SOUTHEAST EUROPE SERIES Vol. XIX No. (Yugoslavia)

THE YUGOSLAV CONCEPT OF "ALL-NATIONAL DEFENSE" A Deterrence to Great Powers

by Dennison I. Rusinow

November 1971

Under the bright blue skies of a Balkan October guerrilla warfare, and an armed citizenry assigned the sounds of war echoed again last month from to sabotage the enemy and provide logistical sup- the green hills of northwestern Bosnia and the port to their own troops. Meanwhile, government adjacent regions of Croatia and Slovenia. The departments, Party committees, newspapers, and Titoist regime was commemorating the thirtieth radio stations from temporarily "occupied" regions anniversary of Tito's call to revolt and revolution were transferred to already prepared facilities in 1941 with the first large-scale and widely hidden in the forests, where they continued to publicized display of a new Yugoslav defense function, publish, and broadcast. strategy designed to deter any potential aggressor, even and especially a Great Power, or to deny vic- The Yugoslavs called the exercise a "confronta- tory if the warning is ignored. tion between two contrasting military doctrines." Victory fell, as programmed, to their own, to the Observed by accredited foreign military attach4s strategic doctrine known as optenarodna odbrana and documented by the domestic (but not the (literally "all-national defense," perhaps better foreign) press corps with cameras, the maneuvers translated as "popular defense"), a particular and called "Freedom 71" were the largest war games to synchronized combination of regular and partisan be held in Yugoslavia since 1953. Also on hand warfare, civil disobedience and sabotage, and urban were Marshal Tito and most of the country's guerrilla activities. present-day political leadership. All of them were in uniform, the older ones looking nostalgic and The spectacle of a "nation in arms" defending the younger slightly self-conscious in long, itself against invasion through such a combination unfamiliar, military costumes extracted from is not new in history, but the Yugoslavs claim that mothballs to symbolize the involvement of the this is the first time the concept has been incorpo- whole population in the new concept of defense. rated into the official defense strategy of a country at peace, complete with coordinated contingency The scenario they were there to observe called plans and assignments, active training of irregular for "aggressor" or "blue" forces, represented by and regular forces, and caches of arms in factories the most modern armor and technology the and communes ready for instant dispersal under Yugoslavs possess, to attempt a blitzkrieg "inva- local control. sion" using traditional offensive strategies designed to exploit superior numbers, equipment, and take The concept has its roots in the experience of command of the air. They were met, harassed, and Tito's partisans during the Second World War, but ultimately thrown back by the coordinated opera- it has evolved in an expanded and modernized tions of what some might consider a motley collec- form since August 1968. It was then, after the tion of "red" defenders: units of the regular armed occupation of Czechoslovakia was taken as a forces'(the Yugoslav People's army), territorial reminder that military interventions by Great militia, partisan units, volunteer "subversive Powers could also happen in Europe as in South- detachments" of youth trained for urban-rural east Asia or Latin America, that the Yugoslav

Copyright (C) 1972, American Universities Field Staff, Inc. [DIR-l-'72] DIR-l-'72 -2-

Marshal Tito (center) and Colonel-General Viktor Bibanj (on Tito's right), the Chief of the General Staff, on an inspection tour of the "battle zone." regime concluded that a small state with6ut mili- senior regular officers must have opposed the crea- tary alliances and awkwardly placed between rival tion of territorial and other irregular formations Great Powers or their spheres of influence must and to have urged instead the expansion and urgent have a defense strategy of sufficient credibility to modernization of the regular armed forces, whose give even a Great Power pause for thought. Other- heavy equipment is nearly obsolete. It was con- wise, the argument ran, there is a high risk that cluded, however, that if the purpose is really deter- both leaders and populace will lose their nerve and rence by means of a credible threat to defend one- ultimately their independence in the face of mili- self with determination and effectiveness, then reli- tary pressures, with or without an actual invasion, ance on the regular armed forces alone would not while awareness of this weakness may even encour- only be inadequate but actually dysfunctional. age a foreign power to apply such pressures. Clearly both one's own people and foreign govern- ments would see that such forces, however well In the subsequent debate about existing defense equipped, could not hope to stand up to the over- doctrine, allegedly rendered urgent by glaring defi- whelming numerical and technical preponderance ciencies revealed when contingency plans were of a Great Power's army. Such reliance would only examined and some reserves were mobilized in invite defeatism and surrender at home and encour- August 1968, two alternative courses seem to have age rather than deter military pressures by a poten- been examined and rejected before the new con- tial aggressor. cept was adopted. The arguments apparently Concern with these aspects of morale and poli- employed are as telling of the tenor of Yugoslav tics was of central importance in the evolution of thinking in this field as the new doctrine itself. the new doctrine and was implicitly admitted by the Chief of the Yugoslav General Staff, Colonel- With the traditional pride, prejudice, and General Viktor Bubanj, in a series of articles pub- acquisitiveness of their profession, a number of lished in the army's weekly newspaper last -3- DIR-1-'72

