april 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 4 intelligence agencies as “Shah Rukh,” quite consistent with the Karachi Assessing the Recent Yasin was identified as a terrorist Project.25 Even though the ONGC and following the September 13, 2008 blasts German Bakery plots are different, and Terrorist Threat to the in New Delhi that killed 30 people.19 perhaps schemed by separate terror Malacca Strait Yasin and Mohsin Chaudhary are close modules, authorities believe that the aides of Riyaz Bhatkal and Iqbal Bhatkal, ONGC conspiracy was also hatched in By Peter Chalk two senior IM operatives believed to be Karachi.26 operating from Dubai and Karachi.20 on march 4, 2010, naval authorities Despite pressure from the United States, issued a threat advisory of a potential Continued Threats to India it does not appear that elements within terrorist plot targeting shipping As details emerge about the Karachi Pakistan’s government will completely interests transiting the Malacca Strait. Project, it is clear that militants inside crack down on the activities of the LT. Malaysia’s navy chief, Admiral Abdul Pakistan are posing an ongoing threat Pakistan is already suffering from its Aziz Jaafar, warned that “terrorists to India. Both Khwaja and Salman own jihadist violence from various are targeting specific tankers in the reportedly told their interrogators that Pakistani Taliban groups, and it risks Malacca Strait and Singapore Strait.”1 IM operatives in Karachi were under making more domestic enemies by Singapore’s home affairs minister, pressure from the ISI-LT leadership turning against militant cadres focused Wong Kan Seng, said, “We received to organize fresh terrorist attacks on the country’s rival, India.27 As a intelligence from our liaison partners in India.21 Like Khwaja, Salman was result, it appears only a matter of time about this possible plot to go and attack instructed to reactivate dormant IM before the LT and IM execute another vessels coming through Singapore cells in India.22 As stated by an Indian attack on the Indian homeland. waters through the Strait of Malacca.”2 intelligence official, the IM has become The warning came on the heels of the a potential resource base that the “LT Animesh Roul is a New Delhi-based analyst arrests of 14 suspected terrorists at an hopes to use right from identification with expertise on radical Islam, terrorism, alleged Jemaah Islamiya (JI) training and reconnaissance of targets to and security issues in South Asia. He is a camp on Indonesia’s Sumatra Island, arranging logistics for terror attacks.”23 founding member and presently the executive which forms the eastern boundary of the director of research at the New Delhi-based waterway.3 The incident has heightened Shortly after the Pune attack, the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, regional and international concerns that Mumbai police’s Anti-Terrorism an independent policy research organization. the Malacca Strait could become a focus Squad (ATS) foiled another major LT- He has written scholarly and investigative of Islamist maritime terrorism.4 IM plot in March by arresting Abdul papers for Terrorism Monitor, ISN Security Latif and Riyaz Ali, who were allegedly Watch, CBW Magazine and NBR Analysis, In light of these recent threats, this planning to attack the headquarters of among others. Mr. Roul is the recipient of article examines the likelihood of sea- the Indian oil major ONGC, along with the MacArthur Foundation’s Asia Security based extremist violence in the region, the bustling Mangaldas Market and Initiative Blogger award in 2009 and he also JI’s capacity to operate in an offshore Borivali’s Thakkar Mall in Mumbai.24 blogs frequently at the Counterterrorism Blog environment, and whether Southeast The subsequent probe revealed a on South Asian terrorism issues. Asia is a place that al-Qa`ida would seek “strategy” and “recruitment” pattern to exploit in terms of maritime attacks. It finds that the risk of a decisive maritime

Suspect in Pune Blast,” Telegraph [Kolkata], April 9, strike in the Malacca Strait is low, 2010. especially in the context of disrupting 19 “Hunt Begins for Mohsin, Missing IM Recruiter.” For shipping interests as part of an economic details on the September 13, 2008 New Delhi blasts, see war against the West. Rahul Tripathi, “Serial Blasts Rock Delhi; 30 Dead, 90 Injured,” Times of India, September 14, 2008. 20 “ISI Colonel Takes Care of Karachi Logistics.” 1 Alex Kennedy, “Tankers Warned of Terror Threat in 21 “Terror Alert Sounded in Mumbai, Bangalore and Malacca Strait,” Associated Press, March 4, 2010. Kolkata.” 2 “Singapore Raises Security Alert Levels After Malacca 22 Ibid. Strait Threat,” Reuters, March 5, 2010. 23 “IM has ‘Hostels’ in Gulf, Nepal & Bangladesh Too,” 3 Ibid.; “14 Suspects Charged Under Indonesia’s Anti- Economic Times, March 11, 2010. Terror Laws,” ChannelNewsAsia.com, March 4, 2010. 24 According to the Anti-Terrorist Squad of the Mum- 4 The Joint War Council of the Lloyds Market Associa- bai police, the accused were in touch with one Karachi- tion designated the Malacca Strait an area of Perceived based “Uncle,” identified as Khan Abdul Bashir Ainul Enhanced Risk in July 2005. For details, see Peter Chalk, Haq Khan, a fugitive himself accused of involvement in The Maritime Dimension of International Security (Santa the 1993 Mumbai serial bomb blasts case. This “Uncle” Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), p. 33; Martin Murphy, Small reportedly directed the two men to recruit Indian youth Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money (New York: Columbia and arrange them to be sent to Pakistan for training and University Press, 2009), pp. 83-84; Graham Gerard Ong- to carry out terrorist attacks in India. For details, see 25 “Phone Calls Made by Mumbai Terror Suspects Webb, “Introduction: Southeast Asian Piracy: Research “Two Held for Planning Attacks in Mumbai,” Financial Traced to Karachi,” PTI, March 15, 2010. and Developments,” in Graham Gerard Ong-Webb ed., Express, March 15, 2010; “Court Extends Custody of Sus- 26 Ibid. Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits pects in ONGC Fire Plot,” Indian Express, April 14, 2010. 27 Narayan. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p. xxxiv.

