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X s - Shutcrgc1rdan Pass J -

p - Peshawar Pi - Pi.shin

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. . . . . THE COLDWAR IN : SOVIET ASCENDANCYIN AFGHANAID DURINGTHE 1973-1978 REGNANCYOF MOHAMMADDAOUD IN POST-WORLDWAR II SOVIET-AMERICANCOMPETITIVE CONTEXT

Occasional Paper #32

by Ralph Groves

The Afghanistan Forum 201 East 71st Street, 2K New York, New York 10021

ISSN: 0889-7883 32 Ralph Groves is a graduate of Columbia University's Middle East Institute and holds a Master's Degree from Columbia's faculty of Middle East Languages and Cultures. Currently, he is a Doctoral Fellow at St. John's University in the field of Modern World History. He is employed at the Grumman Corporation as an administrator of international contracts. Other works by Ralph Groves include studies of Persian literature: soon-to-be published articles include "Variants in Khayyamic Poetry" and "The Many Facets of Khayyamic Poetry." His previous experiences include two years of residence in , and Naval active duty as an operations officer during the Persian Gulf War.

This study is dedicated to Professor Edward Allworth and to Professor Ehsan Yarshater, both of Columbia University. Their priceless help made this study possible. 1

I. Intreductien During the 1980s U.S. naval warships came to transit the Strait ef Hormuz an convoy duty fer U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti ail tankers, and after 29 April 1988 on c•nvoy duty for all neutral shipping. The U.S. Navy cenducted these evelutiens under grave patential danger, far greater than that ef a decade previous, within range of Seviet* cambat aircraft peised at salient bases in Afghanistan. Same of these bases had been built by Soviet farces subsequent ta their invasien ef Afghanistan and seme by American fareign aid during the 1950s. The Soviet invasion af Afghanistan was preceded by a grawth af Sav­ iet influence in that cauntry, especially since 1954. Soviet influence en the ecenomics •f Afghan life (starting with foreign aid prejects in 1954) and en the military (starting with military aid in 1956) gradually percelated, as it were, inte influence en the pelitics ef Afghanistan, as overtly manifested by suppert of the coup in 1978 which braught a cemmunist government te pawer (albeit a cammunist government led by the Khalg factian ef the Pe•ple's Democratic Party ef Afghanistan (P.D.P.A.), rather than ene led by the Mmscew-favared Parcham factien). Such grawths af influence, breught abeut by huge Saviet investments and assistance, fereshadawed the invasian af 1979 which was launched ta protect the new communist government in and ta pretect the Soviet stake in Afghanistan. Those whe were surprised by the invasion may have been insensitive te the gradual integration ef Afghanistan inte the Sov­ iet ecanomy and inta the Saviet geepolitical framewerk, which was evolv­ ing while American foreign aid and influence were diminishing. The purpose of this writer's effert is t• demenstrate that it may be efficaciaus te study contemporary fereign press, even the centrolled press af a clased, or semi-closed, seciety with an undemocratic gavern­ ment. For example, a schelar empleyed by a research center er a govern­ ment agency in the U.S. may perceive and measure changes in a fereign ceuntry's situatien by means ef studying that country's press. Such a scholar may became able to alert the U.S. Government that the prafile of a rival power, such as an assertive regienal pewer, is looming larg-

* The term "Seviet" is histarically apprepriate fer the temporal para­ parameters ef this manegraph. 2 er than befare in the landscape ef natienal affairs in his ceuntry ef study. He may became able ta repert that a favarable image ef the rival pewer is being pertrayed in the press te that ceuntry's seciety (er, at least, ta the literate stratum ef that seciety), with reasenable judg­ ments as ta what such an image may partend. His judgments may amplify intelligence mn subtle er avert grewths ef the rival's pelitical influ­ ence parallel ta grewths of ether types af influence {ecanemic, military, etc.). Nene af the faregeing is ta suggest that centempurary foreign press is the only saurce ef information er signals abaut a foreign cauntry. Informatien and signals may be perceived frem many saurces. The use mf press is warthy ef merit, but does net denigrate ether saurces (such as radia broadcasts dacumented by F.B.I.S., dispatches ta u.s. newspapers, and diplomatic cammuniqu,s). This writer focuses herein an Afghanistan as a case study. Thaugh at the time af this writing (May 1992) forces fram the farmer Saviet Uni•n are ne langer in Afghanistan, and the essentially pra-M•scew re­ gime in Kabul (in the wake af President Najibullah's fall fr•m pewer) collapsed under the aggregate power af factians af the Mujahedin, a can­ tinuing study af Afghanistan is relevant. The dynamism af regianal and glebal events is such that use ef Afghanistan's madern air bases by a regienal pawer remains a passibility f•r centingency planning. (While speculative, a future Islamic gavernment in Afghanistan may ally itself with Iran or Tajikistan (countries which are in a geegraphical and cul­ tural cantinuum with Afghanistan), either of which may deploy its air forces t• Afghanistan as part ef a regianal security pact.) Further, any case study demanstrates emplayment af cencept and methadolegy. Accard­ ingly. this case study may help this writer er another to canduct a similarly-conceived study an, say, Singapere's press with an eye an the future af the strategic Strait af Malacca.

II. BACKGROUND:AFGHANISTAN IN STRATEGICCONTEXT

The S•viet invasi•n ef Afghanistan an 24 December 1979, spearhead­ ed by battali•ns ef the 4th and 105th airberne divisiens en 17 December (during the tenure ef President and Premier Hafizullah Amin), came as a 3 jalt ta the West. Far the first time since its withdrawal from Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946, the Red Army was used against a neighbar outside af the East Eurapean COMECON/WarsawPact member states. The West was faced with a new Soviet salient pesitien, claser ta the Persian Gulf, the Strait af Harmuz, the Gulf af Oman, and the , and began pandering Sav­ iet intentians and capabilities from this new pasitian. Several different perspectives pravided insights inta Saviet inten­ tions and capabilities fram Afghanistan. Prafessar Or. Rashid Khalidi, then at the Institute far Palestine Studies (recently at Columbia Univer­ sity's Middle East Institute and currently at Chicago University's Center far Middle East Studies), expressed the belief that the Saviet invasion was in the context af Soviet-American rivalries and pravided the Soviet Unian with a bargaining chip versus American deployment af missiles in 1 Eurape. Alsa, in the immediate wake af the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Seviet Union became alarmed when the U.S. began ta enhance its cap­ abilities far pewer prejectian int• the nerthern tier ef the Middle East: "The Soviets seem te have perceived a sweeping U.S. advance thraugheut the entire regian in the menths preceding their decisien ta intervene 2 militarily in Afghanistan." Selig l~arrisen af the Carnegie Endewment far Internatienal Peace wrete abeut the Saviet Unian's abilities ta stir Baluch n•tionalism within beth Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan. 3 The U.S. Naval Institute counted Afghanistan as a Soviet client/surrogate frem which pewer could be µrejected inte the Gulf ef Oman and the 4 Arabian Sea, where the U.S. Navy has eperated almost centinually. Dennis Rass, Executive Director af the Berkeley-Stanferd Pragram en Sev­ iet Internatienal Behavier, summarized an aspect of the Seviet role in Afghanistan in strategic cantext: "·•• if the Saviets cauld achieve same leverage over the flew af oil, they ceuld manipulate Eurepean and Japan­ ese dependency and erode the cahesian ef the Western Alliance and als• make U.S. allies mere respansive to Seviet interests." 5 While Seviet farces were active in Afghanistan, their salient pesi­ tians helped to campensate far a weakness of Soviet Naval Aviatian: the lack af aircraft carriers ether than the~ class (which can only em­ bark one kind affixed-wing aircraft, the YAK-36 ••farger"* fighter). 6 The Soviet military availed itself af Afghanistan's strategic geegraphy by building an airbase at Shindand in the west af that cauntry saon af-

* N.A.T.O. designatian 4 ter the invasien. In 1984 tw• ether bases were built in the west and seuthwest ef the ceuntry: at Mir Daud, 18 miles seuth ef Herat, and at Dasht-e Amiran, 18 miles west of Zaranj and a mere 25 miles frem the Iranian city ef Zabel (accerding ta Reuters as repmrted in the l!:.!.u Times). With Seviet aircraft already able te eperate eut mf Shindand in the West and out of Qandahar's airpert (built with u.s. aid in the late 1950s) in the seuth, it is unlikely that the Seviet military need­ ed mere bases fer use against reeistance Mujahedin guerrillas. The l.£!!l

Tin••• stated catageric• ....l. ly: t:;Je--;l :"e· ro 9 u,,,r,)....! )!..rile ~ I.:e._ I hL - e::,• \....--'.-,,,,7 _./ -- • '-1 - •• CS:Jr~ CY~l- ..\! ~ ~ ~:·L» ~> -~ I ·· 1 • ,>...@ >::r-;J '.;J=9 ---·--·-·- New Seviet bases place the Persian Gulf within range ef Soviet aircraft.* On the strategic value sf Seviet air bases in Afghanistan, Amaury de Reincaurt, a French histerian, stated during the Saviet-Mujahedin war: ••• many ef the bases being built or expanded by the Russians in Afghanistan are meant just as much fer aggressive strategic purpeses of eventual eperatiens in the Gulf and beyend as fer fighting the rebellien within the country; Pakistani military autharities whe have access to full informatien on this paint are firmly ef the epinien that this is the lang-term pur- 8 pese af the impressive Saviet military buildup. The strategic value ef Soviet air bases in Afghanistan were addressed alsa by Selig Harrison. 9 Fred Halliday, a member af the Transnatianal Institute, made a gen­ eral abservatian that the world had begun to experience a new celd war in the wake af the Saviet invasien of Afghanistan, ane which came te fa­ cus an the area of the Persian Gulf (rather than Europe and, later, Asia which were the feci ef the first celd war). He cited a statement from Professor Dr. Robert Tucker af Jahns Hapkins University as carrabaratian of this view: 11 'Almest as certainly as did Europe in the 1940s, the Gulf prevides .!b.!.**critical saurce ef canflict between the United States and the Saviet Unian.• 11 10 The analysis uf Jagat S. Mehta, farmer fereign secretary ta the Government af India, revealed that the then Carter Administratian inter-

