THE STATUS OF HOUSING REHABILITATION PROGRAMS IN IN THE POST ISIL- CONFLICT

Abstract This document describes the progresses made so far in the rehabilitation of the housing sector and the data available to assume remaining needs

Shelter Cluster and UN-Habitat | IRAQ

The Status of Housing Rehabilitation Programs in Iraq in the Post ISIL-Conflict

CONTENTS

Introduction ...... 2 1. Shelter Cluster guidance on shelter repairs, damage categories, IM tools and vulnerability criteria for shelter assistance...... 2 2. Achievements in the housing sector repairs (based on Shelter Cluster and UN-HABITAT data as of 11 january, 2021) ...... 4 3. The critical need for an in-depth, observation-based damage assessment ...... 5 4. The impact of the conflict on the Housing sector based on the World Bank Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA) report, Jan. 2018 ...... 6 5. Satellite damage assessment data and their limitations ...... 7 6. Displaced people and the barrier to their return due to shelter damages ...... 9 7. Comparative analysis of all available data on housing sector damages ...... 10 8. The return index and the severity of shelter damages in areas of return ...... 11 9. Attempting a geographical prioritization based on needs, response, partner presence and gaps ...... 12 Districts that have been witnessing the highest targets for housing repairs ...... 12 Districts that have been witnessing the highest number of partners engaged in housing repairs ...... 12 Districts whose housing damage level reported through various data sources indicate highest needs ...... 12 10. Estimated costs to support the return process through minimum housing repairs ...... 13 11. Other obstacles for a faster recovery of the housing sector ...... 13 12. Key recommendations and ways forward ...... 14 Annex I – Compilation of all available data (as of jan., 2021) ...... 16

1 | Page

The Status of Housing Rehabilitation Programs in Iraq in the Post ISIL-Conflict

INTRODUCTION

The Shelter Cluster has been coordinating the shelter and NFI response in Iraq since the onset of the conflict against ISIL in 2014. Following the progressive liberation of several locations occupied by ISIL, international actors started engaging in the rehabilitation of residential houses that were damaged by the military operations. Such programs have been contributing to a process of durable return, in which highly vulnerable families have been supported to regain their properties and reside in minimum standard shelter conditions, whilst re-establishing their lives in areas affected by the ISIL conflict.

The most conflict-affected governorates are Al-Anbar, Babylon, , Diyala, , Ninewa, and Salah-Al-Din, where neither urban centres nor rural areas have been spared by the disastrous consequences of the war. At present, nearly 4.8 million individuals have returned to their areas of origin, but not necessarily to their habitual residence especially when fully destroyed. Meanwhile 1.2 million individuals remain in displacement1, many of whom cite severe damage to / destruction of their properties, dwindling savings and their inability to pay for the rehabilitation, as one of the top three barriers to return.

This document aims at presenting the status of housing rehabilitation programmes supported by the international community as captured by UN-Habitat and the Shelter Cluster, as well as an analysis of what the remaining needs could be. The document also suggests some broad recommendations for further consideration by relevant authorities, UNCT members, Durable Solution Task Force, and other stabilization actors.

1. SHELTER CLUSTER GUIDANCE ON SHELTER REPAIRS, DAMAGE CATEGORIES, IM TOOLS AND VULNERABILITY CRITERIA FOR SHELTER ASSISTANCE

In August 2017, when shelter repair programs started gearing up to a large scale, the Shelter Cluster and its partners developed a War Damaged (WD) Shelter classification scale, adopted by all actors involved in rehabilitation programs:

Category 0: no/negligible damages Category 1: minor damages to walls, doors and windows

1 Of 1.2 million individuals still in displacement, 202,580 are in formal camps (CCCM Cluster data as of December 2020 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/iraq_cccm) 2 | Page

Category 3: severe damages, structurally Category 2: major damages but structurally not compromised compromised

Category 4: completely destroyed/rehabilitation not feasible

The Shelter Cluster has also developed a technical guideline on the minimum scope for shelter repairs2, to harmonise interventions, enhance predictability and make sure the most vulnerable families would be reached with a minimum level of assistance to cover as many persons in need as feasible.

As coordination in the field was becoming increasingly challenging with many actors involved in shelter repairs, in the beginning of 2018, the Shelter Cluster and UN-Habitat jointly developed a set of key Information Management Tools to enhance coordination functions. A War Damaged Shelter Rehabilitation database (WDS rehab database), standard BOQ template and a related online interactive dashboard 3 were set-up in early 2018 to gather activities related to the support of war-damaged residential properties in order to improve coordination at national, city and neighborhood levels. These tools gather data on assessment, housing rehabilitation, new construction/transitional shelter for most vulnerable Iraqis, including when implemented through cash and voucher assistance.

