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Hungarian Foreign Policy During the Cold of the Cominform, and Because of the Stalin-Tito War Rift

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Hungarian Foreign Policy During the Cold of the Cominform, and Because of the Stalin-Tito War Rift Eric Roman. Hungary and the Victor Powers, 1945-1950. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. x + 342 pp. $49.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-312-15891-0. Reviewed by Peter Pastor Published on HABSBURG (July, 1996) Hungarian Foreign Policy during the Cold of the Cominform, and because of the Stalin-Tito War rift. The end of communism in Eastern Europe Roman's conclusion may be considered radi‐ and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union cal when contrasted with the once-popular Hugh provided the opportunity for scholars to examine Seton-Watson interpretation, written in 1965, that hitherto unavailable documents. These were ex‐ Stalin had the same blueprint for the takeover of pected to become sources for new interpretations the various states of Eastern Europe. Roman's as‐ on such a major historical issues as the Cold War. sertions, however, tend to reinforce the conclu‐ Until now, however, the archives revealed no star‐ sions of Charles Gati's award-winning 1986 mono‐ tling secrets; they merely confirmed earlier con‐ graph, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc. Where he of‐ clusions that had been based on less complete pri‐ fers new interpretations--such as the view that mary evidence. At best, recent publications sup‐ "Stalin, so frm in his policies toward other satel‐ ported by new archival resources deviate from lite states, seemed unable to make up his mind pre-1990 interpretations in nuance only.[1] how to treat the hard-nosed Hungarians (p. 140)"-- Eric Roman's monograph is a case in point for he is not always supported by the evidence. the above observation. His examination of the In his book, Gati termed Hungary's short- Hungarian archives led him to the conclusion that lived sovereignty "the Polish trade-off." Stalin fa‐ during the frst three years following the war, vored such a policy to keep on good terms with Hungary was allowed to conduct an independent the Allies. He also expected that his Hungarian foreign policy (p. 140) and that the Soviet Union clones would delay bringing about about a Com‐ "exerted very little influence" even on internal af‐ munist system for as long as "fifteen to twenty fairs (p. 305). From 1947 to 1950, Hungary lost its years."[2] American and Yugoslav foreign policy sovereignty to the Soviet Union because of the developments merely accelerated this trend. For Truman Doctrine, which led to the establishment Roman, however, the task of the Hungarian Com‐ H-Net Reviews munist Party was "not to be the vanguard of sovi‐ Rakosi, Molotov accused the Stalinist Rakosi of etization, but merely to act as a break on the im‐ seeking a separate deal with the Americans. Hege‐ pulse for a western orientation" (p. 197). dus expected that, in the well-established tradi‐ Surprisingly, Gati's book escaped Roman's at‐ tion of purge scripts, the trumped-up charge tention. He never refers to it, and it does not even would be tied to Rakosi's 1946 American visit.[4] appear in his short bibliography. It is unfortunate, While the non-existent part of Molotov's charge as the weakness of Hungary and the Victor Pow‐ may support Roman's thesis that the Hungarians ers is that Roman seems a bit confused about So‐ conducted an independent foreign policy, regard‐ viet foreign policy-making for Eastern Europe. less of Soviet approbation, Rakosi's letter to Stalin This process is masterfully described by Gati. Ro‐ on the American visit contradicts this. The letter man uses only published document collections, indicates that this Hungarian disciple was very memoirs, and excellent secondary sources to eager to show how useful his visit was for Hun‐ trace American and British policy. He did not con‐ garian Communist interests--and for the Soviet sult the Russian archives, although the Soviet Union. He even hinted to Stalin that a Hungarian- Union was the major player in the region where, American contact could be approached for some as Roman points out, the United States had "only atomic secrets.[5] [a] commercial, not political interest" (p. 169). One must also remember that Stalin was al‐ For Hungary, memoir literature is mostly ways suspicious of Communist leaders who were overlooked, although after 1989 much has been successful negotiators in the West. For example, published. Those sources could have clarified the following Molotov's visit to Washington and San meaning of many of the Hungarian archival docu‐ Francisco, Stalin was ready to assume that the So‐ ments Roman utilizes. A crucial source publica‐ viet foreign minister had become an American tion that should have been consulted is a collec‐ spy.[6] In understanding Stalin's attitudes toward tion of documents from the Russian archives, Rakosi, Zoltan Vas's observation may be correct which detail the Hungarian Communists' ties to that Stalin never liked Rakosi, for he always tried Moscow.