summer. Among the fundamental principles of on conventional armed forces, seems to have urged the new military doctrine he listed "an answer to that the partisan sauce that effectively poisoned defeatism" and "also an ideological move to settle this land for German goosesteppers in the last war accounts with all defective concepts of the so- ought by itself to be sufficiently effective (and called military supremacy of the superpowers." inexpensive) as a deterrent sauce for potentially aggressive ganders 30 years later. These people have Noting that no small country could stop a Great in turn been accused by General Bubanj in his Power blitzkrieg with its conventional army, Buo 1971 articles, and thus presumably in the earlier banj argued: debate, of "romanticizing" the partisan experience of 1941-1945 by imagining that a war under con- We can claim with full certainty that we temporary conditions would be similar. A future not only can achieve a successful defense war would not repeat the history of the last one, of the country but also can avoid war, if they were told, since the country to be defended is we consistently apply and realize our not the Yugoslavia of 1941, almost totally agricul- [new] concept tural, underdeveloped, and inhabited largely by barefoot peasants with nothing to lose but their There is again evidence of so-called lives. Today it would be politically and psychologi- military-technical concepts, the essence of cally inappropriate as well as militarily unnecessary which is that it would be much better to to abandon the cities and industrial centers of the devote all our energies to the creation of a plains and valleys to an aggressor without a fight, large modern army which would, with as these "romantic" advocates of pure partisan conventional principles, and by itself, mountain warfare have urged by implication. So a solve the question of defense. If these con- modern version of popular defense by a nation in cepts are analyzed more deeply, then it arms must and can include the use of a modern will be seen that they are based on the (and expensive) regular army. idea that a local war against us is impos- Whether or not this line of thought was also sible, and that if a general war were to influenced by a need to make some concessions take place other factors would come into both to the local "military-industrial complex" and play. That theory is propagated by the to economic pressure groups demanding lower Great Powers, who are trying to impose taxes, the strategists of Yugoslavia's defense, like the idea that a small country should not the good Marxists they claim to be, were in fact ---make any special preparations for defense producing a synthesis; elements of both were and that the policy of independence and combined from the thesis of an expensively mod- nonalignment is unrealistic. By imposing ernized but still unconvincing army and the anti- on small countries-especially those that thesis of a "romantic" untenable 1940 style parti- are not members of any bloc-the idea san war. The result is a concept designed to ensure, that local aggression is something that it in Bubanj's words, "that any aggressor, whoever he would be senseless to undertake in Europe might be and whatever political, ideological, or or anywhere around Europe, they are other motives he might have, must from the very trying to ctisarm these countries frontier reckon on all possible forms of armed ideologically and morally, to create among resistance and a full involvement of all our forces." them a psychological state of mind which It is, in other words, a threat to turn Yugoslavia would make it possible to turn them into into a European Vietnam for anyone foolish obedient satellites without much difficulty enough to attempt a military intervention here. and without the use of force, or, if neces- Conscious that Europe, even in its Balkan sary, to force them into discipline by mili- manifestation, is not Indochina, the authors of the tary intervention. Yugoslav concept have attempted to endow the threat with added credibility by constructing a On the other side ot the debate, another group modern version of a "nation in arms" adapted to of former partisans in senior posts in the military the 1970s and to local conditions, with particular and political establishments, recognizing the attention to social structures, history, and level of strength of the argument against complete reliance economic development. DIR-1-'72 -4-

The forcing of the Kupa River by "aggressor" forces: an engineering battalion erects a portable bridge with impressive speed while an amphibious tank crosses on its own.

