Author's personal copy

Fertility Transition: Southeast Asia Patrick Heuveline, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA Charles Hirschman, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA

Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by C. Hirschman, volume 8, pp. 5597–5602, Ó 2001, Elsevier Ltd.

Abstract

On average, fertility in Southeast Asia is barely above replacement level and declining. However, the region includes countries with some of the highest and some of the lowest fertility levels in the world. Different political contexts have affected the timing of the fertility transition across the region. Also notable were differences in the pace of the fertility transition, between the predominantly Buddhist mainland and the predominantly Muslim or Catholic nations in insular Southeast Asia. While some nations are completing their fertility transition, others are facing the prospects of population aging and may soon undergo the second demographic transition.

Located east of the Indian subcontinent, south of China, and However, the overall level and decline of SEA’s fertility west of Melanesia (Figure 1), the 11 nations of Southeast Asia masks significant variations from country to country. The (SEA thereafter) have a combined population size estimated to region includes countries with some of the highest and some of be 619 million in 2013 – a more than threefold increase from the lowest fertility levels in the world (Timor-Leste, third the region’s population of 168 million in 1950 (United highest with 6.53, and Singapore, fourth lowest with 1.25 in Nations, 2013a). The average annual growth rate of 2.07% 2005–10, United Nations, 2013b; Table S.12). SEA also over this period outpaced the world population’s growth rate includes nations with some of the world’s most rapid fertility and reflected a substantial difference between birth and death decline, for example, Vietnam from 1975–80 to 2005–10 rates. Population growth has slowed dramatically in recent (United Nations, 2013b; Table S.13) whereas others have years and only remains positive due to population momentum experienced fertility lulls and even temporary increases during – a relatively youthful age structure. The average period total that same period (Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Timor-Leste). fertility rate (TFR) for the region is barely above replacement Demographic diversity is not entirely surprising in a region, level (2.13 in 2010–15, United Nations, 2013a). which shares some common geographical, historical, religious,

BURMA VIETNAM LAOS

Luzon

THAILAND PHILIPPINES CAMBODIA

Visayas Mindanao Sabah Peninsular BRUNEI Malaysia MALAYSIA Sarawak SINGAPORE Sumatra Kalimantan Sulawesi

INDONESIA Eastern Indonesia Java Bali

Figure 1 Countries of Southeast Asia.

84 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 9 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.31089-3 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 84–91 Author's personal copy Fertility Transition: Southeast Asia 85 and cultural features, but also experienced quite varied patterns minorities on the mainland (Cambodia and Thailand), in of colonial rule, political and economic systems, and devel- the Philippines, as well as in Singapore. Hinduism is the opment (Reid, 1988a, 1993; Wolters, 1999). Created originally major religion in Bali (Indonesia) and among the ethnic in 1967 with only five member states, the Association of Indian populations of Malaysia and Singapore, whereas Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) today includes all of SEA Confucianism remains influence among ethnic Chinese except but the recently independent nation of Timor-Leste. communities found in metropolitan areas throughout the Participation in ASEAN may eventually contribute to greater region. These different religious influences, and colonial political and economic integration in a region divided by histories have pulled Southeast peoples in different directions decades of cold war politics. during the modern era, but they have not erased the The main line of geographical and cultural division is typi- distinctive cultural feature of SEA: women’s relatively high cally drawn between the nations of mainland and insular SEA. status and economic autonomy (Reid, 1988b; Van Esterik, (Although most of its population lives on the mainland, 1982). Age differences between spouses tend to be Malaysia also includes part of the island of Borneo, shared with comparatively small (Casterline et al., 1986), currently Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam. Together with these two between 2 and 4 years (United Nations, 2012). Although nations, Malaysia is generally classified in insular SEA with polygamy is allowed under Islam, it was never very common Singapore (the two only became separate nations in 1965), as pattern in SEA (Reid, 1988b; Jones, 1994). Matrilocality is not well as Timor-Leste and the Philippines.) However, substantial rare in any Southeast Asian country and is often as common diversity is also found within nations, such as between the as patrilocality among the ethnic Malay populations in different islands of large archipelagoes (Indonesia and the Malaysia and Indonesia, the Philippines, and in most Philippines), or on the mainland, between densely populated mainland nations (Reid, 1988a; Jones, 1995). The major lowlands and the relatively isolated uplands home to small exceptions are Vietnam and ethnic Chinese populations ethnic minorities (Scott, 2009). Numerically larger groups of throughout the region which express strong gender preference Chinese and Indian-origin have also been present throughout (Wongboonsin and Ruffolo, 1995; Guilmoto, 2012). Another the region since the late nineteenth and early twentieth common cultural pattern, especially among Buddhist societies century (Cushman and Wang, 1988; Reid, 1996, 2001), is the moral obligation to repay parents for one’s care in early especially in the major metropolitan areas of the region. life. The cultural expectation that children will support their Driving the new regional economies, these metropolitan areas elderly parents is widely shared in throughout the region are increasingly distinct – ethnically, economically, culturally, (Croll, 2006). and demographically – from their (mostly rural) national populations. In 2000, the TFR in Bangkok was estimated at 1.16 children per woman, closer to Singapore’s than to the A Demographic Overview national figure for Thailand at the time (1.81, Jones, 2009). The extent of between- and within-nation diversity cannot be Five of SEA’s 11 nations are now among the world’s 25 largest fully described here, but key features are highlighted because of countries, compared to only 2 in 1950. Indonesia, the fourth their potential influence on the fertility transition. The principal largest country in the world with 250 million people, is the religions present in SEA are (1) Buddhism, predominant on the region’s “demographic giant,” accounting for 40% of the mainland (Myanmar, Thailand, the Lao PDR, Cambodia, and region’s population (Table 1). Close to 100 million people Vietnam), (2) Catholicism, influential in the Philippines also live in the Philippines, and more than half of the pop- and Timor-Leste, and (3) Islam, the majority religion in ulation of SEA lives on these two archipelagoes (56.3%). The Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei Darussalam, with significant other three nations are in mainland SEA, Vietnam at the eastern