2 https://www.sheltercluster.org/iraq/documents/iraq-emergency-repairs-wds-guidelines-v24-en From this guideline, page 3: The minimum recommended standard is 5.5 m2 of covered space per person including circulation, kitchen, bathroom and toilet facilities. That results in a target of a minimum of 33 m2 per family of 6. Thus, after categorizing the WDS, the main and only focus should be on determining minimum repairs for the portion of the housing unit that can be rehabilitated with least effort both in terms of budget, timeframe, type of works and specialised labour required. 3 Online dashboard: https://www.sheltercluster.org/iraq/iraq-war-damaged-shelter-rehabilitation-interactive-dashboard Spatial database (access on request): https://unhabitat-roas.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=026889c372314e75a35aacef3f2abdfa 3 | P a g e

Such databases have proved to be instrumental to optimize coordination. Firstly, they have played a crucial role in identifying gaps in rehabilitation efforts in severely damaged but underserved areas. At the same time, the tools have also allowed to avoid overlaps, especially in densely constructed urban areas where several actors have been planning their interventions.

In late 2018, the Shelter Cluster and its Strategic Advisory Group also decided to adopt the Socio-Economic Vulnerability Assessment Tool developed by the Cash Working Group, for the identification of the most vulnerable families4, to guide partners toward using similar criteria in their programming to determine who would qualify for shelter assistance.

2. ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE HOUSING SECTOR REPAIRS (BASED ON SHELTER CLUSTER AND UN-HABITAT DATA AS OF 11 JANUARY, 2021)

Since its inception, the WDS rehab database created and managed by the Shelter Cluster and UN-Habitat, has registered activities for approximately 86,617 housing units in 818 neighborhoods/villages across 10 governorates5. That entails that approximately 520,0006 individuals (both returnees and those who could not flee during the occupation but also had their houses damaged) have been enabled to restart their lives inside their property, avoiding the risk of secondary displacement if their war-damaged shelter did not meet the minimum requirements for an adequate living space7.

Below graphs are the data collected by UN-Habitat and the Shelter Cluster through its WDS online database as of 11 January 2021.

Completed WDS Repair per Year 25,000 21,584

20,000 17,008

15,000

10,000 7,661 5,019 5,000

0 2017 2018 2019 2020

4 https://www.sheltercluster.org/iraq/documents/2020-vulnerability-criteria-shelter-and-nfi-cluster

5 Data as of 11 January 2021 6 Based on an average Iraqi family size of six individuals 7 For more information on the Adequacy of shelter refer to: https://www.sheltercluster.org/iraq/documents/guidance-note-defining-adequacy-shelter 4 | P a g e

Overview of WDS by Status

20,992

51,295 14,330

Planned Ongoing Completed

Above totals represent mainly Category 2 WDS (64,019) and some Category 1 (18,523). A small amount of Category 4 have also been reconstructed and/or the family provided with a transitional shelter – below are the related figures:

New Construction/Transitional Shalter vs Overall WDS Repairs 4,310

86,617

Overall New Construction/Transitional Shelter

3. THE CRITICAL NEED FOR AN IN-DEPTH, OBSERVATION-BASED DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Since the damage estimates produced by the World Bank and the Government of Iraq in 2017 in preparation of the Kuwait Conference, a comprehensive, country-wide damage assessment for all affected areas has not yet been undertaken, hence at present there is no comprehensive baseline to determine how many houses are in need of repair and where are the gaps. The responsibility for a full damage level assessment usually lies with the Government, in being primarily primary responsible for leading the reconstruction efforts with support from the international community. Only a door-to-door visual inspection could determine the real damage levels. UN-Habitat has tried using drones for damages recognition for , but this is extremely long work and needs ground verifications. Some more scientific research and development around this topic could definitely be of benefit for future needs – in war zones, but also for studying the consequences of earthquakes, floods, and man-made disasters (see the recent explosion in Beirut on 4 August 2020).

In the absence of such comprehensive field-based assessment, below are some considerations based on available data sources as well as the expert knowledge of the Shelter Cluster and its partners.

5 | P a g e

4. THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON THE HOUSING SECTOR BASED ON THE WORLD BANK DAMAGE AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT (DNA) REPORT, JAN. 20188

Some very useful information quoted in this report are listed below:

