Alex Vines* ISSOpinion October 2008 : looking beyond elections

In early September Angola held peaceful legislative elections, the first since 1992. Last time around the results were close and the União Nacional para a In- dependência Total de Angola (UNITA) and its leader decided to return to war. This time, the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de An- gola (MPLA) had a resounding victory, securing 81.6% of the national vote. This has cemented the political hegemony of the MPLA with 191 seats in the 220-seat National Assembly and allows the MPLA to amend An- gola’s constitution if it so desires. For the foresee- able future the MPLA is fully in the driving seat − the question is to where is it driving?

Despite international financial turmoil and fears of a Copyright : Hadj/SIPA global recession, strong GDP growth in Angola is ex- French President Nicolas Sarkozy with his Angolan counterpart José Eduardo pected at 9.8% in 2009 and 8.2% in 2010. Angola is Dos Santos during a joint declaration held at the Presidential Palace in Luanda, booming, sustained by high government spending and Angola, 23 May 2008. a rapid increase in oil exports. Currently Angola enjoys a healthy current account surplus. Because of Nigeria’s Delta crisis, Angola is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest oil Building upon legislative elections exporter and is set to surpass 2m barrels per day. An- gola will on 1 January 2009 take up the presidency of On 16 September Angola’s electoral commission (CNE) OPEC for the first time. However, oil is finite and peak released the official results of the 5 and 6 September oil is already predicted around 2015 followed by a elections. Turnout was high at over 87%, indicating production decline. There is little sign yet of a non-oil popular enthusiasm for the first multiparty election dependent economy flourishing and the World Bank’s in 16 years. This is not very different from the 1992 ‘Doing Business’ report for 2009 ranks Angola 168th out elections, when turnout was an impressive 90 per of 181 countries surveyed. The average time taken to cent of registered voters. acquire a business operating licence is a staggering 1,011 days according to the survey. Where as 18 political organisations put forward can- didates in the 1992 legislative elections, this time Next year Mr José Eduardo dos Santos will mark his there were fourteen – ten political parties and four 30th year as president of Angola. 2009 is also presi- coalitions – with 5,198 candidates competing. dential election year, and at the MPLA party congress in December Mr dos Santos is likely to be selected as There have been allegations of official intimi- the MPLA’s candidate. dation, corruption and the presence of security

* Alex Vines is Director of Regional and Security european Union Studies, Chatham House, London. Union européenne

European Union Institute for Security Studies forces at polling stations. The most embarrassing UNITA’s strongest showing was in Cabinda, due to a episode was that only 320 polling stations out of protest vote and an official boycott of the election by 2,584 polling stations opened in Luanda, as voter the armed FLEC separatist group. The Frente Nacional papers and voter register lists had not been de- para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA) did well in its Za- livered, forcing a second day of voting despite a ire province heartland but failed to make an impact very expensive and high-tech voter registration nationally. process. According to individuals involved this was more due to incompetence and inexperience The five parties that had polled less than 0.5% of than conspiracy. the national vote (four of which had held seats in the outgoing parliament) have been dissolved. An- Out of a total of 6.4 million valid ballots, the MPLA secured gola now has only six officially registered parties 81.6%. Its main rival, the former rebel group UNITA, only compared with 14 parties and coalitions during the won 10.39% and other parties secured just 7.97%. election and 108 during the pre-election period. The

Legislative election results

Total votes % of total valid votes No. of seats MPLA 5,266,112 81.64 191 UNITA 670,197 10.39 16 PRS 204,478 3.17 8 ND 77,405 1.20 2 FNLA 71,600 1.11 3 Other parties 160,615 2.49 0 Total 6,450,407 100.00 220 Source: Comissão Nacional Eleitoral (CNE)

UNITA’s performance in its traditional heartland, the MPLA with its 191 seats now completely dominates central highlands of Huambo and Bié provinces, was the political landscape. poor. Not unexpected as the parties’ parliamentar- ians had become distant, and the MPLA had pumped resources into these areas and vigorously pursued International response a co-option effort with the traditional authorities since the end of the war. The European Union, Pan-African Parliament, Com- munity of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), UNITA’s main source of revenue was its US$14 mil- Southern African Development Community (SADC), US lion state grant based on the 70 parliamentary seats embassy, and the African Union deployed election ob- it won in 1992. That is now gone and this will have a servers. One or two groups from Angolan civil society serious impact on UNITA’s finances. UNITA needs now were authorised to be observers by the government to look towards the municipal elections, which will but the CNE failed to accredit nearly half of the 2,640 take place some time after the presidential poll in civil society observers, with 28 out of 370 receiv- 2009, to start rebuilding its grass-root support base. ing accreditation in Luanda. This included Chatham UNITA’s leader Isaias Samakuva stands little chance House’s then Angola researcher who was signed up to of winning the presidential poll. be a member of the Angolan civil society monitoring effort in Luanda. Other parties did even worse: only three managed to secure more than 1% of the national vote. The op- The international observers gave a broadly positive position now has only 29 seats in total. The MPLA assessment of the poll although criticising irregu- dominated the vote in the provinces except in Bié larities. The EU mission in particular was critical, and Cabinda where UNITA did better, and the Lunda especially of the state-controlled radio, television provinces where the Partido de Renovação Social and newspaper Jornal de Angola. On 24 September (PRS) enjoys strong support from the Lunda/Chokwe the French EU presidency stated that: ‘The Angolan people. general elections are the fruit of a considerable

