Nawat For Group Research Paper

Study About the Displacement Movement’s Effects on the Syrian Coastal Areas

Prepared by:

Dr. Rateb Shabo Mr. Khaldon Hawala Ms. Rona Eid Mr. Issa Ibrahim

www.nawatsyria.com

Introduction:

The Syrian Coastal areas formed an important social pillar of the Assad regime, the regime that launched a wide war against the areas that went out and revolted against it calling for the "overthrow of the regime" since the beginning of 2011. Thus, the Coastal areas remained far from the regime's military operations, the thing that made these areas a haven for thousands of Syrian families from the attacked interior. The regime's military campaigns led to the displacement of a significant portion of the people from the targeted areas to the Coastal region, or to internal areas that were still outside the circle of the regime's military targeting. The study deals with the displacement movement to the Coastal region and its repercussions and effects on the arrivals and the local communities, and the emerging mechanisms of action of the Assad regime for control. The large number of arrivals was not the only thing that distinguished the situation of displacement to the Coastal region, but also the fact that the displacement occurred in a context of severe political conflict that took a military dimension which does not allow anyone to remain neutral. This means that, in addition to the old elements of the sorting (sectarian, class, and regional), a new element has entered the political sorting, which in fact dominated the rest of the elements.

The number of the IDPs in the Syrian Coastal region is equivalent to nearly half of the region's settled population. The majority of the IDPs are Sunnis who fled because of the military operations in their areas, in addition to the Sunnis there are quite a few displaced who are originally from the Coastal region, and during the past decades had settled away from their original areas by virtue of work and the attractiveness of large cities, then they returned to the Coast after the outbreak of the 2011 revolution, because of the fear of the negative and hostile attitude shown by some of the movement's parties against them through the imitation between the Alawites and the Assad regime. Also, other Alawites fled to the Coast from their original settlement areas outside the Coast, mainly from the countryside of Hama and Homs. The prolongation of the conflict in Syria has made this emergency situation a permanent character that needs to be studied and shed light on the form in which the relations between the IDPs and settled groups have been established, the mutual influences, and the reflection of this situation on the mechanisms of the regime's work.

The first title will deal with the categories of the IDPs in the Coast and outline the lines that can divide the IDPs into categories, which are regional, sectarian and class lines, in addition to the most important line, which is the political position. The second title deals with the changes in the attitudes towards the IDPs with the fluctuations of the conflict, and shows that the Russian intervention at the end of September 2015 restored reassurance to the Assad regime loyalists, which made them deal in a better way with the IDPs, while the bombings that targeted the Coastal region affected negatively the dealing dealings with the IDPs.

As for the third title, it deals with the economic and commercial transformations due to the conflict and the movement of displacement, and shows how economic relations were disrupted by the sharp political polarization that followed the outbreak of the demonstrations which called for the overthrow of the regime.

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1- The categories of the internally displaced persons in the Coastal region.

The Syrian Coast extends between Turkey in the north and in the south, and between the Alawite Mountains in the east and the Mediterranean in the west. It consists of two governorates, and Lattakia, and includes four cities: Lattakia, Tartus, Jableh (which is affiliated to Lattakia governorate), and (which is affiliated to Tartus governorate).

This administrative definition does not precisely coincide with the definition of the Coast as a safer area, taking into consideration the position of the people who are closer to the regime than to the protest movement as some parts of the Coastal region rose up against the regime and witnessed battles starting from an early period. For example, Al-Haffa, Salma, Doreen and Jabal Al-Akrad areas, which are administratively affiliated to Lattakia governorate, but they were not considered safe areas, and for years they remained vulnerable to artillery and aviation bombing, which made them a source of displacement waves, some of which went to safer areas in the Coast, while others headed to areas close to the borders With Turkey. The same applies to Al-Raml Al-Janoubi neighborhood in Lattakia.

The main economic activities in the Coast are agriculture, tourism, ports, and a few light industries. The Coastal region benefited from its relative stability in the period that followed the outbreak of the protests in Syria, so the number of investments in it increased, especially by Aleppian businessmen who moved to the Coast in 2012-2013, and began to settle there due to the prolonged war, and started investing their money in a number of projects.

Tartus, for example, witnessed the registration of 501 new companies in 2013 compared to 326 companies in 2012, that is an increase of 54%. In 2014, the Ministry of Local Administration announced the establishment of two industrial zones near the city of Lattakia to host new investments in manufacturing industries.1 In the mid-2014 census (that is, more than three years after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution), the number of IDPs in the Coast from various Syrian governorates reached 467.8 thousand, of whom 220.4 thousand were from , equivalent to 47%, the majority of whom were displaced to Lattakia.

