.~-'-iP _.- -*

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO AGDA (M) (-26Nov 69) FOR OT UT 693030 4 December 1969 SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Division (Airmobile), Period Ending 31

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM 1 Incl Major General, USA as The Adjutant General DISTRIBUTION: Commanding Generals US Continental Army Command US Army Combat Developments Command Commandants US Army War College US Army Conunand and General Staff College US Amy Air Defense School US Army Armor School US Army Aviation School US Army Chemical School US Army Civil Affairs School US Army Combat Surveillance School US Army Electronic Warfare School US ~rmyEngineer School US A~QYField Artillery school Regraded unclassified when separated US Army Infantry School US Army Intelligence School from classified inclosure. DISTRIBUTION (Contld) US Army Missile and Munitions School US Army Ordnance School US Army Quartermaster School US Army Signal School US Army Southeastern Signal School US Army Special Warfare School US Army Transportation School

Copies furni shed : Office, Chief of Staff, US Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff Chief of Research and Development Assistant 'chiefs of Staff Chief of Engineers The Surgeon General The Provost Marshal General 0SD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces Director, Defense Research and Engineering Off ice, Joint Chiefs of Staff Commanding General s US Army Materiel Command US Army STRATCOM US Army Electronics Command US Army Weapons Command US Army Flight Training Center 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & Operations Commandant of the Marine Corps Senior Army Representative, Marine Corps Development & Education Command USAF Air Ground Operations School The Air University Library Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group Defense Documentation Center Security Officer, Hudson Institute USAF Project RAND Commanding Officers US Army Limited War Laboratory US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center DBARTM&W QF THL AREE HEAD&MTERS, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (m~~~m)

AVDAMH 15 August 1969

SUBJET: Operational-Report for Quarterly Period End$& 31 July 1969 RCS CSFCR-65 (RI) (u)

THRU: Commanding General Headquarters, IIFF'V ATTN: AVFBC-RSH Am 96266

' TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development Department of the hmy IJashington, D .C .' 20310

* SEETIOM I: ~Q@$3@&@#5 ------u,, SUBLTECT r;'0 CKCi,.F;,?STF.T1~AnrT3;: 1, (c) Operations: 3CliEj)!Jl,x p~ E%~i'LI~I;'~ ,:,? ::,?:. 1.'1.65:! hU1'03kA'TT~A!,U DIIWWG;IarU:S- TWO y"4~ a. General TNTERVAJ,S GECLASSIFTED. 0): DEC. 31 .-- (1) The reporting period covers the conclusion of the following opera- tions,

(a) Operation MONTANA RAIDEt (terminated 131200H &lay1969). (b) Operation COMANCHE WKLRIOR (terminated 01 1200N Jun 1969).

(c) Operation CREEK I1 (terminated. 221 200H Jun 1969).

(d) Operation 1OfXCANA SCOUT (terminated 231200H Jun 1969). (2) The reporting period covers the initiation of Operation KEP.rTUCdKl

COUGAR (initiated 241200~Jun 1969).

All the above operations are subsume.d under. Operation..Toan Thang I11 *ich con-

tinued through the close of'the reporting priod. (3) The May-July 1969 period saw a contimtion of.the roles, assions

and functions knitiated when the I st - Cav- Div&sion .(Aimbile>. arrived in

Inclosure I SUBJECT: Operational Report for &rterly Period Ending 31 July 1969 I11 Combat Tactical Zone (CTZ), but with some tactical changes. The 1st Air

Cavalry Dividon continued operations throughout its tactical area of respon-

sibilities to interdict eneq infiltration routes? and *A destroy enemy forces

o~eratingwithin the area. During the firet half of May, the Division co~uct-

ed operations in Tay Ninh, Binh Long arr: Binh Duong Wovinces. During mid-May, the Division continued operations in these three provinces in addition to shift- * forces south to operate in Long Khanh and Bien Hoa FYovinces. During the Mrst week in June, Division forces were slriPted from Bien Hoa to Binh Tuy Fro- vince. On 24 June, elements of the Division shifted north to open operations in Phuoc Long Province. As the reporting period ended, the Division vras concen- trating its efforts in Tay Ninh, Binh Long, Binh Duong and Phuoc Long Frovb ces. During the reporting period, Division foroes shifted as necesszry, -pit& izing on irrtelligence, to interdict and destroy enemy forces throughout northern

111 CTZ. The bulk of 'the Division' s resources and the priority of effort were concentrated in War Zone :C against the 1st md 7th NVA Divisions. Mvision

Operations were corrtinwus, with the changes in names (MOl~khlARAU,ER, C03fANCHE

WARRIOR, CREEK IT, MONTANA SCOUT, KFWUCKY COUGAR) reflecting no significant changes in the pattern or scale of operations: in fact, eqch of these llOperz- tioneI1 blended and overlapped with the others. Mvision combat forces were mtr-

ed in accordance with shifts in the enemy posture and assmed shifts in his hi- tentlons-both within War Zone 'C d elsewhere. The Division's concepts of operation were also responsive to these actual a& ass# changes in the eneq;rts

intentions. When it appeared thet mjor elements of the 1st NVA mcl/or 7th

NVA Divisions were attempting to move south out of the 1st Air Cavalry Ijivisionls

(1 ACD) area of operations (AO), then the majority of Division dements uncle* took an interdictory posture--a decentralized pattern of s d unit ground- recon-

naisece missions and ambusam concentrated avenues to the south, t r~ ,-'+ :ar-% SUBJECT: Operational Repart for Quarterly Feriod Encling 31 Julg 1969 men these enemy units showed no inclination to mve-south but rather to remain in fairly large (one-or tm-battalion) concentrations in bnse arca bunker cow plexes, then the 1 LCD shifted its tactics to deliberate attacks on the lucra- tive targets which these assembled units represented, Combat in lu'a Zones C' a16 D took the form of jungle fighting ~gainsta heavily bunkered eneny,

Division operations during the thrce-month period inflicted daging los- ses on the 1st NVk, 7th NVA, and 5th VC Divisionsp anc! dso severely rclismpt~d the eneqls logistical redoubts in War Zones C and 'D. The kill rztio for the reporting period was 11 to 1, reflecting confirmed eneq dea6; GSTLously, the actual kill rritio was mch higher. Specific results of the B~;--JLL;Tpc?- iod were as follows:

a. Enemy: 2696 killed in action (KIA.) , 103 prisoners of wcs (R.') ' , 15:-

crew-served weapons capture?, 652 inci,ivi?uLl wezpons cepturez, 4301 lap crllSc:

rounds captured, 173,804 small caliber roun6s cqturecl, 2nd in cxcess of fC9 tons of rice, salt, sugar, flour 2nd other assorted fooclstuffs either captured or dsstroyed,

b. U.S.: 247 KIA-, 1781 muncied in action ( k ) ~ with 732 of these evecut-

ed from the Division, 1 armored p~rsonnelcarrier (AFC) destroyed, 11 OH6A

(:LOH .) aircraft destroyed, 8 UHIH (Huey) aircraft c!estroyec., 6 AHIG (cobra)

aircraft destroyed, &3/4 ton trucks Cestroyed, 2 armored cavalry assault vchi-

cles destroyed, ancl 1 tank destroyed,

( 4) 1st Cavalry Division (!&mobile) forces operating in hesvily jungled

terrain against large troop concentrations in fortified base areas utilized a

technique employing massed B-52 strikes followed by multi-conpany or multi-

battalion exploitation of such targets. Wensivc use mde cf lxgc znounts

of CS crystal in conjunction with these operations; this &dcd in c~~>izing

enemy movement and denying him his traditional b~.ses, 2iultiple Z-32 a"u?ikcs, SUBJET: Operational Report for Quarterly Period &ding 31 July 1969

employed in packages against fewer targets, proved more effective than a series

of single strikes against a greater number of targets. It is known, fron battle-- fi-:.lE body counts, 2nd from a vzriety of intelligence sources, tnzt severe da- mage was inflicted on two of the three regiments of the 1st NVA Division anc!

supporting units, that the enenyls logistical traffic was severely disrupted,

anG in effect, that the initiative in War Zones C- and D* was totally wrested fron the enemy. Between 1 May anci 31 July, the Division concludeCi Operattons

I~lOI?'i'bNk RAIDER znd MONTANA SCOUT against elements of the 1st and 7th EVA Divi-

sions in War Zone YC ,Operations CO&UdCFIE \d&WOR and CREM I1 agdnst clenents of the 5th VC Division in War Zone LT)' ,and initizted Operation KEIEUCICY COUG:;-9. All dperstions that were concluded during the reprting period will be 6iscus-

sed in detail in the following paragraphs. However, it nust be unCerstood that tk se are o prations in name only, and, in fact, are Lots where operc-tions by the Division contime on a daily basis.

(5) Operation MONTANA RLIDBi, a throe brig~deeffort reinforced with an armred cavalry regiment, was conducted fron 13 April through 13 Fly throughout War Zone ':C '. This was a three-phased operation targetec! against one regir-lent of the 1st WhDivision and two regiments of the 7th IVA Division vith tach brigade being buttressed when necessary by the 11 th iirmrel C21rrLry .~Zc@i:xnt.( 11 3t

.ACR) to exploit massed B-52 strikes within designatec! areas of cprrtion. The

1st Brigade, with the 1lth ACR, concluctec! operations in the vicinity of the

CRECE2F in A0 RH] qainst elements of the 95C Reginent, 1st MIA Division. In

the initial phase of this operation, the lith ACR encountered nmeroxs anti- tank mines, but overall contact wzs light. The latter phase of the opration was chxacterized by heavy contact with nassed enemy troops in fortifiec bzse

areas. The 3rd Brigade, with the 11th ACR, corductee operations in A0 Blue

against elements of the 209th Reginent, 7th PJVA Division. The conhct of SUBJFCT: Operationql Report for Quarterly Feriocl EnCiri 31 July 1969 operations in 1.0 BLUE were similar to those in A0 RED with codact being sonewhat

lighter, The 2nG Brigzde, also with the 11th ACR, conducted operations in 1iO

WHITE agailist eleolents of the 165th Reginent, 7th NVA Division. Again, the operations were similm to those described above with contact being even light- er. Cumulative final results of dl the operations were:

a, Enexy: 353 IUX, 8 FW captured, 231 individd weapons cqtured, 96 crew-

served weapons captured, 1788 luge cdiber rounds captured, 79,396 sd1cdi- ber rouncs cqtured, 131.91 tons of rice ulc! 29.45 tons of salt captured.

b, U.S,: 39 KIA, 151 MIX, ad 1 aircraft eestroyed.

(6) Operetion MOIKCllNli SCOUT was predorhantly interactoq in nature with the 1st ad2nd Brigades c',eplyecl along the authern frontier of %JarZone -C+ . Small unit patrols ~ZICanbushes dong enmy lines of conmnications character- izeC this Operation from 1 April to 23 June. The northern half of the XOhTMX

SCOUT LO wzs covered extensively by acrid reconnaissance anc! surveillence.

During the period 3-23 June, the 1st ad2nd Brigades, reinforce$ with elements of the 11th tLCFL, attacke2 elements of the 95C Reaqent, 1st N'VTIL Division in the vicinity of the CWCm. During the period 8-23 June, the 1st Br4;ade e3ploy-

ecl three battalions in attacking elements of the 18B Regizcnt, 1st PJVIL Division in 110 GOLD. In t-is operation, as in Base &ea 355, mssed S-52 strilcs the connitc~entof troops. Curdative find results of the o~erdbrswet-e:

a, e : 1570 KIA' ,39 FW- captured, 399 inc'ividual wwns ca;? tured

59 crew-served weapons czptured, 1694 large csliber rods captured, 78,255

small caliber rounds captured, 65.96 tons of rice anZ 14.73 tons of sdt csptursd.

b. U.S. : 64 KIA- :, 376 kJIIi ., 19 drcrdt destroyed, ancl 1x105~~howitzer cleetroyed. SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Periocl Eniing 31 July 1969 (7) Operations C(XIISJCHE WK9IQR (14 May through 1 ~une)ad CRBX I1 (19 &faytbxough 22 June) were both roughly in the sane geographiczl location, were targeted against the 5th VC Division and were conducted by the 3rd Brigace.

Therefore, these operations will be discussed siEniLtaneously. The rrission of the 3rd Brjaade rms to interdict the southerly mvenent. of the 5th VC Didbion out of War Zone D toward the heavily populatd areas in the vicinity of the LONG BIbM - BIEN HOA complex, interdict known crossing points on the Dong IJai River, and locate the 174th and 275th Reginents of the 5th VC Division. Opera- tions of the 3rd Brigade were chmacterized by small unit patrols anc; anbushcs along eneny lines of comrmnication, Although few shmp contacts were initizte2, this period wss characterized by large cache discoveries. These uscoveries were so large, that even though the 3rcl Brigzde did not clecisively engage the

174th ancl 275th Reginents, intelligence inticate6 that these and other 5th VC

Division units withdrew north into War Zone D base areas pru'tly bt-ccuse of food shortages. Cucrulative final results of these two Operztions were:

a. Ihegp: 132 KIA ,5 R.? captured, l+6 inlividual wcepns ceptured, 21 crew-served weapons capturecl, 1826 large caliber rouncis captured, 77,070 dl caliber roun'ds captured, 194.56 tons of rice, 42.97 tons of scat, C,5 tons of flour, 6 tons of sugar, 1000 cand of fish, ane 70 tons of assorted fooclstuffs captured, b. 1st Brigade Operations : ( 1) MO~~fJ1~iSCOUT A0 ( 1May to 9 sky): The 1st Bqigade conducted opera- tions from bases at Landing Zone (LZ) CIJtOLM, LZ ST BARBiJU, LZ IKE, and. LZ

GUNP against enemy lines of commnications through cent.r& War Zone 'C ,

Ground reconnaissance operations were conductec! to locate and destroy eneny bese conplexes within the Brigade LO. ~~ ezphasis ms placed upan anbush opera- tions to interdict en- mvemnt of personnel, equipaerrt, and supplies. Mng S-mJLCT: Operational xeport for Quzrterly Period Ending 31 July 1969 the ccnduct of operations in BLUE, elenents of the 2/5 Cav

2/12 Cav interdictec? routes of with$-raw& to the west anC southwest fro;;! the LO.

Ls increased enemy movement into Ease !flea 355 was Cetected, LZ b.3ilTE ms re- opened as a base of operations gain st this novenent. LZ Cl&OLMJ m.s closed anc! operations west of Highwzy 4 were crinililized as 1st Brigade eleaents intensifiecl operations in south-central WAR Z0P.E C . Continued enphesis w~sgacec! on saturation ambushes to interdict eneq novement into Base kea 355.