Table 1 Total population size, growth, density, and distribution by country

Annual growth rate Total population size, 2013 1950–2013 2010–15 % Urban, 2011 Density km2, 2010 Median age, 2010

Brunei Darussalam 418 3.43% 1.35% 75.20 69.5 29.5 Cambodia 15 135 1.95% 1.75% 19.80 79.3 23.5 Indonesia 249 866 1.96% 1.21% 44.00 126.4 26.9 The Lao PDR 6770 2.21% 1.86% 32.00 27.0 20.3 Malaysia 29 717 2.51% 1.61% 71.30 85.7 26.1 Myanmar 53 259 1.76% 0.84% 33.00 76.8 27.8 The Philippines 98 394 2.65% 1.71% 48.70 311.5 22.3 Singapore 5412 2.65% 2.02% 100.00 7436.3 37.3 Thailand 67 011 1.87% 0.30% 33.60 129.4 35.4 Timor-Leste 1133 1.53% 1.66% 27.70 72.6 16.1 Vietnam 91 680 2.07% 0.95% 29.80 268.5 28.5

Source: United Nations, 2011a. World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision. United Nations, New York; United Nations, 2013a. World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision. Comprehensive Tables, vol. 1. United Nations, New York; United Nations, 2013b. World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision. Demographic Profiles, vol. 2. United Nations, New York.