• The total damage to the Housing sector in the seven assessed governorates is estimated at IQD 18.7 trillion (US$ 16.1 billion). In aggregate, Housing sector needs total IQD 20.6 trillion (US$ 17.4 billion). • An approximate 138,051 residential buildings are impacted. Half of these structures are destroyed beyond repair. Low-income housing has experienced the bulk of the damage, at 68 percent, indicating that the conflict has severely impacted the low-income population of Iraq, worsening an already fragile situation. • Addressing housing recovery needs in post-war Iraq necessitates an area-based, multi-sectoral, participatory, and inclusive approach. This implies sequencing government engagement along a rationale of “fast-tracking housing repairs and preparing for housing reconstruction.” An interim strategy would suggest addressing first the needs of residents of partially damaged housing that can be repaired quickly. In the medium term (two- to five-year timeframe), a detailed strategy of how to rebuild destroyed houses using a special lens should be devised9. • The housing stock in Ninewa was the most affected, displaying 43 percent of the total share of reported damage to housing assets. The urban centers in Ninewa alone incurred 58 percent of the total damage to urban centers across the seven governorates. On the other hand, Salah-Al Din, which sustained 20 percent of the share of total damage, had the highest percentage of destruction to rural housing assets across the seven governorates. In general, the level of damage was distributed equally between “partially damaged” and “completely destroyed.” Yet, in governorates like Diyala and Babel, most impacted housing assets are destroyed beyond repair.

8 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29438/123631.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y Damages and losses were calculated according to the actual or estimated pre-2014 baseline of the physical assets. Damage data were assessed up to early December 2017. The Iraq DNA follows a two-tiered hybrid approach, relying on both ground-based and remote-based data. The analysis is based on direct damage data collected by the GoI. Where ground-based data gathering was not possible due to challenging security conditions and the accessibility of areas, remote-based data drawing on satellite imagery, publicly available information (PAI), and social media analytics were used to triangulate and verify ground-based data and to fill data gaps. 9 Of note is that the “Iraq Housing Reconstruction and Housing Development Strategy in the Liberated Areas” has been endorsed by the Council of Ministers in June 2019 6 | P a g e

5. SATELLITE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT DATA AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

Damage assessment based on satellite imagery has revealed an estimate of 58,167 residential buildings damaged or destroyed10. While the confidence level of these remotely collected data is high, a far larger damage level that cannot be detected from the aerial frames is expected. Hence, the estimate of 58,167 damaged or destroyed houses may correspond to part of categories 3 and 4. Real damage level is believed to be far higher, due to multiple reasons.

First of all, as noted by the WB DNA report, “the imagery is broad-brush in nature as it is limited to what appears in the imagery frame”. Hence, damages on vertical sides cannot be detected. Moreover, structural damages that make buildings appear as still standing and not visibly compromised are not noticed. Below picture shows the severely compromised structures of the buildings, especially the one on the right (see the floor slabs in between floors and the major crack on the upper part). Those unfinished buildings, near Mosul university, were taken by ISIL who detonated “light” mines on the pillars, hence not causing a full collapse of the building but compromising it structurally . Although from an aerial perspective they may look “fine” (still standing, no shelling signs, etc.), clearly they cannot be repaired but need to be fully demolished before any reconstruction can take place.

10 Several actors including UN Habitat, UNDP and UNITAR have worked on satellite imagery review, focusing mainly on cities and large urban centers such as: Mosul, Telafar, , Al Qaim, Bashiqa and Karamless 7 | P a g e

Mined buildings in Mosul (credit: Iraq Shelter Cluster)

Other cases of “invisible” damages (at least from satellite imageries) are the ones caused by fire (whether arson or caused by a strike) – in certain areas many houses were not structurally damaged but heavily impacted by fire/flames/smoke.

Going more in details, the Shelter Cluster has compared the damage data from satellite reviews with the data of shelter repairs programs. From such comparison, the satellite imageries seem to have “missed” 11,154 housing units, particularly in certain districts that have notably been particularly affected by the conflict: in , Hamdaniya, Falluja, Ana, Tilkaef, Al Ka’im and , where shelter partners have assisted 37,210 households with shelter repairs11, while the satellite imageries indicated 8,188 impacted buildings. This is not surprising, based on above mentioned limitations and also on below reasons:

• These districts have large urban centers, hence the buildings captured as damaged by the satellite review are comprised of several housing units which number is unknown. • The impact of an active conflict and especially heavy shelling would destroy or heavily damage certain buildings, while the nearby ones would report less damages. These may not be appreciable through aerial views but only through a door-to-door assessment.

Conclusion: it is recommended that a field-based damage level assessment be carried out as soon as possible, to understand the real situation in i) dense urban areas and ii) those districts where the satellite imageries have reported high number of buildings impacted. That would imply reviewing the data available for: (Anbar) Heet, Khaldiyah; (Diyal) Jalula; (Kirkuk) Al Riadh; (Ninewa) Al Ba'aj, Mosul, , Telafar; (Salah-Al Din) Al Siniyah, .

