Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 585–601, 2010 www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/14/585/2010/ Hydrology and © Author(s) 2010. This work is distributed under Earth System the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. Sciences
HESS Opinions “A random walk on water”
D. Koutsoyiannis Department of Water Resources and Environmental Engineering, School of Civil Engineering, National Technical University of Athens, Greece
Invited contribution by D. Koutsoyiannis, recipient of the EGU Henry Darcy Medal 2009. Received: 5 October 2009 – Published in Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss.: 29 October 2009 Revised: 19 March 2010 – Accepted: 19 March 2010 – Published: 25 March 2010
Abstract. According to the traditional notion of randomness 1 What is randomness? and uncertainty, natural phenomena are separated into two mutually exclusive components, random (or stochastic) and In his foundation of the modern axiomatic theory of proba- deterministic. Within this dichotomous logic, the determin- bility, A. N. Kolmogorov (1933) avoided defining random- istic part supposedly represents cause-effect relationships ness. He used the notions of random events and random vari- and, thus, is physics and science (the “good”), whereas ables in a mathematical sense but without explaining what randomness has little relationship with science and no randomness is. Later, in about 1965, A. N. Kolmogorov and relationship with understanding (the “evil”). Here I argue G. J. Chaitin independently proposed a definition of random- that such views should be reconsidered by admitting that ness based on complexity or absence of regularities or pat- uncertainty is an intrinsic property of nature, that causality terns (which could be reproduced by an algorithm). Specifi- implies dependence of natural processes in time, thus cally, a series of numbers is random if the smallest algorithm suggesting predictability, but even the tiniest uncertainty capable of specifying it to a computer has about the same (e.g. in initial conditions) may result in unpredictability number of bits of information as the series itself (Chaitin, after a certain time horizon. On these premises it is possible 1975; Kolmogorov, 1963, 1965; Kolmogorov and Uspenskii, to shape a consistent stochastic representation of natural 1987; from Shiryaev, 1989). Interestingly, Chaitin proved processes, in which predictability (suggested by determin- that, although randomness can be precisely defined in this istic laws) and unpredictability (randomness) coexist and manner and can even be measured, there cannot be a proof are not separable or additive components. Deciding which that a given real number (regarded as a series of its digits) is of the two dominates is simply a matter of specifying the random. time horizon and scale of the prediction. Long horizons of prediction are inevitably associated with high uncertainty, The move from this mathematical abstraction of a real whose quantification relies on the long-term stochastic number to the realm of real physical phenomena is not properties of the processes. straightforward. Here, commonly, randomness is contrasted to determinism. The movement of planets is a typical exam- Αἰών παῖς ἐστι παίζων πεσσεύων. Παιδός ἡ βασιληίη. ( Time is plea child of aplaying, deterministic throwing phenomenon, dice. whereas that of dice is (Time is a child playing, throwing dice. The ruling power is thought to be random. This reflects a dichotomous logic, ac- The ruling power is a child's ; Heraclitus; ca. 540-480 BC; Fragment 52) a child’s; Heraclitus; ca. 540–480 BC; Fragment 52) cording to which there exist two mutually exclusive types of events or processes – deterministic and random (or stochas- I am convinced that He does not throw dice. (Albert Einstein, in a letter to Max Born in 1926) I am convinced that He does not throw dice. (Albert tic). Such dichotomy is perceived either on ontological or on Einstein, in a letter to Max Born in 1926) epistemological grounds. In the former perception the natu- 1 What is randomness? ral events are thought to belong, in their essence, to these two different types, whereas in the latter it is regarded convenient Correspondence to: D. Koutsoyiannis to separate them into these types, where processes that we In his foundation of the modern([email protected]) axiomatic theory of probability, A.do N. not Kolmogorov understand or explain(1933) are considered random. When a avoided defining randomness. He used the notions of random events and random variables in a mathematicalPublished sense by but Copernicus without Publicationsexplaining onwhat behalf randomness of the European is. Later, Geosciences in about Union. 1965, A. N. Kolmogorov and G. J. Chaitin independently proposed a definition of randomness based on complexity or absence of regularities or patterns (which could be reproduced by an algorithm). Specifically, a series of numbers is random if the smallest algorithm capable of specifying it to a computer has about the same number of bits of information as the series itself (Chaitin, 1975; Kolmogorov, 1963, 1965, Kolmogorov and Uspenskii, 1987, from Shiryaev, 1989). Interestingly, Chaitin proved that, although randomness can be precisely defined in this manner and can even be measured, there cannot be a proof that a given real number (regarded as a series of its digits) is random.