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 84–91 Author's personal copy 86 Fertility Transition: Southeast Asia end and Thailand and Myanmar at the western end of the As for the transition to low fertility, Singapore was the region. Together, these five nations account for more than 90% region’s forerunner, with a decline that started in the mid- of the region’s population. twentieth century and proceeded with unprecedented speed – SEA is densely populated. Compared to the world average fertility had dropped below the replacement level by the late of 51 people per squared kilometer, the regional average is 133 1970s (Saw, 2005). In the rest of SEA, fertility rates seem people per squared kilometer (Table 1), and five nations have stable or even increasing slightly in the 1950s. Such limited density twice the world average or more. Besides the city-state increases are fairly common across LDRs and usually of Singapore (7436), the Philippines (311), Vietnam, (268), indicate a decline in sexually transmitted diseases and Thailand (129), and Indonesia (126) are still predominantly subsequent infertility, rather than a fertility increase among rural countries. Dense rural settlements suggest demographic fecund, married women. Fertility might have been increasing pressure on arable land that likely contributed to the growth of during the nineteenth century as well, as the colonial-period the large urban agglomerations that have developed in each of record, imperfect though it is, indicates an acceleration of these nations. As of 2011, the population size of the urban population growth that may have preceded any significant agglomeration of Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam) has reached improvement in health. While this fertility increase and its 6.4 million inhabitants, Krung Thep (Bangkok, Thailand) causes are still a matter of scholarly debate (Henley, 2011; 8.4 million, Jakarta (Indonesia) 9.8 million, and Manila Reid, 1992), the demographic picture becomes much clearer (Philippines) 11.9 million (United Nations, 2011a). In 1975, in the 1950s and reveals fertility rates in the range 5.5–7.4 Manila was already the region’s largest urban agglomeration children per woman that are fairly typical of LDR nations at but with a population size of just 5.0 million. the time (Table 1). As in many nations in the less developed regions (LDR) of In mainland SEA, fertility levels did not decline significantly the world, mortality has declined tremendously in the second until the late 1960s (Thailand), the late 1970s (Myanmar and half of the twentieth century (Heuveline, 1999). Three SEA Vietnam), or even the late 1980s (Cambodia and the Lao PDR). nations (Cambodia, Myanmar, and Timor-Leste) have life When fertility rates begin to fall, however, after centuries of expectancies at birth in the mid-60s, slightly below the stability or slow increase, they declined rapidly. Replacement contemporary LDR average of 67.0 (in 2010–15) (United level was reached in less than 30 years after the onset of the Nations, 2013a)(Table 1). The estimates of life expectancy decline in Thailand, Myanmar, and