(2) 1:iONTi;NA SCOIIT/KE~RUCKY COUGAR .LO (10 byto 1 ~uly): The 1st Brigaclt continued operations throughout June and into July with the 2/5 Cev, 2/7 Cur,

248 Cav, ..and. 211 2 Cav to interdict enemy mvenent through the Srigade A0 w-d to destroy all major enemy forces. hs visual reconmissance aad us~d2-yi-elia- ble intelligence disclosed eneqy concentr&,ions in lower Base Area 355, tile 1st

Brigacie initiated a two battalion seal-search and destroy operation with the

2/8 Cav, 2/12 Cav, and one tank co1:1pany ORON (unc',,er the operation21 control of the Cav units) fron the 11th liCR. In nid June, responw to intelligmce ad grow? contacts, the 1st Brigade reoriented its forces by: closing LZ CL3.OLYX; releasing LZ GRfXl"; opening LZ WHITE; and receiving I2 J;LIii3 fron another brigede

LO. Then, an eight-coclpzny op~rationwas ccnducted between LZ' s IIZE and JiJEE; egainst a battalion-sized enemy force. For this operztion, the I st Brigade rs- ceiired OPCOIi of 2/7 Cav a,n& release?: OPCOB of 2/12 Cav. Throughout the mnth,

emphasis was placed on saturatian ak~ushesto interact eneny r;over~ent'both into and out of the Brigaf-e AO,

(3) KEKTUCKY COUGfR A0 (9 July to 31 gu2.y) : The I st ~rigcdecontinued

operations though July with 2/5 Czv, 2/7 Car, anl 2/8 CEV t~interdict eimy mvecient through the Brigade [LO am? to clestroy all mjor enerv forces, supplies, an5 fortifications. As a result of operations stetecl in the abovc paragraph to- SUBJZT: Operational Report for Qusrterly Period Liding 31 July 1969 1 gether with continued intelligence reception, it was deternined that tho re~mant ofbjor en- forces encountered had withdrawn to regroup nnc! prepre for fu- t&e attempts to infiltrate to the southeast. To preclude this, by naintainirg close observation over the en- ancl -toallow his supply bases & fortifications

positbned ,alonghis infiltration routes to be found apt? destroyed, it was de- C tqmined that the Bdgade disposition of forces be dtered, shifting northward.

The result was .the establishnent of LZ BECKY by the 2/8 Cav and the closing of

LZ'WETE. To prdt the nassipg of forces necessary to met a threat in the

3rd Brigade LO, econoqy of force actions wae taken resulting in the release oft2/7 ,Cav O N to the 2nd Brigade, 1 LCD. As further econoq d force measures were necessitathd, the 1st Br%gadersleased OFCON 2/5 Cav to the 2nd Eriede Q#$d closed EZ IKE. Then-the I st Brig@e rsceiwd OEON of 1/12 Cav c?nd 2/7 Cav, as- dngenLarged AOrsand closed LZ DOUP. Major respnsibility for interdict* the Saigon Rives approaches to Base Area 355 wzs given to the I st Brigade, Ad- ditionally,. the 25th Infantry IKvidon asswed responsibility for LZ ST BARB&&

-da portion of U1R 1at Brigadec s AO. Throughout the mnth, enes5.s was placed on sat&at+ &ushe@ to irrterclict. eneny rzovenent both into and out of the

Brigade AO,. .and the.destructio$ of all apply bases, caches, and fortifications &countered,.

c,-2nd 3rigade .Operations: (I ) Operation TOAN.TlUJG 111: (a) Operation TO13 THlG I11 c~ntinuec!throughout the reporting period4 During this period, the 2nd eigade,. 1st Cavalry Division (liiwmbile) was giwn th& miqsion of intezxI5cting en-, infiltration routes, of delgring..mhis tra- ditional sto~agead.staging locations, md preventing hin fron gaieng the m- mentun tQ commence offksfve operatkons. In car-ping wt tMs mssion the ?nG SUBJECT : Operational Rep 31 July 1969

Brigade mdntfined its headquarters at Lai Khe, an6 had OPCON of various Div- isional o+gani.tations, On 27 July, the 2nd Brigale's kO was reoriented to the north and northeast of Phuoc Vinh m6 the Brigade was given the fission of lo- cating an2 destroying the 5th VC Division.

1 The 5/7 Cav continued operations in the vicinity of LZ JOE until 7 May 1969 when the battalion was released OFCON to the 11 th ACR. On 11 lw, 5/7 Cav again returned OPCON to the 2nd Brigade and remained uncer its control until 26 June when it was airlifted to L7, BWTONS and released OPCON to the

3rd Brigade,

The 1/5 Cav continued to operate in the vicinity o;f LZ WLLY until it was released OFCON to Division Artillery on 7 July. During tP?s period, the 1/5 Cav had the responsibility of LZ DOLLY anC the surroundhg A0 with en- phasis on ground reconnaissance, trail interdiction an6 mbushes.

3. The 2/7 Cav continue6 operations in the vicinity of LZ Jfl.!JE a?- ti1 8 June when it was releesed OPCON to the 1st Brigade, On 14 July, 2/7 C2v again becine OPCON to the 2dBrigade and conducted ground, recon~iss~ceops~c- tions 4 Eloneters southwest of LZ WTE until 27 July when it vas 1-cleased OKON to the 1st Brigade,

4. The 1/12 C2v had one coupmg becons OFCON to t??e 2nd Brigace 011

24 3L93 with the responsibility of base defenso of LZ JANE. The rerzincer af the battalion becane OPCON to the 2n6 Brigase on 29 June. The 1/12 C2.v had respon- sibility for base defense of LZ GRLNT an< conclucted search ad clear operztions in*its sw-rouncling ID. Otr 27 July, 1/I 2 Cav becaue OFCON to the 1st Brigade, .5; The 2/12 Cav becane OFCON from Division Artillery to the 2nd

Brigade on 6 July and hd responsibility for LZ DOLLY ad the surrounding LO. It was released OFCON to the 3rd Brigaee on 17 July ac!returned to OFCOI'J of the 9

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Qumterly Perior: Ending 31 July 1969 2nd Brigade on 27 July, pic.king up the responsibility for LZ O'KEPE 2nd the

b. The mnth of bby was a highly successful mnth for the 2nd Brigade. It was characterized+ by nunerous contects throu&hout the &nth, mst of these

occurring with snail enem eleuents in bunkers. Merous bunker complexes were

discovered, exploited ancl destroyec?. The mst significant event of the month

w2s the rliswvery on 26 &.izy in the vicinity of LZ F%Y.LLIS of one of the laeest

caches of the entire war. This cache was discovered by B Troop 1/9 and exploit-

e? by it and two conpanies of the 1/5 Cav. The following is a list of their

ffndings: 90,000 lbs. of rice, 23,000 lbs. of salt, 132 B-41 rockats, 3Ck10Si

rockets, 88x12Gmu mrtar rouncls, 65x82nn mrt~rroun?s, 2 ti-47 rifles, 3 bike$,

11 NVA KIA ,20 to 25 cases of weapons (destroyed by air strikes), 23 cases OF

B-40 rockets, ccase of rocket propellee grenade (RIG-6) launchers, ad 10 ewes

3f .,SO caliber dtion. During &y, there were two significant attecks on

fire bases, On 12 May, LZ Ji',L\rIE receive2 200 rounss of lO7m1 rocket nC82a i. &rtar rods (mixed), md a heavy barrqe of mall mts fire, B-4.0 rockets cvld grenacles. This was followed by a heavy grounc: attack. 11Shac20wtt(a C-47 equLp-

'pe6 with mini-guns), kerid Rocket Artillery (iTlX), and air strikes were brought

in around the LZ. t. first light sweep foune 53 FIVX KIA* on or inside the peri-

meter wire. During the height of the attack, the eneny breqrchec the wire with

bangdore torpedoes ad occupied tm bunkers on the perimeter for a shcrt period

before they were killed. Enemy forces were later iCentifiec: as elencnts of

1st NVA Division, On 12 May, LZ JOE receives 43 rouncIs of zlixeO RH; 2nd 82m1

drtar fire with-light damage 2nd no casualties reported. The 2nd Brigade operc- tions in May resulted in 249 enemy KIA 7 M: . Munerous heat casualties were recorde0 throughout the mnth and there wre several ground-to-air firings,

A miairam of friendly casualties was sustained during tMs tine. 10 SUBJET: Operatiod Report for Quarterly Period Eni'jng 31 July 1969

(c) The mnth of June began with mcerate enprbsistance in the

Blackhorse (2n~~ri~ac',e)AO. On 1 June, B Conpany (co), 2/7 C2v mie contact with an estimated enemy pletoon which resulted in 8 NVfi KIA1s. On 2 June, D CO,

1/5 C2v, about 6 kilometers northeast of LZ JA Hll$ spotted an2 engage?. 6 inclivi-

6uals in bunkers. This short contact resulted in 1 NVX KU, On 5 June, k Coy

1/5 Cav sC:e contact with 10 to 15 eneuy troops in bunkers. ilir strikes were enployed along with ELL. The resfit of the contact was 5 NV6 KIhls. During the night of 5-6 June, LZ JB~Ereceivec?a stadoff &tack fron rockets, nortars, anC snail amfire. The 2/7 Czv engaged with its organics, itnP., artillery, an? tfShalowff, h sweep 03 the zrea on 6 June resulteC in a total of 7 NVA ICIk fron the action. lin ambush on 7 June, conclucted by elements of B Co, 1/5 Cav, res- ulted in 5 WA KIA1 . On 13 June, B Co, 1/5 C2v found a wcapons and nunitions cache 9 kiloneters northecst of LZ WIT6 which yieldeZ the following: b7.62

=chine guns, 8x12.7 mchine gun barrels, 1OOx82nm morta rounds and 80Cbr12.7 rouncls. On 14 June, I; Co, 1/5 Cav founc: the following additional item in the vicirlity of Its 13 June cache fin?: 71 Soviet cxbines, 1 SKS carbine, lYi'5m recoiless rifle, - 7 - Germn 14-34 =chine gun, L2 type 53 n.achine guns, 3 Brow- ning automatic rifles and 9x81m nortars. On the sme date, the reconnaissance platoon of E Co, 1/5 Cav uabushec! an cst-tee 15 infividuals which resulted in

9 Erb KIA' . On 28 June, B Co, 1/5 Cav found. a lsge a~ountof NVL equipncnt an6 a mass grave 5 kiloncters west of LZ JOE which coetzined 62 WL boc5r.s.

(d) The mnth of July wzs again characterized by numerous contacts in the Brigade AO, The most significant event of the rmnth occurred on 2 July when

C Co, 1/12 Cav nade contact with an unknown-sized enemy force in bunkers. This contact, supported by air strikes, artillery, ad LR6, lz.ste2. dl clay, mc! on

3 July, C Co, in a swtep of the contact area, founc! 31 FJVn boc5es fron the contact I I SUBJECT: Operational Repart for Quzrterly Period Encling 31 July I969

and a large amount of mescal supplies adother itetm~ The lorge complex con-

tained nearly 100 bunlcsrs, myof which appeared to have been used as a medical

treatment fecility, On 12 July, A Co, 1/I 2 Cav nad~;itect with an unknown-

sized eneny force in bunkers. The contact broke after 20 ninutes to ailow air

strikes to be placed into the area. l. sweep of the contact czrea on 13 July re- vealed the boaes of 16 NKA XIk ed numerous item were seized. On 23 July,

D Co, 1/12 Cav, while conducting a bonb 6zna~;eassessnent (BDA) of a B-52 Strike, found the boCies of 9 NVA, several munitions, ad 1&00.1bs. of rice. On 24 ~uly,Ii Co, 1/12 Cav found aa alxlitional 19 NVA kiUe4.g~the B-52 strike-

d. 3rd BrigaZe Operations:

(1) During the 92-Cay reporting perioc':, 1 Ma@ tkough 31 July, the 3rd 1 1 . ~riga~ecbntinued offensive opecmtions in its LO in %EB vicinity of the Canbo-

Cian border with the mission of interclicking enemy infiltration... routes and efi- ploying c',eliberats anbushes on mjor trail networks t~the dmextent possi- ble. During this 92-day period., 9 Lays were taken up With troop mvenents, md the remining 83 Lays with Brigncle operations.

(2) The nonth of May was chnractcrized by nwmus light contacts in the 3rcl Brigade AO. On the mrning of 11 &by, B Trcop, 1/9 Cav, in support of

3rd Brigade operations, began a series of contacts with en- units entrenched. in bunkers. B Troop, 1/9 Cav utilized severpi air stqkes through~utthc Cay resulting in 7 NVk killed by helicopter (KBH) anc? 9 NVA killee by zrtill~l-y.

The nost significant contact of the mnth occurrd c'llrhg the early mrning hours of 12 May at LZ ANDY (3r2 Brigace Corn& post). The @@ received a heavy rock- et ard 3-40 attack followed by a ground probe mZ a sagper attempt which result-

ed in severd of the enemy insicle the pdneter wirer total enew cas~tieswere heavy with the 31-2 Brigaee sustaining light casualties, On 14 Thy, the 3rC Bri- SUBJECT: Oper&.ional Reprt for Qucarterly Perio2 Mng31 July 1969 gade ceesed operations in the Mbntana Raicler A0 adcomnced opercztions in the*

Comanche Warrior 1iO. In the early noring hours of 21 FIy, LZ ANDY again came unzer heavy attack. from 10Ox@rm nortar roues, all inPcting outside the perine- ter. This initial onslaught was followed by SELL am, B-40, 2nd rocket fire.

Frieni3.y casualties were extremly light anl 1 NVA was captured. During the mnth, emphasis was placed upon anbush oprztions anc? the interdiction of in- filtration routes. (3) The rmnth of June was one of light contact throughout the 3rd Bri- gade LO. On 2 June, R an6 B Conpanies, 1/8 Cav enterec? into a series of contacts

14 kilometers northeast of LZ LIBBY which continued throughout the better p,a& of the day. During the course of the battle, heavy nortar and B-40 rocket fire was receivee, while a total of six air strikes =re leployed in retaliation against the enemy. Supporting the 1/8 Cav, a Cobra and LOH fron C Troop 1/9 receive2 hits from ground-to-air fire anc! were classified as "no fly. " Results of the action revedec! light friendly casualties with 2q NVA KIA . The mst sig- nificant action of the nonth occurred in the early mdng hours of 12 June when the 1/7 Cav Cormand Post at LZ JOY cane under a heavy incyirect fire attack fol- lowed by a grow2 assault. The battle raged on for approximtely two hours with several of the enemy attaining access inside the dre. After heav fighting, the eneq was repulsed leaving behind 35 cead. U.S . casu?.ties were cxtrenely light considering the intensity of the bsttle. There were nllnerous accounts of small arms fire m2 B-40 rocket attacks throughout the mnth of June. Fried- ly casualties were light with eneny casudties armunting to 98 KIA8 dth an un- known herof enemy MA: . SUBJFCT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ihc'Ang 31 July 1969 (4) The nonth of July, like the previous two months, was one of nunerous but light contacts. At 0145 hours on 4 July, a llighthjwk ( a Co5rc: gnc1 Huey used for night-tine surveillulce) spotted me engaged 15 to 20 saripans 21 kilometers northwest of Phuoc Vinh resulting in 5 saxpans c'iestroyed. On 5 July, LZ XNDY re-

F ceived 85x82nn mrtar rounds resulting in 1 US KIA and 6 US WU . Early in the morning of 21 July, a Nightha north of LZ CtlROLYN along the Czllbodian border receiver! ground-to-air fire. Later in the noring, C Troop, 1/9 17 kilometers east of Phuoc Vinh spotted approxbmtely 75 grey tubes 3 feet long. ' The tubes were engage2 with organics resulting in nunerous secondary explosions, On 27 July, B Troop, l/9 30 kiloneters northeast of Phuoc Vinh spotted zpproxinatcily

60 inc5viduals and engaged then with organics and artillery resulting in 10 NVA

KBI! and 14 NVL killed by Artillery. Friendly casualties during the nonth were light with noderate enemy casualties.

e. 11 th kmord Cavalry Reginent :

On 11 May, the 11 th Armred Cavalry Regbent was placed OFCON to the

1st Cavdry Division (Mmobile) and initiated. operations in support of its. three Brigades. This supprt lasted until 14 May when the 11th ACR w.s releas- ed OFCON to the 1st Infantry Division. On 22 June, the Reginent =s ,again fiaced OROM to the 1st Air Cavalry Division with the mission of conducting in- terc'Action and security operations in the vicinity of An Loc dong Highway 13, ad in the vicinity of Lac Ninh. At the end of the reporting period, the 11th

ACFL wr?s operating with two organic squadrons. The 11 th Armred Cavalry Regbent prepares md subcrlta a separate ORIL direct to I1 FIT. SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quvrterly Period hding 31 July 1969

f, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Operations:

(1) king the quarter, A, B, an2 C Troops renainecl under l/9 Cav con-

trol, Bnc! in support of the Ist, 3rd, snC 2nd Brigade areas of operations res-

pectively. The Squadron remilined in general support of THE FIRST TEAM.

