and coordination...... 16
Bibliography ...... 18
Annexes
Annex 1: Summary of Danida’s support to human rights, democratisation, justice and civil society ...... 20 Annex 2: Status of donor funded human rights and democratisation activit ies in 2000...... 22
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 7: Human Rights, Justice, Conflict Resolution and Civil Society
Acronyms and abbreviations
ACTV African Centre for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims ATJ Access to Justice CBO Community based organisation CSO Civil society organisation Danida Danish International Development Agency (before 1991) Danish International Development Assistance (after 1991) DDGG Donor Democratisation and Good Governance Group DENIVA Develo pment Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations DFID Department for International Development (UK) DKK Danish Kroner DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo EU European Union HR Human Rights HRDP Human Rights and Democratisation Programme HUGGO Human Rights and Good Governance Liaison Office HURIFO Human Rights Forum IGG Inspector General of Government JLOS Justice, Law and Order Sector LGA Local Grants Authority LRA Lords Resistance Army NCG Nordic Consulting Group NGO Non-governmental organisation NRM National Resistance Movement PDG Partners for Democracy and Governance PEAP Poverty Eradication Action P lan RDE Royal Danish Embassy Sida Swedish International Development Agency SJP Strengthening the Judiciary Project SWAp Sector wide approach UHEDOC Uganda Human Rights Education and Documentation Centre UHRC Uganda Human Rights Commission UNRF Uganda National Rescue Front
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Thematic Paper 7: Human Rights, Justice, Conflict Resolution and Civil Society
1. Introduction
1.1 This Thematic Paper focuses on Danida’s support to human rights, democratisation, justice and conflict resolution. There are a large number of programmes that fall within this theme, including short-term programmes, such as funding retrenchment from the civil service, and the many small ‘democratisation’ projects funded out of the Local Grants Authority (LGA). Given the scope of the subject, I have opted to concentrate on Danida’s main partnerships and focus areas. The paper therefore focuses on the judiciary, on the Uganda Human Rights Commission, and on non-governmental organisation (NGO) activities carried out under the Human Rights and Democratisation Programme (HRDP). These choices were to some extent also determined by the availability of information. The Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) Pre-Study (NCG, 2006) provides documentation for projects of a value above DKK 3 million, which are the main focus of the Paper. However, this threshold excludes smaller ‘democratisation’ grants, which were an important component of Danida support to human rights and democratisation before the HRDP was set up. Smaller initiatives are therefore referred to in the paper within the limitations of the information available.
1.2 Between 1987 and 2005, donor attitudes towards governance in Uganda changed from an initial tolerance of the Movement style of politics to a more recent impatience with the evidence that it is essentially patrimonialism operating through a one-party system. Throughout this perio d and these changes, Danida has remained remarkably faithful to its first commitments and partners in the fields of human rights and democratisation: the Inspector General of Government (IGG) , the judiciary and public agencies concerned with human rights. This has given Danida a relatively privileged status vis-à-vis these partners. In Uganda generally, Denmark is known for being “passionate about rights”, for being intolerant of corruption and for being willing to take public stands on both.
1.3 In this paper the terms ‘governance’ or ‘good governance’ are often used as a convenient short-hand to avoid the more cumbersome language needed to speak of ‘human rights, justice, conflict resolution and civil society’. It is understood, however, that governance applies not only to the topics covered here but is also a theme that cuts across several other thematic papers, more particularly those on Decentralisation, Accountability and Corruption, and Gender. The IGG is mentioned here, since it originally had a mandate for human rights as well as corruption. However, it is treated in detail in the paper on Accountability and Corruption.
1.4 See Annex 1 for a summary of Danida’s main activities in human rights, justice, conflict resolution and civil society.
2. Origins and evolution of Danida’s support to human rights and democratisation in Uganda
2.1 Human rights and democratisation have been recurrent themes in the Danish partnership with Uganda from the start of the Danida programme in 1989. The 2004 country strategy document makes this point in noting that one of Denmark’s original and continuing objectives for its aid to Uganda has been “to promote good governance, human rights and democratisation by supporting the judicial system, the IGG, the local authorities as well as civil society organisations
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(CSOs)” (MFA Danida, 2004c : 8). This programmatic focus has both Ugandan and Danish roots. Its Ugandan roots lie in the Museveni government’s efforts to address the legacy of corruption, sectarianism and human rights abuses that it inherited from the Amin and Obote II regimes in 1986. Its Danish roots lie in Denmark’s foreign and aid policy as it evolved with the ending of a bipolar world in 1989.
2.2 During the 1990s, Danish aid policy and strategy documents gave increasing importance to governance issues. Democracy and respect for human rights were seen as important in their own right and as factors that were seen as being closely causally linked to poverty reduction. Danida’s 1989 Plan of Action, which marked the first significant step in developing a more poverty-focused approach to Danish aid, identified support to human rights as the fourth of seven criteria to be applied in selecting developing country partners (Udsholt, 1997). This Plan of Action was followed during the 1990s by a series of publications, policies and strategy documents each reiterating and giving more pronounced importance to human rights, democratisation and good governance in Danish aid.
2.3 In 1994, democratisation and human rights was identified as a cross-cutting theme for Danish aid in the strategy document: ‘A Developing World: Strategy for Danish Development Policy towards the Year 2000’ (MFA Danida, 1994). A new civil society strategy in 2000 made democratisation the objective of funding for Danish NGOs, who were seen as having a comparative advantage in support to southern Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) (MFA Danida, 2000a). The government elected in 2001 identified human rights, democratisation and good governance as one of five new focus areas for Danish development assistance, and marked this by making a significantly higher financial commitment to this area of work. Danida’s 2003 strategy document ‘A World of Difference’ highlighted the critical role of recipient governments in providing good governance for their citizens (MFA Danida, 2003: 7). Its 2004 paper ‘Security, Growth and Development’ stressed Denmark’s interest in strengthening the efforts of citizens to ensure that they would be “able to live in freedom and dignity in open societies, with responsible governments, growth and progress” (MFA Danida, 2004b: 17).
2.4 This trend in global Danida policy was reflected in Danida Uganda country strategies. The 1996 country strategy document (‘Uganda – Strategy for Danish Bilateral Development Cooperation with Uganda’) identified democracy as being an objective of development assistance, with human rights and democracy being identified as areas of programme concentration. The strategy document drew particular attention to problems in the administration of justice, unsatisfactory prison conditions, and human rights abuses by the police and military. These concerns were reflected in Danida’s continued funding for the Constitution Commission, the judiciary and the Inspector General of Government (IGG) (all of which had started in the early years of the programme), and in funding for a number of small, mainly NGO, projects (MFA Danida, 1996b).
2.5 In 2000, two pieces of work were carried out that influenced how Danida Uganda managed and organised its support for human rights, democratisation and good governance. The first was an evaluation of Danida’s world-wide support to human rights and democratisation during the 1990s. This review noted inter alia that, because human rights and democratisation programmes are multi-faceted and operate in unpredictable environments, they are complex to manage and require a relatively high level of staffing (Sørbø and et al., 2000a). Around the same time, a review recommended that Danida Uganda’s separate governance programmes should be consolidated in a single programme. The outcome of this review was the elaboration of a thematic Human Rights and Democratisation Programme (HRDP) that included support to the Uganda Human Rights Commission, to human rights NGOs, to peace-building and conflict resolution, and to electoral processes.
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2.6 This programme was managed by Danida’s Human Rights and Good Governance Liaison Office (HUGGO), a Programme Support Unit separate from but reporting to the embassy, under the leadership of a Chief Technical Adviser.1 HUGGO has also assumed responsibility for administering Danida’s support to the judiciary and to anti-corruption activities. In setting up HUGGO, Denmark has made a significantly greater investment in staffing for support to governance interventions than has been made by most other like-minded donors.
2.7 Denmark has used the annual Uganda-Denmark consultations on development cooperation to inform and then remind the Government of Uganda that human rights and democratisation are fundamental considerations in Denmark’s decisions about aid. Minutes of the first meetings show that Danida was mainly supportive of government efforts and ready to support official initiatives to improve governance. But Denmark has also regularly raised questions about human rights, military expenditure, the war in the north and multi-party politics since the first consultation meeting in 1989. From 1993 onwards, Danida was expressing more specific concerns about particular cases of human rights violations and about the conduct of elections and the treatment of opposition candidates. In four early annual meetings, Danida raised questions about how the government proposed to deal with human rights abuses by security forces operating in the north, apparently without receiving satisfactory replies. More recently, Denmark has linked its concerns about high military expenditure to Uganda’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the failure so far to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).
3. Donor support to human rights and democratisation in Uganda
3.1 This section provides an overview of donor support to programmes related to human rights and democratisation. It is not possible or meaningful to present a detailed or aggregate picture of what donors have been doing because the focus, content and boundaries of what is included under these headings varies between donors.2 As there is also no single interface with the Government of Uganda on governance issues, there is no mechanism for collating and consolidating information on donor activity. A summary status report on donor support in 2000 is given in Annex 2.
3.2 In general, donor thinking on governance in Uganda has been similar to how thinking on governance has evolved in the last 10 to 15 years internationally. Until the late 1980s, good governance was understood chiefly in terms of achieving macroeconomic stability, and donor support was largely directed towards this end. Since then, a much broader understanding of what is meant by good governance has emerged both as a concept and as a major objective of development assistance. This has happened partly in response to the recognition that – particularly in many African countries – weak and unaccountable political institutions have been responsible for social and economic stagnation and conflict. A key feature of the current understanding of good governance is that it is both an end in itself and also – and critically – a prerequisite for social and economic development.3 This has encouraged a much higher level of
1 The HUGGO set -up was modelled on similar arrangements in Nepal. 2 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD also categorises different dimensions of what is now called ‘good governance’ under different codes. 3 See, for example, UNDP (1997) Governance for sustainable human development: A UN Policy Paper, the 2000 UN Human Development Report Human Rights and Human Development and the 2002 UN Human Development Report Deepening democracy in a fragmented world. The political reforms that donors associate with ‘good governance’ are typically conflated with the political institutions of Western liberal democracy. How far a positive causal linkage can be date: November 2006 TP7 Page 3
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society donor engagement with political reform in recipient countries than was previously considered legitimate or necessary.
3.3 As governance in this broader understanding moved centre stage during the 1990s, donors increasingly sought to include support for political and institutional reform in their funding portfolios. Where conditions in Uganda differed to some extent from that in other countries is that, in the first years of the NRM government, donor support was directed almost exclusively to state and public institutions rather than to non-state actors such as NGOs. This was largely due to the fact that the national context was seen to favour donor engagement in institutional reform. President Museveni demonstrated a high personal commitment to reform and donors were impressed by the fact that this commitment was backed up with government resources in the form of finance and the deployment of relevant competent personnel for reform initiatives. Uganda’s high dependence on external assistance for restoring the economy also made the government more receptive to donor involvement in reform processes.
3.4 Donor funding for reforms in human rights and democratisation in Uganda fell broadly into three categories: support to democratisation pr ocesses; support to programmes and ‘watchdog’ agencies concerned with preventing corruption and promoting human rights and the rule of law; and support to reform programmes and agencies within the justice sector. In the first category, funding was provided for the development and implementation of the Constitution, for Parliament and for the Electoral Commission. Early activities in the second category included funding for the costs of retrenchment from the civil service and demobilisation from the Ugandan army. And since the early 1990s, donors have also funded a group of semi-autonomous public agencies concerned with ensuring integrity in public life that were either created or reformed by the new government. These included the IGG, the Uganda Human Rights Commission, the Office of the Auditor General and, somewhat later, the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity.
3.5 In the 1990s, donors also invested in programmes that in different ways aimed to improve access to justice. Donors channelled funds to individual agencies and programmes in the justice sector, the main ones being the Department of Public Prosecutions, the police, the prison service, the Law Reform Commission, and juvenile and commercial justice reform. By the second half of the 1990s, donors and government alike had begun to realise that improved access to justice would only be secured with better coordination between the justice agencies and among the donors supporting them. The new thinking on how to secure access to justice was influenced by a donor-funded pilot project in Masaka (the Chain-Linked Initiative), which was designed to improve cooperation between criminal justice agencies (police, prisons, Judiciary, Director of Public Prosecutions, and probation and welfare services).
3.6 The Chain-Linked Initiative was to some extent a prototype for the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS) programme. In the mid-1990s, donors to the judiciary had begun to meet regularly to coordinate their support to justice programmes, and the Government of Uganda asked them and other donors to consider a larger multi-donor initiative to support the justice sector. The idea of developing a justice sector programme was influenced by the more general move towards sector-wide approaches in the mid- to late 1990s, and by the financial incentives that sector approaches offered. In 1999, a process was initiated that in 2001 brought together 10 justice institutions under one umbrella. The JLOS programme provides a framework for donors to provide sector budget support, and for dia logue among sector agencies and between sector agencies, donors and other stakeholders.
shown to exist between these political reforms and economic development is a subject of much debate among scholars and practitioners and is beyond the scope of this paper.
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3.7 In the early years of the NRM government, donor support to NGO activities in human rights and democratisation was rather limited. In part this was because, after the repression of the Amin and Obote regimes, few such NGOs existed. More importantly, donors were keen to work with a government that was as committed to political and institutional reform as the NRM appeared to be. Over time, however, the government’s commit ment was seen to be waning and the momentum of reform began to slow down. The public agencies established by government were under-funded, had limited staff capacity and began to look increasingly weak. Donors became ever more concerned at poor financial management, and at evidence of financial mismanagement and corruption within these agencies. Most donors still feel that public agencies have an important role to play, and they have maintained their support to them. But they also began to balance this support by increasing their funding for CSOs. Contributing to civil society development was seen as an objective in its own right, as a way of strengthening domestic accountability and as a means of building a domestic constituency for the work of agencies like the Human Rights Commission and the Inspector General of Government.
3.8 In the last decade, development discourse has increasingly come to identify civil society, broadly defined, as the main agent of domestic accountability. 4 This focus on civil society has been accompanied by a shift of funding out of NGO service delivery projects (typical of donor support in the 1980s and early 1990s) and into policy dialogue and advocacy. NGOs, rather than other civil society groups, are still the main beneficiaries of donor funding, and the policy and advocacy focus has tended to favour a rather elite set of urban-based NGOs. This has also been the case for Uganda, though the country’s limited urbanisation and deep decentralisation may explain why there appears to be less of an urban bias in donor funding here than is the case elsewhere. Significant levels of funding have been channelled to local rather than national NGOs through the District Networks that are a distinctive feature of Uganda’s NGO landscape; the EU has organised its funding around eight regional NGO clusters; and the conflict in northern Uganda has created a flow of funds to NGOs based in West Nile, Acholi and Karamoja.
3.9 Much donor funding for NGOs has been ad hoc, short term and ‘projectised’, an approach to programme management that combines high transaction costs with uncertain impact. This has prompted donors to look for alternative funding modalities. Donors like DFID that have provided a significant level of aid through General Budget Support have been particularly keen to reduce transaction costs, because the increased levels of aid that they are required to disburse have not been accompanied by an equivalent or proportionate increase in staffing. Several donors in Uganda have become interested in coordinating their support to human rights NGOs through some form of independently-managed pooled fund. This is an idea based on the Foundation for Civil Society in Tanzania, which provides a package of support services to NGOs. In late 2004, DFID and Danida facilitated a fact-finding visit by the Uganda NGO Forum to the Foundation in Tanzania, to see what lessons it offered for donor coordination of support to NGOs in Uganda.
3.10 Funding governance programmes is not the only modality through which donors have sought to improve governance in Uganda. Donors have also tried to influence government’s policies and its actions through dialogue. Indeed, mechanisms for dialogue have grown in importance as Uganda’s development partners have become increasingly trouble d by issues such as corruption, the war in the north, levels of military expenditure, presidential term-limits and state violations of human rights. Various dialogue forums have been set up, the main one being
4 Civil society includes formal and informal membership organisations (e.g. cooperatives, professional associations, trade unions, religious groups, traditional savings and credit groups, burial societies and community-based groups) and third party- serving organisations (e.g. NGOs, policy think-tanks and other advocacy organisations). Civil society also includes groups that have a purely social or leisure purpose rather than a political or economic one, though this is rarely acknowledged in development discourse. date: November 2006 TP7 Page 5
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society the Donor Democratisation and Good Governance Group (DDGG).5 The DDGG has Working Groups for Democratisation, Human Rights, Anti-Corruption, and Northern Ugandan Recovery from Conflict. Bilateral donors also developed a Governance Matrix by which progress on these issues could be assessed. As a general rule, however, donor coordination on governance questions is difficult – governments resist external pressures to reform and donors differ over where to draw the line and whether and how to use conditionality. It is clear that donor dialogue with the Government of Uganda has been relatively ineffective in influencing political processes, particularly where these concern national security considerations and the political transition.
4. Danida’s programme 1989–2005
Overview 4.1 Support to human rights and democratisation has been a consistent feature of Denmark’s development assistance to Uganda. Between 1990 and 1998, Uganda was the third largest recipient of Danish funds for human rights and democratisation (through a variety of appropriation mechanisms), receiving almost DKK 64 million during the period, or 5.5 percent of the funds disbursed (Sørbø and et al., 2000a, Section 2.4).6 The Head of Mission to Uganda in 1988 was personally intereste d in good governance and a number of the earliest grants made at that time were in the governance sector. The Local Grants Authority (LGA) had been introduced almost at the same time as the Danida programme re-opened and this was used to provide small grants to institutions that have become long-standing and important Danida partners.
4.2 Danida’s support can roughly be divided into three periods: the years 1988–1995, characterised by individual projects and short-term funding; the years 1995–2000 when Danida developed programmatic support to a few key institutions alongside continued project funding for NGOs and for conflict initiatives; and the period since 2000 when Danida began the process of consolidating all human rights, justice and conflict-related interventions in a single over-arching programme, a process that continues beyond the period under review.7 This periodisation is summarised in the next four paragraphs, and then support to the judiciary, to the Uganda Human Rights Commission, to NGOs and to conflict resolution are discussed in greater detail.
4.3 The first recorded grant for work in human rights was to the IGG in October 1988. Between 1988 and 1996, a further 33 grants were awarded for ‘democratisation’ under the LGA, or just over one third of LGA grants awarded and funds allocated during that period (COWI, 1996: 108). These grants included funding for the Commission of Inquiry into the Violation of Human Rights (under the Amin and Obote regimes), for the Supreme Court Library, for the High Court, for Parliament and for the Human Rights Commission. Danida provided a series of grants to the Constitutional Commission and was the main funder of the constitutional reform process. This included funding to the Ministry of Women in Development to involve women in the constitution-making process. This support was key to ensuring that the 1995 Constitution was gender-sensitive. On the civil society side, grants were made for work with the media, for conflict resolution in the north, and to DENIVA, the first umbrella organisation of Ugandan NGOs (MFA Danida, 1996a).
5 This group includes representatives of the EU member states, Canada, Norway, Japan, the USA, the EU Commission and UNDP. 6 Uganda was the third largest of 12 countries that accounted for 55.9 percent of disbursements and 61 countries that accounted for 44.1 percent. 7 Danida has also more recently developed a strategy for governance work in Uganda that goes beyond the work covered by HUGGO and support to decentralisation.
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4.4 In the mid - to late 1990s, Danida initiated major programmes of support to the judiciary (in 1995) and to the Uganda Human Rights Commission (in 1999) (both discussed below). Other major funding commitments during this period were for the African Centre for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims (ACTV) between 1993 and 2000, and for the Uganda Human Rights Education and Documentation Centre (UHEDOC) between 1995 and 1999. 8 During this period, the LGA continued making small grants to NGOs, including for legal aid, for women’s media work and for civic education. The relatively large number and small size of these grants made disproportionate administrative demands on embassy staff and, in the mid-1990s, Danida appointed a part-time Adviser to manage and rationalise its funding for human rights and democratisation.
4.5 The period after 2000, and the establishment of the Human Rights and Good Governance Liaison Office (HUGGO) as one of the pillars of the Good Governance Liaison Office (GGLO), saw a step change in how Danida organised its support to human rights, justice and conflict, with the aim of promoting greater coherence and synergy. With its high levels of competent staffing, HUGGO has significantly increased Danida’s ability to administer funds and to monitor partners’ performance and management capacity. HUGGO’s portfolio includes the UHRC, the HRDP, and the Anti-Corruption and Access to Justice Programmes. Danida’s increased capacity to manage governance programmes has been recognised by other donors, and more than half the funds now administered by HUGGO are channelled through multi-donor Basket Funds where Danida acts as Lead Agency.
4.6 Denmark has made visible its support to human rights and democratisation not only through the development assistance programme but also by taking stands on human rights issues both in public and in private conversation with officials. The current Ambassador’s attendance at the trial of Dr Kizza Besigye in November 2005, and his expulsion from the court proceedings, was frequently cited to the evaluation as an example of Denmark being a donor that is “passionate about rights”.9 In the early days of the programme, Denmark earned the status of “godfather of the Ugandan economy” because of Danida’s support to several economic sectors. This status gave Denmark a unique access to government that allowed for very frank discussions with senior officials. As an example, Denmark is reported to have been able to convince government officials of the importance of explaining their position on the conflict in the north to their development partners. Danida’s history as a major donor in a number of sectors is still felt by some NGO partners working in human rights to offer them a degree of protection from government interference. Denmark is also an active member of the donor groups that have been set up for dialogue with government on governance issues.
Judiciary 4.7 Danida’s support to the judiciary dates from 1989, with small grants for refurbishing the Supreme Court Library (MFA Danida, 1996a; MFA Danida, 2000b). Danida also funded an Emergency Programme for rehabilitating court buildings and providing basic materials, such as stationery, to enable the courts to function. 10 The development of full-scale assistance was made conditional on there being a review of problems in the justice system and the formulation of policies to address these. The review that took place succeeded in engaging not only agencies in
8 Support to ACTV was continued after 2000, under the Human Rights and Democratisation Programme. Support to UHEDOC ended in 1999 because the Uganda Human Rights Commission was by then functioning and because it was felt that Uganda now had other more effective human rights NGOs. 9 Here and throughout the paper, statements in inverted commas are direct quotes from interviews conducted during two periods of fieldwork in Uganda (May 29-June 16 and June 12-16, 2006) and in follow-up telephone conversations. 10 Reportedly, the courts were so short of basic supplies that magistrates were forced to write up case reports on the reverse side of old reports, so that each case file contained two court reports. date: November 2006 TP7 Page 7
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society the justice sector but also a much wider group of stakeholders in debate about judicial and legal reform (Sørbø and et al., 2000b). Full-scale assistance to the judiciary was initiated in 1996 through the Strengthening the Judiciary Project (SJP), which had had two phases (1996–1999 and 1999–2005). The second phase of the programme was extended twice through bridge funding, under which the SJP was also reformulated as the Access to Justice (ATJ) Programme.
4.8 The first phase of the SJP focused on the rehabilitation and maintenance of court buildings, on streamlining court procedures through computerisation, and on providing training for judges and other court personnel. In the context of the damage done under previous regimes, rebuilding physical infrastructure was recognised as a necessary step to enable the judiciary to work and one that would restore public confidence in the legal system. But Danida had some concerns that the judiciary attached too much importance to the infrastructure component of the SJP as compared with the other ‘softer’ components such as training. Other criticisms of the SJP drew attention to the programme’s implicit assumption that re-building legal infrastructure (including the computerisation and training components) was suffic ient to ensure access to justice, especially for the poor (ibid.).11 The second phase of the SJP took this issue into account and began to tackle access to justice in a more holistic way. This phase of the programme included a budget line for funding initia tives to complement the work of the courts, such as the chain-linked in itiative referred to in Section 3, a pilot community service programme, a pilot public defender scheme, and support to reform of the law on defilement. To some extent this budget line anticipated the formulation of the JLOS programme. Under the third phase of the SJP/ATJ, Danida continued to fund the judiciary as before, and added budget lines for the newly formed JLOS and for a Legal Aid Basket Fund for NGOs.
4.9 Danida is described as a donor that has been responsive to the judiciary’s real needs, and that has provided consistent, systematic and relevant support.12 As such, Danida can share the credit for the judiciary’s achievements. Among these are said to be that investment in court buildings has greatly increased physical access to justice throughout the country and “in a country like Uganda, a courthouse is also a visible sign of law and order”. Investment in training and in the development of systems is reported to have improved capacity, planning and management, and the judiciary has been able to develop a strategic development plan which is described as “the first of its kind in Africa”. Importantly, there is said to be greater confidence in the judiciary, and the judiciary is better understood and seen as “less closed and reclusive”. Challenges in all these areas remain. 13
4.10 Now that JLOS has been established, some critics argue that Danida’s continued separate funding of the judiciary undermines the inter-agency coordination that is needed to make access to justice an achievable objective. Danida argues that judicial independence is a prerequisite for the proper administration of justice, that separate funding supports this independence in a symbolic sense as well as in a material one , and that conditions do not yet favour the complete incorporation of the judiciary into JLOS. Although a 2005 review of Danida governance interventions questioned this assessment (SEAC, 2005) , Danida staff in Uganda maintain that separate funding has proved its value in practice and is still needed. They note that “the judges stood firm on principles of justice” during the “tough times” of the political transition of late 2005–06 “when we saw the court system used and being attempted to be misused”.
11 DFID uses the following definition of accessible justice: “Poor people enjoy access to justice when they are able to use institutions that are quick, relevant, and effective in meeting their legitimate needs. Justice systems that are remote, unaffordable, slow, or incomprehensible to ordinary people effectively deny them legal protection.” (DFID, 2002) 12 Danida was contrasted favourably with another donor who “did not consult the judiciary about what was needed” and who supplied equipment for the courts most of which was said to have broken down because it was not robust enough to withstand the amount of use that it would get. 13 Documentary sources include Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida. Project Document: Second Bridging Phase on Access to Justice Programme Phase III. October 2004 – December 2005. Annex A (MFA Danida, 2006).
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4.11 Danida is expecting to put all its funding for the justice sector through JLOS from 2008, though the final decision on this is subject to further consideration and study.
Uganda Human Rights Commission 4.12 The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) was established under the 1995 Constitution with a mandate to investigate alleged human rights violations and to promote human rights. The UHRC become operational in 1996. The Government of Uganda was the main source of funding to the Commission during its early years. Australia and Belgium were the first donors to the Commission. Danida has supported the Uganda Human Rights Commission since 1999, initially through funding a Regional Office in Gulu to do awareness-raising, to handle complaints, and to assess conditions in places of detention and Internally Displa ced Persons’ (IDP) camps.
4.13 Initial donor funding for the Commission was bilateral and based chiefly on an individual donor’s interest in a particular area of human rights work. Danida was responsible for persuading donors to move from funding on this projectised basis to funding a Commission Corporate Plan through a multi-donor Basket Fund. Since mid-2001 Danida has acted as the Secretariat and Lead Agency for the Basket Fund, the other donors being the EU, Ireland and Sida. Commission staff credit Danida with pushing for the Corporate Plan to be developed, which both opened the door to Basket Fund arrangements and “provided a framework for the Commission to achieve results in a coherent way”.
4.14 Reviews note that the Commission has achieved results in several areas including better procedures for complaints handling, greater effectiveness in Regional offices, and greater capacity to monitor Uganda’s adherence to international treaty and convention obligations. The Reviews note that there is scope for improvement in all these areas (MFA Danida, 2004a). The Commission has been applauded for reporting and following up on the existence of ‘safe houses’, and for its contribution to raising the general level of awareness about human rights in Uganda. Commission staff acknowledge the contribution of the donor group as a whole towards achieving these outcomes. Danida in particular is credited with enabling the Commission to develop and maintain its five Regional offices, which are seen as key to improving human rights conditions in the country: “If we had had to depend only on government funding, we would have been stuck in Kampala”.
4.15 Throughout the operation of the Basket Fund some complex and difficult discussions have been required between the donors and Commission staff and officials over priorities and management issues. The Commission is critical of the fact that ear-marking within the Basket Fund has enabled donors to influence prioritisation within the Corporate Plan and, as staff see it, to place limits on what the Commission is able to do. Donor limits on funding for logistics and administration are seen as undermining the Commission’s ability to achieve the targets in terms of outreach that donors themselves have endorsed. For their part, donors have had long-running and serious concerns over weak financial management and controls in the Commission, and about the misuse of funds. In its role as Lead Agency, Danida has borne the brunt in these difficult negotiations, often being singled out for criticism over what are in fact shared donor concerns.
4.16 This has not prevented the Commission from describing Danida as a professional and consistent donor that is focused on relevant issues and with whom it is possible to do business: “It has always been possible to come to a compromise with Danida staff and we have never felt that they were people who wanted to put their foot on the brake, even though sometimes you have to write a lot of words to get round their bureaucracy”. Danida is also seen as a donor that is willing to ‘go the extra mile’. For example, the current Adviser helpe d the Commission to lobby the date: November 2006 TP7 Page 9
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Ministry of Finance to write off its debts – reportedly incurred through shortfalls in government funding – so that donors could consider moving from basket funding to budget support, which would have resolved the tensions associated with ear-marking. (One year later, the debt had still not been written off, although a verbal commitment is reported to have been given that this would happen.)
Ugandan NGOs 4.17 During the 1990s, most grants to Ugandan NGOs were relatively small and short-term. Because this approach to funding made heavy demands on staff time and was difficult to monitor, Danida began to look for more effective ways to fund NGOs and, since 2000, NGO support has been handled by HUGGO. In bringing NGO support under a well-staffed Programme Support Unit, Danida has taken a distinctively different path from other donors. Like Danida, other donors were trying to find ways of making their funding to NGOs more effective. Unlike Danida, by the end of the 1990s, other donors were looking for staff savings and were unable or unwilling to increase staffing levels for NGO programmes. It is important to note, however, that this difference between Danida and other donors is more about how support to NGOs has been managed than about what types of NGO or NGO activity have been supported.
4.18 NGO funding has been coordinated within the HRDP. The HRDP was designed to support NGOs working on human rights, civic education, elections, the Constitutional review and other law reforms, corruption, legal aid and conflict resolution. This support had an explicit objective of building up a critical mass of civil society organisations to balance Danida’s support for the judiciary, the UHRC and other constitutional or public bodies. A particular feature of HRDP design was a deliberate effort to reach district-based NGOs rather than simply funding better- resourced, elite organisations in Kampala. Support to district-based NGOs was channelled to and through the emerging District NGO Networks. According to the original programme design, District Networks were to be funded to promote human rights and rights-based approaches; later this was expanded to include dialogue and possible joint planning with local councils, budget tracking exercises, and building capacity in member NGOs and community based organisations (CBOs). The capacity building is done by national NGOs and NGO networks , and by some Danish NGOs (‘process facilitators’).
4.19 District Networks existed before Danida made them a cornerstone of its programme, but on the whole they were embryonic and lacking in capacity. Danida support has focused on building up Network Secretariats through funding the salary of a coordinator, offices, office equipment and so on. Opinions differ among NGO actors over how effective this has been as an approach to building capacity in civil society. Some ‘process facilitators’ criticise Danida for providing too much, too quickly, and with too little attention to analysing the roles and capacitie s of District Networks. As a result, these critics argue, Danida has built up the Secretariats at the expense of network members, has over-extended the Secretariats, and has caused resentment among members and in networks that have not been funded. In the process, Danida support has also undermined pre-existing partnerships between the District Networks and national NGOs and NGO networks. In this view, Danida’s approach is seen as giving too much importance to infrastructure and too little to programme content: “Danida seems to assume that, if you have the physical and human infrastructure in place, the programmes will automatically follow”.
4.20 Other observers have commented more favourably on Danida’s approach which has been characterised as being to “push the idea hard at the beginning and then to take a back seat, allowing things to develop in their own way and at their own pace”. Even those who are more critical acknowledge that Danida has learned lessons from its early experiences with District Networks and has used these to redesign the programme: “They burned their fingers on the
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District Networks. They saw that networks were being formed just to get funding. Or networks that had failed to get funding would realign themselves just to do so. This meant that, if the funding stopped, the network would go back to what it was before, or worse”. The District Networks programme is now hosted by the Uganda NGO Forum and an NGO Steering Committee has been set up to take the process forward without direct Danida involvement.