Vietnam (Table 2). While for the wealthiest nations, Singapore (81.3 years) and Brunei Thailand has come to exemplify a fast fertility decline in Darussalam (78.2 years), exceed the average longevity in the a relatively poor nation (e.g., Hirschman et al., 1994; Knodel more developed regions (MDR, 76.9 years). Only slightly et al., 1996), the decline in Myanmar and even more so in lower are estimates of life expectancy for Malaysia Vietnam from over seven children per woman in the early (74.6 years), Thailand (74.4 years), and Vietnam (75.5 years). 1970s to replacement level before the century’s end are equally These countries have experienced very rapid economic impressive (Goodkind, 1995; Haughton, 1997). In Cambodia progress in recent decades. The diversity of mortality and the Lao PDR, civil unrest and warfare might have tempo- transitions in SEA nations exemplifies the varied “routes to rarily depressed fertility levels, but the actual transition did not low mortality” (Caldwell, 1986; Kuhn, 2010). start until after peace had returned, sometimes followed by

Table 2 Mortality, nuptiality, contraceptive use and fertility indicators, by country

Marriage Mortality indicators indicators Contraception Fertility transition Total fertility rate Life expectancy Under-5 Ever Any modern Peak Onset Years to at birth mortality rate married SMAM method a value year replacement b 2010–15 2030–35

Brunei Darussalam 78.2 6 88.6 25.0 n/a 7.00 1960–65 45.4 1.98 1.68 Cambodia 63.7 69 93.9 22.0 34.9 7.00 1985–90 26.7 2.42 1.75 Indonesia 70.0 31 97.9 22.3 57.9 5.62 1970–75 38.5 2.06 1.74 Lao PDR 67.9 46 96.5 21.7 42.1 6.36 1990–95 22.3 2.54 1.76 Malaysia 74.6 9 94.6 25.7 29.8 6.23 1965–70 50.8 2.57 2.15 Myanmar 66.0 57 85.2 26.1 45.7 6.10 1975–80 29.4 1.94 1.63 The Philippines 69.2 27 92.8 24.4 36.3 7.42 1960–65 60.9 3.05 2.43 Singapore 81.3 2 87.2 27.9 55.0 6.61 1955–60 18.7 1.37 1.69 Thailand 74.4 13 92.0 24.1 79.8 6.14 1965–70 23.2 1.53 1.53 Timor-Leste 63.1 76 96.8 23.1 20.8 7.00 2005–10 68.1 5.92 3.73 Vietnam 75.5 23 94.4 22.7 59.8 7.33 1975–80 21.6 1.75 1.58 aMost recent year available, typically in the last 10 years except for Malaysia (1995). bFor countries that have not yet reached replacement level fertility, the figures are estimated based on extrapolating the pace of the fertility decline to date (figures in italics). Source: United Nations, 2011b. World Contraceptive Use 2010. United Nations, New York; United Nations, 2012. World Marriage Data. http://www.un.org/en/development/ desa/population/ (accessed 15.08.13.); United Nations, 2013a. World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision. Comprehensive Tables, vol. 1. United Nations, New York; United Nations, 2013b. World Population Prospects, the 2012 Revision. Demographic Profiles, vol. 2. United Nations, New York; Ministry of Health and Lao Statistics Bureau, 2012. Lao Social Indicator Survey (LSIS), 2011–12. ICF International, Calverton, Maryland; National Institute of Statistics and Ministry of Health Cambodia, 2011. Cambodia Demographic and Health Survey (CDHS), 2010. ICF Macro, Calverton, Maryland; and authors’ calculations.