The move from this mathematical abstraction of a real number to the realm of real physical phenomena is not straightforward. Here, commonly, randomness is contrasted to determinism. The movement of planets is a typical example of a deterministic phenomenon, whereas that of dice is thought to be random. This reflects a dichotomous logic, according to which there exist two mutually exclusive types of events or processes—deterministic and random (or stochastic). Such dichotomy is perceived either on ontological or on epistemological grounds. In the former perception the natural events are thought to belong, in their essence, to these two different types, whereas in the latter it is regarded convenient to separate them into these types, where processes that we do not understand or explain are considered random. When a classification of a specific process into one of these two types fails—and it usually does, except in a few cases such as the above examples of planets and dice—then a separation of the process into two different, usually additive, parts is typically devised. This perception has been dominant in geosciences, including hydrology. This thinking proceeds so as to form a reductionist hierarchy. Thus, each of the parts may be further subdivided into subparts (e.g., deterministic subparts such as periodic and aperiodic or trends). This dichotomous logic is typically combined with a manichean perception, in which the deterministic part supposedly represents cause effect relationships and reason and thus is 2
586 D. Koutsoyiannis: A random walk on water classification of a specific process into one of these two types processes that we may understand, we may explain, but we fails – and it usually does, except in a few cases such as the cannot predict2. In other words, randomness and determin- above examples of planets and dice – then a separation of the ism (which, in turn, could be identified with predictability) process into two different, usually additive, parts is typically coexist in the same process, but are not separable or addi- devised. This perception has been dominant in geosciences, tive components. It is a matter of specifying the time horizon including hydrology. This thinking proceeds so as to form a and scale of prediction to decide which of the two dominates. reductionist hierarchy. Thus, each of the parts may be further This view, which will be illustrated in the sequel, is consis- subdivided into subparts (e.g. deterministic subparts such as tent with Kolmogorov’s and Chaitin’s views of mathematical periodic and aperiodic or trends). This dichotomous logic is randomness, as well as with K. Popper’s (1992) indetermin- typically combined with a manichean perception, in which istic world view. the deterministic part supposedly represents cause-effect re- In identifying randomness with unpredictability, the latter lationships and reason and thus is physics and science (the is meant in deterministic terms: any specific prediction algo- “good”), whereas randomness has little relationship with sci- rithm is not able to accurately calculate the future state of a ence and no relationship with understanding (the “evil”). The system and thus there is uncertainty. If, in our attempt to pre- random part is also characterized as “noise”, in contrast to the dict the future, we are not able to know the precise state, we deterministic “signal”. “Noise” is a contaminant that causes could lower our target and try to know how high or low the uncertainty, a kind of illness that should be remedied or elim- uncertainty is. Quantification of uncertainty is a useful target inated. and a feasible one. Naturally, it is achieved by means of prob- Probability theory and statistics, which traditionally pro- ability. The classical definition of probability, i.e. the ratio vided the tools for dealing with randomness and uncertainty, of the favourable outcomes of a specified event to the num- have been regarded by some as the “necessary evil”, but not ber of possible outcomes, has several logical problems and as an essential part of physical sciences. This view has also does not help to study natural processes. Rather, we should affected hydrology and geophysics, particularly in the last follow the Kolmogorov (1933) system, in which probability couple of decades. Some tried to banish probability from hy- is a normalized measure, i.e. a function that maps sets (ar- drology, replacing it with deterministic sensitivity analysis eas where the unknown quantities lie) to real numbers. An and fuzzy-logic representations. Others attempted to demon- event A is just a set (of elements called elementary events) strate that irregular fluctuations observed in natural processes to which a probability, i.e. a number P (A) in the interval are au fond manifestations of underlying deterministic dy- [0, 1], is assigned. The notion of a random variable, i.e. a namics with low dimensionality, thus rendering probabilistic single-valued function x of the set of all elementary events descriptions unnecessary. Some of the above views and re- (so that to each elementary event ξ it maps a real number cent developments are simply flawed because they make er- x(ξ)), is central in this system, and is associated with a prob- roneous use of probability and statistics, which, remarkably, ability distribution function (F (x):=P {x≤ x})3 and a prob- provide the tools for such analyses (Koutsoyiannis, 2006). ability density function (f (x):=dF (x)/dx). The notion of a The entire logic of contrasting determinism with random- random variable allows probabilization of uncertainty, typi- ness is just a false dichotomy. To see this, it suffices to re- cal in Bayesian statistics (not to be confused with the lately call that P.