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THE TURKISH INTERNAL REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TALKS* by CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS

June 2011 | GPoT PB no. 24

ABSTRACT Internal social change in , inaugurated by the liberalization

of the economy in the 1980s and given a new impetus by Turkey’s EU accession path during the AKP governments, has engineered a momentous reform process, which marks the beginning of a new post-Kemalist era in the country. Steady economic growth, along with democratization, brings new social forces to the forefront of the political arena and makes them stakeholders in the policymaking processes. As a result, one can observe a substantive shift in Turkey’s foreign policy, from the “hard power” model of the Kemalist era governed by the siege syndrome, to the “soft power” approach of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s doctrine of “nil problems with neighbors”, governed by a feeling of confidence that liberates the country from past obsessions. This foreign policy shift removes the Cyprus problem from the sphere of the untouchable grand national issues as well as from its historical context, and leads to a rationalization that allows for a compromise win-win settlement. Within this framework, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, having won a new mandate with a larger ever-popular support, has a free hand to take the initiative for a lasting settlement of the protracted Cyprus conflict. The practical recommendations made in this regard constitute substantive political actions, which, if materialized, would decisively contribute towards an early settlement.

* This paper is based on Mr. Chrysostomos Pericleous speech at the 10th Round of the Heybeliada Talks, i.e. series of second-track meetings, organized by GPoT Center in the Buffer Zone in Cyprus

on June 13, 2011. GPoT Center, by principle committed to the ideas of dialogue, reconciliation, and GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT) consensus has been always honored to present diverse views and thought-provoking opinions to wider public and is pleased to bring to you a paper from the pen of Mr. Pericleous.

2 2 THE TURKISH INTERNAL REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT | CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS Introduction governments.2 The entrepreneurial middle class that has gradually The ascent of the AKP to power in emerged, along with growing in size November 2002 marked the and broadening its boundaries to beginning of a post-Kemalist era in include intellectuals, journalists, and Turkey. This process, the very first civil society activists, now assumes a seeds of which were sown by Turgut more powerful political leverage Özal in the 1980s, was, to a large and creates social consensus for extent, a bottom-up process, reform. involving a deep rooted demand for change by large segments of society throughout the country. Kemalism, having started as a progressive – Internal Reform and Foreign though top-down and elitist – Policy Shift towards “Soft 3 movement for change, was turned Power” by the 1970s into an authoritarian conservative establishment, alien- For the purpose of this paper, I will ated from society at large, and focus on two main aspects of the

incapable of keeping pace with the reform process being engineered in era of globalization. Turkey. First, the institutional demo- cratization process and, second, the It has been said that the EU foreign policy shift from the “hard accession process has been the power” approach dominant until the locomotive for social and political close of the 20th century, to the reform in Turkey.1 However, there transparent “soft power” approach has been a genuine internal social of Davutoğlu’s doctrine of “nil drive, which made the reform problems with neighbors”. process possible, and which has gained a renewed dynamic during the last decade. This dynamic social drive, though a complex process relating to tradition and inner spiritual life as well, has to be seen 2 See: M. Hakan Yavuz: Islamic Political Identity in mainly as the result of the Turkey, OUP, 2003; Sia Anagnostopoulou: liberalization of Turkish economy, Τουρκικός Εκσυγχρονισμός (Turkish which was inaugurated by Turgut Modernization), Vivliorama, 2004; Yildiz Atasoy: Turkey, Islamists and Democracy, I.B.Tauris, 2005; Özal in the 1980s and later made big Hans-Lukas Kieser (ed): Turkey Beyond strides during the years of the AKP Nationalism, I.B.Tauris, 2006; Ali Carkoglu & Ersin Kalaycioglu: Turkish Democracy today, I.B.Tauris, 2007. 3 See: Joseph Nye: Soft Power: The Means to GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT) 1 Hugh Pope: Solving the EU-Turkey-Cyprus Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York,

Triangle, International Crisis Group, 9 June 2011. 2004.

3 3 THE TURKISH INTERNAL REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT | CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS Democratization and modernization relations with neighboring countries of the state is a prerequisite for as well as peace and stability in the effective entrepreneurial activity. surrounding geographical and trade Moreover, it is a precondition for environment. social mobility and the development of civil society networks. This brings This last parameter adds new the citizens to the forefront of social players to the foreign policy and political developments and decision-making processes. turns them into active players in the Whereas, during the authoritarian policy-making processes. The rapid state, foreign policy was exclusively development of think tanks, social determined behind closed doors by research, and information society, the National Security Council and reflects exactly the upgraded role of the diplomatic bureaucracy, now the citizenry vis-à-vis the state in the the major role has shifted towards formulation of the political policies.4 Whereas, government and […] the improvement of under the Kemalist the social actors relations with former who try to