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 84–91 Author's personal copy Fertility Transition: Southeast Asia 87 postcrisis “baby-boom” (Heuveline and Poch, 2007). A growing consensus assigns to mortality change a central However, at the current pace, these two nations are expected to role in explaining the onset of the fertility transition reach replacement level fertility in less than 30 years after the (Hirschman, 1994; Mason, 1997; Cleland, 2001). The spec- onset of fertility decline. While different political contexts are tacular declines in child mortality, in particular, added strains likely to have affected the onset of fertility declines, all main- on the family (Davis, 1963), but more generally, contributed to land SEA nations will likely share a fast transition to replace- an acceleration of population growth in already densely ment fertility. Moreover, fertility declines have not stopped at populated areas. Pre-transitional fertility levels were lower in replacement levels, and there is still no indication that the higher density areas in Indonesia (Hugo et al., 1987), higher current estimates of the number of children per woman have in lower density frontier areas in Thailand (Vanlandingham stopped declining in Thailand (1.53), Myanmar (1.94), or and Hirschman, 2001) and increased after mortality-driven Vietnam (1.75). reduction in population density in Cambodia (Heuveline With the exception of Timor-Leste, which only recently and Poch, 2007). Consistent with this interpretation, pre- won its independence, fertility began to decline in most of 1975 fertility declines are visible in the SEA nations with the insular SEA from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. On the lowest child mortality levels (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, mainland at the time, only Thailand showed any sign of Singapore) or with the highest population densities a fertility transition. However, no insular SEA nations had (Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines). The only exception to this reached replacement fertility by 2010 (except Singapore of generalization is Vietnam, but the transition likely delayed by course). In spite of a population density almost three times the war there eventually outpaced transitions in the rest of the regional average, average fertility in the Philippines is still the region. above three children per woman. At the current pace, the In the classic formulation of the demographic transition Philippine fertility transition may take over 60 years, more theory (Notestein, 1953), mortality decline was assigned less of than twice the actual or projected duration in any of the a central role, being held rather as one of the several dimen- mainland SEA nations. In spite of being wealthier, markedly sions of modernization, or even possibly a consequence more urbanized (71.3% vs 41.4%), and enjoying child thereof. The multidimensional development process, with mortality rates three times lower than average for the region, rising levels of urbanization and education accompanying Malaysia’s total fertility is still above 2.5 children per woman lower mortality rates may explain the early onset of the tran- (G.W. Jones, 1990). As had been observed in Malaysia in the sition in Singapore. In the rest of the region, however, as in 1980s (Hirschman, 1986), the most recent data for Indo- much of the LDR, mortality declines were achieved rapidly after nesia indicates a stall or even an increase in fertility from World War II, ahead of any other sign of substantial modern- 2.27 in 2000 to 2.41 in 2010 (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2013). ization (in particular in Myanmar or Vietnam). In some This casts doubts on the current projection that the fertility countries, subsequent modernization likely played an acceler- transition might be completed in 2010–15, which would ating role after the onset of fertility decline (Hirschman and have been the fastest in insular SEA besides Singapore, but Guest, 1990b; Gertler and Molyneaux, 1994; Hirschman would still have taken about 40 years from onset to et al., 1998). With the development of public education replacement fertility. systems, parents cite the associated increase in the costs of childrearing as one of the factors influencing their decisions to have fewer children (e.g., Knodel et al., 1984). Some of the Explanations of Fertility Transition increase, however, originates less in the educational system in Southeast Asian Nations than in the job market and the perception of an intensifying competition that leads to higher parental investments and Fertility transitions are typically driven by declines in marital eventually so-called “quantify/quality” trade-offs (Becker, fertility, and this has clearly been the dominant pattern in SEA 1991). Another crucial factor in the increasing costs of (Retherford and Cho, 1973; Hirschman and Guest, 1990a). childrearing has been the opportunity costs of women’s However, there have also been significant changes in marriage wages. Traditionally engaged in the formal economy, women patterns in several Southeast Asian countries. The erosion of have provided almost the entire workforce of delocalized arranged marriages has led to declines in the proportion of factories in fast-expanding sectors like the garment industry. married females at young ages and increases in the mean age at While mortality, with or without other modernization marriage among Muslims in Indonesia and Malaysia in factors, contributed to reduce the demand for children, family particular (Leete, 1994; Jones, 1995; Hull, 2012; Jones and planning programs facilitated access to more efficient means to Gubhaju, 2012). The postponement of marriage was, achieve smaller families. In Thailand, Indonesia, or Vietnam, however, a modest factor in shaping total fertility changes in the onset of fertility decline seems to occur very soon after SEA compared to changes in the behavior of couples after family planning programs were set up (Ross and Poedjastoeti, marriage. The gradual adoption of modern contraceptives 1983; Robinson and Rachapaetayakom, 1993; Haughton, appears to have played the crucial role in this decline of marital 1997). These three nations still have the highest modern fertility (Hull et al., 1977; Freedman et al., 1981; Ross and contraceptive prevalence rates in the region today (Table 2), Poedjastoeti, 1983; Knodel et al., 1987; Entwisle et al., 1997) and the effectiveness of their national programs was clearly in the 1970s through the 1990s. The recent changes in marital a factor in their fertility reaching replacement levels or lower – patterns, including significant proportions of never married in Vietnam in particular, with the introduction of a one–two women in their 30s may be a more consequential determinant child policy (Goodkind, 1995). Signs of a fertility decline of fertility in the coming years. were visible before the establishment of a national family