-S. Laplace, perhaps the most famous proponent abused term of “Bayesian beliefs”). of determinism in the history of philosophy of science (cf. Laplace’s demon), is, at the same time, one of the founders of probability theory. According to Laplace (1812), “probabil- 2 Emergence of randomness from determinism ity theory is, au fond, nothing but common sense reduced to calculus1”. This harmonizes with J. C. Maxwell’s view that To illustrate that randomness coexists with determinism and “the true logic for this world is the calculus of Probabilities” that the two do not imply different types of mechanisms, (Maxwell, 1850). Recently, the same view was epigrammat- or different parts or components in the time evolution, we ically formulated in the title of E. T. Jaynes’s (2003) book will study a toy model of a caricature hydrological system. “Probability Theory: The Logic of Science”. The system, shown in Fig. 1, and its toy model are designed Here I argue that the dominant dichotomous logic reflects 2According to Niels Bohr, “Prediction is difficult, especially of a na¨ıve and inconsistent view of randomness. It cannot help the future”. us see the unity of Nature. Are the movement of planets 3Some texts distinguish random variables, which are functions, and that of dice qualitatively different natural phenomena? from their values, which are numbers, by denoting them with upper Do they not obey the same physical laws? Abandoning this case and lower case letters, respectively. Since this convention has logic and seeking a more consistent view, I propose to iden- several problems (e.g. the Latin x and the Greek χ, if put in upper tify randomness with unpredictability. Randomness exists in case, are the same symbol X), other texts do not distinguish the two at all, thus creating other type of ambiguity. Here we follow 1Original in French: “la theorie´ des probabilites´ n’est, au fond, another convention, in which random variables are underscored and que le bon sens reduit´ au calcul”. their values are not.
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 585–601, 2010 www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/14/585/2010/ Figures D. Koutsoyiannis: A random walk on water 587
Evidently, it is more interesting to study our system when v : it is “alive”, that is, out of the equilibrium. To this aim, as the Vegetation system is 2-D, we need one equation additional to Eq. (1) to τ : cover Transpiration model it, which we seek in conceptualizing the dynamics of vegetation. As x=0 represents the state where the vegetation φ : does not change, we may assume that soil water in excess, Infiltration x >0, will result in increase of vegetation and soil water in deficit, x <0, will result in decrease of the vegetation cover. The graph in Fig. 2 was constructed heuristically, according x : to this logic, and is described by the following equation: Soil water 3 max(1+(x − /β) ,1)v − Datum v = i 1 i 1 i 3 3 (2) max(1−(xi−1/β) ,1)+(xi−1/β) vi−1 Figure 1: A caricatureFig. 1. hydrologicalA caricature hydrologicalsystem for systemwhich the for whichtoy model the toy is modelconstructed. is where β=100 mm is a standardizing constant to make the constructed. equation dimensionally consistent. Summarizing, we have a 2-D toy model in discrete time i 1 whose state is described by the state variables (x , v ) =:x intentionally to be simple. A large piece of land is con- i i i x i 1 = 400 (with xi in bold denoting a vector) and whose dynamics vsidered,i on which water infiltrates and is stored in the soil is represented by Eqs. (1) (water balance) and (2) (vegeta- (without distinction fromx i 1 groundwater), = 200 from where it can 0.8 tion cover dynamics). To avoid approximation errors, the transpire though vegetation. Except infiltration, transpiration dynamics is expressed in discrete time by construction of Increased and water storage in the soil, no other hydrological processes vegetation the model (rather than derived as an approximation of con- High soil water are0.6 considered. To simplify the system, no change is im- x i 1 = 100 tinuous time differential equations) and thus is fully accu- posed to its external “forcings”. That is, the rates of infiltra-(above datum) 0 0 rate as far as the toy model is concerned. The system pa- tion φ and potential transpiration τp