Homs governorate comes second with 59.2 thousand IDPs, or 12.6%, the majority of whom were displaced to Tartus governorate. Then comes Rural with 46.1 thousand IDPs, or 9.8%, most of whom were displaced to Lattakia, then , as 35.3 thousand IDPs were displaced from it or 7.5%, most of them to Lattakia, as the following table shows: From Aleppo Homs Rural Idlib Damascus Hama Al-Raqa Al-Hasakah Damascus

The economy of the Syrian Coast, the stability of the exception, by jihad Yazji. 1 https://www.almodon.com/economy/2014/5/29/%d8%a5%d9%82%d8%aa%d8%b5%d8%a7%d8%af- %d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%ad%d9%84-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b3%d9%88%d8%b1%d9%8a- %d8%a5%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d8%a7%d8%b1- %d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a5%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%ab%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%a1

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To 168.8 18.2 26.7 24.9 18.5 4.2 9.9 5.3 Lattakia

To 51.6 41 19.4 10.4 14.6 12.6 3.8 6.2 Tartus

The total 220.4 59.2 46.1 35.3 33.1 16.8 13.7 11.5

Numbers of IDPs in the Syrian Coast, according to the governorates from which they came (in thousands). According to the aforementioned census, the population in Lattakia governorate reached 1.359 million, of whom 281,000 were IDPs from outside the governorate (20%). The population in Tartus Governorate reached 1.041 million, of whom 169,000 were IDPs from outside the governorate (16%).2 It is likely that the number of IDPs far exceeded these numbers, due to the continuation and expansion of the fighting after 2014. In 2015, the Syrian Interim Government (of the opposition) published that the number of IDPs in Lattakia Governorate exceeded half a million.3 Thus, the number doubled within one year. In September of 2019 alone, Lattakia received a wave of displacement from various governorates that exceeded two thousand IDPs. Statistical bulletins indicate that the return movement is very weak. According to the statistical bulletin 2017-2018, issued by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the percentage of IDPs was equivalent to 18.1% of the population, and the percentage of returnees among them was very small, and did not exceed 0.6%4. Categories of IDPs differ according to the region from which they come (the main areas of displacement to the Coastal region are (respectively) , Aleppo, Homs, Rural Damascus and Idlib). According to the class level, we have middle class IDPs who are mostly vocationals, but the majority of the IDPs are from the poor popular groups, and as for those with large capitals, the Coast did not have a significant share of them. According to religious affiliation, the majority of IDPs are Sunni Muslims, in addition to the number of IDPs from other religious and sectarian backgrounds. Each of these classifications reflects the reciprocal attitude between arrivals and the receiving environment. Many of the IDPs from Idlib have kinship or friendship links with families residing in the Coast, especially in the city of Lattakia, due to the proximity of the two governorates and to the settlement of some families from Idlib in Lattakia in the past due to the availability of wider areas for work in the Coastal city.

In Lattakia, those IDPs arriving from the east are called "Shriqiyin", and there are many families in Lattakia who bear the last name "Shriqi", meaning coming from the East. IDPs from

Population movement inside Syria in mid-2014. Central Bureau of Statistics. 2 http://cbssyr.sy/population_statuse.html. We notice a disturbance in the numbers. In another table, we find that the number of IDPs in Lattakia governorate is 302.7 thousand people, and to Tartus governorate is 165.1 thousand. https://www.eqtsad.net/news/article/11423/ 3 http://cbssyr.sy/Demographic/Demographic_2017_2018.pdf 4

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Idlib often moved to live in or near their relatives' neighborhoods5. The convergence of the economic and social level, and even of the political biases between these two parties (IDPs and hosts), has largely mitigated the impact of the mixing between the two, the mixing that usually is resulted from displacement. The lack of mixing was reinforced by the siege that the regime imposed on these neighborhoods.

The distant IDPs, who come whether from Aleppo or Rural Damascus, did not have social bridges to pave the way for their new stability, like the "Shriqis" did, so they spread in the Coast and mingled in the Coastal fabric better, taking advantage of the welcoming attitude of the the Assad regime loyalists. Unlike the attitude toward Idlib’s IDPs, the loyal Coastal community in general welcomed the IDPs from Aleppo, especially the first waves of them (2012-2013), and this is due to the political attitude of the people of Aleppo, who kept from the beginning a distance away from the protest movement.

In fact, the political position prevailed over every other consideration, including the sectarian position. The truth is that the political position has always prevailed with regard to all categories of the IDPs, as it has prevailed with regard to the perception among the members of the local communities themselves. As the direct experience of researchers has shownIn, generally the Alawite environment has given the priority always to the political position in the period of acute political polarization that followed the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011. Nothing will intercede for those who stand against the Assad regime, neither the sectarian root, the region, nor the class background. It should be noted that the Alawite community did not reach this level of extremism towards opponents of the regime, even during the conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s, and this community, at that time, continued to embrace opponents of the Assad regime from communist currents (the Communist Labour Party in Syria, the Communist Labour Party - the Political Office ) and nationalist currents (the Baath Democratic Party). These opponents had the presence, acceptance and even some sympathy among The Alawites. This important transformation in the Alawi environment needs serious study, which is out of the range of this study. This difference between the categories (region, religion, class, and political position) was also reflected in the areas of stability of each group in the Coastal region, noting that there is an overlap between these elements. For example, IDPs from the middle class are often closer to the regime with their political positions. The IDPs from non-Sunni religious backgrounds are also often closer to the regime regarding the political attitude. As mentioned before, the largest number of IDPs in the Coastal area comes from Aleppo governorate6, the majority of these arrived to the Coast in an early period (2012-2013) and generally enjoyed good acceptance in the area due to the perception that they are close to the regime, as it is known that the people of Aleppo did not join the demonstrations until late. The wealthy segments of IDPs from Aleppo and Idlib tended to live in modern neighborhoods inhabited by the middle class with the majority of Alawites, such as the Al-Ziraa neighborhood and the Al-Baath neighborhood in Lattakia, and the Al-Hamarat neighborhood and Al- Meshbakah neighborhood, which are high-end and mixed neighborhoods in the center of

5 In the questionnaire conducted by the researchers, and in response to the question of why did you choose to move to Latakia, 26 respondents, or 37%, answered that the reason is having relatives in the area. 6 According to the field study, the number of IDPs from Aleppo constitutes 51% of the total number of IDPs in the Coast.