4.21 The original project document for the HRDP made the point that the programme’s support to NGOs should be seen not as an end in itself but as a means of empowering citizens (MFA Danida, 2000b). It is, of course, a moot point whether stronger NGOs lead to a more empowered citizenry, but Danida’s strategies towards NGOs do appear to have strengthened the sector and not just individual organisations. In addition to support to District Networks, these strategies have included a shift from funding single NGOs to encouraging the formation of coalitions of NGOs working on a common issue: for example, the move from the Uganda Debt Network to the Anti- Corruption Coalition of Uganda and from ACTV to the Coalition Against Torture. Danida has also nurtured new NGOs by ‘housing’ them initially in more established ones which provide administrative back-up and financial accountability, the latter being a particularly important consideration for Danida. This was done, for example, with the Acholi Education Initiative in Gulu which was ‘housed’ for its first eighteen months in HURIFO (the Human Rights Forum). Finally, Danida has also sought to encourage a more enabling environment for NGOs through funding work to develop an NGO Quality Assurance Certificate and to help NGOs lobby against pending – and unduly restrictive – NGO legislation. This lobbying delayed but in the end did not prevent a punitive NGO bill being brought into law.
4.22 The NGOs that have been funded by Danida clearly value the support they have received and see it as having made “a unique and important contribution” to their work. The evaluation was given many examples where Danida’s support was felt to have been an important contributory factor to successful outcomes, including: the first national training programme for women electoral candidates, promotion of a Private Member’s Bill on Freedom of Information, and civil society inputs to the Constitutional Review process. NGOs and others have particularly valued the speed and flexibility of Danida’s responses when faced with an urgent and unexpected request. For example, the Uganda Women’s Network spoke of getting funds at 24 hours’ notice to mobilise women to lobby Parliament when MPs were debating the Domestic Relations Bill.
4.23 Nevertheless, NGOs have mixed opinions on what it is like to have Danida as a donor. NGOs recognise and value the fact that – unlike all other donors – Danida has made an investment in employing staff in sufficient numbers and with sufficient expertise to provide a high level of high quality support to NGO partners. HUGGO’s staff were described as “among the best people to have worked in the NGO sector, who really understand it, and who can identify and respond to the real needs. They don’t just give you the cash; they really participate alongside you”. Danida was also frequently described as a consistent donor, especially on issues of governance; one that was “passionate about rights, one of the very few donors that took a stand during the testing year of 2005”. Again the phrase “willing to go the extra mile” was used to characterise Danida’s support.
4.24 However, NGOs also feel that they have had to pay a price for the high level of support that Danida has provided. HUGGO staff are seen as too “hands-on” , with a tendency to involve themselves in the operational details of programmes – to “interfere” – rather than providing strategic support. Danida was also seen as being relatively inflexible and overly concerned with “deliverables”, especially as compared with a donor such as DFID, which was described as being more concerned with outcomes and less worried about the details of how those outcomes were achieved. Related to this, Danida’s demands for financial accountability were felt by many NGOs to be unnecessarily onerous. There were frequent complaints that querying accounts was the rule date: November 2006 TP7 Page 11
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society rather than the exception and that as a result there were frequent delays in disbursement. One informant told the evaluation that the characteristic NGO feeling towards Danida was one of fear occasioned by these stringent demands: “If you get funding from Danida, they want a receipt even for one shilling”.
4.25 HUGGO is now considering whether to adopt a different approach to supporting NGOs where Danida will be a less actively engaged donor and more of what has come to be known as an ‘outcome investor’ – a donor that supports partners in a strategic way and expects to see a social return on its investment, but that is not trying to co-manage programmes.14 The model of the Tanzanian Foundation described above is felt to be a particularly apt one to follow. Whatever changes are made, however, it is clear that Danida does not see itself as a donor whose role is limited simply to providing funds and receiving reports.
Danish NGOs 4.26 More than 15 Danish NGOs operating in Uganda have been funded under Framework Agreements, Mini-Programme Agreements and individual project/programme support.15 Some of these NGOs re-started their operations in Uganda at about the same time as the Danida programme re-opened. During the period of reconstruction in Uganda, most of the large Danida- funded Danish NGO projects were in infrastructure, vocational training, HIV/AIDS, and support for special groups such as street children and people with disabilities. There has been some direct collaboration between Danida and some Danish NGOs, mainly during the early phases of the programme when the priority was on rehabilitation. Danida-NGO collaboration included work with DanChurchAid/Lutheran World Federation on the construction of primary schools in Rakai and with the Danish Red Cross on the Essential Drugs Management Programme. Otherwise, programmatic collaboration between Danida and Danish NGOs has been limited.
4.27 Since 2000, the Danida civil society strategy has emphasised the role of Danish NGOs in supporting civil society in the south. This emphasis has coincided with similar changes that have taken place in NGOs’ global policies. Since the mid-1990s , Danish NGOs have placed increasing emphasis on human rights and good governance as programmatic themes and on partnership with southern CSOs as the main operational modality. From around 1995, MS Uganda began to change its focus from one of sending Danish volunteers to occupy ‘gap-filling’ roles in government agencies and towards programmes that promoted good governance and sustainable livelihoods through partnerships with Ugandan CSOs. Other Danish NGOs have followed similar paths in working more closely with Ugandan CSOs on themes of poverty reduction, gender, the rights of children and minorities, good governance, and peace and reconciliation. The support of Danish NGOs has also been directed towards building capacities in Ugandan CSOs, including in advocacy and policy dialogue. While therefore there has been no conscious effort to align the work of the Danish NGOs in Uganda with the Danida programme – indeed, these NGOs remain very jealous of their autonomy – there has been something of a convergence between their objectives and those of Danida. This has created recent openings for collaboration between HUGGO and some Danish NGOs on anti-corruption work and support to District Networks.
14 The term ‘outcome investor’ has emerged in the context of grant-making to ‘Third Sector’ organisations in Europe. 15 Before 2005, MS had a special status and was funded out of the Finance Bill. Since 2005, it has been funded through a Framework Agreement. Although more than 15 Danish NGOs have received funding, only 15 are covered in the NCG Report because these are the only ones where funding has been above DKK 3 million.
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Conflict resolution and peace building 4.28 There have been some key moments in Danida’s work in conflict resolution when the organisation has been able to make a real difference. Danida has been in the lead of donor involvement in West Nile and its engagement there was described by a like-minded donor as “very strategic and arguably pivotal in bringing the government and UNRF II together”. Danida was also a key player in setting up the Civil Military Operations Centres in Karamoja , in support to the radio station, to youth peace initiatives and to cross-border work with Teso. Officials in Gulu told us of being able to negotiate a ceasefire with a rebel LRA commander because Danida, alone of all the donors, was willing to give the rebels money to buy food, which was their condition for laying down arms. Danida staff themselves cited an incident where they mobilised resources for the Amnesty Commission in a few hours when 100 LRA soldiers presented themselves for demobilisation unannounced.
4.29 In other respects programming has worked around the conflicts rather than addressing them. In the late 1980s/early 1990s, Gulu and Karamoja were options for a District programme along with Rakai but Rakai was chosen because conflict was judged to make these other areas too difficult to work in. The same has mostly been true of sector programming. The net effect of conflict therefore has been to divert resources to non-conflict areas, despite the much higher levels of deprivation in the north. Danida has been able neither to bring its understanding of conflict into its country strategy nor to capitalise fully on those successes that it has achieved. After the ceasefire in West Nile , for example, Danida did not move to supporting rehabilitation, which meant that the people of the area effectively saw no peace dividend from the ending of the conflict.
4.30 Danida is not atypical. Donors in general have had limited influence on the course of the conflict in the north. In Karamoja, in particular, they have failed fully to understand the nature of pastoral society and how this influences the dynamics of conflict and the prospects for peace. With respect to all the conflict areas, the individual national perspectives of donors have undermined coordination, and donors have failed to develop common understandings or shared approaches (Ginifer, 2006). Donors have also tended to place too much faith on working with individuals as agents or champions of change. “Danida did this very effectively in West Nile and Karamoja. But this approach is nevertheless limited – there needs to be a much stronger critical mass of such people to really see change happen.”
5. Overall Assessment
Challenges in assessment 5.1 There are several challenges to assessing whether donors in general in Uganda have contributed to building democracy, peace and respect for human rights. First, the instruments available for measuring progress in these fields are under-developed compared with our ability to measure changes in poverty. Assessing whether significant change has occurred in government attitudes and behaviour, in public opinion or in political culture is a much more difficult exercise than measuring the poverty headcount, or a given population’s health status or educational outcomes. Typically, changes in governance are assessed against milestones (for example, the holding of multi-party elections) that assert but cannot firmly establish a linkage to more open and accountable governance. Sørbø et al (2000b) note in relation to this the limits of the logframe approach in designing programmes to support human rights and democracy.
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5.2 The challenge of measurement is linked to the fact that – much more explicitly than is the case with technical sectors – donors are operating within and trying to influence political processes and institutions. Political and institutional change is slow, uneven, uncertain and reversible. Domestic factors and forces (including the impact of regional political and economic dynamics) are invariably determinant in shaping the trajectory of change, and they can and often do knock donor initiatives off track. With respect to Uganda, donors have learned to temper what now appears to have been an earlier over-estimation of the pace and direction of change. The lesson that donors have taken from this and similar experiences elsewhere is the need for their support to institutional change to be rooted in a careful analysis of political context and of the structural and institutional levers or drivers of change.16 Considerable progress has been made in donors’ capacity for political analysis, but our ability to link this to strategies for programming and policy dialogue is still very much a ‘work in progress’.
5.3 Finally, the way that donors have traditionally organised their support to governance initiatives also makes it difficult to assess whether this support is making a difference. Within donor agencies, much of the funding for governance has been dispersed between a relatively large number of short-term projects and within programmes that were not particularly coherent or strategic. This has mainly been the case with support to civil society, which has become an increasingly important component of donor governance strategies in the last few years. While it may be possible to evaluate the immediate outcomes of discrete projects, it has been much more difficult to reach a judgement on whether cumulatively they had longer-term or wider impact. Coordination between donors has also been limited, which has added to the general difficulty of assessing how far donors as a whole have been able to influence change.
Danida’s choice of interventions 5.4 Danida’s decision to prioritise governance in its programme was relevant in the context of the politically dysfunctional state that was inherited by the NRM government, and governance continued to be a relevant area of work as the Movement consolidated as a one-party patrimonial system. The decision to support initiatives promoting respect for human rights in Uganda was set both by the first Head of Mission’s preferences and by Danida’s global priorities. The specific choices made, to support the IGG, the courts and public agencies concerned with human rights, responded to national priorities as defined by the NRM government in the first years of the programme. These early decisions have shaped Danida’s governance programmes throughout the evaluation period. Danida’s continued funding of these institutions has been consistent with national priorities as they have evolved in the governance pillars of successive Poverty Eradication Action P lans (PEAPs), which have focused on human rights and, particularly, security as being relevant to the welfare of the poor. The most recent PEAP prioritises human rights, democratisation, access to justice, settling conflict and addressing its effects.
5.5 Though Danida’s governance programme has been aligned to formal national priorities, government’s own commitment to these priorities has increasingly been seen to falter. The uncertain political transition, unresolved conflict in the north and Uganda’s regional military involvements have eroded donor confidence in government’s intentions. Over the same period, donors have seen that the public agencies set up by government to address corruption and abuses of human rights were progressively under-resourced and politically constrained. In common with other bilateral donors, Danida has begun to balance funding for these public agencies with funding for NGOs. Danida has reinforced its support to individual NGO activities by working in ways that strengthen the sector as a whole and by supporting NGOs efforts to promote a more
16An example of this type of analysis is the Drivers of Change (DoC) approach has emerged within DFID as a way of applying political economy analysis to the development of donor strategy.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society enabling legal and regulatory NGO framework. The recent enactment of a very punitive NGO law highlights how important and also how difficult this last area of work is.
5.6 Danida’s strategies towards civil society have been relevant, particularly the emphasis on supporting the sector and not simply the work of individual NGOs. Some caveats are in order, however. Donor discourse often contains the assumption of an inevitable positive causal link between a stronger civil society and enhanced democracy. Strategies for support to civil society should not leave this assumption unquestioned. NGOs frequently take an oppositional stance towards government but often have limited understanding of policy processes or of how to influence them. 17 Further, NGOs emerge from and live in the same social and political culture as the governments that they oppose, they often possess similar political characteristics to these governments, and they are not always more transparent or less corrupt. A particular caveat applicable to Uganda is the practice of NGO sub-contracting by local councils, which makes these NGOs ill-suited to the ‘watch-dog’ roles that donors might like to assign to them. In summary, civil society is not always a driver of change and its potential to be so – or the potential of sub-sectors within it – should be subject to the same rigorous analysis as is required for understanding other political institutions.
Implementation 5.7 It was not Danida’s conscious intention to position its support for governance within a wider programme of multi-sector support. In effect, this is what happened as Danida responded positively to a wide range of requests from government in the early days of the NRM. Danida’s status as a major donor to Uganda that was active in several sectors has, however, had the unintended and unforeseen but beneficial consequence of giving Danida a peculiar legitimacy for engagement in governance, both at the operational and the policy levels. This legitimacy has had further beneficial spin-offs in offering a measure of protection to some of its partners working in human rights.
5.8 Danida has been the main source of funding to several key institutions and public agencies concerned with governance and has therefore been immensely important in enabling these institutions and agencies to function. Danida’s initial programme focus on funding infrastructure and running costs was relevant in the context of a country that was recovering from conflict and economic collapse. Danida’s support has also been effective in the long term in enabling these institutions and agencies to carry out their functions, and particularly in giving them a national reach and remit. Questions were raised in the early stages about whether support to infrastructure and running costs reflected a too ‘top-down’ approach. With the benefit of hindsight, we can also see that other questions can be asked about sustainability and about how an exit strategy could be effected in the context of publicly-funded institutions whose resources from government are insufficient and are unlikely to increase. The questions of sustainability and exit strategy remain salient concerns for Danida and other donors. However, without donor support, these agencies and institutions would be much weaker and governance would be compromised.
5.9 Given the concerns about ‘top-down’ approaches to support for public agencies, questions can also be raised about the relevance of some of Danida’s earlier strategies for support to civil society. For example, Danida made highly visible investments in the infrastructure and running costs of District Network Secretariats. This not only raises the issue of sustainability, which is well-known as an endemic problem in the NGO sector, but also of who is in the driving seat of local civil society development – the Secretariats or the membership that they are intended to serve? By singling out the Secretariats for funding in this way, Danida seemed to provoke some
17 See, for example (Robinson and Friedman, 2005). date: November 2006 TP7 Page 15
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society jealousy and competition among other CSOs. This runs counter to Danida’s explicit intention of using its support to strengthen the sector as a whole, and the evaluation concurs with the decision that Danida made to review its strategies and to pass responsibility for management of the programme to a consortium of national NGOs. Recently other donors have gained interest in the programme and it has now become a component in the proposed ‘deepening democracy programme’ that is to be supported by the Partners for Democracy and Governance (PDG).18
5.10 HUGGO has been criticised for being something of an anomaly at a time when Danida’s policy was to reduce the number of its Technical Advisers and Project Implementation or Management Units. Danida’s decision to establish HUGGO was consistent with the growing importance of governance within the Uganda programme and Danida’s wish to build more effective governance strategies in a difficult political environment. In this regard, the physical and institutional separation of HUGGO and the embassy has created opportunities, as well as presenting some problems.
5.11 On the positive side, this separation is seen as having been effective in facilitating Danida’s support to the ceasefire in West Nile. One like-minded donor observed that such an intervention would have been impossible for donor agencies where conflict advisers have both technical and representational functions. The separation between HUGGO and the embassy does not appear to have compromised efficiency. Rather, Danida has been able to capitalise on the comparative advantages of HUGGO and the Royal Danish Embassy (RDE), for example, when Danida was able to provide funds for the partial ceasefire in Acholi and at very short notice for the Amnesty Commission. This depends on there being good communication between the Adviser and the relevant embassy official. Problems have arisen when the technical and political perspectives diverged, and when the respective mandates of each were blurred. Clearly, the relationship requires careful handling.
5.12 One of Danida’s objectives for HUGGO was to manage governance-related programmes more efficiently and effectively. This reflected Danida’s well-known intolerance towards financial mismanagement as well as the desire to develop more coherent governance strategies. The establishment of HUGGO marked a step change in Danida’s capacity to support partners, to monitor their performance and to provide good financial oversight and control. Danida’s investment in recruiting a cadre of staff from among the most experienced professionals in the civil society sector has paid off in terms of the quality of support that it has been able to provide. It has meant that Danida has had a much more engaged and ‘hands-on’ relationship, with NGOs in particular, than is the case for other donors. Most NGOs have found Danida’s engagement with their strategic concerns “refreshingly different” but have been ill-at-ease with HUGGO’s involvement in the day-to-day operations of their programmes, which, in their view, has sometimes created confusion and delay. The evaluation team agrees with HUGGO’s decision that it will be both more efficient and more effective to develop new funding modalities that will enable it to be more engaged at the strategic level and less involved in operational matters.
Coherence and coordination 5.13 Given the range of issues and activities that fall within governance broadly defined, achieving coherence is not altogether straightforward. Nor was it a particular objective for Danida in the first years of the programme. In common with other donor agencies, the initial impetus towards developing a more coherent programme was the burden imposed by administering a large number of small grants, and the difficulty of monitoring these. By 2000, and with the
18 The PDG is a donor group whose members are the Heads of Mission from the EU members states, Canada, Japan, the USA and UNDP.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society formulation of the HRDP and setting up of HUGGO in 2003, Danida had established a management framework through which a more integrated and internally coherent governance strategy could be developed. The programme now has an explicit focus on support to delivery by the Government of Uganda, support to regulatory agencies (such as the UHRC, judiciary and the IGG) and support to the demand side through civil society; with the development of a new governance strategy coherence of governance interventions will be taken still further.
5.14 Where coherence has been more difficult to achieve is in mainstreaming human rights, democratisation and conflict resolution across the Danida programme as a whole. Human rights has been a key factor in Danida decision-making throughout the evaluation period, and human rights and democratisation have been cross-cutting issues for most of it. It is apparent that the north-south division in Uganda between ‘conflict areas’ and ‘development areas’ has been reflected in the Danida programme, as it has been for other donors. The 2004 country strategy document (‘Uganda-Denmark Partnership – Strategy for Development Cooperation 2004–2008’) noted that one of the continuing challenges in the programme was that human rights, democratisation and good governance were insufficiently integrated into other sector programmes. Accordingly over the next period the programme aimed to bring together the different strands of Danida’s support to governance into a single framework that would promote greater synergies between them and promote integration of governance into other sectors (MFA Danida, 2004c).
5.15 As governance is not a sector programme, and interpretations of what it includes differ, there has not been a natural focus for coordination of donor programmes. Moreover, in the first years of the programme, Danida was the only or the main donor for several institutions and institutional processes, including the judiciary and the Constitutional Commission. As sector- wide approaches (SWAps) have been developed for other sectors and as governance has become a more salient concern, donors have also identified the need for better coordination in support for governance. One outcome of this has been JLOS, though here Danida has chosen to partly opt out of the main coordinating mechanism for the moment. For some of the other governance programmes, Danida has taken the lead in pushing for better coordination and alignment around government priorities, for example with respect to the Basket Fund for the Uganda Human Rights Commission. HUGGO’s staffing levels have also enabled it to assume responsibility for managing several of the other Basket Funds that have been set up for governance programmes. With respect to NGO programmes, where historically coordination has been more difficult to achieve, Danida has pushed for a common donor approach to support for District Networks and has led the process for developing a multi-donor foundation for funding work in human rights.
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Bibliography
COWI (1996). Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance: Country Study Uganda: Volume I, Main Report; Volume II, Assessment of Selected Interventions. (November 1996). Copenhagen: MFA.
DFID (2002). Safety, Security and Accessible Justice: Putting Policy into Practice. (Jun-02). : DFID.
Ginifer, J. (2006). Internal Review of DFID's Engagement with the Conflict in Northern Uganda. Ev663. (February 2006). UK: DFID.
MFA Danida (1994). A Developing World: Strategy for Danish Development Policy Towards the Year 2000. Summary of a Strategy Paper presented by the Danish Government. (Mar-94). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1996a). Denmark-Uganda Cooperation Programme - Status Report. (February 1996). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1996b). Strategy for Danish Bilateral Development Cooperation with Uganda. (Feb- 96). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2000a). Strategy for Danish Support to Civil Society in Developing Countries – including Cooperation with Danish NGOs. (Oct-00). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2000b). Thematic Programme on Human Rights and Democratisation 2000–06. (May 2000/March 2002). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2003). A World of Difference: Government's Vision for New Priorities in Danish Development Assistance 2004–2008. (Jun-03). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2004a). Joint Review of Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) Basket Fund. (Jan-04). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2004b). Security, Growth – Development Priorities of the Danish Government for Danish Development Assistance 2005–2009. (Aug-04). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2004c). Uganda–Denmark Partnership – Strategy for Development Cooperation 2004– 2008. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2006). Second Bridging Phase on Access to Justice Programme Phase III: Annex A October 2004–December 2005. Copenhagen: MFA.
NCG (2006). Pre-Study of Uganda Country Programme Evaluation. (March 13 2006). Copenhagen: MFA Danida.
Robinson, M. et al. (2005). Civil Society Democratisation and Foreign Aid in Africa. IDS Discussion Paper 383. Brighton: IDS.
SEAC (2005). Review of Danish Governance Interventions in Uganda. (Apr-05). Copenhagen: MFA.
Sørbø, G. et al. (2000a). Evaluation of Danish Support to Promotion of Human Rights and Democratisation 1990–1998: Synthesis Report. Copenhagen: MFA.
TP7 Page 18 file: DUE-TP7-HRJusticeCS(final).doc
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Sørbø, G. et al. (2000b). Evaluation of Danish Support to Promotion of Human Rights and Democratisation 1990-1998: Volume 2: Justice, Constitution and Legislation. Copenhagen: MFA.
Udsholt, L. (1997). Danish Aid Policies for Poverty Reduction: From Non-Committal Statements to a More Strategic Approach. (April 19997). Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research.
Uganda-Denmark Cooperation Programme. . Agreed Minutes (annually, 1989-2003). In:. Kampala: Uganda-Denmark Cooperation Programme.
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Annex 1: Summary of Danida’s support to human rights, democratisation, justice and civil society
Project/programme Period DKK million Inspector General of Government19 1988–2003 57.74 Demobilisation 1992–96 49.00 UHEDOC 1995–99 4.32 SJP/ATJ 1995–2005 125.58 ACTV 1997–2000 10.07 UHRC 1999–2000 3.19 HRDP20 2000–2005 72.78
HRDP activities covered by this Thematic Paper Project/focus Description Comments from 2005 review of governance interventions Democratisation and HR Uganda Human Rights Commission Complaints handling; support to Civil Complaints backlog a continuing Military Operations Centres, problem; work-load on HUGGO as Karamoja. Danida lead agency for LA because of difficulties in financial basket fund (+ EC, Irish Aid, Sida) management of UHRC District networks Coordinate CSO activities; awareness- Has worked well; synergy with anti- raising on HR and RBA; dialogue with corruption programme; provides Local Councils; budget tracking; balance to BS and SWAps; lack of capacity building. donor coordination and some competition between networks. Coalition against torture/ACTV New coalition with Foundation for Important because incidents of torture Human Rights Initiative as lead appear to be increasing; ACTV has agency and ACTV as member. some management problems but good experience for newer members; Danida should involve other donors. National Civic Education Progra mme Provide citizens with basic civic Planned between government and CS knowledge to promote increased in partnership with DDGG; lack of participation and accountability in clear responsibility and ownership; national and local government. programme not taken off. Election Support Basket Fund Support to Electoral commission, CSOs, media, Makerere, police etc to ensure free and fair elections in 2006. HUGGO instrumental in developing Basket Fund of c. USD8m. And administering it on behalf of DDGG. Frame work organisations Framework agreements/funding with For more coherence, support should key NGOs. either be integrated with other components or passed to other donors. Transition process Support to CS voice in constitutional review process and work on regulatory framework e.g. NGO bill. Conflict Resolution and Peace Building West Nile, Acholi, Karamoja Flexible funding of peace initiatives; Develop more holistic, coherent and support to UHRC, Amnesty long-term strategies for conflict Commission, Conflict Resolution and resolution. Actively participate in Peace Building Project (Makerere). donor groups and strategy development.
19 Mainly engaged in anti-corruption work covered under Thematic Paper 6, Accountability and Corruption. Most of this funding is therefore not strictly for the activities covered in this Thematic Paper. 20 Includes activities not covered in this Thematic Paper e.g. funding for anti corruption work.
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HRDP activities covered by this Thematic Paper Project/focus Description Comments from 2005 review of governance interventions Access to Justice 3rd Phase JLOS and judiciary Judiciary, JLOS – TA only. Legal Aid Separate funding for judiciary as a Basket Fund (NGOs) means of maintaining its independence misplaced; participation in SWAp would enable Danida to participate more in policy dialogue.
Sources: NCG, 2006; SEAC, 2005.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society
Annex 2: Status of donor funded human rights and democratisation activities in 200021
Donor Supported Interventions in the area of Human Rights Major Interventions supported on PD/GG Funding Agency National Local Ireland Aid Contribution to the Multi-Donor Trust fund for the Referendum 2000 Sector budget support in Kibaale, Kiboga and Kumi Local Council Elections 2001 as well as Presidential and Parliamentary elections districts. (earmarked) Juvenile Justice Reforms in Masaka, Hoima and Gulu. The Juvenile Justice Reform programme Support to participatory development and good Contribution to the Legal Sector SWAP Process (earmarked) governance within the districts supported by Ireland Specific support to the area of human rights through the Human Rights Commission Aid. or otherwise. Contributions to the national capacity building (Support if any for the Commission will depend not only on the content of the programme for women local councillors (still being Corporate Plan currently being developed but also what other agencies are developed, process spearheaded by DFID) supporting within the Commission). World Bank Ministry of Ethics and Integrity, IGG, Auditor General, Public Procurement UNCDF for 12 districts systems, Banking systems and micro-finance, Crown Agents study on the Legal Local Government Development Programme sector Netherlands Embassy Contributions to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Referendum 2000, Budget Support to the 4 districts in West Nile and to Local Council Elections 2001 as well as Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Soroti, Katkwi and Lira districts 2002 (earmarked) Good Governance (capacity building for District Contribution to the Legal Sector SWAP Process (earmarked) Councillors in the supported districts) DPP State Prosecutors’ programme Law Reform Commission (Consultations for the Domestic Relations Law) NGOs conducting Voter Education Public Service Reform (PSR) (Retrenchment Costs) Danida Contribution to the Multi-Donor Trust fund for the Referendum 2000, Mainstreaming Human Rights in Sector Programme Programme for strengthening of the Judiciary, Support (focusing on districts with Danida supported IGG, activities) Human Rights Commission (Corporate Plan & Gulu Office) Human rights and Democratisation programme (still being developed with focus on the Human Rights Commission, Strengthening Civ il Society (NGOs & CBOs), areas emerging from conflict
21 Source: MFA Danida, 2000b. Support to human rights is broad and depending on a particular donor agency includes but is not limited to Democratisation, Good Governance, Combating Corruption, Support to the Legal Sector and to participatory development. This Table only reflects information that was available at the time of preparing the report. It is therefore possible that interventions of some donor agencies are not reflected. file: DUE-TP7-HRJusticeCS(final).doc TP7 Page 22
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society
Major Interventions supported on PD/GG Funding Agency National Local Austrian Embassy Contribution to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Referendum 2000 Budget support to Kisoro and Rukungiri districts Commercial Justice Sector Reform, PSR (Retrenchment costs, Job evaluation, Performance Appraisal), Prisons, Registration Bureau, Centre for Arbitration. UNDP Human Rights Commission, PSR (Pensions management, Census & Participatory Planning in 15 districts, District Resource Computerisation), IGG, National Workshops to empower district planners, Capacity Endowment Profiles (DREPs) for the entire country. Building component under UNCDF Civic education and revision of standards for service delivery. Africa 2000 and Global Environment Facility (GEF)? Small Grants Programme both of which target community development activities. Norwegian Embassy Contributions to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Referendum 2000, District Integrity Workshops PSR (Retrenchment costs and the National Service Delivery Survey), Uganda Human Rights Commission (Capacity building programme), IGG (Capacity Building programme and District Integrity Workshops), Implementation of the Constitution, (Consultant to oversee the formulation of legislation arising from the Constitution 1995) Contribution to UNFPA and UNICEF – GOU Country Programmes, Legal Aid (support to the Legal Aid Clinic of the Legal Aid Project), Juvenile Justice (Child Advocacy) Resettlement programme (Lake Mburo) DFID (Chair of Contribution to the Refugee Law Programme – Faculty of Law (developing capacity Gulu, northern and eastern Uganda, lake dependent Referendum 2000 Group) of legal aid organisations to work with refugees) communities and NGOs in Northern Uganda. Contribution to the Chain-Linked project (developing co-ordination amongst major agencies in the criminal justice system) PSR (retrenchment, management divestiture, personnel & payroll systems, audit & inspection), Support to Commercial Justice Sector Reform, Law Reform Commission, Prosecution, Police, the Beijing Portfolio, Parliament, Ministry of Finance, NGO/Social Development and Civil Society Swedish Embassy Contribution to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Referendum 2000, Support to Human Rights and Governance activities of NGOs (FHRI, HURINET, FOWODE) Human Rights Commission, PSR (Retrenchment costs) USAID See Separate Attachment See Separate Attachment
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society
Major Interventions supported on PD/GG Funding Agency National Local EU Delegation National Programme for Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance (due to Water and sanitation programmes in North and North- start 2nd half of 2000). Western Uganda, Micro Projects Programme (new MPP) in North-West, Central and Eastern Uganda, Support to Karamoja District. Support to Gulu and Kitgum districts (still under preparation) German Embassy Contribution to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Referendum 2000, Support to Prisons Department, Friedrich Ebert Foundation Support to Electoral Commission, Human Rights Commission, Conferences in the Context of Human Rights (mainly organised by NGOs) Konrad Adenauer Support to Democracy Studies Programme (Nkumba Univ.), Support to Radio Foundation Programme of FHRI, Support to Uganda Law Society, Media Co-operation with Human rights Commission. Belgian Embassy Human Rights Commission Office in Gulu
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 7: HR, Justice, Conflict and Civil Society
USAID UGANDA DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES ONGOING AND PLANNED (as of 14 December 1999) Activity Description Effective Implementing Partners Estimated Funding Dates (USD) Decentralisation Local Government and Civil Society strengthening 11/99 – 9/01 • MOLG USD 4,000,000 in 8 districts (TED), • Local Government (LC5/LC3) Includes training for local women elected officials • Civil Society Organisations • FOWODE • MSI/Implementing Policy Change Project Parliament Capacity building, creation of Legislative Resource 8/98 – 9/00 • Parliament USD 3,000,000 Center/Library, Budget Office and Public Affairs • State University of New York (SUNY) Office and training of MPs and staff Laws Re-codification of the Laws of Uganda 1996 – 2001 • Law Reform Commission USD 400,000 Legal education • Masters of Law (LLB) and advocacy internship 7/99 – 6/01 • Georgetown University USD 150,000 / Participant & training for 16 months in Washington, DC • MUK Law School – legal information center 9/98 – 6/00 • MUK Law School USD 100,000 • Law Development Center, clinical legal 8/98 – 8/00 • Law Development Center USD 400,000 education Programme
Human rights Domestic Violence Workshops 12/98 – 11/99 LAWA – U USD 70,000 Domestic Violence Bill 8/99 – 8/00 Akima Mama Wa Africa USD 85,000 Referendum Monitoring of referendum process and vote 11/99 – 9/00 NOCEM, UJCC, others in monitoring cluster USD 400,000 Public Opinion Survey 2/00 – 4/00 International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) ????? Anti-corruption Assistance for strategic planning and 1/00 – 2/00 Ministry of Ethics and Integrity ????? implementation Planned activities 2001 elections Assessment of voter registry 3/00 IFES ?????