* Translatian by Ralph Graves. ** Emphasis by Prefesser Tucker. 5 preted the Soviet invasion"••• as a first step teward fulfilling Russian ambitions to secure warm water parts as well as to deminate the Persian Gulf and thereby centrel er even cut the West's oil life line." 11 (Mehta did net persenally agree with this interpretation.) This inter­ pretation ef events gave rise to the Carter Doctrine: Any attempt by any eutside ferce to gain centrel ef the Persian Gulf regien will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests af the United States ef Ameri­ ca, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including mili­ tary force. 12 The circumstances breught about by the Seviet invasion (improved Saviet abilities fer power prejectien taward the vital Strait ef Harmuz, impraved Soviet abilities to influence Baluch nationalism, and a new celd war between East and West) made the invasien a watershed event. The abovementiened Soviet abilities remained a viable optien far several years even after the withdrawal ef Saviet farces, as long as a pro-Mescew 13 client regime existed in Kabul. III. SOVIET-AMERICANCOMPETITIVE AID ANO GROWINGSOVIET INFLUENCE The influence ef the Suviet Unian grew gradually from the 1930s, during which time the Soviets received ane-third af Afghan experts. Thaugh the U.S. was daminant in trade, aid, and cultural relatians with Afghanistan up te 1953, the Soviets came gradually ta displace the U.S. as a partner with Afghanistan starting in 1954 (during the first peried ef Mehammad Daoud Khan as prime minister). In 1954 the Seviets extended $3.5 millien te Afghanistan in credit for the building of silas and mills

(with repayment ta be via waml and cattan at anly Jl,.t interest per annum starting three years later). Later that year the Soviets provided tech­ nical aid far the building of a gasoline pipeline acrass the Amu Darya, the building of four gaseline bulk storage tanks, dispersed throughout the country, and the paving of Kabul•s streets. (The street paving, in particular, was a prapaganda caup for the Seviets as the U.S. Impart- 14 Export Bank had refused ta suppart such a preject ane year earlier.) U.S. suppart for (a member state of Baghdad Pact/CENTO and SEATO over the Pushtunistan dispute with Afghanistan farced Prime Minister Daeud ta turn t• the Soviet Union in 1956 fer military aid (a pmlicy made urgent in the wake of the U.S. c•mmitment in 1954 te 6

provide Pakistan with $21 million in military aid). This led to a $25 million deal for the Soviet Union to provide military equipment and training to Afghanistan. (By 1979, the Soviet military had trained 10,000 Afghan military personnel on Soviet territory.) 15 Political tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1955 re­ sulted in Pakistan's closing of the border to Afghan transit trade destined for the port of Karachi. This prompted a Soviet-Afghan agreement on 28 June 1955 to permit transit trade, duty-free, across Soviet territory {based on Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty of friendship). On 27 August 1955 the Soviet Union guaranteed the sale of Afghanistan's fruit crop, imperiled by Pakistan's stoppage of transit trade. By Nov­ ember of 1955 Pakistan lifted the embargo, but, by that time, in the words of Anthony Arnold (a former U.S. intelligence officer who had served in Afghanistan) "·•• the way had been prepared for a quantum jump in Soviet-Afghan relations." 16 (These Soviet-Afghan relations were all the more solidified by U.S. refusal to help build a 1,000- mile-long highway from Afghanistan southward through Iran to provide an alternate route to the sea.) In 1957 the Soviet Union discovered reserves of 500 million barrels of oil and 22 billion cubic meters of natural gas in Afghanis­ tan and provided itself as a market for these resources. The following table relates the growth of Afghan dependence on the Soviet Union dur­ ing the 1950s: 17 lliQ 1960 arms Dfo 100% petroleum products 1 Of., 90% total foreign trade 17% (1951) 5~

In 1968 aid from the Soviet Union amounted to $550 million (two­ thirds in loans which could be repaid in commodities) compared to $250 million from the U.S. (80% in grants). 18 Soviet road-building in Afghanistan (which served Soviet strategic interests as much as Afghan­ istan's infrastructural needs) was completed by 1966, and for the first time Herat and Qandahar were linked around the . (This Soviet road building included the construction of three new bridges across the Besuda, Kameh, and Asmar rivers. (All of these bridges were overly 7

strong so as to hold the heaviest of Soviet tanks, according to the then U.S. military attache ,,,. who witnessed the construction. 19) In 1 978, the year of the coup against Daoud and the year before the Soviet in­ vasion, aid from the Soviet Union was $400 million, making Afghanistan the fourth biggest recipient of Soviet aid and the greatest recipient 20 in per capita terms. "This triumph for Soviet diplomacy tends to be overlooked in the West when discussing the Russian invasion little more 21 than a decade later."

IV, PROBLEMSTATEMENT

The coup of 26-28 April 1978 ("Saur 1 Revolution") was launched by cadres and sympathizers of the People's Democratic Party of Afghan- istan (P.O.P.A.) * in the Afghan army against President Mohammad Daoud Khan (of the Naderi family) and resulted in the establishment of a "democratic republic" and the death of Daoud. This coup followed less than five years after Oaoud's own coup of 17 July 1973 against the mon­ archy of Mohammad Zahir Shah. (The 1973 coup brought him to power for the second time. His first period of premiership had been from 1953 to 1963.) On 30 April 1 978 Moscow recognized the new regime, the first foreign government to do so (raising suspicion that the Soviet Union had had foreknowledge of the coup, though not necessarily a hand in it). Anthony Arnold summarized that the coup was a culmination of Soviet am- bi tions toward .~fghanistan: " •• , the long-term Soviet goal of establish­ ing a pliable regime in Kabul had apparently been achieved. 11 22 The new regime, headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki, Prime Minister and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, and Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin, each a Deputy Prime Minister and Vice Chairman of the Revolution­ ary Council (Amin was also Minister of Foreign Affairs), was supported by the Soviet Union. (In spite of his nominal position below that of Taraki, Amin commanded strong personal loyalty among key military offi­ cers and secret-police officials,) Taraki and Amin were of the Khalq ------*The Afghan Per!3_i_~n (Dari} uomenclature of P.D.P.A. is Hezb-e Demo­ kratik-e Khalq-e Afghanestan, which in short may be referred ta as - - Khalq,not to be confused with one of the factions of the P.D.P.A. which is also called Khalq~ (The P.D.P.A. was first organized in 1965 as an underground communist g;-_oup. It split into two factions, Khalq and Parc:ham,-in-June ef 1967.) · B faction of the P.D.P.A. whereas Karmal was ef the Parcham factien. Pub­ lic statements of mutual support between Afghanistan and the Seviet Union began almest immediately (even theugh the Seviet Unisn favered the Parcham factimn ever the predominant Khalq factien): Amin referred te the April coup as a" 'prolangatien ef the Great Octeber Revelution ef 1917.' Mescew saan echoed this view; 'Since the revelutienary vic­ tmry of April 1976, the Afghan people under the leadership ef the 23 P.D.P,A. have taken the read to the building ef secialism.• " (Amin became premier in March •f 1979, while Taraki held the pesitiens ef head ef state and defense minister. In September of 1979 Amin assumed all •f Taraki's titles.) The ceup ef 1978 and these kinds ef laudatery public preneuncements indicated a growing Soviet influence and invelve­ ment in the Afghan pelitical landscape and perhaps fereshadewed the in­ vasian ef 1979 which was launched in erder te pretect the new cemmunist regime (as well as ta acquire strategic advantages in the glebal cen­ text, as discussed abeve). 24 There prabably were avert manifestatians before 1978, er, at least indicatiens, that there was a growing Saviet involvement in Afghan peli­ tics parallel te grawths in Seviet-Afghan ecanemic ties (beth eccurring while U.S. invelvement and ties were diminishing). The questian begs us te seek evidence ef such manifestatiens mr indications, measure any changes ever time, and then evaluate and interpret significant patterns.

V. ANALYTICALQUESTIONS Certain analytical questiens can be raised: 1. te what degree were there discernable changes of public attitudes toward the Seviet Unien between the twe caups (1974 - 1977) and what qualitative matters did they entail?; 2. how did the attitudes express themselves in terms af frequency and centent?; 3. what is the validity ef using a contrelled press in making an inquiry ef this kind? ("The press has been fully state­ owned since Daoud's ceup in July 1973 when the few jeurnals left in pri- 25 vate hands during the menarchy were abelished." ); 4. what was the sort and extent of press cever.ge ef Islam and ef the ulema (clerical class), and what was the nature and substance af the interactiens ef this class with the gevernment (especially as the gavernment began ta turn tewards the left)? 9

In seeking answers te the above questiens, this writer seught te uncever evidence te shaw whether er net the pelitice-military events af 1978 - 1979 might have been fereseen by eutside abservers had such ob­ servers been sufficiently sensitive ta a changing situatien in Afghanis­ tan. This writer platted the patterns in the Afghan press as a research center er gavernment agency might have dene by assigning the task af cen­ tent analysis of the Afghan press tea schalar facusing upon the region ta perceive and measure a changing situatian. As suggested earlier, a schalar's reasonable interpretatians based upan quantitative and qual­ itative changes ef attitudes in the press might have shewn that the Af­ ghan autherities in Kabul c•nsciously and intentienally made the Seviet Unian's profile familiar and favarable ta its literate stratum af seciety in the period between the two coups.