(2) During the quarter, the Squadron continued to conduct extensive re-

connaissance and. surveillance operations throughout the Division 1O on a daily basis.

(3) Routine nissions for the Squadron incluGed: Locating targets for air strikes, bomb earnage assessmnts, "sniffer nissionsn (an airborne nethoz for detecting enemy locztions), reconnaissance in direct support of f riendy grod units, insertion of the Lero Rifle matoon to conduct grounS. reconnaissmce, ancl security of Cowed aircraft in the Divisionls LO. Insertion, extraction,

2nd support of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, d providing supprt for the Divisionts Combat Tracker Team were also a part of the Squa?ronts routine rAssions. During this quarter, a new emphasis wzs placed on reacting to intel- ligence infornation 3rd implantation of sensor devises. Much of the intelligen- ce received adgatherec! by the Squadron 2etermined the location of eneny forces ad their ultimite destruction,

(k) Many of THE FIRST TEXMts significant contacts the quarter were a Sirect result of sightings or contacts by units of the Squadron.

(4 May

1, On 10 May, A Troop sightee 40 NVA in the own, which began a dzy long operation resulting in l+O NVk KBH, 15 NVn KBA, ad10 1IVA killed by Artil- lery.

2. On 24 May, B Troop Blues were inserted 2nd swept the area around

LZ PHYLLIS, This sweep resulted in the discovery of 72x107m rockets, 68xl20mn 15 SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969 mortar rounds, 86 RFC rounc?g 30 tons of rice destroyed, and 2 NVA were killed.

3. During the mnth of May, C Troop's kero Rifle Pbtoon was in- serted 16 tines resulting in 4 enmy contacts and hge mounts. of rice and other foodstuffs destroyed.

(b) June

1. On 2 June, on e sweep through a bunker co~qilexin the vicinity of LZ F'HYLLIS, B Troop's hero Rifle Phtoon mde contact with an unkngwn-sized enefiy force. Support by scout team, tube artillery an3 AR$ resulted in 1 1 NVA KIA.

2. On 1 1 June, on a last light recon, A Troop observe? 15 to 20 indivicluals riding bicgcles Zown a trzil, The bicycles were heavily loaded with rice and clothing. Ehgagenerrt of the area resulted in 15 NVL. KBH a& 19 bicy- cles destroyed. 3 . On 23 June, C TIDOP(S J~eroScout Platoon sighted a lerge' riee cache which included cans 'of.fish,. beans, sacks of flour, and other foodstuffs.

This sighting was macle on an islad in the Dong FAa river. This cache was 6es- troy& by enploplent of Tactical rtir strikes.

(c) July

1. On 12 July, C Troop Blues found a rice cache .containing 2000

Ibs. of rice which had Canbodian aru?.Iaotiul writing on.the bags. The Blues also nade contact with two Mviduals which resulted in 2 NVh KIA . 2. On 21 July, a sbut t& fron A Troop received heavy ground-to-

air a-47 .end .51 caliber fire from appraxiqately 15 indivi5;ds i31 a trench line, Ehgagenent of the area with organic weapns5 artilleq-arul'air strikes resulted in 11 WS KBH znd &.51 caliber positions destroyed.

.16 SUBJET: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July

3. On 27 July, a B Troop element observed numerous camp fires in an area. The team received intense autonatic weapons fire from approximately

60 individuals. The area was engage? with organics, artillery and air strikes.

The results were 10 KBH an6 14 NVA killec! by Artillery.

g. Division Cumulative Results: Results of Operations from 1 May to 31 July 1969,

( 1) bemy: 2696 KIA' , 103 Hi captured, 164 crew-served weapons cap turec?, 652 individual weapons captured, 4301 large caliber rounds captured, 173,

804 s d caliber rounds captured.

(2) U.S.: 247 KIA , 1781 WIA out of which 732 required evacuation. h. Coxribat support ELenents Operations:

( 1) Division Artillery: Submitted Separately

(2) 11 th Aviation Group

a. General: The 11th Aviation Group continued to provide general, tactical, 2nd logistical support for Uvisional ad non4ivisional Usin I11

CTZ. B Company of the 227 AHB relocated on 12 July to Phuoc Vinh, providing bet- ter support to units and to base defense. All mjor installations in the Divi- sion area of operation received nunerous indirect fire attacks during the re- porting period, Effects of these attacks on 11th Aviation Group aircraft are contained in TAB AF.

b. Tactical Operations: TOAN THLNG I11 started prior to the report- ing period and has continued through.the current reporting period, The 227th &'

229th !JB1s have renckred extensive support to large reaction forces Wy, In- creased Nighthawk operations have proved very successful in observing md desr troying-:-mewinfiltration at night. During the reporting period, the 1st Air Cavalry A0 extended to I1 CTZ boundary, with the '228th moving nunerous fire sup. port bases in the relocation of the 2nt! .& 3rd Brigades into this area, SUBJECT: Operational Report for QuarterlyPeriod Ending 31 July 1969

c. Unit Disposition

Phuoc Vinh: HHC 11 th Am Gp 11 th GS CO (-) 227 AfB (-1

228 1iSHB (0) Tay Ninh 229th 1J-D (-) D2u Tieng Co B, Co D, 229th' AHE Bear cat Co LL, Co B, 228th lSHB Vung Tau Bsta Plat, 1'1th Gen Spt Co Lai Khe Co A, Co D, 227th AHB

d. Traffic control elements of '11th llvn Gp repcrted the following air traffic at Division Baw airfield for the mnths of MayJ June, 4July 1969:

~hDay R/W Might ~/kDay F/W Night

2, GCA 2021

3. During the reporting period, both GCB and MIB approaches were flight checked and certified.

(3) 13th Signal Battdion Operations

a. During the period covered by this report, the 13th SignaJ. Bat- talion provided. co~cationsfor the 1st Cavzlry Division (firmbile) h the coneuct of 0per~tion.s~ ZRTJGER, O EU3NTI;Nk~ SCOUT,~ COblfWCHE W&OI~, CREEX 11, m6 KENTUCKY COUGAR.

b. Operation HOWAU RfJDER: This operation was in process at the stzrt of the reporting period anc! terL6natec'. on 13 my 1969. Comdcztions instdlec! in support of this operation were reprted in the OEL enc'9ng 30 &l69

c. Operation MONTANA SCOUT: Co~cationssupprt for this opera- tion was reported in the last OFU,L. SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly PerioL Encling 31 July 1969

d, Operation COElC,NCHE WXRRIQR: This operation was conducted during the period 11, May - 1 June 1969. Connications to support the tactical opera- tions were provic'ied as follows:

1. Nine telephone ;pld teletype channels were provided through the fzmy Area Codcations System ax? tarclinated. with Division assets:

(a) Four conrraon user voice circuits fron Skyking Switchboard to Shotgun Switchboard at Bien Hoa.

(b) One hotline voice circuit from DTOC Switchboard to Shotgun s-3

(c) One teletype circuit fron Skyking Conncenter to Shotgun Conmcenter.

(6) One teletp circuit for passing intelligence. (e) Two voice circuits fron Division Artillery to 1/21 Artillery.

2, F'M radio retransnission facility established a5 =oc Vinh to link 3rC Brigade elenents remaining at Quan Loi with the forward CP at Bien Hoa.

This facility was hntained for the Brigade B-1 and B-2 ractio nets until a Brigade relay could. be established at Nui Chua Chan,

3, Two AN/bR~-112 four chmel systems

(a) Bien Hoa to LZ LOIS

(b) Bien Hoa to LZ LIBBY

4. One HF SSB radio with voice ant: rafioteletype capability.

em Operation CRmK 11: The I;rrry kea voice and teletype circuits in operation at Bien Hoa were exteneee ad. reterninatecl at Blackhorse-Long Giao.

The foL&ming aC-clcitional comnunications were installed: \ 1. k additiond voice circuits frop Shotgun4uan Loi to Shotgurr- SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period En~ing31 July 1969

2. FM retransnission facility was established on !hi. Chua Chan

to provice the Brigac!e access to the D-1 anc! Ij-2 nets. 3. One afditional artillery coorcIination circuit to BH'l'l'C anc! one to 18th ARVN Division at Xuan hc,

Two AN/MRC-1 12 f ow channel VHF systems were 6eployed; Blackhorse 4. w to LZ ROCK nnd Blackhorse to LZ LIBBY.

f. Operation KENTUCKY COUGAR: The following codcations were pro-

virlec! to each Brigade:

1, One HF SSB radio tern to use in the Ijivision Delta-3 net.

2. One HF SSB radio team to use in the ljivision Lelta-4 net with

provisions for telephone patch capability .when required; reverts to Delta-3

backup when not in use. 3. One complete 4 channel VHF system to each brigade, 2eployed as follows: 1st Bde - LZ GRAWI! to Tay Ninh; 2n6 Bde - LZ DOLLY to Lai Khe (changed 29 July: LZ o.!= to LZ &U.RY); 3rd Bde - LZ WESCOTT to Quan Loi, 4. One HF SSB rasio team to use in the C-'7 net. 5. One SB-22 switchboard anC wire installation teafor the Bri- gacle FSE,

6. Nine channels per brigsee were provided utilizing the limy kez Communications Systen:

(a) Four comn user voice circuits from Slqking to the brigade switchboard

(b) One hotline f mn CTOC switchboarcl to the brigace S2/3.

(c) One teletype circuit from Skyking Corncenter to brigade corn- ' center. SUBJET: Operational neprt for Quarterly Feriol Enang-31 July 1969

() One teletype circuit from eivision level RilU conpany to

brigade level RRU platoon,

(e) One voice circuit fron ljivision Artillery to Direct Support zkrtillery battalion,

(f) One voice circuit fron the LCC Forward to the brigacle FSE. 7, 1.n aCditional MF SSB raeioteletype wzs sent to LZ BUTTONS for use by the FSE in the r)-7 radio net.

8. The OFCON of the 11th IICR created the requirement for adfition-

al circuits to the Livision Headquarters.

(a) Two comon user voice circuits to Skyking Switchbomd,

(b) Three sole user circuits; G-3, G2, ad G3 Mr.

(c) One teletype circuit to Skyking Corncenter.

(2) One voice circuit from Division Lrtillery to Blackhorse FGC.

g, Luring all bf the period covered by this report, the 13th Signed Battalion also proviCed:

1. FM radio ternincitions in all Division and field force nets (for the Civision ~eadquarkers), an2 Support Command Heaclquzrters . 2. AM HF SSB radio terminations in dl Livision Nets for the Civi-

sion HeaCqmrters and the Support Con=nc"l Heec!quarters.

3. Four channel VHF system for the 11 th hvn Gp bet%reen Fhuoc Pinh,

Ijau Tieng, and Tqy Ninh.

4. Switchboard and wire installation service for the Division Hqs, 5. Message Center a&. courier service for the Givision Hccclquar-

f teYs cn6.&upport Comcl Heaclquarters ,

6, Terminations for approxinately 25 voice a6 teletyp channels

to higher and adjacent heaclquarters (circutits provieod by the krrgr hrea Comnuni-

cations Systen) , 21 SUBJECT: Operatio y Period Ending 31 July 1969

(4) 8th Wneer Battalion Operations

a. L'uring the reporting period., the greatest prxt of the 8th -beer

Battalion's effort was eected towards supprt of the 1st Air Cavalry Civision in Operation Toan Thang 111. The Battzlion wzs involved in operations for 92

Cays faring the reporting period. The 8th Engineers constructed or reopened 18 fire bases for the Givision, upgraded eight other fire bases which were operated by the Livision, and Cismantled eight fire beses which were no longer required for tactical operations. k chronological. listing of fire base openings and

closings is included in Tm K. Non-divisiod engineer effort in 111 Corps con- tinued to be directed toward upgracXng the facilities in c'livision base caps at

Tw Ninh, Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, and Quan Loi. The effort by nondivisional engi- neer units was coor?inatec! by the 8th -niter Battalion. This effort has been

significant and has enabled the 8th Ehgineer Battalion to devote the mjority of its time adeffort to direct conbat support of the 1st fir Cavalry L'ivision.

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Conpny remined at Phuoc Vinh dur- the reprting period, HHC supported the line companies with construction equip mnt adwater points. The moveraents of eq~ipentan? mterials; required 52C CH-

54 an^ CH-47 mrties in support of the construction effort. The divisional mter points produced over 1.6 nillion gallons of potable hater Zuring the priod. The

equipment platoons were involved in several construction anc! mintenance projects

in the division area. The upgrading of the Prek Klok airfield to C-130 capa- bility was completed in May, the repair of the C-130 airfield at Bwrd =s ini-

tiated on 17 July and completed: on 20 July. The upgrade of the roac? net in f~ea

20 at Bien Hoa was conpleted on 29 July, cznC work continues on the upgracle of

ckahge an2 roads in Phuoc Vinh. Helicopter pcc',s ad roac!wam received appli-

cations' of 72,000 gallons of 2sphaltic penetrative soil bider. SUBJECT: Operatiod Report for Quarterly Feriod &ding 31 July 1969

c. Conpayr A rellainec! in support of the 1st Brigade curing the period with its base canp at Tay Ninh. Cirect conbat supprt included dewlition and ninesweep teans to support the infantry. The fire bases at IKE, GfliJUT, CmOLm, ad ST BLRBlJtA were naintained an2 upgraded during the period. Pkjor assistance on the construction of LZ WHITE was given to the LRVN and 2 new fire base was constructed at LZ BECKY. The fire base at LZ CAROLYN was dismantle6 ad closed,

In Tay Ninh, limited. construction projects were completed on a mission request basis. Major projects conpleted 2t Tay Ninh included the construction of SU huts for brigade units, a fire clirection center and tactical operations center.

On 15 July, a platoon (-) displnced to Fhuoc Vinh to build SF& huts for divisional units, This elenent remins at Phuoc Vinh at the close of the reprting period.

d. Company B reminee in clirect support of the 2nd Brigzde 16th its

CP at Lai Khe. Lirect conbat supprt incluced Zaily ninesweep anc! Cemlition support to infantry units in the fie16 cd construction, rehabilitztion and closing of fire bases in the brigacle la. Luring the reporting period, fire base

BETTY was opcned, fire base LORI was reopened and existing fire bases at DOILY,

JOE, iind JUTE were upgraded to inprove their defensive posture. The fire bases at LORI anci BETTY were dismntled an6 closed, when there were no lower require uents for their ?Jse in brigade operations. One platoon remxined in general sup port of tine division at Fhuoc Vinh until 13 July when it returned to Lai Khe.

