Central African Republic

Andreas Mehler

The population faced another disastrous year with the number of IDPs and refugees continuing to increase as a result of renewed fighting in various parts of the coun- try; food insecurity hit nearly half of the population. The elected government in conjunction with international actors managed to secure the vital -Douala corridor, but fully controlled only the south-west. In the centre, the south-east and the north-west, new deadly confrontations, often involving unexpected coalitions of armed movements, could not be prevented, even by international peacekeep- ers who sometimes faced outright popular hostility. Efforts to prepare the justice system to deal with past crimes against humanity were taken, but did not yet yield results.

Domestic Politics

President Archange-Faustin Touadéra met with criticism from many quarters when he had little to show in terms of economic progress and security after one year in office. Faced with half a dozen policy guidelines, some observers wondered what

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:��.��63/9789004367630_023 207 the government’s vision for restoring stability was and raised doubts as to whether there even was one. A core issue was the official attitude towards the numerous armed movements that continued to threaten peace and rarely behaved respon- sibly. Touadéra clearly favoured an inclusive approach, potentially because he did not have the means to confront rebel groups effectively. On 12 September, he carried out a major reshuffle of his government, appointing 16 new ministers and raising the number of portfolios within the cabinet from 23 to 34. The return of Marie-Noëlle Koyara, who had been the first female minister of defence during the transition period, to that same post was potentially a positive surprise. More significant, however, was the fact that some new ministers were linked to armed movements: Energy Minister Gontran Djono Ahaba, the nephew of former warlord president Michel Djotodia, and Water and Forestry Minister Lambert Mokove Lis- sane were clearly seen as representatives of the Ex-Séléka movement within gov- ernment. Equally represented was now the opposing anti-Balaka movement with Government Secretary Jean-Alexandre Dedet and Culture and Tourism Minister Jacob Mokpem Bionli. Retaining his position, Prime Minister Simplice Sarandji was quoted as saying, “For me they are all Central Africans”, to justify the inclusion of rebels in the government. As a side-effect of this move, government expenditure was clearly set to rise. In fact, both government and UN peacekeepers were unable to prevent or stop on-going armed conflicts, at first in the centre of the country. Since November 2016, two former components of the Séléka alliance, the ‘Front Populaire pour la Renais- sance de la Centrafrique’ (FRPC) and the ‘Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique’ (UPC), had repeatedly clashed in or around . The FPRC was seen as com- pletely opportunistic in its choices of partners, who included its former opponents, the Anti-Balaka movements, while the UPC was clearly linking up with sometimes very vulnerable, and sometimes violent and armed Fulani groups. On 12 February, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) intervened to halt the advance of the FPRC coalition, killing the FPRC chief of staff, Joseph Zoundéko. MINUSCA obtained the withdrawal of militia structures from the city, including the UPC headquarters under Ali Darassa, and the local anti-Balaka chief, Gaétan Boadé, also left Bambari. MINUSCA then declared Bambari a “city free from armed groups”. Violence declined in this key city, but the moves resulted in a transfer of conflict further east, with several attacks recorded on Bakouma, Nzako and Zémio. An upsurge in violence was recorded in May, hitting mostly the provin- cial capitals of (with more than 100 killed) and Bria, but also (188 died here alone according to HRW, which also documented 25 cases of rape), and later again Zémio, often against armed Fulani cattle herders and Anti- Balaka groups loosely allied to the FRPC. In Bria, in-fighting between the factions of this alliance resulted in an upsurge of 73,000 IDPs in May and June. Between 20 and 23 June, over 80 civilians died in these battles. In a particularly bloody con- frontation in the town of Gambo in early August, Anti-Balaka elements attacked