VI. METHODOLOGY(CONSISTING OF FOUR SUBTIERS) a) Appreach and Cmnceptual Frame af Reference As discussed earlier, American influences upen Afghanistan wanned as these af the S•viet Unien waxed. Accerdingly, evidence ef official attitudes tawards the Seviet Union were seught by this writer in the epen press. Articles abaut diplomatic relatiens and trade provide evi­ dence ef evert relatianships between the twe countries and articles re­ garding Seviet technelegical achievements provide insights inta Afghans' perceptions ef Saviet abilities. Additianally, evidence ef efficial attitudes tawards Islam were saught. Articles cencerning Islam reveal mfficial values af what religion's rele in natienal life shauld be. The focus af this inquiry was upen the years 1974 and 1977. Articles were found, and then categarized, according ta their head­ lines, Alsa, ene newspaper issue fram each menth (as a randem sample) was scanned in its entirety in a search fer cantent relevant ta this inquiry under nen-indicative headlines. This having been dene, it was praved that headlines are generally indicative of cantent and therefere establishes that it is beth valid and credible to find and categerize articles according ta headlines. Far the purpose •f this inquiry the conceptual frame ef reference assumed a cultural cantinuum among Iran, Afghanistan, and other p.rts ef 10

Central Asia.

b) Translation

In an interview with Professor Or. Ehsan Yarshater, Director of Iranian Studies, Columbia University, this writer confirmed that the written version of Afghan Persian (Dari) is in conformance with Iranian Pers1 ·an (Fa-rs1~). 26 Accor d' 1ng 1 y, th e use o f Hua~m ' s F- ars1-~ E ng 1' 1s h d' 1c- tionary is appropriate for translating headlines and articles from the Afghan press into English.

c) Transliteration

The Chicago Manual of Style suggests the use of a system of trans­ literation"··· employing as few diacritics as possible, except in lin­ guistic or highly specialized studies." 27 As this is a specialized study, this writer will employ the academic system of transliteration used in common by the Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum, the Encyclopae­ dia Iranica, the Persian Heritage Series, the Persian Studies Series, and the Modern Persian Literature Series. A few terms and proper names which have been assimilated into English are presented in their angli- 28 cized forms. Some terms are presented in other transliterations in the context of direct quotations, wherein the authors may have used other methods of transliteration.

d) quantification

Articles which are pertinent to the focus of this paper were sifted into categories. The categories differ depending on the primary source because the intended audience and content differ with each primary source. Articles about Soviet-Afghan economic, political, and diplomatic relations were the principal types of articles sought. Articles about Soviet relations with the U.S. were counted because they equate the Soviet Union with the U.S. as a great power of equivalent status. Ar­ ticles about the Soviet Union in its relations with other countries were not counted because they are of a general news variety and do not necessarily amplify any aspect of Soviet-Afghan relations or present the Soviet Union as a co-equal power vis-~-vis the U.S. Articles about internal Soviet development and about Soviet tech- 11 n•l•gy were quantified because they indicate, h•wever abliquely, that the Seviet Unian's system is laudable and werthy af imitatian. VI I. SOURCES This writer researched the micrafilm callectiens in Celumbia Uni­ versity's Lehman Library fer the Kabul Times* af 1974 and 1977. Alsa, this writer researched the micrafilm cellectiens ef Calumbia's Butler Library far Anis,- the majar Dari language newspaper, af the same years. 29 The chaice •f the two newspapers cited abave was made fer the fellewing reasens: Kabul Times was a majar internatianal newspaper print­ ed in English and, as such, reflected an image which Afghanistan wanted ta partray tm the werld; Anis was a majar Dari newspaper far the literate stratum af Afghan seciety. Accarding ta Mr. Ibrahim Paurhadi, Area Spe­ cialist of the Near East Section af the Library ef Cangress, ~ was the major newspaper within Afghanistan during the 1970s. 30 During the Seviet occupatian a praliferatian ef ethnic newspapers eccurred (in Baluchi, Tajik, Pashte, etc.), making the relative p•sitien mf Anis difficult te assess. The fallawing assessments were made during the Soviet eccupatien cancerning Afghanistan's linguistic landscape: Accmrding te the Ecenemist, the Smviet Unien is"••• enceuraging lecal culture and traditions in different parts ef the ceuntry in the hepe that Afghans will turn away fr•m thoughts mf natienal identity, which is the mainspring ef their resistance te Soviet eccupation." 31 Accerd­ ing te Antheny Arnald, "the eventual geal is te reduce grassroets cemmun­ icatien ameng the varieus tribes, with Russian in the end beceming the 32 only comman language." Accerding te Mr. Obeidullah Noerata, an instructer •f Central Asian languages at Celumbia University, Dari has always held a pre-eminent place in Afghanistan's linguistic landscape (though the majerity ef pe•• ple are Pushtun) because it is"··· easy ta learn and is a literary lan­ guage easy fer expressien." 33 The late Leuis Dupree, a leading schelar ef Afghanistan, wrate that Dari"••• serves as the lingua franca, altheugh the Constitutien designates Pashte as the 'natianal lan-

* The superscriptien Kabul Times was changed t• Kabul~ Times in 1984. 12

guage.' " 34 Or. Zalmay Khalilzadt formerly a Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and subsequently~ an the Pelicy Planning Staff of the State Uepartment, has corroborated Dupree's observation about Dari: despite political domination by (wh• preduced m•n~ archs and dominated the military)t "••• the language of the government and the lingua franca among the various communities was Dari. This de­ pendence on Dari gave the Tajiks an advantage in the bureaucracy, where 35 - they were prominent." According to the Encyclopaedia Iranica Dari is spoken by, or is at least comprehensible to, over 5.6 million people in an Afghan population of over 12 million (as of 1979), or approximately 46%. (The figure of 5.6 million includes 3.5 million Tajiks who speak Dari in addition to Tajiki dialects and 1 million Hazara who speak the Hazaragi- - dialect of Dari.)- 36 It is for all of these reasons that the intellectuals and bureaucracy have always used Dari. The historical context within which this writer analyzed the con­ tent of newspapers was obtained from secondary sources such as scholarly books and journals.

VIII. EVIDENCE

Overt manifestations of a growing interaction between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan can be quantified for the years 1974 and 1977, A survey of the issues of the Kabul Times for the first six months of each of those years indicates a marked evolution and contrast; the num­ ber of articles about the Soviet Union and about Soviet-Afghan relations increased from 24 to 56t more than doubling. (See addenda 1 and 2 for listings of headlines of articles.) Due to the fact that this study is attempting to measure the pro­ file of the Soviet Union in the Afghan press, it should be noted that 15 advertisements for Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, appeared in the

Kabul Times in 1977. \rlhile not articles ~ .§..!::.tthese advertisements had specific Soviet-Afghan overtones in so far as they advertised a Kabul-Tashkent transportational connection. Also, they were large in size (one-quarter page), including a representation of an airliner, thus contributing to the profile of the Soviet Union in the Afghan press. No such advertisements appeared in the Kabul Times in 1974. 13

Taking these advertisements into account, this study's quantifica­ tion of articles/advertisements about the Soviet Union and about Soviet­ Afghan relations in 1977 should be increased from the 56 mentioned above by 15 to 71, which is about triple the 1974 figure~ The categories of articles/advertisements are as follows:

a) b) Soviet Economic Assistance Diplomatic Relations Between to and Trade with Afghanis­ Soviet Union and Afghanistan tan (Including Meetings Between/ Among Ministers and Delega­ tions)

1 97 4 * ...... 3 • . . • . • . • . . . • • 9

1977 .•...•....•.••.• 16 • • • . • • • • • • • • • 8

c) d) Soviet Internal Economic, Soviet Technology (Atomic, Industrial, Political, and Space, Etc.) Cultural Developments/ Achievements

1 97 4 ...... • . . . . . 5 • . . . • • . • . • . . • 1

1 977 .. , ...... 8 ...... 9

e) f) Politico-Economic State­ Cultural Contacts Between ments, Agreements, Messages Soviet Union and Afghanis­ of Bilateral Importance (In­ tan cluding Salutations, Joint Communiques, Observances of Treaty Anniversaries, Etc.)

1 97 4 ...... • ...... 4 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2

1 977 ...... 6 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6

(Further categories are found on the next page.)

* Articles from the first six months of each year are quantified. 14

g) h) Aeroflot Advertisements Negative Coverage About Soviet Union

197 4 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 • • • • • • • • • • 0

1977 ••.••••.••••••• 15 (all in Jan.) ••••• - • • • • 1 i) Islam, Afghan Nationalism in the Context of Islamic Umma

197 4 • • • • • • • • • • • • . • • 0

1977 ...... 2

Articles about internal Soviet developments and achievements and about Soviet technology (categories c) and d), respectively, above) are quantified because they indicate, however obliquely, .that the Sov­ iet system is laudable and worthy of imitation. Some articles in 1977 were written by Soviet authors, indicating a Soviet access to the Af­ ghan press which was not overtly manifested, if it existed at all, in 1974. (See Addendum Number 2 for headlines of articles written by Sov­ iet authors.) The pertinent articles from Anis are categorized identically, with the following exceptions: The category addressing Aeroflot advertise­ ments is replaced by a category addressing favorable postures of the Soviet Union vis-~-vis the U.S. and the West in the international arena. (This exception is necessitated by a lack of Aeroflot advertise­ ments in Anis and by the presence of many articles addressing Soviet international intercourse.) Also, Category i), about Islam, is expand­ ed to include social aspects of Islam. The expansion of this category is necessitated by a great number of articles in Anis (many more than in the Kabul Times), addressing Islam across a broad spectrum of human affairs. The extent of coverage on Islam and Islamic matters in Anis indicates an editorial sensitivity to a Perso-Islamic primary audience. Nearly parallel to the case of the Kabul Times, the number of ar­ ticles in Anis pertinent to this study increased substantially between the years 1974 and 1977: They increased in number from 29 to 77, more 15

than doubling. (As in the review of the Kabul Times, these figures re­ flect a quantification of articles published in~ during the first six months of each year, a sufficient representative sample to plot pat­ terns.) The categorization and quantification of Anis articles are as follows: a) b) Soviet Economic Assistance Diplomatic Relations Between to and Trade with Afghanis­ Soviet Union and Afghanistan tan (Including Meetings Between/ Among Ministers and Delega­ tions}

1974 • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 . • ...... • . . . • 4

1 977 ••••.•..•.•••..•.•• 11 • . • . . . • . . • • • • a

c) d) Soviet Internal Economic, Soviet Technology (Atomic, Industrial, Political, and Space, Etc.} Cultural Developments/ Achievements

1 97 4 . • . • . • . . . • • . • • • • • • • 0 . . • . • • • . . • . . • 0

1 977 ...... 3 ...... 2

e) f) ~olitico-Economic State- Cultural Contacts Between ments, Agreements, Messages Soviet Union and Afghanis­ of Bilateral Importance (In- tan --~~~~~~~~~~~~~ eluding Salutations, Joint Communiques, Observances of Treaty Anniversaries, Etc.)