[3] This volume could, among others to impress the Soviet dictator with his brilliance. things, have clarified the Russian reaction to the Stalin never appreciated people who seemed to be participation of Matyas Rakosi, the Hungarian more knowledgeable than he was.[7] Communist leader, in the Hungarian government The minutes of the Molotov-Rakosi meeting delegation's official visit to the United States in during the latter's visit to Moscow at the end of June 1946. Roman claims that, according to a 1953 April 1947, could also have given Roman pause in statement of Molotov, Stalin was angry with his assumption that the Kremlin did not under‐ Rakosi because he joined the delegation (p. 139). write the politics of the Hungarian Communists. Though it is true that Stalin was unhappy with At this meeting--not mentioned by Roman--Rakosi Rakosi, Molotov said nothing of that sort in 1953. expressed his concern with the post-peace treaty In fact Roman's secondary source for the alleged possibility of the Soviet army's leaving Hungary. Molotov statement makes no such statement. Rakosi's mind, however, was put at ease that it Roman's secondary source is the memoirs of would not happen. This gave the Hungarian Com‐ the then Political Committee (Politburo) member munists the opportunity for the complete destruc‐ Andras Hegedus, who was with Rakosi when tion of the Smallholders, the dominant party in Molotov attacked him. In his memoirs Hegedus the coalition. wrote that after Stalin's death, when the Russian In Moscow, Molotov also berated the Hungari‐ leaders began to favor Imre Nagy instead of an Communists for not forming a multi-party vot‐ 2 H-Net Reviews ing bloc in 1945, which could have prevented the It is also imprecise to call the Comecon Stalin's Smallholders from dominating government poli‐ Marshall Plan (p. 244). The Churchill-Stalin Per‐ tics. Rakosi was forced to admit the mistake,[8] centages Agreement was made in 1944 and not in and upon his return from Moscow, the Commu‐ 1943. Moreover, at the fateful meeting the 50-50 nists implicated the Smallholder Prime Minister deal of British- Soviet influence over Hungary (p. Ferenc Nagy in a trumped-up conspiracy whose 26) was honed down by Molotov to a 20 percent earlier victim was Bela Kovacs. The Smallholders' British and 80 percent Soviet arrangement.[9] general secretary was arrested by the Red Army With this agreement, the British "resigned them‐ police on January 25, 1947, and was taken to the selves to the status of bystanders in Hungary, the Soviet Union where he was imprisoned for eight most anglophile nation of all of East Central Eu‐ years. Perhaps it is because of Roman's uncritical rope."[10] reliance on archival documents of the Commu‐ Electronic typesetting has also played its dev‐ nist-controlled Ministry of Internal Affairs that he ilish trick, as "Soviet" is spelled with lower case takes the so-called Kovacs-Nagy conspiracy seri‐ letters throughout the book. ously, believing that certain aspects of it had Roman's monograph is a welcome addition to "some foundation in fact" (p. 167). Cold War history, though its importance is tem‐ Hungary's relations with another victor na‐ pered by overambitious claims not sufficiently tion, Czechoslovakia, also form an important part substantiated. of the book. Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations Notes went through serious strains because of the Czechoslovak government's determination to con‐ [1]. Melvyn P. Leffler, "Inside Enemy Archives: duct "ethnic cleansing" among the Hungarians liv‐ The Cold War Reopened," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 ing on territories given to Czechoslovakia by the (July/August 1996): 121-22; John Lewis Gaddis, victors in the 1920 Peace Treaty of Trianon. Presi‐ "The Tragedy of Cold War History," Foreign Affairs dent Benes' infamous 1945 decree, which labeled 73, no. 1 (January/February 1994): 142-54. In this the Hungarians traitors and stripped them of essay Gaddis noted: "First, archives are important, Czechoslovak citizenship, was to be the justifica‐ even if all they do is confirm old arguments (p. tion for mass expulsion. This was prevented by 147)." the Western Allies, but Hungary had to accept an [2]. Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc unfavorable, scaled-down population exchange. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), pp. 5 and Soviet responsibility for the outcome is well 21. described. It is surprising, however, that Roman [3]. Lajos Izsak and Miklos Kun, eds., Moszk‐ accepts at face value the claim that Stalin support‐ vanak jelentjuk ... Titko dokumentumok 1944-1948 ed Czechoslovakia--and Romania--in territorial (Budapest, 1994). disputes with Hungary because Horthy's treacher‐ [4]. Janos Nemes, Rakosi Matyas szuletesnap‐ ous behavior cost the lives of hundreds of thou‐ ja (Budapest, 1988), p. 112; Andras Hegedus, A sands of soldiers (p. 130). In fact Stalin used Hun‐ tortenelem es a hatalom igezeteben_ (Budapest, garian lands to compensate Czechoslovakia and 1988), pp.
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