How the Yugoslav Concept Differs dual form of conflict and mobilization. In Yugoslavia today, however, the purpose is the As a result there are several important distinc- defense and preservation of the existing system, a tions between the new Yugoslav concept and the difference that brings an important reordering of conceptions of "popular war" developed by others, priorities and means. including Mao, Che Guevara, and even Tito's own partisans of 30 years ago, with their acknowledged One vital consequence is that the Yusoslavs can debt to Mao. Each of these distinctions is reflected count on the use of the regular armed forces and in specific aspects of Yugoslav organization, strate- other instruments of an existing state from the gic planning, and in domestic and foreign political beginning of a conflict and can, therefore, give purposes that the wide and carefully orchestrated these forces the integral place in their strategic publicity given to the doctrine and to the "Free- planning described above. They no longer have to dom 71" maneuvers was designed to serve. think, as they did in 1941-1945, in terms of a guer- rilla war initially almost entirely dependent on par- (1) In the first place, other conceptions have tisan and other irregular units, which only later usually been designed to fulfill two functions may evolve into something resembling and oper- simultaneously: "national liberation" and social ating like a regular army. It thus becomes possible, revolution. The struggle to repel a foreign occupier in the terminology of the new doctrine, to plan for or invader is to be combined with a seizure of that "mixed kind of armed struggle," combining power and the destruction of the pre-existing elements of both "classic" and "pure partisan" domestic system. The Yugoslav partisan struggle of strategies, which is the essence of the Yugoslav 1941-1945 is itself one successful example of this concept. -5- DIR-l-'72

Along with these advantages for military resistance and armed struggle will be possible only planning, the fact that "popular defense" in if the operative army has previously done every- Yugoslavia is designed to defend the existing thing possible, if our people see that we fought system also imposes psychological and political bravely and with full strength and did everything imperatives that a revolutionary liberation move- to avoid such a situation." The contrast, by impli- ment does not face. One must, in short, build and cation, was with the situation the partisans faced exploit satisfaction and confidence in the existing during the Second World War, when the early col- system, not the opposite. One consequence, as per- lapse of the Royal Yugoslav army and the pre- ceived by the authors of the doctrine, is that all of cipitate flight from the country of king and govern- the established instruments of the existing state, ment were largely irrelevant or even a positive and especially the military one, must be seen to be factor in the morale and fighting spirit of a fully and effectively engaged-both in preparations Communist-led resistance that was as interested in and if necessary in action- if the rest of the popu- the overthrow of the old system as in the expulsion lation is to be expected to have the morale and of the Axis invaders. 3 confidence they need to play their assigned roles. (2) Most other concepts of "popular war" General Bubanj reflected this line of thinking, have been designed for use in underdeveloped too, in the course of his polemic with the "roman- countries and in situations in which urban centers tics" of "pure partisan warfare." Admitting that in are part of the enemy bastion. Yugoslavia is now a a protracted struggle with a resolute and powerful semideveloped country with extensive islands of enemy the defenders might ultimately be forced modern industry and social infrastructure to pro- into an almost exclusive dependence on irregular tect. Its cities are to be defended rather than con- guerrilla warfare, he maintained: "that kind of quered.

Regulars and Territorials in action south of Karlovac. DIR-1-'72 -6-

The doctrinal consequences of these distinctions (3) Finally, other concepts of "popular war" parallel and reinforce those flowing from the "pro- have invariably been designed for the primary pur- establishment" function of the Yugoslav concept. pose of fighting a war. The Yugoslav concept, as Again primarily for the sake of morale, the authors already noted, is primarily designed to deter a of the doctrine argue, the new strategy must envis- potential aggressor and thus preserve peace and age a determined defense of what has been built in independence. the past 25 years, and this could not be achieved by a partisan struggle in the hills, abandoning the If the concept is to fulfill this primary function, cities and industries of the plains to the occupier. both the people who are to be armed and any On the other hand, the very existence of these potential aggressor must be convinced that the doc- greatly enlarged modern sectors, populated by trine makes a long-term defense of a small country people who now have something to lose and some against a Great Power a credible possibility and reason to prefer the existing regime to the alterna- that both leaders and populace are willing to take tive that a hypothetical aggressor would pre- the risk,+united in their determination to defend sumably impose, makes the initial defense of these the country at any cost. areas and effective subsequent resistance to occu- pation there a more realistic possibility than it was A simple syllogism is implicit in this line of 30 years ago. reasoning and in the Yugoslav regime's recent activ- ities in this field, including "Freedom 71:"