1974 ••.....••..•.. ., •.•• 2 • • • . . • • . . • . • . 2

1 977 • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2 • • . • • • • • • • • • • 3

g) h) Soviet Union as a Power of Negative Coverage About Co-equal Status with the Soviet Union U.S./Reflecting Well Upon Soviet Union Vis-~-Vis the West

1 97 4 • • • • . • . • • • • • • • • • • • • 7 . • • • . . • . . • • . . 0

1977 .•....•...... •..• 26 . • • • • • • • . . • . • 3 16

i) Islam, Social Aspects of Islam, and Afghan Nationalism in the Context of Islamic .l:!!!!!!!!,

1974 ••.•..•••.•.•.••• 12

1977 •••.••.•••••••.•• 17

IX. SUMMARY

The evidence clearly shows that the frequency of articles in Kabul Times and Anis about Soviet-Afghan affairs and about the posture of the Soviet Union in the world increased significantly between the two coups (1974 - 1977). The quantitative increase was not the only discovery supported by evidence: Articles about Soviet-Afghan affairs and about the posture of the Soviet Union in the world remained laudatory in qual­ ity while negative coverage remained minimal. As the quantitative in­ crease in frequency was nearly parallel between the two newspapers and the content retained a laudatory quality, the positive image of the Sov­ iet Union for both the English-speaking and the Perso-Islamic social strata of Afghan society was nearly equal. Undoubtedly, this positive image favorably disposed Afghan public attitudes toward a furtherance of Afghan economic integration into the Soviet Union and toward a benign political interrelationship between the two countries. While the quantitative frequency and qualitative content in the two newspapers were nearly pa~allel on secular coverage pertinent to this in­ quiry, articles about Islam were concentrated most heavily in~. rather than in Kabul Times. This is not surprising, given that Anis' primary audience was Perso-Islamic, rather than Western-educated or international. (This also serves as a reminder that a scholar cannot acquire the entire flavor of a foreign press, or the complete cultural and religio-ideological context from which it comes, without being skill­ ed in the language of the country in question.) In spite of Afghanis­ tan's gradual political shift toward the Left in the 1970s, articles about Islam, social aspects of Islam, and Afghanistan's place in the context of the Islamic .l:!!!!!!!!,increased in frequency by over 50%. The articles remained consistently favorable in content. It is clear that the Afghan press did not engender any anti-Islamic sentiments in public 17

attitudes while favorably posturing the Soviet Union. What is the validity of using a controlled press in an inquiry of this kind? In so far as this inquiry sought to measure quantitative frequency and qualitative content in an area which would affect public policy, the use of a controlled press is quite valid. Such a press more closely reflects official attitudes than a press in another country which may reflect dissenting views, minority views, or irresponsible views by individuals who are unhinged from circles of power.

X. CONCLUSION

There were ample overt manifestations in the Afghan press of a grow­ ing favorable image of the Soviet Union before the 1978 coup. A scholar employed by a research center or a government agency may have been able to perceive and measure these manifestations. Such a scholar then may have been able to report to the U.S. Government that an ever favorable image of the Soviet Union was being portrayed in Afghanistan along with reasonable judgments as to what such a trend may have portended. His judgments may have amplified intelligence on subtle or overt growths of Soviet political influence parallel to growths of other types of in­ fluence (economic, military, etc.). U.S. awareness of potential overt Soviet involvement in the land­ scape of Afghan politics may have enabled the U.S. to dissuade the Sov­ iet Union from furtherance of such a policy (through diplomatic channels). U.S. pursuance of a role as a countervailing power vis-~-vis the Soviet Union may have saved Afghanistan from its traumas of 1978, 1979, and beyond. 18

ADDENDA

Addendum 1 - Pertinent Headlines from Kabul Times, 1974,* in chrono- logical order:

January - None 28 February - article on 53rd anniversary of 1921 Treaty 2 March - "President Daoud Sends Greetings to Soviet Leaders" - "Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty Observed" - "Soviet Mission Here for Talks on Economic Cooperation" 3 March - "President Meets Head of Soviet Delegation" B March - "USSR Leaders Reply to President Daoud's Message"

7 April - "Soviet-Afghan Friendship Society Delegation Here" 10 April - "Soviet Union Aids Afghanistan in Locust Campaign" 11 April - "Soviet-Afghan Friendship Society Delegation Leaves" 18 April - "Over 15 Billion Cubic Meters of Gas Exported to USSR" 21 April - "Siberia Holds Tremendous Natural Riches" - "Gogol in Moscow" 23 April - "USSR Academy of Sciences and Cosmonautics" 27 April "USSR, Japan Sign Accord on Gas Prospecting in Siberia" - "Afghan Cultural Mission Visits Soviet Union" - "Soviet Envoy Meets Education Minister Pazhwak" 8 May - "President Daoud Receives Soviet Economic Delegation" - "Development of Industry in Soviet Union" 11 May - "Soviet Economic Delegation Leaves" 18 May - "Soviet Experts to Aid in Maintaining Technical Bu5.lding" 22 May - "Soviet Composers Dig into USSR Musical Past" 26 May - "Education Minister Leaves for USSR" - "Soviet Prime Minister Meets Afghan Envoy" 30 May - "USSR to Continue Assisting Afghan Women's Institute"

------* The collection of 1974 Kabul Times at Columbia University's Lehman Library lacked the 4 February and 4 October issues. 19

Addendum l - Pertinent Headlines from Kabul Times, 1977 * , in chrono- logical order:

3 January - Advertisement for Aeroflot Airlines (citing availability of transportational service from Kabul to Tashkent and thence to Moscow, which provides connections to many other places) 4 January - same as above 5 January - same as above 6 January - "USSR Harvests Record Grain Crop in 1 976" - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above 8 January - "Soviet TU-144 to Continue Test Flights This Year" - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above 9 January - "Atomic Power Engineering in the USSR", by Igor Morokhov * - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above 10 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above 11 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above - "USSR Subway Explosion (Quses Casualties" 12 January - "Afghanistan Buys Telephone Equipment from USSR" - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above 13 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above 15 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above 16 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above - "Soviet Pianist Performs at Radio Hall" 17 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above 18 January - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above 19 January - "USSR Will Never Aggress: Brezhnev" - same advertisement for Aeroflot as mentioned above 23 January - "Afghanistan Buys 4,076,000 Rubles of Exploration Tools from USSR" 26 January "Mohammad Nairn of Foreign Ministry Met With Brezhnev in Moscow on 24 January" 31 January - "Soviet 1976 Grain Harvest: 224 Million Tons" 3 February - "Soviet Space Research Programme in 1976" 14 February - Article on Soyuz 24 (which appeared on the same day as: "Daoud Elected ,President of the Republic; Jirgah Vote Unanimous", which headline would draw attention to Soyuz) ------* The author is cited herein so as to highlight the significance of a Soviet author writing for Kabul Times. 20

Addendum l, (continued):

17 February - Article on Salyut 5 orbital space station, by Mikail Chernyshov* 1 9 February - "Soviet Plans for Development of Siberia", by Viktor Varlamov* 22 February - Article on Soyuz 24 23 February - "Afghan-Soviet Trade Relations Expand" 24 February - "Cosmonauts PreparP for Return Journey to Earth" 26 February - "Soviet Cosmonauts Land Safely" 1 March - "Afghanistan Buys Spare Parts from Soviet Union" 9 March - Article on al-Afghani 22 March - "President Attends Jhenda Ceremony at Mazare Sharif" 24 March - "USSR Seeks No Base in Africa, says Podgorny" 26 March - "Afghan-USSR Trade Teams Hold Talks" 2 April - "USSR Gives Nine Million Rubles Loan to Afghanistan" - "President of Afghanistan Scouts Association Went to USSR to Attend International Children's Festival in Moscow" 4 April - Front page: "Spare Parts from USSR" ($2.4 million for Fertilizer Plant) 6 April - Front page: "rive Hundred Tons of Olives to USSR" -"USSR Launches Meteor Weather Satellite" 7 April - front page: "Afghanistan to import 13,00Q Tons of Sugar from USSR" 9 April - Soviet ambassador to Kabul went to Moscow to prepare for Daoud's visit in near future. - Soviet trade delegation left for home. 12 April - "President Leaves on Official, Friendly Visit to Moscow to Moscow" 13 April - "President Daoud \;Jarmly Welcomed by Soviet Leaders" 14 April - Front page: "President Hold Second Round of Talks with Soviet Leaders" - Verbatim texts of President Daoud's speech and President Podgorny's speech were printed with above article. 16 April - "President Daoud Returns After Visit to Soviet Union" - "Afghanistan-USSR Sign Economic Cooperation Accord"

* The author is cited herein so as to highlight the significane of a Soviet author writing for Kabul Times. 21

Addendum l (continued)

16 April (continued) - "Afghan-Soviet Joint Communique" (issued after Daoud's visit to the USSR, 12-15 April) 18 April - "Joint Afghan-Soviet Archaeological Expedition" 20 April - Agreement signed in Kabul to Buy Soviet Trucks for $t million 21 April - Text of Afghan-Soviet Economic Cooperation Agreement - Lenin's Birthday Observed at Soviet Embassy 5 May - Soviet Delegation for frontier affairs arrives 11 May - Accord signed in Kabul for Afghan-Soviet cooperation against locust and agricultural diseases. 21 May - Soviet Delegation for frontier affairs leaves 26 May - "Soviet-Afghan Friendship Society Delegation Here" -"Afghanistan, USSR Cooperation in Wiping Out Locust" - "USSR to Promulgate New Constitution 30 May - "Soviet Industry Accelerates Rate of Development" - Brezhnev article on peace, detente 4 June - "Soviet-Afghan Friendship Delegation Leaves" 5 June - "Rights, Freedom of Soviet Citizens Under New USSR Constitu­ tion" 11 June "Afghan Art Exhibit in Soviet Union" 15 June - Accord with USSR on copper smelting plant - Olive-processing plant purchased from USSR 18 June - Brezhnev elected as President of USSR 22