regime, the people “enemies”, such as , Iraq, existed to serve promote their , Greece, Bulgaria, the state, nowa- interests through Russia, and Iran, their days priorities are foreign relations. forthcoming approach towards shifting towards This makes foreign solution on Cyprus in 2004, and the fundamental policy-making a in general, the effort to make European demo- more transparent Turkey a factor of stability in cratic axiom where and more demo- the region, all these instances the state exists to cratic process and, reflect a considerable degree of serve the people. at the same time, a democratization in the drafting more complex While social mobi- of Turkish foreign policy. task, as it has to lity and a minimum take into account of social consensus are necessary and balance interests and requirements for economic sensitivities of a larger spectrum of development, export oriented players. growth – which is the case for Turkey – needs also peaceful The openings that the AKP governments have made towards the ethnic and religious minorities in 4 Among other sources, see particularly: Maria Turkey, the improvement of Ververidou: Τουρκία: Παράγοντες Διαμόρφωσης relations with former “enemies”, Πολιτικής (Turkey: Actors in Policy-Making Processes), in Sotiris Dalis (ed): Από τον Μπους such as Syria, Iraq, Armenia, Greece, GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT) στον Ομπάμα (From Bush to Obama), Papazisis, Bulgaria, Russia, and Iran, their

2010.

4 4 THE TURKISH INTERNAL REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT | CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS forthcoming approach towards culminated in the military solution on Cyprus in 2004, and in intervention in Cyprus in 1974. This general, the effort to make Turkey a “hard-power” approach was still the factor of stability in the region, all dominant trend when, in 1996, these instances reflect a conside- Şükrü Elektağ was pronouncing the rable degree of democratization in “two-and-a-half wars” doctrine (i.e. the drafting of Turkish foreign that Turkey should prepare to fight policy. two-and-a-half wars simultaneously against Greece, Syria, and the PKK).5 A second change in Turkish foreign policy, more relevant to the scope Things have changed dramatically of this paper, is connected with its since then. First came the orientation. Up until the close of the “earthquake diplomacy” and the 20th century, Turkish foreign policy Helsinki deal of 1999, which led to a was dominated by the Sevres warming up of Turkish-Greek syndrome, a heritage of the relations while opening the way to disintegration of the Ottoman Turkey’s EU accession and reform Empire, reinvigorated by the Cold process. Then came the 2002 War climate. Turkey was perceived landslide victory of Recep Tayyip as being at a state Erdoğan and his of siege by hostile “black Turks” or neighbors, even by […] the ascent of the AKP to “the other Turkey”, enemies from power meant a second as the Islamic within (i.e. the Revolution (despite its being an Movement was ethnic and evolutionary process) in the seen by the Turkish religious minorities history of the Turkish Republic, press following its and, later on, the marking the beginning of the first electoral Turkish Islamic end of the Kemalist statist victory in 1994.6 In movement). Even authoritarian regime. stark contrast to Greece, a NATO the cases of Celal partner, had turned into an enemy Bayar and Süleyman Demirel, owing to the Cyprus crisis, which has Erdoğan and his “black” or “other” dominated Turkish-Greek relations Turks had been the outcasts of the since the 1950s. In what Zorlu had Kemalist establishment; they had described as Turkey’s preemptive been kept entirely outside of the defense against a Greek grip around political system. In this sense, the its Mediterranean harbors, Turkey ascent of the AKP to power meant a came out vehemently against the Enosis Movement in an over- 5 Şükrü Elektağ: 2 ½ War Strategy, Preceptions reaction that led to the pogrom Journal of International Affairs, Ankara, Vol. 1. GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT) No 1. against the Greeks of Istanbul, and 6 M. Hakan Yavuz, 2003.

5 5 THE TURKISH INTERNAL REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT | CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS second Revolution (despite its being network of social forces on the an evolutionary process) in the stage. Even considering Max history of the Turkish Republic, Weber’s extended freedom of marking the beginning of the end of action of charismatic leaders, this the Kemalist statist authoritarian presupposes a state of siege which regime. And it certainly meant the is not the case in present day end of the “hard-power” dominated Turkey. policy both at home and abroad. Since then, “soft-power” win-win In this same light we have to set our approach of Turkish foreign policy, expectations of the new Turkish brilliantly expounded in Ahmet government’s role in relation to the Davutoğlu’s doctrine of “nil protracted Cyprus conflict; taking problems with neighbors”, reflects a into account not public statements feeling of self-confidence and which most frequently are directed security that helps transcend at multiple audiences and are obsessions of the past. intended to serve multiple internal purposes. A reliable evaluation of solution perspectives should first reside on a rational analysis of the The Cyprus Connection of interests that solution would serve, Erdoğan’s New Mandate and, secondly, on an equally rational analysis of the forces that move In the light of the above analysis, history in the countries involved. As Erdoğan’s third crashing election for Turkey, to the extent that our victory of 12 June 2011, and analysis is a valid interpretation of renewal of mandate with a larger reality, both broad interests and ever popular support, beyond any history drivers converge toward a other intricate complexities, has to peaceful settlement in Cyprus. be seen as the net result of a growing social consensus for reform The Cyprus problem is no longer the and democratization at home, and grand national issue that used to be peace and stability abroad. from Adnan Menderes to the last Regardless of whether Erdoğan has days of Bülent Ecevit’s premiership. a “hidden Islamic agenda” at the What came out, during the recent back of his mind or not, what counts acrimonious exchanges between in politics is not hidden thoughts – Erdoğan and the Turkish Cypriots or even intentions – of key players, was that for Erdoğan the Cyprus but political action and net result; problem is somehow a liability which is no longer determined by which costs Turkey some one billion

