A Shifting Political Tide

University of Amsterdam Faculty of Humanities, Department of History MA: History of International Relations

A shifting political tide

Thailand-Myanmar relations and the Karen Conflict 1988-1997

Supervisor R. van Dijk

Second reader R. van der Veen

MA Thesis by: R. Deckers 5879477 email: [email protected]

Amsterdam, 9th of July 2015

Preface

In February 2012 I bought a jacket at a local market store in the city of Hpa-An, Karen state, Myanmar. I did not realize what the flag on the jacket meant for millions of ethnic Karen. I asked the owner of my guesthouse. I had been reading up on Myanmar’s history, but what the owner said startled me. He told me about the war of the Karen National Union and the Burmese government. Since the Second World War fighting had never stopped in this region. I was not planning to go to Myanmar, but I am happy that I did back then. In September 2012 I started a Master’s degree History of International Relations. For one class I had to visit the website of the International Institute of Social History (IISH). To my surprise I came across several Myanmar related archives like the Burma Communist Party archive or the Burma Personal Papers collection. Finding the archives in the IISH really felt like an opportunity to do research on Myanmar. My time as an intern early 2014 at the Dutch Refugee Foundation or Stichting Vluchteling drew my attention to the refugee question in Thailand of which the causes lay inside Myanmar. In the second half of 2014 I decided to go on an exchange semester with the specific goal to follow courses on Myanmar history and related fields. It was at the National University of Singapore from August to December 2014 where the subject I would do research on took shape. After my study time in Singapore I had the chance to travel to both Thailand and Myanmar. Through the Dutch Refugee Foundation I was offered the opportunity to visit two refugee camps in Mae Hong Son province, in the north of Thailand close to the border with Myanmar in November 2014. Later that same week I visited Dr. Cynthia Maung’s clinic and the Back Packer Health Worker Team in Mae Sot, central-west Thailand. On the final day of that week I had a meeting with David Arnott, the creator of the largest online Myanmar archive, www.burmalibrary.org. Meeting Mr. Arnott and visiting the regufeecamps and different NGO’s was a learnful experience. Seeing how international aid was provided really felt like a final stage of my internship. But what caused all this? What lay at the root of these problems? And how can we solve it? Three years later this master thesis is the result of something that started in that market store in Hpa-an, the capital of Karen state. My internship at the Dutch Refugee Foundation provided me with much background information on the Karen conflict in Myanmar. In Singapore I met many Burmese and other professors who helped to shape my thoughts. My time in Singapore gave me a chance to visit refugee camps in Thailand and to meet with Eef Vermeij, the person who works for the IISH in Southeast Asia. He made sure I got permission to enter the archives of the Karen National Union. Upon return in the Netherlands I found the Burma Peace Foundation and the Karen National Union archives useful. Unfortunately time was against me and if ever given the chance I wish to extend this research and use all the sources found in the IISH at their fullest potential.

Index

Preface 3

Terminology 5

Introduction 6

Map 10

1. Thai-Burma Relations in Historical Perspective 11

1.1 The Karen 12 1.2 World War II and the rise of the Cold War in Southeast Asia 15

2. The End of the Cold War: Thai-Myanmar relations 1988-1997 19

2.1. 1988 and its aftermath 20 2.2. Thailand in the 1980’s 22 2.3 Thai-Myanmar trade: Logging, Oil, Gas and refugees 24

3. 1988-1997 and the Karen National Union 28

3.1 Thailand as a safehaven 29 3.2 Rising Pressure 31 3.3 Cross-border trade 34 3.4 The Karen Borderland 36

Conclusion 37

Archives 40

Bibliography 40

Terminology

Burma/Myanmar: In 1989 the military junta of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) renamed the country ‘Myanmar Naing-ngan’. Several other place names were changed too, for example ‘Rangoon’ has become ‘Yangon’ and ‘Tavoy’ has become ‘Dawei’. I use the old terms when I refer to the period before 1989. I use the new names when I refer to the period during or after 1989.

SLORC/Tatmadaw: Both terms refer to the military junta of Myanmar. The SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) forms the political branch of the same military institute. The SLORC are military men who turned to politics but who function as an instrument of the Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw is a Burmese name for the top officials of the Burmese military. In my thesis I use the two terms interchangeably.

The Karen/KNU: The Karen are Myanmar’s largest ethnic minority and the Karen National Union is their largest political and military organization. There are at least 10 other Karen organizations. The Karen are called the Kayin by the government of Myanmar

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Comparable to the European Union (EU)

BPF: Burma Peace Foundation. British Non-governmental Organization (NGO) which worked for the United Nations.

IISH: International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Nation-states: I have used the definition of Max Weber: A nation-state is a continuous legal administrative apparatus exercising control over a certain territory and holds the monopoly on the right of using violence.

Introduction

“From the late 1980s, Thai policy regarding its neighbors changed from one of surreptitiously undermining rivals and traditional enemies through supporting armed groups in the border areas to a strategy of directly engaging national governments.”1 During the Cold War the foreign policy of Thailand was based on creating buffer zones to protect Thailand’s borders. The largest minority group of Myanmar, known as the Karen, have been waging a war against the government of Myanmar since 1949 to gain independence or more autonomy. The Karen live mainly along the Thai-Myanmar border and thus the Karen have received support from the Thai government to act as a buffer.2 At the end of the 1980’s support from Thai authorities for the Karen’s armed struggle vanished.3 What caused this change? Why did Thailand diverge from its traditional foreign policy of using buffer zones? Why did Myanmar cooperate in the newly found bilateral relation? And secondly, how did this new relationship influence the development of the Karen Conflict? The armed struggle of the Karen is known as the longest civil war in the world. The conflict broke out in 1949 and has been raging on since 1949.4 From 1962 the Burmese military ruled the state of Burma and introduced ‘The Burmese Way to Socialism’. The next twenty-five years the economic situation of Myanmar5 worsened. The Karen, a group of 5 to 7 million people, profited from this situation by levying taxes. The Karen started controlling border posts between Thailand and Myanmar to levy taxes on products entering the black market trade of Myanmar from Thailand. In the 1980s the first Karen refugee camps sprang up on Thai soil. These refugee camps are known to have been used by Karen rebels to prepare for clashes with the Myanmar government.6 While Myanmar followed an economic policy based on Marxism, Thailand became an American base in the 1960s and gradually developed an economy based on capitalist principles. In the 1980s the Thai economy grew exponentially every year opposed to a worsening economic situation in Myanmar.7 Throughout the twentieth century contact between Thailand and Myanmar was minimal. By the 1980s Burma was one of the poorest states in the world. The capitalist urge of Thailand’s elite to make use of the extraordinary rich resources of Myanmar combined with the Myanmarese government financial bankruptcy moved the elites of both states to establish relations in 1988, which pushed the Karen in a difficult position. The struggle for power between the USA and the Soviet Union influenced the Southeast Asian region deeply. Thailand became an American military base to fight communists in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Thailand thus came in the American sphere of influence and capitalism became the accepted system of the economy. Burma followed a neutralist policy internationally, however foreign relations were established with communist China. For this

1 South, A., “Burma’s Longest War. Anatomy of the Karen Conflict.” Transnationale Institute/Burma Center Netherlands, (Amsterdam, 2011) pp. 1-53, p. 20. 2 South, A., “Burma Longest War. Anatomy of the Karen Conflict.” Transnational Institute/Burma Center Netherlands, (Amsterdam, 2011), pp.1-53, p. 20. 3 South, “Burma’s longest war.”, p. 20 and 34 and A. Rajah, “Contemporary Developments in Kawthoolei: The Karen and Conflict Resolution in Burma.” Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter 19, 1992, (http://www.nectec.or.th/thai- yunnan/19.html#3) and J. Brouwer & J. van Wijk “Helping Hands: external support for the KNU insurgency in Burma.” In: Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 835-856, p. 840. 4 Nijhuis, M., Birma. Land van geheimen. (Amsterdam, 2009), p. 21. 5 The Burmese government renamed the country ‘Myanmar’ in 1988. When I use the term ‘Burma’ I thereby refer to the country before 1988. When I use the term ‘Myanmar’ I refer to the country after 1988. When using ‘Burmese’ I refer to the largest ethnic group of Myanmar, the Burmans. 6 Brouwer, J. & J. van Wijk “Helping Hands: external support for the KNU insurgency in Burma.” In: Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 835-856, p. 836. 7 Battersby, P., “Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s international Relations in the 1990s: From Communism to Capitalism.” In: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 71, no. 4, 1988-1989, pp. 473-488, p. 475-479.

6 research I will use this struggle for power between these two ideologies as a basic frame to explain why the foreign policies of Thailand and Myanmar suddenly changed in 1988. The state is an instrument of analysis I will be using to conduct this research. An important concept I will use is proposed by Baud & van Schendel.8 Their theory refers to how nations without states living in borderlands can profit from their position which is generally perceived as fragile. Borderland nations or tribes can use this perception to their benefit because they can communicate between elites on both sides of the border. The Karen are an example of a borderland people which has profited from their position in a border region. Baud & van Schendel define a border as a political construct. Baud & van Schendel use Anderson’s concept of a nation to explain certain historical developments.9 In 1988 Thailand and Myanmar established political and economic ties. This relations was further developed throughout the 1990s. The membership of Myanmar to Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 brought an end to Myanmar’s isolationism. In 1988 Myanmar had to cope with high inflation and a large foreign debt. Large protests broke out in the country against the regime in August 1988. In December 1988 Thai General Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh visited Rangoon to meet the Burmese generals.10 This was the start in new diplomatic relations between Thailand and Myanmar. This relationship would lead to lucrative trading deals between the two Southeast Asian nation states. Within a year the military regime of Myanmar possessed a 100 million dollars.11 The breaking of the status-quo between Thailand and Myanmar had a lasting effect on the armed struggle of the Karen. Without the permission of Thai authorities to use their soil to rest, reorganize and buy arms the Karen were forced into a burdensome position. The trading deals with Thailand gave the military junta of Myanmar also known as the Tatmadaw the financial means to buy Chinese weaponry and start an all year round offence against the Karen.12 A final step for Myanmar to step out of decades of isolationism was to become a member of the ASEAN which opened political and economic relations with all member states. Furthermore the downfall in November 1997 of then Prime Minister of Thailand, former general Chaovalit, introduced a new phase in Thai-Myanmar relations.13 I will therefore focus on the period between 1988 and 1997. For this research I have used two archives, both can be found in the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. The first is the Burma Peace Foundation (BPF) archive and the second is the Karen National Union (KNU) archive. To my knowledge the latter has barely been used for research. The Burma Peace Foundation was an NGO which tried to gather as much information as possible as to what was happening inside Myanmar from 1987 to 2010. Especially fighting for the rights of ethnic minorities in Myanmar at international institutes like the United Nations, the Burma Peace Foundation archive contains a lot of information about the development of the Karen conflict and Thai-Myanmar relations. This information is found in newspaper articles, NGO reports, academic reports, magazines and journals like Burma Issues. This three monthly issued magazine wrote about many different subjects related to Myanmar. Economics, politics and refuge policies were the central themes. The Karen National Union or KNU is the main political and military organization of the Karen, who have been fighting for

8 Baud, M. & Schendel, W. van, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.” In: Journal of World History, Vol. 8, no. 2, 1997, pp. 211 -241. 9 Anderson, B., Imagined Communities. The Origins of Nationalism. (London, 1991), p. 14. 10 Chachavalpongpun, P., A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thai-ness in Thai-Burmese Relations. (Lanham, 2005), p. 67. 11 Myint-U, Thant, The River of Lost Footstops. Histories of Burma. (New York, 2006), p. 328. 12 South, “Burma’s longest war.”, p. 20. 13 Chachavalpongpun, P., A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thai-ness in Thai-Burmese Relations. (Lanham, 2005), p. 76.