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Maritime Terrorism: The Jihadist Call to Arms catching fire is extremely low. Even if By far the most vulnerable vessel to In May 2009, al-Qa`ida issued a global this did occur, the lateral force of any terrorist aggression is a passenger communiqué exhorting jihadists around subsequent explosion would likely be ferry since its very purpose—to move the world to attack strategic maritime contained by the tanker’s hull, which large numbers of people as quickly chokepoints as part of a wider economic would force the destructive energy and efficiently as possible—necessarily war against the West.5 On the surface, upwards rather than outwards (thus precludes the option for concerted (and this call to arms seems to have direct minimizing its destructive potential).9 some might argue even basic) security. relevance to the Malacca Strait. This Sinking a major oceangoing freighter Moreover, these ships generally sail particular maritime passage is one of the is equally as challenging and would, at at or above full capacity and are often most important and busiest in the world, a minimum, require the perpetrating characterized by certain design features seeing an average of 50,000 transits a group to have ready access to a large (notably light flammable “outer-skins,” year that account for around a third of quantity of explosives, the time and thin hulls and open car decks that the world’s trade and oil shipments as means to transport this material and lack stabilizing bulkheads) that make well as much of its liquefied natural gas the expertise to know where to place them highly susceptible to flooding (LNG).6 The Malacca Strait is also highly the bombs to cause a critical breach. and sinking.13 Nevertheless, ferries prone to congestion and bottlenecks, These logistical and knowledge barriers only constitute a small percentage of measuring just over 1.5 miles wide at would pose formidable barriers for a the maritime traffic that transits the the narrowest point.7 single attack—much less an assault that Malacca Strait, they are generally not targeted two or three ships (which would sizeable vessels (meaning that sinking While there is little doubt concerning be required to truly block the Strait).10 them would be unlikely to cause a major the economic salience of the Malacca blockage along the Strait) and their value Strait, carrying out decisive attacks An external ramming strike using a fast as a strategic economic target, at least in against ships transiting through this inshore attack craft (FIAC) arguably this particular vicinity, is limited.14 corridor is somewhat more challenging represents a more realistic scenario and than commonly portrayed. One of the is certainly one that has been used in JI and Maritime Attacks most frequently postulated scenarios is the past. Leveraging these vessels as an Al-Qa`ida’s May 2009 communiqué that terrorists could attempt to disrupt attack platform offers the advantages also had relevance to JI on account of the commercial viability of the Strait, of money, deftness and surprise in the group’s past links to the al-Qa`ida either by detonating a hijacked oil or that FIACs are cheap, easy to handle transnational network. These ties, LNG tanker to shut down a prominent and anonymous enough to mingle however, have mostly atrophied during commercial terminal (such as the Port of with other maritime traffic.11 Even an the last five years, and while JI was Singapore) or by scuttling a large ship to FIAC-mounted attack, however, has certainly prepared to accept Usama bin block the through-passage of maritime a questionable prospect of causing a Ladin’s past financial and operational traffic.8 Although theoretically possible, critical breach. Indeed, as the suicide support, the group always tended realization of both attack contingencies bombings against the USS Cole in 2000 to prioritize its own local objectives would be difficult to achieve. and the MV Limburg in 2002 highlighted, over that of its erstwhile backer. if the site of the impact does not accord Since the mid-2000s, this agenda has Igniting pressurized LNG or oil is with weak points in the ship’s skeletal essentially centered on reconsolidating technically problematic. Unless these design, it is unlikely that catastrophic and building strength in Indonesia by substances vent in their liquid form damage would result.12 returning the movement to its historical and mix with air in the correct ratio, Darul Islam roots.15 Executing attacks the probability of either substance fully in the Malacca Strait at the behest of 9 Martin Murphy, “Maritime Terrorism: The Threat in 5 “Maritime Terrorism in the Eyes of Al-Qaeda,” In- Context,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2006, p. 21; 13 For more on the vulnerability of ferries to terrorist at- ternational Institute for Counter-Terrorism, November “Facts About LNG,” Sound Energy Solutions, available tacks, see Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International 2009. The communiqué was posted in Jihad Press, an online at www.soundenergysolutions.com. Security, p. XX; Michael Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry electronic newspaper. 