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Tartus. With the prolonged conflict, they began to settle, as they switched from renting houses to buying, and turned to investing their capitals in projects. As for the popular groups of IDPs from Aleppo, they were received at the Sports City in Lattakia with remarkable interest at the level of the people as well as the state level. Whereas the IDPs from other governorates did not receive similar attention, the prevailing view of them was as the incubator that produced "terrorism" and still supports it, “They kill us and then take refuge in our areas,” a phrase repeatedly heard, one of the indicators of the weakness of the Syrian national formation. During that period, the people of the Sahel used to camouflage between the authority, the state and the loyal public, the camouflage began to disintegrate in the recent period under the pressure of the economic decline and the sharp increase in the level of corruption and the blockage of prospects. Most of the Sunni’s IDPs come from governorates other than Aleppo are from the poorest groups, and these people, especially Idlib’s IDPs who had kinship or relations with the indigenous population, went to live in poor neighborhoods that are predominantly Sunni, such as Al-Raml Al Janoubi, Qinnas and Al-Skantouri in Lattakia. For these IDPs, The displacement did not change the characteristics of their environment, which remained in general as it is, poor, closed, and preserving the line of differentiation of the religious identities with the introspection of a feeling of injustice that originates from sectarian discrimination, which reinforces the intertwining of the sectarian and class colors. The thing that reinforced sectarian identities and sectarian dissonance for these groups. These are predominantly Sunni neighborhoods that suffer from poverty, neglect and lack of services. Therefore, with their young demographic composition and high birth rate, they constitute a permanent reservoir for social rebellion, These are predominantly Sunni neighborhoods that suffer from poverty, neglect, and the lack of services. Therefore, with their young population composition and high birth rate, they constitute a permanent reservoir for social rebellion,7 so the regime invades these areas with a network of informers whose livelihood sources are based on smuggling, crime and contraband. The same applies to those who were displaced from the western countryside of Homs (Tal Kalakh, Al-Zara, and Al-Hosn) to Tartus. Most of these people went to Al-Hamidiyah and its vicinity, an area inhabited by the majority of Sunnis (Greeks), and they lived in shelters and chalets, and remained isolated from the Alawites surroundings.

In the first years of the revolution, the regime sought to encircle and isolate these neighborhoods by placing numerous security checkpoints at their entrances. For example, a security checkpoint was placed at the entrances to the Qaninas neighborhood from the city center side, and from Al-Mashro’ Al-Tase’ neighborhood and the Montazah neighborhood. If a resident of Al-Raml Al-Janoubi wants to go to the city center, he must pass through at least seven security checkpoints8. The same was observed in Tartus, in the Hamidiyah region, for example. The displacement to the Coast also included also groups from non-Sunni religious backgrounds, as there are a number of Shia who were displaced from Aleppo and Idlib, including those who come from Raqqa after the regime lost control over the city, especially after the takeover of the Islamic State (ISIS), and they settled in neighborhoods with the majority of Alawites due to the similarity of the political attitudes.

7 Birth control in these societies is not encouraged and rejected from a religious point of view. It is noteworthy that, with the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the people of the Qaninas neighborhood in Lattakia attacked the family planning headquarters next to their neighborhood and destroyed its contents.. http://alaalam.org/ar/translations-ar/item/478-636170317 8

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A large number of Alawites headed to the Coast after the protests turned violent under the pressure of the regime's violence. Some of them have been subjected to attacks, and voices attributed to the protests have called the Alawite neighborhoods in Damascus (which are mostly slums and poor neighborhoods) as settlements. Although these voices were limited, they were sufficient to trigger mechanisms of fear that have deep roots in the Alawite collective subconscious. These have returned to their original areas, and many of them have families and properties, and accordingly, their movement was closer to returning than displacement. If the return, for most of them, was not heavy in terms of housing and livelihood security, then it was heavy from a psychological point of view, as it implies a feeling of ostracism and disappointment. For them, and for their surroundings as well, it is a feeling of alienation that leads to shrinkage. In this case, it is understandable that these people have negative feelings against the protests and their supporters. Apart from these "returnees," hundreds of Alawite families, estimated at hundreds, were displaced from their original areas in Homs or Hama countryside, to the Coastal areas. They suffered from what the displaced Sunnis endured, as they lost their homes and livelihoods, and changed their environment and lifestyle. The only constant with regard to all Alawites, whether they are settled or displaced, is the identification of the vast majority of them with the existing regime and the establishment of a psychological and political barrier based on a lack of trust that prevents them from identifying with the movement opposing the regime. In addition to the remote displacement, that is from outside the Coast to the Coast, Lattakia witnessed a near or internal displacement of hundreds of families (about 6 thousand people) who were displaced from areas of conflict in the Coastal region (Al Raml Al Janoubi, Al Haffah, Salma), in addition to the displacement of about 18 thousand people from the northern countryside of Lattakia, which was exposed in the summer of 2013 to an attack carried out by Islamic units, the attack is locally known as (the massacre of the ten villages)9. This displacement was dramatically different from any other, as it was tangible evidence that the enemy had become in the homeland and that the state was unable to protect the areas of its most stable loyalists. What added to the bitterness of ten villages' tragedy was the recklessness with which the state agencies dealt with them and their victims.