7 independence from 1949 to 1974 and later fought for more autonomy within Burma.14 This archive contains similar material as the BPF archive, but it contains more information on the KNU’s armed struggle and its financial income through the illegal border trade. Especially important is the KNU bulletin, issued every four months from the 1970s onwards. The KNU bulletin reports about the military and political activities of the KNU. The archive contains information on a wide variety of subjects by many different people and institutions. Locating specific information is easy because the bulletin is ordered by theme. The KNU archive is very interesting for research on the organization itself. The KNU archive contains information on the history of the KNU, the people running the organization, its armed struggle and how and by whom certain policies developed overtime. The one sided perspective forms a disadvantage of the KNU archive. Furthermore most of the material is written in Burmese or Karen script and thus it is only accessible for those who have mastered these languages. Both archives contain detailed information waiting to be discovered. The existing literature tends to focus on either the history of Thailand (Chachavalpongpun) or the history of Myanmar (Callahan, Mint-U). Some studies do look at the relationship between Thailand and Myanmar (Kramer), but do not study the borderland as a single unit and do not focus on the Karen. Other studies specifically look at the refugee history and politics of the border region (Lang). My research specifically looks at the relationship between Thailand and Myanmar and how this influenced the struggle of the Karen National Union. The archives consulted provided me with detailed information not found in the existing literature. The Karen region is divided by the border running between Myanmar and Thailand. In this research the Karen region is studied as a single unit of analysis. Most studies use the state as a framework for analysis. The social scientists Baud & van Schendel argue to use a cross- border perspective, in which the region on both sides of the border is the unit for analysis. Thus a borderland is made up from two parts across one border in a single borderland. It is important to treat the borderland as one unit, because changes in one part of the borderland lead to immediate adaptations on the other side.15 According to Baud & van Schendel national borders are political constructs, they are imagined projections of territorial power. In this respect the border is the ultimate symbol of a state’s sovereignty.16 It is important to look at both sides of the Thai-Myanmar border, since the KNU and more generally the Karen people have used Thailand as a safe haven for decades. In this respect this research differs from the existing literature produced by historians and political scientists. For Myanmar’s neighbors her geographical location is very important. Both China, India and the ASEAN are trying to gain influence in the country. Myanmar is one of the richest countries in Asia with large oil, gas, teak reserves and gem mines. Myanmar’s membership of ASEAN puts the country into this Southeast Asian economic bloc. China wants to use Myanmar as her backdoor by building gas and oil pipelines from the port of Sittwe to Yunnan, thus avoiding the vulnerable bottleneck of the Malacca Strait through which 90% of China’s oil is transported.17 Myanmar’s historical legacy may influence the developments in this strategic region in the twenty-first century. It is therefore important to understand Myanmar’s history. This study tries to clarify why the bilateral relationship between Thailand and Myanmar changed overnight and what the consequences were for the Karen conflict. Little research has

14 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 22. 15 Baud, M. & Schendel, W. van, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.” In: Journal of World History, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1997, pp. 211 -242, p. 231. 16 Baud & van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.”, p. 211 and 226. 17 Battersby, P., “Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s international Relations in the 1990s: From Communism to Capitalism.” In: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 71, no. 4, 1988-1989, pp. 473-488, p. 477.

8 been done on this subject of Thai-Burmese relations and its effect on the Karen conflict. The influence of international and local developments between 1988 and 1997 analyzed here will shed light on contemporary decisions and developments in Thailand and in Myanmar. Some studies do analyze Thai-Myanmar ties in the same period, but they lack an analysis of the economic ties which developed over time. The economically motivated new relationship especially affected the border region and therefore the insurgency of the KNU.

Map of Myanmar

http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/myanmar_map2.htm

1. Thai-Burma Relations in Historical Perspective

The most prominent physical features of the present day territory of Thailand and Myanmar are the North-South river valleys. Originating in the Himalayas the rivers have shaped migrant waves for centuries. Different linguistics groups like the Karen, the Burmese and the T’ai came down from present day China along these rivers and have settled on both sides of the border.18 The proto nations states of modern Thailand and Myanmar waged war against each other from the sixteenth century onwards. Burmese kings Tabinshweti (1530-1550) and Bayinnaung (1550-1581) both attacked the kingdom of Siam, the former name of Thailand. Throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the two kingdoms wanted to extend their power across the Dawna range and Tenasserim hills, today still these mountains form the border between Thailand and Myanmar. The most notable battle of this rivalry was the ransacking of Siam’s capital Ayudhaya in 1767 by the Burmese king Hsinbyushin (1766-1776). Ayudhaya’s splendor was greater than any city in Burma at the time.19 While in Myanmar Hsinbyushin is revered as a legendary Burmese king, in Thailand the destruction of the beautiful royal city Ayudhaya is still remembered in dance, theatre and songs. After the destruction of Ayudhaya the Siamese had to endure other Burmese attacks in 1774, 1775, 1785. The last Burmese invading force entered Siam in 1810.20 From that time the Burmese kingdom was threatened by another force, the British East India Company. In the early modern aged Thai- Burma relations were predominantly characterized by war. The Thai and Burmese historically have perceived each other as the traditional enemy. Thai governments up to 1988 have invented and reinvented Burma as the personification of the historical enemy. Thainess was defined by creating an enemy ‘other’, Thainess was defined by what it is not: Burmese.21 The British brought a change in the relations between the Burmese and Siamese kingdoms. Driven by forces of the Industrial Revolution, the British were drawn into Burma. The British East India Company operations in Manipur and Assam (East-India) were threatened by attacks of Burmese armies.22 In three wars the British defeated the Burmese kingdom and by 1886 had taken full control of the territory known today as Myanmar. In each Anglo-Burmese war the British used the Karen for guidance and military support.23 The British were looking for an ally in to them unknown territory.24 The British divide-and-rule tactics relied on ancient antagonism between the Karens and the Burmans.25 Karen groups lacking a privileged social and economic status in nineteenth century Burma saw it as an opportunity to align oneself with the British to improve their socio-economic status.26 Accordingly throughout the 19th century a

18 Silverstein, J., “Some thoughts on Burma-Thai Relations”, In: Legal Issues on Burma Journal, no. 6, September 2000, pp. 1-14, p. 1. 19 Mint-U, T., The River of Lost Footsteps. Histories of Burma. (New York 2006) p. 98-99. 20 Kramer, T., Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993. PhD, University of Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 1-122, p. 15. 21 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 33, 57-59, 65, 84 and 135. Chachavalpongpun refers to Edward Said’s concept of ‘Other’, as explained in his book Orientalism (London, 1978). 22 Callahan, M.P., “Myanmar’s Perpetual Junta. Solving the Riddle of the Tatmadaw’s Long Reign.” In: New Left Review 60, Nov/Dec 2009, p. 32. 23 Aung-Thwin, M. and M. Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar since ancient times. Traditions and Transformations. (London, 2013). For the role of Karen in each Anglo-Burmese war in chronological order see p. 180, 184 and 191-192 and M. Gravers, "The Karen Making of a Nation." in: Asian Forms of the Nation, Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlöv, eds. (Surrey, 1996), pp. 237-269, p. 245. 24 Christie, Clive J., “Anatomy of a Betrayal: The Karens of Burma.” In: I.B. Tauris (Eds.), A Modern History of Southeast Asia. Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism (London, 2000), pp. 54 – 80. 25 Harriden, J., “Making a name for themselves: “Karen identity and the politization of ethnicity in Burma”, in: The Journal of Burma Studies, vol. 7, 2002, pp. 84-144, p. 98 – 99. 26 Aung-thwin M. & M. Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar since ancient times. Traditions and Transformations. (London, 2013), p. 192 and 194.

11 loyalist relationship developed between these groups of Karen speakers and the British.27 British colonial rule brought unprecedented changes to Burmese society. Traditional social systems disappeared and the Burmese economy was changed to produce. The British and other foreign companies were the largest benefiters of this change. Thailand managed to maintain its sovereignty during the colonial and imperialistic period, although a large share of its export was controlled by British companies. From 1886 to 1948 Thailand communicated and dealt with the new power on her border, the British-Indian colonial administration.28 It was the Karen who had been living on both sides of this border for centuries.

1.1 The Karen

The Karen conflict is of great importance to understand Thai-Myanmar relations in the Cold War era.29 The Karen are the largest ethnic minority in Myanmar constituting around 5 to 7 million people. Around 300.000 Karen live in Thailand.30 The alignment of certain Karen groups with the British colonizer caused the development of Karen nationalism. In 1947 the Karen National Union or KNU was established and in 1949 an armed struggle between the KNU and the Burmese state broke out. Thailand used the KNU as a buffer against the Burmese state and to prevent Burmese and Thai communists from collaborating. The Karen were among the first people to be Christianized by American and British missionaries. The British colonial administration preferred Karen in the colonial administration over ethnic Burmese. This process had huge implications for the future of Burma. As soon as Burma gained independence ethnic tension erupted into civil war. The Karen were banned from states institutions like the army. Soon the Karen took up arms to fight for independence or more autonomy within the newly independent Burma. But who are these Karen? Why where they preferred by the British colonial administration over the Burmans? The Karen emigrated to Burma from what today is known as Mongolia around 500 BCE.31 Since their arrival the Karen dispersed over different territories nowadays found in Myanmar and Thailand. Karen communities developed distinctly communal characteristics overtime within Myanmar and Thailand. The Karen constitute a population of 5 to 7 million and speak about twenty mutually unintelligible dialects, the two biggest subgroups being the Pwo and Sgaw. The Pwo speaking Karen constitute around 80% of the Karen population and they are mainly Buddhist.32 Around 15% is Christian and the remaining Karen are either animist or Muslim. About three million Karen live in the Ayeyarwaddy river delta and have developed an urbanized society based on the agriculture of rice. The Karen living in Burma’s eastern hills bordering Thailand developed their own distinct society and history. The hill Karen generally speak Sgaw, their communities traditionally based on a subsistence way of life.33 Karen communities are religiously, linguistically, culturally separated and geographically dispersed. The majority of the Karen never supported an armed conflict and have never affiliated with the

27 Christie, Clive J., “Anatomy of a Betrayal: The Karens of Burma.” In: I.B. Tauris (Eds.), A Modern History of Southeast Asia. Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism (London, 2000), pp. 54 – 80, p. 62. 28 Kramer, T., Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993. PhD, University of Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 1-122, p. 15. 29 Callahan, M., Making Enemies. War and state building in Burma. (Ithaca/London 2003), p. 23. 30 Burma Peace Foundation archive, inventory number ARCH02962 box 4, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. (Onwards referred to as BPF archive, inv. No., …. , IISH, Amsterdam.) 31 Worland, Shirley L., "Displaced and misplaced or just displaced: Christian Displaced Karen Identity after Sixty Years of War in Burma" PhD. Philosophy at The University of Queensland, March 2010, p.8 32 Thawnghmung, A. Maung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends. (Washington, 2008) p. 3. 33 Christie, Clive J., “Anatomy of a Betrayal: The Karens of Burma.” In: I.B. Tauris (Eds.), A Modern History of Southeast Asia. Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism (pp. 54-80). London, England, 2000, p. 53.

12 armed struggle of the KNU-KNLA.34 The term Karen hardly refers to a homogenous group, as is illustrated by the following quote: “No matter whether a Karen lives in the mountains or in the plains, whether animist, Buddhist, Christian or otherwise, whether from whatsoever tribe, Sgaw, or Pwo, Red or Black Karen – A KAREN IS A KAREN: one in blood brotherhood, one in sentiment, one in adversity and one mass of a Karen nationhood.”35 Some scholars have claimed that the Karen do not exist and that at least five different ‘Karen’ identities can be recognized.36 The Karen lived and still live along the Thai-Myanmar border and have played a pivotal role between the civilizations of the Ayeyarwaddy river valley (in present day Myanmar) and the Chao Praya river valley (in present day Thailand). Historically the Karen were used by armies of both sides as guides. The British continued this tradition for whom Burma was unknown territory at first. The Karen groups with low socio-economic position in nineteenth century Burma were the first people to be Christianized. The first missionary in Burma was Adoniram Judson of Malden, Massachusetts, who arrived by ship from New York in 1812 and spend the next four decades in Burma.37 In the 1820s and 1830s other American and later British missionaries started converting communities speaking Karen languages to Christianity. The Karen already had their own stories of a great flood and of a woman being created from the rib of a man. They even had a tradition that messengers from across the sea would one day bring “the lost book”. These stories proved to be a perfect opening to European missionaries.38 The missionaries soon found out that Sgaw Karen speakers were easier to convert than Pwo speakers. The latter group had recently converted to Buddhism.39 American missionaries started searching for the origin of the Karen speakers and slowly constructed a pan-Karen identity through writing ‘the Karen’ history. The Karen were ascribed to be the first people to have arrived in Burma, a claim the KNU still uses in negotiations with the government of Myanmar. British colonial officers copied the historical narrative constructed by American missionaries. Christian missionaries helped modernize the Karen script, translated the Bible into Pwo and Sgaw Karen and established the first Karen journal, all before 1900. In the latter half of the nineteenth century Christian Karen were taught how to read and write and many learned English.40 In 1875 the Baptist College was erected in Rangoon, which soon got the nickname ‘Karen College’.41 Karen from the eastern hills made ‘pilgrimages’ to these newly erected educational institutes in urban centers of Burma. 42 Another instrument of the British colonial administration which formed an ethnic identity known today as ‘Karen’ was census taking. The British census taking has been an important factor contributing to elevating the Karen from an ethnic minority to a ‘nation’. In the first census taking of 1872 the British colonial administration recognized a separate Karen category.