are assumed constant in x = 0 rameters are four and are assumed to be known precisely: time. The toy model is constructedi 1 assuming discrete time, Unchanged 0.4 Normal soil φwater=250 mm, τ =1000 mm, α=750 mm and β=100 mm. The denoted as i = 1, 2, ..., and that in each time unit 1t (say, p vegetation 0 (at datum) model is easy to program on a hand calculator or a spread- “year”), the input is φ:=φ 1tx i 1 =250= 100 mm and the potential out- 4 0 sheet . The system dynamics is graphically demonstrated in put τ :=τ 1t=1000 mm. The internal state variables, which 0.2 p p Fig. 3, where interesting geometrical surfaces appear, show- are allowed to vary in time, are two, thus shaping a two- Decreased x i 1 = 200 Low soil water ing that the transformation xi = f (xi−1) is not invertible. It vegetation dimensional (2-D) dynamical system: the fraction of the(below land datum) x i 1 = 400 should be stressed that no explicit “agent” of randomness that0 is covered by vegetation, v (0≤ v ≤1) and the soil wa- i i (e.g. perturbation by a random number generator) has been ter storage0xi. 0.2 The latter 0.4 is measured 0.6 above 0.8 a certain 1 datum, v i 1 introduced into the system. so that it can take positive values up to some upper bound Moreover, there is no external forcing imposing change Figure 2: Conceptualα (assuming dynamics that of watervegetation above forα thespills caricature as runoff) hydrological or negative system. onto the system. If any change occurs, it is caused by inter- values without a bound (i.e. −∞ ≤ xi ≤ α). The constant α is assumed to be 750 mm. If the vegetation at time i is v , the nal reasons, that is, by an “imbalance” of the vegetation cover i and water stored. To see this, let us assume that at time i=0 actual output through transpiration will be τi = vi τp. Thus, the water balance equation is the system state is somewhat different from the equilibrium state, setting initial conditions x0=100 mm (6=0) and v0=0.30 xi = min(xi−1 +φ −viτp,α) (1) (6=0.25). Using Eqs. (1) and (2) we can calculate the system state (xi, vi) at times i >0. The trajectories of x and v for We can observe that, if at some time i, time i=1 to 100 are shown in Fig. 4. Apparently, the system vi=φ/τp=250/1000=0.25, then the water balance re- remains “alive”, i.e. it exhibits change all the time, and its sults in xi = xi−1+φ −viτp=xi−1. Assuming that the system state does not converge to the equilibrium. The trajectories, dynamics is fully deterministic, continuity demands that albeit produced by simple deterministic dynamics, are inter- there should be some specific value of xi−1 for which esting and30 seem periodic; we will discuss their properties in v = v − . Without loss of generality, we set this value x=0; i i 1 Sect. 5. that is, we define the datum in such a way that the vegetation As the dynamics is fully deterministic, one may be remains unchanged if water is stored up to the datum. Thus, tempted to cast predictions for arbitrarily long time hori- the state (v=0.25, x=0) represents an equilibrium state: if zons. For example, for time 100, iterative application at some time the system happens to be at this state, it will of the simple dynamics allows to calculate the prediction remain there for ever. In other words, once the system x100=−244.55 mm, v100=0.7423 (as plotted in the right end reaches its equilibrium state, it becomes a “dead” system, exhibiting no change. 4The interested reader can find a spreadsheet with the toy model in http://www.itia.ntua.gr/en/docinfo/923/.
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/14/585/2010/ Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 14, 585–601, 2010 Figures
v : Vegetation τ : cover Transpiration
φ : Infiltration
x : Soil water Datum
Figure 1: A caricature hydrological system for which the toy model is constructed. 588 D. Koutsoyiannis: A random walk on water dynamics, which is fully consistent with this understanding, very simple, fully deterministic, 1 dynamics,nonlinear andwhich chaotic. is fully consistent with this understanding, very simple, fully deterministic, v x i 1 = 400 i nonlinear and chaotic. However,x i 1 = 200 science is not identical to understanding. As R. Feynman (1965) stated, “I dynamics, which is fully0.8 consistent with this understanding, very simple, fully deterministic, However, science is not identical to understanding. As R. Feynman (1965) stated, “I Increased think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics”—and this does not nonlinearvegetation and chaotic. High soil water 0.6 think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics”—and this does not dynamics, which is fully consistentpreclude with thisx i 1 under= quantum 100 standing, mechanics very simple, from (abovefully being deterministic, datum) science. Literally, the name science points to However, science is not identicalpreclude to understanding quantum mechanics. As R. Feynman from being (1965) science. stated, “I Lite rally, the name science points to nonlinear and chaotic. overstanding *, and