The new doctrine, therefore, does not recognize (a) The best deterrent is a credible defen- the surrender of any territory, but as Bubanj sug- sive strategy that everyone believes you gested: "only the temporary presence on some ter- are willing to use whatever the odds. ritories of an enemy against whom an armed (b) The only credible defense for a small struggle is waged permanently, throughout the ter- country awkwardly situated between ritory, by resorting to all means and methods and Great Power spheres of interest and with- in all possible ways." This would include urban out military alliances is their kind of "all- guerrilla warfare, virtually nonexistent during the national defense." 1941-1945 War of National Liberation but now, (c) The only credible deterrent they can that has resulted from large-scale changes in the have, therefore, is to plan and train on a social structure and the increase in size of Yugoslav large-scale and detailed kind of defense- cities since the war, potentially effective enough to which means involving, arming, and deny to the aggressor permanent or easy occupa- training the whole people-and to be tion of at least many urban centers. observed doing so.

In such a war, as Yugoslav planners see it, the To achieve such credibility is thus the purpose concepts of "front" and "rear" assume secondary of the organization and training of the past 18 importance, if they exist at all. After initial engage- months, the massive demonstration provided by ments on the frontier and inevitable initial with- the "Freedom 71" maneuvers, and the wide pub- drawals, the regular armed forces are to be present licity given to the concept, to the training of-and "everywhere in the country." Their primary task willingness to distribute weapons to members of all will be to attract, engage, and neutralize as far as ethnic groups in this otherwise troubled multi- possible the armored spearheads of the enemy national community, and to the maneuvers them- blitzkrieg, while the more lightly armed territorial selves. and irregular forces-deployed during that initial holding action on the borders-attack the enemy's flanks and communications to prevent the con- As a senior Yugoslav diplomat recently told me: solidation of his hold on occupied territories. All "The only security a small country like this has in of the defending forces are to make maximum use the contemporary world is to possess a detonator of the extensive "interspaces" of liberated or with unpredictable reverberations. Our unique and unoccupied territory that such a war is expected to sufficient detonator was demonstrated in the 'Free- create. dom 71' maneuvers." -7- DIR-1-'72

Arms and the Man in the Balkans one time in charge of smuggling a theatrical troupe out of German-occupied Zagreb to perform for forces in the mountains. One young actor How convincing a demonstration was it? The partisan was always condemned, because of his blond hair foreign military attaches invited to observe the and Aryan to the of a German maneuvers presumably could give (and have given features, play part officer in these productions. Peasants in the area their superiors) a professional evaluation. This lay would bring the partisans and the troupe what observer, following the action through the mass little food they had for a party after the but and talking with Yugoslav journalist friends show, media consistently refused to give the "German officer" were there, was particularly impressed but not who even an apple. My friend would point out that he by some incidents that were not written surprised was really a good Croat and partisan and as near the scenario. into starvation as everyone else, to which the locals would reply: "We know that, but we still won't for example, took Peasants in the "battle zone," give him anything!") the war games so seriously that official warnings them "not to had to be issued in the press begging All of this, however amusing and even impres- as slashing tires, cut- carry out crude actions such sive, begs a vital but delicate question that official these actions by ting cables, etc.," but to "pretend Yugoslavs do not like to have asked outside their of the marking with white paint" the equipment own ranks: even if their modernized version of of the "aggressors," and to remember that the men "popular war" does make a long-term defense of their own "enemy forces" were really part of Yugoslavia viable in theory, is the second condition army. necessary to make it a credible deterrent really ful- filled? That is, are foreign governments and the "It is again emphasized," the announcement Yugoslavs themselves fully convinced that all the said anxiously, "that it is not their fault that they peoples of this quarrelsome multinational state are playing the role of aggressors." would be willing to fight as they did in 1941-1945 in defense of the present state and its system? To The plight of these "aggressors" was frequently take one specific example, which is not so far- quite genuinely pathetic. Peasants who trekked for fetched that it has not been included in some miles with supplies on ponyback for their own hypothetical scenarios contemplated by worried "red" forces refused food and even water to thirsty Yugoslavs and their worried friends abroad: Would "blue" footsoldiers. When one of the latter found a the Croats (and perhaps the Slovenes) participate spring or well, a peasant would appear to tell him it as fully and enthusiastically as opYtenarodna was poisoned, and the soldier could never be quite odbrana requires in a war in which the invader had sure it was not really so. "Blue" soldiers and even cleverly hinted or said that he would stop on the an occasional noncombatant journalist captured by borders of Croatia, satisfied with the occupation of irregular units were sometimes treated with gen- the south and east and an independent, uine brutality by their captors, despite their pro- "Finlandized" Croatia or Croatia-Slovenia? Or vice tests and those of official umpires. versa?