34 South, “Burma’s Longest war.”, p. 24 - 25 and A. Maung Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends. Washington: East – West Center, 2008. 35 Christie, “Anatomy of a Betrayal”, p. 80. 36 Harriden, “Making a name for themselves”, p. 90. Harriden refers here to the article: Peter Hinton, "Do the Karen really exist?" in: J. McKinnon and W. Bhruksasri (eds.), Highlanders of Thailand (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 155 – 168 and Christie, “Anatomy of a Betrayal”, p. 54. 37 Mint-U, The River, p. 210. 38 Ibidem. 39 Harriden, “Making a name for themselves”, p. 88. 40 Callahan, M., Making Enemies. War and State building in Burma. (London/Ithaca 2003), p. 34 and M. Gravers, "The Karen Making of a Nation." in: Asian Forms of the Nation, Tonnesson and Antlöv, eds. (Surrey, 1996), p. 249. 41 Harriden, “Making a name for themselves”, p. 96 – 97. 42 Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London/New York, 1991). I refer to Andersons’ notion of ‘pilgrimages’. In this case the journey from the Karen hills to the capital Rangoon helped to create a Karen consciousness. Ch. 7 emphasizes the importance of census taking for creating an Imagined Community.

This particular census also indicated that ‘the Karen’ were the first to have arrived in Burma. This label and official recognition helped forge the claim of Karen that they had the right to create their own state.43 In the 1880’s Karen nationalism developed significantly fast. In 1881 The Karen National Association (KNA), the first Karen political organization was established. It aimed to represent all Karen. The KNA was led by Christian Karen speaking the Sgaw dialect. This organization developed into the KNU in 1947. After the third Anglo-Burmese war in 1886 Karen soldiers helped to control the new territories in central Burma and Christian Karen helped to crush an uprising in lower Burma. From 1886 large numbers of Karen were recruited into the army and military police.44 The preference of the Karen in Burma’s army can be clearly seen in 1941 just before the outbreak of the Second World War in Asia. Ethnic Burmans made up only 75.11% of the total population in Burma in 1941, while they only accounted for 23.7% of the total in the army. The Karen in the army constituted 35% while the Karen only represented 9.34% of the total population in Burma. This means that the recruitment of Karen was much higher than the recruitment of Burmans per head of the population.45 The low socio economic position of certain Karen groups and the British demand for an ally within Burma resulted in an alliance between the two. The groups of Karen who wanted to improve their socio-economic status did so by aligning themselves with the British and more generally with Western culture through Christianity. Christian Karen were being ‘advertised’ by American missionaries to be used in the colonial government. The reason for this was not only their Christian identity but also their knowledge of the English language. Most of the population in British Burma had no access to education, those people who did immediately gained access to the English language. It was this group of Karen who quickly developed into a new middle class. The knowledge of English helped these Karen to operate in the private and public sectors of the Burmese colony.46 Several developments ignited the development of Karen nationalism and were partly the cause of the outbreak of the Karen Conflict. The first process was the construction of the history of the Karen by missionaries. Another important process was the development of an independent Karen literature in the form of journals, newspapers and books. Concludingly many Karen gained access to English-Christian education. These developments contributed to the growth of a pan-Karen ‘national’ consciousness.47 However it must be emphasized that American missionaries operated predominantly among the hill tribes.48 ‘The Karen’ in the minds of the British and the American missionaries became a category which was seen to be anti-Burman, Christian, loyal to the British and from the mountainous region bordering Thailand. ‘The Karen’ therefore referred to by the British meant Christian Karen largely speaking the Sgaw dialect.49 The role of education and language are of great historical importance for the rise of a Karen identity and thus for the later outbreak of the Karen Conflict. The exceptionally well educated Karen elites soon acquired a taste to have an independent Karen state. 50 The Karen were imagined to be Christian and loyal to Britain. The Burmese nationalist

43 Gravers, "The Karen Making of a Nation.", p. 248 – 249 and Anderson, Imagined Communities. See chapter 7 for the importance of census taking. 44 Mint-U, The River, p. 211. 45 Callahan, Making Enemies, p. 42. 46 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 197 – 198. 47 Christie, “Anatomy of a Betrayal”, p. 54 – 55. 48 Brant, Charles S. and Mi Mi Khaing, “Missionaries among the Hill Tribes of Burma”, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 1, no. 1 March, 1961, pp. 44-51, p. 44. 49 Gravers, "The Karen Making of a Nation.", p. 245. 50 Pederson, D., Secret Genocide. Voices of the Karen in Burma. (Dunboyne, 2011), p. 24.

14 movement was anti-imperialist and Buddhist. The Burman came to be seen by the British as disloyal and treacherous. Once Burmese nationalists started demanding home rule from the 1920s onwards, Karen nationalist started demanding their own state. Karen believed they would never receive a fair treatment under the Burmese. Burman nationalism was on the rise and several Burman rebelllions broke out. These rebellions were put down by armed units of Karen.51 Before the outbreak of World War II the Karen nationalist movement was moving completely opposite of the Burmese nationalist movement.

1.2 World War II and the outbreak of the Karen Conflict

“The Burmese had nothing to do with the war, but it destroyed their country.”52

This quote applies to Thailand too. Both Burma and Thailand were destroyed after the Second World War. The Japanese had conquered Thailand and invaded Burma from Thailand on the 23rd of December 1941. The British quickly retreated to India, leaving Rangoon on the 7th of March 1942. On the 2nd of May 1942 the conquest of Burma by the Japanese was completed.53 Both the Burmese and Thai nationalists movement welcomed the Japanese, while the Karen and other ethnic minorities in Burma stayed loyal to the British.54 After the war Thailand made a relative smooth transition to peace and independence while Burma entered a phase of chaos. Up to that point there was little or no contact between the two states it was only under Japanese occupation that their history once again intertwined.55 Before the outbreak of World War II the Japanese financed the creation of the Burma Intelligence Army or BIA, led by Burmese nationalist Aung San. For the first time an indigenous Burmese army representing the majority of the population (70%) was created. The Karen and Mon minorities were favored by the British and were thus not to be trusted by the BIA.56 The BIA was an ethno-nationalist Burmese force, described by Burma expert Callahan as ‘a “school” in nation-ness’.57 Early in 1942 violence between the BIA and the Karen broke out. Karen soldiers who had fought for the colonial army were disarmed by the BIA. A group of Karen tried to ‘rescue’ the Karen in the village of Myaungmya from the BIA, because they believed the Karen trapped inside were in serious danger. The BIA discovered the plot and killed all partakers. Fearing more Karen treachery, the BIA killed hundreds of ethnic Karen in the Ayeyarwaddy river delta over the next weeks. The Karen retaliated by attacking Burmese villages which further boosted communal violence throughout the river delta. The Japanese army had to step in to quell the fighting.58 The events of World War II have strained Burmese-Karen relations deeply. For the first time since British occupation ethnic Burmans were allowed to form political and military institutes. During the war the Karen and other ethnic minorities like the Kachin stayed loyal to the British. Some British officers promised these minorities postwar autonomy. There was a strong sense among Karen war veterans that they at least deserved self-determination after the war.59 They fought jungle insurgencies for years and tried to undermine Japanese and hence Burmese operations in the years 1942-1945. The BIA and its successor the Tatmadaw still hold this as betrayal. In their opinion ‘the’ ethnic minorities tried to prevent Burma from becoming independent. The BIA under guidance of Aung San switched sides in 1945. The BIA helped to

51 Callahan, Making Enemies.,p. 36 and Mint-U, The River, p. 211–212. 52 Mint-U, The River, p. 220. 53 Tarling, N., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. From World War II to the present. Volume Four (Cambridge, 1999), p. 3. 54 Mint-U, The River, p. 240 – 244. 55 Silverstein, J., “Some Thoughts on Burma-Thai Relations” In: Legal Issues on Burma Journal, no. 6, 2000, pp. 1-14, p. 3. 56 Aung-Thwin, and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 231 -232. 57 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 67. 58 Mint-U, The River, p. 231 and Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 75. 59 Smith, Martin J., Burma: insurgency and the politics of ethnicity. (London, 1999), p. 62-64 and 72.

15 drive out the Japanese and so was invited at the negotiation table by the British. Aung San vowed for independence and tried to establish a political framework to keep Burma a single territorial unit after independence, arguably a territory with the world’s widest variety of peoples.60 In 1947 Aung San organized a gathering in which the Panglong Agreement was signed by the Shan, the Kachin and the Chin. A formal representative delegation of the Karen was absent. The KNU's leadership by this time was boycotting all official government organized gatherings.61 This boycott effectively removed a Karen voice from the critical debates which were to come in the future. In 1947 the Burmese government produced a new constitution, but this document failed to address and resolve the Karen question.62 On the 17th of July 1947 the KNU headquarter in Rangoon ordered the establishment of Karen fighting units, known as Karen National Defence Organization or KNDO's. The KNU also established an underground communication line with the Karen Rifles within the Burmese army. In October 1947 the AFPFL government proposed to the KNU to create a Karen state but the KNU refused. The KNU demanded more territory than was included in the proposal.63 In that same year the one symbol and person in Burma to which all groups could relate to, namely Aung San, was shot.64 To both Thailand and the Burmese government after World War II the biggest threat came from Thai and Burmese communists.65 After Burma gained independence on the 4th of January 1948, stability was soon threatened by three groups. 66 The communists, the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO) and the Karen National Union (KNU) fought for more political power or independence from the Burmese government in Rangoon.67 Some Karen believed the British or Americans would support their cause in postcolonial Burma.68 The communists in Burma started their armed insurrection in March 1948.69 If the Thai and Burmese communists would unite this would pose an even larger threat to both Thailand and Burma. To prevent this the Thai government put up a buffer zone at the end of 1940s. The buffer zone was in operation for almost half a century. The buffer zone policy supported ethnic minorities along Thailand’s border. This policy can therefore be characterized as anti-Rangoon. Although Thailand officially established bilateral relations with the government of Burma in 1948, one could not speak of a political relation. After WWII Thailand’s politics was dominated by a military which lacked political legitimacy. The Thai military elite upheld the image of Burma as an external threat to Thailand, in order to sustain and protect their own power interests. Leaders in the Thai military assisted ethnic rebels to fight against the Burmese central government, instead of reviving friendly ties with Rangoon.70 The only transfer of information, people or goods between the two states for a long time was via the 2000 km long stretch of border controlled by the Karel National Union. After a traumatizing colonial experience, the Burmese government followed a policy in international relations of neutrality. The Thai government wanted to prevent the spread of communism and welcomed foreign support. In 1954 the American inspired anti-communist Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) opened its headquarters in Bangkok. Thailand became one of the two Southeast Asian nations to join the SEATO.71 Thailand openly supported the United States struggle against communism in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) starting in the 1960s. This was largely due

60 Mint-U, The River, p. 235-250 and Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 63. 61 Smith, Martin J., Burma: insurgency and the politics of ethnicity. (London, 1999), p. 73-75 and Myint-U, T., The Making of Modern Burma (Cambridge 2001), p. 94. 62 Smith, Burma, p. 77 and 83. 63 Ibid., p. 86. 64 Callahan, M., Making Enemies. War and state building in Burma. (Ithaca and London, 2003), p. 108-109. 65 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 130. 66 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 227. 67 Ibid., p. 238. 68 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 85. 69 Yoshihiko, Tanigawa, “The Cominform and Southeast Asia” in: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia. Ed. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye. (New York, 1977) p. 371. 70 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 58-59. 71 Silverstein, “Some Thoughts on Burma-Thai Relations”, p. 4.