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 8 –
Gender
May Sengendo Trish Silkin
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 8: Gender
Contents
1. Introduction...... 1
2. Danida Context ...... 1
3. Uganda Context ...... 3
4. Gender Components of Danish Aid to Uganda...... 4 Rakai District Development Programme...... 4 The Masese Women’s Self-Help Group...... 5 Ministry of Women in Development ...... 6 Gender mainstreaming in sector programmes...... 7 Rural Water Supply and Sanitation ...... 8 The Agriculture Sector Programme Support...... 8 The Road Sector Programme Support ...... 9
5. Assessment...... 10 Masese Women’s Self-Help Group ...... 10 Ministry of Women in Development ...... 10 Sector mainstreaming ...... 11
Bibliography ...... 13
Annexes Annex 1: Summary status of Danida interventions in Women in Development/ Gender and Development ...... 15
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 8: Gender
Acronyms and abbreviations
ASPS Agricultural Sector Programme Support CSO Civil Society Organisation Danida Danish International Development Agency (before 1991) Danish International Development Assistance (after 1991) DKK Danish Kroner ELU Environmental Liaison Unit GAD Gender and Development HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome HUGGO Human Rights and Good Governance Liaison Office MAAIF Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries MFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development MGLSD Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development MOWHC Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications MP Member of Parliament NCG Nordic Consulting Group NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NRM National Resistance Movement PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan PIU Project Implementation Unit RDDP Rakai District Development Programme RSPS Road Sector Programme Support RUWASA Rural Water Supply and Sanitation UN United Nations UJAS Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy VBS Victoria Building Society WID Women in Development
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 8: Gender
1. Introduction
1.1. This Thematic Paper focuses on Danida’s support to gender. This has been a significant focus of Danida’s development assistance to Uganda throughout the evaluation period. Its main components include funding for women’s business development under the Rakai District Development Programme, support to individual projects (notably the Masese Women’s Self-Help Group) , support to the development of national gender policies and programmes (through the Ministry of Women in Development), and the promotion of gender-mainstreaming in sector programmes.
1.2. In the period covered by this evaluation, international strategies for bringing women into development changed from stand-alone Women in Development (WID) projects to a Gender and Development (GAD) approach that sees gender as a cross-cutting issue in all development interventions. Danida’s support has largely followed these international trends. Danida has been seen as a major donor for work on gender issues in Uganda – to some extent as the major donor, particularly in the early years. The Government of Uganda has also put in place a strong policy and legal framework for developing work on women’s rights. To that extent, there has been a favourable environment for addressing gender inequalities. At the same time, these inequalities are rooted in cultural attitudes and social and economic structures that are very resistant to change.
1.3. The Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) Pre-Study (NCG, 2006) provides documentation on projects of a value above DKK 3 million, and these are the focus of this Thematic Paper. Projects falling below this funding threshold could not be included in the evaluation. It is acknowledged that this excludes several successful interventions such as Danida funding for the Mukisa Mpewo Clay Works and Handicrafts. See Annex 1 for a summary of Danida’s recorded activities in gender above DKK 3 million.
1.4. Gender issues are also covered in Thematic Paper 7 (Governance issues: human rights, justice, conflict and civil society) and in Thematic Paper 11 (Poverty Monitoring and Analysis). Gender topics discussed in those papers are not covered here.
2. Danida Context
2.1. Within the evaluation period, international policies and strategies for addressing the role of women in development have passed from a phase of handling gender issues through somewhat insulated women’s projects and towards a concern with the structural and institutional causes of gender inequality. This change has been reflected in UN Conventions, international instruments and other relevant political commitments, culminating in the Millennium Development Goals where gender equality is recognised both as a goal and as a precondition for achieving the other poverty reduction goals.
2.2. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a step-change in international thinking about gender issues within development processes, with the shift from a ‘women in development’ approach (WID) to a ‘gender and development’ approach (GAD). WID aimed to integrate women in the development process by focusing on their practical needs (i.e. for immediate necessities such as water, shelter and food.) WID approaches aimed to raise women’s productivity and date: November 2006 TP8 Page 1
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 8: Gender income levels so that they could meet these needs. WID projects did not address the structural causes of gender inequalities and it became apparent over time that the WID approach did not increase women’s social and economic power.
2.3. In contrast, the GAD approach focuses on how differences between men and women are socially constructed. GAD interventions focus on women’s strategic interests and are therefore often related to structural changes in society regarding women’s status and rights. GAD approaches may include legislation for equal rights, reproductive choice, and increased participation in decision-making. The starting point for any GAD intervention is a detailed gender analysis. The GAD approach requires sustained, long-term support and commitment.
2.4. Danida’s evolving thinking and practice on gender issues has been in line wit h these broader international changes. In 1987, as a follow-up to the UN Conference on Women in Nairobi in 1985, Danida elaborated a ‘Plan of Action for Development Assistance to Women’. This took a WID approach in emphasising the importance of meeting women’s basic needs and bringing women more effectively into the mainstream of development. Danida’s 1989 Plan of Action, which marked the first significant step in developing a more poverty-focused approach to Danish aid, made specific references to women’s issues as a key development concern. The 1993 strategy ‘Women in Development – Danida’s WID Policy Towards the Year 2000’ (MFA Danida 1993) had a two-fold strategy: (i) to bring women into development processes on an equal footing with men and (ii) to address the structural constraints to women’s ability to influence and benefit from development processes. Despite its title therefore, the 1993 strategy was in effect a bridge between WID and GAD approaches.
2.5. In 2004, Danida elaborated a strategy for promoting gender equality in its development assistance programmes (MFA Danida, 2004). This strategy built on previous Danida and other international experience in supporting gender projects and issues. The main lessons from this experience were that: - interventions to promote gender equality need to be well-articulated and adequately resourced; - small-scale interventions can increase women’s income, at least for a period, but they do not address structural gender inequalities and are therefore unlikely to have wider or longer-term impact; - gender interventions need to be underpinned by robust gender analysis and by gender- disaggregated data for measuring progress in gender equality; - to make a real impact in reducing gender inequalities, donors must develop strategic partnerships with a variety of stakeholders and need to be able to deploy better tools and methods.
2.6. The objective of the 2004 Danida gender strategy is to contribute to the promotion of equality between men and women in rights, access to and control of resources, and opportunities to achieve political and economic influence. The strategy involves both gender mainstreaming and special interventions to support structural and institutional change, based on the specific conditions in a country, policy area or organisation. Country strategies are expected to identify a minimum of one special intervention for Danida support; gender mainstreaming will be intensified in sector support and in support for human rights, democratisation and good governance.
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3. Ugandan Context
3.1. As with other societies, gender inequalities are endemic in Uganda. Women’s economic role has gone largely unrecognised, women are over-represented in unskilled and low waged work, and they have had little redress against the pervasive problem of domestic violence. A tangible indicator of the relative vulnerability of girls and young women is that they are 5-6 times more likely to be HIV+ than boys and young men (Keller et al, 2000). Uganda has a relatively long history of women organising to solve their problems, typically in community-based groups, often organised under the auspices of the church. In 1985, these groups were brought under the umbrella of the National Council of Women. In 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government put its weight behind efforts to redress gender inequalities in the context of the need to support women’s contribution to national efforts to deve lop the Ugandan economy.1
3.2. The new government carried out a series of measures that created a legal and institutional framework for the promotion of women’s rights. In 1988, the government created the Ministry of Women in Development as the national machinery for planning, coordinating and monitoring gender mainstreaming. In 1995, the new Constitution established a new framework of rights, with specific attention being given to the status of women. The Ministry of Women in Development played a key role in ensuring that women’s rights and interests were given due attention during the constitution-making process. The Constitution banned discrimination on the grounds of sex, provided for equal rights for women in political, economic and social affairs, and stipulated a gender balance on constitutional and other bodies. Women’s political rights were further entrenched in the 1997 Local Government Act which instituted quotas for women on Local Councils. In the same year, the policy of Universal Primary Education required two of the four children in a family entitled to free education to be girls. In 1997, the Cabinet approved a National Gender Policy to guide the mainstreaming of gender in national development processes.
3.3. Gender and the gender dimensions of poverty received limited attention in the 1997 and 2000 Poverty Eradication Action Plans (PEAPs). Evidence from a Demographic and Health Survey that gender inequalities were having an adverse impact on infant and maternal mortality rates led to gender being addressed more substantively in the 2004 PEAP revision process. Participatory Poverty Assessments showed that women’s lesser power and greater work-load than men had far-reaching and complex effects in terms of the relative poverty of women compared to that of men. Other studies showed how Uganda’s high fertility rates and the shift to commercial agriculture had detrimental effects on women. 2 As a result, gender has a much more important place in the 2004 PEAP where it is a key cross-cutting issue under each pillar. Specific actions to address gender inequalities include strengthening women’s access to land, addressing gender- based violence, and increasing access to safe water and sanitation. The PEAP further emphasises the need to implement the National Gender Policy and to mainstream gender in local government.
1 “The challenges of development enjoin us to pay more than just lip service to the core issue of unequal relations in our society. . . Our policy aims at strengthening the position of women in the economy by raising the value and productivity of their labour and by giving them access to and control over productive resources.” President Yoweri Museveni March 8th 1988 (Keller et al, 2000). 2 There is a large body of evidence that demonstrates how the commercialisation of agriculture may have negative effects on women. Typically, it adds to their work-load since women often form the main labour force for non-traditional crops while remaining fully responsible for the household’s subsistence agriculture. Women are rarely involved in decisions about which cash crops will be planted, nor do they have access to or control over the income earned from them. The squeezing of women’s time available for subsistence agriculture and their lack of access to the income from cash-cropping, can mean that commercialisation paradoxically raises household income while at the same time the family’s nutritional status declines. date: November 2006 TP8 Page 3
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 8: Gender
4. Gender Components of Danish Aid to Uganda
4.1. Danida Uganda country strategies have been consistent with the evolution of Denmark’s gender policies. Danida’s first Country Strategy document (MFA Danida, 1996) observes that women in Uganda are more affected by poverty than men, due in the main to a lack of access to land and to education, and to poor health services. In the context of a strategy which aimed to reduce the number of sectors of Danida involvement, Danida continued to support its two women’s projects (MFA Danida, 1996). Gender receives greater attention in the 2004 Country Strategy where promoting gender equality becomes one of the key cross-cutting issues in the Danida programme. An important challenge foreseen for the coming period was to integrate gender equality more effectively into Danish support to sector programmes and good governance (MFA Danida, 2004).
4.2. Danida has marked the importance of gender within the country programme by appointing an experienced Ugandan Programme Officer as a focal point on gender issues. Between 1994 and 2000, gender was the Programme Officer’s primary responsibility; since then other responsibilities have been added but the focus on gender remains strong. Danida’s most substantive programmatic support to gender has had four main components: support through the Rakai District Development Programme (RDDP) to small business development for women; support to the Masese Women’s Self-Help Group, support to the Ministry of Women in Development (and its successors), and mainstreaming gender in sector programmes.
Rakai District Development Programme 4.3. At the start of the RDDP, Rakai district was suffering the combined effects of years of oppressive governance, war and HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS had also created a large number of highly vulnerable and dependent female -headed households. The Rakai Local Development Fund sought to support such women through funding for a range of income-generating and social projects, not all of which were successful. Ensuring women’s access to working capital was also seen as being important both for supporting women’s livelihoods and contributing to reviving the local economy. During Phase I of the RDDP it became apparent that the existing credit institutions were failing to reach such women and other similar poor households. In Phase II, Danida invited the Victoria Building Society (VBS) to become the implementing agent for loans to poorer households, including women. Danida made the first disbursement to VBS in 1998.
4.4. It rapidly became apparent that the VBS had serious institutional weaknesses. Having already been alerted to problems of corruption in Rakai, Danida was concerned not to add to these. A hiatus in the relationship with VBS ensued that impacted negatively on the availability of credit for women. Nevertheless, the 2000 evaluation of RDDP found that in the time that it had been running, the VBS had made a positive difference to women’s lives. It had reached over 300 mostly poor women, in a wide range of rural, peri-urban and urban settings throughout the District. A number of self-help groups had also benefited from loans. Small businesses were being secured and increased profits were being used for household consumption needs, school fees and reinvestment in the business. Women who had received credit also reported feeling greater autonomy, confidence and status as a result of the improvement of the performance of their businesses. (School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, 2000)
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The Masese Women’s Self-Help Group 4.5. The Masese Women’s Self-Help Group is an example of a more conventional WID project as it involved a relatively small number of women and aimed to meet their immediate practical needs for income and services. In point of fact, the Masese project was not identified initially as a ‘women in development’ project at all but rather as a project to reach the ‘poorest of the poor’. It was because the majority of households in Masese were female -headed that the project became characterised as a women’s project.
4.6. Masese was a squatter area in Jinja, Uganda’s second largest city, with an ethnically mixed population of 700 immigrant households from different parts of Uganda who were dependent on low and unreliable incomes. Danida became involved in the area at the invitation of the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, and the project was managed by the African Housing Fund. The main aim of the project was to strengthen the economic position of families in Masese. Its objectives were to improve living and housing conditions and to develop skills and employment opportunities for women.
4.7. Danida funded the Masese project between 1989 and 1994 to a total of more than DKK 8 million, provided as part loan and part grant. The funds were used to procure equipment, to provide training in construction skills, for working capital and to construct a building materials factory. Under the project, 300 houses were built and water, sanitation, roads and drainage were provided. At its height, the project provided employment for some 250 Masese men and women as manufacturers and suppliers of high quality building materials. The group was initially successful in winning contracts, particularly from local government and for donor-financed projects.
4.8. In an otherwise positive assessment of progress, an evaluation of the project conducted in 1994 expressed concerns that the flow of work in building materials production was already rather spasmodic and limited to a few market outlets. The evaluators expressed the view that, without further investment, the women’s technical and business skills would be insufficient to enable them to compete in a fully commercial market. These comments were prescient: the building materials business was unable to ma intain its position and as at mid-2006 business appeared to be at a standstill.
4.9. The group also experienced problems of corruption. In 1994, when support from Danida and the African Housing Fund was ending, it emerged that two committee members had forged cheques and stolen project funds. As a result, the group suffered severe financial losses from which it was only beginning to recover in mid-2006. The group is planning to complete the programme of house building from the savings of members, but the future of the building materials business is uncertain.
4.10. Danida’s ‘hands-off’ support to the project, through the African Housing Fund, meant that the problems of corruption were not picked up when Danida support to the Masese Women’s Self-Help Group was still current. Unusually therefore for Danida no action was taken to recover the stolen funds. Women still involved with the Women’s Self-Help Group in 2006 felt that Danida and the African Housing Fund had been remiss in not exerting greater control over proje ct funds. They also felt that had there been a formal hand-over of the project (as happened with other donors) the theft might have been picked up sooner and “we would not have fallen into this big hole. It was a big blow to the process”.3
3 Here and throughout the rest of the paper, statements in inverted commas are direct quotes from interviews conducted during fieldwork in Uganda (May 29–June 16, 2006). date: November 2006 TP8 Page 5
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Ministry of Women in Development 4.11. Danida supported the technical wing of the Ministry of Women in Development (and its successors) for 10 years from the beginning of 1991 until the end of 2000. Total funds allocated were DKK 32.8 million. Danida provided the Ministry with two long-term Technical Advisers between 1991 and 1997.4 The programme was in two phases of five years each. The first phase was designated a Women in Development Programme (WID/DAN) and the second a Gender and Development Programme (GAD/DAN).
4.12. The main objectives of the first phase were to strengthen the Directorate for Women in Development, to promote women’s legal and political rights, and to strengthen women’s economic situation. Strengthening the Directorate was an important objective in the context of a new ministry where the staff had little previous experience of working on women’s issues. The first phase of the programme included a mix of interventions. Some of these were conventional WID projects. Others addressed issues of women’s rights and access to justice through legal research and a pilot paralegal training project. In addition, because the Ministry lacked staff to implement major programmes, the Directorate adopted a gender mainstreaming approach from the start, working with the central le vel of sector ministries. The main outcomes defined for the second phase of the GAD/DAN programme 5 were to see improved capacity in legal, political and administrative systems to practice gender-sensitive policy-making, planning and implementation.
4.13. Danida’s support to the Ministry during the Constitution-making process during the early 1990s was critical to ensuring that women were able to make effective inputs into this process.6 The Ministry collaborated with a number of Ugandan NGOs to carry out a civic education programme for women and to ensure that women participated in the seminars and debates which were organised by the Constitutional Commission. To support the education programme, Danida funded a survey to determine the appropriate content and methodology to employ for working with women. The Ministry then developed a simple training manual and pamphlets in local languages. Training was also given to the media to ensure that women's concerns featured in the newspapers, and on the radio and television. The issues and concerns raised by women in the civic education programme formed the basis of a memorandum submitted by the Ministry to the Commission. The Ministry’s engagement was key to the ‘gendering’ of the 1995 Constitution.
4.14. Having a gender-sensitive Constitution gave a push to the development of the National Gender Policy (MGLSD, 1997). Developing the National Gender Policy was an early and important initiative during Phase II of Danida’s support. The Policy provided a framework for policy making, planning and implementation at all administrative levels and across a range of government and non-governmental stakeholders.7 Consultation with government, private sector and NGO stakeholders translated the policy into a National Action Plan for Women (MGLSD, 1999) , formulated as a follow up to the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995. In practice, it has proved difficult to operationalise the Action Plan and to some extent both the Policy and the Plan have existed on paper only. Even so having a National Gender Policy has been an important benchmark: “It doesn’t always bite, but it’s there and people refer to it.”
4 One Technical Adviser was in post from 1991 to 1995 and the other from 1991 to 1997. 5 The WID/DAN programme was renamed the GAD/DAN programme during Phase II, reflecting the change in focus of the Ministry and of Danida support. 6 Support to the Ministry complemented other support that Danida provided to the Constitution-making process, which is described in Thematic Paper 7. 7 The objective of the National Action Plan was to achieve equal opportunities for women through four focus areas: poverty, income generation and economic empowerment; legal framework and decision making; reproductive health; and the girl child and education.
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4.15. It was particularly difficult to translate the Action Plan into concrete programmes at local government levels and, in the context of decentralisation, the GAD/DAN programme began to give greater attention to Local Councils. This was an ambitious and difficult undertaking for a resource-constrained programme working within a centralised Ministry. A review of experience of work in gender in Uganda noted that GAD/DAN staff were often not available when Local Councils were developing their 5-year plans or during implementation. From their side, Local Councils faced severe constraints in trying to undertake gender initiatives since gender was located in the community services department, which was one of the most poorly funded departments at this level (School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, 2000). A gender audit carried out in 2001 found that District planning, budgeting and resource allocation were still insufficiently gender sensitive, both because of constraints faced by Local Councils and because the Ministry lacked the skills and resources needed to support work at local levels (UNCDF, 2002).
4.16. When the Ministry was established in 1988, its mandate was conceived in fairly conventional terms. However, even in the first years, this mandate was translated into strategies that went beyond standard WID approaches into reform to laws, policie s and institutional frameworks, and mainstreaming by other ministries. Danida also funded and helped to develop a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) that acted as a point of contact for a caucus of women MPs, an approach to supporting women parliamentarians that was so successful it was later adopted by the Association of Women Parliamentarians. In the early days of the programme, gender mainstreaming was not well understood by other government agencies, but over time requests from other Ministries for support with mainstreaming increased and Ministry staff began to be consulted as a matter of course when new policies were being developed, for example over the introduction of Universal Primary Education in 1997. The Ministry was also able to influence officia l data collection exercises to include sex-disaggregated data.
4.17. The two Danida Technical Advisers undertook a major programme of capacity building with Ministry staff. In 1988, the Ministry was completely new, its staff were inexperienced, and its mandate was a particularly challenging one. Staff acknowledged their inexperience: “In terms of policy development, nobody had a clear idea of where things should go.” The approach adopted to capacity building involved a lot of ‘learning by doing’ as well as in-house and external training programmes. Capacity building focused not just on building staff expertise in gender but also on instilling a professional work culture, and on developing management skills, negotiating skills, and the ability to work effectively in teams. These new capacities strengthened the Ministry organisationally and were also important resources for staff in assisting other ministries to mainstream gender.
4.18. Support to the Ministry of Women/Directorate of Gender was Danida’s most visible contribution to work in gender. Several evaluation interviews emphasised the fact that during the 1990s gender was seen as ‘belonging’ to Danida. In part this visibility was due to the high level of resources that Danida committed to the Ministry and in part to the effectiveness of the Danida Technical Advisers. The level and character of Danida’s support enables it to share much of the credit for the Ministry’s achievements.
Gender mainstreaming in sector programmes 4.19. As noted above, gender mainstreaming was an early concern in the Danida programme through its support to the Ministry/Directorate of Gender. After 1996, Danida’s strategy was to work more directly to incorporate gender as a cross-cutting issue within its support to sector programmes. This is discussed below in the context of the water, agriculture and roads sector programmes. date: November 2006 TP8 Page 7
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Rural Water Supply and Sanitation 4.20. The Ministry of Women/Gender was involved in the first phase of the National Sub- Sector Strategy for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RUWASA) from 1990. At this stage, the aim of the programme was mainly to get women involved in the physical work of implementation, and the role of Ministry staff seconded to the programme was to ensure that this happened. Lessons learned in phase I informe d practice in the second phase, which took a much more explicitly ‘engendered’ approach.
4.21. During this second phase, gender training was given as standard to a wide range of district stakeholders. Efforts were made to bring women into the programme as decision-makers (not just as consumers or labourers) through holding meetings at times that fitted in with women’s other commitments and by introducing a minimum quota of women on decision-making committees. There was also a policy of affirmative action in recruiting women for hand-pump mechanics. These approaches were successful in increasing women’s participation and representation on committees. However, women were still rarely elected to executive positions on committees, which suggested that more time and effort was needed to translate the formalities of a quota system into meaningful participation by women in decision-making.
4.22. In terms of gender integration, the outcomes of Phase II were a significant improvement over the experience of Phase I. However, this was the result of changes in practice by programme implementers and not because gender had been built into programme design. This meant that the personal commitment of programme implementers was essential to ensuring that gender was addressed adequately throughout the programme. As an approach to gender mainstreaming, this was clearly unsystematic and unsustainable.
4.23. RUWASA also contained a component for women’s groups to produce slabs and platforms for latrines. As with the Masese Self-Help Women’s Gr oup, anecdotal evidence about this component suggests that these businesses found it difficult to operate in a competitive market and did not always survive once project support had ended.
The Agriculture Sector Programme Support 4.24. The Danida-supported Agr icultural Sector Programme Support (ASPS) was developed towards the end of 1998. Lessons learned from the water sector were incorporated into the ASPS, particularly the need to address gender in the design phase of the programme .
4.25. The objectives of the ASPS were to reduce poverty, improve household food security and give special attention to women in agriculture.8 Danida felt that the original programme design did not give sufficient attention to poverty reduction and gender, and a cross-cutting Poverty and Gender Strategy was added during the design phase. To support the strategy, a long-term research programme was set up alongside the ASPS to collect baseline data in the districts where ASPS operates to assess the effect of interventions on poverty and gender.9 The ASPS also employed a Gender and Poverty Adviser to support the mainstreaming of gender issues within the programme.
4.26. By 2002-03 some tangible outputs had been achieved. Poverty and gender strategies had been developed for some individual components; a gender mainstreaming training package and a gender analysis and planning manual were in place; gender sensitisation and mainstreaming
8 The ASPS comprised seven components including livestock research, household food security, farmers’ associations, agricultural education, District Agricultural Training and Information Centres, support to MAAIF, and rural financial services. 9 These are discussed in Thematic Paper 11.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 8: Gender workshops were being conducted at different administrative levels; and policies of affirmative action to encourage female representation in projects and on decision-making committees were being implemented. An assessment commissioned by Danida in 2002 noted that there was a positive attitude and good will towards gender mainstreaming at the highest level of the programme , which was backed up by the necessary technical and financial resources. Workshops and training had raised awareness of gender in participants.
4.27. The assessment also found that the training provided to date had been too limited and short term to enable participants to really internalise the importance of addressing gender in programme components. For many, gender was still seen as a donor-imposed conditionality. Most ASPS implementers were unaware of the programme’s Poverty and Gender Strategy and gender had therefore not informed their planning. For example, project planning and design did not sufficiently take into account the time and other constraints that were likely to hamper women’s involvement. While the ASPS had succeeded in increasing the numbers of women participating in the programme, therefore, their numbers were still fewer than the numbers of men who were involved.
4.28. While noting that the Gender and Poverty Adviser had been very effective, the evaluation also remarked that this had sometimes had the unintended consequence of slowing down the pace of gender mainstreaming because implementers waited for guidance from the Adviser rather than taking initiatives themselves (Kharono and Tanzarn, 2003).
The Road Sector Programme Support 4.29. The first phase of the Danida Road Sector Programme Support (RSPS1) ran from 1999– 2002 and the second phase from 2003–2007. Experience of addressing gender in the first phase of the programme demonstrated the pote ntial for mainstreaming gender issues across road sector activities. Before 2000, road sector policies and strategies had given little attention to gender, despite well-founded evidence that women bear the main travel and transport burden in rural areas. In 2000, the Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications (MOWHC) established the Environmental Liaison Unit (ELU) with responsibilities inter alia for mainstreaming gender into road sector policies and strategies.
4.30. Gender mainstreaming involves building capacity to address gender issues at all administrative levels, reflecting the different transport needs of women and men in local development plans, and ensuring that women have equitable access to employment on road works. The national curriculum for labour-based works has a gender focus and Districts have gender guidelines for planning and implementation of district roads. These include the need for Districts to provide gender-training for road sector staff and contractors, and the importance of labour-based methods in providing employment opportunities for women. Concerns expressed at the start of the second phase of the Road Sector Programme Support (RSPS) included the need to have more robust mechanisms in place for ensuring that women have equitable access to labour- based works.
4.31. Evidence from Phase I of the programme indicated that women had significantly benefited from employment in terms of approximately 2.8 million work days. This had increased their incomes during the duration of the programme, and the poorest households had received a fair share of employment and income. When Phase II was discussed at the Danida Board, concern was expressed by some Board members that participation by women in the RSPS should not merely increase their work-load but should give them a meaningful stake in the programme.10
10 Translation of Board Meeting minutes, 13th November 2002. date: November 2006 TP8 Page 9
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5. Assessment
Masese Women’s Self-Help Group 5.1. The Masese Women’s Self-Help Group was a WID project that was very typical of its time. Given the changes that have taken place in thinking about gender since then, it is not surprising that Danida did not maintain this approach to addressing gender inequalities. While it was still being funded, the project was successful in providing income and improving services for a large number of poor families living in a very deprived part of Uganda. The project also enabled women to acquire and to practise new technical and business skills. The limitations of the project were also typical in giving a lack of attention to business development and marketing in the context of the wider economic and political environment in which the business was expected to operate. This limitation is common in skills training and income-generation projects for other social groups, and is not limited only to women’s projects.
5.2. In some respects, the project appears to be moribund. However, the people involved are continuing to save funds to pay off debts incurred by others so that they can resume house- building when the debt is cleared. This demonstrates remarkable faithfulness to the original objective of the project, and suggests that Danida’s decision to support a housing project with this particular group of people at this time was a good one. It is not possible to reach a judgement on how far the people’s steadfastness is a reflection of their character, is related to the design and appropriateness of the project, or is in some way connected to the type of support provided by Danida and the African Housing fund.
Ministry of Women in Development 5.3. Danida’s programme in Uganda is considered to have been at the forefront of addressing gender as a cross-cutting issue. Danida’s support to the Ministry of Women/Directorate of Gender has been its most visible intervention in gender. Within the Ministry/Directorate, Danida’s influence has been most evident in policy innovation and in getting issues of women in development and gender onto the policy agenda. For example, both the Directorate of Gender and external observers consider that Danida’s support to the Ministry was determinant in Uganda developing a National Gender Policy. Danida was also described as having been influential in promoting the idea of women parliamentarians forming a caucus to advance women’s interests. Danida’s work with the gender machinery – and in mainstreaming more broadly – is also seen as having influenced other donors to take up gender questions more systematically.
5.4. International experience has shown that the creation of Ministries or other state agencies for women’s affairs (characteristic of state interventions in the 1970s and 1980s) has been a relatively ineffective way of addressing structural inequalities in gender. To be really effective, they require high levels of funding and professional expertise, and particularly in developing countries these are in short supply. They need to be backed by political support at the highest levels of the administration. This is often available at the beginning but tends to diminish over time in the face of other more pressing demands for government attention and resources.
5.5. In common with experience elsewhere, the Ugandan Ministry/Directorate began to face problems of diminishing resources and declining political support within a few years of being established. The Ministry was also re-structured three times during the 1990s. In 1991, the Ministry lost its autonomy and became a Directorate within a new ministry that also included youth and culture; three years later it became part of the Ministry of Gender and Community
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Development. Further restructuring in 1999 created the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development in which the Directorate of Gender was down-graded, the numbers of its professional staff were reduced by two-thirds and the Department of Legal Affairs was abolished. The Ministry has also lacked funds to carry out gender programmes: the pledges that the government made at the World Conference on Women in 1995 were not matched by budgetary allocations that would enable these pledges to be operationalised except through donor funding.
5.6. Several commentators take the view that Danida’s support to the Ministry ended too early, and was more influenced by a change in global Danida policy towards mainstreaming, rather than reflecting the real needs on the ground in Uganda. Typical comments made to the evaluation include: “Danida set up systems but wound up too quickly before the women’s ministry was well-established. We are still grappling with how to address gender properly” and “Danida left us when we were still learning to walk.” These criticisms may have some validity – particularly in relation to whether Danida had a properly phased exit strategy from its support to the Ministry – but they suggest an over-dependence by the Ministry on Danida that reflects the lack of commitment from government. Even if Danida support had continued for a much longer period, it is unlikely that it could have compensated for the fact that government support has clearly not been sustained.
Sector mainstreaming 5.7. Gender mainstreaming in sector programmes has been a constant thread in Danida support during the evaluation period. Although not specifically referenced in the 1996 Country Strategy, it was being implemented in practice both in the work of the Directorate of Gender and in the RUWASA programme. Danida was described as having pushed mainstreaming hard and to have been very demanding in expecting gender-relevant information to be included in plans and progress reports. This is reported to have been successful, both in terms of how gender was reflected in programme documentation and, more substantively, in the way that gender issues are operationalised in sector programmes at district level. Sector-specific achievements include the development of a gender strategy for the water sector, and guidelines for the road sector especially the district and community roads. A gender focus was built into the programme design and programme objectives for the ASPS. Evidently, challenges in all these areas remain.
5.8. Danida’s experience in Uganda corresponds to international experience of gender mainstreaming, which is that developing policies and programmes that seriously tackle gender inequalities requires focused effort and a long-term time perspective. It is necessary to build gender into programme design from the start and stakeholders need to be helped to see that this is important not only because it beings benefits to women but also because its makes it more likely that broader social and economic outcomes will be achieved.
5.9. It is also important to recognise the limitations of programme-specific or sector-specific strategies. Attitudes and practices in the relations between men and women are rooted in cultural understandings that are themselves deeply embedded in social and economic structures. Change is therefore dependent not only on how gender is addressed within individual programmes and sectors but also on changes in the macro-economy and in the social and political developments associated with these macro-economic changes.
5.10. In this regard, it was an important development that dur ing the PEAP revision process government established a Gender Team within the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) to take the lead in incorporating gender into the 2004 PEAP. Among the priority actions identified for the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) process are to support the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) to revise and date: November 2006 TP8 Page 11
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 8: Gender operationalise the National Gender Policy, to support the MFPED in implementing gender budgeting and to assist the enactment of the Domestic Relations Bill and the Sexual Relations Bill, both of which have been pending for many years. Donor support to these priorities will be operationalised through the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS), which Danida is now joining. As a member of UJAS, it will be important for Danida to capitalise on its comparative advantage, acquired through early and sustained support to gender, to push for these commitments to be honoured.
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MGLSD (1997). Uganda National Gender Policy. Kampala: The Republic of Uganda.
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MGLSD (2001). Women in Development/Danida Phase I & Gender and Development/Danida Phase II Programme Completion Report. (October 2001). Kampala: The Republic of Uganda.
MGLSD (2002). Social Protection in Uganda. Study to inform development of a framework for social protection in the context of the poverty eradication action plan. Vulnerability assessment and review of initiatives. Social protection task force.
MGLSD (2003a). Significant achievements by and for women of Uganda (1986–2003).
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MGLSD (2004a). Implementation of the Beijing Week of Action and Special Session on Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twentieth Century. Summary report prepared for the UN advancement on Women. Government of Uganda
MGLSD (2004b). National Action Plan for the National Gender Policy. Government of Uganda
MGLSD (2004c). Uganda National Gender Policy. Government of Uganda
MGLSD and MFPED (2003). Engendering Uganda's Poverty Eradication Initiatives: A Desk Review on Gender and Poverty . Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development and Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. (May 2003). Kampala: Government of Uganda.
Mugume, A. (2005). Socio -Economic and Policy Context Study – 2005.