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 84–91 Author's personal copy 88 Fertility Transition: Southeast Asia planning program in some countries, for example, in the marriage remain below 25 in most nations (SMAM Philippines, though by only a few years, and even (Singulate Mean Age at Marriage), Table 2), and fertility rates more clearly in Myanmar (Herrin, 2007; Myint, 1991). In have fallen even more after age 35 than below age 35 (e.g., Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar, modern Thailand, Vietnam: United Nations, 2012). Like Singapore, contraceptive prevalence has increased in the first decade of nations faced with durable below-replacement fertility may the twenty-first century and now ranges from 34.9% to also attempt to counter population decline and aging 45.7%. These contraceptive prevalence rates, though high by through immigration, but this might prove politically historical patterns, are actually lower than the levels usually challenging (Jones, 2012; National Population and Talent associated with their fertility: Laos has a prevalence rate of Division, 2012). 55.2% and a TFR of 2.57 children per woman. Other than Fertility rates are expected to continue to decline in the five contraceptive use, potential factors contributing to this low SEA nations still above replacement, albeit at the different paces fertility includes spousal separation due to temporary work- noted above. By 2030–35, only Malaysia and the Philippines related migration and voluntary abstinence. (due to a slow pace) and Timor-Leste (due to a late onset) are Overall, the fertility transition is relatively advanced in SEA projected with fertility levels above replacement. These and the region’s cultural context has typically been considered fertility projections are mere extrapolations of past trends, favorable to the fertility transition (e.g., relatively high-female and reversal cannot be entirely ruled out. As noted in autonomy). Contrasting nations within SEA, however, one can Indonesia, fertility seems to have stabilized and possibly hardly overlook the religious dimension. In the predominantly increased slightly in the past 10 years, while the proportion of Catholic Philippines, the transition has been very gradual, married women among 15–24 year olds increased slightly arguably more typical of Latin American nations. As noted (United Nations, 2012) after a precipitous decline in the earlier, the transition in predominantly Muslim Indonesia and previous decades (Jones and Gubhaju, 2012). This inflection Malaysia have proceeded unevenly, with some temporary lulls of these demographic trends might result from a reaction to or possibly reversals. The transitions in predominantly secularization and globalization trends leading to an increase Buddhist mainland SEA started later, proceeded faster, and to in religiosity (Hull, 2012). date, without interruption until well below replacement level. The record from around the world seems to indicate that the The uneven transition in multi-ethnic Malaysia and Indonesia completion of ongoing fertility transitions is all but certain, might reflect fertility transitions proceeding at different paces and that lulls and slight reversals are only temporary. A more among different communities – differences that might be speculative question is whether the region may experience the related to government policies (Govindasamy and DaVanzo, onset of a ‘second’ demographic transition, alongside the ‘first’ 1992). Although their small population sizes often makes one still ongoing in some other parts of the region. As argued them invisible even in disaggregated, subnational data, the above, the fertility transitions of SEA have been driven by limited evidence on the various highland populations in the declining marital fertility rates, without necessarily involving region suggests that their fertility remains high and stands major transitions in marriage, divorce, unmarried cohabita- out from the general transition in the region (Gray et al., 2005). tion, and childrearing or having children out of wedlock toward rates that have been associated with low fertility in Western nations. Completing the First, Starting a Second To date, if by international standards, the proportions of Demographic Transition? women marrying are still relatively high across SEA nations, the trend away from universal and young marriages is clear. Fertility is currently below replacement in 6 of the 11 SEA Surprisingly, the proportion ever marrying is lowest in Myan- nations. Recent trends suggest that fertility in these nations is mar (85.2%, Table 2). Rather than a new trend, this might be very likely to remain below replacement in the next couple of linked to contemporary political uncertainties and to the decades (Table 2). Concerns over high density and fast growing traditionally accepted form of celibacy in order to look after populations may soon be replaced by concerns over rapidly aged parents (Jones and Gubhaju, 2012: 86). With smaller aging populations that may even experience absolute decline in family sizes, older-parent care falls on an increasing proportion the coming years. The median age in Thailand is projected to of the children’s generation, and with economic restructuring, reach 51.1 years by 2050, which would make it one of the 10 may now require work-related emigration and remittances oldest in the world (United Nations, 2013a). from urban settings, increasingly conflicting with the Singapore has tried to increase fertility (Saw, 2005: Chapters traditional marriage process (Barbieri, 2009; Alipio, 2013). 11–13), but as elsewhere in the world, their pro-marriage and However, the clearer signs of decreasing proportions ever pro-natalist policies only had a limited impact (Yap, 1995) marrying are in Singapore (87.2%, Table 2), among ethnic and failed to durably and substantially raise fertility (Jones, Chinese communities in the rest of the region, and in some 2012). In contrast to Europe, changes in the timing of of the other large metropolitan areas (Jones, 2005). Given fertility have had little impact on period fertility rates in SEA the current weight of the rural populations in most SEA (Chuan, 2010). In Europe, the postponement of fertility has nations still these changes are not too visible on national been a major reason for the ultra-low levels of fertility in averages yet, but might soon become so with the likely recent years. Since fertility postponement cannot continue continuation of rural-to-urban migration and possible indefinitely, this downward trend appears to have run its diffusion to rural areas of new attitudes regarding marriage course and period fertility measures are inching back up (Tey, 2007; Situmorang, 2007; Jayakody and Vu, 2009). (Goldstein et al., 2009). By contrast, in SEA, mean ages at Observed all over the world, the trend is not surprising and is