11 The Shelter Cluster has collected data on the number of households served, hence this total also corresponds to the number of shelter units repaired by partners (equal to 37,210). 8 | P a g e

6. DISPLACED PEOPLE AND THE BARRIER TO THEIR RETURN DUE TO SHELTER DAMAGES

It is crucial to also investigate the perception of IDPs in regard to their challenges to return due to shelter damages and the lack of capacity from their side to repair their houses. Attempting to quantify housing damages through the intention of all IDPs (in and out of camps, including those who have returned to their districts of origin but not their actual homes because un-inhabitable), based on the latest most comprehensive survey run in December 201912 and based on overall IDP population figure of 1,389,540 individuals13: • IDPs not returning because of fully damaged houses account for 48.7 percent of overall IDP population. That would correspond to 676,705 individuals or 112,784 households. This could be the figure for category 4 houses – but not based on a comprehensive damage assessment. • IDPs not returning because of heavily damaged houses account for 22.1 percent of overall IDP population. That would correspond to 307,088 individuals or 51,181 households. This could be the figure for category 3 houses – but not based on a comprehensive damage assessment. Intention surveys date from December, 2019. Yet, it is safe to assume that the substance has not significantly changed. As a matter of fact, due to lack of large scale reconstruction program, most IDPs who indicated not willing/able to return due to housing damage/destruction have not yet benefitted from wide reconstruction/repairs efforts or any compensation, also following the prolonged period of movement restrictions linked to the COVID-19 outbreak.

Based on the Intention Surveys run in IDP camps in Feb.-Mar. 202014, below are the key findings:

• 58 percent of IDP households reported their property in their Area of Origin (AoO) to be completely destroyed. • 53 percent of IDP households reported the need of rehabilitation and reconstruction of their homes as primary needs to enable return to their AoO. • 42 percent of IDP households reported that house damage and destruction was one of the main reasons for not intending to return to their AoO.

12 The results of the survey, run by REACH Initiative, are available at: https://www.reachresourcecentre.info/country/iraq/theme/movements-and-intentions/cycle/646/#cycle-646 13 Based on DTM data from April,2020: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/MasterList 14 The results of the survey, run by REACH Initiative, are available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/assessment/reach-iraq-intentions-survey-idps- formal-camps-march-2020 9 | P a g e

Intention data can therefore be a useful source of information in regard to shelter damage. The figures presented above could actually be higher since some of the respondents might not have cited WDS are a barrier to return, even if their home is destroyed – other things like security, access and livelihood might have been higher on their agenda. Conclusion: Attempting to quantify damages based on intention surveys, the numbers indicate 163,96515 households with category 3 and 4 damaged shelter. Based on district of origin and on IDPs knowledge of their properties, Al- Shirqat seems to be the area with highest destruction of houses – followed by Al-, Al-Hawija, Al-Baaj, Al- Hamdaniya, Al-Mosul, Beygee, Makhmour, Sinjar, Telafar.

7. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA ON HOUSING SECTOR DAMAGES

Based on intention survey data, 163,965 households have their shelter heavily damaged or destroyed, hence likely falling into categories 3 and 4. This figure is far higher than the WB DNA report quote for residential buildings being damaged/destroyed (138,051). Considering as well that shelter actors have been assisting around 75,000 households with shelter repairs16 (mainly category 2, and few in categories 3 and 4), summing this result up with the figures of the intention survey (assuming these refer predominantly to categories 3 and 4 WDS), a more realistic number could be near 240,00017 damaged and destroyed houses (spanning from categories 2, 3 and 4). This is almost double the figure quoted by the WB report in 2018.

15 112,784 households + 51,181 households 16 While the Shelter Cluster has recorded number of households served, it is safe to assume that the same figure also represents the number of shelter units that have been repaired. More data in the online WDS repair dashboard: https://www.sheltercluster.org/iraq/iraq-war-damaged-shelter-rehabilitation-interactive-dashboard 17 163,965 households + 75,341 households 10 | P a g e

Shelter repairs Intention Survey WB DNA report program report Satellite assessment (Estimated # Shelter units of (# residential buildings (# Shelter units (# impacted buildings, IIDPhouseholds not able to return damaged/destroyed, rehabilitated, Jan. Oct, 2017) due to shelter Jan. 2018) 2021) damages/destruction, Dec. 2019)

86,617 58,167 138,051 163,965

Conclusion: Assuming the overall figure of 240,000 houses being damaged or destroyed is credible, that would mean that 20 percent of them have been repaired to minimum standards, 6 percent are undergoing repairs and 5 percent are planned for rehabilitation. The remaining balance of 69 percent (or, 163,965 households) are still in need of support.

8. THE RETURN INDEX AND THE SEVERITY OF SHELTER DAMAGES IN AREAS OF RETURN

IOM/DTM has been collecting data on the severity of housing destruction through a Return Index. They have classified 1,373 locations based on the following shelter destruction severity:

• Locations with high severity: more than half of the houses are destroyed (hence, category 4) • Locations with medium severity: about half or less than half of the houses are destroyed (hence, category 4)

Data was collected through Key Informants, hence the precision of this information may not be guaranteed. Also, the severity threshold does not allow any precise calculation on the damage level (high being above 50 percent and medium being less than 50 percent). Nonetheless, it is still a valuable data as the distribution of severity across districts do match other damage assessments. For instance, the districts that appear to have a large population in locations scored with high and medium severity are: Falluja, Heet and Ramadi in Anbar; Hawiga in Kirkuk; Hamdaniya, Mosul, Telafar and Tilkaef in Ninewa; and Shirqat in Salah al-Din.