Luring this period, the platoon constructed SEA huts throughout Phuoc Vinh, at the Livision E;M Club, and the Feg~susTheatre at Division Headqurrters.

e. Company C renained in clirect support of the 3rd Brigde- with its

CF at Quan Loi. Minesweeps ulc! ?emlition support were provided to th; infantry on an 2s request& basis. The construction, rehabilitation, d.3 closing of fire bases. in the brigade A0 ims the coqany!s &n concern 6uring the reporting period. 23 SUBJXT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969

New fire bases were constructed at LZls LIBBY, BOCK, JOY, ti-ESCOTT, JULY, VIVIAN, adOIKEEFE. Old fire beses were reopened 2.t LZls KELLY, LOIS, CIIaY, and ELLEN in support of the brigade, while those at KELLY, JAKE, CINEY, LIBBY, and ROCK

=re dismntled and closed when no longer required in support of tactical opera- tions. One platoon remains at Quan Loi upgracing the defensive wire and providing limited general support of the brigade base cap. SUBJECT : Operzt ional ileport for Quarterly Period Ending 3 July 1969

2. ( C) Significant Act ivit ies

a. General: See paragraph la.

b. SignificAnt activities occuring within the Divisim A@ during the reporting perid.

(1) 1May: M, 3d Squadron, llth Pmared Cavalry Regimerrt ( ACR)

discovered X),400 pods of rice stded in 200 ad 250 ~ournlpackages 4 ka-

ometer s southeast of LZ E3EEQ.; 10,000 pounds was extracted while the remainder

was dcstr oyed in place.

(2) 2 May: Canpany C, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, while coducting

an operation in conjunction with elemellts fran Troop B, 1st Squadron, %h

l$vOg'; in A0 BLUE, discovered 30,000 ~odsof rice packaged in 150 pound

bags. h further search of the general area produced onexSKS rifle, 230

pounds of bandages, thirty battles of medicine and equipment for intravenous

feeding.

(3) 6 May: Cmpanies C and E, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry defend* LZ Co~t%mreceived a mortar ad rocket attack followed by a regimerrtal size

ground attack by NVA farces. The ground assarilt was launched simultaneously

frm the southwest and ndth at 0200 hours; breachirg a portion of the

perimeter at 0225 hours and destroving a 105mrn howitzer ammunit ion area at

0315 hours. Fig?&- continued throughout the early morning, with 1T.S. farces

ub ilizing all available support. Counter attacks reestablished the perimeter

and the enemy force began withdrawing at 0fJ5 hours, with contact finally

breaking at 0600 hours. At first light three canpany sized units were air

assaulted to block and interdict .avenues of escape to the north and west. 4 F'in'al sesults of the NVh assault were 19%enemy KIL, 30 PW,?. 10 cf which

were wou-nded. Enemy equipment captured consisted of ~&Omm mortars, Elld.K-47 SU3JXT: (&!rational ileport for rtuarterly Fericd Ending 3 July 1969 rifles, 11 Rocket Propelled Grenades (RFG), and 2 rocket launchers, 9 RFD machine guns, 1type 57 machine gun, 128 IiPG rmnds, 100hOmm mortar rounds,

Ux82nm mortar rouds, 10~75mmRecoiless Rifle rounds, 12,000 rounds of 7.6hm ammunition, 2% grenades, 325 satchcl charrges, 3 Chicom radios, 3 pole charges, and Ix8;hun mortar sight. Friendly casualties were 10 US KIA ad- 73 r4rr1.

(4) 6 May: Ccmpanies C and E, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry defending

LZ XE received an estimated 125-150 mixed 60mm and 8- mortar rounds followed by a ground probe from an unknown size enemy force at 03% hours.

The enemy fdce broke contact 2nd evBcd at 0430 hours. Two rifle cmpanies were airlifted to LZ dl'm. to conduct operations to the south ad solxthwest attempting to reestablish the contact. h first lkht se~xchof the battle- field produced 8 NVA KIA, 3xAK-47 rifles, lxl3-4.0 rocket launcher, 3hOxlX-47 raurids, 5 hand grenades, 5 bargalore torpedoes, ad 5 ?as masks. Friendly casualties were 4 US KIP., and 25 US ?,Tl,.

(5) 12 May: Canpanics A and 9, 2xl Battalion, 12th Czivdry deferding

LZ GbAM'. received a mortar and rocket zttack f~llmcdby a two cmpeny ground assault th~tbreached a portion of the western perimter ad occupied two bunkers. Massed fire from ,'L2!?and artillerv supported the couIj,er attack that reestablished the perimeter. ii search of the battlefield disclosed 45

NVA K DL,3 PVA PTq; 7 irdividual and 8 crow-served weapons were captmd.

The NVA assault accounted for 5 US KIA, and 40 US IIIIiZ.

(6) 12 Thy: C~npanyE, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry defending LZ

,JNIE pceived a mortar and rocket attack of 200 rmnds follawed by a battalion size ground assault that breached one bunker on the perineter. SUBJET: Operat ion& Report f 6 Quarterly Per id Ending 3 July 1969

The bunker was quickly neutralized and the perimeter reestablished; the NVA farce broke contact and withdrew at 0615 hours. A sweep of the battle area pr cduced 70 hTVA KIA, 1NVi: FTlT (llIf~), 26 individual weapons, 5 rocket launchers,

47xR-40 rockets and 200 hand grenades. The nrVL assault resulted in 7 US KIA, ad 35 US I,!'Ifi.

(7) 12 May: 3rd Brigade Headquarters, on LZ arid Canpany B, 1st

Battalion, 7th Cavalry defending LZ PWAX3 received martar ad rocket attacks f~llawedby ground probes fran sappers and AVA infantrv elements.

Results of the action included 13 BJVA KIA, miscellaneous amunition, grenades and demolitions captured. This resulted in 3 US KIA and 32 US ?IA.

( 8) 21 May: Cenpanies r, and $ 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry defending

LZ received mall arms, B-4.0 rocket, and grenade attack frcn an unknown size enemy fmce. The cmt act was initiated at 0248 hours ad continued until 0440 hours, with the 2-5 Cav employing organic weapcns am3 Shzadcw 11 support. A check of the battlefield prduced 12 PINA KIA, 1 NVR PV, 7xLK-47 rifles, and miscellaneous grenades and demolit ions. Friendly casualt ies were 2 US KIA.

(9) 23 May: Cmpany C, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry defending LZ JOE received a mortz and rocket attack of 200 rouds and a ground assa~ltfrun an estimxbed NV;, company. The ground assault st,wted at 0340 hws and contac ceased st 0420 hours. Enemy losses were 8 PVP. KIA, 4 FVi? PV

1xfhm mortar, 50 rourrls of mortar ammunition, and 8xAI<-k7 rifles captured.

The attack resulted in 13 TdIfl.

(10) 23 May: Troop R, 1st; Squadron, 9th Cavdrv operating in conjundicn with elemelrts of 1st Sattalion, 5th Cavdry discovered a cache SUBJ'ECT : %eration& Report for Quarterly Pericd End- 31 July 1969 consisting of 153 martar round~,~13L+B-40 rounds, 90x10?mn rockets, 100 tons of rice, 15.2 tons of salt, and p cases of assurted weapons and ammunit ion.

(22.) 24 May: Troop B, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry i3lues operating with me platoon of D Cmpany, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry discovered a cache of

10210'7mrn rockets, 124xJ3-40 rounds, h.0 tons of rice, and 15 tons of salt.

Two NVir were killed an3 twsc,?K-47 rifles were captured in the near vicinity which resulted in no fkiencily losses.

(12) 27 May: Troop C, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry while collducting a

Bomb Damage Lssessment. (BDA) of an air strike, 11 kilometers southwest of

LZ Rms,discwered a cache 3f 175x200 pound bags of salt. 1, shjlar 99:~ later in the day discovered between 100 and 150d00 pmnd baqs of rice.

(13) 28 May: Campany B, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry while cmductinq a canbat assault to the nwtheast of LZ ~6i&received d l arms fire frm a bunker cmplex. The 'enemy force was engaged with orgm-ic weapons, artillery, and two & strikes as Canpany B swept though the bunker area. P. search of the area revealed 1SKS rifle, 150 r omds of S-47 ammmit ion, 4,015 pmnds of flow, 35 pounds of rice, 1,100 poullds of noodles and miscellaneous medical supplies ard documents. There were no U!3 casualties.

(l4) 29 May: Cmpany C, 1st Battdim, &h Cavalry while conducting an offensive operatim northeast of LZ ROdB: fcund a cache containing 9,750 pounds of sugar, 28,100 pourds of salt, 20,250 pouds of rice, 2,600 pounds of peanuts, and miscellaneous cmking utensils such as pots, plates and silverware. Cenpany B, also while corducting a search of the area northeast of LZ RXX, found a cache cmtaining 187xh'il martar rounds, 67 RPG rourds,

19 RPG-7 rounds, and a variety of &her ammunition, mes and nhs. 4USJ3CT : Operationdl Seport for nuarterly Ferid %ding 3 July 1969

(15) 31 May: Cmpany 9, 1st 3attalion, 8th Cavalry while continuing their sweep northeast of L7 R!XX discwered three bunkers contalninq 20,000 pmds of salt, 3,000 pourcis of rice and 65 cooking pots.

(16) 2 Jun: Sporadic enemy contacts erupted thrqughout the Division

fiO as elements continued their mission of interdict- and destrwirig enemy

forces. The largest contact was by Cmpanies k and 5, 1st Battalion, 8th

Cavalry northeast of LZ Rm, in vicinity of the cache sites. Total enemy losses for the day were 54 NVi, KU,, with miscellaneous medical, foal and weapons supplies ' captured, As a result of the days contacts 14 US were KI.1

and 53 'WIfi.

(17) ll Jun: Campany 3, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry operating in vicinity of LZ JOY and Company D, 1st Sattalion, 8th Cavdry operating north

of LZ RKK uncovered two sizeable caches. fiemy eq-uipmen and fad captured

consisted of 9 individual weapons, 42.3 tons of sdt, 5 tons of flour, vary-

ing amounts of other fod stuffs such as cmking oil, sugar, dried fish, nocdles, and tobacco; additional supplies captured were medical supplies,

cldhhi!, photo paper, 3 bicycles and assorted bicycle parts.

(18) 12 Jun: Cmpanies D and R, 1st bttdion, 7th Cavalry while defend- LZ 3areceived a marts and rocket attack of 300 reds, along

with heavy small arms, automatic weapons and EL40 fire. -The NVA force broke

contact at 0445 hours with the friendly units employing organic weapons,

artillery fire ard Shadow. The unsuccessful. attack resulted in 35 NV~LKIA,

2 NVA PW, and capture of 22 X-47 rifles, assmted ammunition admines-

The friendly forces sustained 5 US KIA, and 10 US VdIR

(19) 14 Jun: Capany I;, 1st Battalion, 5%h Cavalry corduct ing cpera- tions nath of LZ DGLLP aisccxrered a bunker complex dontahing 71 Soviet SUBJECT : Operational Report for !?uartcrlv Fericd Emling 31 July 1969 carbines, 1SKS rifle, 2x74mm Secoiless Rifles, 9X81mm martas, 3 machine guns, and 3 autcmatic rifles.

(20) 18 Jun: Canpanies D an3 X, 2nd Rattalion, 5th Cavalry defeding

LZ IKE receivcd a mortar and rocket attack along with small ,ms an6 auk matic weapons fire as NVA sappers attempted to ~enetratethe perimeter, The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, iZRl., SM'W~and withdrew at 0330 horns.

The hniL conducted a stad off attack on LZ GRANT at the same the the sappers were attempting to penetrate EB. Results of the attack on L'I SfR3 were 37

NVL KIA, 3 NV1, Fllr, assorted individual weapons, mines, and ammunition captured. The attack cost 3 US KLt and 11 US FIIA.

(21) 20 Jun: Canpanies D aral E, ?11d Battalion, 5th Cavalrv continuing to defend LZ DEE were subjected to their sec~ndmortar and rocket attack, in three days followed by an assault by an WA Battalion. The attack carmnced at 0103 hours and the NVf, face was engaged by organic weapons, artillery,

MA, 3rd Shadow until they withdrew frm the battle area & br~kecontact at

0240 hms. Final results of the NVA assault were 90 NVA KU, 5 NVA Pw (lXI~),

6 machine guns, 33 irdividual weapons and 10 rocket launchers captured along with nmerms rounds of rocket, small arms, ad Recoiless Rifle ammunit ion.

Friendly casualties were 7 US KIA, and 19 US FZA. The IuVL r3athdion assault on LZ was coordinated with stand off attecks directed taward LZrs JAMIE,

ST. BARBGRA, GRANT and WHITE.

(22) 28 Jun: Cmpany 3, 1st Dattalion, 5th Cavalry while cmducting

BDA of a B-52 Strike 12 kilometers east of LZ WHITE, found 54 Killed by Air (KB~L)an4 nuni$ruus small items of equipmerrt anil ammunition. SUBJIXT : %erstion& Report for QuarterlyPeriod Ending 3 July 1969

(23) 3 Jul: Cmpany C, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry while conducting

a sweep scutheast of LZ GAGKr where there had been contact the previms - day, found 32 NV>% KIA, 15 m;illim~units of penicillin 4assorted small arms

munitions. A Demolitions cache w3s also captured during the same sweep, SU3JZT: @erst ional Report for Quarte'rly Perid Ending 3 July 1969

I, Personnel: M~ne

12, Cperations: 'R, Tactical Operations against bunker cmplexes : ' (1) Cbservation: Tactics ad techniques used against bunker ccmple&a has dwavs been a matter for cmmd concern within the 1st Cavalry Division. Erring the month of April 1969, as the Division expanled its operattons within bra Zone C, an increased number of bunker canplexss were discovered that were extrenely well fatified. Due to an increase in US casualties, crxnbincd with the variation of tactics within the Division ad the wide variation of results attained, a need for, ad the development of a ~ta~ardizedsequence of tactical everrts when clperet ing in or against a bunker canplex was recqnized. e2) fialuation: Basically two bunker area situations confront the battalion an6 caqany cmander. The first one, classed as, if?xttackof a Knom

Bunker Cmplex, ff troops not in contact. The secord situation, and the most - chon to date, is classed as a tweet* Engagement in a Bunker Canple~~~, troops in contact. It usually developgr when the point man becmes a casualty and the lead clements are pinned dmliy enemy fire. (3) Recmel?dation: (a) Techniques devel~edby the 1st Cavalry Division in tactical operations against bunker complexes be disseminated to other RnT units for thck consideration. *b Attack of a known bunker complex, troops not in contact, is a planned attack, The sequence of tactical events (shown below) is based on the use of Division resources, d upon a plannirg cycle beginning early the evenin& before the attack. The most critical step and often the mmt difficult, in this sequence, is reconnaissance of the area in order to locate and define the canplex. During the actual execut%m phase of the attack, KLl timing is keyed to a plannd air strike which mu& take place 10 minutes after CCj is init idly rlelivered into the bunker area. Normally the CS is 4elivered in the fm of E-158 bmblets droppd frm a Cav heliccpter. The attqcking ground farces, corrtrolled frm a Commanfl and Control helic~ter,must be located so they can begin the assault on the bunkers 30 kinutes after the CS has been placed on target. Timing of the tactical sequence must be rigid due to the use of CS; the ~pcration must be well planned and executed in mder to achieve the mpximm r zsults.

-TIME ACT ISFT M

M PLUS 10 AI;% FCnCE DELNJ!$S CLUSTER AIR FCRCE PLLhP3S IIIJST BCMB UNE 25's IN THE CF tBEA, BE @ISTATIOIJ BY M WITH 750LB BLDS AND NAPLUf F~~INVTES. SUBJECT : +erational Reprrrt far Quafi,erly Perid Ending 3'1 Jzily 1969 -ACT ION M PLUS 15 Pm MORE CS INTO TtIE AREA.