It is perhaps worth noting that the region in No one can answer these questions with cer- which the maneuvers took place was once part of tainty. Pessimists among those who believe that the the famous military frontier of the Hapsburg mon- existing Yugoslavia is the best of all realistically archy against the Ottoman Empire and that the possible Yugoslavias or alternatives to Yugoslavia inhabitants, descendants of South Slav peasant- point to such straws-in-the-wind as recent demands warriors who settled there as privileged Hapsburg in some Croatian circles for a separate Croatian minutemen on perennial alert, have a famous army (in addition to the territorials and other more fighting tradition they still eagerly maintain. irregular formations of "popular defense," already legally under local control) and even a Separate (An old partisan friend in Belgrade told me a Croatian membership in the United Nations as a wartime anecdote from the same district, as we logical fulfillment of the "state sovereignty" of discussed incidents from the maneuvers. He was at Croatia and the other five Yugoslav republics DIR-l-'72 -8-

written into the 1971 amendments to the Federal display of unity and militant determination. In his Constitution. The military themselves are con- public pronouncements and in televised conver- cerned about the national problem, if one can sations with local functionaries during the maneu- judge from recent articles in military journals or vers Tito seemed far more preoccupied with the the results of a poll of officers in which 54 per cent theme of "brotherhood and unity" among the of senior (major and above), 40 per cent of junior, Yugoslav nationalities, forged during the partisan and 47 per cent of noncommissioned officers war 30 years ago but seriously shaken in recent thought that "nationalism and chauvinism" were months, than with strictly military matters. The the greatest danger facing the Yugoslav socialist troop review in Karlovac with which the war games community. (Only 13.5 per cent of senior, 10 per ended on October 9 began with the massed flags of cent of junior, and 11.7 per cent of non- the six federal republics followed by "rep- commissioned officers answered that possible for- resentative" units of the participant territorial eign aggression was the greatest danger.)4 militia-one detachment from each republic in alphabetical order, a brave display of young Optimists among Yugophiles at home and Yugoslavs of both sexes prepared to defend their abroad reply, in defiance of some historical experi- common homeland. ences (e.g., April 1941) that Yugoslavs have always quarreled among themselves but always unite in The theme of unity had a dual function. It was the face of an external threat. In an article casting designed to demonstrate to foreign observers, scorn on reports in an Italian newspaper that the especially those who have been speculating upon Yugoslav army was planning a coup d'dtat, one the possibility that Yugoslavia might break up, that Belgrade journalist-noting also that no army with unity exists and the population supports the such intentions would have drafted directives for present system. It was also planned to create or "popular defense" creating territorial and other regenerate that unity with a demonstration and units not under its control, thus "ceasing to be the reminder of things that hold Yugoslavs of all only military force in the country"-quoted an nationalities together, including the need to unite anecdote which he thought more characteristic of in the face of foreign threats, real or imaginary, the real situation: and emphasize their independence and freedom to build their own peculiar form of socialism. A Yugoslav functionary paid an official visit to a top functionary of a friendly The maneuvers and the whole organization of country. He explained to his host that "popular defense," with its territorials, partisans, Yugoslavia was a monolithic country de- sabotage detachments, and arms caches in factories spite all its conflicts, differences, ano and town halls, seemed to say that here is a regime underdevelopment. The Yugoslav added: that is not afraid to arm the mass of its people and If anybody attacks us, we shall be united train them for irregular warfare. Here, they said, is as one! The foreign functionary asked: our demonstration of confidence that an armed But what will happen if nobody attacks and trained multinational populace will not turn its you? The lesson from this exchange: weapons against each other or against the system. Yugoslavia's problem is not that some- Is the confidence misplaced, the gamble unwise? body may attack us, but the opposite, s The Yugoslavs themselves, in earlier efforts to point out that their "national question" should not In this context, and whether or not the foreign be dramatized because it is neither unique nor attaches were suitably impressed with the military unanswerable, were wont to find parallels in aspects of the "Freedom 71" demonstration, the Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, Northern Ireland, maneuvers were also designed with a second propa- Pakistan, India, and the United States. Not all of ganda function in mind. these are setting the happiest of precedents today. Frequently photographed among the observers Balkan Wars and World Wars of the exercise were Marshal Tito and most of the country's regional as well as federal political One additional point of equal delicacy cannot leaders, all in uniform as noted earlier, putting on a be entirely evaded. President Tito and others -9- DIR-1-'72