2-The shifts of the attitude toward the IDPs according to the vicissitudes of the conflict. What controls the attitude toward the IDPs is the political position, as mentioned before. It is not possible to find an IDP in the Coastal areas publicly expressing a political position opposing the regime, everyone is looking for safety (this also applies to the answers that the researchers collected in their questionnaires). If this is what the regime is aiming for, to secure its dominant position, using a deterrence force which prevents people from freely expressing their opinions, so this would satisfy the loyalists of the regime but does not reassure them. The people of the Coast are aware from contact with the IDPs that the political separation line does not coincide with the sectarian separation line, and that there are Sunni’s IDPs who are more loyal to the regime, and that some of them have a strong connection to the regime that makes local loyalists fear them while they are in their areas10.

9The ten villages massacre. A special report on the massacre in the northern Latakia countryside 2013, issued in December 2015. Under the supervision of Safwan Daoud. One of our researchers from Tartus reported the story of an IDP from Aleppo who has a clothing factory (printing and 10 drawing) in the basement of a building in the Al-Mashbakah neighborhood of Tartous, working in violation of the laws, but all the neighborhood residents fear him, and none of them dare to file a complaint against him, because of his links to the Shabiha and his support for Aleppo groups in ( National Defense).

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The Sunnis in Lattakia noticed that part of the Sunni arrivals, especially members of some tribes from Aleppo, turned into elements of repression in the interest of the regime. One of the researchers participating in the study, a resident of one of the Lattakia neighborhoods in which the Sunnis are predominant, said, “The civil servant who comes to collect electricity bills was accompanied by an armed personnel from the IDPs of Aleppo, and this personnel is often very rough in comparison with the usual rudeness of the security men. Also, at the checkpoints that were held on Fridays during prayer time, there were volunteers, from Aleppo, with the National Defense Militia, and they were more cruel and provocative”. It is known that many of these Aleppans returned to Aleppo after the regime took control over it at the end of 2016 to work with forces supervised by Russia or Iran. However, there is an economic aspect that had an impact on the attitude towards the IDPs, due to the expected impact of displacement in competition on the labor market and in the formation of an excess pressure on resources. The Aleppian vocationals competed with the local vocationals in the Coast, but on the other hand, they provided the consumer with better goods and service at a lower price. Therefore, it is normal that the economic impact on the people would not be homogeneous. A percentage of the Coast people believe that economic competition and the availability of vocational and owners of capitals serve in securing alternatives to goods that are not available anymore in the market due to the war and blockade11. We can also notice a security aspect based on the fear that the IDPs would form a source of danger, such as sleeper cells among them that would be active at some point, or that they will form a support of backup to the opposition forces who may attack the Coast at some point, especially with repeated calls to open the Coastal front. The thing that can be expressed as one of the researchers said: “these IDPs became in this case (fearful and frightening at the same time)”12. However, the attitude towards the IDPs is connected to the developments in the field. Each fall back or defeat of the regime forces increased the negative charge towards the Sunni IDPs. The regime's military fall back reached its climax in March 2015, when the Allied Islamist Factions under the name (Jaish Al-Fateh) quickly took control over the city of Idlib, then Jisr al-Shughour which is adjacent to the Lattakia governorate, and then controlled Ariha, which was the last city under the regime's control, from the Idlib governorate.

At that time, the regime prevented IDPs from Idlib from entering Tartus Governorate, and the reason behind this decision could be the fear from some attacks by the local people against the IDPs due to the frustration and the defeat feelings by the regime's loyalists.

The regime has always been keen on stabilizing its areas of control in terms of the relationship between the locals and the IDPs, so it gives the impression to the outside that it is the party that protects diversity13،, in contrast to the Islamic monophonic version that occupied the opposition scene. This was one of the strengths that the regime struggled to keep.

11 In a survey conducted in 2015, and in response to a question: About the impact of displacement on the Coast, 89% answered that the impact is negative. A study entitled (Alawites and the Syrian Revolution), for the Democratic Republic Studies Center. Rateb Shaabo. 12 Sadiq Abdel Rahman, Displaced people in the Syrian Coast. https://www.aljumhuriya.net/ar/28476 13 After the attack on the villages in the northern countryside of Latakia, voices were calling for revenge or at least pressure on the kidnappers by kidnapping in return. In the new cultural center in Lattakia called Dar Al- Assad for Culture, regime officials held a meeting with the survivors of the massacre, and calmed the situation. This was one of the reasons for absorbing the shock and dampening the reactions. The same thing was done by the regime after the criminal bombings that ISIS adopted and which affected civilian gatherings in garages in Jableh and Tartus in May 2016, which resulted in more than 160 deaths. Military security personnel in Tartus protected the whereabouts of the IDPs, after they were attacked by Shabiha. It is understood that the

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In addition to the regime’s keenness on civil stability in the areas which are under its control, the movement of displacement to the Coast was in the interest of the regime that in this case looks like the political representer of the majority of the Syrians, and the ruler of the largest human mass of them. The regime's media sought to show this displacement movement as fleeing of the terrorist groups that seized their areas, to cover the main reason, which is the regime's bombing of these areas. In addition, the direction of those fleeing the conflict abroad (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan) did not favor the image that the regime wanted to export abroad as a guarantor of the country's stability. In addition to that, the direction of those fleeing from the conflict abroad (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan) did not favor the image that the regime wanted to export abroad as a guarantor of the country's stability.