M PLUS 25 SAT URi3E TXI3 ;'iRZ?, ?Kl!TH FIX FU'SX DZLAY AID TUBE 13TILLERY. QUICK. CCNTINUT UNT lL TR CBS APFROL-CH . USE mini?,r~~msccurs qunm T!iE FIN,L ENTRY IhT0 THE I3uNKms.

c E'ieeting enqaqment in a bunker cmplex, trocrps in cmtact is a mod difficult situation to control, The first action by frienclly farces must be rapid a2plication of fire power followed by exploitation using fire and maneuver. If these actiom fail, the sequence of tactical events (shown below), the recovery of casualties, anri disengaqment fra enemy forces beqin simultan- e suslg. Three critical areas with tr99s in cqnt act in a bunker ccmwlex me firing of available smoke to allow dis*,qaqement ; marking of frien4l.r posit ians early to reduce identification time prick to .IRA 21x3 Air Force fkhter strikes; ad getting a Ccmmand arrt Corrtriil helicopter airborne to corrtr~lthe action and sequence of events.

-Trn -ACTION CWEJTS RW,mSl' !-IR TRIKES, CS, ARTat.3RY !SFmx.

c PLU~2 DELIVER A~TII;LER~ SM~EON FRIERTDLIXS. SXTRLCT C;!TUNr TIES. *

C PLUS 15 BmGB TdIT H ARA UNTIL iS!RIVlL USE EN LCG BRD FcT CC4. CF CS BIRD; DELIVrn CS IN THE BUNKER .%Eli.

C PLUS 25 SATURATE TFIE ?In3A ITN TUB9 ONCS D ISFT\G:,GED r)P VCV LET lL'RTILLERYUNTIL FEFIIIHI.3 ~,R!L. mm. C PLUS 45 DENEB NtPAUf 3N TL% CCNFLm; FaLCRJ hWH 75CiW3 BU4BS IF .!lVAILfm,E. SUBJECT : Cperat ion81 Repwt fez" ruarterlg Ferid %ding 3 July 1969

& Tactical Methals of Conducting BDAl s of "Heavy !irtillery" concentrat ions and Air Strikes: 1 Cbser~~~tiion:During the past three morkhs , elements of the Division hav~on occasion mde coiTtact while canduct- a BDA of a "Heavy Pstillesgu Concentration ar Air .Strike. Aerial reconnaissance has fY2quentlly detected bunkers having been rebuilt and grmd movement throughout the area after such a strike, Since units are required to cmduct either air or graund 9DA1sof each stri?ce, a pattern is quickly established that the enemy can easily ascertain. 2 fialuation: The concept of considering areas of 1f"lea~.ktSleryf1 strikes as being cleared of enemy fclrces must be avoided. The eneq knows that either a ground or air BDA will be conducted ard will often return t 0 the area of the strike in anticipation of inflicting personnel and/m equipment losses. 'j Rec anmendat ion: a Careful reconnaissance by ais shcruld.be accqlished prior tc insertion of ground forces. h-tillery follow-ups, ad justerl by scout teams, is effective in placing fire on areas that show the possibility of enemy fmces being present. The BDk reconnaissance must vary in time ad rick be conducted on a scheduled basis after the strike. Bangalore Torpedoes Against Fortified semg Posit ions : .1 aservation: Two major pr~blmsa rifle cmpany encounters when in contact with enemy elemerrts located in a bunker cmplex are; well camouflaged bunkers and hidden lanes of fire. 2. EvaluatFm: The bunkers e?e c~nstructedin such a manner as to seal off. all avenues of approach. This is accmplished by constructing the- ccmplex in thickly vegetated hmboo with interlock- lanes of grazing fire. Because of the enemy's expertise in the use of cover and concealment, it is extrmelg difficult to detect and place effective organic fire on his pc6itions. 13' Rec mmendati~n: f&'. The bangalore torpedo is an effective meam of cleariw fields of fire far the emplo.yment of organfc weapons. The torpedo can be brought to the contact area by helicopter a& dispersed to the lead elements, slid under the bamboo and detonated. The bangalore will clear a large field of fire whish enables the grmnr! canmandm to engage the enemy with ~rganicweapons. D, Faking Unit Locations for Suppwting Aircraft During Terids of Reducd Visibility or Darkness without the Benefit cf Ground Control Approach Radar (GCB). #:l Cbservetion: Aircraft su~portinggrcund units, while in contact with enemy farces, have the initid problem of findhg the unit and becm- orientated.after arrivi% on station. 2 Evaluation: Whsn a unit is in contact, during the hours of reduced visibility or darkness, it becomes necessary to provide a long rarge neans of identify- the unit's exact locatim for Xli, aerid resupply or other supporting aircraft. '-3 Recommendat ion: a Firing a white phosphorous mark- ram3 in the vicinity of the wit enables approach- aircraft to be guidd to the general location where conventional means of irlent ificat ion may be mployed. SUBmT : Operational Repcrt faO,derlg Fericd Ending 31 July 1969 , 1E, Leaflet Missions: 1 Observation: Frequently, Lgroun? emtacts are ligM and so short- lived that leaflet cwerae cmld not :be accmplished with ang assurance that the enemy was still in the area, 2 Evalustim: l;zl "an the spd leaflet cweraee system, where limited. amounts of leaflets could be distributed, was needed by the battalions falocal use. h "on the spotlf reaction box containing five different trrpes of leaflets that could be used in suppdt of the battalion's mission, was made up for each battalion, Instructions were post4 b. each box tell* the user what the leaflet s themes were and haw they m4ht be distribzzted. &hasis was placed on '!hand distribution of l@aflets" by US soldiers as they moved tkupopulated areas, down trails, or thru enemy bunkers. f 3 - Recamnerdation: (a- Dattalim S-51s main+'Bfn an had, a limited nmber of leaflets, of various c&unan themes far immediatq fiistribution (air or ground), when P SY (;P exploit at ion of the situs?tion can support their missim , Rice Destruction: (1' asemation: The Divisidsr has been plagued by the tine required and the method of destroying large an-.: of rice, 2 Zvaluatim: A method of diE:sroying rice on a large scale is needed using materids read- avail&ik fkan a fire base (forward) to the capany in the field. 3 Recamendation: 'a: A mcthd used by this Division is by either digging a large hole or using an existing artillery bmb crater; partially filling the hole or using an existing artillery ur banb crater; partially filling the hole with JP4 a Ma;S and stacking the rice an8 deadfall in layers wer the crater thus making a large wen. By igniting the fid with a trip flare, the rice will be turned Moblackened ash within 6-42 hours. The heat generated by the fuel is enoucrh to break dmthe cmpositi.& of the rice leaving it tdally unusable by the enemy G. Use of CS to Contaminate Rice: 1 Cbservation: Units cont*ue to find large ,mourrts of rice, which raises the problem of how to destroy it if it can't be evacuated. .2' Tvaluation: It has been found in the 1st Cav Div LO that the enemy will not attempt to use rice that has been contaminated with persistent CS. This is not to say that rice contaminated with CS cannot be eaten, but merely that the enemy1s fear of CS and possibly his lack of ~rotective equipnent keep him frm attempting to me the contaminated rice. Contaminating r .ice with CS is p~~bablgthe quickest neans available to render the rice useless. 3 Recommendation: .:a: That caches of rice tW cannut be evacuated be cmtaminated with persistent CS. H. CS Drum Drops : 1 Observation : A 30%dud r&e was experienced with the P925 Fuzing System for C5 drum drops. 2, Evaluation: ~xperinor&ation .revealed that the Tetryl explosive in the XM923 hse did not have the necess- frrce to set off the explosive rod in the Dl55 Durster, i, small amount bf GI+ explosive p13ced between the XkJ923 fuze adthe XI455 Burster has reduced the dud rate to less than 1%. Z:3, Recanmendat ion: .'a:. Until new lots of XI4923 fuzes with an improved charge becomes available, units dropping CS with the 31925 system can reduce malfunctions by placin~a small of. G4 between the Dl923 fuze and XM55 F3urster. % E-158R2 GS Munit ions : .I'2bservat ion: A high dud rate was being experienced. while dr~pin~: the E-158's fran 2000 feet. '2: Evduatim: Pradicall;y all E-15'€3?2 munit ions arrive with the initiator set for 1500 feet. It has been obssrved that altering this setting will increase the dud rate. This indicates that the initiator is probably accurate for l5OO feet ofiy. Drqpirg the Z-158R2 at 1500 feet has lowered the dud rate to less than 1%. < 3. Recommendat ion: (a) That E-l58";22ts continue to be dropped with the fuze set at 1500 feet udil improved munitions are available. The 250 watt loudspeaker and public adflress set (~JN/FI%~FI): \''1! Observation: Due to the cmbat loss of two 1000 watt asid loudspeakers, the Division had. difficulty in c~nductingextensive lm1dspe2ker' ccnrera.p rxrer the AC. Thae speakers frequently behy used in one bri~a,deA?, were concurrently .needed in another A3 f rr Quick react ion explqit at ions. 2: Evaluatian: The Division P,%@ section tested the 250 watt speaker mounted in an LSH. The 250 watt speaker proved to be the most effective at abmt 1000 feet. Engine noise prduceri by the LC3 did not interfere with reception at grourd level. The Division also testd the public address set (i~1,&1Q-58) from an LCH and foun4 it to be less effective than the 250 watt speaker. ' 3 Recmendation: a 'When t%re is nd a 1000 watt speaker available, the 253 watt speaker or the public ad4ress set can be used as a media far rapin exploit ation of contacts. Cross talk radio remote units: i 1 Observation: The remote unit frm the ELF', IRC-105 radio, can cause interference when used in close proximity to the 8T-53A radio. " 2 Xv~Juation: Exhaustive tests, line changes, re-gr ounding of equipment and frequency changes failed to solve- the problem. The cross talk occurrd only when both remotes were keyed si~ultaneouslg. It was finally eliminated by adding a full MX-306 *'donut roll!' in series with the FT': remote- unit. It 2s assumed that the MX-306 acted as an 2F choke in the remote line, decreasi~the interfering signal to an acceptable level. 3 Recanmendation: .'a:' That the use of the MX-306 be noted as a field expedient methcd for reducing crcss talk between ranote control units. &, Capture of FW. : !I. Cbservation: ?!byNTTL soldiers pinned down outside a fir6.berse ' after a nkht attack will surreder at first light if properly hamild. Evaluation: Timely ard eff edive means of persuasion- must be employ& to comince enemv soldizrs to surrender. The enemv is most susceptible to capitulation vhen his group (squad, platoon, etc.) has been effedj-vely disorganiead or destr@fed. The use-.:of F.SYCF broadcsst equipment, both air an?

- . -.. SLEJgT: $crational Repart far harterly Feriod. Ending 31 July 1969

ground, can be an effective det erminsnt in earning enemv surrender. 3 Reccmmemlation: 'a. I,fter a night attack has been st qped, units should ccmtinue to fire wer and behind enemy elements to keep them &an withdrawing or pick- up their w3unded. b hediately aner an enemy attack has lost its manenturn, Psychological Operation teams should begin tkir work of persu&iqg enw soldiers to surrender. c 1: firebase should have a simple reception plan for bringing in PW d l"lu pers o-me1 should know the SCF concerning fire discipline when receiving FW . e Lfter a night attack, both ground and air loudspeakers should be used bv the PSY@ teams. f. Fresh troops should be brought in to sweep the area; they will be nore inclined to take PW than the men who fmght most of the night defending the fir€*me.

11% Training: Nme

Intelligence: None

V, Logistics: A, Movement of Fire Base Kits to Forward LZ's: '1 Cbservation: Fire Base Kits are normallv mwed by CH-47 to the L'? i! me day. With the mwement of troops and &her mganic equipment this creates an werload of available organic lift capabilities. 2- Evaluation: Fire Base Kits can be mwed wer a perid of two ar more days without adversely effecting the c~nstructionproject. This can lessen the daily lift reouirment, thereby allowing normal resupply missions to continue withcut interruption. Under the present c~ncept,resupnly missions often must be delayed or in sane cases cancelled the dav the Fire Sase Kits are moved, In addition, mwsnent of Fire 3ase Kits lasting two or .nore daw wdd preclude the pile-up of supplies m LZ9s which often creates a problem. Phased mwment would result in better use of available aircrafk and also assist in the construction project. '3 Iieccmmendation: a The lift of Fire Base Kits to LZ's cm be acccmplished in a perid of two or mare dam instead of one day. Friority of materials to he lifted daily must be made by the cmander . '% Qrderly, timely arrival of Fire Base Kits to new LZfs: 1' Qservation: The sudden mass arrival of Fire Base Eqwipnent can lead to confusion, wasted effmt, ad lost time unless there is direct control and sup~isionaver the arrival of loads, 2 Evaluation: The insertion of the standard Fire Base Kits normally require 26 to 30 CH-47 saties, In order fm the material to arrive on a timely basis and continue to flow mootm, ?ired control ad coordination is needed. 3 necmenitat fans: & "Hard1' miss5ons as oppcrsed to logistical missions must be JTBJECT: Ooerational Seport far quarterly Fericd &din& 3 July 1969 scheduled toinsure arrival of Fire Sase Kits at the time requird. b The Fire 3ae material must be dram the night before the planned insertion and rigged for sling-olrt. 'c, Priorities on loads must be established with a representative sqle of dL1 the material moving in the initial lifts, Those-items which shdd go in the first lifts are: water, 500 gallons of KCT!..S, 500 gallms of diesel fuel, nails, culvert, sandbags, and drama material. .d The first lift of Fire Base material should move a?proxbately- 30 minutes after the insertion of the grand troops. This-should be an cxl-cdl mission allowing eno,qh time for prclper security of the LZ. e hce the materid starts to move, close attention must be paid to maintain an adequate supply of slings and nets, The de-rigsing crew on the LZ must work fast in getting the slkgs and nets off the loads and returning them to the airhead. :f Each soldier should carry with him: (1) Ten sandbags (2) Cne five gallon can of water per 3 men (3) Che case of C-rat ions per 3 men (4) In addition each man should carry one 81mn mmt2r round, and one claymore per two men. .g If the zbove procedures are followd., adequzte material and

supplies will be available tothe men fm one nigM f s operation. C., Assignment of M6EL Rifles : 1 Bservation: It is not essential that each irrlividual retain an M16!i rife. 2 Evaluation: The original concept within the Division was that all ranks should be initially issued and retain zrm 1.~16~rifle. -This pglicy was followel without regsd to the individual's later assigrment, i.e., machine' .gmna, grenadier, aviator, etc. Such a procedure cansed the unnecessary storage and stockpiling of weapms that codd have been used elsewhere. ~iccordhgly,the policy w2s changed so that KL6LL rifles wodd not be issud to field grade officers and a~iators. In addition, an individual receiving a duty assigment where an l.Q6fl rifle w2s nut required t uined in the M16N rifle. Rather than stockpiling the weapons at the unit they were then retr- grad& to Division Rear for re-issue to incoming personnel, 3 Recmmedation: a This policy should be considered for adqtion by other divisions whenever a requirement exists for rear area weapons zeroing an4 training. D, Q61! Aircraft Barrier Filter System: 1 &servztion: The 2d611 aircraft incorpmates a barrier filter spsten to prevent ingestion of foreign objects through the mgine. %>%enthis filter beccmes clogged the pilot can select a by-pass position which allow unfiltered air into the engine, Frolon~ed.oper.& ion in this posit ion accmdates dirt and other objects around the fuel contr.01 sensor and the bled bond actuator, resulting h a partial engine failure, 2 Evaluztim: The barrier filter of the CH6A is rewired. to be cleaned daily with a vacuum cleaner. Since all units in the ffcrrwzrd areas do not have such eguipment, s cap and water works eaually well. If the latter methrd is used the filter must be allowed to dry thorm.qhly. SUBJZT : Cperat iom Report f 3~ nuapterly Period Ending 31 July 1969

f 3. Becamendat ion : ,a. That all units with {Y~Aaircraft maintain an extra filter on hand so that while me is being us& the other can be cleaned and dried. E, Ground Surveillance Radar: 1 Bservatim: The grmd surveillance radar prwam in use until 1 June was not sufficierrt tomaintain operational radar sets on all Fire Support, Bases (FsB), '2 Evduatim: Until 1June, control, accnuntabilitv, and rdrwa4e was decentralized to battdian level. No centralizsd float was maintained. The rapid turnover rate of radar sets outstripped replacement capability. To increase the replacement capability a centralized float was established at WFF, 27th MaMenance Battalion, Bien Hoa Army 3ase (BHIL~) and close liaison was maintained between the repair unit and float facility. Divartp *sun4 responsibility fw maintaining an opzatimd radar set on each FSR. Divart~ was task4 to provide helicopters on a priority basis to retroqrde T)/L sets directly fran PSB to BHAB for direct exchange ad return to the FSD. '3 Recanmendat ion: a. That the Division continue the present prvam Znrl increase Division ground surveillance radar capability. b That an aggressive werat or-maintenance prqran be established with emphasis on use and care of radar sets unqer field cmriitims.