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Annex 1: Summary status of Danida interventions in Women in Development/ Gender and Development Danida file ref. no. 104.UGANDA.32 and project name Gender and Development Programme Description and Phase one of this programme was based on the women in development approach. period, geographical Phase two considered a gender perspective, and aimed at addressing the unequal coverage, components relationship between men and women, in social, economic and political spheres. Its main concern was to mainstream gender in national and district political, administrative and legal structures – and to increase the dissemination of information to the general public. Period: April 1996 to April 2000 Geographical coverage: National Objectives The programme’s objectives were: - Improved capacity within the legal system to take gender issues into consideration - Improved capacity within the political and administrative structures to practice gender sensitive policy making, planning and implementation at national and district levels - Increased dissemination of information to the general public and to particular stakeholders about gender issues and the ministry’s experience of programme activities Danida funding DKK 17.4 million Implementing agency Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development Other agencies Government of Uganda contribution : DKK 2.8 million involved Lessons learnt Although the programme worked effectively and was relevant at that time, women’s rights and gender concerns were not yet a priority for the Government of Uganda. Frameworks developed and support to gender policy enabled the Govt of Uganda to make women’s rights and gender key priorities although budget allocations are still low in this area.
Danida file ref. no. 104. Uganda.29 and project name Masese Women’s Association Description and The project followed a new approach on how to mobilise the talents, determination period, geographical and skills of the beneficiaries being the poorest of the poor. The project allowed coverage, components people in the slum area to afford better housing, water and sanitation and employment opportunities were created through the Masese women’s own business within construction of building materials. The women group produced and sold all necessary building materials to the housing scheme as well as to the open market. Period: 1989–1994 Geographical coverage: Masese – Jinja district. Objectives The development objective of the project is to improve the living conditions for the members of Masese women self help group and their families. The immediate objectives of the project were: - To improve infrastructure and social services in Masese. - To establish and manage a revolving loan fund to provide credit for small scale business among unemployed women in Masese. - To create employment and assist running a construction programme by contracting the Masese women’s construction factory to build class rooms at five schools. - To assist building up a suitable professional management structure for the commercial running of the Masese construction factory. Danida funding DKK 1.73 million Implementing agency Masese Women’s Association Other agencies African Housing Fund in collaboration with the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban involved Development. Lessons learnt Economic empowerment of women can be possible where decision making and control of property is accessible to women. The skills component for construction as well as access to credit can help in ensuring such benefits.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 9 –
Private Sector Development
Lawrence Bategeka
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
Contents
1. Introduction...... 1
2. The Context for Business Development ...... 1 Danish Concerns...... 1 Trade between Denmark and Uganda ...... 2 Ugandan Economic Policy towards the Private Sector ...... 2
3. The Private Sector Development Programme ...... 3 Background and description...... 3 Disbursements ...... 5 Direct outputs of the PSD programme ...... 6 Environmental consideration of the PSD programme...... 6 Assessment...... 6
Bibliography ...... 8
Annexes Annex A: Background Data...... 10 Annex B: PSD Long-Term Projects 1996-2006...... 16
Boxes Box 1: Involving Danish Business and Industry...... 1 Box 2: Uganda Activities of the Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries ...... 4 Box 3: External Evaluation Findings on the PSD Programmes (2001) ...... 7
Tables Table 1: Approvals and disbursements under the PSD Programme (DKK’000) ...... 6 Table A1a: Uganda’s external trade (in USD millions) ...... 10 Table A1b: Trade between Uganda and Denmark (in DKK millions) ...... 11 Table A1c: Breakdown of Denmark’s exports to Uganda (in DKK millions) ...... 12 Table A1d: Breakdown of Denmark’s imports from Uganda (in DKK millions) ...... 13 Table A2: Ugandans living in Denmark ...... 14
Figures Figure A1: Trade between Uganda and Denmark...... 11 Figure A2: Ugandans living in Denmark ...... 15
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
Acronyms and abbreviations
B2B Business to Business DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo EIA Environmental Impact Assessment ICT Information, Communication and Technology IFU [Danish] Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries IMF International Monetary Fund NEMA National Environment Management Authority NGO Non-Governmental Organisation PSD Private Sector Development PSF Private Sector Foundation UIA Uganda Investment Authority UMA Uganda Manufacturers' Association
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
1. Introduction
1.1 This Thematic Paper reviews Danida's support to business development during the evaluation period. Two themes converge: (a) the concern for the "productive pillar" of development, which was always one of the three main strands of Denmark's strategy in Uganda, and (b) the desire to engage the Danish "resource base" in the Danish aid programme. Section 2 reviews the general context for Danish support to private sector development, then Section 3 focuses on the Private Sector Development (PSD) programme which has been the centrepiece of Danida's business development effort since 1996.
2. The Context for Business Development
Danish Concerns 2.1 From the beginning, Danish strategy for Uganda stressed the importance of the productive pillar of development. This was reflected in the orientation of financial support and in the emphasis given to roads and other infrastructure. The modes of Danish support have been influenced by the attitude to the "Danish resource base" and the desire to give Danish business a stake in the development programme. The tying of aid became less explicit early on in the evaluation period, and subsequently dwindled even further (see Background Paper 4). Nevertheless it was a significant influence on the choice of interventions in agriculture (grain mills, dairy) and for financial support. The perceived importance of supporting Danish business through the aid programme was reflected in the 1996 strategy statement (see Box 1).
Box 1: Involving Danish Business and Industry The 1996 Strategy for Danish Bilateral Development Cooperation with Uganda (MFA Danida, 1996) included the following rationale: 6.5 The involvement of Danish business and industry Danish business and industry became heavily involved in the development assistance programme following the resumption of Danish bilateral cooperation with Uganda in 1987. Efforts included the construction of a large silo complex and a fodder mill. Among subsequent projects undertaken with participation of Danish industry was the construction of a harbour complex at Port Bell near Kampala. In recent years Danish companies have been engaged in the development of the dairy sector and on various infrastructural projects including, for example, the support to the national railway company. Import support has resulted in a considerable rise in Danish imports. Danish consultancy firms have been involved in the preparatory phases and in the implementation of various projects, including the major water supply project. Prospects for Danish industry will become more favourable with the implementation of major infrastructural projects including the modernisation of Entebbe Airport and the erection of high-voltage electricity supply line. Training and the conveyance of know-how and skills from Danish firms to local organisations and institutions will be an important element of these projects.
2.2 However, as discussed below, trade between Uganda and Denmark is of very minor importance to either country and the fact that Denmark does not have special interests in Uganda is cited as a positive factor in its aid and diplomatic relationships with Uganda; for example, ¶3.15 of the Perception Study in Volume 2 quotes a Danida informant: It was challenging for a small country that was considered non-political to be a big donor in Uganda. However this did give us many opportunities. Danida was considered to have no hidden agendas, and as such had a very good dialogue with the Ugandan government … we had very good access to the highest levels of the Ugandan government. date: November 2006 TP9 Page 1
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
Trade between Denmark and Uganda 2.3 Turning to trade between Uganda and Denmark, Uganda is not a major trading partner with Denmark, as can be seen from Annex Table 1c and Annex Table 1d. Denmark’s exports to Uganda were on average only 0.013% of Denmark’s exports to all countries. Similarly, Denmark’s imports from Uganda were on average only 0.0088% of Denmark’s imports from all countries. Uganda is thus an insignificant trading partner with Denmark.
2.4 In value terms, Denmark’s exports to Uganda recorded an upward trend from DKK 33.6 million in 1994 to DKK 62 million in 1997 before beginning to decline. Machinery and equipment and transport equipment comprised well over 90% of Denmark’s exports to Uganda throughout the period under review. Denmark’s imports from Uganda recorded an upward trend from DKK 11 million in 1991 to DKK 43.2 million in 1999 before declining almost every subsequent year to DKK 19.5 million in 2005. Well over 90% of Denmark’s imports from Uganda were raw materials and semi-manufacturers plus food, beverages, and tobacco (see Annex Table 1d).
2.5 There is a small but significant number of Ugandans living in Denmark (see Table A2 and Figure A2 in Appendix A). It seems likely that personal links have been more significant than trading interests in influencing Denmark's engagement in Uganda. For example, Ugandan exiles in Denmark were among those keen to see a rapid growth in assistance once the Museveni regime was established.
Ugandan Economic Policy towards the Private Sector 2.6 Following the near collapse of Uganda’s economy in 1986, Uganda prepared an economic recovery programme whose economic vision was of a mixed economy in which the state and the private sector would complement each other in the economic growth process. Prior to the reforms that started around 1990, Uganda’s economy was characterised by high inflation, disequilibrium of markets, and consequently low economic growth. The state controlled markets and ran public enterprises virtually for everything, thus rendering the role of the private sector minimal. The economic reforms Uganda implemented from 1990 to 2005 were intended to stabilise the economy, correct the imbalances in markets, and support private sector investment with a view to ma ximising economic growth. Uganda’s development partners shared the country’s development vision and stood ready to assist Uganda in pursuing the development vision. Broadly, liberalisation and privatisation were the key policies that defined the operational environment in all sectors.
2.7 Government reworked the legal framework to provide for private sector-led economic growth. Security of private property became strengthened through appropriate legal provisions. Government took a firm decision to return private property that the state had confiscated from Ugandans of Asian origin in 1972, thereby increasing confidence of foreign investors in Uganda as an investment destination. This move, among others, encouraged Uganda’s development partners to work closely with Government to attract investors from their countries to Uganda. Uganda revised its constitution in 1995 and made adequate constitutional provisions for security of private property, thereby laying a firm foundation for private investment in Uganda, both local and foreign. From 1990, Government embarked on a process of privatisation of state-owned enterprises to create room for private sector participation in business. As at end of April 2006, 128 public enterprises had been fully privatised, and 24 were at various stages of privatisation.
2.8 Uganda witnessed an increasing role of the private sector in business and investment from 1990 to 2005. Both local and foreign direct investment grew, mainly on account of the supportive
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development policies and measures that Government put in place. (See also Background Paper 1 in Volume 3 of this report.)
3. The Private Sector Development Programme
Background and description 3.1 The Private Sector Development (PSD) Programme was the main explicit intervention to promote business de velopment. A programme piloted in India, Ghana and Zimbabwe was extended to Uganda from late1996. 1 This involves financing links for investment and technology transfer between Ugandan and Danish private companies. Its focus is exclusively on promoting partnerships between enterprises from the two countries; it does not provide investment capital. A separate Danish agency, the Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) does provide equity and loans to support Danish-developing country collaborations, and has had some operations in Uganda – see Box 2.
3.2 The PSD programme is funded directly from Copenhagen, outside of the country budget frame. A Private Sector Secretariat in the Embassy manages the programme.
3.3 The programme finances study visits and feasibility studies, which have led to about 40 long-term business cooperation agreements between Danish and Ugandan enterprises, in a range of sectors including agriculture, agro-processing, manufacture, and ICT (see Annex B for summary details). There have been some notable successes; Thematic Paper 1 on agriculture notes that the successful emergence of private-sector dairies has been greatly facilitated by Danida’s support to private business development.2
3.4 During the first phase (before it was introduced in Uganda), the PSD programme had a component called “enabling environment”, which was dropped under the second phase mainly because the programme countries had already implemented policies to make the investment climate in their countries supportive to private investment.
1 Although it first appears separately in the consolidated expenditure records in 1999. The PSD Secretariat's records show disbursements of DKK 1.1m in 1997 and DKK 5.9m in 1998. 2 For example, Danish expertise was brought in by Jesa Farm Dairy. Farm production of 7,000 l/day is supplemented by 3000 l/day from outlying contract farmers. The operation has succeeded because it addressed the issue of dairy management.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
Box 2: Uganda Activities of the Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries The Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries (IFU) is another vehicle for supporting private enterprises in developing countries in collaboration with Danish businesses. Unlike the PSD programme, its support includes the provision of capital and loans. It had made a small number of investments in Uganda by 2001, detailed below. An evaluation of IFU's activities, undertaken by NCG for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was published in April 2004. Uganda was one of the countries used as a case study. Because of business confidentiality, the details that can be gleaned about the projects in Uganda are limited, but the following excerpts from the evaluation indicate the flavour of its findings: By collecting key information from IFU’s staff and management combined with interviews with Danish partners and field visits to projects in five selected African countries, the study team was to evaluate IFU as an instrument to “promote business sector development in developing countries in collaboration with the Danish business community” related to the following five criteria: Relevance, impact, sustainability, efficiency and effectiveness. Three main countries were selected (South Africa, Ghana and Uganda) with the target of visiting all projects in the portfolio. Much as most African economies have accepted the fact that the private sector will be the engine of growth in the future, few countries can offer investors returns on investment competitive with those in other emerging markets and attractive enough to increase the steadily decreasing foreign direct investments (FDI) to the African continent. The three main countries visited – South Africa, Ghana and Uganda – are all pursuing private sector friendly policies, still with a long way to go. Of the three, South Africa is the only one with a large domestic market and growing purchasing power among the middle class. Five sectors dominate IFU’s portfolio in Africa: Cement, hotels and restaurants, breweries, dairy and transport related activities. A common feature is that 10-12 internationally experienced Danish partners account for more than 50% of IFU’s total investments on the continent. As the case is for other regions, 100% of these Danish partners confirm that the projects would have been undertaken without IFU. All the enterprises visited unanimously confirmed that access to risk capital through risk sharing was the main purpose of involving IFU. Some enterprises emphasised IFU’s facilitation (structuring and quality assurance), know how (often through advisors and facilitators) and its semi-official image. Thus, IFU’s involvement is relevant both as a risk capital provider and in combination with other instruments. As an overall observation, the Evaluation found that approximately 75% of the projects would have been undertaken irrespective of IFU’s participation. All larger enterprises would have gone ahead, while more than half of the Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) shared this view. Source: Evaluation of The Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries, NCG, April 2004
Source: ibid. Annex VIII. file: DUE-TP9-PrivateSectorDevelopment(final).doc TP9 Page 4
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
3.5 The PSD programme implementation in Uganda started towards the end of 1996. The first phase of the programme in Uganda ran from 1996 to 2001 and a second phase ran from 2001 to 2006. The PSD programme in Uganda is entering a third phase starting in July 2006, maintaining the key elements of the programme but with some modifications that will strengthen business-to-business linkages and address broader development concerns, under the new title of Business to Business Programme (B2B).
3.6 The PSD programme had the following elements and objectives that were either explicitly or implicitly stated (NCG, 2004): · To contribute to Uganda’s economic development in the form of extensive strengthening of Uganda’s private sector. · To provide support to long-term, commercial cooperation between Danish and Ugandan companies. · To contribute to Uganda’s objective of poverty reduction. · To promote investment by Danish companies in Uganda. · To transfer technologies from Denmark to Uganda. · To transfer business skills from Denmark to Uganda. · To promote trade between Uganda and Denmark.
3.7 The PSD programme has an in-built component that addresses environmental health issues: every project that receives assistance under the programme is required to put in place measures for ensuring environmental health, with the programme giving additional support for that.
3.8 The PSD programme was structured such that two firms – one from Denmark and another from Uganda – would collaborate for business purposes. Under the programme, collaborating firms would be supported basically in three phases: a preparatory phase, a start-up phase, and an implementation phase. The preparatory phase includes carrying out a feasibility study, and identification of a prospective Danish business partner for an already identified Uganda business firm. Danida supports the first phase to the tune of DKK 250,000. The start-up phase includes exploration of collaborative arrangements, exchange visits by partners, and dialogue between partners. Danida supports the second phase to the tune of DKK 500,000. The implementation phase includes procurement of equipment and machinery where necessary, technology transfer, training, and management arrangements where necessary. Danida supports the third phase to the tune of DKK 5 million of which DKK 2 million supports environmental aspects of the firm’s investment.
3.9 Ugandan businesses are identified through contacts or recommendations by previous beneficiaries or the Uganda Manufacturers' Association (UMA). UMA has also been a beneficiary, through twinning with the Confederation of Danish Industries.
Disbursements 3.10 From the time the programme started about DKK 100 million, equivalent to about USD 17 million, has been disbursed. Of this, DKK 2.6 million financed study visits from Denmark to Uganda; DKK 1.36 million financed study visits from Uganda to Denmark; DKK 12.37 million financed business studies (feasibility studies and special studies); DKK 23.6 million financed business start-ups; and DKK 54.4 million financed long-term cooperation arrangements.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
Table 1: Approvals and disbursements under the PSD Programme (DKK’000) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total Approved 3,037 17,625 19,514 18,393 21,183 6,660 12,788 25,544 26,023 7,203 158,173 Disbursed 1,151 5,945 12,348 15,788 15,192 10,980 9,840 11,538 11,750 4,712 99,337 Source: Private Sector Secretariat, RDE Kampala.
Direct outputs of the PSD programme 3.11 From the time the programme started towards the end of 1996 there have been 153 study visits from Denmark to Uganda, 79 study visits from Uganda to Denmark, and 72 business studies of which 53 were feasibility studies. Some of the exchange visits and feasibility studies translated into business collaborative arrangements. As of 2006 there were 40 long-term cooperation projects (lasting 2–5 years with PSD programme support) and 64 business start-up projects.
3.12 Study visits to Uganda by Danish business firms are more than the study visits of Ugandan business firms to Denmark because of the difficulty of persuading Danish firms to come and invest in Uganda. To them, the risks are high. On the other hand, Ugandan businesses are more attracted to the twinning arrangement and do not require so many study visits to be convinced.
3.13 There were no preferred areas of support. Support depended on firms that reached agreement to do business in Uganda collaboratively with Danish businesses.
3.14 Annex B includes 41 projects that have been funded to the level of long-term cooperation Clearly, the businesses that received support under the PSD programme are diverse in nature. The diversity of the projects notwithstanding, 17 of the 38 long-term cooperation projects were in agriculture-related activities such as dairy farming, poultry farming, piggery, ranching, and agro- processing. Services follow in the second position with projects in areas such as communication, ICT, advertising, and training. Manufacturing comes in the third place with projects in areas such as paint manufacturing, textile, galvanising, battery manufacturing, and aluminium manufacturing.
Environmental consideration of the PSD programme 3.15 Each of the long-term cooperation arrangements has an element of ensuring environmental health. This includes treatment and disposal of waste that arises from implementation of the projects, especially those in the area of manufacturing. For example, car battery manufacturing could produce toxic waste, which if not handled with care could lead to environmental degradation. Such projects in the field of manufacturing include an element of addressing adequately the adverse environmental effects that arise from project implementation.
Assessment 3.16 The review of Danish assistance to Uganda since 1987 was not a primary evaluation of the PSD programme, or of the other components of Danish aid. The evaluation team has drawn on document review, discussions with stakeholders, and previous reports and evaluations.
3.17 We have formed the impression that the PSD programme is well managed within the framework that has been established for it. It has supported a number of successful collaborations, and is well thought of by those who have benefited from it. Ugandan beneficiary firms spoke highly of Danida support and reckoned that their businesses would not have grown to
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development the extent they did without the support. Firms that were not able to export their products have been enabled to do so following the intervention. However, it is driven by a somewhat different motivation than the main country programme, and its mandate to focus strictly on business to business collaborations between Uganda and Denmark entails a number of limitations. The business sector in Uganda is small, and previous links with Denmark are limited. This restricts the scale and scope of the programme (most of the beneficiary business are in Kampala and neighbouring districts, for example).
3.18 The PSD programme enjoys a special place in Denmark's overall aid strategy because it is seen as an important factor in maintaining Danish business support for the programme. One of the results of the strategic review after the 2001 Danish elections was: Emphasis on greater involvement of the Danish business sector in development co-operation, including the inclusion of private sector programmes in every programme country and the expansion of Mixed Credit schemes. (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2003)
3.19 The perceived importance of this strand of Danish development cooperation strategy seems to have made Danida rather impervious to the criticisms from external evaluators (such as those summarised in Box 3), who find that such programmes are of limited relevance to the wider issues of private sector development and economic growth in the countries concerned.
Box 3: External Evaluation Findings on the PSD Programmes (2001) Extracts from an evaluation of Danish PSD programmes in a number of countries, including Uganda: The evaluation’s assessments Of the five evaluation criteria, the evaluation focuses to a large extent only on the impact of the PS Programme. In this respect, the development impact of the PS Programme is assessed at three levels: The immediate objective of improved local partner businesses, which is assumed to contribute to the intermediate objective: Private sector development. This in turn is assumed to contribute to the development objective of promoting sustainable and socially balanced economic growth. In terms of the immediate objective, the PS Programme is found to have been reasonably successful. The co- operations established, in general, resulted in relevant technologies being transferred from the Danish to the local partner. Technology transfer is defined to include not only specific technical aspects, but also organisational, marketing and management expertise. This is assessed as having contributed to important improvements for the local businesses, though many local beneficiaries also face other constraints limiting the effects and longer-term sustainability of the technology transfer. From the point of view of the local partner, the PS Programme, however, appears rather successful. In contributing to the overall development of the private sectors of the respective countries, the PS Programme is considered less successful. There are clear, direct positive effects on employment and foreign exchange earnings in a number of the individual local companies, and important instances of improvement in environmental and gender aspects in partner companies. However, this was offset by the thin spread, lack of synergy and lack of demonstration effects of the portfolio, as referred to above. The evaluation assessed the PS Programme’s contribution to growth and social development mainly in terms of its performance in respect of job creation and improved international competitiveness. Lack of priority setting implies, however, that the project portfolios do not consistently reflect these concerns. It is also argued that the segments of the private sectors being supported are not necessarily those which have the highest growth potential, or which would contribute most to socially balanced growth processes. The PS Programme does not, for example, consistently prioritise support to small and medium sized enterprises, which might be expected to generate broad-based growth. In sum, the evaluation assesses that the PS Programme has been reasonably successful with respect to attaining its immediate objective, but that it has been mu ch less successful in contributing to the overall development of the private sectors of the respective countries. Further, the PS Programme is seen as, generally, paying very little attention to the issue of economic growth and social development, seriously affecting its impact at this level. Source: Development Associates, 2001.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
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Booth, D. and Nsabagasani, D. (2005). Poverty Monitoring Systems: An Analysis of Institutional Arrangements in Uganda. London: ODI
Deininger, K. and Okidi, J.A. (2003). Growth and poverty reduction in Uganda, 1999–2000: Panel evidence. (July 2003). London: ODI.
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Lawson, D. et al. (2003). Factors affecting poverty dynamics and persistence in Uganda. David Lawson, Andrew McKay and John Okidi. University of Nottingham, ODI and Economic Policy Research Centre, Kampala.
MFA Danida. (1993). Evaluation of Danish Assistance to Grain Storage and Grain Drying Projects, Volume 1 Synthesis Report. (October 1993). Copenhagen: MFA
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MFA: Danida (2004). Uganda–Denmark Partnership; Strategy for Development Cooperation 2004– 08. MFA: Copenhagen.
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NCG (2004). Meta -Evaluation, Private and Business Sector Development Interventions. (December 2004) MFA: Copenhagen.
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Okidi, J.A. and McKay, A. (2003). Poverty Dynamics in Uganda: 1992 to 2000. Chronic Poverty Research Center.
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
Annexes
Contents
Annex A: Background Data...... 10 Annex B: PSD Long-Term Projects 1996-2006...... 16
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Annex A: Background Data
Table A1a: Uganda’s external trade (in USD millions) Trade Year Imports Exports Balance 1975 -650.5 801.0 150.4 1976 -690.3 779.0 88.8 1977 -860.2 889.6 29.4 1978 -780.3 892.8 112.5 1979 -803.1 1,065.7 262.6 1980 -908.3 1,103.6 195.3 1981 -954.3 710.7 -243.6 1982 -588.7 607.0 18.3 1983 -499.7 439.1 -60.6 1984 -533.0 565.9 32.9 1985 -668.7 632.4 -36.3 1986 -735.1 749.3 14.2 1987 -933.9 826.8 -107.1 1988 -993.4 881.0 -112.4 1989 -1,011.6 808.2 -203.4 1990 -1,205.0 896.8 -308.2 1991 -1,318.7 997.7 -321.0 1992 -1,456.5 986.3 -470.2 1993 -1,728.0 1,063.6 -664.4 1994 -1,579.9 1,237.7 -342.2 1995 -1,687.8 1,431.2 -256.6 1996 -1,950.7 1,570.0 -380.7 1997 -2,143.7 1,489.9 -653.9 1998 -2,991.6 2,090.8 -900.8 1999 -3,279.9 2,005.5 -1,274.4 2000 -2,766.6 1,936.3 -830.3 2001 -2,968.5 1,867.1 -1,101.4 2002 -2,707.0 2,015.2 -691.8 2003 -3,276.1 2,562.4 -713.7 2004 -4,297.3 2,784.6 -1,512.6 Total -46,968.3 36,687.2 -10,281.1
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics-Country Tables.
Definition: Exports f.o.b and Goods: Imports f.o.b are measured on the "free-on- board" basis - that is, by the value of the goods at the border of the exporting economy. For imports, this excludes the cost of freight and insurance incurred beyond the border of the exporting economy. The goods item covers general merchandise, goods for processing, repairs on goods, goods procured in ports by carriers, and non monetary gold.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
Table A1b: Trade between Uganda and Denmark (in DKK millions)
Ugandan as % of Danish as % of Imports total exports total to Danish to Danish (DKKm) Denmark imports Uganda exports 1988 31.7 0.02% 26.8 0.03% 1989 23.9 0.01% 71.4 0.07% 1990 13.8 0.01% 67.2 0.06% 1991 11 0.01% 29 0.02% 1992 10 0.00% 39.7 0.03% 1993 11.8 0.01% 35.5 0.03% 1994 24.9 0.01% 33.6 0.02% 1995 29.8 0.01% 35.2 0.02% 1996 31 0.01% 49.9 0.03% 1997 33.2 0.01% 62 0.04% 1998 39.1 0.01% 35.3 0.02% 1999 43.2 0.01% 47.4 0.03% 2000 36.6 0.01% 68.6 0.03% 2001 24.8 0.01% 33.5 0.02% 2002 27.2 0.01% 29.7 0.01% 2003 21.9 0.01% 37 0.02% 2004 25.6 0.01% 43.8 0.02% 2005 19.6 0.00% 31.2 0.01% Total 459.1 776.8 Source: Denmark Statistics (Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs) http://www.statistikbanken.dk [Accessed August 2006].
Figure A1: Trade between Uganda and Denmark
DKKm
80
70 60
50 Exports to 40 Denmark Imports 30 from Denmark 20 10
0 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year
Source: Denmark Statistics (Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs) http://www.statistikbanken.dk
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Table A1c: Breakdown of Denmark’s exports to Uganda (in DKK millions)
DKKm 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Total Denmark exports to all countries 191,619 215,972 228,128 241,811 251,025 247,750 273,163 288,186 298,562 324,271 326,504 351,916 408,239 424,670 442,754 429,272 452,400 502,534 5,898,774 Total exports to Uganda as % total 0.01399 0.03306 0.02946 0.01199 0.01582 0.01433 0.0123 0.01221 0.01671 0.01912 0.01081 0.01347 0.0168 0.00789 0.00671 0.00862 0.00968 0.00621 0.013169
Total exports to Uganda 26.8 71.4 67.2 29 39.7 35.5 33.6 35.2 49.9 62 35.3 47.4 68.6 33.5 29.7 37 43.8 31.2 776.8
Breakdown of exports to Uganda (from highest value DKKm): 68 Machinery and instruments 8.9 31.5 12.2 5.9 25.7 19.1 9.5 16.8 25.6 26.5 18.1 21.8 48.9 17 13.3 16.2 17.4 13.1 347.5 69 Transport equipment, excl ships of more than 250 GT and aircraft 2.1 5.6 3.3 1 2.8 3.2 5.7 4.6 7.3 19.2 9.7 15.7 8.6 6.8 5.3 4.4 6.6 2.8 114.7 72 Other manufactures goods, n.e.s. 0.8 4.3 35.3 2.5 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.8 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.9 1.2 1 55.6 56 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 1.1 1.2 4.4 1 0.7 1.7 1.7 0.6 1 5.7 1.1 1.6 1.9 3.5 3.1 3.7 4.1 4.2 42.3 57 Other chemical goods 0.4 0.6 1.3 2.5 1.6 3.6 4.5 2 8.6 1.9 1.2 0.6 0.1 1.2 0.3 0.7 0.6 1.5 33.2 67 Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. 1.1 16.1 0.9 2.9 0.3 0.9 3 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.5 0.9 0.7 31.6 70 Furniture 1.7 0.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 1.3 0.3 1.4 0.5 1.2 0.1 1.4 1.8 2.6 1.6 1.6 2.3 0 22 66 Metals 4.1 4 1.5 0 0.2 0.3 0.8 4.3 0 0 0 0.4 0 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 16.9 24 Other agricultural products of vegetable origin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 1.8 0 1.3 4.7 0 0 1.2 4.3 2.7 16.3 54 Animal and vegetables oils and fats 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 2.4 4.5 4 1.7 14 22 Seed, fruit and spores for sowing 0 0 0.1 3.7 0.2 0.8 3.3 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.2 0 0.3 0.3 0.4 1 1.4 13.9 42 Other manufactured products of agricultural origin 0 1.1 0.6 0.9 1.1 0 0 0 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 7.9 48 Beer 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.2 1.4 1.3 0.3 0 0.3 0 0 0 6.8 65 Non-metallic mineral manufactures 0 0 0.4 0 1.6 0.5 1.6 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0.2 0 0 0.1 6.5 31 Canned meat 0.2 1.5 0 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.4 11 Other agricultural products of animals origin 3.7 0.6 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 5.7 71 Articles of artificial plastic materials, n.e.s. 0 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0 0.3 0 5.5 86 Other goods 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.1 1.7 0.7 0 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 4.6 64 Textiles and clothing 0.9 0.3 0 0.3 0.3 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0 0 3.4 21 Cereals 0 0 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.3 61 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0 0.5 3.2 63 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard 0 0 0.2 0.9 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.3 1.7 49 Other beverages (excl. fruit and vegetables juices) 0 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.4 62 Wood and cork manufactures (excl. furniture) 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.2 47 Feeding stuffs (excl. straws, roots, etc.) 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 1 03 Poultry; live, dead or dressed; fresh, chilled or frozen 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 82 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 32 Canned milk 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3
Source: Denmark Statistics (Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs) http://www.statistikbanken.dk
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Table A1d: Breakdown of Denmark’s imports from Uganda (in DKK millions)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Total all imports to Denmark 181,780 203,212 204,896 217,407 214,153 203,029 231,794 256,094 260,977 293,063 309,787 310,586 358,871 367,032 384,710 369,701 400,125 447,284 5,214,499 Total imports from Uganda as % total 0.0174 0.0118 0.0067 0.0051 0.0047 0.0058 0.0107 0.0116 0.0119 0.0113 0.0126 0.0139 0.0102 0.0068 0.0071 0.0059 0.0064 0.0044
Imports, total 31.7 23.9 13.8 11 10 11.8 24.9 29.8 31 33.2 39.1 43.2 36.6 24.8 27.2 21.9 25.6 19.6 459
Breakdown of imports from Uganda (from highest value DKKm): 23 Other raw materials and semi-manufactures 31.7 23.9 13.2 10.9 9 8.1 23.9 29.8 30.4 32.7 38.9 43.1 36.4 24.6 18.6 11.4 11.1 17.6 415.3 47 Food, beverages and tobacco 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.4 0.1 0 0 0 0 8 9.8 14.1 1.4 34.1 02 Feeding stuff for animals 0 0 0 0 0.8 3.6 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.3 54 Goods not elsewhere specified 0 0 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 2.2 14 Textile fibres 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.4 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 49 Clothing 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 11 Oil seeds, oleaginous fruit (excl. flour and meat) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 42 Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 53 Other durable consumer good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.1
Source: Denmark Statistics (Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs) http://www.statistikbanken.dk
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Table A2: Ugandans living in Denmark Men Women Total 1980 76 86 162 1981 76 90 166 1982 85 92 177 1983 88 95 183 1984 89 99 188 1985 97 103 200 1986 103 113 216 1987 108 119 227 1988 117 122 239 1989 124 137 261 1990 138 154 292 1991 145 170 315 1992 163 212 375 1993 207 279 486 1994 245 349 567 1995 283 405 688 1996 307 455 762 1997 353 502 855 1998 367 543 910 1999 375 570 945 2000 384 599 983 2001 404 633 1,037 2002 436 633 1,099 2003 448 706 1,154 2004 473 722 1,195 2005 464 740 1,204 2006 468 758 1,226
Source: Denmark Statistics (Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs) http://www.statistikbanken.dk
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
Figure A2: Ugandans living in Denmark
1,400
1,200
1,000
800 Men Women 600 Total
400
200
0
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Year
Source: Denmark Statistics (Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs) http://www.statistikbanken.dk
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Annex B: PSD Long-Term Projects 1996-2006
Date of Project Ugandan Business Danish Business Project Idea Grant Disbursed Completion date Approval (DKK) amount (DKK) 27.08.1998 Premier Flour Mills ABC Hansen A/S The main objective was to transfer skills to 2,998,025 2,339,004 May, 2002 Ltd Premier Flour Mills and create a joint venture involving establishment of a service provision and consultancy unit to support flourmills and related enterprises in Uganda. 27.08.1998 Sadolin Paints (U) Sadolin Paints Ltd, Improve the working environment and 2,979,569 2,971,067 April, 2003 Ltd DK upgrade paint production to meet the demand. Also skills and knowledge transfer. 21.10.1998 Transemka (U) Ltd Kjaer & Kjaer Extensive staff training in sales and 2,997,744 2,997,455 February, 2002 Worldwide A/S marketing, workshop management and general improvement in workshop facilities, services and implementation. 30.04.1999 Real Press Adventure ApS To develop the local company, through 2,575,022 893,851 August, 2002 Consultants skills transfer, into a full service advertising and marketing agency. 26.05.1999 MTN (U) & Opus Ascom Nordic A/S To provide technical, financial and 3,000,000 2,999,974 July, 2001 (U) Ltd institutional sustainability in public telephone services accessible and affordable by the general public in different towns and districts. 20.07.1999 Ugachick Poultry Emmelev A/S Technical assistance and management 2,708,820 2,691,120 April, 2001 Breeders Ltd training in various areas, plus focus on improved working and external environment
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Date of Project Ugandan Business Danish Business Project Idea Grant Disbursed Completion date Approval (DKK) amount (DKK) 07.12.1999 Jesa Farm Dairy Ltd Scandinavian A management contract whose target is to 2,999,704 2,200,638 December, 2002 Livestock Export increase the milk production of Jesa Farm. ApS Contract also included technical assistance and training of farm employees. 10.07.2000 Mail-Net NetGuide Training of staff in website development 2,990,066 2,990,066 April, 2003 Communications Scandinavia ApS and marketing of services in Uganda and Ltd (Metrocomia (Metrocomia A/S) across the nations. [U] Ltd) 10.10.2000 Uganda Confederation of Strengthening UMA in advocacy etc 2,983,100 2,983,100 December, 2003 Manufacturers’ Danish Industries services with regard to delivery of its Association (UMA) services, as a single voice on behalf of its members 06.12.2000 Kwera (U) Ltd Cadena & A/S Training in different production and 2,627,939 2,627,570 September, 2003 Time Out management skills on manufacturing of sportswear in Uganda 06.12.2000 ITS-Lions Intertec PC-House Development of IT solutions and after 1,593,153 1,583,945 December, 2004 Enterprises sales services in ICT 18.07.2001 MTN (U) & Opus Ascom Nordic A/S Continuation of technical support and 1,998,018 1,990,681 March, 2003 (U) Ltd training in management of public telephone services through out the country. 16.01.2001 ABC Hansen 2 ABC Hansen A/S To project improve both the working and 1,354,465 0 May, 2002 the external environment; including a substantial decrease of dust emission from the plant, which was above the acceptable level. 22.03.2001 Tropical Ecological Urtekram A/S Training and technical assistance in the 2,681,874 1,791,347 February, 2005 Foods Uganda Ltd production and processing of organic dried (TEFU) apple bananas and pineapples for export.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
Date of Project Ugandan Business Danish Business Project Idea Grant Disbursed Completion date Approval (DKK) amount (DKK) 26.06.2001 Lwanga Electrical Innovation To establish a modern electronic 3,610,101 156,469 October, 2003 and Electronic Research production line; based on production of Machines, (Pvt) Ltd. Development A/S seven different electronic products within (LEEM) (IRD) renewable energy power systems and power conditioning equipment. 20.07.2001 Kaisa Bamulangeyo Scandinavian Management contract to increase the 2,496,381 894,285 February, 2003 and Sons Ltd (KBS) Livestock Export production, processing and sale of ApS processed and raw milk of KBS; as well as employee training. 26.07.2001 Masaka Organic Urtekram A/S Training and technical assistance in the 2,466,639 1,408,570 December, 2004 Producers Ltd. production and processing of organic dried (MOP) apple bananas and mangoes for export. 14.11.2001 Golden Crest DLH Nordisk A/S Management agreement on the set up of 2,500,000 1,026,767 August, 2002 International Ltd (DLH) timber processing modern facilities and training in production of cut timber for export to Europe 08.04.2002 Interio Construct Batec A/S To set up a manufacturing plant for solar 1,495,186 1,495,186 December, 2003 Ltd. water heating systems to be sold on the domestic market. 27.12.2002 Victoria Herning To set up an environmentally friendly and 2,675,796 1,831,864 On-going Engineering Ltd. Varmeforzinkning production safety hot dip galvanising plant. A/S 23.01.2003 Namaliri Mixed Otto Madsen To set up beef production and improve the 2,568,464 2,206,721 September, 2006 Growers Ltd. quality, efficiency and productivity of the existing herd by improving herd management, forage and grazing management.
