Combinatorial Games: from Theoretical Solving to AI Algorithms Eric Duchene
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Arxiv:2101.07237V2 [Cs.CC] 19 Jan 2021 Ohtedsg N Oprtv Nlsso Obntra Games
TRANSVERSE WAVE: AN IMPARTIAL COLOR-PROPAGATION GAME INSPRIED BY SOCIAL INFLUENCE AND QUANTUM NIM Kyle Burke Department of Computer Science, Plymouth State University, Plymouth, New Hampshire, https://turing.plymouth.edu/~kgb1013/ Matthew Ferland Department of Computer Science, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, United States Shang-Hua Teng1 Department of Computer Science, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, United States https://viterbi-web.usc.edu/~shanghua/ Abstract In this paper, we study a colorful, impartial combinatorial game played on a two- dimensional grid, Transverse Wave. We are drawn to this game because of its apparent simplicity, contrasting intractability, and intrinsic connection to two other combinatorial games, one inspired by social influence and another inspired by quan- tum superpositions. More precisely, we show that Transverse Wave is at the intersection of social-influence-inspired Friend Circle and superposition-based Demi-Quantum Nim. Transverse Wave is also connected with Schaefer’s logic game Avoid True. In addition to analyzing the mathematical structures and com- putational complexity of Transverse Wave, we provide a web-based version of the game, playable at https://turing.plymouth.edu/~kgb1013/DB/combGames/transverseWave.html. Furthermore, we formulate a basic network-influence inspired game, called Demo- graphic Influence, which simultaneously generalizes Node-Kyles and Demi- arXiv:2101.07237v2 [cs.CC] 19 Jan 2021 Quantum Nim (which in turn contains as special cases Nim, Avoid True, and Transverse Wave.). These connections illuminate the lattice order, induced by special-case/generalization relationships over mathematical games, fundamental to both the design and comparative analyses of combinatorial games. 1Supported by the Simons Investigator Award for fundamental & curiosity-driven research and NSF grant CCF1815254. -
Alpha-Beta Pruning
Alpha-Beta Pruning Carl Felstiner May 9, 2019 Abstract This paper serves as an introduction to the ways computers are built to play games. We implement the basic minimax algorithm and expand on it by finding ways to reduce the portion of the game tree that must be generated to find the best move. We tested our algorithms on ordinary Tic-Tac-Toe, Hex, and 3-D Tic-Tac-Toe. With our algorithms, we were able to find the best opening move in Tic-Tac-Toe by only generating 0.34% of the nodes in the game tree. We also explored some mathematical features of Hex and provided proofs of them. 1 Introduction Building computers to play board games has been a focus for mathematicians ever since computers were invented. The first computer to beat a human opponent in chess was built in 1956, and towards the late 1960s, computers were already beating chess players of low-medium skill.[1] Now, it is generally recognized that computers can beat even the most accomplished grandmaster. Computers build a tree of different possibilities for the game and then work backwards to find the move that will give the computer the best outcome. Al- though computers can evaluate board positions very quickly, in a game like chess where there are over 10120 possible board configurations it is impossible for a computer to search through the entire tree. The challenge for the computer is then to find ways to avoid searching in certain parts of the tree. Humans also look ahead a certain number of moves when playing a game, but experienced players already know of certain theories and strategies that tell them which parts of the tree to look. -
Impartial Games