V& Cbganization: None

VIP, cther: A, Breaching Concert ina r3arbed Wire : 1- bservation: Triple stand& cmcertina can easily be breached when not pr qerly tied down. '2: lbaluation: Because of the skill with which the VC/lrVE, are able to crawl under the concert&, the currently use? method of constru~tionis not as effective as it should be. { 3. ;lecanmeralation: ?.a That two single strands of barbed wire be run at gr& level thPsugh each of the two concertina roles an4 then secured to each picket. The strand shod13 then be tig%tened to preclude lifting the concertina off the gr-• 8, Barbed. Tape Concertina !p?ire: ' 1. aservation: laen barbed tape concertina wire is emplovd at the recamended 15 meters per roll it will not support the third roll in a triple stanlard cmcert ina. '2' Evaluation: The barbed tape' is not as riqid as the nmal cbncertina wire, '3 2ecanmel.Kiation: .a That a concertina roll 3f barbs? tepe be stretched anly 10 meters. C~ilputationof material requiranents when using barbed tape must reflect that the tape only covers 10 meters instead of the recaranendecl 15 meter per r611. C. Kit Carson Scout Frogram: '1 aservstion: The Division Kit Carsm (KCS) prowam was nrrt retain- ine: Mont~nar~dsemplo~das KCS. Fifteen Irontagnard scoubs h2ve either cuit or left emplqment during the reporting perid. SUBJXCT : qper ational i'leport for nuarterly reric? Endim5 31 July 1969 '-2. Evaluation: PJthough these lbntqnarrl scoubs were recruited frm within the Division's AG, those units mplwing them have had t t nwe ~!PQII the Mont agnd's home areas. These scouts have very strong f anilv ties and prefer employment when the units are in close proximity to their fdlsand village. Reenlistment attempts have been unsuccessftxl when the units am located in areas away horn the Montagnard settlements. The BfontagnazYls prefer to stay within their village baundries. !3': Recanmendation: .a,- That Montagnards ernploved as KCS be thorouqhly brief4 a3 to the possibilities that scout work may require thm to leave their family, and that canmanders emploving Montagnard scouts be made awarq of the bortance of giving frequent passes for the purpose of allowing the sco& to visit his family. D, Civic Act ion: , .1' Observation: ti method of counteracting the-VC propaganda which states "saigon is in ruins", and 'The WN is t dteringlf, was ncer'red in rural areas. 2 Evaluation: By coordinating with local school teachers and village chiefs, school children have been flown to- .Saigon, and have been qiven a tour of the city to include government buildings, religious edifices and the city zoo. Upon returning home, the children have been most tdka%ive, and have informed their parerrts and others of the vitalitp of the city and the q overnment . > Recamendat ion: a' That major cnnmands operating amory: rural populations make every effart to arrwe trips such as these when the tactical situation permits.

SECTION III: I+q;S, DL SU?XET IRTi3P.T IW

Escape, Evasion and Swivd: None SUBJXT: Operational Reprt for Qusrterly FerioS, Enc;ing 31 July 1969

FOR TEE COWER:

32 INCL T A: Task Organization TAB B: Weather and Terrain cm, TAB C: Aeriai Surveillance Asst rFrD T'.. . . . Tig E: v p e n t s

1: Casualty St~tistics

... 'IT. .--

TAB LA: Logistic Operations Tf23 13: Logistics TAB LC: Civil Affers TI3 iS): Psychologicd Operations TAB a:Chexical Activities TB D: 11th Aviation Group Statistics Tabs D, F, G, H and J thru Z wd, HQ, DA.

8 - CG, I1 FFORCEV, LTTN: G3 R&E, AFO 96266 2 - CINCUSARP~LC,ATTN: GP OF-UT, !PO 96558 2 - LA, ACSFOS, WASHINGTON, U.C. 20310 2 - CG, USPBV, ATTN: AVHGC-ESr, k~I396375 2 - ea-BCe (6) 1 - Office of the Com6. Historian, HQ, USI'BV, Am 96375 203 1 - Office of the Chief of Mtlitaly History, L;k, Washington, E.C. 15 1 - ea Gen Staff Section (6) 1 - 14th Nil His Cet AVFBC-BE;H (4 Sep 69) 1 st Ind SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ehding 31 July 1969 RGS CSFOR-65 (RI) (u)

Da, HQ II FFQRCZV, BW San Francisco 96266 b_ 3 SEp 196 9.

THRUt Conrmending General, US Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST),APD 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GmP-DT, AW 96558 TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Developmnt, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310 This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Fkport - l.@ssonslearned of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for the period ending 31 July 1969 as corrected (~abA). FOR THE COMQWDER:

-+-

1. (u) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

2. (c) Comments follow:

a, (c) Reference item concerning "CS Drum Drops," section 11, page 35, paragraph 2H, This headquarters is unable to evaluate the perfornaance of the modified fuze burster. This item has been forwarded by separate correspondence t.0 Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland for evaluation.

b , (c) Reference item concerning "E-1 58R2 CS Munitions, section 11, page 36, paragraph 21; concur. This item has been forwarded by separate correspondence to Edgewood Arsenal,?%ryland for information.

c. (u) Reference item concerning "Cross talk on radio remote units," section II, page 36, paragraph W;concur. The one-half mile roll of wire does act as a choke and may be used by units who feel that feedback from high powered radios coming over the wire line is excessive. This feedback is only heard by the transmitting operator at the remote site and then only when the remote is keyed at the same time as the high-powered radio. This feedback is not transmitted and therefore is only annoying to the transmitting radio operator.

Q furn: 1st C v Div (AM) I1 F4 GPOP-DT (15 Aug 693 3d Ind SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (Rl)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 OCT 6 9 TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310 This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed,

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

CPT, AGC Asst AG SUBJECT: %eratima Repart for Quarterly Pericd Ending 3 July 1969 TAB A: Task Organization

Task Q-ganizat im a, 1st-Air Cavalry Division HHC, 1ACD Security Plat (~rov) 184th Cml Plat (DS) 14th Military History Det 1-9 Cav 6% Inf Plat (Cunbat Trackers) Grourml Sensor Plat (~ruv) %h Ehgr Bn 13th Sig Bn Co H anger), 75th Inf 545th YP Co 26th CIFl Det 3nst RR Co 191st MI Det 583rd MI Det Operational Location #2, 5th Idbather Sqdn (USAF) 322nd Avn Spt Det 391st CN Dee 273rd Avn Co (~vyel) b. 1st He 2-7th Cav 24th Cav 1-12th Cav c, 2nd Bde 24th Cav 2-12th Cav d'. 3rd He 1-7th Cav 5Rh Cav 1-8th Cav e. Div Arty 14th Cav HHB, Div Arty #l%h Arty 2/mh Arty 1/21st Arty 1/77th Arty Btry E (~vn),82hl Arty 1/3%h Arty 268th FA Det (~adar) 273rd FA Det (Radar) 3rd Prw Plat, 4/60th My f. Ilth Am 1-IZ ACR 1-12 Am g. Ilth Avn Gp HHC, llth Avn Gp SUBJECT: OperGtio* Report far karterly Period Ehdhg 31 July 1969 TAB A: Ta.& bganhation (Collt)

ATC Plat (~rov) . llth AvnCo (GS) 227th Avn Bn (~sltel) 228th Avn Bn (~sltHe1 sat) 229th Avn Bn ( Aslt el) h. Division Support Canmand HHC & Band 15th bin Co 41st PI Det 42Ixi PI Det 15th Me8 Bn 15th Sup & Svc Eh 15th Trans Bn 27th Maint 13n 25t h Inf Plat (scout Dog) 34th Xrrf Plat (Scout Dog) TB..B: weather and Terrain

1, %eration TOAN TYAE In a. The terrain in the Division A0 is generally flat, Scme portions of TW Ninh are rice ad marshlands while the nwth and east are forested. Binh Long Frov2nce is flat with dense farests in the n&h and farests mixed with rubber plantations in the south. Phuoc Long Province consists of a rising plain to the west and a mountain range in the nartheat. The province is-generLLl~ heavilQ vegetated;prhxrily with rnulticanopied forest. Four rivers, the Vam Co J)w, the Saigm, tha Be, and the Dong Nai, flaw thraugh the 1 I?CD AO. These rivers ' present an ~bsCacletogroundnwementdue to their depth and'steep banks. There are three praninent lad masses in the area; Flui Sa Den, the Razor Rack, and hiBa Ra,

b. Weather:

(1) king the month of Map the weather conditions were simile %O that of the Southwe st ;tonsoon; however, the Southwest flmv was very shdl~v*h 22 May wirals alort, up to 20,000 feet, shifted to the Southwest marking fhe onset of the Southwest Monsoon. Ekcept far isolated patches almg rtver valleys, fog was a rarity with scattered morning stratocumul~clouds cha.I'tc- terizing the AO. 51the afternom thunderstorms prevailed which rerluced ceilings and visibility. The weather for the month of June was dcninated by the Southwest Monsoon with the moisture content of the air mass increashf: significantly because of its long trajectarg over water. This situation result- ed a substantial increase in the total monthly precipitati~n, The PEitorid Trough (Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone) mmd south twice during the nonth to a position over the A0 providing further assistance for rainshower arrd thunder- storm fannation and resulting in several days of emeptionally large areas Of intense showers. Morning stratus and fog became a major factor during the last half of the month with higher elevations cmpletely obscured bv fcg between 0600 hours and 0900 hours on several occasions. During July the weather was again dominated bv the Southwest Mansoon with increased winds aloft somewhat causiw an incrrease in cloud cover alld precipitation which in turn lowered temperatures. Typhoons Tess and Viola affected the A0 ~15thCap Sorvad receiving 2.01 inches of prec2pitation on the day Typhoon Tess reached land near the DMZ, %horn Viola caused an fncrease in winds anct mid2le clmdlness during the last week of July with stratus fainhe around 600 fee5alaost dajl~r after 0200 hours around Song Ae and nuan Loi. (2) Maximum Temperatures: May - 10bn, June - 193O, July - 880. Kinhm Temperatures: May - .?6 , June - 73 , Jd.v - 74 Relative Humidity: May - 90% narning and 628 afterfioon; June - 90% mornbg and 55% afternoon; July - 92% manlng and 6& afternoon, (5) Rainfall: May - 2-25 inches, June - 10,98 inches, July - 21.07 inches of recipitatim, (67 Maximum Density Pltitudes: May - 3322 feet, June - 3657 feet; JuLy - 3251 feet. (7) Minimum Density Altitudes: Mhy - 1563 feet, June - 1613 feet, July - 1U6 feet. - + SUPJECT: %erational Report for Quarterly Period &ding 31 July 1969 TAB C : AeriaL Surveillance

1. Mission Statistics for the pericd 1May - 3. July 1969, MISSION TYPE RESULTS

IR 277 IlRs

PHOTO */a @t IPIRs PHOTO ad ~eld) 313 3 IPlRs

2, General Cmnerrts: Flying weather, especially during the last two months 'of the repartj.vg pericd was poor. Yaintenance of aircraft Qr equipent wag not a significant problem,

a. 3 During the qaarter 90.5% of the missions were completed. 29 missions were cancelled, 26 due to weather, 2 due to Ili system maJ.function, and 1due to cmtact artillery fire in the area.

b. SLAR king the auarter 97.8% of the XAR missions were cuttpleted; 4 missions were cancelled, 2 due to sensar malflulctim and 2 due to wsather.

c, PHOTO king the quarter 97.8% of the pkuto missions were cgrrpleted. 2 missions were not completed, 1due to *ather, ard 1, which is still pending at this tihe, due to insufficient coverage, SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1969 T,2B E : ~raining/canbat Development s

I-. Division Training:

a. THE FIRST TEAM JICADEMY at Bien Hoa conducted individual replacement' training fOr all incaning replacement personnel durine the reporting perid. 704 officers and 5,592 enlisted men received the three-day course of instruction.

b. .The Canbat Leaders Course (CLC)graduated 202 personnel during the quarter. The 10 day POI provides training for selected %3 thru %-5 personnel who are progrmed to be team leaders ar.d squad leaders in the line units. The subjects stressed are small unit Air Cav tactics, map reding, canmunications procedures, weapons employment, first aid and leader ship.

c. The Kit Carson Scout Training Frogram graduated 78 personnel during the quarter. The objective of the program is to provide Csv maneuver units -with mll-trained indigenous scouts familiar with enemy tactics adprocedures as well as the area of operat ions of the rifle canpanies and reconnaissance platoons cf the Division, The training includes basic Air Cav tactics, care and operation of US eouipnerrt, Ehglish language, proficiency, and the mission of the Kit Carscn Scout Program.

d. The Division Sniper Program was initiated during the report- perid* As of 31 July THE FIRST TEAM ACADEMY hd graduated 32 slipers. The program is designed to train carefully selected personnel fr~nthe ground units in the advanced markmanship and sniper ambush- techiques. Included in the cwse are cmnications procedures, map reading, ad justnent of indirect fire support and night firing techniques. Upon graduation, the trained snipers are returned to their parent battalion for emplqyment as a battalion asset.

2. Non-Divisional Training Programs anl Schools:

a. The Division made use of the US!iRV school system to the maximm extent possible during the reporting perid. The following figures Micate which schools ald how many students participated: -EM -OFF Army Aviation Refresher Training School 180 27

MASV Reconlo School 15

US Army Training.Facility, 1st Signal. Brigade 22

be Twerity-two aviatar s attended the Jungle Envirormentd. Suilrival Train- ing (JEST) course in the Philliphes during the reparting period. 3. Combat Developments:

a, 1May 1969, the ~ivisionreceived n'ine 300 watt, Fkjdrzzine Air Fuel SUBJECT : Cperatimal Report for Quarterly Pericd Fhding 3 July 1969 TRB E : TrainingrCmbat Developments (Cont)

Cells. The items were requested for kediate development under XA~8URE 80 and were intended to serve as silent pclwer scurces for the kN/VRC 12 series radios and small equipment operating withh.that pmer rating on forward fire bases. After a prelininary training pericd for the operators, the fie1 cells were muved to the 2-12 Cav forward fire base and placed in operation on 1June 1969 to begin a 90 day test, At the end of the first week a,ll nine cells were inoperative due to acid leaks in the coding fan housings, The test was termi-nated and the cells were returned to CONUS for further mcdification.

b, On 10 June 1969, the Division received its first increment of the m~76 Anti-Oscillat ion Sighting Device, The instrument, designed for Airborne use, is an electrically controlled gyrcbstabilized monocular with a nower zoan lens extending f!rm 3x to 9x power. Prelimbarn testing during the reporting period indicates that the device will be extremely useful for use in C & C and reconnaissance aircraft. The test ad evaluation was not cclmplete at the conclusion of the reparting pericd. 1 * .