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Date of Project Ugandan Business Danish Business Project Idea Grant Disbursed Completion date Approval (DKK) amount (DKK) 31.03.2003 Kampala Nissan Ltd Kjaer Group A/S To upgrade Kampala Nissan to be a full 1,107,525 613,667 On-going franchisee with showroom and after-sales services workshop; and to establish a network outside Kampala of authorised service and spare-parts franchisees. 27.06.2003 Global Energy & RAcell A/S To develop commercial PV solar systems in 2,798,050 2,202,514 December, 2004 Environment Uganda and the neighbouring countries Consult 23.10.2003 Gourmet Institute EUC SYD To support the enlargement of the 2,451,138 1,558,505 June, 2005 of Environment, education capacity for the hotel and Hotel and Business catering industry in Uganda Management Ltd. 04.02.2004 Crown Tiles ’98 Ltd Spedalsø Transfer of skills and know how in the 2,379,373 1,466,386 On-going Betonvarefabrik production of roof tiles, building blocks A/S and other generic concrete products. 19.02.2004 M/S Biyinzika Agro Business To develop Biyinzika Enterprises into a 2,997,810 1,694,694 On-going Enterprises Ltd. Development A/S profitable production and processing plant of commercial broilers. 22.03.2004 Sadolin Paints Sadolin Paints Ltd, Training of production staff in methods 1,931,213 1,680,008 On-going (U)Ltd DK and processes that restrict and reduce the generation of waste. Wastewater treatment and general reduction of waste, including improvements in areas requiring cost saving and company image improvement. 02.04.2004 Central Purchasing Dansk Indkøb A/S To establish SMARTbuy Ltd as a joint 2,316,754 733,527 On-going Co. Ltd. venture company with the intention of linking Ugandan customers and suppliers together through a web based procurement site. date: November 2006 TP9 Page 19
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development
Date of Project Ugandan Business Danish Business Project Idea Grant Disbursed Completion date Approval (DKK) amount (DKK) 02.04.2004 Amfri Farms Batec A/S To develop Amfri into a more efficient 1,220,792 859,003 On-going fruit drying company, based on international standards and regulations on food safety, so as to meet the demand for dried fruits internationally. 15.07.2004 Kibonwa Ranchers Dalgaard Angus To establish a technical cooperation 2,351,675 1,094,528 On-going between the partners through technical assistance and training services with a target of establishing 100 hectares of grazing land and healthy beef cattle. 15.07.2004 M.R. Temangalo Langerimgaard To develop Temangalo into a modern dairy 3,922,956 1,881,148 On-going Farm farm through establishment and implementation of a modern and highly efficient milk-producing unit. 18.10.2004 Uganda Batteries Danish To establish a technological partnership 3,028,560 1,148,132 On-going Ltd. Technological and improve the environmental conditions Institute in the production of batteries. 10.02.2005 Shumuk Aluminium Danish To establish a technological partnership 5,000,000 On-going Industries Ltd Technological and improve the environmental conditions 1,547,909 Institute at Shumuk 29.12.2005 Beatrice Dairy Farm Sdr. Esp (DK) Training in management and production of 3,500,000 66,968 On-going quality raw milk 29.12.2005 Kinoni Produce Sdr. Esp To develop Kinoni farm into a 3,073,500 616,158 On-going Farm Limited commercially strong and viable position by establishing, developing, and utilising the synergy between the three commercial “legs”, that is piggery, maize growing, and maize supply.
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Date of Project Ugandan Business Danish Business Project Idea Grant Disbursed Completion date Approval (DKK) amount (DKK) 29.12.2005 Katumba Piggery Julianeholm To develop the farm into a commercially 2,747,660 219,816 On-going Farm strong and viable piggery farm. 29.12.2005 Global Star Ltd. Rykind Farm To establish a binding cooperation between 2,563,520 On -going the two partners and develop Global Star 192,772 into a commercially strong and viable piggery farm. 13.06.06 African Organic Solhjulet The partners want to further develop Amfri 2,533,558 - On-going (Amfri Farm) farm by broadening the range of fruits and species produced for export 17.07.06 Northern Uganda Hyldagergaard The project involves the development of 2,808,000 - On-going Agriculture and Havdrup NUAC into a commercially viable Construction agricultural business where the farm will be Company Ltd transformed into a modern mechanized (NUAC) farm through the use of Danish technology, equipment and training. 17.07.06 Kisombwa “Ullerup”, The ten-year production plan is based on 2,600,000 - On-going Ranching Scheme the expansion and improvement of the existing stock. 18.07.06 Steel Rolling Mills Danish The project is to address the poor 4,760,000 - On-going Ltd (Alam Group of Technological management and operational practices at Companies) Institute (DTI) the factory by carrying out a comprehensive training programme for both management and staff. Total 107,394,125 55,316,411 Source: Private Sector Secretariat, RDE Kampala, November 2006.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 10 –
Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda
Richard Johnson
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda
Contents
1. Introduction ...... 1
2. Influences and Drivers of Change in Management of Danish Aid...... 1
3. Key Changes in the Management of Danish Aid in Uganda...... 2 Evolution of the Danida programme in Uganda in the context of Danish and global development ...... 2 Danida development cooperation in Uganda ...... 3 Implications of developments in global Danida policy for Uganda programme 3 Implications of global development policies ...... 4 (a) From individual projects towards programmatic approaches ...... 4 Programmatic planning ...... 5 Staffing to meet project and programme needs...... 6 HUGGO ...... 6 (b) A reduction in the tying and the earmarking of aid ...... 7 (c) Alignment with government strategies and systems, and harmonisation among donors ...... 8 (d) Decentralisation from Copenhagen to Kampala...... 9 History of decentralisation in the management of Danish aid ...... 9 Decentralisation from 2002 ...... 10 Staffing for decentralisation ...... 11 (e) Evolution of results-based management ...... 11 Development of monitoring and evaluation ...... 11 (f) Rise of results-based management...... 11
4. Overall Assessment and Issues...... 13 Introduction...... 13 (a) Assessment...... 13 Meeting project and programme needs ...... 13 Harmonisation with government and donors...... 13 Untying of aid ...... 13 Decentralisation...... 13 Effective accountability for activities and results ...... 14 Overall verdict...... 14 (b) Issues (or Challenges) to take forward...... 15
Bibliography ...... 16
Annexes
Annex 1: Organisational Chart 2004...... 20 Annex 2: 2005 KVA Achievement Indicators ...... 21
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda
Acronyms and abbreviations
ASPS Agriculture Sector Programme Support BFT Technical Advisory Services – Development Cooperation, Danida BP Background Paper DAC Development Assistance Committee of OECD Danida Danish International Development Agency (before1991) Danish International Development Assistance (after 1991) DKK Danish Kroner EU-ACP European Union – African, Caribbean and Pacific Nations GBS General Budget Support GOU Government of Uganda HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus HRD Human Rights and Development HSPS Health Sector Programme Support HUGGO Human Rights and Good Governance Liaison Office KVA Department for Quality Assurance – Development Cooperation, Danida LGA Local Grant Authority MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFPED Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development NCG Nordic Consulting Group NGO Non-governmental organisation NRM National Resistance Movement NSA Non-state actor OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PC Programme Coordinator PCU Programme Coordination Unit PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan PO Programme Officer PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PS Private Sector RDDP Rakai District Development Programme RDE Royal Danish Embassy RSPS Road Sector Programme Support RUWASA Rural Water and Sanitation Project SWAp Sector wide approach TA Technical Assistance/ Technical Assistant/Technical Adviser TP Thematic Paper UJAS Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy UK United Kingdom UN United Nations VPA Annual Business Plan, Danida WSPS Water Sector Programme Support
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda
1. Introduction
1.1 This Thematic Paper focuses on the management of Danish aid as an issue that cuts across the Uganda programme. It thus complements most of the other thematic papers; it also links to Background Paper (BP) 3: Institutional Context and Aid Modalities, and BP4: Evolution of Danish Aid Policies.
1.2 This paper considers the suitability and adaptability of the management of the Uganda programme to the changing requirements of the programme itself, and to the changing relationship between the Royal Danish Embassy (RDE) and Danida. It draws on the evaluation team’s examinations and data about development programmes themselves, the pre-study and the overview of Danida policies in BP4, as well as interviews within RDE.
1.3 This is not a detailed internal review of the managerial and organisational competencies of RDE or Danida, nor of their Ugandan partners. This would require analysis of performa nce, structures, systems, staffing, communication, learning and resources, as well as underlying strategies. We have had limited access to previous evaluations and reviews of RDE itself.
1.4 The paper notes the evolution of Danida’s aid management in Uganda over the period in the context of Danida’s and other development actors’ global policies. It considers the ways in which Danida’s and RDE’s management approach has adapted to the changing requirements of the Ugandan programme; and thereby identifies overall evaluation issues to feed into the Synthesis Report.
2. Influences and Drivers of Change in Management of Danish Aid
2.1 There has been considerable interaction between Denmark’s Uganda programme and the development of Denmark’s global development policies. Uganda experience particularly informed Danida's 1994 strategy, and had a wider influence through Danida’s involvement in the development of the Uganda Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) on subsequent support by Danida to Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSPs). Danish Uganda approaches have also widely reflected trends in global development practice. In turn, management of the programme in Uganda has had to respond to changes in policy and practice at the global level of Danish development policies.
2.2 There have been substantial changes affecting the management of Danish aid to Uganda during the period of this evaluation. This changing configuration reflects three interacting streams of influence: · Strengthening of Government of Uganda (GOU) capacity to plan and implement coherent development strategies at national and sector level (discussed in BP 3). · Danida's own moves towards improving the strategic intent, quality and effectiveness of Danish aid (which in some important ways anticipated moves at the wider OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) level). · Changing perceptions of good practice across the aid community as a whole. The 2005 Paris Declaration is the latest in a series of international commitments on aid effectiveness, following those made in the Monterrey, Rome and other forums. date: November 2006 TP10 Page 1
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda
2.3 Over the period the most striking changes in the management of Denmark's Uganda country programme have been: (a) A shift from a focus on individual projects towards programmatic sector approaches. (b) The reduction in the tying and the earmarking of aid. (c) Greater emphasis on alignment with government strategies and systems, and on harmonisation with other donors. (d) Decentralisation of responsibilities from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Copenhagen to the RDE in Kampala. (e) More systematic attention to the results of Danish assistance.
2.4 The next section provides a timeline of developments to contextualise changes in Uganda, before examining each of these changes (a–e) in more detail, and considering their implications for the management of Danish aid to Uganda.
3. Key Changes in the Management of Danish Aid in Uganda
Evolution of the Danida programme in Uganda in the context of Danish and global development 3.1 This section presents a timeline of the evolution of Danish aid in Uganda from 1987, in the context of developments in the management of aid in Denmark and the wider world.
Date Danida Development Danida Global Policy World Development Cooperation in Uganda Developments Policy Perspectives 1987 Danida Country Analysis 1988 Danida Field Office, Kampala Danida Action plan heralds focus on 25 poorest countries 1989 Uganda selected as one of 12 programme countries 1990 RDE Kampala established 1991 Absorption of Danida within MFA 1994 Publication of “A Developing World – Strategy for Danish Development policy to the year 2000” (MFA Danida, 1994a) 1996 Publication of first strategy “Danish Bilateral Cooperation with Uganda” (MFA Danida, 1996b) 1998 Publication of “Guidelines for Sector Programme Support” (MFA Danida, 1998) 2000 Foundation of HUGGO Publication of “Partnership 2000” UN Millennium (MFA Danida, 2000a) builds on Development Goals “A Developing World” agreed
Cotonou Agreement emphasises government and NSA participation 2001 Reduction in annual budget from Publication of Danida strategy for DKK 280 million to support to NGOs and civil society
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Date Danida Development Danida Global Policy World Development Cooperation in Uganda Developments Policy Perspectives DKK 250 million (MFA Danida, 2000b)
Election of new Government 2002 Examination of Danish Aid Monterrey Consensus on undertaken financing for development Quality Assurance team established (KVA) 2003 Implementation of Danida Completion of decentralisation Rome Declaration on aid decentralisation process. harmonisation (OECD First publication of Aid Management Development Assistance 1st Programme Review by KVA Guidelines Committee, 2003)
Establishment of Results Contract between RDE and Danida 2004 Uganda–Denmark Partnership: Publication of Technical Assistance Marrakesh round-table Strategy for Co-operation 2004– (TA) policy (MFA Danida, 2005) on managing for results 2008 (MFA Danida, 2004b) 2005 2nd Programme Review Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2005)
Danida development cooperation in Uganda 3.2 Although a Consul represented Denmark’s interests throughout the Amin period and subsequent turmoil, the early development of the new programme was handled from Nairobi, which produced a country analysis in 1987 and established a Kampala field office in 1988. These mark the starting point for the programme. An Embassy with 4 staff was established in 1990. The embassy has grown to a staff of approximately 18 (excluding support staff) (MFA Danida, 2004a).
3.3 Three major strategic exercises were undertaken by RDE in the period, resulting in the publication of strategy documents in 1996 and 2004. An intermediate strategy document, developed around 2000, was not formally presented to the Danish parliament, or adopted. This is partly associated with the change in government in 2001. The inputs by Danida to the PEAP at this time, however, were themselves of major significance, and provided important strategic models for Danida.
Implications of developments in global Danida policy for Uganda programme 3.4 As one of the first 12 “programme countries” designated by Danida in 1989, the Uganda programme was itself a leader in the expression and development of Danida’s evolving global policies. The first ambassador for the new programme led the formulation of Danida’s 1994 strategy, whose focus on poverty reduction, sectoral approaches, and cross-cutting concerns, are closely reflected in the emerging strategy for Uganda published in 1996.
3.5 The evolution of the Uganda programme occurred at a significant time in the evolution of Danida itself (as set out in BP4: Evolution of Danish Aid Policies). At the start of the period, Danida was an Agency within MFA, until fully incorporated in 1991. Since 1991, Danida has undergone major developments in strategy, mechanisms of management and control, operational guidelines for projects and programmes, decentralisation, and links to foreign policy. The incorporation of Danida within MFA has led to a close integration between the diplomatic and developmental policy of the Embassy, with the former led by the ambassador, and the latter led
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda by the deputy head of mission. This has been particularly relevant to Denmark’s longstanding concern with governance issues.
3.6 The recruitment of both local and international staff has also evolved. Since 1991, international staff have been recruited following MFA , rather than Danida, criteria, fostering a generalist approach. While RDE staff have included local staff in project and administrative roles from the outset, there has been a growing commitment by Danida globally and locally to support the development of local staff roles.
Implications of global development policies 3.7 The evolution of the management of the Danish Ugandan programme needs to be seen in the context of global development policies. In the 1990s, Danida’s interest in deve loping country strategy beyond the project level, as well as in donor harmonisation and alignment, reflected the interests of international bodies, for whom these were also new considerations. Danida was a contributor, for instance, to the UN Framework on Harmonized Aid Management and Accountability. (Development Assistance Committee, 1995: 8).
3.8 Over the last decade , there have also been significant developments in policie s for deve lopment cooperation, reflected in the UN Millennium, Monterrey, Rome and Paris discussions and outputs. The Millennium Development Goals provide d a powerful focus on results, while subsequent conventions also addressed the financing, effectiveness, harmonisation, and ownership of development cooperation. Cross-cutting themes adopted by Danida, such as gender, environment, and HIV/AIDS, have also been cross-cutting concerns in international development more widely.
3.9 In the context of the European Union – African Caribbean and Pacific Nations (EU-ACP) group, of which Uganda and Denmark are both members, the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 sought to address the weaknesses of previous Lomé Conventions, by locating development cooperation within the context of the institutional and political context of partner countries, by focusing on governance and human rights, and by engaging the participation of non-state actors (NSAs) as well as government in all aspects of social and economic development processes. The evolution of Danida’s programme has been in line with these developments.
(a) From individual projects towards programmatic approaches 3.10 The core operational task of Danida’s programme has been shaped by the number and size of its discrete interventions (projects, programmes, or joint interventions), and by its type of involvement in each of these.
3.11 At the outset, most of Danida’s support was implemented through separate projects. It operated according to Danida’s 1985 and 1992 guidelines for project preparation, which were only subsequently developed to provide guidance on management throughout the project life- cycle (Danida, 1985; MFA Danida, 1992).
3.12 RDE’s early practice reflected the proje ct focus of Danida’s global policies and procedures, with limited concerns with project monitoring, or with sectoral or programmatic development. RDE was able to use great flexibility in small interventions, using Danida’s newly created Local Grants Author ity (LGA) to approve projects up to DKK 1m with NGOs and others without referral to Copenhagen. 1 The establishment of RDE enabled it to undertake project-based interventions in agriculture, water, NGO development and human rights, with a focus on
1 The ceiling was increased to DKK 3m in 1992 (Development Assistance Committee, 1995: 25).
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda rehabilitation. These LGA projects provided the starting points for subsequent development. The growth of the programme was rapid: by 1993/94, Uganda was the second largest recipient of Danish aid after Tanzania, consuming 3.4% of Danish aid (OECD, 2006: Statistical Annexes Table 32). It still commanded 2.9% of Danish aid in 2003/2004.
Programmatic planning 3.13 From the early 90s, the programme evolved towards programme-based planning, and towards the current position where the sector programme is the unit of account. Sector programmes may still have project components, but the strategic focus is across the sector. Even where Danida continues to fund sets of separate projects (e.g. in governance), there has been considerable effort since the mid-1990s to situate them within an explicit sector strategy. Although the formulation of strategies and the recent formation of Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS) are landmarks in this change, the process has been incremental and iterative.
3.14 Development of the first Uganda strategy took place in the context of the new Danida global strategy, A Developing World, (drafted under the direction of the former ambassador to Uganda), which set out sectoral approaches, themes and cross-cutting issues for development co- operation (MFA Danida, 1994b).
3.15 The move to programme-based support from 1993–94 enabled RDE to establish key relationships with GOU and other development partners. Even before Danida’s 1996 strategy was published, considerable progress had been made towards strategic planning for programmes. TP8: Gender, for instance, shows how Danida supported the Masese women’s self-help project in 1989, and followed this with support to the development of women’s projects with the Ministry of Women in 1991; Phase II of this programme, from 1995, promoted a wider gender awareness in formulation of government policy; the developing understanding of gender dimensions in GOU and Danida-supported projects and programmes was reflected in the design and implementation of Rural Water and Sanitation Project (RUWASA), Agriculture Sector Programme Support (ASPS) and roads programmes.
3.16 The length of Danida’s involvement in particular sectors is likely to have been significant in enabling strategic thinking. Within Gender, Danida had an 11 year involvement. Its involvement in all other major sectors has been even longer than this, including health (13 years), Human Rights and Development (HRD) (16 years), and agriculture and decentralisation (18 years).2
3.17 The new Uganda strategy resulted in a smaller proportion of stand-alone projects, and a much stronger engagement with GOU, using GOU economic frameworks, and indicators. The strategy also limited Danida’s focus to 4 sectors, with Sectoral Programme Strategies following over the next 2 years: · Health (HSPS from 1996) · Water supply (Water Sector Programme Support (WSPS) I from 1998) · Agriculture (ASPS I from 1998) · Infrastructure (Road Sector Programme Support (RSPS) 1 from 1998)
3.18 The 2004 organisation chart still reflects these 4 sectors.3 There are two additional sectors: one broadly covering decentralisation and governance, and a second covering the private sector.
2 See NCG Pre-study Report (NCG, 2006: figure 3.3 and Annex C or C2). The exceptions to this longevity are energy (3 years) and finance (10 years). 3 See Annex 1 for Organogram. date: November 2006 TP10 Page 5
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3.19 RDE will be changing its internal structure in 2006 to reflect the focus of the current 2004-2008 strategy on three “pillars” of the current PEAP: · Production and Private Sector – including business-to-business projects, agriculture. · Rural Development – health, water, labour -based road construction – an “open mandate”, because Danida may need to drop either water or health. · Good Governance – economic and political aspects of governance.
3.20 Sectoral programmes have therefore been evolving since the early 1990s. Increasing harmonisation with other donors and GOU through UJAS provides a further step for Danida, while the provision of General Budget Support (GBS) is still in the future.
3.21 Finally, it should be noted that the evolution of programme and sectoral approaches has not precluded projects. Agr iculture, HRD and NGOs have an ongoing role for projects, but these are in the context of a broad strategic portfolio.
Staffing to meet project and programme needs 3.22 From initial allocation to disparate projects, staff began to be moved to sectoral briefs from 1993. By 2004, staff were managed within 7 sectoral teams, (including one for finance and administration) each headed by a Danish Programme Coordinator (PC), with a locally recruited Programme Officer (PO).
3.23 The development of the first Danida strategy in Uganda and of sector specific programmes required sector specialists, able to work across middle and senior levels in GOU institutions as well as with external consultants. Inputs to the strategy included a consultancy report to Copenhagen and a works hop with Ugandan partners. Negotiations with GOU involved lower as well as higher level officials, which was seen as a useful way of ensuring a good fit between counterpart levels within GOU and RDE. Posts funded by Danida also provided an important contact.
3.24 Discussions also included contributions by Danida to the evolution of governmental policy on decentralisation and poverty reduction, as well as being about project implementation. Discussions on sector wide approaches (SWAps) on the chosen sectors drew on both Danida’s and other donors’ expertise, with Danida promoting a harmonised approach and coherence.
3.25 More recently, staff have been encouraged to adopt more generic than sectoral perspectives. There is already some mobility between sectors for both POs and PCs. Under UJAS, the number of Danida-managed divisions will fall from six sectors to the three pillars of the PEAP. This is expected to require higher collaboration between staff who will need to focus on results within the PEAP matrix, using cross-sector collaboration.
3.26 However, making connections outside sectors of work is not entirely new. As the theme paper on gender notes, Danida has long assigned a PO as the focal point for gender, and this has been reflected in the gender-awareness of policies in agriculture, roads and water. RDDP also adopted a multi-sectoral approach as early as 1993. There is also mobility of staff between sectors.
HUGGO 3.27 Danida’s continuing support to a large number of projects related to governance deserves special consideration. Danida’s support for interventions in human rights and democratisation has been managed since 2000 by the Human Rights and Good Governance Liaison Office (HUGGO),
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda a unit separate from, but reporting to, RDE. It is staffed by a cadre of highly qua lified Ugandan professionals under the leadership of a Danish Chief Technical Adviser. HUGGO has significantly increased Danida’s capacity to manage funding for human rights and democratisation interventions and to monitor partners’ performance. In the same period, other donors have reduced their staffing, particularly for NGO programmes, and more than half the funds administered by HUGGO are channelled through multi-donor basket funds where Danida acts as lead agency.
3.28 HUGGO might be seen to contradict Danida’s policy of reducing the number of its Technical Advisers and Project Implementation Units.4 Danida’s decision to establish HUGGO was, however, consistent with the growing importance of human rights and democratisation within the Uganda programme and Danida’s wish to build more effective strategies for these areas in a difficult political environment. In this regard, the physical and institutional separation of HUGGO and RDE has enabled HUGGO to take initiatives, for example in conflict resolution, that would have been much more difficult if there had been a closer identification with RDE. The sensitivity of some initiatives has been challenging for HUGGO and RDE: problems have arisen when technical and political perspectives have diverged, and when the respective mandates of each have become blurred.
3.29 Civil society organisations clearly value HUGGO’s support as “a unique and important contribution” to successful outcomes and to the development of the sector as a whole. But HUGGO has sometimes been criticised for being too “hands-on”, at the expense of more strategic support to partners. Danida has expressed an intention to “anchor” HUGGO more effectively in Ugandan institutions in the future. Because support to human rights and democratisation involves a variety of programmes and partners, this is not a simple undertaking. However, HUGGO has made a start by handing over support for District NGO Networks to an NGO; it has also investigated, with like-minded donors, the potential of an autonomous foundation to manage support to human rights NGOs.
(b) A reduction in the tying and the earmarking of aid 3.30 The characteristics of donor organisations depend significantly on their stakeholders, and are therefore likely to be considerably shaped by tying aid to national suppliers.
3.31 Historically, there have been major economic linkages between Danish international development and Danish business, making the latter a major stakeholder. However, the opportunities for such linkages were curtailed just before the start of the Uganda programme, and remained low, despite the introduction of a new private sector development programme , managed within a separate secretariat. The involvement of Danish business became more focused on exchange visits and support to Ugandan businesses rather than as a source of export markets or other benefits to Danish firms. The impact of tied aid has therefore been low, both in terms of financial commitment, and in terms of the involvement of RDE staff. A possible exception to this is international consultancy and Technical Assistance (TA) where 60% of international advisers are Danes and 40% non-Danes. Danida also funds Danish NGOs operating in Uganda. This funding is outside the country framework, but forms part of bilateral aid. (See TP7: Governance Issues.)
3.32 As stated in BP4, Danida assistance has been largely untied since 1987, with tied funding for most goods and services abolished in 1988. Only consultancy services remained tied until 2004. Despite the retreat from formal tying, expectations remained that some 50% of total aid
4 See TP4: Capacity Development and Technical Assistance. date: November 2006 TP10 Page 7
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda would “return” to Denmark in the form of contracts for Danish firms. While this percentage is still calculated, it is no longer reported.
3.33 Several early projects were clearly tied to Danish imports and contractors, including grain silos, dairy projects, railway wagons and road construction. Balance of payments assistance was also tied, and thereby required more administrative input (first in arranging the imports, then in tracking the counterpart funds) than later contributions to debt relief.
3.34 Subsequently the main tied component within the Uganda programme was the Private Sector (PS) Programme, introduced in Uganda in 1996,5 which provides for long term partnerships between a Danish company and a local Ugandan company. It is managed by a separate secretariat within RDE.
3.35 The PS Programme is reviewed separately in TP9: Private Sector Development. While its impact has a significance to the Danish and Ugandan firms involved, its aggregate effect in tying aid is small. Total expenditure on PS development has been small compared with the whole Uganda programme. Total PSD expenditure from 1999 to 2004 was only DKK 65.8 million.
3.36 Unlike other supplies, consulting services were only untied in 2004, in accordance with EC procedures. International TA still provides considerable opportunities to Danish companies and individuals, though not exclusively so. Ownership of the work of international TAs and consultants is discussed in TP4: Capacity Development and TA.
3.37 The shift towards programmatic approaches has also reduced the opportunity for earmarking of funds. As discussed under the next heading, moves to reduce earmarking have been constrained by scepticism about budget support: scepticism on political grounds , especially in rela tion to General Budget Support; and on accountability grounds in relation to direct support to sector or local government budgets.
(c) Alignment with government strategies and systems, and harmonisation among donors 3.38 Danida’s strategy has been one of close engagement with both government and other donors. Therefore, Danida’s capacity to manage its engagement with government and with its development partners has been a central requirement. Trends towards harmonisation and alignment are reviewed in BP3. The present paper’s concern is more narrowly with the management implications of these trends for Danida.
3.39 Despite joint strategic planning processes and joint implementation arrangements with foreign and local actors, there has been a less marked trend away from Danida control of funds. Earmarking, separate accounts, TA control, and programme coordination units (PCUs) are enduring features. Recent PCUs approved include one for the PS Programme in 2004, with a Danida senior adviser and financial controller. Reliance on such control mechanisms appears to have deepened, following experiences of financial mismanagement. Rakai District Development Programme (RRDP) for instance, started by transferring money directly to the District Council. This flexibility has now been set aside, in favour of direct control. RDDP disbursements are now handled on a project basis by a programme officer at RDE.