Combinatorial Games MSRI Publications Volume 29, 1995 Impartial Games RICHARD K. GUY In memory of Jack Kenyon, 1935-08-26 to 1994-09-19 Abstract. We give examples and some general results about impartial games, those in which both players are allowed the same moves at any given time. 1. Introduction We continue our introduction to combinatorial games with a survey of im- partial games. Most of this material can also be found in WW [Berlekamp et al. 1982], particularly pp. 81{116, and in ONAG [Conway 1976], particu- larly pp. 112{130. An elementary introduction is given in [Guy 1989]; see also [Fraenkel 1996], pp. ??{?? in this volume. An impartial game is one in which the set of Left options is the same as the set of Right options. We've noticed in the preceding article the impartial games = 0=0; 0 0 = 1= and 0; 0; = 2: {|} ∗ { | } ∗ ∗ { ∗| ∗} ∗ that were born on days 0, 1, and 2, respectively, so it should come as no surprise that on day n the game n = 0; 1; 2;:::; (n 1) 0; 1; 2;:::; (n 1) ∗ {∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − |∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ − } is born. In fact any game of the type a; b; c;::: a; b; c;::: {∗ ∗ ∗ |∗ ∗ ∗ } has value m,wherem =mex a;b;c;::: , the least nonnegative integer not in ∗ { } the set a;b;c;::: . To see this, notice that any option, a say, for which a>m, { } ∗ This is a slightly revised reprint of the article of the same name that appeared in Combi- natorial Games, Proceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics, Vol. 43, 1991. Permission for use courtesy of the American Mathematical Society. -
Game Theory with Translucent Players
Game Theory with Translucent Players Joseph Y. Halpern and Rafael Pass∗ Cornell University Department of Computer Science Ithaca, NY, 14853, U.S.A. e-mail: fhalpern,[email protected] November 27, 2012 Abstract A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one another—if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does not affect the choice of other players’ strategies. In many situations this is an unrealistic assumption. We develop a framework for reasoning about games where the players may be translucent to one another; in particular, a player may believe that if she were to change strategies, then the other player would also change strategies. Translucent players may achieve significantly more efficient outcomes than opaque ones. Our main result is a characterization of strategies consistent with appro- priate analogues of common belief of rationality. Common Counterfactual Belief of Rationality (CCBR) holds if (1) everyone is rational, (2) everyone counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational (i.e., all players i be- lieve that everyone else would still be rational even if i were to switch strate- gies), (3) everyone counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational, and counterfactually believes that everyone else is rational, and so on. CCBR characterizes the set of strategies surviving iterated removal of minimax dom- inated strategies: a strategy σi is minimax dominated for i if there exists a 0 0 0 strategy σ for i such that min 0 u (σ ; µ ) > max u (σ ; µ ). i µ−i i i −i µ−i i i −i ∗Halpern is supported in part by NSF grants IIS-0812045, IIS-0911036, and CCF-1214844, by AFOSR grant FA9550-08-1-0266, and by ARO grant W911NF-09-1-0281. -
Algorithmic Combinatorial Game Theory∗
Playing Games with Algorithms: Algorithmic Combinatorial Game Theory∗ Erik D. Demaine† Robert A. Hearn‡ Abstract Combinatorial games lead to several interesting, clean problems in algorithms and complexity theory, many of which remain open. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the area to encourage further research. In particular, we begin with general background in Combinatorial Game Theory, which analyzes ideal play in perfect-information games, and Constraint Logic, which provides a framework for showing hardness. Then we survey results about the complexity of determining ideal play in these games, and the related problems of solving puzzles, in terms of both polynomial-time algorithms and computational intractability results. Our review of background and survey of algorithmic results are by no means complete, but should serve as a useful primer. 1 Introduction Many classic games are known to be computationally intractable (assuming P 6= NP): one-player puzzles are often NP-complete (as in Minesweeper) or PSPACE-complete (as in Rush Hour), and two-player games are often PSPACE-complete (as in Othello) or EXPTIME-complete (as in Check- ers, Chess, and Go). Surprisingly, many seemingly simple puzzles and games are also hard. Other results are positive, proving that some games can be played optimally in polynomial time. In some cases, particularly with one-player puzzles, the computationally tractable games are still interesting for humans to play. We begin by reviewing some basics of Combinatorial Game Theory in Section 2, which gives tools for designing algorithms, followed by reviewing the relatively new theory of Constraint Logic in Section 3, which gives tools for proving hardness. -