Addendum]. - Pertinent Headlines from Anis, 1974, in chronological order:

------·------·-·--·-·------·---··---··--·------,------

Nixon will make a return visit another time from the Soviet Union. ----- ·----·------·---·------+-----·-

i 1-

------~-> ___E ______:;.. I •·- ' .. I ...... (Y>- - 9...1-:::>~--;;;>--C:5;,_;1r---->-Ls'--t_Y.JJU----1------_____------Y.J·-C.. L~J~------The ~~!l!___ ~_!_y_~e Soviet Union in t_~_e__ second_!:l~ege ~_the G_!:.!:'_eve1______

negotiations. -· ------··------·-·------+------

------·----· ------·------______yJ->L7 ___ _

l~L~ ~:) C •• .jy~~ ~y-~;P-J_,____

-··------·------. - ----···-··--- ··---·------·------·----·------·---·------Brotherhood end assistance with a view to Islam. ------·-··-· ----··------>------.~--

------·-· ··-··-·· ···-·-·--·------·------~-----·· -----·------·------...------. -·------} > t'_,E__, __ _ .../~-~'··· C)jJy~>~J__ ~__ ,___1-1------;~L ______!_he i'!!P~nce_ of a_ sy)llmetrical economy_ with a_ viewio~em_ ..______,______

------~------·--·------1------

-····------·---·--· ···------··------~·------23

Afghanistan participates in __~ conference with Heeds __Clf __~tate of r I Islamic countries in Lahore, i '

A high conference of Islamic countries has opened in Lahore~

from the point of view of Afghanistan the efforts of Islamic i .....- I -····-···- --· ·-· countries must conform to effori;s of the U.N. I ·--·---~~ _&) >' L.:s> ·~I ~\.L;i .J~J -· c:: .. ·: .,., U.A ~­ ..~L t-f.·; •• c. • ..?---d y. > I I t ·····-··---- An invitation was arranged on the occasion of the military day of / ~--··------·--· the Soviet Union.

--- . . ···-- - < .. .J~ 71------(51.m_)_4 oY"" cr~1- · -~ ~ ...""l..o,'.; G.-_;)..JA' ~ ..,,>1- -

!

The conference of the ~eacil:i_~f.J sJ.amic_ colJn!ries in .. Lahore came to a conclusion. 24

- . c:::...!!..) ~ 7 I>.c: --- --t:,./~

I - .i The thought of social equi_!y _ _;ri_lslam. I j -... c.::J .Y;- l e.f ------·-··

C: .. J J )-.C -....c.::;r" -- lJLol ..- --- •• I I

The scale of Islamic justice.

L .1 . . _ ··· 1ri' .. ·: • ...)I (.__5.y~- ., .. 'I >-' o>~--- 4 - • - ..

The leaders of the U.5.5.R._~~v_e expressed thanks for the message

of the Head of Government. i ····- . -· .. ·-...

Between the Soviet Union and America progress has been achieved ------····-····--· concerning the limitation of strategic atomic arms.

ing limitation of strategic arms. 25

------~ l~ ------­ _r:·--7.~>~ _;_,_r-~ -w>>L:v:, _""':~r1-'1········· ___, ·· .....Lr°~L • :..,.r./-- Friday is coincident with ~~~___ day of the birt~ of __!~e __great Prophet\ ____ ! of Islam, ! ··------... -- t- ·····------·-··------~. I A t' 71---I _,,b..,;.,, ...r""""' I:: >)>- cu ~ ~ f I __: ~ ! c::11•!:·I ••• I'" .. ·~)>l 1.-U.41 > CJ-'..J_r c)-t (_g..,o __)>.. c5 f .-~ .

------. ------~ L• Nixon: America has an interest.that Egypt act amicably vis-~-vis

the Soviet Union,

The preservation of public interests with a view to Islam, . t. . ·····-----!J~'tE.) _·-· ·- > t_;;I ob-; l..uL (Y- ~j:,~_ ~ ! .. ' ------~5}_)r l ------____. ------·. . . ------.. - ... --. ------... ····--···· . ------__J .. ---·· -- - -.

The greater streng thentn.Y_.".1'.... •t_ta chmen ts. &9.tweej . Af g~ani s ta~ and. j ......

the Soviet Union. _ ····----··· .. ··- .. . .. __ ·-··~?-l t.) I -·. L>~) ~ Lo~-----~.,;---, ( ..·~~-- ~l---- 9-9 ~- ~r cfi~-- !.)~ _;>- o.J.Jr--->W' ·-· ,>j>_r-L o>I>-o The Head of Government ar:i~--~l::i_eleader of_ our nation. discussed 26

matters of interest with spol

Grechko: The Soviet Union must protect its own military readiness and augment its own defensive power.

Benaqoli Mohammad Na' im inqugur_aJed_ a photography exh_i_~;_ii_,m of the

Soviet Union,

A photography exhibition of the Soviet Union in Kabul.

The Head

the Soviet Union.

--- -- ·- ···-·---···-----·- ..·-·· --- . --·--·------·------·------·

Joint decla~a!io_n of the Republic of Afghanistan and_ the U.S. S. R. _____ ------·-

--·------··· ---- ______., ______------·------·---

>-----·-----

--- -·---- ..------C •• ,., L..Ll

The Soviet __1l.!1ion will divulge_i ts _own economic end technical_coopera-

--rtion __in twenty-one projects.

I ----·------·-···-- --- l--- ! --___------_------·------·· _...... Yr. td______I ____>_Ll_l __=\> -)~ c.__-.,:s::r~S:-_r->...:;LJ,-s,___t.,_L\_ _ ___ I I ---·------1 ------~Y~--·c5-37r~-- 1 1______------·------

2 .8 billion cubic_ meters of_Jias was __C:(:)l'.)_°!=r_a_cted to the Soviet Union'---+-----

------~------·------· 26

th!~:nfmnce hel;i:::mmo~~bjth) foreign.~·~-----·--- ministers __o_! __ I_slamic couri~-~!_e_s_.______-----·------__ J ______···

The Islamic World and Arab countries. ------·· -· ------·------·------

------··-···-···------·-----·--·------

--·------

---- - ·-- --··-··- ··------·------·-·· ---·------· -

------

------~- .______

------··------

------·------·------·----

- - - ·-·------

------·------

------29 Addendum~ - Pertinent Headlines from Anis, 1977, in'chronological order: . ---·----·------~--;:t'~~-~---1.EI=~:-· ;;, >~~f°L:.) .-e7__;;1f 'C":J!.r-"c .. ~ µ-1.>-.e-L______

------C .. HY \--=.?..r ~~>---y-e;-~---0~+--- __qiscussions are_ taking place [~et,,,i_=enJ_ hea~s of the Sovi_et_~~~-~~ ____ _

and America on the r__c:~~[ to J___E_~~-cean~~-et~~~E!.

- ---··------. -··-·------·-··-·-··------·· .------·---···--- --(::g-~- ___, ~-- ~f ~-C:::':;)7...., (5~-Q·~'~··------. ------Q'-'...JJ----~-~-----J--::7-!}-0--~~-.. - ::·~ ...-..' I ------;:s;; _J> L~ __i ______: ___~11-~fgb_~!!_ __fFlli__!; ind~t~YJ will _ _e_x_p_o_!"~_two _!hou_sand tons of ------L------1 rai~-- _11_~--t~_the Soviet Union. (Note: This fruit_ industry ___has ______

a Pa~to name, not a Dari one.) -----~----· 1 ------e5-~ ___J 7J ____ - ______c_., __~--~~J ______c Lo_~_k,..j ______

______... ____ -~:___ ~---~-bJu U_LJ.. .. An exhibition of published Islamic books has opened in Italy.

-···------+----

------·--··------~------(:5'-~- '-~~-----

I ..__ >L;,;L Jj-L:-~---~if-~---+------­ ! I I -··-----·--·------· ~------i -~-~--<-:J7_:;Jr---+-- 1----Benaqoli Mohammad_ Na' im has set out [!_o_J-~e Soviet Unio~------+------l --

------30

The party leader of the Soviet Union and the President of America -·------··---

-~~!l_.:::_~_n_:_~~~t~~-r this year.-·· ___ ------(:S~---J~_Z__,______I ->::Jr--/> - ~-~-~ ~/ 1-__)Y-~---~------I - 'I .. .. · L ·· ------(:_5 y \ ---~--~ ~--~--~-~---~------>c:µ-~-q__~_,____ l ---~-~J---~-•• __.I ~<: _./ • J--· • l I I -··-··--···----~' -~-~-~-=LL_UiJ...r.,_2_~~--+----- . ----- j . ~>. ~y;;JY ) ~-[_, __ _ I ~ ~ ~~ I I . ' --- --·------_ _ C u ~A• I (_ 0 >~----+------1 n the opinion of an American senator, one should not be impatient I ----·------·------··- ---··----f------I in the case of a favorable agreement for the limitation of _l atomic arms --- The American government has not received a -----·· ----··------·-·· ------·------·------·----·-t----·----··------I reciprocal proposal on limitation of strategic weapons from I ------·+------the Soviet Union. ------·--- -·---·------·---·----~---·------·-----···-··---·

··-·-·--· ------··-··-. ·------·-----·------~->--J~_ e------ti····v~Jr -0'~r~L~~J d ··r~- ... ..____ ~-~--jLc:5;~y4---e5~------···------·-·-······-----·------~·-'1--t------

_ armament competition.·----

·------·-----·------~ypt has requ~_!'.l_~e~.clarification of the policy of America and