Return Index (December 2020) Total population living # of locations with Total population living in # of locations with High in High shelter severity Medium shelter Medium shelter severity shelter severity locations (HH) severity locations (HH) 73 12,298 1,389 630,797 Based on above data, assuming that the households in high severity locations have at least half of their houses destroyed, and those in medium severity locations have 30 percent18 of their houses destroyed, that would mean a total of 195,388 households19 which houses are in category 4/destroyed. This figure is higher than the one deducted from the intention survey (163,965 households which houses are in category 3 and 4).

Furthermore, the Return Index compares the extent of damage to housing in these areas to the rates of return. This relationship between housing damage and return rates is specifically explored in the January 2019 DTM Briefing titled “the Physical and Social Dimensions of Housing in Conflict-Affected Areas”. This report finds that the areas with high levels of house destruction are associated with low rates of return. For example, 75% of the locations that

18 This is a very large approximation, since the definition of Medium severity, as quoted above, refers to those locations where less than half of the houses are destroyed. 19 This is the sum of 6,149 (50 percent of 12,298) plus 189,239 (30 percent of 630,797) 11 | P a g e

have high levels of housing destruction (which cover the 10,680 HHs mentioned in the table above) only have half of their pre-conflict population back.

Conclusion: due to the way these data were collected (through key informants), the return index figures may have been slightly overestimated, although they may be a sign of a higher damage level compared to the other data available (satellite assessment and WB DNA report).

9. ATTEMPTING A GEOGRAPHICAL PRIORITIZATION BASED ON NEEDS, RESPONSE, PARTNER PRESENCE AND GAPS

For the past 3 years, certain districts – and even certain locations within the same district - have received more attention than others, for various reasons, mainly: high number of people in need of shelter repairs and high return rate; absence of access challenges (including remoteness and security situation); functional markets; donor preference (especially for faith-based organisations), and more collaborative local authorities. Furthermore, urban areas have generally represented the “low hanging fruit”, easier to work compared to rural areas due to the large scale of needs in a rather small and sometimes difficult to access area.

In a longer-term perspective, it would be important to try and prioritize those areas that have been so far underserved and/or those where the needs seem to still be high. Below is an analysis based on the data collected by the Shelter Cluster and UN-Habitat through WDS rehab database (presented in alphabetical order).

DISTRICTS THAT HAVE BEEN WITNESSING THE HIGHEST TARGETS FOR HOUSING REPAIRS

Anbar: Al’Kaim, Falluja, Ramadi Ninewa: Hamdaniya, Mosul, Sinjar, Telafar Salah al-Din: Baiji

DISTRICTS THAT HAVE BEEN WITNESSING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF PARTNERS ENGAGED IN HOUSING REPAIRS

Anbar: Al’Kaim, Ana, Falluja, Ramadi Kirkuk: Al-Hawiga Ninewa: Hamdaniya, Mosul, Sinjar, Telafar, Tilkaef Salah al-Din: Baiji

DISTRICTS WHOSE HOUSING DAMAGE LEVEL REPORTED THROUGH VARIOUS DATA SOURCES INDICATE HIGHEST NEEDS

Anbar: Al’Kaim, Ana, Falluja, Heet, Ramadi Baghdad: Mahmoudiya Diyala: Kirkuk: Al-Hawiga Ninewa: Baaj, Hatra, Hamdaniya, Mosul, Sinjar, Telafar, Tilkaef Salah al-Din: Baiji, Balad, Shirqat, Tikrit, Tooz

12 | P a g e

10. ESTIMATED COSTS TO SUPPORT THE RETURN PROCESS THROUGH MINIMUM HOUSING REPAIRS

With the rule of the thumb, if on average the shelter repair for a house in category 2 costs around 2,500 USD, based on above figures the overall budget spent so far is around 188M USD. The houses in need of further repairs are the ones more seriously damaged or destroyed, hence a higher cost shall be planned: assuming an average cost of 5,500 USD/house20, the budget required to repair the remaining 163,965 houses is around 900M USD at minimum. As a matter of fact, these calculations are based on the information provided by people still in displacement, while certain returnees have decided to go back to their area of origin but may not have returned to their home, due to shelter damages and their inability to rehabilitate their house. That said, this is the value of repairs for a minimum space of 33m2/family of 6. The reconstruction cost for the full damaged surfaces will be clearly far higher.