SUBJECT : $eratiom1 Repart far Quarterly Pericd Ending 3 Julv 1969 TAB I : Casualty Statistics

-KIA -WIA MAY 69 102 716 0

CCMMENTS: 1, The fdlowing problem areas exfst in the area of casualty report ing :

a. Delayed and incomplete casualty reports are being &bitted fran the field,

2. A ccmtinuing effart is being made by this office to provide guidance to field canmandw s in proper casualty reporting procedures . Unit canmander s have been requested to send the& unit casualty reporters to this office fma cmplete briefing in casualty repurt ing. SUBJECT: $ar$ioraal Report for &arterly Perid Ending 31 July I%$' TAB AA: Logis~icOperati om

1. During the reporting period, 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969, Divisial S~lppcrrt Canmand' provided or cdfnated ccmbat service sum& including 6,IIF~~ tenance; medied service, transportation, evacuation of captured materiel and salvage, bath, lauridry, aand graves registration for the 1st Cavalry Division (~irmobile), #%ached element=, ad contiguas units. a, The Id FSE, collocated with-and supparthg the CBCm battalions of the 1st Brigade, remained at Tay Ninh.' The 1st FSSE pwided materLb and transpat far ,wee new f irebases, moved three battalion rears and trains, 'ad ac ccmplished Wistical resupply by-CH-47 sf an 1 1 Am Tr mp far two weeks. I st FSSE rnovewnbs control moved 14,240 tons of cargo and 7032 passeFers frQn !it a consolidatctd sling-out pad', and 2555 fms of cargo an3 20,504 passengers from the fked ttring air strip at Tay Ninh. b, During the reporting ~eriod,the 2nl FS SE staffed three locations in support of the 2rd Brigade, providing continuous liaison with the 2rd Brigade CP at Lai Khe, principal FSSE operations at Ouan Loi, and resupplv capabilities at TayIJinh in proximity to 2nd Wigade fire support bases located in-the west- ern portion of the 2rd Brigade AO, Because of a sh&age of personnel, thg 2d FSSE Tag Nbh operatian was discontinued in July; Materiel an3 txanspd for six fire suppmt bases were provided by 2nd FSSE, ard 28,$3& passengers t oget her with tons of cargo were moved thrmgh 8th Aerial POI%at Quan Loi. :-. c. The 3rd. FSSE, in suppart of 31~3Brigade operations, moved to Black- horse in May & set up a supply transfer point at &an Lac: Supplies were maved frm the Long Binh-Bien Hoa cmplex along Highway One, *aged at Xuan Loc, and slung-'out by CIE-47 to 3rd Brigade fbe suppart bases. In cmtrast to this type of suppart, LZfsLibby ard Rock were the first 1 liCD fisa support bases to-receiffe difect support resupply By convoy. 5 ACD pravidecF Canvo;r security, air &over, the convoy cmmnder, ready rc?action forces and &ilhXt-y in mpport of %he convoys providedJ@ the 48th Transportation Group other general suppa% units. On 25 June, the 3rd FSE returned to Ouan Lo5 and msrged 'with thq Zxl FSSE to provide area supncrt' for tenant units. d, On 22-, Headquarters, I1 FZeld Force, Vietnam, assigned resp- sibility for the Army Aircraft Logistical Areas (!&A) at Sang Be and -&an Lof to the 1st Air-Cavalry Division, The MLl, pravide US helicopber refuez-remu service on an &ea suppart basis, 'The Song Be refuel Facility is %gated by the 391st OuarCermaster Detachnent, WCOR to the 15th S&S Sattalian. Sersm- nel frm the ltth Aviation Group operate the Song Be rearm poM, The 15th S&S Battalion @pratesthe h&nLoi refuel point while using aviation Wits provide rearm @int operation, The twc-part facility at each locatia is urder the operatiom2 corrtrol of DISCm. Relocation of the refuel-remu at Song Be ard co$strudion of 5 new rearm point at nuan Loi is perding resolu- tion of construction designs, Late in the repmting period, the prom of instruetian f& the DISGQIT Logistics %rat ions Course wss expamled to include serial delivery support, medical service and aircraft mabtenance, and supplg subjects. In addition, DISCCM has re-e&ablishecf the Divisian Sumcu-t Command Q.isrrtat im for replacement officers ar; senior NCOts at the 1st Team ,Acade- my- SUBJECT : Operational Report fcr C,uarterly 'Perid Ending 31 July 19& TAB a: Logistic @erations (~ont)

2. During the reporting period, the 27th lfaintenance Battalion coWinud to pr wide direct suppart maintenanbe and repair parts supply for all groud equipment (1ess medical and cryptographic) of the I st Cavalry Division (Air- mobile). This flhywhere-Anytime" support was evident in the fact that the following percerrtages of equipment were operationa7: at the en3 of the quarter:

...... VehicXegl ;...... ,..,, ,.,. ...,..,...... -. ... 98.1 % Artillery.. ;. .,...... , ...... -.,...... ,...... 1m.d Generators ...... ,...... ,...... ,...... -:. .6 '96;2% Cmnications ,. ,...... ,... ..,..,....,..,,.. ,,e.56e3%

a, Dl~~hgthe quarter theee were 25 technical assistance vis%ts Can- ducted by unit s of the Battalian. 5, Th6 Battalion Am Team vistted a total of 24 units 6mhg.the re- pmting pride c, The disposition of elements of the BattalCion as of 25 JuTy 1969 ms as folXm: Headquarters aEd Compawj A .... Bien Hoa lfain Support Det achrnent ...... ?huoc Vlnh B Detachment ...... b ...... Quan Loi C Detaclmerrt...... Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, and ~i Buttorrs D Detachment...... ,.. Tay Minh d, Th& consolidated Battalian prcduction for the repol-ting mid shows the following completed jabs:

HQ/CO A MSD B C D Tor !I, Bien Hoa Phuoc Vhh Aut mot ive 220 226 156 €% 133 821 kgineer 1TT 339 229 127 204 1016 mectr onic s 5B 21 05 962 651 1156 5463 firmament (Art iVery) 8 23 9 13 Z' 72 (smll Arms) 333 694 656 2B8 480 2451 ( Instrumerrts) 234 49 1 176 7:s 167 I l4.L Other

NmE: IfGther~lcategories of cmpleted woPk order requests sham above include machine shop work, welding, canvas repair; gIass cutting, office machine repair and fuel arsl .eTectricaI c~nponerrtsrepatre SURJECT : Opekati onal Report for quarterly Perid Ernfing 31 July 196-9 TAB Logistic $erstions (cod)

e. S-y of supply data for the quarter reveals the folloa:

Total ASL requests received Total Fr- requ&s received Average demand a cc modation Average demand sat isfacti on Average ASL lines stocked Average zero balance Jines Average fYinge lines on hard Fringe lines turned in Units supported by @L Lines inventoried during the period

f. Receipt of repair parts at the supply bass at Bien Hoa for the quarter was as follows:

Red Ball Receipts Parcel Post Normal; Stockage

3, The 15th Supply and Service Batt alim (AM) coi&inued to suppclrt the 1st C~valryDivision (AM) during the reparting perid. The Battalim operated fran a base area in Bien Hoa and forward locations in Tay Ninh, %an Loi ad Phuoc Vbh. kjor operational achievements were:

(a) FuXL suppZ~su~wortto Phuoc Vinh: The forward support platoon at Phuoc VZh t mk wer tk responsibility for providing Class I and CIass III supplies. TWs area-suppmt mission, in addit ion to the existing Class I1 & IV supply mis;sion, means that the Battalion nav has responsibility &or total supply suppart of 1st Cavalry Division (AM) units located in the Phuoc Vinh area. (b) Su~plyby air to Song Be: The Battalion was originally ass3gnd the mission of providing Class 111 support to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) upits located at Song Be. The 391 st QH Detachnerrt (PC&) was placed ndei. aperatiW1 control of the Battalion for the performance of this mission. However, the repired support increased and presently the Battalion is prw- iding aU classes of supplies to Sung Be, ALL resupply is beirg effected by air; supplies are beirg flown in cn a daily basis from Bien Iioa, a distance of approximately 65 air miles. Perishable rat ions are packed in insul3tsd ,on- tai~ersow boxes) in order to preserve them. (c) Forward shipnent of mpplies: The Battalion obtained dedicated truck support frcm 48th Transpartation Grcup as a mans of supplemerrting or- ganio transportat ion assets. This added transpart ation capability enabled the Battalion to be responsive to'.the necds of the user and to ship supplies as far forward as possible, During tk reporting pericd, the Battalion mwed 7198 tons of supplfes by trucks. (d) Establishent of transfer point at Xuan Loc: During June, $he Bat- talion m d the major eJ.ementa of a fourth farwzrd support plat con into Xuan Lw to operate a transfer point. Suwlies were mwed frm the base st Eien Hoa. to the transfer point by lad cmog..; fl-can there, 'supplies vme slung out by GH-47 helicopters to thee different landhg zones, which were wead cut SUBJECT: Cperational Report for@arterlyPeriad E&hg 31 July 1969 TAB AJ% Lcgistic Wratims (cork) in a radius of mare than twenty air miles fran Xuan k. This three week operation was successfully acccxnplished by the .Battalion withart dajngrading the acccmplishnellt of other mission reauirement s. (el- Cl!ass I ~ointestablished a6 Bien Hoa AnsP Base: The Battalion established a Qass I supply point to sekvice all 1st Cavallry Division (AM) units located at Bien H& Am& Base. This supply point has elhinated the requirements far uniks to travel to Long. Binh. 50 draw rations. (f) Technical assistance.ahen for MiLA's: The Class III ad Class V sectims were called upan to give technical acluice ard assistance during the eskablishnent of hCILA*s at Sang Be ard Quan Loi. Personnel of the Cbss In and Cbss'V sectks were able'to give recanmerdations related to efficient -ration, safety and security, (g) Chss I Ls sues:

(1) Rations: Feb4a.r-&rr k~-JWul

I1Af1 rations 1'799 tons 1562 tons 1!Brr ratims + '1'215 tons '1201 tons 11C" rations 1,719; 551 meals 1,315; 762 meals LRRP rations 72,3m 114,655 meals (2) Ratian Snpplments: Ice 5852 tons 3702 tons SmcTry packs ' '373 tons - -3'7CJtans MXck 1,829,600 pints 2,712;986 pints Ice cream 41,017 gals 19,340 gals

(h) Class I1 & IV Issues: '.. " - Quarterly t&al 1796 torrs - 4783 tons

(5) Class 111 Issues! I . . . JP-4 2,670; 500 gas 5,769; W gels! A~AS . - 53;300 gals ' 77; h73 gals $GAS 607; 170 gals 1;049; 500 gals DF-2 837,0013 gals 1,512,90(r gal?

(3) mss V Issues:_ Quarterly total 4. Mairrtenance ~~erations (a) DecentralLzd Maintenance (1) During the re?arting pericd, the 15th Transpartation Battalian (M) rerceived the nineteen shgp sets required' to nme the 1si; CavOy Division (~irmobiie)intothe Dece:~.;~alizecPMaintenance Concept. The shop sets were received shcrt a few esserrl; ial items which has p-eveiked all operational ufit a fr~naccepting a deect support maintenance function. Further, special tools adre@r parks have been received- to support the new maintenance concept, for the 1st CavaI3-y Division (M). A PLL requisitid fcr each detachnent has receikd fU.l which varies fr~n57% for a pure AH-10 unit to 8% for the CH-47 units, The 228th Assault Support Helicopter Battdion has assumed a direct sup ,q $'*$ -*j;",P i f - l@%~~pfkt@k$C4% - Z 4. , :&.W +a* SUBJECT : Dpwational ILepc$% faQuarterly Perid Biding 31 J~Y1969 TAB AA: Lqistic Cperations (~ont)

(2). Cmpany A of this Battalian has gone to zero strength' since the 228th ASHB accepted a direct support maintenance role on receipt of their KF 1;eams.. Canppny C now pr widee back-up direct support maintenance for the 228th ASHB anl maintains €he authmizied stockage list far f st Cav CM7 re- pair pasts ard ccmponent s. (b) Production Control (1) Aircraft Wmk Ckders Received' 25% (2) Aircraft Released 2575 (c) Shop Office ( 1 ) Product ion Control lirternal Work Crders 31 48 (2) Direct Supnort Internal FJmk Wers h.183' (d) Production Maintenance Manhour s 294,216 (e) Recoveries 1 (f) EIR rs submitted 111 (g) Technical Assistance Visits to Units 48 (h) Unit Locat ions

BEAR CAT HHC (-1 A Co (0) CU CHI B CO (-) LQG THhNH NCRTH C CO (-) PK[T LO1 D CO (-1 (i) Amamerrt (1) The 15th TC L6U's are turning in aU: excess armament subq'stms to the 34th Group m-to Sharpe Pssng Depot. (2) 3n 15, 17, ad. 18 July, a courtesy insp6ctia was made by the 15th TC ArmmenZ NC8 of HQ, A, B and C Troop 719th Cav. (3) Avioxkcs (1) Cunplete turn-in of- BC - 122 fran 15th TC Bn to UStRV (2) A Cunpany Avionics shop has been transfered to Hq 228th- ASHE. SIBJECT: %eration&l Report far Czlarterly Feriod &ding Julp 1969 TAB AB : Logistics

1. The quarter has been characterized by a steady hprwemerrt in the vehicle status of the Division. As this is written sane 107 5 ton trucks hwre been received along with 82 3/4 tm trucks. No further allocatims of 2$ ton trucks ected cmsider- the Division's excess No further $- ton trucks are expected for the balance of the .gear. Despite the receipts mentioned abwe, shartages still exist in thme classes along with ton, $ ton, & ton . ambulances, and fuel servicing trucks.

2. The Division's position on night observation devices has also +roved mr the qumter. This was particularly true with the PVS-3 where an additional 59 becane part of the inventory. Ccmbined PW-1/2 totals increased by 17 and TITS-2's by 2. Prospects for the forthcmix receipt of 10 TVS-4 remained as July came to a close.

3. The radio. situatim remained f airlg static f m the period. 6 GRC '106's were received, but .not-hing in the PRC 25/77 area m the -VRC 12 fmil~.

4. hunition corrtinued to camand qreater attention because of problen areas with fhmHE and the 10 lb 2.75 ITD rocket. During previous 3.SR periods it' was found that the allocation of HT mortar rounds was particularly short because of the relatively mall number of 4.2 martars in the Division. Other I1 FFV divislom were beiq allocated approximately l4,OOO' f3bnvtm BE rounds alom with about-13,700 !;.2 HE for a total of 27,70ME rourds, The'lst Air Cavalry Div- ision, on the &,her had, was receiving the 14,CK)O figure, -but mky 1,700 4.2 HE because of the small rider of 4.2 weapons in the Division. Vane the less, this put the Division at a decided disadvantage- as the mortar wab expected to handle the work load that in other divisions wsshared with the 4.2" mortar. The situation was causing the Division to reauest continual increases. The problem was recognized by Hq 1s I1 FFV and allocations of 81mm HE rounds have been quite satkifactor;y,

5. k more presying ard still outstanding problem in ammunition has been that of the 2.75'' 10 lb PD rocket. Previous allocations on thls item have been in the area of 45,000 mo&hl;y, Starting with the 24 June 24 Julv period the allocatim for this rocket was reduced to just under 20,000 with the situation expected to remain the sane until September. The shm%agewas traceable to a problem in the COWS manufactwe of the rocket motor. The problem received. the personal attentian of the CG who talked persorra~with the cmders of the US-% units and issued a messaqe limiting the use of this particulw rocket. In addition, greater usage of the other rockets in lieu of tho 2.75" 10 15 fD tias urged. These restraints have paid dividends as the Dtvision kept we11 withb the allocations for all-r ock::ts mt il the end of the perrod when, urged to draw up to their allocation, slight overdraws occurred. The prospects for the 24 July - 24 August period brightened sanewhat with the all~cat~tonof 23,088 2.75" 10 lb PD rockets.