understanding is not identical, nor a prerequisite, to overstanding. Perhaps think I can safely say that nobodyoverstanding understandsx i 1 =* ,0 quanand tumunderstanding mechanics”—and is not identical, this does nor not a prerequisite, to overstanding. Perhaps Unchanged However, science0.4 is not identicalan imbalance to understanding of understanding,. As R. Feynman whichNormal (1965) soil pertains stated,water “I to observing the details of a system, and preclude quantum mechanics from being science. Literally, the name science points to vegetation an imbalance of understanding, which(at datum) pertains to observing the details of a system, and think I can safely say that nobody understandsx = 100 quantum mechanics”—and this does not overstanding *, and understanding is notoverstanding, identical,i 1 nor which a prerequi aims site,at an to overall overstanding. image ofPerhaps the system, the “forest” rather than the “tree”, 0.2 overstanding, which aims at an overall image of the system, the “forest” rather than the “tree”, preclude quantum mechanics fromkeeps being science science. alive. Lite rally, the name science points to an imbalanceDecreased of understanding, which pertains to obx serving = 200 the details of a system, and * i 1 Low soil water overstandingvegetation , and understanding keepsis not identical, science alive.nor a prerequi site, to overstanding.(below datum) Perhaps overstanding, which aims at an overall image of the system, thex “forest”i 1 = 400 rather than the “tree”, an imbalance of understanding,0 which pertains We can to thus observing hope the that, details despite of a system, achieving and a good understanding of the system keeps science alive. 0 0.2 We 0.4 can 0.6 thus hope 0.8 that, 1 despite achieving a good understanding of the system overstanding, which aims at an overallmechanisms image of the and system, a precise the “forest” formulationv i 1 rather than of its the dynamic “tree”, s, science may have not come to an end, mechanisms and a precise formulation of its dynamic s, science may have not come to an end, Fig. 2. Conceptual Figurekeeps We dynamics science 2: can Conceptual thus of alive. vegetation hope dynamics for that, the caricature despiteof asvegetation far hydrological achievingas our for toy the system. a modelcaricature good is un concerned. hydrologicalderstanding Let system. of us the now system focus on predictions, especially of the future, as far as our toy model is concerned. Let us now focus on predictions, especially of the future, mechanisms We and can a thusprecise hope formulation that, despitewhich of its achieving isdynamic a crucial s, a science good target unmay derstanding of have science—with not ofcome the to systemevenan end, high er importance in engineering. Does, which is a crucial target of science—with even higher importance in engineering. Does, as farmechanisms as our toy andmodel a precise is concerned. formulation really,Let ofus its nowdeterministic dynamic focuss, on science predictions, dynamics may have allowespecially not acome reliable of tothe an future, preend,diction at an arbitrarily long time horizon, really, deterministic dynamics allow a reliable prediction at an arbitrarily long time horizon, whichas far is as a our crucial toy model target is of concerned. science—with800 Let us now even fo highcus oner predictions, importance especially in engineering. of the future, Does, as inx i our above example? In the previous section, 1in vconstructingi our prediction for time 100 really, deterministic dynamics allowas600 a inreliable our above prediction example? at an Inarbitrarily the previous long timesection, horizon, in0.9 constructing our prediction for time 100 which is a crucial target of science—with600 800 even higher importance in engineering. Does, (400x100 = –244.55 mm, v100 = 0.7423), we, explicitly0.8 or implicitly,0.9 1 assumed that we know the 400 600 0.8 0.9 as in our above example? In the previous(200x100 = section, –244.55 in mm,constructing v100 = 0.7423),our prediction we, explicitly for time 100 or0.7 implicitly, assumed that we know the really, deterministic dynamics allow a reliable prediction at an arbitrarily long time horizon, 0.7 0.8 200 400 0.6 parameters0 and initial state with full precision. However,0.6 0.7 these are real numbers. It is now (x100as = in –244.55 our above mm, example? v100 = 0.7423),In the previousparameters we, explicitly 0 200section, and i norinitial constructing implicitly, state withourassumed prediction full tprecision.hat forwe timeknow H 100owever, the0.5 these are real numbers. It is now 200 0.5 0.6 200 0 0.4 0.0 well known that1.0 not only can real numbers not be kn0.4 0.5own with full precision, but (with (x100 = –244.55 mm, v100 = 0.7423), 400 we, 400 200explicitly or implicitly, assumed that we know the 0.2 parameters and initial state with fullwell precision. known H thatowever,0.8 not these only canare real real numbers. numbers It notis now be0.3 kn0.3 0.4own with full precision, but (with 0.4 600 600 400 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 probability 1), they0.4 are not computable (Chaitin, 2004). Therefore, our further investigations well0.6 parameters known that and notinitial only state can with real fullprobability numbers precision. 