11. OTHER OBSTACLES FOR A FASTER RECOVERY OF THE HOUSING SECTOR

By their nature, housing repairs usually require long implementation periods to go through all necessary steps: identification of vulnerable families in need of shelter support, technical assessment of their shelter, negotiations, preparation of Bill of Quantities (BoQ), tendering of the rehab works, actual execution of the repairs which shall preferably happen during the dry season (otherwise cold and rainy weather would slow down all concrete-related works). Countries affected by war have achieved a full reconstruction process over decades. But there are other obstacles to consider when planning for an adequate timeframe:

1) Presence of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) inside or on the land plot of a house represent a great risk that should be handled by specialized entities. At the moment, GoI and international actors have contributed to mine clearances mainly in public buildings and spaces, while the needs for residential housing clearance are far higher and very often house owners end up clearing their properties on their own. The task of clearing ERW from private properties is further complicated by lengthy approval processes and ambiguous government policies related to issues of liability (who is responsible for the damage caused at a private residence if something explodes during removal?). 2) Debris should be removed to speed up the rehab works. These will be slowed down especially in densely constructed areas (e.g. urban centers) and for category 3 and 4 houses where the clearance of the house footprint shall happen before being able to move machineries and workers to the construction site. Certain entities, including UN Environment, advocate for larger-scale debris removal and recycling programs which could apply to the housing sector and remove one of the barriers to reconstruction of destroyed households. 3) House, Land and Property (HLP) issues: under the principle of “Do No Harm”, beneficiaries of WDS programs need to prove ownership of the house before the reconstruction effort can commence. The owner may have lost his/her civil documentation to prove the identify and the legal ownership of the shelter, hence works won’t start till the beneficiary can provide such documentation. Moreover, missing of ownership documentation, lack of access to compensation scheme, secondary/Illegal occupation, forced evictions and confiscation and illegal sales of the properties are major barriers for the official owner to return to their property and start repairing it (on his/her own or with external support).

Hence, the effort to support the housing sector will also have to be planned inter-sectorally, taking into consideration the scale and scope of the house rehabilitation efforts across priority governorates in Iraq. While international actors

20 This is an average as unit costs vary a lot based on locations. Such value may be far higher in the Old City of Mosul and far lower in remote, rural areas for instance 13 | P a g e

continue to be engaged in addressing the above-identified gaps, the ultimate responsibility for leading this effort remains with the GoI and its relevant ministries and government agencies.

12. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS AND WAYS FORWARD

While the main aim of this document is to present available data on the damages suffered by the housing sector in Iraq following the ISIL-conflict, here is a set of broad recommendations for relevant Authorities, key stabilization actors and any other entity that will engage in the long-term reconstruction process.

1. Build Back Better: there is a chance to review master plans, policies and standards, and organize the reconstruction efforts in a way that urban settlements will benefit from best and most modern practices. While this clearly represents an opportunity, there are also other compelling factors to take into consideration, first and foremost the immediate needs of many people to secure a house as fast as possible. Especially those extremely vulnerable run the risk of compromising their safety by residing in buildings that lack structural stability, or that do not meet other minimum standard for adequate housing, for the sake of securing an urgent roof on top of their heads. 2. The key elements for a solid housing reconstruction strategy: the private sector, the labor market and the financial instruments. The construction effort can offer a great opportunity for income generating activities and market recovery. There is a need to inject financial resources with solid plans and regulatory measures, so as to avoid a fragile, short-term business environment that would not attract potential investors. The “Iraq Housing Reconstruction and Housing Development Strategy in the Liberated Areas” endorsed by the Council of Ministers in June 2019 should serve as a basis for this discussion. Furthermore, the Trust Fund will also be an occasion for Iraqi Government to advance on this front. 3. Equitable plans for the poorest: as many people will lack the resources to initiate the reconstruction effort, the Government shall ensure equitable and non-discriminatory policies to support the most vulnerable. With enough resources, efficient compensation schemes can contribute in this sense, considering also fast-tracking of claims for the most disadvantaged ones. Furthermore, as the needs are massive, an incremental approach shall be applied: to support a durable return process, people may need external support for a partial rehabilitation/reconstruction of their home, while they can complement such initial effort on the longer term. 4. The human right to adequate housing for All: in a still very complex and dynamic society traumatized by the recent conflict, the risk of discrimination and tensions among diverse groups, including those with perceived affiliation to extremists, may be exacerbated by any exclusion from housing programs. Hence there is a need to safeguard the fundamental human right to adequate and affordable housing for every Iraqi, irrespective of their socio-economic status. Particular attention to areas with underlying tribal, ethnic and religious tensions shall be paid when planning for and implementing the reconstruction effort, including at neighborhood level. 5. Affordable social housing: many displaced people do not have a house or land to return to. A solution should be found as soon as possible, so as to avoid the proliferation/expansion of informal settlements or secondary occupation of existing buildings, as the only housing alternative for such cases. At the same time, such programs will take long time, hence the need to balance such programs (which will benefit the most vulnerable) while continuing the investment on damaged properties. 6. The central role of the Government at both national and local level: the current COVID-19 pandemic is challenging even well-resourced countries, obliging them to reconsider their international commitment to other nations. Iraq, as middle-income country, may not receive the same level of support as in the past, hence it is of utmost importance that the Government be on the driving seat to lead its housing reconstruction plan since its inception and throughout the entire implementation.