The Effective Minimax Value of Asynchronously Repeated Games*
Int J Game Theory (2003) 32: 431–442 DOI 10.1007/s001820300161 The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games* Kiho Yoon Department of Economics, Korea University, Anam-dong, Sungbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea 136-701 (E-mail: [email protected]) Received: October 2001 Abstract. We study the effect of asynchronous choice structure on the possi- bility of cooperation in repeated strategic situations. We model the strategic situations as asynchronously repeated games, and define two notions of effec- tive minimax value. We show that the order of players’ moves generally affects the effective minimax value of the asynchronously repeated game in significant ways, but the order of moves becomes irrelevant when the stage game satisfies the non-equivalent utilities (NEU) condition. We then prove the Folk Theorem that a payoff vector can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium out- come with correlation device if and only if it dominates the effective minimax value. These results, in particular, imply both Lagunoff and Matsui’s (1997) result and Yoon (2001)’s result on asynchronously repeated games. Key words: Effective minimax value, folk theorem, asynchronously repeated games 1. Introduction Asynchronous choice structure in repeated strategic situations may affect the possibility of cooperation in significant ways. When players in a repeated game make asynchronous choices, that is, when players cannot always change their actions simultaneously in each period, it is quite plausible that they can coordinate on some particular actions via short-run commitment or inertia to render unfavorable outcomes infeasible. Indeed, Lagunoff and Matsui (1997) showed that, when a pure coordination game is repeated in a way that only *I thank three anonymous referees as well as an associate editor for many helpful comments and suggestions. -
COMPSCI 575/MATH 513 Combinatorics and Graph Theory
COMPSCI 575/MATH 513 Combinatorics and Graph Theory Lecture #34: Partisan Games (from Conway, On Numbers and Games and Berlekamp, Conway, and Guy, Winning Ways) David Mix Barrington 9 December 2016 Partisan Games • Conway's Game Theory • Hackenbush and Domineering • Four Types of Games and an Order • Some Games are Numbers • Values of Numbers • Single-Stalk Hackenbush • Some Domineering Examples Conway’s Game Theory • J. H. Conway introduced his combinatorial game theory in his 1976 book On Numbers and Games or ONAG. Researchers in the area are sometimes called onagers. • Another resource is the book Winning Ways by Berlekamp, Conway, and Guy. Conway’s Game Theory • Games, like everything else in the theory, are defined recursively. A game consists of a set of left options, each a game, and a set of right options, each a game. • The base of the recursion is the zero game, with no options for either player. • Last time we saw non-partisan games, where each player had the same options from each position. Today we look at partisan games. Hackenbush • Hackenbush is a game where the position is a diagram with red and blue edges, connected in at least one place to the “ground”. • A move is to delete an edge, a blue one for Left and a red one for Right. • Edges disconnected from the ground disappear. As usual, a player who cannot move loses. Hackenbush • From this first position, Right is going to win, because Left cannot prevent him from killing both the ground supports. It doesn’t matter who moves first. -
570: Minimax Sample Complexity for Turn-Based Stochastic Game