3.40 Key factors in Danida’s reticence have been concerns about corruption and accountability. Problems of financial mismanagement with the National Medical Stores in 1995 were followed by problems in Rakai in 1996–98, and other similar incidents. Continuing difficulties in the management of funds, even where they do not affect Danida directly, as in the case of the Global
5 But with first expenditures recorded in 1999.
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Fund,6 maintain a high level of awareness. Danida’s stance on financial probity is seen as uncompromising, but not necessarily unreasonable, by other donors and partners.
3.41 The evolving requirement to support government and donor alignment has encouraged the development of inter-sectoral approaches, and collaboration on budget support. Donor-based working groups are now a major forum where programme staff meet to discuss policy and strategy. RDE’s sectoral staff organisation has shown itself well suited to working with government, and it has facilitated the development of sector programmes and cooperation with other donors. RDE has also been willing to reshape its structure in line with the three pillars of PEAP and the prospective sharing of responsibilities under UJAS.
3.42 The transition to three pillars from multiple sectors represents another important challenge for RDE, though there is a clear intention that the new pillars will help programme staff to get beyond sectoral perspectives to focus on broader socio-economic results.
3.43 There are concerns that the current trend towards generalists working in government and donor working groups gives young international professionals too few opportunities for learning about the specifics of sectors or Ugandan realities on the ground. To some extent, Danida has been able to balance this by including Ugandan professionals in its team, who have provided approximately a third of RDE professional staff for several years.
3.44 As well as RDE’s own staff, Danida has clearly benefited from its deployment of international TAs and local staff funded within Ugandan organisations. Despite pressures to cut the numbers of TAs (discussed in TP4: Capacity Building and TA), the number of international TAs stood at around 10 during the 1990s and has risen somewhat to just under 20 since 2000. 7 TAs are particularly valued by other agencies as “ears on the ground”, with expertise in some sectors, e.g. drugs and labour -based road building. A large number of other staff are also directly or indirectly funded by Danida: those paid by Danida exceeded 200 in 2000 and 2001, but had reduced to 73 by 2003, of whom 5 were in the office of the HRD programme, 5 in HSPS, and 12 in the Transport unit of Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED).
(d) Decentralisation from Copenhagen to Kampala. 3.45 The recent decentralisation has made major changes in the manner and location of decision-making about the Danida programme. Decentralisation has been made with objectives related to efficiency and effectiveness, and also to enhance local country ownership. Although the full assessment of this goes beyond the scope of this paper, both this section and the following highlight some of their implications.
History of decentralisation in the management of Danish aid 3.46 As it existed before 2002, Danish aid was described as “a remarkably compact and centralised organisational system” compared with other DAC countries. Decision making was concentrated within three departments of MFA , (Development Assistance Committee, 2003: 47), with little external input from NGOs or others.
3.47 However, this does not imply poor local ownership by Ugandan stakeholders, or low involvement by RDE. Even before the 2002 decentralisation, the Field Office and then RDE appear to have experie nced considerable autonomy in-country, earning a reputation for innovation and flexibility by their ability to respond quickly to needs. The development of the
6 The Global Fund Commission of Inquiry reported in May 2006 into abuse of its funds. 7 However, there is evidence that compared with other Danida programmes, Uganda has been relatively frugal in the use of TA. Boesen 2001 shows that, from 1991–1999 the number of person-months TA per million DKK of the bilateral programme in Uganda was substantially lower than the average of programme countries. date: November 2006 TP10 Page 9
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1996 strategy and its component programmes also had strong local involvement by RDE and Ugandan stakeholders, and can be seen as a fore-runner of future global Danida strategies advocating sectoral cooperation, partnership and ownership by local stakeholders. The DAC Peer Review of 1995 also noted that, across Danida’s programmes, there was considerable local ownership of development, reflected in local stakeholder involvement in development of strategy, sectoral and programme plans, and in evaluation. (Development Assistance Committee, 1995: 25).
3.48 Danida decentralisation initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s took place in the context of increasing budgets. There was a growth in staffing in Copenhagen, as well as a dramatic growth in field staff (ibid.: 17). This was matched by increasing author ity for approving projects: DKK 1 million in 1988 and DKK 3 million in 1992.
3.49 By contrast, the 2003 drive for decentralisation was energised by the new Danish government’s cuts in the aid budget, and by its 2002 review of development cooperation, which stressed the need to focus Danish aid on fewer countries, sectors and programmes – along the lines of the Uganda programme – to make it more efficient.
Decentralisation from 2002 3.50 The decentralisation process begun in 2002 was more radical in scale and intent than its predecessors. It also occurred at a time of budget cuts, rather than growth. The decentralisation contains three main strands: · delegation to embassies of all responsibilities for identification, preparation and implementation of programmes; · allocation of greater responsibility in strategy and policy to geographical desk officers; · establishment of a new quality assurance department to strengthen perfor mance management.
3.51 Danida decentralised responsibilities for developing and implementing agreed national and sectoral programmes, and demanded clear indicators for how the results defined in these programmes would be achieved. These results are used as a basis for the “results contracts” between each embassy and Danida in Copenhagen.
3.52 The decentralisation placed greater emphasis on embassy responsibility, along with geographical desks, for the local ownership of strategies and programmes.
3.53 The decentralisation has classic features with major implications for relations between Danida, its regional office, RDE, and Ugandan stakeholders. The numbers of interventions by the centre in operational decision-making are reduced but are replaced by increased upward accountability for results. It should be noted that the level of accountability required by the new decentralised structure represents a great contrast with the flexibility and autonomy experienced by RDE in the early years, and the uncertainties around monitoring in the 1990s.
3.54 Since decentralisation, project and programme preparation is now led by RDE. Only programmes over DKK 30 million are referred for appraisal to Danida in Copenhagen, having been prepared in country, along with terms of reference for appraisal. Typically, one or two major sectoral programmes a year have exceeded DKK 30 million (NCG, 2006: Tables 3.3, 3.4). Most projects are of a lower value. The annual Uganda programme review now takes place in Kampala, with visiting officials from Copenhagen. The national programme is subject to periodic Programme Reviews by Danida’s global Quality Assurance Department (KVA).
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Staffing for decentralisation 3.55 Unlike earlier decentralisations, the global 2002 exercise was to be carried out with no overall increase in cost, but with the relocation of some 50 staff from Copenhagen to field offices. Uganda received only one additional staff person, compared with the 2001/02 establishment.
3.56 The 2004 Uganda organogram (see Annex 1) already reflects the 2003 decentralised model, with local programme officers working closely with internationally recruited programme coordinators. However, historically, programme officers have operated at a lower level than programme coordinators, with less access to reports and key meetings. These roles are still evolving, as will be required in order to maximise country ownership in the way envisaged by the decentralisation.
3.57 The process of decentralisation is likely to generate additional tasks for RDE, to some extent recognised by the provision of an economist. More responsibility is , however, being delegated to locally recruited staff, which is believed to improve local ownership, and also reduces costs.
(e) Evolution of results-based management 3.58 The philosophy of “results-based management” espoused by Danida since the 2003 Decentralisation comes in the wake of varied experience of monitoring and evaluation in the 1980s and 1990s. Some attention has been given to monitoring and evaluation throughout the period, at project and programme level, but the approach has not always been systematic.
Development of monitoring and evaluation 3.59 Danida has undertaken several major evaluations during the period. The evaluation of RDDP and the Programme for the Modernisation of Agriculture have been specific to Uganda. Multi-country Danida evaluations, including those of health, human rights, balance of payments aid and poverty reduction, have directly involved Uganda.
3.60 In early stages of the Uganda programme, projects were reviewed by quarterly reports submitted to RDE by GOU, and by project completion reports. Steering Committees between RDE and GOU were subsequently formed to conduct joint reviews.
3.61 Managing a rapidly growing programme clearly challenged RDE in the 1990s. The quality of monitoring was criticised in 1996 by consultants, who described the Uganda programme as strained in its capacity for planning, programming and managing its programme (COWI, 1996: Uganda Volume I, 56 and ff, section 6.2). The number of disparate projects, high levels of planned disbursements, and poor operational guidelines were identified as sources of strain. The report saw sectoral programmes and increased macro-economic policy resources as ways to address the problem. Monitoring and evaluation were seen as weak at programme and national levels. Similar concerns about implementation of Danida programmes globally were voiced at this time in a report by the Copenhagen Centre for Development Research (Udsholt, 1996) : “It is important … to explicitly address the risk that during implementation the attention paid to complex and demanding poverty related objectives may taper off.”
(f) Rise of results-based management 3.62 The focus on results-based performance management, led by the new Quality Assurance Department, KVA, represents a major cultural change. In adopting it, Danida policy reflects the
date: November 2006 TP10 Page 11
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda importance of results, as now embodied in the Paris Declaration of 2005. 8 Key to the Paris view of results is the alignment of donor approaches to monitoring to results identified in the local country’s own policy frameworks. Danida’s programme is, therefore, well positioned to adopt such an approach, because of its history of engagement with GOU frameworks. However, commentators in Uganda have valued Danida’s historical concern with “process”, and have sometimes seen this as being at odds with an exclusive focus on results. Similar concerns from Tanzania are reflected in the DAC Peer Review of 2003.9 Danida’s use of results-based management therefore needs to be widely enough conceived to ensure that its results reflect the achievement of processes that are widely owned.
3.63 The Quality Assurance Department (KVA), set up in 2003, now has overall responsibility for the performance management of Danida Uganda (MFA Danida, 2006b). It facilitates the development of the annual plan (VPA) which results in an annual results contract between MFA and the embassy, and is the basis for performance review.10
3.64 KVA also carries out country performance reviews which assess whether practices and activities in country programmes are in accordance with stated policies, goals, plans and procedures, which are the basis for each country’s results contract. The performance review is based on the country’s strategy and programme objectives. It provides 7 ratings (A to D) on the national programme’s performance in relation to their fulfilment of, or progress in, overall development objectives, cross-cutting issues, sectoral programmes, PRS, donor coordination, good governance and general progress. It also scores sectoral programmes in more detail.
3.65 KVA’s annual report from 2003 provides a global report based on its performance reviews conducted over the year. KVA Performance Reviews were undertaken in Uganda in 2003 and 2005 (MFA Danida, 2004a : 18). Overall, Uganda meets its performance indicators well, compared to other national programmes (MFA Danida, 2006a : 36). Reporting on Danida embassies as a group, KVA found that embassies were managing heavy workloads well, but some embassies need to adjust competencies of their staff, and make even better use of local programme officers (ibid.: 34). KVA cites the development of sectoral strategies in Uganda as best practice.
3.66 The Annual Business Plan, Danida (VPA) process requires RDE to submit Terms of Reference for reviews and appraisals to Danida’s global Technical Advisory Services – Development Cooperation, Danida (BFT). RDE provides with this a note of mandate, recommending any changes to the programme, including changes to programme costs. This is discussed face to face with BFT, which provides conclusions and recommendations during the visit that are sufficiently firm to provide a basis for action. RDE can recommend re-allocation of funds, including the use of unallocated funds in sectoral programmes, within the mandate for the
8 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005: clause 45 “[Donors will] · Link country programming and resources to results and align them with effective partner country performance assessment frameworks, refraining from requesting the introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with partners’ national development strategies. · Work with partner countries to rely, as far as possible, on partner countries’ results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks.” (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2005.) 9 The DAC Peer Review cites: “Over-emphasis on results favours old-fashioned projects, such as infrastructure, where it is easy to identify the problem and make a quick technological fix, but which are not necessarily sustainable” “Some areas are easier to measure than others… democracy and human rights the hardest” “Our indicators are yet too old fashioned… we need to find indicators that better reflect process orientated success.” (Development Assistance Committee, 2003: 55.) 10 Overall, KVA has a very broad remit. As well as its brief in performance management, it also has a responsibility for quality assurance of financial management and project and programme databases, and as such has instituted anti-corruption training and requires quarterly reports.
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VPA. Changes between budget lines can be made by RDE, unless they imply changes in outputs or objectives.
4. Overall Assessment and Issues
Introduction 4.1 The purpose of this final section is (a) to offer an assessment of the success of Danida in adapting its management to serve the changing requirements of the Uganda programme (b) to identify outstanding issues to be addressed in the future programme.
(a) Assessment Meeting project and programme needs 4.2 The programme was established more rapidly than those of most bilateral donors. It demonstrated flexibility from the outset in responding to needs as they were identified. It was an early adopter of strategic sectoral and country-based planning, and has demonstrated a consistent commitment to sectoral and programmatic approaches. It also maintains a continuing capacity to support projects, and has been innovative , in developing HUGGO and in other ways , to do this. It has made good use of RDE staff, TAs, and staff funded in Ugandan institutions, to build effective working relationships with projects, sectors and programmes over many years, and to support their evolution through shared learning.
Harmonisation with government and donors 4.3 The programme has supported alignment with government from early in its history. It has built effective working relationships at both high and mid levels of GOU, and within decentralised government. This has helped to build local ownership of the Danida programme. At the same time, Danida has had a steady involvement in governance and human rights, and has maintained a close integration of the diplomatic and development functions of RDE. These have put it in a stronger position to express its reservations around government accountability and corruption, and to act accordingly in relation to further alignment with GOU. However, maintaining a critical distance on GBS and UJAS is likely to pose major challenges.
4.4 Danida remains conservative in its use of separate instruments for financial accountability, including earmarked funds, Project Coordination Units (PCUs) and TA supervision. RDE staff and TAs have worked well with donors and government to build effective donor coordination, and support the establishment of successive PEAPs. RDE has been willing to re-align its programme and staffing to support inter-sectoral working. However, the growing focus on working within governmental and donor processes may be at the cost of developing local and sectoral understanding, particula rly by international RDE staff and TAs.
Untying of aid 4.5 Danida assistance largely became untied during the period, both in policy and in practice. This has not posed major difficulties. There is, however, a continuing need to ensure that in fulfilling the employment, consultancy and technical assistance requirements of the programme, it makes full use of Ugandan staff, companies and consultants.
Decentralisation 4.6 The Ugandan programme benefited from a considerable degree of decentralisation from an early stage. The provision of the LGA, and a degree of informality in the early relations date: November 2006 TP10 Page 13
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda between RDE and Danida, allowed it considerable flexibility within its operations in order to take advantage of opportunities for development. A lack of clear focus on monitoring, coupled with a high rate of growth resulted in some weaknesses in monitoring in the 1990s. The development of programmes and sectoral strategies provided a more formal structure. However, this still allowed Danida some room for innovatory modes of funding, as in HUGGO.
4.7 The 2002 decentralisation provides a much more regulated environment, and rigorous accountability for achievement of programme results. This may result in less flexibility for the programme, even though it provides much higher leve ls of delegated financial authority.
Effective accountability for activities and results 4.8 The Uganda programme has demonstrated that it can perform well in terms of the new results-based management system introduced with decentralisation, although the rigour of this accountability may have presented a major cultural change. Factors in its success have been its long-standing commitment to country and sectoral strategy, and its efforts to share ownership of the programme with its Ugandan partners.
4.9 While a focus on results should still allow RDE considerable room for flexing its activities to achieve these, it is uncertain whether the degree of flexibility and responsiveness that has characterised the programme in the past can be maintained. The high level of accountability through KVA to Danida may have a similarly uncertain impact on local ownership of the programme: because the results are based on policies that have been developed and agreed with Ugandan partners, RDE’s accountability for them to Danida should increase RDE’s commitment to those agreed policies. However, too much accountability to Copenhagen might also have the effect of reducing the accountability of RDE to Ugandan institutions.
Overall verdict 4.10 Danida’s approach to management in Copenhagen and locally has enabled the Uganda Programme · to establish its initial programme rapidly, flexibly and responsively. · to develop and implement strategic perspectives for sectoral and country programme development. · to build local ownership and effective working relations between Danida and Ugandan institutions. · to maintain constructive working relations with Government, despite difficulties. · to become and maintain a position as a respected member of the donor community. · to make good use of international and local human resources for staffing of RDE, and in placements through TA or otherwise in Ugandan institutions.
4.11 The major challenges for the programme to address relate to · harmonisation and alignment. · decentralisation. · human resources.
4.12 These are set out in the final section.
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(b) Issues (or Challenges) to take forward 4.13 Further harmonisation and alignment with GOU and other donors challenges Danida · to dedicate sufficient resources for the harmonisation and alignment agenda, without losing the sectoral and other specific knowledge required to maintain the quality of the programme. · to maintain the integrity of development and diplomatic policy and actions , particularly in respect of Danida’s engagement in UJAS and GBS, and its stance on governance.
4.14 Decentralisation challenges Danida · to maintain and strengthen local ownership of the programme in an environment that is more highly regulated and accountable to Danida’s headquarters. · to maintain a balance between respecting agreed policy frameworks, and maintain ing flexibility and responsiveness to local needs. · to ensure that programme implementation is more systematically monitored and evaluated than in the past, in ways which meet the standards of both Danida and local stakeholders. · to develop performance indic ators that demonstrate both results and the processes by which these have been achieved, in ways that meet the needs of all stakeholders.
4.15 The human resource challenges are · to ensure that RDE and TA staff retain sufficient contact with the sectors, institutions and social realities of their clients. · to maximise the contribution made by Ugandan professionals to the work of RDE, and through TA and consultancy to its development partners.
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Bibliography
Danida Evaluations
COWI (1996). Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance. Country Study Uganda: Volume I, Main Report; Volume II, Assessment of Selected Interventions. (November 1996). Copenhagen: MFA.
Development Associates (2001). Evaluation: Private Sector Development Programme 2001/01. (October 1991). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1995). Programme for Renovation and Shipment of Used Equipment. (March 1995). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1996a). Environment and Development. (June 1996). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1999). Evaluation of Danish Support to Promotion of Human Rights and Democratisation 1990–1998. Synthesis Report. Copenhagen: MFA.
Oxford Policy Management (2005). A Joint Evaluation: Uganda's Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture. (November 2005). Copenhagen: MFA.
Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) and Cowi (2000). Evaluation of Danish Bilateral Assistance to Health 1988–1997. (November 2000). Copenhagen: MFA.
School of Public Policy University of Birmingham (1996). Evaluation of Rakai District Development Programme, Vol. I Synthesis Report and Vols II–IV. Copenhagen: MFA.
T&B Consult (1994). Evaluation of Danida Balance of Payments Support. Volume 1: Main Report and Volume 3: Case Studies of Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique. (July 1994).
Other References
Boesen, N. (2001). Advisers in Danish Bilateral Cooperation. Volume II: Annexes. Copenhagen: MFA.
COWI (1996). Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance. Country Study Uganda: Volume I, Main Report; Volume II, Assessment of Selected Interventions. (November 1996). Copenhagen: MFA.
Danida (1985). Project Guidelines, Appraisal and Planning. Copenhagen: Danida.
Development Assistance Committee (1995). Denmark Peer Review. Development Co-operation Review Series. Paris: OECD.
Development Assistance Committee (1999). Denmark Peer Review. Development Co-operation Review Series. Paris: OECD.
Development Assistance Committee (2003). Denmark 1995 No.10. Development Co-operation Review Series. Paris: OECD.
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MFA Danida (1992). Guidelines for Project Preparation. Copenhagen: Danida.
MFA Danida (1994a). A Developing World – Strategy for Danish Development Policy towards the year 2000. (1994). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1994b). A Developing World – Strategy for Danish Development Policy towards the year 2000. Summary of a Strategy Paper presented by the Danish Government. Paper made available by the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations. http://www.euforic.org/dk/adw.htm. (March 1994). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1996b). Strategy for Danish Bilateral Development Cooperation with Uganda. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (1998). Guidelines for Sector Programme Support. (1998). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2000a). Denmark's Development Policy: Strategy – Partnership 2000. (October 2000). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2000b). Strategy for Danish Support to Civil Society in Developing Countries – including Cooperation with the Danish NGOs. (October 2000). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2003a). A World of Difference: Government's Vision for New Priorities in Danish Development Assistance 2004–2008. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2004a). Annual Performance Review Report 2003: establishing a framework for Danish Development Assistance. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2004b). Uganda–Denmark Partnership – Strategy for Development Cooperation 2004-2008. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2005). Technical Assistance in Danish Bilateral Aid. Policy Paper, Department of Business Cooperation & Technical Assistance. (December 2005). Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2006a). Annual Performance Report 2005. Copenhagen: MFA.
MFA Danida (2006b). Organisation Manual for the Management of Danish Development Cooperation. Copenhagen: MFA.
NCG (2006). Pre-Study of Uganda Country Programme Evaluation. (March 13 2006). Copenhagen: MFA.
OECD (2006). 2005 Development Co-operation Report. OECD Journal on Development. Paris: OECD.
OECD Development Assistance Committee (2003). Rome Declaration on Harmonization. High Level Forum, Rome.
OECD Development Assistance Committee (2005). Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. High Level Forum, Paris, March 2. Paris: OECD.
Oxford Policy Management (2005). A Joint Evaluation: Uganda’s Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture. (November 2005). Copenhagen: MFA.
date: November 2006 TP10 Page 17
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Udsholt, L. (1996). Danish Aid Policies for Poverty Reduction: From non-committal statements to a more strategic approach. CDR Working Paper No. 96.7. Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research.
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 10: Organisation and Management of Danish Aid to Uganda
Annexes
Contents
Annex 1: Organisational Chart 2004...... 20 Annex 2: 2005 KVA Achievement Indicators ...... 21
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Annex 1: Organisational Chart 200411
11 Annex to RDE Financial Manual 2004.
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Annex 2: 2005 KVA Achievement Indicators
Source: MFA Annual Performance Report 2005 (MFA Danida 2006: 36).
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 11 –
Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda
Charles Lwanga-Ntale Martin Adams
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda
Contents
1. Introduction...... 1
2. Poverty Data and Poverty Monitoring in Uganda ...... 1 The Genesis of Poverty Monitoring in Uganda ...... 1 The National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Framework...... 4 Institutional Roles, Responsibilities and Relationships ...... 6 Central agencies...... 6 Sector/line ministries and other institutions...... 7 District-level poverty monitoring...... 8 Summary assessment...... 9
3. The Danida-Supported Gender-Disaggregated Poverty Profiles...... 10 Introduction...... 10 The origin of the EDGPM...... 10 Steps in the development of the EDGPM under ASPS1...... 11 EDGPM results ...... 11 From ASPS1 to ASPS2...... 12 Assessment of the contribution of the Gendered Poverty Profiles...... 12 Monitoring of the PMA...... 14 Conclusions for policy...... 15
Bibliography ...... 16
Boxes
Box 1: The structure of the monitoring system...... 7 Box 2: Extracts from the TOR relating to the District Poverty Profiles...... 10
Figures
Figure 1: The National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Framework ...... 5
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda
Acronyms and abbreviations
ASPS Agriculture Sector Programme Support ASRA Annual Sector Review Agreement CBR Center for Basic Research CDR Danish Centre for Development Research CDRN Community Development Resource Network CIAT Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical, Colombia CSO Civil Society Organisation DAE-MUK Department of Agricultural Economics, Makerere University, Kampala DATIC District Agricultural Technology & Information Centre DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies DRT Development Research and Training EDGPM External District Gendered Poverty Monitoring EPRC Economic Policy Research Center FO Farmer’s Organisation HASP Household Agricultural Support Project IGG Inspector General of Government IRM Inception Review Mission JLOS Justice, Law and Order Sector MAAIF Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDG Millennium Development Goal MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Denmark) MFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development NAADS National Agricultural Advisory Services NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NIMES National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy NPA National Planning Authority OPM Office of the Prime Minister PAF Poverty Action Fund PCR Project Completion Report PCU Programme Coordination Unit PEAP Poverty Eradication Action Plan PEWG Poverty Eradication Working Group PMA Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture PMAU Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit PMES Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy PMS Poverty Monitoring System PPA Participatory Poverty Assessment PRSC Poverty Reduction Support Credit PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSR Poverty Status Report ROM Results Orientated Management TOR Terms of Reference UBOS Uganda Bureau of Statistics UPPAP Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project
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EVALUATION OF DANIS H AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda
1. Introduction
1.1 Uganda’s poverty monitoring system (PMS) continues to evolve. The formulation of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was pivotal. Originally published in 1997, the PEAP has since gone through two revisions. The latest (third) PEAP edition (2004) was built on a wide range of consultations between Government, civil society and external development partners, and it recognises the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as one of its cardinal objectives.
1.2 The PMS in its current form aims at tracking the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) framework. It seeks to enable a two-way flow of information between beneficiaries and service providers on the one hand and policy makers on the other. Ultimately the system is aimed at ensuring timely and appropriate implementation of programmes derived from the PEAP framework, and contributing to accountability by revealing the degree to which declared objectives and agreed performance standards have been met.
1.3 The PEAP strategy for poverty reduction contains two principal objectives, namely: (a) to reduce by half the proportion of the population living below the poverty line by 2015; and, (b) to reduce by three quarters the infant and maternal mortality rates for the same period.
1.4 This paper reviews the genesis and status of poverty monitoring and analysis in Uganda, and its implications for the quality of evidence available to the evaluation of Danish Assistance. It is in two parts: (a) A review of poverty data and poverty monitoring in general over the evaluation period. (b) An assessment of the gendered poverty profiles supported by Danida in connection with its agricultural sector support programme and their future relevance for the monitoring and evaluation of the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA).
2. Poverty Data and Poverty Monitoring in Uganda
The Genesis of Poverty Monitoring in Uganda 2.1 Uganda’s poverty monitoring system has been built mainly on the existing structures of data collection and analysis, and objective and output monitoring. These structures have in the past been reported to have inherent weaknesses of principle and actual practice as is the case in most other poverty monitoring systems.1 Even in key sectors, such as education or health where management information systems are well resourced, there are problems of completeness, reliability, multiple reporting and waste. These problems are further aggravated by weak or distorted information flows and links between local and central government levels.
2.2 These challenges notwithstanding, Uganda’s PMS has attained a considerable level of maturity, creatively weaving additional qualitative and quantitative aspects into the system, and
1 See, for example, Booth, D. and Nsabagasani, D., 2005. date: November 2006 TP11 Page 1
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda ensuring that while each of these remains independent in design and delivery, together they contribute enhanced understanding by building a holistic picture of both the poverty situation and the impact of key development interventions.
2.3 During 2001–2002 efforts to define a strategy for coordinated monitoring of the PEAP led to the establishment of the Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit (PMAU) within the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. The PMAU outlined a strategy, the Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (PMES), one of the purposes of which was to help close the gap between what actually existed on the ground in terms of knowledge and understanding of poverty and what needed to be done in order to attune the poverty monitoring system to this reality. The PMES thus became the national monitoring and evaluation framework guiding sectoral management information systems, district monitoring and evaluation systems, and the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) monitoring requirements.
2.4 First, early focus was on identifying key elements of a suitable PEAP monitoring system. At the outset it was deemed necessary to have in place a system that produced information that was policy-relevant, reliable and timely. This, it was noted, necessitated comprehensive information reflecting the multi-dimensional nature of poverty. Consequently deliberate efforts were made to integrate both quantitative and qualitative information. This effort brought together the statistical series on household consumption produced by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) with information from qualitative and participatory poverty research which was already being used by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and which was further enhanced by the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP). Similarly, surveys on service delivery, the demographic surveys, and the National Integrity Surveys complemented the effort by bringing in additional quantitative and qualitative information.
2.5 A key challenge in taking this route is that more attention was being paid to monitoring of poverty-impact trends and outcomes rather than intermediate actions, processes and outputs. This was a key weakness in the system, because (a) it made it extremely difficult for analysts to track “causation” and (b) there was little attention to short-term indicators of progress in implementing the poverty reduction strategy. This was, perhaps, not completely surprising given that PEAP indicators and targets were only clearly specified at the outcome level, which left a gap between donor-instigated and country-based review mechanisms which the PMS and its annual reporting were not quite able to bridge.2
2.6 A second challenge was to integrate the monitoring system with the policy process. What Ugandan officials wanted to have in place quite early on was an institutional framework that facilitates the interaction between the “beneficiary population”, “information workers”, and policy makers. The poverty monitoring system was, in this regard, meant to ensure effective communication between communities on one hand and the statistical agency, research institutions, planning agencies and policy makers on the other hand. The involvement of both government and civil society organisations in monitoring the use of Poverty Action Fund (PAF) funds is only one example in this continuum. Though it was fraught with conceptual, methodological, and operational challenges, achieving the objective of integration was boosted by the willingness of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) not only to use the information arising from the different sources but, perhaps more importantly, to use such information to propose adjustments in budget policies and to encourage Government Ministries and District Administrations to review their own policies in the light of the emerging information. The process of integration became better established because of the new working
2 Ibid
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda arrangements between mainstream MFPED officials, the PMAU, UPPAP and, the Poverty Eradication Working Group (PEWG).
2.7 From that time, the Uganda Government continued to produce the Poverty Status Report (PSR) every two years, as the main document outlining progress in reducing poverty and meeting PEAP objectives in Uganda. Drawing on information from various sources, the PSR has over the years continued to collect and synthesise evidence from a cross-section of research findings on poverty while at the same time monitoring the critical indicators of poverty. In addition, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) Progress Reports are also produced and these give annual summaries of the state of poverty in those years when the PSR is not produced. Side by side with the annual review pr ocess is the annual preparation of a "Background to the Budget" which is in part informed by the PRSP Progress Report and which in turn informs policy makers on progress in PEAP implementation, specifically looking at each PEAP pillar, identifying key challenges, and proposing a way forward.
2.8 A third challenge was that the PMS which the Ugandan officials preferred had to have effective mechanisms for providing Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) information which was relevant to the different users, including policy makers, service providers and beneficiaries. However, the strategy as developed was only capable of identifying mechanisms linking policy makers and service providers. The role of the public who are beneficiaries of development interventions in regard to poverty monitoring remained undetermined. Given that the PEAP is supposed to be a comprehensive framework for poverty reduction, it needed to have in place monitoring mechanisms that respond to different stakeholders’ information needs, including those of beneficiaries. While the strategy recognises the role of NGOs/CSOs in promoting people’s participation in poverty monitoring, it does not explicitly involve the people themselves.
2.9 The challenges described above, though clearly recognised, were tackled with mixed success. At the political level the need for inter-ministerial coordination rekindled interest in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) – the office which at the political level is charged with overall coordination of Government business, and whose responsibility it is to coordinate and streamline routine reporting. Yet in practice, the arrangements which have over the last few years been set up under MFPED and more specifically the PMAU have continued to inform the annual reviews on PEAP implementation, in most instances leaving out the coordination function. Responding to this challenge, OPM during 2003–2004 spearheaded discussions aimed at formulation of a more inclusive monitoring strategy – the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES). Originally conceived as a comprehensive alternative to existing poverty monitoring systems, NIMES has now redefined its role to that of better coordination of what already exists on the ground, and is seen as a possible answer to the question of coordination and systematic approach to poverty monitoring in Uganda. However, the mandate o the National Planning Authority (NPA), launched in2004, seems to clash, at least in part, with that of OPM with respect to poverty monitoring.
2.10 Three key lessons emerge from the above review. First, it is now recognised that for the country’s poverty monitoring system to be effective and efficient it needs to overcome both political and technical challenges. The need for national ownership of the institutional framework is highlighted. This would forestall fragmentation of poverty monitoring and lead to the development of an evaluation culture as a practical tool, rather than a sanction, so that it can be proactively used by different authoritie s and sectors to define and implement poverty monitoring instruments. Uganda, like other developing countries, is here also challenged by the issue of institutionalising an effective disaggregated approach to assess changes in the status of specific categories of the poor and marginalised (e.g. women and girls, older people with disabilities, indigenous people, refugees and internally displaced persons, among others, who are date: November 2006 TP11 Page 3
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda particularly vulnerable to poverty) while at the same time generating a holistic picture of poverty trends over time.
2.11 Second, implicit in the above lesson is the need to support the country’s emerging institutional framework for poverty monitoring to ensure that efforts of different national sectors and agencies are coordinated and that the participation of different stakeholders within existing mandates and capacities is facilitated. An additional objective would be to support government to strengthen statistical information systems and M&E structures in the sector Ministries, and in UBOS, universities, research institutions, CSOs and the private sector to ensure production of reliable and high quality statistics on a regular basis. Similarly, it is also important to foster national ownership of poverty reduction goals and strategies through consultations with public, civil society and other actors. Such efforts should be specifically directed at establishing clear roles and responsibilities for developing independent monitoring systems so as to encourage poverty monitoring by the beneficiaries and community based groups, including NGOs and CSOs.