800 600 not1), H owever, bethey kn areown these not with computable are fullreal precision,numbers. (Chaitin, It but is now2 (with004). 30 Therefore,0.1 0.2 our further investigations 800 0.2 0.1 0.8 0 0.1 1000 800 0.0 0 v i 1 1.0well known that not only can realwill 1000 numbers incorporate not bev ithe kn 1 ownpremise with that full precision,a continuous but (with(rea l) variable cannot ever be described with 0 probability 1), they are 0 not computablewill (Chaitin,incorporate 2004). the Therefore,premise that our afurther continuous investigations (real) variable cannot ever be described with 200 400 600 200 400 600 800 600 400 200 800 600 400 200 1000 probability 1000 1), they are not computablex full (infinite) (Chaitin, 2precision,004). Therefore, particularly our further if it investigations varies in time. This premise, which will be called the will incorporate the premise thati 1 a fullcontinuous (infinite) (rea precision,l) variable particularly cannot ever if beit variedescribeds xini 1 time. with This premise, which will be called the will incorporate the premise that a continuous (real) variable cannot ever be described with Fig.Figure 3. Graphicalfull 3: Graphical(infinite) depiction precision, of depiction the toy model particularly of dynamics. the premisetoyifpremise it variemodel of sof in incomplete incompletedyna time.mics. This precision,premise, precision, which is is consistent consistent will be called with with mathematicsthe mathematics (cf. (cf. Chatin’s Chatin’s results), results), as aswell well full (infinite) precision, particularly if it varies in time. This premise, which will be called the premise of incomplete precision, is consistentasas with with physics physics with mathematics (cf. (cf. W. W. Heisenberg’s, Heisenberg’s, (cf. Chatin’s 1927, 1927, results), uncerta uncerta as wellintyinty principle). principle). of Fig. 4). Furthermore,premise of incomplete one may beprecision, tempted is to consistent think that with themathematics name science (cf. pointsChatin’s to results),overstanding as well5, and understand- 800as with physics (cf. W. Heisenberg’s, 1927, uncertainty principle). 0.9 the “primitive science”Soil that water, this system x represents, if It any, is Equilibrium: reasonable,ing is not identical, then,x = 0 to nor assume a prerequisite, that there to overstanding. is some small Per- uncertainty, at least in the x as with physics (cf. W. Heisenberg’s, 1927, It isuncerta reasonable,inty principle). then, to assume that there is some smallv uncertainty, at least in the hasi come to an end withVegetation the above discourse.cover, v We have al- Equilibrium:haps an imbalance v = 0.25 of understanding, which pertains toi ob- ready achieved It an is understanding reasonable, then, of the to system, assumeinitial its that driving conditions there isserving so (initialme the small details values uncertainty, of aof system, state atvariabl and least overstanding, es). in the Perhaps which it aimswould be reasonable to assume 600 It is reasonable, then, to assumeinitial thatconditions there is (initial some small values uncertainty, of state variabl at least es). in thePerhaps 0.8 it would be reasonable to assume mechanismsinitial and conditions the causative (initial relationships: values of (a) state there variabl is wa-es). 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And to wetheto the haveuncertainty uncertainty completely of of initial and initial precisely conditi conditions.ons.as FigureFigure our toy 55 modelshows isthe concerned. trajectorytrajectory of Letof the the us soil nowsoil focus on pre- formulated the system dynamics, which is fullywaterwater consistent x x for for the the dictions,already already especiallyexamined examined of initial theinitial future, conditions conditions which is( x a(0x crucial=0 =100 100 targetmm, mm, ofv0 v=0 0.30)= 0.30) and and for for five five more more water0 water x for x forthe thealready already examined examined initial initial conditions conditions ( x( x0 = = 100100 mm,mm, v0 == 0.30)0.30) andand for for five five more more 0.5 with this understanding, very simple, fully deterministic,setssets ofof initial initial conditions conditionsscience0 – with only only even 0slightly slightly higher (< importance (< 1%) 1%) dif dif inferentferent engineering. from from the Does,the basic basic set. set. At At short short times, times, the the nonlinearsets and setsof chaotic. initialof initial conditions conditions only only slightly slightly (< (< 1%) 1%) dif differentferentreally, fromfrom deterministic thethe basic set.set. dynamics AtAt shortshort allow times, times, a reliable the the prediction at However, 200 science is not identical to understanding. As 0.4
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