repeatedly emphasized that the "Freedom 71" The basic premise of opftenarodna odbrana, as maneuvers, like the strategy they were demon- we have seen, is that it makes credible the Yugoslav strating, were not conceived with any specific regime's implicit threat, first clearly enunciated in potential aggressor in mind. Tito expressed annoy- the autumn of 1968, to turn the country into a ance while the war games were under way that Vietnam in which any Great Power, tempted into a some foreign press commentators had suggested military adventure, would be bogged down indef- the contrary, "in the hope," as Tito saw it, of initely, and never able to conquer even if itself provoking unpleasantness, conflict, or suspicion unconquerable. But when my diplomat friend between us and some countries that are near and speaks of a "detonator with unpredictable rever- friendly, as for example the East European coun- berations," he clearly has more in mind than that, tries." It was frequently pointed out that the site and so does the regime he represents. The Yugoslav chosen for the maneuvers was quite deliberately far deterrent will be bigger and better if and because a from any frontier, to avoid any misunderstanding, potential aggressor must reckon that, if he fails to and that it was unfair and reaching too far to make achieve a lightning occupation, a local war of indef- a point for a foreign press agency like United Press inite duration will carry with it an unpredictable International to note that the "aggressor's" line of but growing risk of escalation into a world war. attack was from northeast to southwest. The scenario for such an escalation needs no elab- oration here, but the Yugoslavs are hoping that The official Yugoslav point here is certainly fair their enemies are contemplating it with suitable enough and should be respected. It is also true, horror and their friends willingly will play their however, that of the "Great Powers" or "super- assigned role to give those potential enemies powers" (and both terms are specifically used in additional pause for thought. Yugoslav writings to specify the kind of aggressor Discussing the sad plight of nonaligned small the new doctrine is designed to meet) China is states in Europe and the continuing risk of local rather remote geographically and militarily; the wars as the rationale of Yugoslavia's "all-national United States, with or without the rest of NATO, defense," General Bubanj noted that "they all, like has in the recent past and the foreseeable future countries on other continents, are included with- had an undeniably real and publicly expressed out their consent in the calculations of global strat- national interest in the unity, territorial integrity, egy made by the superpowers, they play a role in independence, nonalignment, and further develop- the alignment and maintenance of the latter's ment of Titoist Yugoslavia. Only one Great Power, spheres of interest, and if their strivings and therefore, has any conceivable objective and impor- policies are in contradiction to these interests then tant interest in a drastic change in Yugoslav they may be subjected to pressures or force. ''6 policies or the regime, or, failing that, in the dis- solution of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs know this Two kinds of states can play that game, and and are not disinclined to say it-never, of course, Great Powers, too, can be included without their officially-in their uncensored normally cautious consent in the calculations of global strategy made foreign policy and fundamentally Party-controlled by small states, as it has happened before in the press. Balkans. DIR-l-'72 -10-

NOTES

1. Parts of this Report have previously appeared, in con- 3. It is worth noting in this connection that a recent densed form, as "La conception yougoslave de la guerre amendment to the Federal Constitution, adopted in July populaire: Les manoeuvres 'Libert( 71' ont montrdqu'un 1971, expressly forbids anyone "to sign or acknowledge the petit pays peut en principe assurer seul sa defense," in Le capitulation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Monde diplomatique (Paris), November 1971. or of any of its individual parts," making such acts punish- able as high treason (Amendment XLI). 2. In Narodna Armija (Belgrade), July and August 1971. It is from these articles and a long interview, also by Gen- 4. "What does the Army Think?" in NIN, (Belgrade), eral Bubanj, in the Belgrade weekly NIN, July 25, 1971, June 20, 1971. that the nature of the dispute within the military establish- 5. Nedeljne Novosti (Belgrade), June 13, 1971. ment, rumored at the time but never made public, can be inferentially reconstructed. 6. op. cit. in Narodna Armija.