10 Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Secu- Willis, Ivan Khilko and David Ortiz, Maritime Terrorism. 6 “Country Analysis Briefs: World Oil Transit Choke- rity, pp. 12, 23; Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, Risk and Liability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006). points,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Janu- “Smooth Sailing: The World’s Shipping Lanes Are Safe,” 14 Of course, this does not preclude the possibility of ary 2008; “Singapore Warns of Threat to Tankers in Foreign Affairs 86:3 (2007). It should also be noted that attacks against ferries in other parts of Southeast Asia Malacca Strait,” BBC, March 4, 2010. the Malacca Strait is not a truly non-substitutable water- where they are far more common and critical to the day- 7 Ibid.; Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global way. Blocking the passageway would require, at most, to-day lives of many ordinary citizens. The Philippines, Trade: Maritime-Related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of only an extra two to three days steaming time which for instance, has seen several attacks on these vessels, Mass Destruction (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004), p. 38; “Ships would not unduly impact the overall cost and transport including the 2004 bombing of SuperFerry 14, which left Collide Off Malaysia Coast,” al-Jazira, August 19, 2009. of global freight. 116 people dead. 8 See, for instance, Richardson, pp. 38-45; Mansoor Ijaz, 11 Murphy, “Maritime Terrorism: The Threat in Con- 15 Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau and “The Maritime Threat from al-Qaeda,” Financial Times, text,” p. 23. Leanne Piggott, The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast October 19, 2003; Jerry Frank, “Big Business Gets Politi- 12 Rupert Herbert-Burns, “Terrorism in the Early 21st Asia: A Net Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), cal Over Rising Global Risks,” Lloyds List, January 24, Century Maritime Domain,” in Joshua Ho and Catherine p. 102. The basic aim of Darul Islam was to overthrow 2008; Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, Zara Raymond eds., The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: the secular Indonesian state that emerged in the wake of p. 266; “Security Raised in Malacca Strait After Terror Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: World independence from the Netherlands and replace it with Warning.” Scientific, 2005), pp. 164-165. one based on the full observance of Shari`a law.

9 april 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 4 an organization based on the other side Qa`ida’s purported aim to disrupt maritime targets, both of which have of the world would have little, if any, Western shipping interests. For two stated their full allegiance to the Islamist relevance to this strategic priority. basic, inter-related reasons, however, enterprise: al-Shabab, which in 2010 for the group would probably seek to the first time announced its solidarity Just as importantly, JI has no realize this objective elsewhere. First, with Bin Ladin and readiness to stage maritime tradition, and apart from the Malacca Strait is well guarded. attacks off the Horn of Africa in pursuit unsubstantiated allegations has never Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore of his ideological and militant agenda;23 sought to extend its operational realm are all fully committed to ensuring the and al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula beyond a territorial environment. safety of the waterway through the (AQAP), which in 2009 declared a The group is not known to have any exchange of intelligence and the regular “mast media” campaign urging Muslims mariner human or technical skill sets conduct of joint patrols and exercises.19 to gather all relevant information on at its disposal, and given its current Since 2005, a limited but growing American vessels sailing near Yemen, weakened and disaggregated state regime of wider airborne surveillance including data on payloads, crews and would be unlikely to invest the limited has also been in place. Known as the how they are serviced by other states.24 resources it has in trying to develop “Eye in the Sky,” the initiative includes an entirely new (and in many respects the three littoral states in addition Conclusion unproven) attack profile.16 to Thailand and the Philippines.20 Although the Malacca Strait represents Under the scheme, each participating a key maritime corridor and has been Moreover, JI’s center of gravity lies country has made available two planes the focus of a number of postulated risk in Indonesia’s Java, which is by no and commits to flying two sorties a scenarios, the threat of a major terrorist means contiguous to the Malacca Strait. week over the Strait—meaning that for strike appears low. The waterway is Although commentators have claimed every seven days there are at least 16 well guarded and there is