one sole actor; which now is an euro a year. The very fact that GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT) intricate process with a complex economic parameters are seriously

6 6 THE TURKISH INTERNAL REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT | CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS accounted for and openly commen- One might argue, in this regard, that ted on, is indicative of a rationali- the European ambivalence on zation which allows room for Turkey’s accession path relates to negotiating a compromise solution. more important considerations The additional fact that the Cyprus which will not be removed once problem was almost completely left there is a settlement on Cyprus or out of the election campaign agenda even on the Turkish-Greek disputes. and that social research findings This argument is only partly true, as showed considerable segments of it fails to account for the spillover the Turkish society positively effect that such a momentous inclined towards a compromise development will have on the federal solution while keeping the European public opinion. Moreover, issue low in their priorities, leaves a neither Turkey nor the European free hand to the Union can oversee new government the fact that more to take the The additional fact that the than half of necessary initia- Cyprus problem was almost Turkey’s trade

tives leading to an completely left out of the exchanges are with agreed settlement. election campaign agenda and EU countries and that social research findings that about two Last but not least, showed considerable segments thirds of foreign an early solution of the Turkish society positively investment in on Cyprus would inclined towards a compromise Turkey come from have far reaching federal solution while keeping EU member states. positive effects on the issue low in their priorities, Turkey’s EU leaves a free hand to the new What is urgently accession process. government to take the needed, which will Apart from freeing necessary initiatives leading to immensely help the blocked an agreed settlement. towards a Cyprus negotiation solution, is chapters, it will set revitalization of the the pace for a lasting negotiated Helsinki spirit, I would say, a new settlement of the disputes with Helsinki deal, reconfirming Euro- Greece, thus making the triangle of pean will to accept Turkey as a full Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus a member of the Union and paradigm for peace, stability, and recommitting Turkey to work consis- cooperation in the turbulent region tently in the direction of fulfilling of the , and a big asset the Copenhagen accession criteria. for the European Union. Turkey’s unprecedented economic performance is an additional asset GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT)

7 7 THE TURKISH INTERNAL REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT | CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS that sets aside quite a lot of crisis- the Annan Plan for the stationing connected European fears. of a 6000-strong Turkish con- tingent for seven years after the Recommendations implementation of the agree- ment and for a 3000-strong one To put the record straight, what are for another seven-year period the practical steps that one might could not be legitimized in the expect Turkey to take, now that it minds of the people as has a government with a new reasonable or necessary. mandate and a free hand, one might say, to reach a compromise 4. As timeframes, particularly on settlement on Cyprus? the return of land and properties, would be necessary I would suggest the following points to give time for relocation of as food for thought: Turkish Cypriots, Turkey should 1. Turkey should dispel Greek show readiness to accept such Cypriot fears that it perceives guarantees of the implement- tation of the agreement to be, so

solution in terms of power politics. It needs to convince that that to dispel any fears that it will the doctrine of “nil problems not keep its commitments. with neighbors” could be 5. While Greek Cypriots should applicable in Cyprus as well on a accept such arrangements on the win-win basis. property issue that would 2. Turkey should also dispel Greek address the will of the vast Cypriot fears, which loomed majority of the Turkish Cypriots large in the run up to the to live in a compact area, as well referendum of 24 April 2004, as practical needs within the that while they would agreed upon federal framework, immediately give power sharing, Turkey should convince the what they would get back in Turkish Cypriot negotiators not return, which was territory and to insist on arrangements that properties, would be too slow to stink of ethnic cleansing. I would come, in exceedingly long recall, in this regard, the timeframes that made it look far principles underlying the Cyprus remote and uncertain. Academic Dialogue Property Proposals, which, while allowing 3. Drastic shortening of timeframes for Turkish Cypriot majority of should particularly apply to the population and land ownership

withdrawal of Turkish troops in the Turkish Cypriot constituent GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT) from the island. The provision in state to be, give priority to