16 to the increasing pressure of communism in this decade. The neutralist policy of Laos and Cambodia urged the Thai elite to seek external support. Thailand gained American guarantees of armed support if it were seriously threatened. US financial aid helped to develop Thailand’s communications and economy.72 By the late 1970s however, Thailand was divided into two rivalling power centres. One was centred in Bangkok and the other was situated along the border with neighboring countries Burma, Laos and Cambodia and controlled by communists revolutionaries.73 The Burmese state was troubled by several insurgencies in the 1950s. Virtually all ethnic minority groups (the Shan, the Karen, the Mon, the Chin, the Kachin and the Wa) inside Burma had started fighting the central government in the 1950s, either to gain more autonomy or to fight for independence. In 1958 prime minister U-Nu asked the army to take control for two years. This so-called care-taker government which ruled from 1958 to 1960, was the most effective government Burma had in the twentieth century. This government stabilized the country for a while.74 After 1960 instability threatened to overthrow the Burmese government. In 1962 general Ne Win staged a coup and established a military junta which has controlled the Burmese state up to 2012. One of the first acts of general Ne Win was introducing ‘The Burmese Way to Socialism’, which had a devastating effect on Burma’s economy and on the relationship with Thailand.75 The Burmese Way to Socialism is a mix of Buddhists and Marxists principles. Thailand’s anticommunist leaders were afraid that socialism would be exported to Thailand. Therefore they supported anti-communists groups on the border like the Karen. To stop the communist insurgency in mainland Southeast Asia the Thai and U.S. government supported Karen rebellions through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. KNU General Bo Mya once described the KNU as Thailands' 'foreign legion', because the KNU guarded the border. The KNU prevented Thai and Burmese communist from unification. The strong shift to the right in 1976 under Karen General Bo Mya was a strategy of the KNU to gain more support from the Thai government.76 The U.S. government simultaneously also supported the Burmese government to fight communists. The U.S. government provided weapons and American produced helicopters, which strangely have been used against the KNU.77 General Ne Win and his regime therefore distrusted Thailand’s government, because the Karen were seen as the number one enemy of the Burmese army.78 Ne Win sacked all well-trained and well-educated personnel from the government. He also expelled foreign aid agencies and advisers. Anything connected to Britain or America was closed down. Hundreds of thousands of Burmese Indians were kicked out of Burma in 1964, a terrible loss for the professional and commercial class of Burma. Foreigners were not allowed entry into Burma anymore. All business was nationalized, even Burma’s twenty four foreign banks were taken over by the state. In 1962 alone the industrial output of Burma fell by fourty percent.79 The changes led to the rise of an illegal trade with Thailand and a large black market developed. By the 1980s the Burmese Way to Socialism had led to tremendous economic problems. The demonetization of Burma’s currency severely hurt many people, as there was no compensation. Between 1981 and 1987 the price of rice and timber fell by 51 percent.80 The Burmese government had to apply for Least Developed Country (LDC) status of the United Nations in December 1986. A year later, one of the richest countries in Southeast Asia regarding natural resources, received this status. Burma needed this LDC status to cut the foreign debt, which was

72 Tarling, N., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. From World War II to the present. Volume Four (Cambridge, 1999), p. 294-297. 73 Battersby, P., “Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s international Relations in the 1990s: From Communism to Capitalism.” In: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4 (1988-1989), pp. 473-488, p. 475. 74 Mint-U, The River, p. 282-298. 75 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 33-36. 76 Smith, Burma, p. 297-298. 77 Pederson, D., Secret Genocide. Voices of the Karen of Burma. (Dunboyne, 2011), p. 19. 78 Chongkittavorn, K., “Thai-Burma Relations”, p. 119. 79 Mint-U, The River, p. 290-296. 80 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 255.

US$5 billion in 1988 while the gross domestic product was declining at the same time.81 After World War II there was virtually no contact between Thailand and Burma. While Burma was struggling with a worsening economic situation, Thailand’s economy in the 1980s was growing at an unprecedented rate. The official income per capita in Burma was around US$200 in the fiscal year 1988-1989. A considerable difference with Thailand’s income per capita in the same year which was US$800. 82 As Thailand’s elite grew more focused on economic prosperity, its interest in the resource rich territory of Burma grew too.83 In 1987 Burmese general Ne Win started liberalizing the Burmese economy. Trade in rice and beans was liberalized. But in March 1988 protests broke out at Rangoon’s university. On the austere date 8-8-’88 large national protests were planned to protest against the junta. “The underlying causes of these riots were economic ‘bread and butter’ issues which can be attributed to the previous 30 years of the Burmese Way to Socialism. Its stagnant economic policies saw earlier eruptions, but by 1988 they had crystallized in more recent events such as the demonetization of the currency and the stigma of LDC status.”84 1988 proved to be the year in which the relationship between Thailand and Burma would change with lasting effects for many people in the region and the wider international community. The threat of communism was disappearing. In the preceding years Thailand adopted a market economy as part of the international capitalist system. Burma’s economy was ruined by several ethnic insurgencies and the policy implemented by General Ne Win. The economic malaise was answered by the Burmese people with large national protests in 1988. After the riots a warm and an energetic relationship between Thailand and Burma developed. How and especially why did this relationship change? Why did Thailand move away from its traditional foreign policy of maintaining buffer zones? And who profited of this new relationship?

81 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 40. 82 Ibidem. 83 Silverstein, “Some Thoughts on Burma-Thai Relations”, p. 9. 84 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 257.

2. The End of the Cold War: Thai-Myanmar relations 1988-1997

In the period 1988-1997 Thailand and Myanmar established a relationship which quickly developed into a complex and interdependent economic tie. This chapter tries to clarify how and why this happened. The preceding decade saw the ideology of communism losing support worldwide. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s Asia saw the excesses of the Cultural Revolution in China, the cruelty of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia and the stagnation of Vietnam’s economy. In the 1980s China was preoccupied with modernization and gradually introduced capitalist inspired market principles to its economy.85 The USSR introduced a new policy of glasnost and perestroika and Russian troops retreated from Afghanistan. In 1983 the Communist Party of Thailand ceased to exist. A few years later in 1989 the Communist Party of Burma ceased to exist too.86 These examples were proof that communism as a model for development did not function properly. Thailand became Myanmar’s ‘big brother’ in international politics after 1988. Politically and economically relations developed fast. In 1991 Thailand launched its ‘constructive engagement policy’, thereby officially abandoning its buffer zone policy. Thailand argued that Myanmar would integrate faster into the international community through engaging with Myanmar.87 Thailand initiated the construction of a highway early 1990s from Thailand to Tavoy, a large harbor city inside Myanmar situated on the Indian Ocean. The existing harbor in Tavoy was enlarged by an Italian-Thai company.88 In January 1993 The Thai-Burma Joint Commission was established. The Thai-Burma Joint Commission promoted Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN. The admission into ASEAN would give Thailand even greater access to Burma’s economy. The Burmese generals committed to ASEAN immediately.89 In August 1994, Thailand was ASEAN’s largest investor in Burma.90 In 1996 former General Chaovalit became Prime Minister of Thailand, although only for a year. When resigning in 1997 he took credit for the closer ties with Myanmar, the termination of the buffer policy, the introduction of the constructive engagement policy and the ascension of Myanmar into ASEAN.91 Central to the first part of this chapter are the developments between Thailand and Myanmar in the 1980s. Why did their foreign policies change and especially how did they change? To clarify how this relationship changed the second part of this chapter uses three examples in which Thailand and Myanmar collaborated. Each example had an immediate effect on the struggle of the Karen, which will be discussed in the next and final chapter. The first example is the logging industry, which had a large impact in the border region between Thailand and Myanmar. The second example is the oil and gas industry, Thai and other foreign companies were and still are highly interested in the gas and oilfields found in the coastal waters of Myanmar. The third example is the movement of cheap labor/refugees from Myanmar to Thailand, which was beneficial to many Thai businessmen.

85 Steinberg, D. and Hongwei Fan, Modern China-Myanmar relations. Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence. (Copenhagen, 2012), p. 33. 86 Lang, H., Fear and Sanctuary. Burmese Refugees in Thailand. (New York, 2002), p. 11. 87 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 128. 88 BPF archive, inv. no. ARCH02962 box 109, IISH, Amsterdam. 89 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 125 and 139. 90 Hyndman, J., “Business and Bludgeon at the Border: A transnational political economy of human displacement in Thailand and Burma. In: GeoJournal, Vol. 56, 2002, pp. 39-46, p. 43. 91 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 73-74.

2.1. 1988 and its aftermath

In spite of opening up its economy to foreign investment in the 1980s, Burma’s economy stagnated. In 1987 Burma was granted the Least Developed Country (LDC) status by the United Nations.92 But the government invalidated 70% of the currency in circulation in the same year.93 The majority of the Burmese lost all their savings and did not receive any compensation for it. The shortage of foreign exchange combined with a decline in growth rate of the gross domestic product was the major cause of the economic malaise.94 The stagnation of a once prosperous Burmese economy and the poverty which followed resulted in growing political unrest.95 In March 1988 in a teashop in Rangoon a brawl between groups of students broke out. The matter escalated and within a couple of days between 20 and 100 students lay dead in the streets of Rangoon. In May 1988 a rapport of the government claimed only two students had died. The students continued their protests throughout the summer. The students received support from the Burmese society as a whole. The protest movement set an austere date for a country wide general strike: 8-8-‘88.96 The Burmese military responded with an aggressive military campaign to quell the protests. By the end of August 1988 the country was in a state of complete chaos, thousands of people were killed, thousands of prisoners were released by the Burmese government (to form fight gangs working for the government), the transport system had stopped operating, prices rose and food was scarce.97 In the middle of September 1988 the protest movements momentum was over. The civilian unrest in Burma from March to September 1988 had large political and economic consequences for Myanmar and its wider region. The U.S. and the European Union strongly condemned the military crackdown and put up economic sanctions and called for an isolation of Myanmar. The West and Japan suspended all development assistance like financial aid.98 The Burmese military also called the Tatmadaw needed hard cash fast. 90% of the country’s foreign exchange was provided by Western and Japanese aid.99 The Tatmadaw did not have any foreign exchange reserves by the end of 1988. Thousands of students fled to remote parts of country due to the harsh military crackdown. Some joined the armed insurgencies like that of the Karen National Union. By mid-October 1988 it was estimated that around 7,500 students had fled to the Thai-Burmese border with another 1000 students at the Indian border and around 2000 at the Chinese border.100 The Tatmadaw was taken off-guard by the wide protest against their regime. Due to its harsh reaction towards the Burmese people the regime lost international credit. First scared by its own people and later by the international community, the Burmese military leaders displayed a multitude of strategies to ensure its own survival. To safeguard their power position already in 1988 the Tatmadaw introduced changes in the political, military and economic fields. In an effort to lose the legacy of the military

92 Mint-U, The River, p. 276. 93 Ibid, p. 40. 94 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 40. 95 Tarling, N., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. From World War II to the present. Volume Four (Cambridge, 1999), p. 309. 96 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 41. 97 Deutz, A., “United States Human Rights Policy towards Burma, 1988-1991.” In: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 13, no. 2, September 1991, pp. 164-187, p. 173. 98 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 207 and BPF Archives, int. no. ARCH02962 box 3, IISH, Amsterdam. 99 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 328. 100 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 33.

20 crackdown, a new government was created and the name of the country was changed.101 The aim of the military junta can be seen in the new name given to the government: State Law and Order Restoration Council better known as the SLORC. The SLORC also changed the name of the country, ‘Burma’ was to be called ‘Myanmar’.102 The conflicts with Burma’s ethnic minorities was explained as defense of ‘Burmeseness’ prior to 1988. The changing of the name of the country signaled a mentality shift within the higher circles of Burma’s ruling class. ‘Myanmar’ was created by the military regime to include all ethnic minorities. After 1988 the Tatmadaw started concluding deals and ceasefires with many ethnic rebel groups. Between 1988 and 1997 the Tatmadaw signed as many as seventeen ceasefires.103 The ceasefires gave the Tatmadaw political legitimacy to hold on to state power.104 Yet, while calling for “peace” and signing ceasefires the Burmese government held devastating counterinsurgency offensives. Along the Thai border key strongholds were attacked to gain control of the border.105 From 1988 the Tatmadaw began a process of military expansion which was financed by investments coming from trade with Thailand and China. The Tatmadaw strengthened its ties with China and traded teak for new weaponry.106 The military personnel in Myanmar’s army rose from 180.000 in 1988 to over 400.000 in 1996.107 T140 new combat aircrafts, 30 naval vessels, 170 tanks, 250 armored personnel carriers and other weapons were bought.108 By mid- 1990 US$1.4 billion was spent and the Tatmadaw was able to wage a war in all weather conditions.109 Due to the new weaponry the Tatmadaw was able to fight the jungle insurgencies all year round. This would have far reaching consequences for the Karen insurgency in the years to come after 1988. The SLORC made sure it kept control over certain parts of the Burmese economy while introducing market economy principles. The State-owned Economic Enterprises Law 26 was issued in 1989. In chapter 2, section 3 of this law, the junta clearly expressed in which industries they would like to keep full control. Reflecting their need for currency the most lucrative industries were to be controlled by the state: “… Extraction and trading of teak within and outside the Union [of Burma]; … All plantation of wood and its preservation and protection, except firewood plantations by villagers for subsistence; … Exploration, trading and extraction of oil and natural gas and the production of oil, natural gas and related products; … Exploration, trading, extraction and export of pearl, jade, ruby and other mineral precious stones; … Production of fish and shrimps (…)”.110On the 30th of November 1988, the SLORC passed the Foreign Investment Law (FIL). The FIL shows that the SLORC was desperate for foreign capital.111 The FIL “undermined the major revenue resources of the insurgents who have monopolized the black market supply of goods for the past 25 years. In the long term this will

101 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 256-257 and 263 and Deutz, A.M., “United States Human Rights Policy towards Burma, 1988-1991.” In: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 13, no. 2, Sept 1991 pp. 164-187, p. 170-171. 102 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 40-45. 103 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 220. 104 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 61-62. 105 Lang, H., Fear and Sanctuary. Burmese Refugees in Thailand. (New York, 2002), p. 47. 106 Battersby, “Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s international Relations in the 1990s”, p. 477 and McCarthy, S., “Ten Years of Chaos in Burma: Foreign investment and Economic Liberalization under the SLORC-SPDC, 1988-1998.” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, no. 2, (2000), pp. 233-262, p. 256. 107 Mint-U, The River, p. 331. 108 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 211. 109 BPF archive, inv. No. ARCH02962, box 3, IISH, Amsterdam. 110 Gutter, P., “Environment and Law in Burma.” In: Legal Issues on Burma Journal , August 2001, pp. 1-27, p. 6. 111 McCarthy, S., “Ten Years of Chaos in Burma: Foreign investment and Economic Liberalization under the SLORC- SPDC, 1988-1998.” In: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, no. 2, 2000, pp. 233-262, p. 235-236.