With the prolonged conflict, which contained many incidents of violence and sectarian massacres, the sectarian dimension emerged to the utmost limits, which left its impact on the displacement movement. For example, after the massacre of Al-Bayda and Ras al-Nabaa in Baniyas, the IDPs from these areas refused to go to the surrounding Alawite areas, and went to the remote village of Al-Matras, inhabited by Sunni Muslims, despite attempts by independent Alawites to host them14. On the other hand, the prolongation and spread of the conflict has led to an increase in the number of IDPs who have been forced to seek refuge in the Coast15, and to reside in neighborhoods where Alawites predominate, such as Al-Raml Al-Shamali, Al- Zaqzaqanieh and Saqoubin neighborhoods in Lattakia, and such as Al-Sheikh Saad, Dweir Al- Sheikh Saad, Al Radar neighborhoods, and the villages of Muntar and Zarqa in Tartus. By the time of the Russian military intervention in the conflict, at the end of September 2015,...... especially after the regime regained control over eastern Aleppo at the end of 2016, the people of the Coast regained security reassurance, and this was reflected in their relationship with the IDPs, which became more accepting, the perception of them as a potential danger receded, and the speech about the coexistence returned “we had always lived together as brothers, and that the tendentious people will not succeed in sowing enmities among us... etc”. With the beginning of the Russian military intervention in the conflict, at the end of September 2015, and the beginning of the retreat of the control of the opposition military formations elsewhere in Syria, especially after the restoration of eastern Aleppo at the end of 2016, the people of the Coast regained security reassurance, and this was reflected on their relationship with the IDPs, which became more acceptable, the idea that these IDPs are a possible risk retreated, and with that came back the discourse that we all lived as brothers and the tendentious people will fail to grow hatred among us. One of the researchers participating in the study from Tartus reported that in 2017, he was visiting the Zaytoun camp and saw a police patrol helping to distribute aid. The scene caught the attention of the researcher, who is originally from the region, then he came toward a policeman who knew him before and asked him why do you bother yourself with the distribution? this usually does not happen! The policeman replied: "If all the Sunnis had gone out against us, we would have fallen a long time ago. These have sons who are fighting with the army and are defending my brother and your brother at the front." Two years ago, this policeman was very hostile towards the IDPs, according to the researcher. regime presents itself to the world as a protector of diversity against the extremist Islamic forces, and it is likely that the insecurity in the Coast which is crowded with IDPs has always been a pressure card in the hands of the regime against the world as well as against the Syrian opposition itself. 14 For example, activists from the Adiyat Tartus Association tried to persuade the tired IDPs to stay at the neighboring Alawite villages instead of continuing the road to the village of Al-Matras, but to no avail. 15In our survey in the Coastal areas, many people answered the question: Why did you choose to seek refuge in the Coast?, by saying that they had not found another place.

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3-Economic and trade transformations due to the conflict and the displacement. Originally, the economy transcends sects due to its connection to the basic needs of the people. However, the sharp political polarization that followed the outbreak of the Syrian revolution and followed the lines of sectarian division, imposed itself on economic relations as well. When the Alawites viewed the protest movements against the Assad regime as harboring rejection and hatred for the Alawites themselves and not only for the regime, or as rejecting the Alawites through the rejection of the regime, they acted with a backlash and refrained from hesitating to the markets of the Sunni merchants who in fact control the commercial movement in the Coast. On the other hand, Alawite customers (especially unveiled women) were not welcomed in the shops of Sunni merchants in the first months of the demonstrations.

This reality imposed changes in the movement of the market manifested in the revitalization of the distribution of materials and goods in the Alawite neighborhoods. For example, in Al- Raml Al-Shamali neighborhood, which has the majority population of Alawites, in a short period of time, a market containing everything that customers need from clothes to gold to food was created. The phenomenon of “car-moving trade” has arisen as some Alawite individuals became active in transporting goods with their cars from the city of Lattakia to the Alawite villages, in order to spare people going to the city on the one hand and because they consider that these new "merchants" (who are often employees or teachers and have nothing to do with the trade before) have the priority From Sunni merchants to profit. This new activity has gained solidarity value with an explicit sectarian dimension.

In Baniyas, a new grocery and vegetable market was formed for the Alawites (Al-Souq Al- Fawqani) at Deir Al-Bashel junction near Damascus International highway. Likewise, in Jableh, where Alawites also opened private markets, and Sunni merchants were forced to open stores within Alawite gatherings, especially in the garage area.

To this economically polarized Coastal canvas as a reflection of political polarization, the displacement movement entered. The displacement movement from Aleppo, in particular, contributed to the restoration of the economic picture that was affected by a sectarian rift in the Coast, which made the Sunni merchants, who are the experts, away from Alawite consumers. Aleppian vocational, merchants and various stakeholders filled the gap, with their capital and skills, benefiting from the acceptance they enjoyed in the Coast, as a result of their political stance towards the regime, as previously mentioned. In Baniyas, for example, a number of Alawite merchants, who have shops in the central vegetable market that Alawite in Baniyas farmers boycotted, have employed IDPs from Aleppo to be their agents and work for their trade, the same applies to the Sunni merchants of Baniyas, who also relied on displaced Aleppans to manage their commercial affairs in the Alawites areas. This indicates that sectarian sensitivities do not include the entire sect, but rather have a special force in the near or local sphere16. Tartus. The waves of displacement from hot/unrest areas to the city of Tartus began from late 2012 until the end of the year 2014. Most of the IDPs in Tartus are from the Aleppo governorate, especially after armed groups from the Aleppo countryside entered the city in mid-2012, which forced a large part of people to flee.