8 8 THE TURKISH INTERNAL REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT | CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS humanitarian criteria and a minority vis-à-vis the over- suggest arrangements that would populous and overpowering allow, and even encourage, Turkish mainland. gradual social and economic interaction among citizens of the 8. This would entail, at first hand, two communities.7 Turkey’s unequivocal commit- ment to withdraw Turkish 6. If the motto of a settlement is military forces the presence of “power sharing for peace” as far which in Cyprus is not covered by as Greek Cypriots are concerned, international treaties. “land for peace” should be the motto for Turkey, which should 9. It would also entail a show readiness to accept such commitment to withdraw, under arrangements that would allow agreed upon arrangements and the return of substantial num- incentives, a substantial number bers of Greek Cypriot refugees to of Turkish citizens who have their homes and lands. Linking settled in the northern part of the issues of “territory” and Cyprus, the presence of whom “property” we might set a on the island dramatically upsets balancing rule whereby the more demographic structures, while the land to be returned under constituting a burden on cultural Greek Cypriot administration, the identities and social stability. higher the percentage of Turkish 10. Turkey should show readiness to Cypriot land ownership in the reconsider the 1960 guarantees, Turkish Cypriot constituent state. in the light of the European 7. With regard to the security issue, framework and of Greek Cypriot the Turkish government should concerns at the possibility of show readiness to accept such unilateral intervention. arrangements that would 11. In the face of the disquietingly address the “double minority slow pace of the Cyprus peace concerns” in Cyprus, that is, the talks between the two leaders, Turkish Cypriot concern for being Erdoğan might bring back his a minority in Cyprus and the proposal for broadening the Greek Cypriot concern for being negotiation procedure (with the participation of Turkey, Greece, 7 Cyprus Academic Dialogue is a bicommunal forum and the EU). Having pronounced established in 2010 by Greek and Turkish Cypriot the measures noted above and academics and intellectuals. Its Property Proposals were submitted to party leaders of the two having thus established the GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT) communities and the negotiators as well as the UN necessary trust, he might help and the EU representatives in Cyprus before being

released to the press last February. settle stalled issues on the spot

9 9 THE TURKISH INTERNAL REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT | CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS in unison with the two back to simplistic reflexive attitudes community leaders, the UN and according to which “Turkish the EU. The spillover effect of intransigence” was behind the such a statesmanlike initiative is deadlock. Failure of the leaders to so self-evident that it does not deliver played the fiddle of need to be elaborated on. nationalism, a new brand of Cypro- centric ethnic nationalism which emerged with Tassos Papadopoulos and makes its come-backs whenever Concluding Remarks solution perspectives fade out. This Considering the current negative is why a Turkish positive initiative political atmosphere in large that might bring back hope might segments of the Greek Cypriot turn things upside down in the community, one might retort: “Well, Greek Cypriot community and make why should Turkey take all these its leadership reciprocate. steps while there is little or no Concluding, I feel the need to point chance of Greek Cypriot recipro- out that Greek Cypriots have to cation?” become aware that they will never The answer is: reach solution in an open “There is”. confrontationist antagonism with Those Greek […] Greek Cypriots have to Turkey, or with Cypriots who are become aware that they will public lecturing on now refusing basic never reach solution in an open justice confined to power-sharing confrontationist antagonism internal audiences, with Turkey, or with public principles and are or even with insisting on lecturing on justice confined to recourses to inter- absolute legalistic internal audiences, or even with national legal fo- approaches on the recourses to international legal rums, a practice issues of governan- forums, a practice that has that has already ce, property, and already backtracked. backtracked. the settlers, are among those who overwhelmingly A conciliatory gesture by the endorsed Christofias’ handlings of Erdoğan government, at this the peace talks as long as those talks particular juncture, will pass the kept the solution prospect alive. message to the Greek Cypriots that Failure of Christofias and Talat to they can reach a settlement by deliver, regardless of who was to coming to an understanding with blame, pushed large segments of a Turkey through direct dialogue in a GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT) desperate Greek Cypriot community broadened negotiating procedure,

10 10 THE TURKISH INTERNAL REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT | CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS It is high time Cyprus got reconciled with its Geography; certainly not through submission to the dominant power of the region; but through a balanced cooperation based on mutual benefits, and through safeguarding to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots the conditions to live peacefully as autonomous

historical and cultural entities.

The European framework, within which Cyprus has already been functioning and towards which Turkey is aspiring, provides all necessary guarantees of such safeguards.

CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS

Chrysostomos Pericleous is the author of the book “The Cyprus Referendum: A Divided Island and the Challenge of the Annan Plan”,

I.B.Tauris, 2009 (recently published in Turkish as “Kıbrıs: Tarihsel Süreçten Referandumuna”, by Galeri Kültür Yayınları, Lefkoşa, Kıbrıs).

The opinions and conclusion expressed herein are those of the individual author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of GPoT or Istanbul Kültür University. GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER (GPoT)

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