21 undercut the rebels’ ability to maintain their armies, while it enhances the revenues of the Burmese government.”112 At this crucial stage the Thai army commander in Chief, General Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh flew to Rangoon in December 1988.113

2.2 Thailand in the 1980s

When the Thai Foreign ministry announced that it would send a delegation to Rangoon in November 1988 to finalize economic agreements Thai students groups, NGO’s and the media protested heavily. The trip was cancelled and instead General Chaovalit travelled to Rangoon in December 1988 to finalize lucrative trading deals.114 Close connections between Thai authorities and the Burmese generals would produce a large number of trading deals in the years to come. These business concessions granted by Rangoon were of “greater value than the ethnic minorities in Thailand’s bufferzones could offer to Thai cabinet members-and- businessmen.”115 Thailand’s economy showed exponential growth rates in the 1980s. The gross domestic product of Thailand grew by 10% in 1988. Industrial output, agriculture, construction and tourism were the most important sectors for Thailand’s economic growth. Further boosting Thailand’s economy the country experienced a foreign investment boom in 1988. 1987 saw a total of foreign investment into Thailand of US$2.6 billion. For the first six months of 1988 alone a total of 621 companies invested US$3.8 billion in Thailand. In the first seven months of 1988 Thai export figures showed an increase of 34% compared to 1987, reaching a total of US$8.46 billion.116 Thailand’s economic boom was welcomed by Thailand’s elite. Thailand wanted to be economically independent. The economic surge in 1988 coincided with a shift in Thailand’s political system. Prior to the military crackdown in Burma in July 1988 civilian rule was established in Thailand. Up to July 1988 military rule similar to Burma persisted in Thailand. Chatichai Choonhavan became the first elected civilian prime minister in Thailand since the military coup in 1976. Under Chatichai a new attitude to the resource rich Burma arose.117 The government of Chatichai consisted mainly of Thai businessmen and army leaders. Chatichai symbolized a new generation of military men who were both businessman and politicians. Money-making and vote-buying went hand in hand for this new generation of Thailand’s leaders. Chatichai’s government developed a good working relationship with Thailand’s army, ruled by General Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh. Chatichai gave General Chaovalit a free hand in the annual army promotions in September 1988 and he offered Chaovalit the post of defense minister several times. Prime minister Chatichai is mostly known for his policy of turning ‘Battlefields into Marketplaces’.118 The business-oriented cabinet ministers targeted logging and fishing deals in Burma.119 Chatichai wanted to turn Thailand into the region’s largest economy and turn the battlefields of Indochina into a marketplace. Relations with Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos

112 Taylor, Robert H., “The Evolving Military Role in Burma.” 30 November 1988, The Bangkok Post. In: BPF archive, inv. no. ARCH02962 box 3, IISH, Amsterdam. 113 Mint-U, The River, p. 288. 114 Niksch, L., “Thailand in 1988. The Economic Surge.” In: Asian Survey, Vol. 29, no. 2, Feb 1989, pp. 165-173, p. 171- 172 and Mint-U, The River, p. 288. 115 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 60. 116 Niksch, L., “Thailand in 1988. The Economic Surge.” In: Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 2, Feb 1989, pp. 165-173, p. 165- 166. 117 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 65. 118 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 52. 119 Niksch, “Thailand in 1988.”, p. 168 and Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 66.

22 entered a more active stage in 1988. In February 1988 a peace truce was established between the Thai and Lao forces.120 From the early 1980s the need for maintaining Thailand’s traditional buffer zones became less relevant. The Communist Party of Thailand ceased to exist in 1983 after a forty year old armed struggle.121 The crucial buffer role once played by the Karen, the Mon and other minority forces diminished in importance. In the dry season of 1983-1984 the Tatmadaw actually started a large anti-insurgency campaign. At that stage the Thai authorities still provided support to their traditional allies the Karen. Chatichai’s government developed a new foreign policy.122 This policy has been described as ‘resource diplomacy’.123 In 1988 the foreign policy of Thailand led to a new relationship with Burma’s government. Already in April 1988 General Chaovalit travelled to Burma with a Thai delegation of businessmen and ‘commerce-oriented military officers’, as Thai academic Chachavalpongpun described the delegation.124 Chaovalit was known for his intimate relations with the Burmese military.125 Thai public opinion turned against the military crackdown and Thailand became the new safe haven for the activists and students who fled Burma. Despite public opinion in Thailand, Chatichai’s government was the first to develop official ties with the SLORC after the crackdown.126 Under Chatichai “Burma was now presented as a new business partner, whilst ethnic insurgencies were treated merely as burdens on national security.”127

120 Niksch, “Thailand in 1988.”, p. 171. 121 Silverstein, “Some Thoughts on Burma-Thai Relations”, p. 12 and Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 142. 122 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 144. 123 Ibid., p. 142. 124 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 68. 125 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 61. 126 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 143. 127 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 59.

2.3 Thai-Myanmar trade: Logging, Oil, Gas and refugees.

After General Chaovalit broke the ice, trade and investment between Thailand and Myanmar became ‘official’ and increased significantly.128 Thai companies invested in banks, breweries, casino’s, the construction of dams, factories, the fishing industry, hotels, the gem and jade trade, mining, the oil and gas industry, tourism, the pharmaceutical industry and the largest investments were made in the logging industry.129 Before 1988 unofficial (black market) trade between Thailand and Burma could be found along the 2401 kilometer long border and was largely controlled by the Karen National Union or other politically organized ethnic minorities like the Kayin or the Shan.130 Thai-Myanmar industrial collaboration increased fast under the new policies of both countries. Within a year 93 Thai companies were selling products on the Burmese market. Myanmar released Thai prisoners and signed agreements on the opening of border crossings.131 Thai companies suddenly started crossing the border, building roads and extracting Myanmar’s resources. Thailand became Burma’s largest foreign investor in within four years. In 1989 Thailand opened a commercial section in its embassy in Rangoon.132 The sectors directly affecting the border region between Thailand and Myanmar were the logging industry, the oil and gas industry and the use of cheap Burmese labour by the Thai industry. Myanmar’s teakwood reserves were priority for Thailand’s business oriented politicians and army officers. On January 18th 1989 Prime Minister Chatichai announced a logging ban in Thailand. Finding new logging terrain was crucial to the industry’s survival.133 Prior to the announcement 350 Thai had been killed by mudslides which had been caused by heavy rains on deforested mountain slopes.134 Almost immediately after the flood disaster in southern Thailand in the end of November 1988, army general Chaovalit visited Rangoon.135 Chaovalit made sure Burmese forests, containing the best and largest teak wood reserves in the world, were opened to Thai logging companies.136 Twenty logging deals were contracted by the SLORC with Thai timber companies, sixteen of which were in ethnic insurgent areas.137 Already in August 1988 the Chao Phraya-Irrawaddy Company was allowed to fell trees inside Burma for the next three years. The company was a joint venture of a major financer of the Chart Thai Party and a group of Thai army officers. The logs felled by this company would be transferred overland. For the first time since World War II a border checkpoint between the two states was opened. Thai companies were allowed to cut trees on Burmese soil.138 Soon many more logging deals followed between Thai logging companies and the Burmese government. In the year 1989 as many as 48 Thai logging companies were allowed to fell trees on Burmese territory.139 The Thai bought a teakwood tree for around US$800 and sold it at a price ranging between US$2500 to

128 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 142. By ‘official’ I mean that the governments of Thailand and Myanmar started replacing the ethnic minorities as the official leviers of taxes on the products crossing the border. 129 Burma Rights Movement For Action (B.U.R.M.A.), Foreign investment in Burma 1988-1991, inventory number ZDK 49032, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. (I will refer to this archive as following: B.U.R.M.A., inv. No. .., IISH, Amsterdam). 130 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 11. 131 Ibid., p. 129. 132 Steinberg, David I., “International Rivalries in Burma. The Rise of Economic Competition.” In: Asian Survey, Vol. 30, no. 6, June 1990, pp. 587-601, p. 596. 133 Chongkittavorn, K., “Thai-Burma Relations” in: Challenges to democratization in Burma: Perspectives on Multilateral and Bilateral responses. G. Standbridge and A. Zaw (edt) (Stockholm, 2001), pp. 117-129, p. 120. 134 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 57. 135 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 143. 136 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 142. 137 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 143. 138 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 142. 139 B.U.R.M.A., Foreign investment in Burma, 1988-1991, inv. no. ZDK 49032, IISH, Amsterdam.

US$3000.140 Thus this trade proved very lucrative indeed. By the end of 1989 Thai timber companies had gained logging concessions valued at more than US$100 million.141 A crucial side effect of these new logging deals was the role Thai logging companies started playing in building all weather roads from Thailand into Karen state.142 These roads would later be used by the Tatmadaw to move army equipment and soldiers into Karen state. Due to the lucrative logging business, the Southeastern region of Mergui/Tavoy in Myanmar became a priority region for the Burmese military. The Burmese military started occupying and controlling routes to Thailand.143 By 1993 the SLORC ended the logging deals with the Thai companies due to unsustainable practices on the part of the Thai. By that time a total of fourteen border crossings had been opened.144 The SLORC could afford to do this because investments from the oil and gas industry ensured a larger and more secure financial benefit.145 Thai and Western oil and gas companies wanted to extract fossil fuels from Myanmar’s unexplored and untapped fossil fuel reserves. In the fall of 1989 nine contracts were signed with multinationals to start exploring the Andaman Sea.146 The first pipeline to be laid was to go to Thailand and thus through Karen National Union held territory.147 Thailand’s fast growing economy needed more stable energy supplies. The pipeline would run 300 km offshore and another 100 km onshore and would enter Thailand in Kanchanaburi province, west of Bangkok. The Burmese government had already built a railway from Ye to Tavoy in the southern Tenasserim Division to send troops to guard the building of the pipeline, because it was afraid that the KNU would sabotage the pipeline.148 In 1993 only four companies remained active inside Burma of which one was Thai and one was Burmese owned. The four companies invested US$400 million to be succeeded by another US$320 million into exploration projects.149 The total amount invested would reach US$1.2 billion in 1998.150 The oil and gas sector accounted for more than 1/3 of the foreign investment put into Myanmar since 1988.151 In 1991 the Tatmadaw started to relocate Myanmar’s civilians by force precisely in the area where the pipeline was to be laid. Around 500 households were forcibly relocated. The inhabitants of the area were also forced to work on clearing the ground without receiving payment. In 1992 TOTAL and the SLORC signed a contract which gave permission to Total to explore the off-shore Yadana gasfield in the Andaman Sea. In 1993 the American UNOCAL joined the project. In the beginning of 1993, Thai pressure on the KNU to sign a ceasefire started growing. In 1995 the Thailand’s Petroleum Authority of Thailand Exploration and Production Co., Ltd. (PTTEP) signed a contract with the shareholders of the project to build and operate the pipeline from the Yadana gas field to Thailand. The Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) signed a thirty year contract to export the gas to a power plant which was still to be built in Ratchaburi, near Bangkok.152 Since the signing of the deal on the 2nd of February 1995, the same

140 B.U.R.M.A., Foreign investment in Burma, April 1992, invt. no. ZDK 49032, IISH, Amsterdam. 141 B.U.R.M.A., Foreign investment in Burma, April 1993 p. 27, invt. no. ZDK 49032, IISH, Amsterdam. 142 BPF archive, invt. No. ARCH02962 box 3, IISH, Amsterdam. 143 BPF archive, invt. No. ARCH02962 box 4, IISH, Amsterdam. 144 B.U.R.M.A., Foreign investment in Burma, April 1993, invt. No. ZDK 49032, IISH, Amsterdam. 145 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 147. 146 Steinberg, David I., “International Rivalries in Burma. The Rise of Economic Competition.” In: Asian Survey, Vol. 30, no. 6, June 1990, pp. 587-601, p. 593. 147 Hyndman, J., “Business and Bludgeon at the Border: A transnational political economy of human displacement in Thailand and Burma.” In: Geojournal, vol. 56, 2002, pp. 39-46, p. 43. 148 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 62. 149 B.U.R.M.A., Foreign investment in Burma, April 1993 p. 4, inventory number ZDK 49032, IISH, Amsterdam. 150 Hyndman, “Business and Bludgeon at the Border”, p. 43. 151 BPF archive, inv. No. ARCH02962, box 4, IISH, Amsterdam. 152 BPF archive, inv. No. ARCH02962, box 4, IISH, Amsterdam.