16 KHEDER KHADDOURJuly 2016The Coast in Conflict Migration, Sectarianism, and Decentralization in Syria’s Latakia and Tartus Governorates. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/12682-20160725.pdf

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The IDPs settled in two main areas, in the Bseira area, about 20 km north of the city center, and the Nawras area 20 km south of the city center as well. A small percentage settled in the makeshift camps for the IDPs in the center of Tartus city, where the number of IDPs exceeded fifteen thousand. As for the total number of IDPs, it is approximately 500,000 IDPs, distributed over the areas of Busra, Al-Nawras, and Tartous “the city” with its countryside, Al-Sheikh Saad and Dweir Al-Sheikh Saad, some of them rented in the city center, others rented in the suburbs, and some rented in the chalet areas (Nawras - Baseera) where the rent is much lower. The regime emptied the camps in the city center and nearly 30% of the IDPs returned to their cities in 2017. In the chalet areas, special environments for the IDPs were formed, where the IDPs are in contact with each other most of the time and rarely come into contact with other people from the city because there are no reasons for such contact (about two hundred thousand IDPs). And there are the IDPs in the city and the suburbs, who have daily contact with the residents of the governorate and have fully adapted to the locals (about 150,000 IDPs). The results of the questionnaire in Tartus. The researcher noticed that the IDPs had no desire to talk and fill out their own questionnaires. This could be because of the idea that most of them are hopeless about any qualitative improvement in their lives unless they return to their original cities. Where the father or mother accepted to answer our questions, we managed to conduct 73 interviews. However, we received direct rejections more than a hundred times, and many of the answers were either a complete silence or a turning back. 1- Gender of the respondent: 64 Male (Fathers), 9 Female (Mothers) 2- The original living place (where did you come from?): We had three cases from Idlib governorate, two cases from (worth mentioning that there are approximately 10.000 IDPs from Homs, but the majority of them have relatives in Tartus to whom they moved to or asked for their support) and these do not consider themselves IDPs and refused to participate in our questionnaire. Also, we had 68 cases from Aleppo governorate, and it is notable that most of the IDPs in Tartus are from Aleppo. 3- The date of the displacement (in which year were you displaced to Tartus?): 39 cases were displaced in 2014, 27 cases were displaced in 2013, some cases do not know the exact date and when we insisted to get a specific answer they chose a year but without a clear clarification. 4- Have you been in other cities before coming to Tartus?: 4 Cases were in Lattakia then moved to Tartus, one case was in Messiaf first then moved to Tartus and 70 cases moved directly to Tartus. 5- Why did you choose Tartus governorate? 18 Cases said “we have relatives here”, 55 cases answered “because it is a safe city” and some others answered that they had no other place to go to. 6- What was your previous profession before coming to Tartus? 11 Cases worked as a government employee, 24 cases worked in the private sector (clothing factories), 36 cases worked in vegetable trade or had a mini market or worked as daily workers (and this had no fixed job, the work in any field). Two cases with small pickup cars they used it to work(It is clear that the absorption of these IDPs into the state institutions is weak, about 15%). 7- What is your job/ profession right now? 21 Cases work in clothing factories, 2 cases work in shoe repair workshops, 6 cases work as a government employee, 40 cases work as daily workers, 4 cases work in the field of house services, 2 cases are jobless and are fully dependent on money transfers. 8- Has your work formulated a type of competition to the locals? All cases answered with No, the researcher noticed the fear to say Yes, that some cases had. (Certainly, fear controls the answers here, according to reports in the spring of 2019, a dispute erupted between the

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Aleppian vendors and Tartusian, which led to collective quarrels between the two parties, followed by calls by some of the people of Tartus to expel the Aleppoian from the entire coast, claiming that their presence "reflected negatively on the coastal civilized face." Especially since Aleppo has become safe17). 9- Has any of the locals expressed their annoyance of this work? All cases answered “No”. (It is also obvious here that the fear and the sense of uselessness are controlling the responses of the IDPs.) 10- Does this job secure your needs and the needs of your family? No one answered “yes” except for 2 cases who answered “no job”, 17 cases answered “ somehow it does” and 54 cases answered “no”. 11- Do you integrate with the new society around you? All answers were “Yes”. 12- Have you formed new social relations with the people of Tartus? All cases answered “Yes”. 65 cases formed work relations, 63 cases formed friendships, 6 formed marriage relations. 13- Are you being harassed by the people of the city? 69 cases answered “No”, 4 cases answered “Yes, we were but it was over after a period of time”, there is no answer that the harassment still exists till now. If we compare, we find that the answers provided to a researcher differ from those provided to international organizations that the IDPs know that they have the power to act and influence. For example, a testimony published by UNICEF, (Fatima explains: “I went to school when I first arrived here, but after three days the other children rejected me, and I was scared because they were violent with me. I don't want to go back to that school again”. After talking to some of the other kids, I realized that they, too, have suffered the same stigma because they come from "out of the city". The children's reactions confirmed to me the state of division and turmoil the country is going through. When I asked Fatima what does she do during the day, she replied that she plays all day long with her friends, but only in the vicinity of their home, because they fear cruel treatment from other children. As Fatima ran towards the supplies truck to collect hygiene supplies, her mother came to talk to me, and asked UNICEF to provide more clothes and support to improve their living conditions. She said they have a feeling of insecurity and rejection, and that they want a school inside the center so that her daughter can learn in a safe environment.18). 14- Did the women have to change the nature of their dress to adapt to the environment? All cases answered “No” (The answer here is compelling, because the nature of the dress refers to a sectarian aspect, because the displaced women generally wear the hijab as a religious commitment, while Alawite women do not usually wear them, since the Alawite doctrine does not impose it on women. However, it is part of the nature of the esoteric Alawite sect that it does not interfere into a religious debate with the rest of the sects, especially the Sunni sect, and that it respects its religious traditions. Therefore, it is likely that the people of Taurus will not express direct or even indirect expressions that refer to the removal of the Hijab). 15- What are the most common risks you are exposed to? 71 Cases answered “ the loss of housing”, 68 cases answered the “diseases and epidemics”, 6 cases answered “sexual