2.12 Third, within the different arms of Government itself, there is an added need to sensitise policy-makers to the importance of monitoring the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of poverty; identifying a core set of indicators for monitoring poverty at the intra-household, household, community, sub-national and national levels; identifying best practices for the design of innovative and participatory policies and programmes; and setting up monitoring procedures that allow for comparison of qualitative and quantitative data over time – by creating a network of national experts and practitioners in monitoring poverty.
The National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Framework 2.13 Levels of poverty: The redefined National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES) has been described at four different levels (see Figure 1). Level I lies at the pinnacle of the system, and this may be described as the overarching National Integrated M&E Strategy. The primary function at this level is that of coordination, and this is overseen by the Office of the Prime Minister, which houses the Coordination and Monitoring Secretariat.
2.14 Level II is the Higher National M&E Subsystem Coordination level. This is the level at which various key national processes, such as the budget process and the poverty research and analysis process, are located. In the current design, it is envisaged that policy-relevant information would flow between the two levels in order to enable major decision-making to take place.
2.15 Level III of the current monitoring and evaluation system brings in aspects of sectoral monitoring and evaluation, combining this with other types of monitoring which are carried out by national and district-based CSOs. While upward flow of sectoral information for national level planning and decision-making has always been the norm, increasingly information has been observed to flow between CSOs and the Higher National M&E Subsystem Coordination le vel.
2.16 Level IV, the District Level M&E Coordination level, facilitates the articulation of information from beneficiaries as well as communication of this information to the sectors. CSO information also plays a key role in this communication.
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Figure 1: The National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Framework
Level I: Overall National Integrated M&E
Strategy
Office of the Prime Minister (Coordination & Monitoring Secretariat) U N Info flow for high level G A policy decision making A T N I D Level II: Higher National M&E Subsystem Coordination O A
N A Budget S L Evaluation & P Poverty research A T S I T Other… A A Flow & CSO exchange L T of M&E I sectoral D S Info A T Level III: Sectoral M&E Subsystem Coordination T I A C Sector A
A Sector B Sector C I L N
th F S N Sector… R Y A
S CSO S T T Beneficiary Flow & Exchange of info between R E Assessments M&E M districts and sectors U C T District A District B U R E
Level IV: District Level M&E Coordination
2.17 Poverty indicators : A new and more cautious estimation (contained in the revised PEAP 2005) projects that poverty will fall to 28% by 2013/14 and 26% by 2015 and further if inequality is reduced or fertility falls. The PEAP also has an objective of achieving universal primary education by 2015, implying that net enrolment would be increased from the current 85% to 100% in 2015.
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2.18 Similarly, on gender, a key objective is to achieve gender parity by 2005 in primary and secondary education, and in all levels of education by 2015, and halving the prevalence of malnutrition by 2015. Other indicators include reducing under-five mortality by two-thirds by 2015; reducing maternal mortality by three quarters by 2015; halting the spread of HIV and AIDS; halting the spread of malaria and other major diseases by 2015; halving the proportion of people by 2015 without sustainable access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation; and improving the lives of slum dwellers.
Institutional Roles, Responsibilities and Relationships Central agencies 2.19 The Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development – effectively, the Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit (PMAU) – is the main driving force behind M&E actions at the Higher National M&E Subsystem Coordination level, ensuring that the selection of indicators reflects the direction of the PEAP strategy, and developing an agenda of research to examine the causes of poverty. The Ministry has in the last few years also coordinated poverty data collection, particularly the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs), as well as data analysis. In addition it has regularly published poverty status reports that present a holistic view of the poverty situation in Uganda vis-à-vis PEAP implementation. Similarly, MFPED working through PMAU has been at the forefront of dissemination of poverty findings and PEAP review status to Government and civil society, as well as to different working groups.
2.20 Thus MFPED has to date been a lead institution for monitoring intermediate and final outcomes resulting from the PEAP interventions.3 The PMAU's status as a unit within the MFPED encourages a very close link between the activities of monitoring policy formulation and expenditure allocation, with the same personnel working on both sets of issues. The PMAU is also responsible for disseminating the results of monitoring. This includes formal publication of the Poverty Status Reports, informal exchanges with sectoral ministries and dissemination of information to the public.
2.21 More specifically the PMAU has hitherto: § worked in collaboration with UBOS on the national household surveys, especially in suggesting relevant poverty indicators which would inform the PEAP strategy; § overseen the collection and analysis of qualitative information on poverty and wellbeing, and on processes contributing to changes in different poverty dimensions, including the implementation of PEAP programmes; § commissioned poverty related research on specific issues; § ANALYSED various data sets in order to feed into the production of annual PRSP Progress Reports, bi-annual Poverty Status Reports, and occasional Discussion Papers; and § disseminated the various reports produced in national and district-based institutions.
2.22 Within the same Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development’s Budget and Macro-economic Departments monitoring is undertaken respectively of public expenditure and macroeconomic indicators.
3 This role is expected to change in the future following establishment of the National Planning Authority (NPA) and the NIMES secretariat within the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM).
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2.23 The Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation System (PMES) classifies indicators along five links of the results chain, namely: input, output, process, outcome, and impact. Information is available on these indicators, although this is to varying degrees of regularity and accuracy. The PMES also identifies institutional responsibilities for poverty monitoring. The monitoring structure is summarised in Box 1.
Box 1: The structure of the monitoring system Indicator level Institution responsible Input indicators Budget Department Output indicators Budget Department/line Ministries/Local Governments Process and impact indicators National Poverty Reduction Programme/Statistics Departments/Line Ministries/Local Governments
2.24 The Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) is the lead institution in providing national statistical data on intermediate and final outcome indicators. According to the UBOS Act, the bureau has an oversight mandate in relation to statistical data standards in government systems, although it may be argued that in more recent times it has been much less involved in supervising sectoral and district level statistical systems. The bureau has responsibility for the general coordination of surveys, as well as the data collection and analysis function. It conducts censuses and surveys (including Integrated Household Surveys, National Service Delivery Surveys, and Demographic and Health Surveys) and provides basic analysis of these data. It also constructs national accounts.
2.25 All the above functions are carried out in partnership with the Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit in MFPED. In particular the two institutions collaborate on the preparation and analysis of socio-economic data. Overall, collaboration between UBOS and PMAU is at two levels, namely, on definition of information needs and indicators to be produced, and on analysis of outputs.
2.26 In order to achieve its objectives, UBOS collects and analyses household and community level data to provide timely poverty indicators on service use, and poverty trends. It also aims to promote comparability of data from different sources by ensuring standardisation of approaches by all data agencies on matters of definitions and concepts. The bureau has also been working closely with the Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC), ensuring that deeper quantitative and economic analysis is undertaken of the data which it (UBOS) collects.
2.27 Besides the tasks which UBOS carries out at national level, it also provides technical support to districts and other institutions undertaking statistical data colle ction.
Sector/line ministries and other institutions 2.28 The line Ministries, using their Management Information Systems in Planning Units, produce information that serves as a basis for other work in poverty monitoring. This information is, however, limite d by a narrow base, as the line ministries only cover particular groups in the population (e.g. those who access education in registered schools or those who go to health centres) making it difficult to undertake a comparative analysis. This problem notwithstanding, the respective sector Ministries are often in a better position to produce certain kinds of data and information which are relevant to the sector. In particular they design indicators and collect administrative data on service delivery efforts and their immediate outcomes; analyse these data in conjunction with other data sources, and identify policy responses.
2.29 More specifically, line ministries are the lead institutions for monitoring inputs, activities, outputs, and sectoral aspects of PEAP implementation. They develop targets to assess sectoral date: November 2006 TP11 Page 7
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda performance, including both interim and final targets to be achieved by 2017 (the PEAP target year of eradicating mass poverty). In addition, they use their management information systems to ensure that reliable and timely M&E data is generated for their own use, and for policy makers at different levels and in different locations. In this regard, therefore, they also contribute to the generation of information for monitoring the annual PRSP indicators, and the bi-annual PSR.
2.30 In some instances, as is the case with the Ministries of Education, Health and Lands, regular evaluation exercises by independent evaluators have been commissioned to assess sectoral performance with a view to drawing lessons for improvement.
2.31 The list of sectoral ministries which have a key link with the Poverty Monitoring System is long, and in this paper we can only provide examples of what actually happens. The Ministry of Public Service, for example, provides information on public service performance (using the Results Oriented Management (ROM) system). On the other hand the Uganda AIDS Commission coordinates data and policy responses on HIV/AIDS, while the Police, Judiciary, Prisons, and other JLOS institutions compile administrative data on crime and the activities of the police and judiciary. Similarly, the Inspector General of Government (IGG), the Auditor General and the Department of Ethics and Integrity ensures that inputs are converted into outputs in a transparent manner by monitoring the integrity of public expenditures. In the meantime, the Uganda Human Rights Commission provides information on human rights issues.
2.32 In order for the poverty monitoring system described above to benefit from independent research and analysis, a number of institutions carry out research on topical subjects and issues. The Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC), for example, conducts relevant economic policy research that informs the monitoring process. At the same time, the Centre for Basic Research (CBR), Development Research & Training (DRT), and the Community Development Resource Network (CDRN) produce poverty and policy relevant research which also informs the monitoring and evaluation system.
2.33 There are, in addition, other academic institutions and NGOs conducting research on different aspects of poverty, using either official or their own data. The NGO Forum Coordinates CSOs’ monitoring efforts which complement government efforts in monitoring poverty at all levels by providing reports on public expenditures (whether funds were received at the point of service delivery, and actually used for the intended purposes).
2.34 NGO monitoring also provides reports on value-for-money with respect to public expenditure (quality of outputs), and on poverty dynamics among specific socio-economic groups such as orphans, people with disabilities, etc.
District-level poverty monitoring 2.35 At the District level, local governments monitor inputs, the implementation of service delivery activities, outputs, and outcomes. This monitoring feeds into both the sectoral and the national level monitoring system. In order to have better streamlined and capacitated district poverty monitoring systems, efforts have been made by Central Government, especially working through UBOS, to strengthen district management information systems. A case in point was the support which was extended by Danida to the Kalangala District Council and which linked the Danish Statistical Organisation with a UBOS operation at a district level. A key objective is for the districts to generate timely information on PEAP implementation under the different sectors. These data mostly include activities, outputs, and outreach. Similarly, district monitoring and evaluation information is used to draw lessons to enhance local government performance in implementing the PEAP.
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Summary assessment 2.36 The status of poverty monitoring and analysis in Uganda continues to evolve. The PEAP is a useful starting point for tracing different deve lopment partners’ contributions to the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy. Danida’s current interventions in Uganda are captured at a number of levels – district, sectoral, non-state and national levels.
2.37 Considerable progress has been made in enhancing the quality of decision-making in terms of formulation, budgeting and operational management. The increased availability of information concerning national poverty eradication efforts has also allowed key stakeholders, such as civil society, Parliament and development partners, to exert more influence over public policy. While a major part of the progress is attributable to the Poverty Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (PMES) which was developed in 2001, and which identified a set of 33 priority indicators for implementation of the PEAP, the contribution of other stakeholders to the evolution of the system should not be underestimated. Thus learning was also gained from such processes as the Danida support to decentralisation.
2.38 In order for Government to make key decisions which would keep the implementation of the PEAP on track, a systematic monitoring and evaluation system is being fostered. The strength of this system will lie in the coordinated flow of relevant information from different sectors and levels to decision makers, who can then make informed decisions on whether modifications to policies and spending programmes are necessary. Thus the system will best function when it is able to provide key decision-makers with a flow of reliable information and analysis about what works and what does not. In addition to this function, the M&E system is also designed to keep other stakeholders (such as civil society organisations, the legislature, the public, and donor development partners) informed about the progress being made in implementing the PEAP, and therefore enables them to offer informed advice to decision makers and, where appropriate, to modify their own policies and programmes.
2.39 To date, Uganda’s Poverty Monitoring System has found root in strong partnership between PMAU in MFPED on one hand and other actors, such as UBOS and Civil Society Organisations, on the other. New developments with respect to the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES) at the Prime Minister’s Office are awaited.
2.40 While much progress has been made in developing Uganda’s Poverty Monitoring Framework and system, a number of challenges still remain. These include weak coordination, a limited flow of reliable and relevant information, gaps in data collection, etc. In order to address some of these challenges, in particular that of rationalising M&E, one of the strategies which have been proposed by the Government of Uganda is to implement the National Integrated M&E Strategy, with a secretariat in the Office of the Prime Minister. NIMES is not a new system but a coordinating function and will provide mechanisms for the systematic flow of data relevant to the tracking of progress in implementing the PEAP.
2.41 At the same time, the Uganda Government's explicit focus on poverty reduction, and hence its concerted efforts to improve the monitoring of poverty, began only in the mid-1990s. Even then, collection and analysis of data is a slow process. The quality of poverty data available at the end of this study's evaluation period is much better than at the beginning, but data for the early years in particular are very patchy. This limits the extent to which aid in general, still less the Danish aid programme in particular, can be precisely correlated with trends in various dimensions of poverty. The next section reviews one of Danida's interventions that was explicitly designed to address this problem.
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3. The Danida-Supported Gender-Disaggregated Poverty Profiles
Introduction 3.1 The TOR for this study anticipated that the information generated by the ‘district poverty profiles’ would form an integral part of the evaluation of the Danish Uganda Country Programme (1987–2005) and that the ‘main results’ pertaining to the profiles would become available before the eva luation commenced (see Box 2). In the event, the district poverty profiles provided information limited to part of the Agriculture Sector Programme Support (ASPS) up to 2003; and the report on the second round of results was not available on time. Nonetheless, the reports and documents pertaining to the External District Gendered Poverty Monitoring (EDGPM) component of the ASPS, which was out-sourced to Ugandan and Danish research institutions, have been studied and meetings have been held with the main actors involved. 4 The process has generated useful pointers on issues relating to the future monitoring of the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA).
Box 2: Extracts from the TOR relating to the District Poverty Profiles 4. Approach and Methodology 2. District poverty profiles will form an integral part of the evaluation. The Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, Makerere University is currently conducting such studies in co-operation with the Agriculture Sector Programme Support. The profiles will be ready in time for the actual evaluation exercise, and will be made available to the consultant. It will also be possible for the Consultant to define specific data requirements that they wish to extract from the database at Makerere.
5.1.2. Overall human and social context and development The evaluation should provide answers to the general development concerning key Uganda indicators like: · Human Development Index, [etc] · District poverty profiles (updating by Makerere University of 2000-profiles in co-operation with Danish-funded Agriculture Sector Programme Support)
5.3.2. Contribution of Danish financed activities to human and social development achievements Consider achievements against specific indicators of the current Danish country strategy [inter alia] · Poverty reduction and gender (including district poverty profiles, updated by Makerere University in co-operation with Agriculture Sector Programme Support)
6. Timetable It is anticipated that the evaluation will be completed by November 2006, as indicated below. The tentative time schedule of the evaluation is as follows: District Poverty profiles – main results (Makerere) Nov 05-Jan 06
The origin of the EDGPM 3.2 The EDGPM was a sub-component of the ASPS, under Phase 1 (September 1998–June 2004) and Phase 2, beginning July 2004. Phase 1 was a Danida-specific programme, but ASPS2 is more explicitly linked to the PMA, and includes a Danish contribution to the joint funding of the new government approach to agricultural extension represented by NAADS (National Agricultural Advisory Services). Accordingly, under ASPS2, Danish support to NAADS has replaced assistance to the Household Agricultural Support Project (HASP), a component of ASPS1 (see Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources).
4 The Department of Agricultural Economics, Makerere University; Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit, in MFPED in Kampala; and the Danish Institute of International Studies in Copenhagen
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Steps in the development of the EDGPM under ASPS1 3.3 The ASPS1 Project Document (MFA Danida, 1998) stated that ‘district gender disaggregated and poverty profiles in the focus districts of HASP’ would be established for the monitoring of project impact (page 56). The poverty profiles would be used to measure the impact of ASPS on poverty in general and gender in particular in six pilot districts. At the same time, it was noted that the performance of the agricultural economy would inevitably reflect other external factors (the quality of the rainy season; the government’s macro-economic policies, etc.) and that such phenomena would also have to be monitored and taken into account. The proposal for the monitoring of project impact was in addition to M&E of directly verifiable indicators (numbers of HASP groups formed, training sessions conducted, etc).
3.4 Two years later in March 2000, the ASPS Annual Sector Review Agreement (ASRA) (MFA Danida and MAAIF, 2000) stated that the plans for the EDGPM were still being developed. The Uganda Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC) and the Danish Centre for Development Research (CDR) had been designated by the ASPS to form a task group for developing the system and to draft a proposal for the wor k. However, the proposal needed ‘strengthening’, especially with regard to the institutional relationships between the two research institutions and the ASPS. By September 2000, a more detailed proposal had been prepared by the Department of Agricultural Economics, Makerere University Kampala (DAE-MUK) and CDR as the external task group (MFA Danida, 2000).
3.5 The proposed survey methodology was based on one developed by Helle Munk Ravnborg of CDR and Roskilde University in association with her colleagues in CIAT, with Danida’s support (Ravnborg, H.M. et al., 1999). District poverty profiles and indices were to be obtained by means of stratified sample surveys involving some 400–500 households per district. The report proposed a monitoring system comprising three main elements: (a) socio -economic policy context; (b) district gendered poverty profile; and (c) the assessment of the impact of external change processes. The intention was to repeat the gendered poverty and impact monitoring every two or three years to provide information necessary to isolate the impacts of ASPS and non-ASPS poverty and gendered changes.
EDGPM results 3.6 Four years after the case for district poverty profiles was made in the ASPS Project Document, the Annual Sector Review Agreement of 2001 (MFA and MAAIF, 2001) stated that the monitoring work was finally about to commence, in August-November 2001. In the following year, it was recorded that the EDGPM team had completed the policy context studies and the district gendered poverty prof iles (MFA and MAAIF, 2002).
3.7 During the period 2001–2003, the profiles were obtained for five pilot districts in which the Household Agricultural Support Project (HASP) was operational, namely Kabarole, Rakai, Masaka, Pallisa and Tororo (Ravnborg H.M. et al, 2004). A sixth district, Bundibugyo, had to be omitted from ASPS1, at least until 2002, for security reasons and was not included in the original EDGPM baseline surveys. HASP, an ASPS1 component, was a community-based activity which aimed to reduce rural poverty by improving income from household agriculture. It was coordinated with other ASPS initiatives involving formal and non-formal agricultural education and support to farmers’ organisations. HASP also sought to develop local governments’ capacit y to respond to farmers’ needs and to test policies which are now being more widely applied by the PMA, part of the government’s broader poverty reduction strategy.
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From ASPS1 to ASPS2 3.8 The Project Completion Report for ASPS1 refers to the innovative methodologies which had been developed to monitor rural poverty and better understand its dynamics. It concludes that the methodology has the potential to complement the PMA and national poverty monitoring processes. However, the geographical coverage of the EDGPM was perceived to be too limited to form a representative poverty monitoring data-set: The first studies to monitor changes in the baseline areas will be undertaken by the ASPS II in 2005/2006. Coverage to include more districts using this methodology would be expanded in consultation with the PMA and Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit (PMAU) of MFPED. At the same time, impact indicators from these institutions would be mainstreamed into the methodology (italics inserted). (MFA Danida and GOU, 2005: 13).
3.9 The ASPS2 Appraisal Report (MFA Danida, 2004) stated that the EDGPM activities should be continued only if the PMA Secretariat fully adopted the past and future technical gender and poverty impact studies undertaken in five districts: For all M&E support, special emphasis should be given to the usefulness of data collected for being used at the more aggregate levels in PMA/MAAIF, MFPED, and Prime Minister's Office. (p.12) The meaning is not clear, but read together with the statement from the PCR of ASPS1 (Para 3.8), it suggests a centrist bias which is at odds with the philosophy and participatory approach developed for the EDGPM.
3.10 The final word on EDGPM’s transition to ASPS2 is contained in the 2005 Review of ASPS2 (MFA Danida, 2005). The IRM had discussions with the External Poverty and Gender Monitoring Unit at Makerere University on the integration of its ASPS-financed activities into the M&E framework of the PMA and PMAU; an integration which the ASPS-II appraisal set as a strong prerequisite for continued support. ……it does appear that both the ASPS and Makerere University understand, accept and [will] work towards the required integration and alignment. However, the developments should be closely followed by future reviews. The external monitoring studies undertaken in six districts during ASPS-I will be expanded to another two districts in 2005/6 and possibly another four new districts in the coming years. This expansion is considered necessary in order to make the monitoring useful on the larger, national scale of the PMA and PMAU. The new set of monitoring data should be actively used to assess the medium-term impact of ASPS-I, disseminated through various papers and reports. (page 16)
3.11 Discussions have been held with the Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit (PMAU), which has also advised on how to improve the indicators’ list and focus. PMAU advised that no additional value was being gained by ASPS collecting information on aspects/indicators of poverty where other institutions were already collecting the data and in order to address the problem of relevance of the information being collected, a number of workshops have been held to look more critically at the instruments which are being used.
Assessment of the contribution of the Gendered Poverty Profiles 3.12 The ASPS2 Project Document refers to the EDGPM in appreciative terms: A major contribution to the discussion around gender and poverty has been made by ASPS1’s External Gendered Poverty Monitoring Unit (EGPMU) which has developed a strategy to evaluate the impact of ASPS interventions. This followed from the overall objective of ASPS1 which has been to improve the conditions for the poorest part of the population and to contribute to reducing gender-based inequalities in Uganda. ………… The EDGPM surveys undoubtedly added value to existing government efforts to measure poverty by quantitative methods alone. The EDGPM indices may be viewed as bridging the gap between the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment (UPPAP) efforts and the traditional income
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and expenditure poverty measures associated with the work of Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS). (MFA Danida and MFPED, 2004: 15).
3.13 The methodology is reported to have been widely tested in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and is used by other aid agencies. It involves a participatory approach in which men’s and women’s concepts of well-being are ranked and extrapolated statistically to develop common, quantifiable district-level indicators. The EDPGM approach depicts and compares the situation of the ‘better off’, the ‘less poor’ and the ‘poorest’ households according to a number of dimensions that local people themselves identify as important when describing poverty and well- being in their communities. It makes possible the analysis of aspects of equality and inequality in gender relations within the household. Based on women’s own perceptions of their well-being, three levels of equality in gender relations are distinguished and related to household poverty (Ravnborg, H.M. et al., 2004).
3.14 Several issues in poverty, gender and M&E are brought to the fore by the Gender Poverty Profiles project. In defining poverty, the project recognises that women are a vulnerable group and that female -headed households are more vulnerable to falling into poverty. Results demonstrate that intra-household consumption differences by gender exist. The DAE reports discuss these intra-household distribution patterns. However, the issue of workload gender inequalities including unpaid women’s work and unequal gender impacts of male migration to the urban areas was not fully covered by the study. Similarly, the project only made a superficial gender analysis of domestic violence, human rights and personal safety or the inadequacy of the legal system to address domestic violence.
3.15 There is no doubt that the EDGPM methodology provides a basis for analysing the outcomes, including both the households reached and the resulting behavioural changes achieved through various development interventions. It can be related both to poverty levels, gender relations and differences between districts. The methodology is a departure from one- dimensional measures of poverty based on household income and expenditure, which facilitate inter-district comparisons, but do not uncover the varied wants and needs of the poor or the underlying reasons for differences in well-being.
3.16 For the purpose of the impact analysis in the five HASP pilot districts, respondents were asked to indicate whether they were members of various groups, whether they had participated in different activities such as field days or on-farm-trials, and whether these activities had received support from or were organised by outside agencies. Positive responses on exposure to ASPS were so few that households were included as “reached” by the activities of one of the components if they had just participated in any one activity supported by that component, irrespective of the type of activity. In total, 26% of the households of the five districts had been reached by an external intervention, including those by the local government, NGOs, etc., while 6% were reached by one or more of the three ASPS components. This low percentage was not surprising, considering the short period that the ASPS had been in operation. Significantly higher exposure was found among the better-off households, followed by the less poor and with the lowest among the poorest (Ravnborg, H.M. et al., 2004).
3.17 For this evaluation, the scope for assessing the impact of the ASPS interventions by reference to just one round of results (i.e. 2001–2002) was very limited. However, the potential usefulness of the approach for monitoring impact in rural Uganda is evident from elsewhere – for example, from Kabale District (Boesen, J. et al., 2004). The second round of results from the five pilot districts is expected to add significantly to understanding of the rural economy and gender- related poverty. All fieldwork is reported to have been completed, data are now being analysed and reports are being written. The second report will cover the socio-economic and gender date: November 2006 TP11 Page 13
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda aspects in eight districts. Another report, the Monitoring Report, is also being prepared, but this is only based on the first six districts for which at least two sets of data will be available, thus enabling comparison. A panel element of 511 households was included in the sample in order to help track changes in poverty over time.
3.18 An early concern from within the project was that the different agro-ecological zones in the country do not seem to have been well represented. A proposal was thus made to increase the number of sample districts by including the districts of Kabale, Yumbe, Kapchorwa, and Hoima. However, inadequate funds were allocated by the Programme Coordination Unit (PCU) and only two additional districts, Yumbe and Kabale, were added in the second round of data collection.
3.19 It is reported that the first EDGPM study of ASPS impact was not well received by the authorities in Kampala. This was partly a problem of institutional design and reflected the earlier findings of the Annual Sector Review Agreement of 2000 relating to the need for strengthening linkages between the external survey team and the ASPS project and UBOS. At the very outset of the project, an effort was made to have in place a structured collaboration between DAE and UBOS, but this does not seem to have materialised. On the part of the ASPS, the poor reception could possibly have been due to over-optimistic expectations and a lack of awareness of the initial geographical scope and content of ASPS coverage in the pilot districts.
3.20 Within the PMAU and UBOS it would appear that the socio-economic context study was well received and positive feedback was given. The gendered poverty analysis by the study was well received, though some stakeholders complained about the ‘inaccessibility’ of the report due to its technical nature.
3.21 Our interviews of the authorities in May–June 2006 recorded little enthusiasm for the EDGPM studies, especially those relating to the disappointing ASPS impact. It was reported by the researchers involved that the study was perceived to be too critical. The EDGPM was not in step with the ASPS1 planning cycle and survey findings could not be taken into account in the preparation of annual work plans and budgets. The development of the district profiles was not undertaken during the inception phase of the programme and subsequent results were slow in being forthcoming. As noted by the ASPS Gender Consistency Study: ‘Although the activity monitoring is supposed to feed into the impact monitoring by the external monitoring unit, the lack of a thorough gender analysis means that the information will only be able to indicate by how much but not how well the activities met gender targets’ (Kharano, E. and Tanzarn, N., 2003: 23).
3.22 Overall, the gendered poverty profiles brought a hitherto overlooked aspect of poverty monitoring to the fore. It may be argued that the gendered poverty profiles which were developed by the EDGPM have already informed government thinking. This is evidenced by key statements and proposals which have been made on gender and poverty. But as one official put it, however, “… having statements captured in the PEAP document is not a guarantee that implementation will actually happen on the ground…”. Much remains to be done to mainstream intra-household disparities into poverty monitoring.
Monitoring of the PMA 3.23 In April 2002, relatively early in the life of the PMA, a Monitoring and Evaluation Study was conducted of the PMA (MASDAR and Sunshine Projects, 2002). The purpose of the study was to streamline and improve existing arrangements and focus on the poverty reduction, central to the PMA. The study concluded that existing M&E systems and procedures were extremely
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 11: Poverty Monitoring and Analysis in Uganda fragmented and primarily concerned with performance monitoring by central government ministries and with little attention being paid to impact. The study noted that the UBOS mainly carried out socio -economic surveys, the results of which were for the purposes of manage ment by central government. The periphery (i.e. districts and lower levels of local government) lacked human and infrastructural resources for monitoring and was poorly served by UBOS. More should be done to build capacity at the local level.
3.24 Despite a promising start, subsequent progress with setting up the PMA monitoring system, especially the measurement of programme impacts, appears to have been slow. The second review of the PMA stated that it was regrettable that it had taken until August 2003 to produce the M&E framework and that there remained many challenges in developing useful interpretations of the framework (Ekwamu, A. and Ashley, S., 2003).
3.25 The PMA Evaluation of 2005 (Oxford Policy Management, 2005) (a joint evaluation which was funded and led by Danida) contains some important observations on M&E and reserves one of its nine priority recommendations for the topic: As part of its M&E, there is a need for more systematic impact assessment. This should be linked to the implementation of the PMA M&E system, which should include key impact indicators and periodic case studies, to address more qualitative aspects of PMA implementation and impact.
3.26 This recommendation clearly strengthens the case and the urgency for upgrading the EDGPM approach pioneered under ASPS1 so that it is fully aligned with the PMA.
Conclusions for policy 3.27 If the EDGPM is to be aligned and integrated with the PMA, the scope of the survey instruments will have to be expanded to cover more districts, embrace the seven ‘priority pillars’ of the PMA (extension, research, agricultural education, farm credit and marketing, natural resource management and rural roads and water supply) and further develop and learn from techniques of gendered poverty monitoring. While implementation of the M&E system would be coordinated by the PMA, technical coordination would be the responsibility of the Poverty Monitoring Analysis Unit (PMAU) under MFPED.
3.28 Furthermore, the resolution of problems encountered by M&E of the ASPS and the PMA requires closer attention from programme management than it has received hitherto. It is evident that matters relating to M&E of outcomes have been typically pushed aside and postponed. EPGPM was poorly coordinated under ASPS1 and is lagging behind under ASPS2.
3.29 Ugandan ownership of the process is vital. M&E must complement and link with national poverty monitoring systems. At the same time technical cooperation, which draws on relevant international experience, will be essential for the oversight of planning and data analysis. DIIS researchers are well qualified to provide the support required and should be more closely involved.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 12 –
Environmental Aspects of the Danida Programme
Martin Adams
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 12: Environmental Aspects of the Danida Programme
Contents
Introduction...... 1
ODA for sustainable resource use...... 1 Contribution by Other Donors...... 1 Danida’s Contribution...... 2
Indirect environmental consequences of Danida’s aid programme ...... 3 Private Sector Development ...... 3 Agriculture and Rural Water Supply Sectors...... 4 Transport ...... 4 Energy ...... 5 Health...... 6
Bibliography ...... 7
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 12: Environmental Aspects of the Danida Programme
Acronyms and abbreviations
ADB African Development Bank DWD Directorate for Water Development EIA Environmental Impact Assessment ENRECA Enhancement of Research Capacity in Developing Countries MUIENR Makerere University, Institute of Environment and Natural Resources NAADS National Agricultural Advisory Service NARE National Association of Professional Environmentalists NEMA National Environment Management Authority NGO Non Government Organisation ODA official development assistance IPs International Partners PMA Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture PSD Private Sector Development RDE Royal Danish Embassy TP Thematic Paper UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development WAP Water Action Plan WRAP Water Resources Monitoring and Assessment Services
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 12: Environmental Aspects of the Danida Programme
Introduction 1. The environmental impact of Danida’s development cooperation can be viewed from two standpoints: a) the significance of projects and programmes which aimed directly to contribute to the sustainable use and conservation of Uganda’s natural resources; and b) the indirect environmental consequences of projects and programmes funded by Danida. These are discussed in turn below.
ODA for sustainable resource use
Contribution by Other Donors 2. With the notable exception of support to conservation in protected areas provided through CARE Denmark, Danida involvement in the environmental sphere has been modest in Uganda. Of the Nordic countries, Sweden has taken a leading role with its Lake Victoria Initiative of 2003 under which the countries with lake coasts have produced an agreement on the sustainable development of the area and the lake and a joint vision for its future. The area is threatened by escalating poverty and alarming environmental degradation, as well as the failure of expected rains. The destruction of the basin’s wetlands has resulted in a loss of bio-diversity and a decreased filtering effect on the water entering the lake via watercourses.
3. The water hyacinth, now brought under control, has previously been a source of concern, but it is not the most important environmental issue.1 Others are: · increasing population causing human waste, urban runoff, effluent discharges from industries; · deforestation that leads to erosion and an inflow of enormous quantities of soil into the lake; · inflow of residues from the use of chemical herbicides and pesticides and to some extent heavy metals resulting from gold mining operations; · raw waste from settlements, market centres and towns around the lake; · unsustainable use of the major wetlands through agricultural activities which have greatly reduced the buffering capacity of the wetlands; · Over-releases by hydro-electric power projects into the Victoria Nile; and · the impact of climate change and decreased rainfall which is affecting the hydrology of the lake basin.