25 period when the Tatmadaw attacked the KNU’s capital Manerplaw, the Thai took a much tougher stand towards the Karen. The Thai government completely closed off the border for a while, denying the KNU access to supplies on the Thai side.153 The third example where Thai-Myanmar relations changed in the period 1988-1997 is in the field of refugees. The Tatmadaw has been fighting ethnic insurgencies in Myanmar since the country gained independence in 1948. As a result many people fled to neighboring countries. The first political refugees from Burma arrived in Thailand in the 1970s. Thailand never signed the Geneva Convention on Refugees of 1951 and can therefore deal with refugees according to its own policy.154At first Thailand allowed people from Burma to take refuge in Thailand. But after their numbers increased from 1984 onwards155 Thailand tightened its border controls.156 The reception of Burmese refugees in Thailand became even more chilly after 1988.157 The new bilateral relation between Myanmar and Thailand blurred the border between the two Southeast Asian nation-states to promote economic infrastructure and trade. Due to the refugee issue the border was sometimes invoked by both states. The refugee problem showed a border is a flexible instrument of the state to adjust according to its own needs. The transnational political economy which was being developed between Thailand and Myanmar in 1988-1997 resulted in a harshening position of the Thai authorities towards Burmese refugees. After another military coup in Thailand in 1991 the Thai authorities scrapped the plan for building a holding centre for Burmese political asylum seekers. Furthermore Thai authorities in the Tak province started a campaign in 1991 to send illegal Burmese immigrants back to Myanmar while fully aware of the treatment they would receive by the Burmese military. By 1995 over 100.000 Burmese people sought refuge within Thailand’s borders.158 Many of them were ethnically Karen and worked for low wages in Thai factories and other parts of the informal economy.159 This latter fact was welcomed by Thai businessman who were able to make greater profits. After 1988 Thai authorities have been cautious with providing humanitarian aid to anti-Rangoon insurgents in fear of economic and/or diplomatic repercussions.160 In the period 1988-1997 a new political relationship was developed between Thailand and Myanmar. An ‘official’ transnational economy arose between Myanmar and Thailand in this period. The opening of relations between Thailand and Myanmar helped to establish lucrative trading deals for both sides. Myanmar’s money supply rose from 11 billion Kyats in 1988 to 54 million Kyats in 1991. Myanmar’s economy grew with 10.9% in 1992 and most importantly the foreign reserves of the SLORC rose from almost nothing in 1988 to US $310 million in 1991 to around US $900 million in April 1993.161 For Thailand’s industry and the government of Myanmar the new established relations proved very beneficial. The Thai investments in the logging, oil and gas industry ensured the Tatmadaw of a large financial reserve. The Tatmadaw used this capital to modernize the Burmese military and fight the jungle insurgents like that of the KNU all year round. By 1997 large parts of the border region were being developed by Thai and Burmese

153 Tun, Moe K., Burma Issues, 1997, p. 11. In: BPF archive, inv. No. ARCH02962 box 4, IISH, Amsterdam. 154 Brouwer, J. & J. van Wijk, “Helping Hands: external support for the KNU insurgency in Burma.” In: Small Wars & Insurgences, Vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 834-855, p. 842. 155 Barron, S., Between Worlds. Twenty Years on the Border. Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) (Bangkok 2004), p. 16. 156 Silverstein, “Some Thoughts on Burma-Thai Relations”, p. 9. 157 Hyndman, “Business and Bludgeon at the Border”, , p. 39. 158 Brouwer & van Wijk, “Helping Hands”, p. 839. 159 Brouwer & van Wijk, “Helping Hands”, p. 842. 160 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 86. 161 B.U.R.M.A., Foreign investment in Burma, April 1993, inventory number ZDK 49032, IISH, Amsterdam.

26 businessmen for industry, trade and tourism. The year 1997 saw the opening of the ‘friendship’ bridge between the border towns of Myawaddy (Myanmar) and Mae Sod (Thailand), Myanmar’s membership to ASEAN and the opening of a large industrial estate in the Thai border region of Kanchanaburi (using cheap Burmese labor).162 Thailand left its old bufferzone policy and replaced it with a policy of resource diplomacy. The above mentioned examples show that the Tatmadaw and Thailand’s elite decided to cooperate. The Tatmadaw was triggered by the 1988 riots and needed financial reserves in order to maintain in power. Thailand’s elite wanted to make use of the resources found in Myanmar. This resulted in a newly found interest in the border region between the two states. That same border region was used by the Karen National Union as a base for their struggle for more autonomy/independence from the Burmese government. What were the consequences of this new economically motivated relationship between Thailand and Myanmar for the armed struggle of Karen National Union?

162 BPF archive, inv. No. ARCH02962 box 109, IISH, Amsterdam.

3. 1988-1997 and the Karen National Union

“Burma after 1948 is an example of a state completely unable to dominate its borderlands. The Burmese armed forces have been fighting inconclusive wars with separatist regional elites along the country’s huge borderland, which stretches from southern Thailand via China and India to Bangladesh, for nearly half a century. Some of these regional groups, such as the Karen, established separate administrations that fell short of being states only because they lacked international recognition.”163 During the 1950s, 1960s and the 1970s the central authority of both the Thai and Burmese governments was tenuous at the peripheries of their territory. The Karen were able to run an independent administration partly due to being located in a borderland. The political scientists Brouwer & van Wijk recognize three factors of external support through which insurgencies can survive for a long time. Neighboring states are potentially the most important providers for an insurgent cause.164 Central to this chapter is the political organization of the Karen National Union, the most significant insurgent group in Myanmar in the twentieth century.165 The KNU’s most important external supporter has been the Thai government.166 During the 1980s and 1990s this changed because the governments of Thailand and Myanmar started cooperating. What was the effect of this newly found bilateral relationship for the struggle of the Karen National Union in the period 1988-1997? National borders are political constructs, they are imagined projections of territorial power. In this respect the border is the ultimate symbol of a state’s sovereignty.167 Borders mark the territorial consolidation of states. Border studies use the state as a framework for analysis. The social scientists Baud & van Schendel argue to use a cross-border perspective, in which the region on both sides of the border is the unit for analysis. Thus a borderland is made up from two parts across one border in a single borderland. It is important to treat the borderland as one unit, because changes in one part of the borderland lead to immediate adaptations on the other side.168 According to Baud & van Schendel one cannot assume any linear development of the relationship between borderlands and states over time. Baud & van Schendel see developments at different levels influencing a borderland. “The impact of a particular world transformation (world time) on social change in borderlands must be related to the developmental phases of the states concerned (state time), as well as the stages of the life cycle in which individual borderlands find themselves (borderland time).”169 These conceptual time levels have each influenced the struggle of the KNU in a different way. Baud & van Schendel recognize five stages in the development of a border. The border between Thailand and Myanmar had been officially established by the end of the nineteenth century which was the infant borderland, the first stage. The infant borderland is characterized by preexisting social and economic networks and people on both sides of the border are connected by close kinship links. In the second half of the twentieth century the Thai-Myanmar border moved from its second stage named the adolescent borderland and was shifting to its third stage. The third stage is called the adult borderland by which Baud & van Schendel mean a

163 Baud, M. & Schendel, W. van, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.” In: Journal of World History, Vol. 8, no. 2, 1997, pp. 211 -242, p. 218. 164 Brouwer & van Wijk, “Helping Hands”, p. 834. 165 South, “Burma’s Longest War”, p. 14. 166 Brouwer & van Wijk, “Helping Hands”, p. 837. 167 Baud & van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.”, p. 211 and 226. 168 Ibid., p. 231. 169 Ibid., p. 236.

28 border that is fully accepted by all parties involved. The fourth stage is called a declining borderland and is the result of the border losing its political importance. New cross or supra- border networks emerge, often initially economic in character. This is what happened to the Thai-Myanmar border between 1988 and 1997. The decline of a borderland can be a peaceful or violent process. Baud & van Schendel would define the border between Thailand and Myanmar as a Rebellious borderland. In the case of rebellious borderland, a regional elite sides with the local population against a state that seeks in vain to impose its authority on a border.170

3.1. Thailand as a safehaven

The KNU became more dependent on Thailand as a safehaven in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. While the Burmese government in the form of the SLORC and the Burmese armed forces the Tatmadaw became more reliant on foreign investment from Thailand and China171, simultaneously the KNU heavily relied on the use of Thailand as a base by 1988. The first Karen refugee camps on Thai soil appeared in 1984 and closely resembled the strictly run KNU villages inside Burma.172 In 1984 the Tatmadaw started a large scale military campaign against the Karen thus many Karen fled to Thailand. A refugee camp can serve an insurgency in two ways. Firstly the insurgents can use a camp as a safe haven and as a place of recruitment. Secondly insurgents can make use of the humanitarian aid provided in the refugee camps. The refugee camps in Thailand served the KNU in both ways. In 1992 72,000 Karen were living in refugee camps inside Thailand.173 Soldiers of the KNU often had family members living in the camps. In 1995 Thai authorities found a large amount of weapons of four different refugee camps, mainly inhabited by Karen.174 It is important to emphasize the differences stances taken by Thai authorities at the local and state level. Thai authorities at the local level were often involved in the deals concluded in the refugee camps with the KNU, while Thai authorities in Bangkok after 1988 tried to keep a good relationship with Rangoon and thus acted against the KNU. 175 In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s Karen state closely resembled a nation-state, whereby the KNU acted as the government. The KNU relied for its finances on the black market goods crossing the Thai-Myanmar border, levying taxes on households in KNU controlled areas and on revenues from timber mills, rubber plantations, fish farms and the extractions of mineral resources.176 Nonetheless the most important source of income was the border trade. The KNU charged a 5% ad valorem tax on transit actions in both directions. The KNU claimed in the mid 1980’s that it received US $65 million annually.177 Through the tax income the KNU was able to finance its government. The KNU proclaimed Manerplaw, in close proximity of the Thai border, as the capital of Karen state in the 1970s. Karen state was divided into seven administrative districts, whereby each district had its own committee, a chairperson, a vice-chairperson, a secretary and departmental district officers. Each administrative district was controlled by a KNU military brigade. In the mid-1980s the KNU had established its own schools, hospitals and

170 Baud & van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.”, p. 228. 171 Steinberg, “International Rivalries in Burma.”, p. 593-596. 172 Brouwer & van Wijk “Helping Hands”, p. 834 en 842. 173 Karen Refugee Committee, “Monthly Report”, October 1992. Karen National Union archive, inventory number 27, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. (From here on referred to as KNU archive, inv. no.,.., IISH, Amsterdam). 174 Brouwer & van Wijk, “Helping Hands”, p. 843. 175 Ibid., p. 841. 176 Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma., p. 25-27. 177 Steinberg, “International Rivalries in Burma.”, p. 590.

29 clinics.178 The KNU practiced a ‘drug-free’ policy and thereby gained support of Thai authorities in the 1980s. The KNU did not fund its activities through trading in opium.179 Thailand was heavily influenced by the United States of America and its War on Drugs. The relationship between the KNU and Thailand was largely the product of their common anticommunist stance. The KNU’s performed its role as acting as a buffer against a possible communist threat from Burma well. The KNU provided Thai authorities with cross-border intelligence and has actually fought the Communist Party of Thailand on certain occasions.180 Furthermore Thai officers were attached to Karen and Mon insurgent groups as observers and advisers. The buffer arrangement was beneficial for both parties. The threat of communism to Thailand was diminished and the ethnic insurgents gained access to Thailand and thus to trade and materials. In Thailand the KNU found the external support of crucial importance for their insurgency to survive. The relationship which developed between the KNU and Thailand at the local and state level in the 1980s was complex.181

178 Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma., p. 25-27. 179 Fink, C., “Squeezing the Karen: Burmese and Thai political strategies in a global order.“ PhD, University of Victoria, 1994. In: BPF archive, invt. no. 75, map 4, IISH, Amsterdam. 180 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 141. 181 Ibid., p. 142-143.