17 Regional sensitivities between the residents of Tartus and the IDPs from Aleppo end with calls to expel them from the Syrian coast https://www.alquds.co.uk/%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA- %D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86- %D8%B3%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%B7%D9%88%D8%B3- %D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AD%D9%8A/ 18 https://www.unicef.org/arabic/infobycountry/syria_67916.html

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harassment and exploitation”, two cases answered “the abuse from the host community”. (What is striking here is the absence of the hunger risk). 16- Would you like to go back to your original hometowns? All cases answered “Yes”. (It is understood that the IDPs have the desire to return to their hometowns, but this answer may be a desire/ indicator to show their misery in this place). 17- Do you receive any humanitarian aid or relief from charitable organizations? 15 Cases answered “No”, 58 cases answered “Yes” and most of the cases answered that they receive some food materials, but all cases confirmed its irregularity and interruption for long periods). 18- Who is the breadwinner of the family? In 52 cases the father is the breadwinner (among them 16 cases where the wife shares this responsibility with, and 13 cases where the wife and the children share this responsibility with, and 20 cases receive external support). Five cases are dependent only on the external support, and in 16 cases the mother and the children are the breadwinner of the family (among them 3 cases that receive external support). 19- Is there a missing member of the family? 16 cases have missing members, 57 cases have no missing members. 20- Are there any children out of the school and what are their ages? 11 Cases have children who are out of schools. 21- Are there children who are not registered in the civil records? And from which year? There are 6 cases with not registered children. 22- Have you affected the locals in terms of social, intellectual and environmental aspects? 68 cases answered “No” as most of the IDPs live in closed environments, and the researcher noted that they are not aware of the meaning of the question or the extent of their impact due to their deep sense of being temporary in this environment. 23- Have the locals affected you in terms of social, intellectual and environmental aspects? 70 cases answered “No”. (It is clear that the interaction with the last two questions was not as the researcher expected, and the reason is often the weak culture of the respondents, which is what the researcher refers to by saying that they do not understand the meaning of the question. The purpose of the question is to discover the impact of direct contact between two different environments, especially here with regard to the political level and the attitude from what is happening in the country. However, this did not reach the respondents and the two questions remained of little value). Lattakia Lattakia has received thousands of displaced people since early on, and the number increased with the continuation of the conflict until the number of IDPs reached nearly half a million, equivalent to half the number of settled residents in the governorate. The majority of the IDPs come from Aleppo and Homs, Rural Damascus and Idlib, as shown in the table that have been established in the study. Some of the IDPs, especially the first IDPs coming from Aleppo, headed to the Sports City and the Chalet areas in Lattakia. As for the part that resided among the people, a distinction can be made, as the study showed, between those who lived in conservative, poor and neglected Sunni neighborhoods, and those who were divided into more diverse and open neighborhoods, and there are the ones who settled in the countryside near the city. The results of the questionnaire in Lattakia 1- Gender of the respondent: 22 Male and 47 Female. 2- The original living place (where did you come from?): 24 Cases come from Aleppo, 3 cases come from Deir Al-Zour, 9 cases come from Al-Raqa, 7 cases come from the countryside of Lattakia, 2 cases come from Homs, 3 cases come from Hama, 7 cases come from Damascus, 2 cases come from Jesser Al-Shoghour, 12 cases come from Idlib.

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3- The date of the displacement (in which year were you displaced to Lattakia?): - 15 cases in 2011 - 18 cases in 2012 - 12 cases in 2013 - 13 cases in 2014 - 8 cases in 2015 - 1 case in 2016 - 2 cases in 2017