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Second Edition, 2015, 84–91 Author's personal copy Fertility Transition: Southeast Asia 89 frequently associated with the expansion of educational and change in extra-marital sexual behavior notwithstanding, professional opportunities for women. While a major reason there is little evidence to date to suggest that SEA will soon for marital postponement in SEA as well, rising educational exhibit the high nonmarital fertility ratios of the United levels are not the only factor as Jones and Gubhaju (2009) States or some North European nations. In these nations, finds increasing proportions never marrying across all out-of-wedlock fertility has maintained overall fertility fairly educational groups. A modest counterbalancing factor – close to replacement level. In SEA, a more likely demographic visible, but still relatively small numerically – is the predicted path would seem to include the expectation of childbearing increase in international marriages to males from countries mostly within marriage, marital decisions still embedded in confronted to the “marriage squeeze” generated by increasing child–parent relationships, but increasingly the prerogative of male-to-female birth ratios (Jones and Shen, 2008; Yang and individuals with changing aspirations, some of which may Lu, 2010). conflict with marriage and childbearing. In such a scenario, Unmarried cohabitation seems to remain extremely rare in fewer and later marriages are typically paired with fertility SEA, at least based on the standardized data that demographic substantially and durably below replacement (Jones, 2007). surveys collect across many countries. In the region’s national censuses, unmarried cohabitation only appears as a distinct marital status in the Philippines (Jones and Gubhaju, 2012). Acknowledgments When unmarried couples openly live together, however, they are typically considered as married de facto. The census defini- While preparing this article, the first author benefited from the facilities tion of marriage in Indonesia, which includes unmarried and resources at the California Center for Population Research, UCLA, cohabitation (Hull, 2012), seems to reflect the general which is supported by infrastructure grant R24HD041022 from the perception also prevailing in predominantly Buddhist nations. Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health & Human Development. He also wishes to thank Gavin Jones, Terry Hull and Elaborate and often expensive wedding ceremonies are socially Jenna Nobles for bringing to his attention some of the work reviewed desirable in the , but Buddhism does not prescribe for this article. The authors remain solely responsible for the content of any particular ritual (Cherlin and Chamratrithirong, 1988). this article. Unmarried cohabitation is likely more prevalent than data that suggest among the lower classes and in urban settings (Xenos See also: Demographic Measurement: General Issues and and Kabamalan, 2007; Esara, 2012). Nonetheless, when Measures of Fertility; Family Size Preferences; Fertility married and unmarried partnerships are considered jointly, the Transition: Cultural Explanations; Fertility Transition: East Asia; prevalence of actual celibacy appears higher in SEA than in Fertility Transition: Economic Explanations; Southeast Asia: Europe (Jones, 2007). Sociocultural Aspects. In Western nations, increasing divorce rates are another feature of the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe, 1983), consistent with the economic theory of marital insta- bility (Becker et al., 1977). In SEA, however, some traditional Bibliography societies were already accommodating high levels of marital disruptions (Jones, 1997; Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan, Alipio, C., 2013. Young men in the Philippines mapping the costs and debts of work, 2003). In Thailand, divorce rates were averaging about 15% marriage, and family life. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and after 20 years of marriage (Smith, 1981; Knodel et al., 1984), Social Science 646 (1), 214–232. but were highest among Muslims, as also observed in Malaysia Badan Pusat Statistik, 2013. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) by Province 1971, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2007 and 2010. http://www. and Indonesia. Divorce there is relatively simple to obtain, at bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?tabel¼1&daftar¼1&id_subyek¼12¬ab¼7 least for the husband, and was experienced by as many as 40% (accessed 08.08.13.). of men and women when arranged, early marriage was the Barbieri, M., 2009. Doi Moi and older Adults: intergenerational support under the norm (Jones, 1994), until the declining incidence of this constraints of reform. In: Barbieri, M., Bélanger, D. (Eds.), Reconfiguring Families in Contemporary Vietnam. Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, pp. 133–165. marriage pattern brought a concomitant decline in divorce Becker, G., 1991. A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. rates. In Cambodia, where marriage rates had remained rela- Becker, G., Landes, E.M., Michael, R.T., 1977. An economic analysis of marital tively rare, however, the likelihood of divorce is now higher instability. The Journal of Political Economy 85 (6), 1141–1187. among couples who chose each other as marriage partners, and Brown, A.D., Jejeebhoy, S.J., Shah, I., Yount, K.M., 2013. Sexual Relations among divorce rates have actually increased with the decline in Young People in Developing Countries: Evidence from WHO Case Studies. WHO. http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/adolescence/RHR_01.8/ arranged marriages (Heuveline and Poch, 2006). Slow en/index.html (accessed 05.09.13.). increases in this ‘modern’ type of divorce are visible elsewhere Caldwell, John, 1986. Routes to low mortality in poor countries. Population and in the region, including in populations where it was dis- Development Review 12 (2), 171–220. approved of before, such as those influenced by Confucian Casterline, J.B., Williams, L., McDonald, P., 1986. The age difference between spouses: variations among developing countries. Population Studies 40 (3), traditions (Jones and Gubhaju, 2012). 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