currently no that the militants recently arrested hours of continual coverage over the group in the immediate region with the in Indonesia’s northern Sumatra waterway.21 necessary skills or motivation to conduct were attending a JI training camp, no decisive operations against maritime evidence has yet to surface that this was Second, there are other strategic assets. The most likely entity to attempt the case or, indeed, that those detained chokepoints that offer a more conducive an attack would be al-Qa`ida, with the were Islamist terrorists seeking to operational theater. Notable in this principal objective being to realize the target ships transiting the seaway.17 regard is the Gulf of Aden. Not only movement’s self-defined economic jihad The fact that Achenese Muslims, does this passage serve as a vital and against the West. Nevertheless, there including former insurgents associated largely non-substitutable22 trade and is no evidence that the organization with Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, have energy link between the Indian Ocean is presently working with affiliates historically (and strongly) shunned and Europe, it also abuts Somalia—a in Southeast Asia to further this goal. attempts by JI to gain a foothold in the state that has not seen a functioning Moreover, there are other theaters that region also clouds the veracity of these system of governance since 1991. offer a far more conducive environment claims.18 Moreover, there are at least two groups for targeting sea-based commercial and in this region that are well placed to hit energy assets that have critical relevance The Malacca Strait an Unlikely Target to the functioning of the contemporary The Malacca Strait constitutes an 19 The effectiveness of these measures has been reflected global order. important maritime corridor that in the dramatic drop of piracy incidents reported in the presumably accords well with al- Malacca Strait. According to statistics from the Inter- Dr. Peter Chalk is a Senior Policy Analyst national Maritime Bureau (IMB), attacks have declined with the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 16 See, for instance, Stefan Eklof Amirell, “Political Pi- by roughly 83% during the past four years. See “Armed California. He specializes in transnational racy and Maritime Terrorism,” in Graham Gerard Ong- Robbery and Piracy Against Ships: Annual Report, security threats and has worked on a range Webb, Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Mal- 2009,” International Maritime Bureau, 2010, p. 5. of projects in South and Southeast Asia, sub- acca Straits (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), pp. 58-59. 20 The three littoral states are Malaysia, Indonesia and Saharan Africa and Latin America. He is 17 Personal interviews, maritime security analysts, Co- Singapore. also Associate Editor of Studies in Conflict penhagen, Denmark, March 2010. Thus far, no evidence 21 Personal interview, maritime security specialists at- and Terrorism,­ one of the foremost journals has surfaced that those arrested in northern Sumatra tending the “Comprehensive Responses to Terrorism in the international security field, ­and serves were connected to either JI’s mainstream or its so-called Conference,” Cambodia, August 2009. Also see Ong- as an Adjunct Professor with the Naval “pro-bombing bloc.” As noted in the text, JI has consis- Webb, “Introduction,” pp. xxix-xxxi; Mohd Nasir Yu- Postgraduate School in Monterey, California tently failed to gain a footprint in this particular region. soff, “Eye-in-the-Sky-Initiative Over Malacca Straits and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Moreover, most of the materiel seized in the purported from September 13,” Bernama, September 8, 2005. Studies (APCSS) in Honolulu, Hawaii. camp—rifles, military uniforms, propaganda leaflets and 22 In this respect, the Gulf of Aden offers a more at- videos of the 2002 Bali suicide bombings—strongly sug- tractive operational theater for carrying out terrorist at- gest preparations for a land-based attack as opposed to tacks designed to disrupt the mechanics of global trade. 23 Huma Yusuf, “Somali Militant Group Al Shabab one aimed against maritime conveyance. If ships were precluded from transiting the waterway, Aligns with Al-Qaeda,” Christian Science Monitor, Febru- 18 See, for instance, Leonard Sebastian, “The Indone- they would be forced to re-route around the Cape of ary 10, 2010. sian Dilemma: How to Participate in the War on Terror Good Hope in South Africa. This would add at least three 24 “Q&A: Yemen’s al-Qaeda Wing Gains Global Notori- Without Becoming a National Security State,” in Kumar weeks to an average journey, resulting in increased ship- ety,” Reuters, January 13, 2010; Bill Gertz, “Navy Warns Ramakrishna ed., After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in ping costs of between $1.5 and $2 million to cover extra Ships About Al Qaeda Risk Near Yemen,” Washington Southeast Asia (Singapore: World Scientific, 2004). fuel, labor and time. Times, March 23, 2010.

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