14 | P a g e

7. An integrated approach that takes into consideration demining, debris removal, HLP and basic services: any reconstruction plan needs to include efficient strategies to tackle all obstacles for a fast recovery (particularly the issue of mine clearance, debris removal and HLP barriers including disputes). At the same time, the reconstruction of the housing sector will contribute to a durable return process only if basic services will also be re-instituted. An incremental approach is highly recommended, so as to attain minimum standards in as many locations as possible, while scaling them up on the longer term. 8. Tailored reconstruction strategies, rural vs urban models: Many displaced HHs are from rural areas where most homes are built using traditional techniques such as dried mudbricks. Other areas are home to a mix of mudbrick and concrete buildings over large areas of land. This offers opportunities for owner-driven, locally-sourced options for home reconstruction. Cost effective and culturally appropriate transitional housing options can be used to bring people back to their homes in rural settings, also at a faster pace 9. Coordination with MODM, MoP, and the concerned Governorates and local authorities on proper planning for IDP camp closure and consolidation of camps, and creation of conducive conditions in the return areas to ensure sustainable return of IDP and avoid settlement of IDP in informal areas.

15 | P a g e

ANNEX I – COMPILATION OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA (AS OF JAN., 2021)

Housing repairs programs - achievements as of 11 Jan 2021

Overall No. Completed Ongoing Planned Looking Completed Ongoing Planned Completed Ongoing Planned # Governorate District (completed, partners total total total for funds cat. 1/2/3 cat. 1/2/3 cat. 1/2/3 cat. 4 cat. 4 cat. 4 ongoing, planned) working

1 Anbar Al Ka'im 6,930 1,363 982 4,585 - 1,363 982 4,585 - - - 6 2 Anbar Al Wafa ------3 Anbar Al Walid ------4 Anbar Ana 3,076 1,020 719 1,337 - 970 719 1,337 50 - - 4 5 Anbar Falluja 9,113 6,605 854 1,654 - 6,401 854 1,654 204 - - 8 6 Anbar Haditha 1,440 766 674 - - 716 674 - 50 - - 3 7 Anbar Heet 327 177 - 150 - 127 - 150 50 - - 3 8 Anbar Khaldiyah ------9 Anbar Kubaisah ------10 Anbar Ramadi 14,071 11,946 413 1,712 - 11,725 413 1,712 221 - - 4 11 Anbar Rawa 1,200 - - 1,200 - - - 1,200 - - - 1 12 Anbar Al Rutba ------13 Baghdad Abu Ghraib 324 324 - - - 224 - - 100 - - 2 14 Baghdad Mahmoudiya 214 214 - - - 114 - - 100 - - 2 15 Baghdad Al Kadhmiyah - 16 Diyala Baladruz ------17 Diyala Jalula ------18 Diyala ------19 Diyala Khanaqin 787 392 - 395 - 392 - 395 - - - 3 20 Diyala - 21 Diyala Muqdadiya 622 322 - 300 - 322 - 300 - - - 3 22 Dohuk Sumel 112 - 112 - - - 112 - - - - 1 23 Erbil 200 - 200 - - - 200 - - - - 1 24 Kirkuk Al Abasy ------25 Kirkuk Al Hawiga 1,002 746 74 182 - 746 74 182 - - - 4 26 Kirkuk Al Rashad ------27 Kirkuk Al Riadh ------28 Kirkuk Dabes 101 101 - - - 101 - - - - - 1 29 Kirkuk 235 138 97 - - 138 97 - - - - 1 30 Kirkuk Kirkuk. 442 - 442 - - - 442 - - - - 2 31 Kirkuk Sabaghiyah ------32 Kirkuk Yaychi ------33 Kerbala Kerbala. 20 20 - - - 20 - - - - - 1 34 Najaf. 180 23 157 - - 23 157 - - - - 1 35 Ninewa Al Ba'aj 314 107 161 46 - 107 161 46 - - - 2 36 Ninewa Al Hatra 42 - 42 - - - 42 - - - - - 37 Ninewa Al Qahtania ------38 Ninewa Al Shamal ------39 Ninewa Bartella ------40 Ninewa Fayde ------41 Ninewa Hamam Al Aleel ------42 Ninewa Hamdaniya 8,464 6,649 1,672 143 - 6,583 1,672 143 66 - - 10 43 Ninewa Mosul 21,056 12,261 4,300 1,098 3,397 11,856 4,280 1,098 405 20 - 12 44 Ninewa Qayrwan ------45 Ninewa Sinjar 3,097 2,081 419 597 - 2,081 419 597 - - - 4 46 Ninewa Telafar 2,873 2,023 460 390 - 1,872 460 390 151 - - 7 47 Ninewa Tilkaef 2,091 1,283 473 335 - 1,283 473 335 - - - 11 48 Ninewa Zummar ------49 Salah al-Din Al Daur ------50 Salah al-Din Baiji 5,333 1,078 1,114 3,141 - 832 914 2,926 246 200 215 4 51 Salah al-Din Balad 924 454 140 330 - - 140 120 454 - 210 2 52 Salah al-Din 50 50 - - - 50 - - - - - 1 53 Salah al-Din Shirqat 9 9 - - - 9 - - - - - 1 54 Salah al-Din Tikrit 453 96 357 - - 96 357 - - - - 2 55 Salah al-Din Tooz 533 65 468 - - 65 468 - - - - 3 TOTAL 85,635 50,313 14,330 17,595 3,397 48,216 14,110 17,170 2,097 220 425