3.2. Rising Pressure

In the early 1990s pressure from both Myanmar and Thailand on the KNU started to rise. Firstly the Tatmadaw, in a classic divide-and-rule strategy, signed 17 ceasefires between 1989 and 1997 with various ethnic armed rebel groups in Myanmar.182 Due to these ceasefires the KNU lost valuable allies. More importantly extra military personnel and material became available due to the many ceasefires which were signed in this short period. 183 Army battallions first deployed in Shan or Kachin state were now moved further south. Most batallions were settled in the district of Mergui/Tavoy. The Tatmadaw wanted to gain control of the harbor city Tavoy and the Three Pagoda Pass through which most cross-border trade was transported. In Tavoy district the harbor was to be constructed and the pipeline to Thailand was to be laid.184 From the 12th of December 1991 up to April 30th 1992 “Operation Dragon King” was carried out, but without success.185 The objective was to catch the KNU’s capital Manerplaw. After this failed attempt the Tatmadaw opened peacetalks with the KNU. In April 1992 a unilateral ceasefire was signed between the Burmese army and the KNU.186 The strategy of the Tatmadaw at this point seemed to be to strengthen its position in the Southeastern region of Myanmar to prepare for a final major offensive against the KNU’s stronghold. In 1993 for the first time Thai military officers travelled to the KNU headquarters in Manerplaw and put the KNU leadership under pressure to attend peace talks with the SLORC.187 In 1994 the Tatmadaw forced local villagers into building a road. This road proved to be essential for ‘a succesfull military offensive against Manerplaw and is called the Paingkyon Mae Tha Wah Road.’188 Thai policy supporting the KNU had by 1993 thus changed into pressuring the KNU to sign a ceasefire with the SLORC/Tatmadaw. Thai authorities even threatened to close the border completely, thus robbing the KNU from its tax revenue. The struggle of the KNU the possibilities to continue their insurgency became limited. The rise in pressure on the KNU came to a culmination in 1994-1995 which had dire consequences for the insurgency of the KNU. The Tatmadaw was pushing hard to control its side of the Moei river, the river separating Thailand and Myanmar for several hundred kilometers. In the years before 1994 and 1995 the Tatmadaw had managed to conquer certain KNU strongholds. Six days after the visit of Chaovalit in December 1988 the KNU camp Mae Tha Waw was captured. In the first four months of 1989 several other camps along the Moei river were captured. The loss of these camps also meant the loss of revenue. Already in April 1989 General Bo Mya admitted that more than half of the trade was lost due to the Burmese offensive.189 In 1994 the Tatmadaw dealt a severe blow to the KNU. It succeeded to motivate around 500 Buddhist Karen to form their own group called the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army or DKBA. Thus the disparity in the ‘nation’ of Karen eventually came to the surface in the early 1990s. The name of the DKBA group implied the reason for the breakaway. These Buddhists soldiers were fed up with the Christian domination of the KNU. Also the KNU had created a common Karen identity to unify all Karen against the Burmese regime. This policy is called separative

182 Brouwer & van Wijk, “Helping Hands”, p. 837. 183 Ibidem. 184 Tun, Moe K., In: Burma Issues 1997, p. 9. BPF archive, inv. no. 75, map 1, IISH, Amsterdam. 185 Statement of Standing committee of the KNU, “On the Successful defense of headquarters at Manerplaw against the SLORC offensive.” In: KNU Bulletin, no. 26, August 1992. IISH, Amsterdam. 186 The Nation, 7 February 1995. BPF archive, invt. no. 75, map 3, IISH, Amsterdam. 187 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 107. 188 Human Rights Watch Asia, Vol. 7, no. 5, March 1995, In: BPF archive, invt. No. 75, map 3, IISH, Amsterdam. 189 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 68.

31 ethnicization: it promoted Karen ethnicity and identity as strictly separate from Burman and other Burmese groups. But as mentioned earlier around 75% of Karen never lived in KNU controlled areas and thus never recognized the leadership of the KNU.190 The DKBA overtook the KNU as the politically and economically most important non-state Karen actor. The DKBA served as a proxy army to the Tatmadaw. Later in 1997 and 2007 other armed units broke away from the KNU and established their own political and military organizations.191 On January the 28th 1995 the KNU issued a statement announcing that their capital Manerplaw had fallen into the hands of the Tatmadaw.192 The formation of the DKBA in December 1994 proved to be decisive for the capture of Manerplaw. The 500 DKBA soldiers helped to capture Manerplaw within two months after its formation.193 With the capturing of Manerplaw the Tatmadaw ‘had extended its control over the increasingly war-weary ethno nationalist forces in the once rebellious peripheries as it had never done before, reaching into areas virtually all along the Thai border.’194 Despite this loss the KNU continued its struggle and the organization changed tactics. The war was now fought exclusively in guerilla tactics. Nonetheless the capture of Manerplaw by the Tatmadaw was a heavy loss. The leadership silently moved to the border town of Mae Sot, Tak province, Thailand. The leadership was therefore further away from the areas it used to control. The communication lines between the KNU’s leadership and the forces in the field became longer and thus slower. Some KNU battalions started acting more independently. After the capture of Manerplaw 10.000 Karen fled to refugee camps in Thailand. In March 1995 the last KNU stronghold Kaw Moo Rah fell in the hands of the Tatmadaw which now exercised full control of the border.195 One way or another, the capture of Manerplaw can be seen as the biggest blow to the struggle of the KNU it had to endure since the outbreak of the Karen Conflict in 1949. In the aftermath of the conquering of Manerplaw the DKBA started cross-border raids into Thailand and attacked the Karen refugee camps.196 In 1989 the Burmese army had been using Thai soil for the first time to attack KNU strongholds on the Moei river from the rear. Some Karen officers were surprised. No Thai military commander had allowed Burmese troops to attack the KNU using Thai soil before.197 The response in Bangkok to foreign soldiers landing on Thai soil was dramatic. Thai politicians discussed how to respond. In 1995 the only reaction Thai authorities gave was to move the Karen refugees further inland. The overall military movement in 1995 can be interpreted as an operation in which the Thai and Burmese army intelligence cooperated to further decimate the KNU. The cross-border raids became a frequent phenomenon in the border region, between 1995-1998 DKBA forces killed around twenty refugees inside Thailand. Thai authorities responded with creating fences around even larger camps and refugees were not allowed to move freely in an out the camps. 198 In this way the camps, known for being used by the KNU as sources of external support, were easier to control. Thai and Myanmar intelligence started working together in the period 1988-1997, possibly to exterminate the KNU. Writing about the attack on Manerplaw the Thai scholar Chachavalpongpun for example claims: “The Burmese army was able to cross over into Thailand

190 Brouwer & van Wijk, “Helping Hands”, p. 838. 191 South, “Burma’s Longest war.”, p. 10. 192 KNU archive, inv. no. 250, Foreign Affairs Department KNU, IISH, Amsterdam. 193 Nijhuis, M., Birma. Land van geheimen. (Amsterdam, 2009), p. 66-67. 194 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary., p. 47. 195 South, “Burma’s Longest war.”, p. 14. 196 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 125. 197 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 69. 198 Brouwer & van Wijk, “Helping Hands”, p. 842.

32 to attack the Karen bases from the rear with the tacit support of the Thai army’s new Task Force 34, which was set up by General Chaovalit.”199 Through the Thai intelligence the Tatmadaw gained information of Burmese and foreign activists who were active inside Thailand. The Thai intelligence sometimes played a double role in the early 1990s. In exchange for giving border passes to KNU soldiers the Thai military gathered information on the Burmese army’s movement. Simultaneously the Thai gathered information on the rebels movement through the Burmese army. It is unknown wether the information exchange between the two governments was merely local or extended to the top levels. After the fall over Manerplaw the next area to which the Tatmadaw moved military personnel was the Mergui/Tavoy district. In this case a Thai soldier admitted that the Burmese army and the Thai army cooperated. In April 1996 Thai military commander Maj. Gen. Taweep Sawanasing and his team of thirty officers traveled to the area and gathered information about the position, the amount of soldiers and the weaponry of the KNU. This information was subsequently given to the Burmese army. From October 1996 onwards the Burmese military informed the Thai military about the planned attack.200 After this successful attack for the first time in history the Tatmadaw had gained full control of the border with Thailand by 1997.201 Establishing full control over the border region could not have been achieved without cooperation between the Burmese and Thai military.

199 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 63. 200 Tun, Moe K., Burma Issues, 1997, p. 19. In: BPF archive, inv. no. 75, map 1, IISH, Amsterdam. 201 Barron, Between Worlds., p. 26-27 and Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma., p. 31.

3.3. Cross-border trade

Border trade between present day Thailand and Myanmar has been taking place for centuries.202 After Burma gained independence it was mainly the KNU who controlled the border trade. In several industries Thai and Myanmar authorities at the local and national level worked together in order to gain control of the border region. The shifting political tide had drastic economic consequences for the taxes and revenue income of the KNU, particularly in the teak wood industry. The construction of an oil and gas pipeline from Dawei (Tavoy) to Thailand also had adverse consequences. The KNU in the 1970s and the 1980s actually became very concerned with defending lucrative trading deals and routes. Some experts Ashley South have argued that the KNU has paid more attention to earning money than to fighting for its political goals.203 For weapons and other supplies the KNU was actually heavily dependent on Thailand and in return Thai timber companies gained access to timber resources.204 When Thailand and Myanmar opened bilateral relations, the monopoly on the teakwood trade was quickly lost by the KNU. Valuable forests formerly under Karen control began to be logged by Thai companies, paying taxes mainly to Rangoon.205 Though Thai and Myanmar authorities allowed Thai timber companies into Myanmar, authorities at the state level barely exercised any control over them.206 Due to this lack of authority, Thai businessmen sometimes cooperated with the Burmese army at the local level. Around the Three Pagoda Pass for instance the Thai timber company Pathumthani Tangkakarn has been known for using its trucks to transport Burmese troops on both Thai and Myanmar territory.207 “For the anti-Rangoon insurgencies, the borderland forests were a long-term strategic haven, a valuable source of revenue and taxation, indeed a symbolic site of (contested) sovereignty, particularly after the insurgents were pushed into these remote regions in the 1970s.”208 For decades the KNU sold teak wood to Thai timber companies and made large profits of this trade. After 1988, as explained in chapter two the Burmese government in Rangoon gave concessions to Thai timber companies to cut teak wood trees on Burmese soil. Thereby the KNU lost control of this most lucrative trade. When in April 1995 the KNU stronghold of Kaw Moo Rah was seized, the KNU had most likely lost its last saw mill.209 Income from the logging industry therefore completely stopped. For the first time the logging industry was controlled by the Burmese state and Thai timber companies. The Thai timber companies paid large sums of money to the Burmese army to protect the loggers while they were extracting the world’s finest teak wood from Myanmar’s forests. Early in 1990 the SLORC received US$3.28 million for teak in 45 concessions areas from sixteen Thai teak companies.210 The Thai timber companies contributed to clearing logging routes between the concession areas and the Thai-Myanmar border. The building of these roads facilitated the Burmese army in gaining access easier to KNU controlled territory. The opening of the border region by these roads changed the dynamic of the war.211 The road linking the Burmese towns

202 Chongkittavorn, “Thai-Burma Relations”, p. 120. 203 South is mentioned in the following article: Brouwer & van Wijk, “Helping Hands”, p. 838. 204 Battersby, “Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s international Relations in the 1990s:”, p. 484. 205 Barron, Between Worlds., p. 24. 206 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 64. 207 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 146. 208 Ibid., p. 145. 209 The Nation, 30 April 1995, In: BPF archive, invt. no. 75, map 3, IISH, Amsterdam. 210 Benson, L., “The Vanishing Forest.” In: KNU Bulletin, no. 24, February 1991, p. 16. IISH, Amsterdam. 211 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 145.