Minimax Sample Complexity for Turn-based Stochastic Game Qiwen Cui1 Lin F. Yang2 1School of Mathematical Sciences, Peking University 2Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, University of California, Los Angeles Abstract guarantees are rather rare due to complex interaction be- tween agents that makes the problem considerably harder than single agent reinforcement learning. This is also known The empirical success of multi-agent reinforce- as non-stationarity in MARL, which means when multi- ment learning is encouraging, while few theoret- ple agents alter their strategies based on samples collected ical guarantees have been revealed. In this work, from previous strategy, the system becomes non-stationary we prove that the plug-in solver approach, proba- for each agent and the improvement can not be guaranteed. bly the most natural reinforcement learning algo- One fundamental question in MBRL is that how to design rithm, achieves minimax sample complexity for efficient algorithms to overcome non-stationarity. turn-based stochastic game (TBSG). Specifically, we perform planning in an empirical TBSG by Two-players turn-based stochastic game (TBSG) is a two- utilizing a ‘simulator’ that allows sampling from agents generalization of Markov decision process (MDP), arbitrary state-action pair. We show that the em- where two agents choose actions in turn and one agent wants pirical Nash equilibrium strategy is an approxi- to maximize the total reward while the other wants to min- mate Nash equilibrium strategy in the true TBSG imize it. As a zero-sum game, TBSG is known to have and give both problem-dependent and problem- Nash equilibrium strategy [Shapley, 1953], which means independent bound. -
ES.268 Dynamic Programming with Impartial Games, Course Notes 3
ES.268 , Lecture 3 , Feb 16, 2010 http://erikdemaine.org/papers/AlgGameTheory_GONC3 Playing Games with Algorithms: { most games are hard to play well: { Chess is EXPTIME-complete: { n × n board, arbitrary position { need exponential (cn) time to find a winning move (if there is one) { also: as hard as all games (problems) that need exponential time { Checkers is EXPTIME-complete: ) Chess & Checkers are the \same" computationally: solving one solves the other (PSPACE-complete if draw after poly. moves) { Shogi (Japanese chess) is EXPTIME-complete { Japanese Go is EXPTIME-complete { U. S. Go might be harder { Othello is PSPACE-complete: { conjecture requires exponential time, but not sure (implied by P 6= NP) { can solve some games fast: in \polynomial time" (mostly 1D) Kayles: [Dudeney 1908] (n bowling pins) { move = hit one or two adjacent pins { last player to move wins (normal play) Let's play! 1 First-player win: SYMMETRY STRATEGY { move to split into two equal halves (1 pin if odd, 2 if even) { whatever opponent does, do same in other half (Kn + Kn = 0 ::: just like Nim) Impartial game, so Sprague-Grundy Theory says Kayles ≡ Nim somehow { followers(Kn) = fKi + Kn−i−1;Ki + Kn−i−2 j i = 0; 1; :::;n − 2g ) nimber(Kn) = mexfnimber(Ki + Kn−i−1); nimber(Ki + Kn−i−2) j i = 0; 1; :::;n − 2g { nimber(x + y) = nimber(x) ⊕ nimber(y) ) nimber(Kn) = mexfnimber(Ki) ⊕ nimber(Kn−i−1); nimber(Ki) ⊕ nimber(Kn−i−2) j i = 0; 1; :::n − 2g RECURRENCE! | write what you want in terms of smaller things Howe do w compute it? nimber(K0) = 0 (BASE CASE) nimber(K1) = mexfnimber(K0) ⊕ nimber(K0)g 0 ⊕ 0 = 0 = 1 nimber(K2) = mexfnimber(K0) ⊕ nimber(K1); 0 ⊕ 1 = 1 nimber(K0) ⊕ nimber(K0)g 0 ⊕ 0 = 0 = 2 so e.g. -
Games with Hidden Information
Games with Hidden Information R&N Chapter 6 R&N Section 17.6 • Assumptions so far: – Two-player game : Player A and B. – Perfect information : Both players see all the states and decisions. Each decision is made sequentially . – Zero-sum : Player’s A gain is exactly equal to player B’s loss. • We are going to eliminate these constraints. We will eliminate first the assumption of “perfect information” leading to far more realistic models. – Some more game-theoretic definitions Matrix games – Minimax results for perfect information games – Minimax results for hidden information games 1 Player A 1 L R Player B 2 3 L R L R Player A 4 +2 +5 +2 L Extensive form of game: Represent the -1 +4 game by a tree A pure strategy for a player 1 defines the move that the L R player would make for every possible state that the player 2 3 would see. L R L R 4 +2 +5 +2 L -1 +4 2 Pure strategies for A: 1 Strategy I: (1 L,4 L) Strategy II: (1 L,4 R) L R Strategy III: (1 R,4 L) Strategy IV: (1 R,4 R) 2 3 Pure strategies for B: L R L R Strategy I: (2 L,3 L) Strategy II: (2 L,3 R) 4 +2 +5 +2 Strategy III: (2 R,3 L) L R Strategy IV: (2 R,3 R) -1 +4 In general: If N states and B moves, how many pure strategies exist? Matrix form of games Pure strategies for A: Pure strategies for B: Strategy I: (1 L,4 L) Strategy I: (2 L,3 L) Strategy II: (1 L,4 R) Strategy II: (2 L,3 R) Strategy III: (1 R,4 L) Strategy III: (2 R,3 L) 1 Strategy IV: (1 R,4 R) Strategy IV: (2 R,3 R) R L I II III IV 2 3 L R I -1 -1 +2 +2 L R 4 II +4 +4 +2 +2 +2 +5 +1 L R III +5 +1 +5 +1 IV +5 +1 +5 +1 -1 +4 3 Pure strategies for Player B Player A’s payoff I II III IV if game is played I -1 -1 +2 +2 with strategy I by II +4 +4 +2 +2 Player A and strategy III by III +5 +1 +5 +1 Player B for Player A for Pure strategies IV +5 +1 +5 +1 • Matrix normal form of games: The table contains the payoffs for all the possible combinations of pure strategies for Player A and Player B • The table characterizes the game completely, there is no need for any additional information about rules, etc. -
Combinatorial Game Theory, Well-Tempered Scoring Games, and a Knot Game
Combinatorial Game Theory, Well-Tempered Scoring Games, and a Knot Game Will Johnson June 9, 2011 Contents 1 To Knot or Not to Knot 4 1.1 Some facts from Knot Theory . 7 1.2 Sums of Knots . 18 I Combinatorial Game Theory 23 2 Introduction 24 2.1 Combinatorial Game Theory in general . 24 2.1.1 Bibliography . 27 2.2 Additive CGT specifically . 28 2.3 Counting moves in Hackenbush . 34 3 Games 40 3.1 Nonstandard Definitions . 40 3.2 The conventional formalism . 45 3.3 Relations on Games . 54 3.4 Simplifying Games . 62 3.5 Some Examples . 66 4 Surreal Numbers 68 4.1 Surreal Numbers . 68 4.2 Short Surreal Numbers . 70 4.3 Numbers and Hackenbush . 77 4.4 The interplay of numbers and non-numbers . 79 4.5 Mean Value . 83 1 5 Games near 0 85 5.1 Infinitesimal and all-small games . 85 5.2 Nimbers and Sprague-Grundy Theory . 90 6 Norton Multiplication and Overheating 97 6.1 Even, Odd, and Well-Tempered Games . 97 6.2 Norton Multiplication . 105 6.3 Even and Odd revisited . 114 7 Bending the Rules 119 7.1 Adapting the theory . 119 7.2 Dots-and-Boxes . 121 7.3 Go . 132 7.4 Changing the theory . 139 7.5 Highlights from Winning Ways Part 2 . 144 7.5.1 Unions of partizan games . 144 7.5.2 Loopy games . 145 7.5.3 Mis`eregames . 146 7.6 Mis`ereIndistinguishability Quotients . 147 7.7 Indistinguishability in General . 148 II Well-tempered Scoring Games 155 8 Introduction 156 8.1 Boolean games . -
Combinatorial Game Theory
Combinatorial Game Theory Aaron N. Siegel Graduate Studies MR1EXLIQEXMGW Volume 146 %QIVMGER1EXLIQEXMGEP7SGMIX] Combinatorial Game Theory https://doi.org/10.1090//gsm/146 Combinatorial Game Theory Aaron N. Siegel Graduate Studies in Mathematics Volume 146 American Mathematical Society Providence, Rhode Island EDITORIAL COMMITTEE David Cox (Chair) Daniel S. Freed Rafe Mazzeo Gigliola Staffilani 2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 91A46. For additional information and updates on this book, visit www.ams.org/bookpages/gsm-146 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Siegel, Aaron N., 1977– Combinatorial game theory / Aaron N. Siegel. pages cm. — (Graduate studies in mathematics ; volume 146) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8218-5190-6 (alk. paper) 1. Game theory. 2. Combinatorial analysis. I. Title. QA269.S5735 2013 519.3—dc23 2012043675 Copying and reprinting. Individual readers of this publication, and nonprofit libraries acting for them, are permitted to make fair use of the material, such as to copy a chapter for use in teaching or research. Permission is granted to quote brief passages from this publication in reviews, provided the customary acknowledgment of the source is given. Republication, systematic copying, or multiple reproduction of any material in this publication is permitted only under license from the American Mathematical Society. Requests for such permission should be addressed to the Acquisitions Department, American Mathematical Society, 201 Charles Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02904-2294 USA. Requests can also be made by e-mail to [email protected]. c 2013 by the American Mathematical Society. All rights reserved. The American Mathematical Society retains all rights except those granted to the United States Government.