Mark R. Anderson. The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony: America's War of Liberation in Canada, 1774-1776. Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2013. 460 pp. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-1-61168-497-1.

Reviewed by Jon Ault

Published on H-War (June, 2018)

Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University)

Frequently throughout its history, the United ton at the time) under the command of Colonel States has sent military and diplomatic personnel met with remarkable initial suc‐ abroad to wage what its leaders perceived to be cess in late 1775. However, overestimation of wars of liberation, seeking to assist other peoples Canadian commitment, inadequate political guid‐ in throwing of the yokes of oppressive regimes. ance from Congress, and poor military planning Born of good intentions, and of ascribing Ameri‐ ultimately doomed the enterprise. can political values to other nations, these eforts Anderson contends that the root cause of the have, on many occasions, encountered difculties failure lay in the political and diplomatic realm. due to diferences in culture, language, religion, To begin with, Canadians bristling at the provi‐ and other factors. Mark R. Anderson, who was sions of Britain’s of 1774 (by which himself involved in such recent eforts in Quebec Province would be governed by a “hybrid Afghanistan and Iraq, discerns these patterns in of French civil law and English criminal law” with what he considers to be America’s frst war of lib‐ no elected assembly [p. 39]) lacked a widespread eration, the abortive invasion of Quebec Province communications network akin to the Committees early in the Revolutionary War. Seeing parallels of Correspondence, which galvanized the resis‐ between resistance to Parliament’s colonial mea‐ tance movement in the colonies to the south. In‐ sures in Quebec and in the in the stead, they operated in relatively isolated cells early 1770s, members of the and “did not make the slightest step toward coor‐ optimistically envisioned the French and British dinated political action” (p. 350). Separating these settlers to the north joining them in common small groups of patriots was a population either cause. As war clouds loomed in 1775, American steadfastly loyal to the Crown or of dubious and congressional and military leaders also saw the often shifting allegiances (as was frequently the importance of securing an alliance with Quebec to case in the lower thirteen colonies). Many Canadi‐ bolster the colonies’ northern defenses. A bold, an merchants, economically dependent on trade two-pronged invasion by the Northern Depart‐ with Britain, balked at joining the lower colonies’ ment Army under General embargo against the and by a contingent of General George Washing‐ mother country: “Isolated from other colonies and ton’s fedgling (besieging Bos‐ less self-sufcient as a province, a lost fur-trade H-Net Reviews and wheat-marketing season would be economi‐ tered the city of Trois-Rivières, located roughly cally devastating” (p. 351). Although Canadian pa‐ halfway between the cities of Montreal and Que‐ triots fought alongside and supplied the American bec, from February to April 1776.) armies throughout the campaign, they remained Finally, faulty military planning also sabo‐ a distinct minority. taged the American efort. As the battered Ameri‐ Compounding this problem was a lack of po‐ can army retreated back into in late litical direction from the Continental Congress, June and early July 1776, Congress began an in‐ despite the repeated urgings of Montgomery and vestigation into the causes of the failure, “with General Philip Schuyler, then in command of the members distracted by other important tasks Northern Army. Though American political and such as declaring independence.” Not surprising‐ military leaders made some commendable eforts ly, the preliminary report did not address con‐ to win the hearts and minds of the Canadian pop‐ gressional neglect but rather blamed the Conti‐ ulace, including translating ofcial messages into nental Army on three counts: “short enlistment French, fnancially compensating patriot Canadi‐ terms of the Continental troops,” which forced ans for supplies used by the invading armies, and commanders “into measures which their pru‐ reassuring French Catholics that their religion dence might have postponed” before their sol‐ faced no threat, the Continental Congress failed to diers left for home (such as the unsuccessful at‐ help unify Canadian patriots or to assist them in tack on Quebec City on December 31, 1775, in forming a viable alternative government. Al‐ which Montgomery was killed and Arnold seri‐ though Philadelphia tasked two diferent civilian ously wounded in the leg); the lack of hard mon‐ committees to address these needs, the frst (sent ey; and the smallpox epidemic that ravaged the in November 1775) never ventured beyond north‐ ranks (p. 337). Interestingly, one might argue that ern New York, and the second (sent in April 1776) General Washington grappled with the same arrived as the American military position was col‐ problems. Anderson, however, perceives other lapsing. Consequently, administration of occupied military difculties. Montgomery launched his in‐ territory devolved upon Continental Army of‐ vasion of the Richelieu Valley while Congress was cers, already preoccupied with commanding a in recess, thereby guaranteeing that “the Conti‐ campaign and with little or no experience in civil‐ nental confederation would be politically, fnan‐ ian governance. For them, immediate military cially, and logistically behind from the start.” To and security needs often outweighed long-term add to the Northern Army’s difculties, Arnold’s socioeconomic concerns, causing tensions with epic march to Quebec “efectively forced Mont‐ the local population. Overseeing the city of Mon‐ gomery to operate on a 150-mile span of the St. treal for several months after Montgomery’s army Lawrence River, a massive chunk of territory that captured it in November 1775, General David the Northern Army was ill equipped to control Wooster instituted several controversial policies, and infuence under the best circumstances” (p. such as detaining and deporting known loyalists, 349). Anderson suggests that the campaign might and severely curtailing the business activities of have gone quite diferently had Montgomery fo‐ local fur traders. As the campaign became stale‐ cused on consolidating his gains and bolstering mated in the early months of 1776, depletion of defenses around Montreal, rather than advance to specie and endemic troop discipline problems, join Arnold in the ill-fated attempt to take the cap‐ particularly among newly arrived units, further ital city. soured relations. (As an interesting contrast, An‐ Anderson has given us a thorough and well- derson devotes a chapter to the harmonious ten‐ written account of a campaign that, as the frst ure of Captain William Goforth, who adminis‐

2 H-Net Reviews chapter of a major theme throughout American diplomatic and military history, deserves more than footnote status in Revolutionary War histori‐ ography. He provides a solid portrait of the Que‐ bec Province society that the Americans of the mid-1770s encountered and tried to infuence; succinctly recounts the army operations of the campaign; and deftly explains the political, mili‐ tary, and diplomatic difculties that ultimately doomed the attempt. As he states in his preface, he made a point of focusing his attention on the campaign itself, allowing his readers to reach their own conclusions about similarities and dif‐ ferences between this and subsequent “wars of liberation.” While I agree with Anderson that it is indeed a “rich Revolutionary War story” that de‐ serves to be the sole focus of this book (p. xi), it would also be interesting to read Anderson’s in‐ sights, derived from his studies and his career, about such similarities and diferences, and lessons learned and disregarded.

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Citation: Jon Ault. Review of Anderson, Mark R. The Battle for the Fourteenth Colony: America's War of Liberation in Canada, 1774-1776. H-War, H-Net Reviews. June, 2018.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=40802

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