34 of Bokepyin and Kawthaung was important for cross-border trade but also to prevent the Karen from gaining access to the sea. From May 1991 Thai timber firms helped to construct this strategic road. The 200 kilometer long road ran parallel to the Thai-Myanmar border. According to Burmese authorities the road was to provide security to the international gas companies who were searching for gas fields in the Andaman sea.212 Another road was constructed first by Thai companies and later by the SLORC, from Kanchanaburi to Tavoy straight through Karen state. This road was to be used for transportation from the yet to be constructed harbor in Tavoy. By 1993 environmental damage to Myanmar’s forests made the SLORC regime change tactics. While it profited from the newly constructed roads, Rangoon downscaled the number of concessions given to Thai logging companies. The Tatmadaw had found a new source of financial supply: the oil and gas sector.213 The development of contracts between international gas and oil companies and the Burmese regime affected the insurgency of the KNU too. Under guidance of the Petroleum authority of Thailand and the Myanmar Oil/Gas Enterprise the American TOTAL and the French Unocal invested into projects exploring the fossil fuel reserves in the Andaman Sea. By 1994 the four companies accounted for more than one third of the foreign investment into Myanmar.214 The construction of a pipeline from the Andaman Sea to Ratchanaburi province in Thailand meant that full control was to be established in the pipeline area. From 1991 onwards the first Karen villagers were relocated and around 60.000 people, most of them ethnically Karen, were forced to work on the line. After careful exploration negotiations started between the four companies and the Tatmadaw. In 1994 it was decided that by the first of July 1998 gas was to be exported to Thailand. In 1995 the relocations of villagers living in the pipeline area became more intense. More infantry was moved into the area, which had two goals. The first goal was to push the KNU away from the pipeline. The second goal was to cut the access of KNU soldiers to food and medicine via Thai smugglers. Internationally too the mood against the KNU had changed. In 1995 the KNU attacked the oil pipeline within the borders of Karen state in Myanmar. Instead of supporting the KNU, the United States of America this time gave an official warning to the KNU for the first time.215 The tide had clearly turned against the KNU.

212 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 92. 213 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 147. 214 KNU rapport, April 1995, KNU archive, inv. no. 4, IISH, Amsterdam. 215 Smith, Burma., p. 448.

3.4. The Karen borderland

The paradox found in a borderland is how borders simultaneously separate and unite.216 Borderlands have confrontational and/or cooperative relationships. Borders create political, social, and cultural distinctions, but simultaneously imply the existence of (new) networks and systems of interaction across them.217 While some borders acted as ethnic and religious divides, increasingly borders have become economic divides. The latter process also happened to the Thai-Myanmar border during the second half of the twentieth century. While The Thai- Myanmar border cuts the ethnically distinct population of the Karen at the same time this borderland connects two economic systems.218 In the case of the Thai-Myanmar border the shift from an adult borderland to a declining borderland is violent. The shifting of the five borderland stages in the theory of Baud & van Schendel is between two nation states. In the case of the nation-states Thailand and Myanmar the shift from an adult to a declining borderland is peaceful because the two governments agreed in a cooperative manner on border issues. But the regional elite by which I mean the leaders of the KNU, rebelled against the state of Myanmar. Thus a regional group made the shift from an adult to a declining borderland violent. The KNU turned the border region in a rebellious borderland. The Karen are a typical example of what Baud & van Schendel call transborder peoples. Transborder peoples make use of their position in between two states. Smuggling is a typical border activity in which the political and the economic come together and through which transborder peoples can improve their socio-economic position. The cross-border trade which developed on the Thai-Myanmar border is a direct result of the restrictive policies of the Burmese government, which caused certain goods to become scarce and/or expensive.219 The Karen National Union controlled this cross-border trade for a long time. The KNU was able to finance its war by the incomes from many different economic activities. The fall of Communism (world time), the change in the relationship of the two states Thailand and Myanmar (state time), and the search for resources which flooded the borderland (border time) all had a lasting effect on the struggle of the Karen National Union. In 1988 the KNU might have been at the height of its power with a new influx of young rebellious students from Burma’s cities fleeing into KNU controlled territory. By 1997 the Tatmadaw conquered the last KNU controlled territory by which the KNU also lost control of its main income: the levying of taxes on products crossing the border. “As the ethnic insurgent bosses were no longer in the position to grant concession rights following the ceasefire agreements with the Burmese government, the Thai power holders began to distance their relations with the ethnic minorities. The KNU leaders have said that they were specifically warned by senior Thai army officers not to interrupt the trade, which Thailand was conducting with the Burmese government.”220 In a a few years the KNU lost control of its two main sources of income: the levying of taxes on products crossing the border and the teak logging industry. The KNU’s capital Manerplaw was conquered in 1995 and the organization was severely weakened in the years 1988-1997 while Thailand’s industry and the Tatmadaw gained large financial profits in that same period.

216 Baud & van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.”, p. 242. 217 Ibid., p. 216. 218 Ibid., p. 227. 219 Ibid.,, p. 230. 220 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 70.

Conclusion

International, state and regional processes influenced the foreign policies of Thailand and Myanmar to change after 1988. In the period 1988-1997 the bilateral relationship between Thailand and Myanmar heavily affected the struggle of the Karen National Union. Despite deeply rooted antagonism between Myanmar and Thailand the disappearance of the threat of communism made it possible for the Thai government to focus on economic issues as opposed to security issues created by the threat of communism. In the 1980s communism was losing terrain worldwide and simultaneously Thailand’s economy was expanding exponentially. Central to this research has been the question why both Thailand and Myanmar changed their foreign policies between 1988-1997. The second part of this research tried to clarify how this change affected the armed insurgency of the Karen National Union from 1988 to 1997. The change in relations gave the Burmese military the capability to fight the KNU insurgency more effectively. By 1997 both Thailand and Myanmar had gained almost full control of their shared border region. In the latter half of the twentieth century many Third World states tried to curb regional autonomy. Postcolonial states were no longer content with “rough edges” and took possession of disputed areas. State elites made sure there were no more loosely defined borders within their state’s territory.221 The developments in the border region of Thailand and Myanmar also fit this picture. From the fifteenth century onwards the proto nation-states of Thailand and Myanmar waged war against each other. During the British colonial administration of Burma contact with Thailand was limited to economic activities. After both countries gained independence contact was minimal. The Karen profited from their position in a borderland by controlling the border trade and communicating between the state elites of Thailand and Myanmar. Between 1988 and 1990 Myanmar adopted a new attitude towards Thailand. The Tatmadaw gained access to new financial reserves by handing out concessions to the Thai industry. Thai military and political leaders gained commercial and trade concessions. Thailand’s elites wanted to profit from the resource rich country Burma. Thailand put a ban on teakwood in 1988 which pushed the Thai teak wood industry to exploit the large teak wood forests of Myanmar. Before 1988 Thailand had a foreign policy of maintaining buffer zones around its territory, whereby it supported armed groups to prevent the spread of communism. The Karen National Union is one example of a group supported by Thai authorities. Ethnic insurgents of Burma were used in the official Thai foreign policy. After 1988 the Karen National Union gradually lost this support from Thai authorities. After 1988 the ethnic insurgents of Myanmar were treated by both Thailand and Myanmar as security threats. Some Thai officials, either at the local or maybe state level, must have known that the money invested into Burma would be used to fight ethnic insurgents. It is unknown to what level this extends. However one thing is certain: the tide had definitely shifted against the Karen National Union by 1997. The dictatorial regime of Myanmar changed its foreign policy of isolationism and opened bilateral ties in 1988 with Thailand and other neighboring countries. The Tatmadaw had no financial reserves left plus the financial reserves of the state of Burma was also depleted. The trigger to break the isolationist policy was given by the people of Burma in 1988. Protests broke out nationwide against the regime of General Ne Win. His top priority was to hold the territory of Burma together. The British left a devastated and unstable Burma in 1948. The direct and indirect rule of the British colonial administration in Burma had enlarged the antagonism

221 Baud & van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.”, p. 223.

37 between the Karen and the Burmans. Eventually the ethnic tension erupted in a civil war between these two groups in 1949.222 Other groups like the Burmese Communist Party also fought the Burmese government in Rangoon. This government only exercised influence of the larger cities like Rangoon and Mandalay in the 1950s. That is why the military took control of the state. The policies of General Ne Win devastated the economy and led to the nationwide uprising in 1988. Suddenly the regime of Burma was not only threatened by the ethnic armed insurgencies but also by its own ethnically Burmese people. The bankruptcy of the Burmese state and the Tatmadaw’s deplorable own financial reserves pushed the regime of General Ne Win to create a new foreign policy. The transition in the Thai-Myanmar borderland which took place in the years after 1988 is remarkable. The new bilateral relation between Myanmar and Thailand blurred the border between the two Southeast Asian nation-states to promote economic infrastructure and trade. But occasionally due to the refugee issue the border was sometimes invoked by both states to prevent refugees from crossing. The elites of Thailand and Myanmar have cooperated to push aside the Karen and profit from the trade. The Tatmadaw succeeded in gaining a permanent military foothold in formerly KNU controlled territory. A large counterinsurgency campaign was started by the Tatmadaw in 1984. Only after new foreign reserves came in after 1988 from the logging and oil and gas industry the Tatmadaw was able to buy new weaponry. Fighting the Karen insurgents was now possible all year round. Since 1988 economic activities in the border region increased. Thai timber companies constructed roads and the Burmese military forced villages to relocate to gain full control of the area where the gas/oil pipeline was to be constructed. In 1994 the Tatmadaw succeeded into convincing Karen Buddhists to break away from the mainly Christian dominated KNU. These Buddhist Karen were crucial factor in the conquering of Manerplaw by the Burmese military. After Manerplaw fell in 1995 the KNU was forced to move their headquarter to Mae Sot, Thailand. As a result of this process the KNU lost much of its income from tax and other revenues and it became difficult for the KNU to finance its war against the Burmese government. By 1997 the Tatmadaw had gained full control of the border area formerly controlled by the ethnic political and military organization, the Karen National Union. Without the help of Thai military intelligence this would have not been achieved so quick. The relationship between Thailand and Myanmar is best illustrated by the army intelligence of Myanmar and Thailand exchanging information between 1988-1997. While the KNU became even more dependent on external support from Thailand after 1988, Thailand turned less receptive to their cause. The shifting alliances between ethnic opposition movements and the Burmese government and between Thailand and the Burmese authorities has worked to the disadvantage of the KNU. The position of Karen changed from a relative autonomous buffer group to that of an ethnic minority group with limited rights and split between two countries. Before 1988 the border region could be seen as one borderland. In the early 1990s the Thai-Myanmar border was blurred to enhance trade and investment but simultaneously invoked to stop the activities of the KNU. In this sence the Karen borderland became more divided than ever. The demand for natural resources which began in the colonial period and intensified the last two decades has dramatically affected the way that the territory inhabited by the KNU was perceived. Where the border region was first considered a waste land, the mountainous region was now coveted for teak trees and Karen state became a valuable energy corridor between Thailand and Myanmar. After 1997 Prime Minister Chuan reversed the policies of his predeccessors Chatichai

222 Aung-Thwin and Aung Thwin, A history of Myanmar, p. 182 and 191.

38 and Chaovalit. Chuan’s cabinet ministers were professional politicians and academics without any personal economic interests in Myanmar.223 By mid-1998 all Thai investment in Myanmar had ceased.224 But in 1997 Myanmar became a full member of the ASEAN, whereby it entered the international economic system and established full political and economic ties with all ASEAN memberstates. In November 2010 20.000 people crossed the border into Thailand due to renewed fighting.225 The historical legacy described here will have consequences in the future for both Thailand and Myanmar and the wider region. It is therefore important to understand the complex economic and political coalition that developed swift in the period 1988-1997 between Thailand and Myanmar. Thailand’s policy shifted from non-engagement to extensive engagement with the government of Myanmar. Thailand’s foreign policy in the 1990s has been described as resource diplomacy. It must have been known to at least some of Thailand’s businessman and politicians that investment in Myanmar would somehow be used by the Burmese military to fight the insurgencies. Unfortunately I am not able to read Burmese or Karen but the archive of the Karen National Union can surely expose more details in this process for the person who is able to read Burmese and Karen. The material I found has renewed our knowledge in a more detailed manner. Statistics of the logging industry for example show how much money was made per day Thai companies. The Myanmar related archives found in the International Institute of Social History are very fruitful and they can be used for more research in the future. The Karen National Union is not a strong organization anymore. The Karen National Union signed a ceasefire with the government of Myanmar in 2012, but the KNU’s relationship with both Thailand and Myanmar is precarious. The Karen are still a large minority in both countries and their political organizations have influence over large parts of the border between Thailand and Myanmar. The historical legacy might move future generations of Karen to disturb the wish of Myanmar’s and Thailand’s government to create a stable and economically prosperous border region.

223 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 76. 224 MacCarthy, “Ten Years of Chaos in Burma”, p. 254. 225 Pederson, A Secret Genocide, p. 270. 39