4- Have you been in other cities before coming to Lattakia?: 61 cases answered “No” and 8 cases answered “Yes”. 5- Why did you choose Lattakia governorate? 47 Cases answered “because it is safe”, 26 cases answered “because they have relatives”, one case answered “because of the availability of housing”, onee case answered “because it is a central city with good location”, one case answered because they love Lattakia”. 6- What was your previous profession before coming to Lattakia? 32 cases were housewives, 2 cases were lawyers, one caes was a military personnel, 14 cases did self- employment (freelancers), 2 cases were students, 3 cases were teachers, 2 cases were farmers, 8 cases were vocational workers, 4 cases were not working. 7- What is your job/ profession right now? 30 cases are housewives, 2 cases are working as lawyers, 2 cases are working as military personnel, 12 cases are freelancers, zero cases as students, 3 cases are working as teachers, zero cases are working as farmers, 7 cases are working as vocational workers, 8 cases are not working. 8- Has your work formulated a type of competition to the locals? Three cases answered “Yes”, 66 cases answered “No”. 9- Has any of the locals expressed their annoyance of this work? and how? 66 cases answered “No”, three cases answered yes, by increasing the rent. 10- Does this job secure your needs and the needs of your family? Zero cases answered “Yes”, 58 cases answered “No”, 11 cases answered “somehow”. 11- Do you integrate with the new society around you? 54 cases answered “Yes”, and 15 cases answered “No”. 12- Have you formed new social relations with the people of Lattakia? how if yes, and what are the reasons if no? 53 Cases answered “Yes” and 15 cases answered “No”. 13- Are you being harassed by the people of the city? and how if yes? 64 Cases answered “No” and 5 cases answered “Yes”. 14- Did the women have to change the nature of their dress to adapt to the environment? Zero cases answered “Yes” and 69 cases answered “No”. This indicates a good ability to accept different people. Alawites generally do not tend to impose their doctrine or sectarian views, and this helps explain this acceptance. An allergy can arise towards a specific dress, not based on a religious ground, but on a political ground, as the dress style is linked to a specific political attitude. 15- What are the most common risks you are exposed to? - Four cases answered “the abuse from the host community” - 20 Cases answered “the diseases and epidemics” - 9 Cases answered “ the denial of housing” - Zero cases answered “the harassment and exploitation” - 64 Cases answered “ the low income” - One case answered “ the Lack of acclimatization” Not being afraid of harassment and exploitation is illogical, and this answer can be traced back to the fear or courtesy. In fact, not only the IDPs, but also the locals themselves fear

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harassment and exploitation by the Shabiha, whose presence and abuse are greater than they were before the revolution. But the risk regarding the low income and the living situation is also understandable for the IDPs and locals. 16- Would you like to go back to your original hometowns? - 35 Cases answered “Yes” - 34 Cases answered “No” It is striking that almost half of the respondents wanted to stay in Latakia. This answer is understandable regarding 17 respondents (half of those who do not wish to return) who justify their stay as having nothing left in their hometowns. It seems even more striking when compared to the Tartus survey, as it seems that everyone wants to return to their home cities. 17- Do you receive any humanitarian aid or relief from charitable organizations? - 23 Cases answered “Yes” - 46 Cases answered “No”. 18- Who is the breadwinner of the family? - In 69 cases the father is the breadwinner - In 12 cases the mother is the breadwinner - In 3 cases the children are the breadwinner - In 1 case it is an external support. 19- Is there a missing member of the family? - One case answered “Yes” - 68 Cases answered “No”. We conclude that most of the arrivals to Lattakia do not have clear problems with the regime, as most of the other families fled to the countryside of Aleppo and the countryside of Idlib or left for Turkey. 20- Are there any children out of the school? - 63 Cases answered “No” - 6 Cases answered “Yes”. The absorption rate in schools is good, about 90%. This reflects the regime’s understanding of the importance of shaping awareness in childhood which reflects on shaping tendencies, although this is not completely guaranteed, as we have witnessed a revolution in Syria despite decades of state control over education, as living conditions remain after everything more capable of influencing. 21- Are there children who are not registered in the civil records? - 4 Cases answered “Yes” - 65 Cases answered “No” 22- Have you affected the locals? - 65 Cases answered “No” - 13 Cases answered “yes”. 23- Have the locals affected you in terms of social and environmental aspects? - 55 Cases answered “No” - 14 Cases answered “Yes” It seems that the last two questions are not well understood, or the question wording did not fulfill its purpose. The purpose was to notice the effect of friction between two different audiences on reformulating the consciousness and behavior of each. However, the answers did not fulfill the requirements.

Conclusion The coast received early waves of displacement due to the evolution of the Syrian revolution into an armed conflict. The displacement movement led to the friction of societies that were

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until recently strangers to each other, and there is no doubt that this is what helps build a more cohesive Syrian nationalism. The interaction of the people of the Coast (the loyalists to the regime in general) was not the same with the categories of theIDPs, and the political bias of the IDPs (or at least the supposed attitude of them) formed a basis for determining the attitude toward them, so Aleppans were welcome, while others were less welcome. The Aleppians were able to form a bridge between the Alawites and the Sunnis in the Coast, after the current events separated them, in a new proof that the political attitude in the Coast prevailed over the sectarian one. The coast remained calm and did not witness any sectarian incidents, although that was about to happen twice, the first time when villages in the northern countryside of Lattakia were attacked in the summer of 2013, and the second time when popular gathering areas (garages) were subjected to bombing attacks that killed hundreds of people and resulted in a number of wounded. In light of what the conflict in Syria has ended today, Syrians on the Coast, IDPs and settlers, and everywhere in Syria will see that there is no victor but a group of criminals who have become rich, benefiting from the conditions of war, at the expense of the livelihood and security of the Syrian people, and that the result that they awaited, on both sides of the conflict, and sacrificed their children for it, was replaced by the specter of famine hovering over their heads. And before the Syrians strive to discover the reasons that led their revolution to this fate, they discovered through their direct experience that the pursuit of control by any party leads only to more destruction, and that the only way out that can be relied upon is to abandon dreams of control and hard and honest work for the sake of equality and the rule of justice.

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