______the Soviet_ Union_ concerning the Middle East_·------+-----

-·------·--··--·-·-·------31

1 I I-- l - I ---i ____ A_relatively intense earthquake shoo~_!i_l:!Ven_(:_E'!__r_,tral Asiar_,~!__tj_e_s __ .. ______I i of the Soviet Union. i ------~------f------·--- I I

I l I

-----. ------The development of civil law in Islam. ------·------+------~-> ___J£ ------·~ ~--dL -~--~0-1.;·····------___------>--1>-c_) lbJ-t-e::S::Y_;;Jr-- ...-~--- I An earthquake shook parts of the north of Soviet Turkmenistan. I L ------·· -----·---··----. ------

------· This year more than 4,100 tons of citrus fruits will be export------~--+------

------The Soviet Union solicited a new t~eat~ restraining ermamen_t______.____ _

competition. 32

------yJ__)!____ L\L ____ f------\ :. . . . I ---u--'7!-----oY_;J~-~---c:..r~_J>--cr;,J------~----!Y----~-16->~ - ~--h_-7>---,~------>--'-~--f------,. ... Vance is trying to make manifest a decrease in forces and to

reduce mix-ups during his trip to the Soviet Union. ------· ·-- ---· ------·- --··--·--·------

------+------

---- . --··--· --·------·------

- . ______..______--···-····------The Minister of Bridges discussed acceleration of work pertaining ------___ ,______to projects with the Soviet ambassador. --- --~------··-

The Soviet Union and America have an agreement to bring into ------existence a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

----···------. -·------··-- ·-·------!------

------aJ> J:_•--+------~ ---~~ -:il--es-:,:r;+-)J-l----- ~ ~- I_,..___ k,_~ I > t __c •.•• ...,.>-__ ~-~---1----- ~ •-J ~- J... •• /_

If the Soviet -~~-~-~-n-wou--1-d_e_m_b_a_r_k_::::~,-a-tC: 1 0 ;~::-~-1------missiles, America would implement an analogous action. 33

---·----····----····------.. ------·------···-··· --·---·------·--·-···--·--··~------··-----·· -----·----··-~ >_J-~t -----­ if1 > --~- -e5-::J_;;1Y--9L~Y-a~------

--C .. , "' ------>",",'_i;,~-----~---- b . ~----~ Lu T~_e_~:'_viet _:>~~=e Base in the inte~~~~---h~~~-~-~~~_n control . [err]______Salyut. ------>------

------+------

_Soviet ships __can take __advantag~of coastal waters of Western ______

countries. -----· ------·------·------+-----

-· ------···-··--····-· . ·---·-··------·--C:- •• j 7___ ~ ·---- ~-+------. . .. k? .) . ------>-w-. ~----.. - . c:53.-,Jy->"--~. \'· .. --::;)~;;;------

. ·------··------··------···-··------··-· -----·------·------Soviet Military Day was glorified. ·--··· ------+------

------~- procurement contract from the Soviet Union --rox:_J 7,000 tons _o__f __ +------­

sugar was concluded.

of Islam. ------·------·-···- --~------~ 34

------·--~------

-· ------·-·-···------< •• )~ __'L ______---~~- a~Jral>..,1.Y~~ · i f ------··--·-----·--·--·-····-..-·-·------··- ~--::;r------1 ! __S_o\l_i~J __ ~_os111_o_nauts _returned to earth. ______I I ·------+----- ! . ··--·------····-··------·····-·---~~---_:l_t--- !e5y__,1_r C.:.:?:.J~---dli- ~·-­ ____> \ ~----c;"~~~--+----

------

____A___ g_re_ oc:c~rr!!~ __J~ the_ Soviet Ministry __of Commercial Shie~g~---+----

-·------

------

_____The __birtbday __o_f__His_E_x_ce_l__l,_en_1:y_tbe __Bless_e_d__fropb_eLo_f_l_slcm_was_, ____ _

_,' __glo_x:ifil!_~ __1:h_x:ougl}_o_ut the country with esp~cial ceremonies.

··-tI -··- --·------! -+-····------< •• ..))) ~ \_7 t5°-~-L-c-·~fa-·c5-~- 1--c1"J .<° t..fl.~~ - ~--cJ-!--K~_G-~ ---C:Y-f--~~-t--

___J he _JJe_acLo_L1;be_ e xa l.te.d-1.sl..amic_par.liament_of_the_Uni.ted_AJ:ab __ -+-----

R_ep_ubUc...... CE_gyp_t_) ___a :r,:_I'_iy_e.9_i.n._K_c1_b_1,1l. ------t------

...... ------c .. J~ _ _)~-•--• ------!)-----(5:7_7~~_J~-~ l~_G---+---- -______.>J_~ ___ _l ·-~->-,Lc:-i_, I . .J ~ ./ _./ J··~ ____!:_rench, Soviet, and __Algerian scholars have a_rrived in Kabul. __ _ 35

_ ~-~!!._ter_~111and from the Soviet Union_ concerning limi teti_o __n__ o__ f ____ +------·- -t I strategic arms. --- -·-·· .. ------~ ~-----·-·-- ______L~t>7 ~--t' __

______; c._::_.,_ c..::....>_~ >->-----J-~---~~-\- - __ --+------ke.. __ __/ . _.// --- .. - . .. ./ ~L-:-_u., .__ I • I -~ I - _J \ l . s ~ - J 9-.J -(S--;!)_;;;(r -- >Lr_,_(::) __ u;_u ~r--=t.v.~J:) _,______L ~ -s:;~ -----·------>->;! -C::5---~/- - Jr"-' ---+------Benaqoli, the Heed of the Republic, per the invitation of the ··------·--- ' ----+------i high executive committee of the Soviet Union is traveling to ------! ------,---- ' i that country. __! ------~---E_ __------­ ) -- UJ/r----~-~7-- c u~--:r.-d~----- ______c . . ._.AJJ___-->- :,S;------d-~---7-::?.~r--L--1------Ac£ordi_~9-~~-B_:r:f:?_~~~vthe relatio119- ___()! the Soviet Union _e_n_d______,______

America are at a standstill. ------~-·-·-·------+-----

------!------& .0.. _£_ ------_____J______O .~ ~-r~'~"------t=f-3.:)Y~·------~-L--~-~_...9_l ___->--~ \ k:,·\ -----·----- ____J! - • ·- :;,· - ~ - ~ I -i' ------··------! The Soviet Union does not want to have any military bases in ------t------.+ ... Africa. . ___ .. ··------~--V __ .•.... -.-p lr-_J~-~·-=w~r1---;~-,-t5-:Jyr--+---- . ___ j _>I>-=:)~ L7 W~c'",2 C:S'U2>~.liid:;,5"J___ _ 36

··------·------·------··--· ------

for Africans to lower colonielization pressure, ------~-+-----

~ ~ -· _.__.___..__.___, - ~ I) ...c}wJ A~ ~T_l-~7-~-~.J~J_ ; i ···---~>-----)l:_L_U-:J)r ~Ll_l_<:::>~~)-- Amer i ~· ' •- f.orei g n minis! e;::_f ses.ret.ary _oJ_s !a••]...o.Joarte d _e..Uery __ j. ____ _ I

;· .. ------··-····-·. ------. ·-· .. ------~~- ·-~-

- :...,,_,~I~ C "ii ..~ "L, __ ~--t=r.t,_,____~_ ··· · ; . - ----LJY/~·--->L 1~-v~_:_,-l.;->r'---+----~-

-·------·------l---·--···------·------C.. VN_\___ ~~'------+----

--- Vance_is optimistic in relation_to his_ successful perleys~i_t.._h._, __ -+------

leaders of the Soviet Union.

-- l ______j I ------__ ) I

_ l'1e_S_c,\_/i_E!~__l.J_r1ior1, for the sake __o_f_ i_ts __se_c_L!_~ity 1 __ ct_i_dno.!_Elc:cept ______

_America's _proposal!!! concerning etomic __weapont.1.

______I_h~--~_o_v_i_e:LU_ni_on_is_gi"ing_11_.l._oen_to_A.fghanistan_f_ox_tb__e ______,______

establishment of a 200-bed hosQii!:!_l.

·-·---·------·------37

The _r_elj.g_iCJ_Ll!llaw of I slam and consti tu_~J-~ri~_l__ lE!_~( Per_t__ 1__ )______, ______

I' I - j ------·------·--··------•------I ___1I ____ J_he_religious_ law __of_lslam and constitution1:1l_l~w._{f_~_!'~ ------

-! ------. ------~ _t,_·__-t-~- ·l t':'__-_<=5"'LJo:Y-u;~.,--,~~J-~f,~·· __,__~ l ------~~- I The religious law of Islam and constitutional law. (Part 3) --1 .. ------I ------~ ------~__e__.____ _

- 1'__ ..... /•._ ;\ -~ < \ .. -~ . I ~ C::f;:;Jr-- r9JL.c-e-Y..Jr--~- ~------, ------·-······------l A g!_ea:l;__~mb_assador_ of __the_Soviet Union_is_ travelling out of ~~------

- ______j ____1:~~nt1:y. ______~ ___L__• --t------j • • .~< \ . \ ·: f ------j~---(:J';)_:r-J--(_)-l.t::.-C:Y-;!)~r--d:.I~-~-~------

------A Soviet commercial mission set out from its country. ------t------· I - ""~L ______~ ~ ------~--~~~...·.< T-L~ ·~ :fl.) g __----- ___ < ...... l_ __ 9_>-}_.>-__ 1----(:5-JJ7~-Ll_J ______Carte~ personally has given an ord~~-fror J the detention o_f_a____ +----- ship of the Soviet Union. ------·------38

l I Approximately JOO members from J2 countries have participated in I ------. ------·- - --···-·- ---·------_,______

------·-- -·------

____-·- ______--:--_ _ ------~-LL __+-----

. C::::5'_/7 r l,,~ b~-::P"C •• l !:,S'J..:,...,,,_~~-t-+--~------>1->~.J7 ~-~!-~--'-· --·- AmericawiH_continue its own parleys_with_the __Soviet Union. ______

------·----·------·-- - ·------~----,------

. ------· ------·--····------

. _ _!3enaqoli Mohammad Daud began his first cycle of parleys with ____ +------

leaders of the Soviet Union.