2 European Union Institute for Security Studies effort to which the European Union must pay tribute, In its election manifesto pledges the MPLA put for- despite the logistical difficulties noted, and have ward an even more ambitious second phase of post- been considered by all observers as being successful war reconstruction. This includes the creation of two overall. They show the distance Angola has travelled new cities, a new railway line running along the coast to achieve national reconciliation, six years after from Namibe to the enclave of Cabinda, as well as one the end of the civil war, and are a strong symbol for million new houses across the country by 2012. the whole of Africa.’ However, the final report of the EU observer mission to Angola has not yet been pub- How Angola is going to match this massive investment lished. in physical infrastructure with investing in its citi- zens and their health and education waits to be seen. Just prior to the elections, Chatham House published, Skilled Angolan labour remains at a premium. Angola’s Elections: A Democratic Oil Giant? This briefing paper highlighted how the MPLA enjoyed enormous financial advantages and started its elec- Angola’s vision tion campaign before the official campaigning start of 8 August 2008. It also warned that the ‘playing For the last decade, Angola has viewed itself as a field for the political contest is particularly unequal regional superpower. This policy originated in Lu- in access to the media’ in favour of the MPLA and anda’s conflict with UNITA, which ended in 2002. It that the body tasked with the electoral process, the required crafting an aggressive policy throughout CNE, had problems. The Economist Intelligence Unit Africa to erode UNITA’s support. This external strat- believes the MPLA spent some US$300 million on its egy of isolating UNITA and its leader Jonas Savimbi campaign compared with the $17 million shared by abroad was coupled with a fierce ‘peace through war’ the other parties. strategy inside Angola.

Since its military victory in February 2002, the An- Government reshuffle golan government had also benefited from the com- modities boom and especially high oil prices. With In late September, President dos Santos conducted oil production set to continue rising against a back- the most significant reshuffle of government since ground of high oil prices, strong economic growth 1997. A new government of 33 ministers (five more is predicted at 21.4% in 2008 and 10.4% in 2009. than its predecessor) was unveiled. Some portfolios The rapid increase in oil exports and high interna- have been split and two ministers without portfolio tional prices are also forecast to keep the current ac- have been created, one of them for Antonio Bento count in surplus, rising to a peak of 32.4% of GDP in Bembe, a former leader of the Cabindan separatist 2008. Manuel Vicente, the president of the national group FLEC. oil company Sonangol, announced in February 2008 that Angola’s oil production had risen to 1.9 million The most significant changes are economic with the barrels per day and should reach 2 million by the end replacement of José Pedro de Morais as finance min- of the year. ister by his former deputy Eduardo Severim de Mo- rais. The appointment of the MPLA’s former chief of Flush with oil revenues, the Angolan government can economic and social policy, Manuel Nunes Junior, to now continue to pursue its strategic goals independ- the new post of economy minister is also significant ently, which has enabled Angola’s leadership to em- as it suggests that the presidency wants to reduce bark upon a ‘gradualist policy of domestic change the assertiveness of recent years by the finance min- at it own pace, and not influenced by outside pres- istry. sure’.

The long-serving petroleum minister, Desidério Cos- If Angola is ‘in peace’, it is not yet ‘fully at peace’. ta, takes up Angola’s presidency of OPEC in January Armed conflict has ended (with the exception of the 2009 and is replaced by the former energy minister, separatist conflict in Cabinda) and the dominant José Maria Botelho. There is also a new foreign min- MPLA party faces no serious internal competition, yet ister, Assunção Afonso dos Anjos. the vast majority of the population has not thus far reaped the benefits of a ‘prosperous peace’. This sit- Overall the new administration emphasises continui- uation itself has important implications for Angola’s ty rather than change, with the key ministers of plan- international status. The Angolan government’s capa- ning, interior, public works, transport and education bilities abroad and its external image will be in part remaining the same. measured by social improvements for its population.

3 European Union Institute for Security Studies In southern Africa, Angola’s main competitor is South has offered Angola in the short term things others do Africa and this relationship at presidential level has not offer, such as rapid post-conflict infrastructural been frosty because of former South African pres- development that is important to the Angolan gov- ident Thabo Mbeki’s efforts to mediate during the ernment in a pre-election context. The relationship Angolan conflict. With Mbeki’s departure Angola- with China is important but there are signs that the South African relations are likely to improve signifi- honeymoon is over and a more normal business-like cantly. relationship is emerging.