Housing repairs programs Satellite assessment Return Index achievements. Overall Total pop. in No. houses Discrepancy with SC No. locations with Total pop. in high No. locations with # Governorate District (completed, Medium severity damaged/destroyed data high severity severity (HH) Medium severity ongoing, planned) (HH) 1 Anbar Al Ka'im 6,930 836 (6,094) 44 16,721 2 Anbar Al Wafa - 1 1 3 Anbar Al Walid - 120 120 4 Anbar Ana 3,076 260 (2,816) 12 2,532 5 Anbar Falluja 9,113 2,668 (6,445) 71 87,453 6 Anbar Haditha 1,440 378 (1,062) 1 68 11 1,948 7 Anbar Heet 327 2,243 1,916 57 25,932 8 Anbar Khaldiyah - 1,239 1,239 9 Anbar Kubaisah - 316 316 10 Anbar Ramadi 14,071 3,782 (10,289) 1 1,020 79 99,063 11 Anbar Rawa 1,200 10 2,662 12 Anbar Al Rutba - 9 4,598 13 Baghdad Abu Ghraib 324 72 33 3,872 14 Baghdad Mahmoudiya 214 30 5,260 15 Baghdad Al Kadhmiyah - 24 1,639 16 Diyala Baladruz - 115 115 17 Diyala Jalula - 1,185 1,185 18 Diyala Al Khalis - 40 6,421 19 Diyala Khanaqin 787 89 (698) 15 950 53 15,663 20 Diyala Kifri - 1 220 21 Diyala Muqdadiya 622 226 (396) 4 950 37 7,071 22 Dohuk Sumel 112 23 Erbil Erbil 200 3 96 36 3,066 24 Kirkuk Al Abasy - 393 393 25 Kirkuk Al Hawiga 1,002 83 20,172 26 Kirkuk Al Rashad - 300 300 27 Kirkuk Al Riadh - 972 972 28 Kirkuk Dabes 101 29 Kirkuk Daquq 235 2 120 5 616 30 Kirkuk Kirkuk. 442 3 66 4 197 31 Kirkuk Sabaghiyah - 174 174 32 Kirkuk Yaychi - 411 411 33 Kerbala Kerbala. 20 34 Najaf Najaf. 180 35 Ninewa Al Ba'aj 314 2,929 2,615 1 82 91 7,847 36 Ninewa Al Hatra 42 113 71 34 5,782 37 Ninewa Al Qahtania - 39 39 38 Ninewa Al Shamal - 63 63 39 Ninewa Bartella - 167 167 40 Ninewa Fayde - 37 37 41 Ninewa Hamam Al Aleel - 17 17 42 Ninewa Hamdaniya 8,464 197 (8,267) 32 16,575 43 Ninewa Mosul 21,056 22,750 5,091 7 2,660 266 147,818 44 Ninewa Qayrwan - 45 Ninewa Sinjar 3,097 9 1,269 70 16,590 46 Ninewa Telafar 2,873 11 2,042 88 46,258 47 Ninewa Tilkaef 2,091 6 966 18 8,981 48 Ninewa Zummar - 49 Salah al-Din Al Daur - 1 2,826 50 Salah al-Din Baiji 5,333 1 64 34 12,799 51 Salah al-Din Balad 924 3 1,848 5 8,145 52 Salah al-Din Samarra 50 53 Salah al-Din Shirqat 9 59 26,992 54 Salah al-Din Tikrit 453 33 20,687 17 | P a g e 55 Salah al-Din Tooz 533 6 97 19 4,391 TOTAL 85,635 42,092 (40,146) 73 12,298 1,389 630,797