4. Concerning the environmental implications of climate change and decreasing rainfall, Uganda's policy response to the threats of climate change has been poor. National climate policies do not exist. The implementation of global climate policies have not been integrated into national policy frameworks, partly due to conflicting national and global priorities. Given limited national awareness and the fact that climate policy is marginal relative to other national interests in Uganda, the experiences with donor support for the implementation of global climate policy nationally have been poor. Neither national policies nor donor advocacy have secured a country- driven approach (Holm Olsen, 2006).
1 http://www.sida.se:80/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=479&a=1467&language=en_US date: November 2006 TP12 Page 1
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 12: Environmental Aspects of the Danida Programme
5. Since 1995, the World Bank has also been prominent in contributing to natural resource conservation and development in Uganda, most recently with support to the Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (2002). Other projects, ten in number, cover protected areas’ management, environmental management and capacity building.
Danida’s Contribution 6. In 1987, Danida responded in a timely manner to the alarm raised by the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. In Uganda, Denmark’s contribution to farm forestry, part of the national Forestry Rehabilitation Programme, aimed to protect the remaining natural forest, reduce soil erosion and help the rural population become self-sufficient in timber for construction and fuel. The difficulties faced by Danida’s contribution to the FRP and the reasons for them are briefly noted in Section 4 of Thematic Paper 1.
7. It was with the regional importance of Lake Victoria to the Nile Basin and other water resources in mind that the ‘Uganda Action Plan for Water Resources Development and Management’ (also known as the ‘Water Action Plan’ or WAP) was funded by Danida in 1993– 95. The project emerged from discussions in Copenhagen in 1991, leading up to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, during which new strategies for improving water resource development and management were formulated. These were subsequently elaborated in an International Conference on Water and the Environment held in Dublin in January 1992. Uganda n representatives from the Directorate for Water Development (DWD) were involved in all these meetings. One of the recommendations which emerged was that each country should formulate a national action plan to effectively coordinate water resource development.
8. The purpose of the project was ‘to manage and develop the water resources of Uganda in an integrated manner so as to secure and provide water of adequate quantity and quality for all social and economic needs’ (MFA Danida, 1993). This important project was a prelude to the project entitled ‘Strengthening of Water Resources Monitoring and Assessment Services’ (WRAP) and the current Water Sector Programme Support. Uganda’s effective management of water resources has implications for downstream users in Sudan and Egypt and is of interest to all signatories of the Nile Waters Agreement (RDE, Danida, 1995).
9. Since 1994, Denmark has funded capacity building in wildlife management and research into the population genetics of wildlife. Rebuilding the game populations , game management and protection within Uganda’s national parks depends on knowledge of population genetics to conserve and multiply unique populations and avoid inbreeding. Danida funded a laboratory for DNA analyses which was set up at Makerere University, Institute of Environment and Natural Resources (MUIENR). The intention is that the laboratory will become financially self- sustaining. The Ugandan researchers are being assisted in applying for other external support for new research projects. The DNA lab is attracting outside orders for analyses which are carried out for payment. A total of 4 Ugandans have been trained to Ph.D. level and 2 have obtained master’s degrees. The new Ph.D.s will be able to continue their work at the lab or use their expertise in other fields where they are in great demand, such as human or veterinary medicine, agricultural research or environmental management. The project has also increased general understanding of molecular biology at Makerere University, thereby adding to capacity building and curriculum development (RDE, Danida, 2005).
10. The cooperation between Copenhagen and Makerere Universities has greatly contributed to capacity development in the environmental sphere. Funds have been forthcoming through the
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Programme for Enhancement of Research Capacity in Developing Countries (ENRECA) which is funded by Danida. It is a partnership arrangement between Danish and host-country institutions with the purpose of promoting mutual learning through collaborative research and research capacity enhancement.
11. Over the last 10 years, Danida has funded the implementation by CARE Denmark of three important projects for the development of protected areas and local communities. As farmers and their husbands on the fringes of African national parks know, the benefits of wildlife conservation are usually enjoyed by a very different group from that which bears the brunt of its costs. CARE Denmark has worked to increase the benefits and reduce the costs to local communities living near three protected areas in Uganda on the understanding that these remaining protected areas will diminish further until the benefits from wildlife are shared more equitably.
1996-2004 Queen Elizabeth Protected Phase 1 addressed the perceived problem of unsustainable use Area (QEPA) Community by local people of terrestrial, park resources (wood fuel for Conservation Project domestic use and fish smoking) and lake resources (fish). (104.N.251.b.1) The scope of Phase 2 scope was broadened to establish and institutionalise a collaborative management framework for sustainable and mutually beneficial relationships between QEPA-adjacent communities and QEPA authorities. 1997-2002 Development Through An integrated conservation and development project which Cooperation (DTC) Bwingi aimed to share the benefits of protected areas more equitably Impenetrable Forest with local communities. National Park & Gorilla National Park (104.N.251.PDB.15) 2003 – 2008 Rights, Equity and Protected REPA operates in south western Uganda among the Areas (REPA) Bwindi, communities that surround important forest and wildlife Mgahinga, Queen Elizabeth biodiversity resources. These areas are characterised by park- Kalinzu, Maramagambo and people conflicts, poverty and discrimination all of which Echuya Forests Programme impinge on the human rights of the people living there. This (104.N.251.PDB.36) intervention has an important advocacy dimension which targets policy makers.
Indirect environmental consequences of Danida’s aid programme
12. With regard to the indirect environmental consequences of projects and programmes funded by Denmark, the balance of evidence is that Danida has been attentive to potential adverse environmental consequences, although the same cannot be said for some of Denmark’s international partners.
Private Sector Development 13. Thematic Paper 9: Private Sector Development identifies 38 Ugandan-Danish business projects that have been funded. Seventeen were in agriculture related activities such as dairy farming, poultry, piggery and agro-processing. Ten involved the manufacturing of paint, textile s, galvanized iron, batteries and aluminium. Each of the agreements were subject to an EIA of the proposed undertaking, especially matters relating to the treatment and disposal of waste arising from project implementation. This was in line with Uganda’s requirement that every new investment must be cleared by the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) after conducting an Environmental Impact assessment (EIA). As pointed out in TP9, the PSD programme fulfilled that requirement not by seeking clearance from NEMA but by doing what
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 12: Environmental Aspects of the Danida Programme was expeditiously correct. The programme did not provide for working with NEMA, the established national institution for environmental standards.
Agriculture and Rural Water Supply Sectors 14. As noted in ‘Thematic Paper 1: Agriculture, Land and Natural Resources’, rising poverty both causes and results from environmental problems; it increases the pressure on natural resources as more people are forced to rely directly upon them. Environmental degradation will not be halted by miscellaneous ‘environmental projects’ (e.g. tree planting, terracing of fields, etc.). This would be merely treating the symptoms, rather than the underlying disease which is that poverty is caused by problems with food production, rising population, a resource base declining in both relative and real terms, and a world economic order which continues to reinforce these trends.
15. The principal focus of Danida’s assistance to the agricultural sector under the guidelines of PEAP and the PMA is and should remain poverty alleviation. Provided this objective is realised, Danida’s assistance should result in more sustainable use of natural resources. At the same time, it is important that the direct impacts of the various components of ASPS do not have negative consequences. For example, in the case of the Danida-funded Rakai District Development Programme, according to Working paper 7 (Production) for the evaluation of RRDP (School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, 2000) it is apparent that very little attention was paid to the environmental issues in most of the sectors: Below are excerpts (page 46 para 4.1 and 4.2) on the production, water and roads sectors: “Although all available studies relating to the Production Sector make reference to environmental issues, particularly soil degradation and erosion, the Project Documents do not address environmental issues or the possible environmental impact of particular interventions.” “While environmental considerations cross-cut and impact on other developments, such as the proposed extension to the Rakai town water supply, there is an apparent absence of environmental impact assessments….” “Because the construction of roads necessarily impacts on natural catchment and drainage systems, an impact assessment has not been an element in any road development”.
16. The evaluation team has been assured that ASPS-II agri-business component routinely examines the environmental implications of interventions in the rural sector. However, a more pro-active ‘strategic environmental assessment’ of the total ASPS-II programme should be undertaken and would be in accordance with the conclusions of the PMA evaluation.
Transport 17. In Uganda in the period 1991–98, Danida supported major infrastructure investments, notably in the transport, energy and water sectors, all of which could potentially have had important negative environmental consequences. A Danida-funded project with environmental implications for Lake Victoria was the Rehabilitation of Entebbe International Airport during 1994–97 (104.Uganda.52), which is on the very shore of the lake. The project documentation that was made available to the Evaluation Team makes no reference to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) preceding the development. However, the appraisal report did recommend the construction of oil collection tanks as part of the drainage improvements at the airport, to limit damage from oil spills. Further, it stated that untreated sewage should no longer be discharged from the airport into the lake and that a sewage treatment plant be constructed as part of the rehabilitation project (MFA Danida, 1994). The project completion report confirms that the sewage treatment plant was constructed and was operational (MFA Danida, 1996).
18. Road construction is another Danida-funded sector which has significant environmental implications and Danida has pressed for adherence to the National Environmental Authority
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(NEMA) guidelines and its own standards in the planning and implementation of road projects. Danida has produced a Consolidated Environmental Management Plan for the Road Sector Programme Support, Phase 2 (MFA Danida, 2002). Danida is providing resources for the implementation of the provisions of the plan. For example, according to the District Engineer Gulu and other respondents, it is a requirement that the cost of mitigating negative environmental impacts should be budgeted and charged on the district road grant.
Energy 19. In the energy sector, the most important project was the upgrading of the overhead transmission line from Owen Falls to Kampala which commenced in 1994, and was part of the Third Power Project also funded by the World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB), NORAD, Sida and the Nordic Development Fund. The Danida-financed component of the project involved the construction of a double -circuit 132 kV high-voltage transmission system from the Owen Falls hydroelectric power generating plants to Kampala, substantially extending transmission capacity and assuring a secure power supply to the Capital. At that time (at the conclusion of the WB Second Power Project), the installed generating capacity of the hydroelectric plants was 180 MW. Kampala, the major load centre of the country accounting for about 70% of total national demand, had a severely constrained demand of 84 MW, while actual true demand was estimated at 100-110 MW. The largest component of the Third Power Project was the construction of the Owen Falls Extension Power Station (200 MW, 80 MW installed initially).
20. The Appraisal Report states that in June 1993 Danida fielded an EIA study in order to evaluate the impact of the proposed power-line project (MFA Danida, 1994). The study focused on the proposed corridors for the transmission lines to identify potential negative environmental impacts, to recommend possible alternative corridors and propose other mitigating measures. The final EIA report was dated March 1994. 2 Direct measures proposed by the EIA included alteration of the planned corridor to avoid forested areas, settlements and schools. The EIA found that it was not possible to identify a routing completely without human settlements and the project was approved by the Danida Board, on the condition that the Ugandan authorities found a satisfactory solution for land acquisition and fair compensation of those property owners who would have to be moved. The project agreement between Denmark and Uganda included a clause to the effect that the Uganda Electricity Board was responsible for these aspects. In the event, costly delays were caused by compensation being paid late to property owners in the ‘right of way’ of the transmission line. In a Project Review conducted in 1998, it was recommended that in future ‘the contract with the contractor should not be signed until the compensation with land owners had been agreed upon or milestones regarding the compensation scheme had been agreed’ (NCG, 1998).
21. The indirect environmental benefits of Denmark’s support to the energy sector were substantial to the residents of Kampala in the period 1999–2004. These benefits can only be imagined by today’s residents, who must endure extended power cuts and the daily noise and fumes of private auxiliary diesel generators throughout the city. Uganda has an installed capacity of 300MW, but because of the drop in water levels in Lake Victoria, hydro power production has reportedly fallen to about 135MW. Another 50MW is produced by a thermal plant (Among and Kalinaki, 2006).
2 The EIA was carried out before the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) published guidelines for EIA in Uganda in October 1996 date: November 2006 TP12 Page 5
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 12: Environmental Aspects of the Danida Programme
22. The proposed infrastructural measures to overcome these problems will raise a host of environmental issues which will have to be addressed. Part of the fall in lake levels is reported to be due to problems in the design and operation of the hydropower installations on the River Nile outlet of Lake Victoria constructed under the Second and Third Power Project at Owen Falls (Kull, 2006). Recent severe drops in Lake Victoria (2004–2005) are approximately 45% due to drought and 55% due to over-releases from the Owen Falls Dams (Nalubaale and Kiira). Reportedly, the Owen Falls dams have not been adhering to the international agreements regulating their operations, and have been releasing more water than agreed, an accusation denied by the Ugandan authorit ies. According to the International Rivers Network, a US environment group, based on the current Lake Victoria hydrology, as well as on observations from the past 100+ years, the Owen Falls dams are probably designed to discharge too great a volume of water. The current hydrology, long-term observations and non-adherence to the ‘agreed curve’ for dam operations must be considered in the cost/benefit analysis of the proposed Bujagali Dam. Climate change will probably reduce lake levels and downstream river flows, making it increasingly difficult for the Victoria Nile dams to produce their projected power, and thus challenge hydropower on the Victoria Nile as a viable energy source for Uganda (International Rivers Network, 2006).
23. The Own Falls Extension Power Station was engineered by the Canadian firm Acres International, which based its design on hydrological analysis that was considered too optimistic by other experts at the time. The project did not undergo an EIA. The World Bank Staff Appraisal Report stated that the extension of the existing plant at Owen Falls would have no environmental impact because the project would not affect downstream hydrology or fisheries (World Bank, 1991). Frank Muramuzi, of the Ugandan NGO National Association of Professional Environmentalists (NAPE) has blamed three parties: the Uganda n Government for refusing to listen to views about problems with the dams; Acres International, for suspect technical advice, and the World Bank for backing the project. By association, the International Partners (IPs) – including Danida who contributed to the project – could be implicated in the minds of some, despite Danida’s environmentally sound planning and surveillance of the power-line’s construction. 3
Health Another environmental issue is the safe disposal of expired medicines which has arisen in the context of Danish work in the drugs sector. During the first phase of Danida's Health Sector Programme Support (HSPS1) this was an issue of contention between the Ministry of Health (MOH) and Danida. In HSPS2 it was agreed to develop a disposal facility under the Danida- supported National Drug Authority (NDA), as well as continuing support to improve district management of drugs. However the issue was still not resolved by 2005, when NDA reported it had land but lacked funding for the necessary environmental assessment and equipping the facility (MOH Annual Sector Performance Report, 2005). The issue is not addressed in the present phase of the Heath SWAP (HSSP II). A third issue arose in 2005 over the use of DDT; Danida was engaged in the debates on this as chair of health development partners. Thus environment issues are addressed as they arise, but they have not been simple to resolve.
3 In commenting on an earlier draft of this paper, Henning Nøhr (Danida Copenhagen, 14 August 2006) observed that the experience demonstrated a classic case of a limited EIA approach and the need for ‘strategi c environmental analyses’. ‘Already then there was awareness of a water supply problem, but Danida did not attend to this as we were exclusively concentrating on the isolated input assisted. It is an interesting lesson learned which ought to be stressed’ (translation).
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Bibliography
Among, B., Kalinaki, D.K. (2006). Uganda's power plan to cost $4.4 billion. Newspaper article. (May 8 2006) East African
Holm Olsen, K. (2006). National ownership in the implementation of global climate policy in Uganda. Climate Policy 5, 6.
International Rivers Network. (2006). Report Reveals How Dams are Draining Lake Victoria . Press release. (February 9 2006)
Kull, D. (2006). Connections Between Recent Water Level Drops in Lake Victoria, Dam Operations and Drought. Report. (February 1 2006) International Rivers Network: Nairobi
MFA, Danida. (1993). Project Document, Water Action Plan Phase II. (September 1993)
MFA, Danida. (1994). Appraisal of Project Proposal: Transmission Line Owen Falls-Kampala, Contract OFE-7 of Third Power Project Owen Falls Extension, Uganda.
MFA, Danida. (1994). Rehabilitation of the Runway and Aeronautical Facilities at Entebbe Airport.
MFA, Danida. (1996). Rehabilitation of Entebbe International Airport: Project Completion Report.
MFA, Danida. (2002). Consolidated Environmental Management Plan, RSPS -II. Ref. No. 104.Uganda.815. (October 2002#)
NCG. (1998). Second Project Review Owen Falls Extension Contract OFE-07, Kampala, Uganda.
Oxford Policy Management. (2005). A Joint Evaluation: Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture. (November 2005) MFA: Copenhagen
RDE, Danida. (1995). Project Completion Report. PCR by Sven Jacobi, Senior Technical Advisor to DWD. (October 1995)
RDE, Danida. (2005). Forskning i vildtgenetik 1994 – 2004. 104.DAN.8.L.307.
School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham (2000). Evaluation of Rakai District Development Programme, Working Paper no. 7: Production. Copenhagen: MFA.
date: November 2006 TP12 Page 7
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Volume 4
– Thematic Paper 13 –
Special Education
May Sengendo
November 2006
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 13: Special Education
Contents
1. Introduction...... 1
2. Uganda Context of Special Education and Related Services...... 1
3. Danish Aid to Special Education in Uganda ...... 2
4. Assessment and lessons learned...... 3
Bibliography ...... 6
Annexes Annex 1: Programme Summary ...... 7
date: November 2006 TP13 Page i
EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 13: Special Education
Acronyms and abbreviations
DDL Danish Deaf Association EARS Education Assessment and Resource Service NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NUDIPU National Union of Disabled People in Uganda PAPSCA Programme for the Alleviation of Povery and Social Costs of Adjustment PWDs People with Disabilities UNAD Uganda National Assoc iation of the Deaf UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNISE Uganda National Institute of Special Education
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EVALUATION OF DANISH AID TO UGANDA 1987–2005
Thematic Paper 13: Special Education
1. Introduction
1.1 This paper focuses on the small but distinctive special education component of Danish assistance. Early on, Danida made a strategic decision to concentrate on health, rather than education. However, partly because of previous experiences in the same field in Kenya, Danida did provide support to special education. Information on project funding to the Government’s education institution, the Uganda National Institute of Special Education (UNISE), has been included as well as support to a Non-Governmental Organisation, the Uganda National Association of the Deaf (UNAD).
1.2 Although People Living with Disabilities (PWDs) have long faced social inequalities, it is relatively recently that they have been recognised internationally as a disadvantaged social group. At the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, where the key concern was on equality, development and peace, civil society organisations, especially women’s organisations, had an opportunity to advocate for a reflection on disabilities as one of the ways through which gender inequalities are embedded. It was also realised that cultural attitudes as well as exclusion from social and economic opportunities through education, health and exposure, are key areas within which the inequalities are hidden. Danida has responded to the need to support these disadvantaged male s and female s.
2. Uganda Context of Special Education and Related Services
2.1 All children have a right to be educated but in most cases, children with disabilities are marginalised by beliefs and attitudes in society. Planning and impleme ntation of programmes for children with disabilities has not been easy since there are specific teaching methods and institutional structures that are required for addressing the special needs which such children have. Such programmes require financing and institutional mechanisms in order to operate. Various efforts have been undertaken to develop systems, institutions and teaching methods for addressing special needs in the education of disabled children as well as adult women and men. Most of such efforts have been developed to address exclusion and marginalization of People with Disabilities (PWDs). However, most of such efforts were being made by Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) who were mainly missionaries and some relatives who needed to educate their children or relatives (Ministry of Education and Sports, 2003). For example, in 1952 when special needs education in Uganda started, the Colonial Government had realized that children and youth with disabilities were not benefiting from the existing educational provision and as such separate ‘special education’ services were provided to a few children with visual, hearing, learning and motor impairments (Stackus, 2006).
2.2 Before 1980, the Government of Uganda had no legislation that could be used to support the education of PWDs. Education Service delivery to such people was therefore affected. For tunately by 1983, the Ministry of Education had established the Special Education sector as the formal structure to deal with education of the PWDs. However, it was not only under-funded but also had only one person in terms of human resource to run the sector. The role of NGOs was much appreciated at that time since they are the ones who filled in the gap for provision of education to PWDs. Inclusive education became a key strategy in the 1990s, to ensure improved and more effective means of enabling increased access and participation in education for the PWDs, especially children. There was therefore a need for a policy that could cater for special date: November 2006 TP13 Page 1
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 13: Special Education education. A policy on ‘Education for National Integration and Development’ was established in 1992 with specific focus on ensuring improved financing for special needs education as well as effective and increased numbers for teacher training activities. Legal and policy oriente d actions on special education facilitated financing of the Special Education activities. In particular, the “1991 Act of Parliament mandated the Uganda National Institute of Special Education, UNISE, (now Faculty of Special Needs and Rehabilitation, Kyambogo University) to train special needs education teachers” (Stackus, 2006). Danida funded the establishment of UNISE as explained in section 3 below.
2.3 Recognition and strengthening of the vulnerable groups as a key social group took place during the period of formulation of the Constitution in 1994/95. Institutional structures were set up to cater for the needs of PWDs such as a unit in the Ministry of Women in Development (now the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development). Earlier on, a non-governmental organisation called National Union of Disabled People in Uganda (NUDIPU) had been formed by representatives of the PWDs. Another NGO called Uganda National Association of the Deaf (UNAD) was also set up. Further more, the declaration of Universal Primary Education (UPE) in 1996 as well as its implementation in 1997 helped to make special education a priority in Uganda. Uganda’s Parliament at that time discussed the modalities for inclusion of the children with disabilities and enabled each family having children with disabilities to be given priority during enrolment in mainstream school.
2.4 Apart from that, PWDs became one of the priority groups of people who were focused on within the government’s Programme for the Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs of Adjustment (PAPSCA). Funding through PAPSCA was therefore important in starting off activities that involved the PWDs. Danida’s programme on Special Education was a key contribution to such poverty alleviation strategies.
2.5 In 2004, the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development embarked on formulation of policies on the PWDs, the youth and elderly. UNDP and UNFPA spearheaded these developments. Availability of a policy framework led to demand for services needed to implement the policy, especially that of People with Disabilities. Such effort was advocated for by NGOs which focus on PWDs, including UNAD and NUDIPU. Special education was then funded by Danida as discussed in the next section.
3. Danish Aid to Special Education in Uganda
3.1 The projects that were funded by Danida included: • the programme for special education and related services; • the bridging arrangement for support to special needs education/education assessment resource services and Uganda National Institute of Specia l Education; and • support to UNAD for institutional development.
3.2 Special education was considered by Danida as a fundamental human right for handicapped children and youth. Giving equal educational opportunities to children with disabilities was the key objective of the programme for special education and related services for phase one (1991–1997) and two (1995–2000). The targeting of handicapped children of ages 0– 18 years and youth clearly indicates the relevance of this programme and the way it addresses a poverty focus. The Appraisal report and project proposal (Danida, 1990) had indicated that this target group formed the most vulnerable group in Uganda. Review studies which followed
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 13: Special Education estimated that there were 800,000 children with disabilities in Uganda by the time the programme was being designed.
3.3 The rate of risk for such children was increasing especially among the poorest communities in ways that were affecting handicapped children’s “potential to learn and function in society” (Danida, 1995). The programme addressed the needs of these children and youth through outputs that included: • Funding for the infrastructural requirements of the Uganda National Institute of Special Education (UNISE); and • Establishment of a nation-wide network as mechanism for assessing educational needs, through which provision of resources and services to the handicapped children could be channelled.
3.4 UNISE was the institutional structure within which the programme was implemented, and was part of the Institute for Teacher Education, a government institute at Kyambogo. UNISE was expanded to take up the needs of the programme. In addition to this, the programme was formulated when there was a need to implement the special education policy that had earlier on been formulated by the Ministry of Education during the October 2002 Education Sector Review. Although there was no specific education sector policy for Danida, the programme was based on the human rights component of Danish aid through the provision of educational resources and services for the disadvantaged group (COWI, 1996).
3.5 Danida also funded a project: Supporting the Development of a Deaf Association in Uganda, which was carried out in three phases that were undertaken between 1992 to 1994 (phase one), 1994/95 (phase two) and 2003 to 2004 (phase three). This project was carried out with the cooperation of the Danish Deaf Association (DDL). The establishment of a national deaf association contributed to fulfilment of the project objective of enabling deaf people in Uganda to achieve equality and full participation in society. Institutional establishment was a means to address issues of equality. The activities which included planning and recruiting staff, capacity building of staff and board members, advocacy, information development and dissemination, as well as sign language related work, enabled the project to be recognised even dur ing the process of constitution-making.
3.6 Achievements of the UNAD project included: · Establishment of deaf associations in 48 districts of Uganda. · Strengthening of sign language training to both deaf and hearing in those 48 districts. · Recognition of sign language in the Constitution of Uganda. · Approval of telecasting sign language news on at least one television station. · Strengthening advocacy for equality of deaf people that enables establishment of one position for elected representative of PWDs in Parliament of Uganda. · Training on HIV/AIDS to the deaf and advocating for their services to be provided by civil society organisations like TASO and through government health systems.
4. Assessment and lessons learned
4.1 This programme provides an example of how effectiveness of activities can be achieved if the programme works by strengthening already existing institutional structures and policie s. By funding UNISE, Danida’s support helped to set up new administrative systems and to build date: November 2006 TP13 Page 3
Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 13: Special Education capacity for already existing human resources. It was through such institutional growth that UNISE was upgraded from just being a department to a full institute within the University establishment at Kyambogo University.
4.2 A component of sustainability was built into the project by involving teachers and parents in ways that ensured acquisition and retention of skills for care and economic empowerment of these children well as ownership of the outcomes. There appeared to be a risk in that it was indicated in the Danida Board presentation that “sustainability of the project would mainly depend on the Uganda Government’s economic capability to ensure and keep the necessary staff and defray the various school expenses as the Danida contribution phases out”. However, the fact that government continuously made special education a priority area enabled financing to be catered for within government budgets. One of the respondents indicated that “government paid its part of the funding in timely way and supported those areas which had been allocated to it within the funding agreement”.
4.3 Unfortunately, such support from government has not been extended to enabling the teachers who qualify from this Institute to be completely integrated and assured of jobs in the existing schools and NGOs where skills like those of sign language assistants are needed. Such qualified people have to look for jobs themselves and negotiate pa y which is usually not commensurate with the amount of work they have to do to support people with disabilities.
4.4 The methodology of project delivery of services is another element which enabled effectiveness of the UNISE programme to be achieved. This inc luded a step-by-step training of teachers (40 per year) in special education and this was increased to 80 teachers per year after 1994. Within the process of training, teachers would then produce training materials and aids to be used to teach handicapped children. This process was implemented through 39 Education Assessment and Resource Service (EARS)/Special Education centres at the district level.
4.5 UNISE’s institutional strengthening process for working through district level structures, enabled ownership of the outcomes by the districts in ways that provided mechanism of funding of activities to be planned for within the district budgets. Continuous training was provided to teachers under the staff development component to ensure renewal of skills.1 This strengthened the institutional capacity of the programme. Apart from that, sustainability was catered for by ensuring that the EARS/Special Education Centres were linked with mainstream schools in order to integrate children with disabilities in such already established systems.
4.6 In terms of gender mainstreaming in the UNISE and EARS programme, effort was made to ensure that there was an ongoing focus on employment of female staff in the programme. However, the programme did not specifically put in place systems or mechanisms to focus on encouraging parents to bring forward female children and youth for special education in cases where this category was neglected. The target was more to do with the type of disability (deaf, dumb, lame) and not specific on female or male child/youth. Since both female and male children and youth were disadvantaged, the programme succeeded by focusing on both sexes in the same way.
4.7 Achievements for UNISE were significant and visible. For example, the Poverty Reduction study report noted that, in Iganga, “… the quality and commitment of staff was high for UNISE, EARS as well as the primary school teachers. It was edifying to see deaf and blind children communicating so effectively with each other and with their teachers. There is no doubt that the quality of life of these individuals has been greatly enhanced” (COWI, 1996: 40).
1 More than 1,000 teachers benefited from short-term courses (COWI, 1996).
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 13: Special Education
4.8 Danida’s funding to UNAD and UNISE illustrates institutional linkages that were formed between the two organisations in ways that helped cross-fertilisation of skills and knowledge about capacity building that supports PWDs. In phase two and three of the UNAD project, UNAD embarked on “selling services” of sign language trainers to the interpreter-training programme at UNISE.
4.9 Achievements of the UNAD project were so significant given the fact that such initiatives were taking place for the first time in Uganda. Indeed the establishment of institutional structures, capacity building in sign language and strengthening partic ipation of the deaf in decision-making at national level through establishing an elected position for People with Disabilities in Parliament, all added to making the deaf a key and visible social category whose needs were being addressed. However, such achievements can be undermined by lack of sustainable systems that enhance continuity and expansion of the efforts made. These cannot be sustained without support from civil society and government to ensure that the needs of the deaf are taken as a priority concern. There is need to realise that “there are few NGOs working on disability, yet there is lack of government considerations of employment of the sign language interpreters and this discourages further training in this field….who wants to study but when you cannot be employed?” (as reported by one of the respondents). Furthermore, there are not enough schools for specialised teaching of the deaf. There is only one Government secondary school in the whole country. Opportunities for higher learning by the deaf are therefore limite d which contributes to persistent inequality of this category of people.
4.10 In cases where the project faces administrative challenges such as what happened to UNAD in its third phase (UNAD, 2003), Danida continues to stand firm to enable transparency and accountability to be undertaken in ways that enable the organisation to improve its financial systems. The UNAD project is an example of a project where conditions for accountability were set up before any further funding could be allocated. Some of those actions included a request to pay back the funds that were not accounted for and ensuring that the process went through the court of law in Uganda.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 13: Special Education
Bibliography
COWI (1996). Evaluation report:Poverty reduction in Danish Development Assistance: Country study Uganda. Volume II: Assessment of Selected interventions. Copenhagen: MFA. Danida (1990). Special Needs and Related Services: Appraisal report and project proposal prepared by a Danida Mission visiting Uganda from 19 November to 6 December 1989. January 1990. Copenhagen: Danida. MFA Danida (1995). Progress report Ministry of Education and Sports (2003). Project completion report: Phase Three of Danida support to UNISE Ministry of Education and Sports (2003). Department of Special Needs Education/Career Guidance and Counselling In Uganda as at 31st January 2003 Stackus , O. (2006). Teacher Training in Uganda. Enabling Education Network, Newsletter 10, 2006 UNAD (2003). Project agreement for UNAD and DDL
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 13: Special Education
Annex 1: Programme Summary Danida file ref. 104. Uganda.38 number and Special education and related services. project name Description and Description: The principal educational policy of the project was to seek to integrate period, handicapped children into regular primary schools through placement either in regular geographical classrooms or in special education units, established within the schools. Placement in coverage, special institutions or home based educational or training programmes is sought only components in those cases where integration into regular primary schools is found not to be possible or feasible.
Period: 10 years (1994–2004) Geographical coverage: nationwide Components: handicapped children Objectives Development objectives: When fully established, the project will have two mutually supporting components which will aim at ensuring to handicapped children equal educational opportunities with other children, and thereby to support their integration into society. Immediate objectives: 1. Department of special education at institute of teacher Education, Kyambogo (ITEK), Established in new buildings and expanded to meet project requirements. 2. A nation wide network established through which educational assessment and resource services are provided for handicapped children and their parents and for teachers of special education.
Amount of USD 8,654,000 funding/value Implementing UNISE and Ministry of Education agency Other donors involved Assessments done
Danida file ref. 104.Uganda.38 number and Bridging arrangement for support to special needs education/education project name assessment resource services and Uganda National Institute of S pecial Education. Description and Description: the SNE/EARS is a countrywide district-level programme which period, aims at identifying and directing children with special education needs into the geographical main stream education system. SNE/EARS centres are presently established in all coverage, Uganda’s 45 districts and manned primarily with teachers who have received components training at UNISE. Period: six months Geographical coverage: Nationwide Components: Objective SNE/EARS The long term development objectives of the SNE/EARS programme is to improve capacity to address sustainable special needs education. The immediate objectives are:- - Increased number of learners with special education needs receiving quality education. - Increased awareness among stakeholders to include learners with SNE in all activities in society. - Improved strategies for the sustainability of the SNE/EARS programme.
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Evaluation of Danish Aid to Uganda 1987–2005 Thematic Paper 13: Special Education
UNISE The long-term development objective of the UNISE programme is to improve capacity to address sustainable special needs education in Uganda. The immediate objectives are: - Improved quality and quantity of the human resources base in the field of SNE in Uganda. - Improving capacity in research, information dissemination and production of education materials in special needs education. - Improved strategies for the sustainability of the institute’s programme .
Amount of DKK 2,324,400 funding/value Implementing UNISE agency Other donors involved Assessments done
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