Carter discussed limitation of _atomic ar_111~1_-~dtt,__1;_1:1~-~9yiet_ __ ambassa'."'"+------

dor. 39

Approximately 300 members from 32 countries have participated in

board-of-governor meetings with the Islamic Bank. ------

------·-----

I ---- J -l i ------I .The._second _phase of_ discus.si..ons __of Beneqoli Mohamma.cLDeud_begen__ -+------

j _with_sp_ol

----··------· -··-·------···------· I------~--t~ - j- f~~L_;L >3-.!-y~ ~_:;1--~ ~------­ t_:r6-y--'\.L__ C5 _y~y--2.L~LL-j_L_<-::-J~___k_ --- _j ------~-;~-~-~-·--- ! Benaqoli, Head of the Republic, returned to the Fatherland after ------+------

------~---~------

The text of the joint statement of Afghanistan end the U.S.S.R. 40

... _ ------·---- ·---~-~---·------·--·------·---

·------~-J~ ~--1---

· · 1 ~.LJL __JI-~~ ~~-~--~--+----- .--l -·-_____>-j_>;--v-~-:>-c5-:Y_;)r---~-3>-CC--+---- I_ ..BenaqoJ._i_f:l_ea_d __ of __thEL.Rep_ul:l_l_i_c_fU;'l.,i..Q_a_visit_t_o __ the_S_oy_i_ej;_government ____ _

l from i::.!lSBlll~o_l_.______·------·----·--- --+------' -1-I

1 l _The ___decla.ration __oLA fghanist_a_n_::__U_.S. S. R ._partner Gbipt..______---·--·------~ _L~ -- ..-- ---C=:5-->~J ___~ ~--- ~~-'-r------~--->Jis. __C5 ..Y_)-r-j ---C)-~Wl_c::r-H_ ------An economic cooperative written agreement was _contracted be_t_w_e_e_n__ -+------

Afghanistan end the Soviet Union. ··------·------·----·--····------·---··-·--·-----·-~---l 1----+---- -) l~-y- o > !_r---2,6._c5.JL>rl? >L>;)~--f------~- ---~ 1--f:5--_)7 r-----1----- A procurement_ contract was s~gned.Jor __28 __motor carriages ___ -~------

from the Soviet Union. ·-·------·-·-·------7:fs--e:J_,J_+----_ · -~--G- ~-(=>-'-7r~--~~-1,---i------~ o~L~~y-L~ l >Y-·~·- ____ _

VancE!_ dlscussed __limi tation of atomJ.c~~apons wi th'-,__t~h"0e::-:__:S:_:-o-_-v'-"i=--=e,-=t'------I------

ambassador.---

. - ·------·------·------·-··----·------· - 41

------Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. ------··------·------

--- l ------:)~-----t-·-t---- ·····t59lh Lu !..ta~jy;;,;~-· L., La a ly ______-----1--~-(5-,Y_j r--),,__~J-7---u -~ l~_l __ ~-----,--- 1 ------~ ------j An investigatory written eg_:r_eement_~! __fc_>_?d~!~!! _ _!lr_c_>J~cts w~~c_>~~:r~_c_J_: ______l ed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, ------·-" ------·------. ------::::}Y--~ i ______(0.L/ _ o_k:{~_JJ ~ ;,::,-1~~~ ____

I ,~ 11 -- I ~--~------.7~~------, ... I ' / I .-. i --

------·------~------

5 ov iet_a_nd __America [n].di scu_s si_QJl~_hav e _be el']____x-_ealiz.e_d_,______---+------

- ··-----·-··----·-·--·----·· ···--·-·"· --·····------·-· ------·------1-----

______(L(or_eign_f1inist_ers_' _conf_e_~_e[le_e_o_f__l_slamic_c_oun.:trie.s___ha_s___b_een_____ --+------

:i.11augtJi:at~cl___ ~!1 _Libya. ______42

------;;JY.~ ---'-"-µ V I e5 le.;;1~ ~_;:;JG._..o-~J_::,·-if ~· ----­ -~----0 ~'--&L~------~-Y---cs-~-1---+----- A Fo_E_eign Ministers' conference of Islamic _countries_was inauguratE!cJ __+-----

[ byJ_!_h_e_ intermediation of Qaddafi. ______, ____ _

___ I _ ~------_____ ::l~---t/\ ____ _ '-0J-! c::-, IF ...h.; ..,._00-:.i>- e;, L~~-b \_,______············I >-;! ~- y-o~ -<..:.:->~I~ f-~J ______j Afghanistan_has_shown and __ind_i_e~_ted an __endeay_or __in __the_direction_of _ _, ______

J)re>te c:!,ing_-\;_l:!f!_Q rea t i nh e rij;_a_flC_~_CJ_f__I slam•------______1------

A Soviet council set out from its country. ----- ~~-dJJ ___,___ _ e:_s-;J;J-r--->-~- L---~- --c._::_J_~_~J__>~-y---<----­ .1 9..r.>.~Jr cs 1..--:---1~,;1.,,--:;;>--~f-L--~------1 ______c ·• _J_lw__ ,__

The existance of conflict between the Soviet Union and America ------+----- regarding the signature of the SALT written agreement. ----1------'; ~-I:__+--_

------~~-\---~~ 0 -~-~_>-(22-Y 7-~.__1------F·'-s-Y-u-~Yr~-:;r~T .b_,J~_:j-2~-----+------c...-- ~~------

- Carter-: The main_ objective of ~overnment of America is the well-

bein_g_ of relations _of t~_at coun!~l_W,i th_:':he Soviet Union and Ch~_!l_a_~-- ____ _ 43

···--····------~------I - --- !------_ _)~~---L_ ...__ j ~ ~-->-~._I __---c=5Jr----<::J-~-W_1__7>--- ~-,---

1 ( ~L-e:..:r ~~c.....:.:...,LL I__ JL--~fa-+-----

-·------I -w.----·- -in------Afghanistan .- --·----go-~;----- tho holy fou~da6:.:am ~h:~--+------i creation of conditions of progress. . i ------.------·-··--

! I' - ---·--·--··--··--·------~~-t) ---·- I i I > __LlJ _->--> >-?--~-LJ -oY--~_J_>~------­ •I ------~--~~C:::::::j __ c.S-:J;Jr------

--t·I ------·------~------·------I The draft of the new fundamental law of the Soviet Union was

Conclusio~ __of ___!l____l:ll!:'_~!~ct of assistanc~--~~~_wee_n Afghanistan end the ___ -+------

Soviet Union countering locust.

The Council of the_Society of Friendship_ of the Soviet Union and __ ---+------­

~_fg_b~_11istan arrived in Kabul. Y~- --"----+------~ -~-;;J l)_q ___F•"\-~-1-~-~->-.,-~--~-L,------+----- ~· ~ __,/ '-./ .. . ~ .. .. / . ------~~-c .. _)?_l_c_d- ~·- . L----:::J.r--JJ -'---+------~ f-~ I._--+-----

·------~----- 44

-- --·------·-- ·-·------· ------·------

Again ,_the __CCJunciL of_the_Engj.neers' _Ministry of _Bridges levies ______

a customs __~_uty of _I slam on_ constructional matters. ______

------· ------·------·· ---- ·-----

The Sovie_i;___ ~r:1Jcm will be_p_repared to __parley concerning limitation o_f__ +------

the building _of_ armaments. ______lj~---9 ______

1,) r---2_Ll L _J >--~-~--- ~--LJ-o~-lsi _____...,___ _

. - . ------~----- A new fundamental law in the Soviet Union •

.------_____tj~-_l l_, __

------)--LS .Y/ r~-y >----~ 1-~--~-1----­ ~ ~) ~__)~~-~--~ -- ~-~-~-'------>~-----c .. _)Ls;_~--">------The council of the Friendship Society of the Soviet Union and

Afghanistan met with the eBtablished Cultivation Ministry. -- --·----·------

------~--- -·-··- -·-- ·--·-·------

The future economic order of the world of Islam.

------·--·--·- --~---- 45

I The Council of the friendship Society of the Soviet Union and lI Afghanistan has set out from its country. ---· --···------··· ------.. ·------·------0r__JV __ ------>-'2J __!_~ --~ >--J-~-c:..5y~f--j L-~------>?------Fahmi will return from the Soviet Union, .. -··------·--·-·------

------

----. ·------

------+------

------··------

. - . ------·-··----- ·------···-

------t------

------·------·------·------

------+------

--- --· ··-·------··------

------

------··------

------<,-----

------~-----··--··------•-----

---·------+-----

-- --·------·------·------46

ENDNOTES

1. In an interview of Professor Dr. Khalidi by Ralph Groves at Colum- bia University, New York City, 2 December 198B, 2:45 PM, Khalidi opined that the planned withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanis­ tan in the wake of the recent I.N.F. Treaty, combined with a gen- eral relaxation of global tensions between the superpowers, may vindicate his belief. (Nete: discussed in the context ef geepelitics.)

2. Rashid Khalidi, The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s (Institute for P-;i;stinian Studie-;;-1980), p. 18~~----

3. See Selig S. Harrison, l!! Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism 2.!2!!Soviet Temptations, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, N.Y., Wash., D.C., 1981, 228 pp., xi). See also articles by the same author which su~gest that poten~ial Soviet support for Bal_uch nationalists could have achieved fer the USSR warm-water parts at Gwadar and other sites: "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Fin­ land?", Foreign Policy, Number 41, Winter 1980-81, pp. 163~187, and "Cute Regional Deal", Foreign Policy, Number 62, Spring 1966, pp. 126-147, and "Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry", Inter­ national Security, Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 1980/81, pp. 152-163. See also Amaury de Riencourt, "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2, Winter 1982/1963, pp. 416-437.