6. Fortification materials becvne increasirglg scarce during the quarter. It was difficult to accanplish wrk required above and hevmd-that alreadv canplet- ed with the basic fire base materials. Specific lumber lX, 2X, 4X, and xff SUBJECT:. %erational Report for Quarterly Period &ding 31 July 1969 TAB RB : Logistics (Cont) pljwocd became US?BV cumnand controlled. P,ttempts bv the Division to secure emergency materials for fire bases damaged through enemy attack resulted in USARV applying a monthly lunber ration. This in turn resulted in a temporam fkeeze cm Division lumber reswces while an inventory of on hand assets was conducted. It has becane apparent that'strict lumber rationing nust. be instituted within the Division. The amounts allocated bv USmV mist not ody cover fortification pr o,jects, but installat ion activities as well. SUBJECT : Operational Report for Ouarterlg Fericd Ending 31 July 1969 TAB AC: Civil Affairs

1. (C) POPULATION ifiJ RFSOURCES COrPFtOL

(1) During the reporting period, 12,690 pounds of fod were distributed to refugees within the Division's TzIOR, primarily in the Tay Nhh area.

(2) lit the request of the village chief, the villge of Hoa My, Chon Thanh Distrid, Binh Long Province was moved four kilaneters to a new and more secure location. With the help of 1st Cavalry Division trucks, the entire village was moved in one dav to its new location. The &LO villagers were enthusiastic about the move, and did the bulk of the preparatary work for the move by themselves.

b. Security Cmtrol:

Thru the Divisionts Cmcdity Distributian Program, 17,000 pounds of b2rrier material were given to villages and hamlets throughout the TAm.

2. (u) CIVIC EiCTIOlJ a. Through close coordination with civic action platoons, and District and Province Officials, the Division provided support in the buildinq and furnishing of 5 schools, 2 dispensaries, 2 hamlet offices aTKZ one orphanage, Additional material and technical support has been given to villa.qe and hmJet chiefs for self-help projects in conjunction with the 1969 Pacificati~nPlan.

b. During the repurting period, 48 MXDC!,P.S and 33 ICAF'S, with a IfEDCAP as their focal point, trepted 4566 patients.

c-. Throwh the use of the Voluntary Civic Action Fund, a rjcholicship ~ssistance.Program was instituted to help needy Vietnamese students. In additior to Scholarship Ass istmce, eight Grants-in-hid have be en awarded to nedg students at the Eien Hoa School of Nursing to defray the cost of books, uniforms and living expenses over the length of the course. d. The functioning of the Cmnity Relations Council and the Friendship Council continued to be- an effective means through which mutu3-l prcjblems are discussed, and resolved, and patentid problems averted.

e. During the quarter,.the Division sponsored weolsly trips to Sakon far children and their teachers, who came frm the outlying rural districts. The children were given Vietnamese Flags ad ?Tee" sshirts-preparatory to the trip. A two fold benefit resulted frm these tours; firstly, the children, in the va.st majority of cases, saw for the first tine the seat of their National Government. SUBJECT: Operational Report for fu,rter9y Perid Fmding 3. July 1969 TJB kc: Civil Affairs (~mt)

Secondly, the children created a viable canter to the EILF Propaganla that says Sigon lays in ruins due to VC offensive action.

f. Spoken kg1ish classes were conducted for approximately €33 students on a three meetings a week basis during the reporting perial.

g. 7021 p0WId.s of soap, 610 health kits, 6m pounds of clothing, aid 10,000 board feet of lumber were distributed to needy families over the perial. SUBJECT : Operational Repwt far karterly Perid Ending 31 July 1969 TAB AD : Psychole ical %eratiom

1. General: As the auarter commenced, TI% FIRTT TFiW continued its operati~ns against major enemy units. The 1st ad 7th NVA Divlsiors had withdrawn't o their sanctuaries in Cambodia, Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phoc-Long Prwincss, to regroup after the losses of his I~INTER/SPRINGOffensive. The enemy w~ssubjected to constarrt reminders of his despergte situation thrwgh Division PSI@ effarts, Using all available PSY (B media, known vulnerabilities stressin,? themes of loneliness, health, morale, and poor leadership were exploited, As the Division's demoralization campaign against the 1st and 7th NVA Divisions in A0 MOm!JA SC(XIT continued, tho 3rd Brigade deployed to A0 QlEM to conduct qerations against the 5th VC Division. A vigorous PSYG campaign again& the 5th VC Division was undertaken as soon as ground operations cmenced. Large caches were uncsvered in WkR ZONE D. Leaflets and tapes were prcduced capitalizing m the enmyis loss of supplies. Concurrent with offensive operations, the Audio-Visual tea was employed in A0 CREZK to support CIVIL :~FFcIR~/FsYB, Broadcasting pdlic distributing literature, and publicizing ME;DC!iF's uld ICW ls; the HZ team aided greatly in the LO CREEK FSYrdM effort. In kO MO?JTANk SbOUT, the 1st and 7th NVR Divisions ventured frm their secure areas to attack several FIRg TEAM firebases. Division FSYOP assets were * immediately employed to take advantqe of the enemy during and after corrt act s. In every instance, loudspeaker aircraft were on station at BmT, giving instructions to the enemy on haw to safely be taken prisoner. In a

2. Support:

a. The 5th Special Operations Squzdron (USA??) supported the 1ACD PSYQ effort with leaflet drops-and aerial loudspeaker broa.cicasts. Using both lLlO and C-47 aircraft, &l,075,000 leaflets were dropped in pre-planned target areas specified by TH?3 FIBST TEAM. Loudspeaker appesls totaling 78 hours were broadcast to selected target audit-=n ce s ,*

b. The 6th PSYG Battalion, located at Bien Hoa, provided general. support with personnel, equipment, technical advice and media. The battalion f'urnished one HA (liaison officer) team, three HB (ground)-loudspeaker teams, and one HE (~udic-Visual) team to the Division PSYQ? effort.

c. 1ACD Brigade HB PSYCP teams cperating frcxn Division UH-1 helicmtrrs br odcast 563 hours, and dropped 27,192,000 leaflets. Brigade operations included weekly pre-~lanned ard daily planned target areas, as well ss sufck SUBJECT : %eratiom1 Report for Duprterlg Period &ding 3.l July 1969 TAB $3 Psychological Operations (~ont) yeact ion PSYB exploitat ion.

d. The Division PSYB capability Is dependent on the equipment mailable to accmplish the mission. With this .in mind tho Brigades, with the help of G-5, began and successfully conducted a program tomaintain equipanent at the lok~st possible echelcm. b a result; days l6st to repair were re6uced resulting h. greater use of organic PSYW eauipment,

e. The Division PSYQ section continued to impr we its knowledge of enemy units. Current intelligence dossiers listing vulnerabilities of allmajor enemy units down to battalion level were maintained by G-5. Increased coordin- ation bdween G2 adG5.intelligence analysts provided daily FSYOP 'essential elements of infamat ion on enemy activities. PSY@ was thus able to program PSDJAR campaigns while maintaining the flexibility to react to any hediate sitilatim, should it arise,

f. With an additimal nission to support the rrVN 1969 F~cification *d Development Plan, the 1st Cavalrv, PSYB broadened its .weas of interest. Increased emphasis was placed on the inducement of Hoi Chanhs, the 3rd Party Inducement Prqgram, use of Armed Propaganla Teams, expanded ICFZs ad !mC!Ps, and PSYQ support to the enhancement. of the GVN image in populated seas.

g. The 1ACD experienced ant incr:.-.:se 5-i T r-isoners .-af "'21- t ekEn as -a resnB' of stressing the PSYOF theme ffGocd Treatment for PW". FSPW mphasLs b suppart of the GVN Chieu Hoi Program continued throughout the repart ing perid. Fcr the quarter, 127 Hoi Chanhs return& to GVN authority within TEE FIR.9TTS ELO, 4 Efoi Chanhs returned to GVN thru Division elements, and 105 FW1s surrendered.

3. Kit Carson Scouts : G-5 increased recruiting activities in Sinh Lag, Fhuoc Long and Bien Hoa Prwinces as well as 31the IV Corps area and at the National Chieu Hoi Center. Special recruiting posters were distributed to the centers ad a recruiting brochure was planned far reproduction and distributim to KC5 candidates. The Division1a KCS regulation was written for implementation penling appwal. p3hasis was placea on improvinq the prwp-a? of instruction the scout receives in his initial four weeks of instruction at TRX FIRST TTAW AG.4DEMY. new POI was written sad implemented uskg English,Qietnmese language texts, A special booklet of militarv terns in Xnglish ard Vietmeso was made up for the scouts use during trainhg and later during his field duty. Administrative process ing procedures were irnprsved and measures were taken to update all scout recqrds . Special lea~e/~assfms written in English ancl Vietnanese were prduced and distributed to units mpla~ingRCS. Pay r~11 ~rocedureswere improved using KC5 D cads adKC5 pay day was changed SCI that scats ~ouldbe pa^ rn the sane day as 1st hir Gav Trwpers by bat tali^ pay officers. An additi~nalARVN interpreter was added to the instructor staff for KGS training ad an additimal officer frathe ACofS, G5 office was assigned to the KCS Frogram. Chief &igade Scmts mre designated ~ndassQner! tn the brigades to assist in supervising the scmt activities within the brigades. Flans were hplemenbed to assign Battalion Chief Scquts within er-ch SUBJECT : Operat i~nalRepcjrt for cluarterly Ferid Ending 3 July 1969 T:B jg) : Psych~logical%erst iqns (Gent) battalion.. Special KC5 pocket patches were des-ed, produced and rlistri5uted to the 3c:xts fclr wear. A number of Montagnard KCS recruited frcm Binh Long ad Phuoc Long Frwinces either quit crr requestec! release frm emplqmerrt, Their family tiss are very strong and they preferred to live with their families. Despite these losses, the Division KCS strength was 145 at the end of the quarter. One scout was killed and two were wmded in cmbat operations. SUBJECT : %erat iondl Report for harterly Per id Yndi~3 July 1969 TbB a: Chemical Activities

1. Operations: a. ,General: During the rqortbq perid 1Nay 1969 - 31 July 1969, there was an increase in the use of RCA (Riot Control Age~lts), flame field expedients, -and sniffer missions. Chemical cdact terns were again established at all - three Brigades to work uder the supervision of the Brigade Chemical Officer.

(1) During the reporting pericd, FIRST 'I,'EiJr Chemical personnel dropped . several sorties of CS drums at night using the GCI! radar guidance. GCi? per- sonnel are given the coordinates of the start and st9 points on the target run prior to the start of the mission. They plot these two voints on their radar scopes, When the CH-47 canes on station, GCh personnel vectar the ship onbo the target line and tell the pilot when to start dropping and when to stop. Accuracy of this s~ternis dependent upon the ewerience of the GCA operators and the distance fran the GCA location to the target.

(2) THH3 FIRST TEi4 also comlucted nQht drops of ELl58's'CS canister clusters utilizing PXA guidance, QI clear, moonli&t nights the accuracy of the GCA radar can be checked by having artillery mark the target with LP.

(3) THE FIBS TEm has developed an expedient munition to conbaminate bunkers with persistent CS. It.is c&ed the Runker Use Restriction Rmb m' BURB. consists of the cardboani container for a 2.7511 RKT WarheaCl, 2 N.E. Blasting Caps, approximateLy 25 secs of time fuze and a hze iqnitor. A hole is drilled in the container ,just below tk removable cover. The time fuze is inserted in the hole and a blasting cap is attached on the -inside of the can- tainer. The second B cap is t aped to the first R cap. A fuze ignitor is attached to the other end of the hze and taped to the outside of the cmtainer. The point where the f'uze enters the cmtainer is sealed with rubher ' cement. The container can then be filled with CS and ta~edshut, The two N,E. Rlasting caps [email protected] force to rupture the cmtainer and mead the CS with- out causing the CS to flash. Approximate weight of the fjlled munition is &- 3 pc~unds.

2. @erztionnl Tckds: TOtitls for the rqorting pericd includes most but not dl of the chemical support given to Tm FIRST TEM.

1588 drums (127,040 lbs)

Sniffer Missions 276 Fwasse hstalled 659 55 gal Drlnns E-158 Missions 283 Munit ions dropped SUBJECT : $eratiom1 Report for Quarterly Period ming 3.l July 1969 TllR riE : Chemical Activities (Cont)

Bunkers Corrtaminated by Chemical Personnel 263 Insecticide Missions 37 missions 3700 gals of Malathion solution Napalm dro~~ed 45 drums 2250 gal

Flame Cperatims on Perimeter at Camp Gorvad 69,500 meters sq Burned

Husch Flares 102 Installed SUBJECT: %erational Report fm Quarterly Pericd Ending 3 July 1969 TAE F3P: 11th Aviation Group Flight Statistics

JiuK . J* Total Hours Flown 10,682 11,227 10,194 32,103 Sarties 35,607 33,463 29,766 98, 836 Pax 47,935 4.4, 886 48,320 lW,191 -. Cargo tons 11,670 1,174 1,192 4,036

Hits fly 8 12 9 29

Bits No fly 8 17 10 35

ours ~loyn 1,642 1,TjS 1, n8 4,893 Sarties 3,024 3,5U 3,632 10,167

Hits fly 3 2 - 0 5

Hits No fly 0 1 -0 1

Hours Flown 2, E,l 2,7W 3,040 8,632

Useful Sorties 4,230 4,202 9,205 18,137 Total 7,219 6,603 Sorties n,W 24,963 * . pax 22,276 20,490 26,847 69,613

Cargo Tons ll, 592 10, W5 22,239 44,246

Fly 0 0 7 Hits 7 Hits No Fly 0 0 1, 1 ~adicalA/c Recmries 17 15 18 50 (S~curifyclasmiflcafion af fii!e. &dl af ob=mcf adjnd.t=in. mmtafimmust be entered vhan the overall repollis c~,,salficd~ I. ORISINATING ACTlVl TY (C0lPONle OUllh~r) a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIF~CATIO~ CONFIDENTIAL HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310 Zb GROUP I I Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Cavalry Division (Airnobile) xperiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 - 31 July 69. Au THOR4S) (Pint wm. mi- Idtie!, !*at MEW) I CG, 1st Cavalry Division (AirmobiJe) 7a TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 16. NO. OF REFS - a. *EPORT DATE 15 August 1969 69 U. CONT!WCT OR GRANT NO. w. ORlGlNATOA'S REPORT NUMBERIS) 693030 b. PROJECT UO. N /A c. Sb. OTHER REPORT NOIS1 (Any 0111- mbera Ih-t mybe mmlgmod Ihlo mporf)

d.

10. DISTRIBUTIOY STATEMENT

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (2- SPONSORING NILlTARV ACTIVITY N /A OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

I I DD ,FOWmw.s1473 - UNCLASSIFIED SccuriW Uassification