This signals the ending of the war diplomacy that Angola has also made political moves to underpin has provided a backbone to Angolan foreign policy its regional ambitions. Joining OPEC in 2007 was a since the mid-1990s. Most importantly, in the Con- significant policy shift. The move was apolitical – a gos, Angola maintains a heavy political and security statement of ‘non-aligned alliance’, coupled with a footprint in Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic desire to match Nigeria (sub-Saharan Africa’s other Republic of Congo (DRC). Luanda sees both countries OPEC member). An economic logic is also at work as as its own backyard. With the low-intensity conflict Angola wishes to off-set the impact of oil volatility ongoing in Angola’s Cabinda province, the govern- in prices and was already considering a production ment wants to continue to neutralise any rear-base cap. support. DRC officials also complain of heavy-handed Angolan policing of frontiers and expulsions of mi- A second step has been Angola’s backing of the Gulf grants but admit that they are too weak to complain of Guinea Commission, which was launched in Octo- as the Kabila government remains deeply reliant on ber 2006 and aims to mediate disputes in the region Angolan security advice. Angola advised DRC Presi- over oil exploration and fisheries. Hosted by Angola, dent Joseph Kabila to act definitively against opposi- the Commission also includes Cameroon, Congo-Braz- tion leader Jean-Pierre Bemba and his supporters – zaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, the DRC, an extension of the Angolan vision that peace through and São Tomé. Despite Angola’s ambitions, the Com- war is an effective policy option. mission’s impact on regional politics has yet to be established. Beyond this historic backbone of Luanda’s security strategy, a wider Angolan ambition is emerging: that Likewise Angola also took a leading role in the crea- of being a major power in the Gulf of Guinea. Two tion of the African Diamond Producers Association forces are at work here – the post-conflict confidence (ADPA) in November 2006. Following Botswana’s re- of the Luanda elite, and a realistic assessment that gional model in attempting to improve the local ben- Angola can never effectively challenge South Africa’s eficiation impact of the diamond production process, regional hegemony in the SADC. There has been a big the Luanda-based ADPA is focused on increasing em- push over the last few years of opening or expanding ployment and value-addition in the country of origin. Angolan embassies in West Africa and the Gulf of Guin- The body, which includes Angola, Botswana, South ea. The Angolan oil company Sonangol has also played Africa, Namibia and the DRC, has tried to downplay a role by entering down-stream joint ventures. fears of an OPEC-style cartel.

Angola in 2008 also sits on the UN Human Rights Com- Diversification of partnerships mission and also chaired until recently SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, both also state- Angola’s post-conflict behaviour reflects Luanda’s ments of Luanda’s political ambitions. pragmatism in avoiding any rigid adherence to dog- ma. President dos Santos made this point clear in his 2008 New Year’s address to the diplomatic corps by Europe remains important stressing that the Angolan government plans to rein- force its bilateral and commercial relationships with Having secured the domestic conditions to ensure other countries: ‘[…] globalisation naturally makes regime longevity – military might and oil wealth us see the need to diversify international relations – the Angolan government is now also seeking to and to accept the principle of competition, which has move beyond the status of a petro-military state. in a dynamic world, replaced the petrified concept MPLA policy documents talk of 25 years more rule of zones of influence that used to characterise the and the Angolan government has commissioned blue world.’ Angola’s ‘diversification’ strategy allows it skies scenario planning to model education, food to maintain beneficial economic arrangements with production and energy needs in 2025. There is no whoever it chooses, such as the US and China, by of- doubt that Luanda’s horizons are changing and that fering access to its rich oil fields while not allowing change is also occurring inside Angola. It is with- any one foreign country to get too influential. China in this context that Europe needs to engage Angola.

4 European Union Institute for Security Studies Meanwhile, Portuguese exports to Angola, Portugal’s President José Eduardo dos Santos shies away from sixth largest foreign market, expanded strongly in excessive international travel and did not attend 2007 by 39 percent to €1.4 billion. Some 10,000 Por- the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation in Beijing tuguese companies operate in Angola and Angolan in November 2006 but attended the EU-Africa sum- capital is increasingly being invested in Portugal. mit in Lisbon last December. It is time that Europe Spain and France have expanded their efforts and engaged with Angola more consistently, not least Sweden has just reversed its decision to close its as an extension of European Security and Defence embassy in Luanda this year. A more coherent policy Policy and its interface with African Peace and is needed at the Commission level and surveys have Security Architecture. This is particularly relevant shown that the EU is not perceived as a major player to peace and security in Angola’s neighbours such in Angola despite its importance. as the DRC.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the EUISS.

5 European Union Institute for Security Studies