4. See The Maritime Strategy, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, Jan. 1966, p. 7. Note: As ef 1992 this strategy is ne longer used.

5. Dennis Ross, "The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, Number 4, Winter 1984-1985, P• 623

6. Most Soviet Naval Aviation was shore-based and had tm be deplayed to shore stations within proximity of the Soviet fleet. Karen Dawisha, Lecturer in the Department of Politics of the University of Southampton, pointed out the value which Egyptian airbases had afforded to the Soviet fleet in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, when the Soviet Union was on good terms with Egypt. (See Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt, St. Martin's Press, N.Y., 1979, 271 pp., xiii). Likewise, Afghanistan's relatively close proximity to the waters on both sides of the Strait of Hormuz facilitates power projection into that area (a matter of great import since many oil tankers and U.S. naval vessels transit the area).

7. ~ Times, Vol. XIV, No. 36, Friday, November 23, 1984

8. Amaury de Riencourt, 11 India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanis­ tan", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2, Winter 1982/3, p. 432

9. See Selig s. Harrison, "Cut a Regional Deal", foreign Policy, No. 62, Spring 1986, pp. 126-147 (especially p. 139 where Harrison mentions that certain runways can accommodate large Soviet "Bison" 47

ENDNOTES (Cantinued) aircraft). Further tea discussion of specific Soviet aircraft, the ability af Saviet leng-range aircraft {fer anti-shipping strike, anti-submarine/maritime patr11l, electronic warfare, recennaissance) te reach the Strait •f Hormuz frem bases in the southern Seviet Union had been leng established. Aircraft of these types which the Seviet Uni11n ceuld have depleyed included IL-38 "May," M-4 "Bi­ son," TU-16 Badger," TU-22 "Blinder," TU-26 "Backfire," and TU-142 "Bear" (all ef which cmnfiguratians had variants in service with Seviet Naval Aviation). Salient bases in Afghanistan decreased the transit time of these aircraft during potential cembat missians toward the Strait ef Hmrmuz, and increased, thereby, laiter time over target areas (withaut the legistical cemplicatiun ef resort­ ing to in-flight refueling). Also, more impertantly, such bases afforded fighter protection ta the afarementiened aircraft fer pmtential combat missiens toward the Strait of Hormuz. The posi­ tiening af high-performance fighter aircraft at such bases put them within range ef the strait. Types ef fighters which the Sov­ iets could have deployed included MiG-23 "Flogger," MiG-29 "Fulcrum," MiG-31 "f•xhuund," and SU-27 "Flanker." (It should be noted that the MiG-29 was designed to aperate from rudimentary runways, as evidenced by leuvres which pretect the air intakes frem fereign abject injestien.) See Bill Gunston, Aircraft .!f ,!h! Seviet Union: The Encyclopaedia ..!f. Soviet Aircraft Since 1917 {Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1983, London, 414 pp.), and~ ferce Magazine (Air Force Association, Arlington, VA., March 1987 issue), and "Soviet Avia­ tion in Afghanistan," Proceedings (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, February 1967 issue), pp. 85-88. {Note: Far the future, air­ craft from Islamic Republics neighboring Afghanistan may be more pertinent with regard to deployment to Afghan bases than Russian aircraft from the former Seviet Uniun.) 10. Fred Halliday, Soviet Policy.!.!:!. ~~..!f. Crisis {Institute for Policy Studies, Washingtan, D.C., 1981, 143 pp.), p. 9 11. Jagat S. Mehta, "A Neutral Solutien," Foreign Pelicy, No. 47, Summer 1982, P• 139 12. Fred Halliday, .Qe.. ~., P• 21 13. For a discussion ef how a client Kabul could have granted military basing rights te Masc•w (pessibly modeled on the Porkkala, Finland, naval base precedent) see Selig S. Harris•n, "A Breakthreugh in Afghanistan?", Foreign Pelicy, Ne. 51, Summer 1963, PP• 13 and 24. 14. fer a detailed discussion of foreign aid ta Afghanistan, see Anthany Arnold, Afghanistan: lb..! Saviet Invasion.!.!:!. Perspective (Heaver Institution Press, Stanferd, CA., 1985, 179 pp., xviii). See es­ pecially PP• 33 - 39. 15. See ll!i!:!•, PP• 33 - 39. 16. Anthony Arnald, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasimn in Perspective, cited abave, p. 36. 46

ENDNOTES (Continued) 17. ~., data derived from narrative on P• 39.

1B. Ibid., see chapter 5.

19. Ibid., see chapter 4.

20. ~., see chapter 6.

21. John c. Griffiths, Afghanistan:~ to.!! Continent (Westview Press, CO., 1981, 225 pp.), P• 152

22. Anthony Arnold, Qe.. Cit., p. 71

23. Middle East Research!, Information Project (MERIP), July-August 1980, p. 4

24. See Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Fin­ land?", Foreign Policy, No. 41, Winter 1980-81, PP• 163-187, for an account of domestic, regional, and global dimensions of the coup and the invasion. Of particular interst is Harrison's re­ search on the role of the Shah of Iran, who attempted to orient Afghanistan militarily and economically away from Moscow and to­ ward the West (alarming the P.O.P.A. and the Soviet Union in the process).

25. Arabia: The Islamic World Review, May 1984, P• 69

26. Interview of Professor Dr. Ehsan Yarshater by Ralph Groves, 19 March 1986, 10:30 AM, Center for Iranian Studies, Columbia Univer­ sity, New York City. Note: discussimn in cmntext of Persian literature.

27. The Chicago Manual of Style (Thirteenth Edition, Revised and Expand­ ed, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1982, 736 PP•, ix), P• 268

28. See Encyclopaedia Iranica (Routledge & Kegan Paul, Vol. 1, Fascicle 1, 1982), pp. 4 and 5.

29. According to Ha!m, The One-Volume Persian-English Dictionary (Librairie-Imprimerie Beroukhim, Teheran, 1961, 1040 pp.), the term anis means "companion", or "associate", and can be used as a feminine proper name. Vartan Gregorian, author of The Emergence .2f Modern Afghanistan (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA., 1969, 566 pp.), prefers the translation of "companion". See his book, p. 244.

30. Interview of Mr. Ibrahim Pourhadi by Ralph Groves, 16 April 1986, 10:00 AM, Library of Congress, Near East Section, Washington, D.C.

31. The Economist, March 13, 1982, P• SB 49

ENDNOTES (Continued) 32. Anthony Arnold, Qe. • .£!!•, p. 109

33. Interview of Mr. Obeidullah Noorata by Ralph Groves, 23 April 19B6, 2:20 PM, Columbia University, New York City

34. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton University Press, 1973, 760 pp., xxiv), P• 66

35. Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Southwest Asia: Political Development or Political Decay?", Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1984-85, p. 660

36. Encyclopaedia Iranica (Routledge & Kegan Paul, Vol. 1, Fascicle 5, 1983): all statistics gleaned from article on Afghanistan, section on ethnography, PP• 496-499, columns A and B. 50

BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS

Arnold, Anthony, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA., 1985, 179 pp., xviii)

Bradsher, Henry S., Afghanistan and !b..!.Soviet Union (Duke Press Policy Studies, N.C., 1983, 324 PP•, xiii)

Dawisha, Karen, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt (St. Martin's Press, N.Y., 1979, 271 pp., xiii)

Dupree, Louis, Afghanistan (Princeton University Press, 1973, 760 pp., xxiv)

Gregorian, Vartan, .IJll:lEmergence .E.f.Modern Afghanistan (Stanford Univer­ sity Press, Stanford, CA., 1969, 586 pp.)

Griffiths, John C., Afghanistan:~ to.!. Continent (Westview Press, co., 1981, 225 pp.)

Gunston, Bill, Aircraft of the Soviet Union: The Encyclopaedia of Sov­ ~ Aircraft Since 1917 (Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1983, London, 414 pp.)

Halliday, Fred, Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis (Institute for Pol­ icy Studies, Wash. D.C., 1981, 143 pp.)

Harrison, Selig S., l!l Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism~ Soviet Temptations (Carnegie Endowment for Inter­ national Peace, N.Y., Wash. D.C., 1961, 228 pp., xi)

Khalidi, Rashid, The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s (Institute for Palest~an Studi;;:-1980-r--

PERIODICALS

Air Force Magazine (Air Force Association, Arlington, VA.), March 1967

Arabia:~ Islamic World Review (Islamic Press Agency, Ltd., Bucks, U.K.), May 1984

The Economist (London), March 13, 1982

Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., N.Y.), Vol. 61, No. 2, Winter 1982/1963

Foreign Policy (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Wash. D.C.), Number 41, Winter 1980-81

Foreign Policy, Number 47, Summer 1982 51

BIBLIOGRAPHY (Continued)

PERIODICALS (Continued) foreign Policy, Number 51, Summer 1983

Foreign Policy, Number 62, Spring 1966

International Security (Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University), Vol. 5, No. 3, Winter 1980/ 81

~ Times (Wash. D.C.), Vol. XIV, No. 36, Friday, November 23, 1964

Middle East Research and Information Project-MERIP (Wash. D.C.), July­ August, 1980

Political Science Quarterly (Academy of Political Science, N.Y.), Vol. 99, Number 4, Winter 1964-1985

Proceedings (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD), February 1987

PRIMARYSOURCE PERIODICALS

Anis (Kabul, Afghanistan): all available issues for first six months of 1974 and 1977 from library of Congress, Wash. D.C.

Kabul Times (Kabul, Afghanistan): all available issues for first six months of 1974 and 1977 from Lehman Library, Columbia Uni­ versity, New York City

U.S. NAVALINSTITUTE PAPER

The Maritime Strategy (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MO), January 1986

GENERALREFERENCES

Ha!m, 5., The One-Volume Persian-English Dictionary (Librairie-Imprimerie Beroukhim, Teheran, 1961, 1040 pp.)

The Chicago Manual of Style (Thirteenth Edition, Revised and Expanded, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1982, 738 pp.)

Encyclopaedia Iranica (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London), Vol. 1, Fascicle 1, 1982, and fascicle 5, 1983