On God's Omnipotence That God Can Only Do What He Does Do
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
On God’s Omnipotence from Proslogion by Anselm of Canterbury (~1078 AD) translated by Thomas Williams (2002) [Note: You can also find this passage on pgs. 104-105 of Three Philosophical Dialogues] Chapter 7 In what sense God is omnipotent even though there are many things he cannot do But how are you omnipotent if you cannot do everything? And how can you do everything if you cannot be corrupted, or lie, or cause what is true to be false (as, for example, to cause what has been done not to have been done), or many other such things? Or is the ability to do these things not power but weakness? For someone who can do these things can do what is not beneficial to himself and what he ought not to do. And the more he can do these things, the more power misfortune and wickedness have over him, and the less he has over them. So whoever can do these things can do them, not in virtue of his power, but in virtue of his weakness. So when we say that he “can” do these things, it is not because he has the power to do them, but because his weakness gives something else power over him. … In the same way, then, when someone is said to have the “power” to do or suffer something that is not beneficial to himself or that he ought not to do, by ‘power’ [Latin: potentia] we really mean ‘weakness’ [Latin: impotentia]. For the more he has this “power,” the more power misfortune and wickedness have over him, and the less he has over them. Therefore, Lord God, you are all the more truly omnipotent because you can do nothing through weakness, and nothing has power over you. That God Can Only Do What He Does Do from Theologia ‘Scholarium’, Book III by Peter Abelard (~1135 AD) translated by M.M. Tweedale (2006) I think it needs to be asked whether God can do more or better things than he does, or whether he even could in any way have stopped doing the things he is doing so that he never in fact did them. Whether we allow that he can or deny it we will likely face many worrisome problems. If we affirm that he can do more or fewer things or stop doing what he is doing, clearly we will greatly detract from his supreme goodness. Certainly it is argued that he can do only good things and only things which it is fitting for him to do and good for him to do. 1 Likewise it is also agreed that he can omit some things in the sense that he does not do them, only if they are things which it is fitting for him to omit or which it is good for him to omit. But to do and omit the same thing is not fitting to him, nor is it good. Certainly nothing admits of being done and being omitted at the same time, and what it is good to do cannot be good to omit, since the only contrary of good is bad. Neither can there be a valid reason why the same thing ought to be done and omitted. If, then, when it is good to do something it is not good to omit it, and God can do or omit only what it is good for him to do or omit, clearly it seems that he can only do or omit what he does do or does omit. For if it is good that he omit what he omits, then it is not good for him to do the same thing, and consequently he cannot do it. Or if he omits what it is good for him to do and draws back from some things which should be done, who would not infer that he is sort of envious or hostile? Certainly he to whose will all things are equally subjected incurs no toil in making anything, just as it is written: “He has spoken and they have been done; he has commanded and they have been created.” It is clear, therefore, that there is a right and valid reason for whatever God does or omits, and consequently he only does or omits those things which he ought to and which it is proper for him to do or omit. If whatever he does he ought to do, it is right for him to do whatever he does, and doubtless he ought to do whatever he does. And if he ought to do it, clearly he cannot rightly omit doing it. Certainly everything which it is right to do it is wrong to omit, and whoever does not do what reason demands is at fault just as much as if they did that which does not agree with reason at all. … It seems, then, that by the above reasoning God can do only what he does do, and can omit only what he does omit, since in fact in each case of something to be done or to be omitted he has a valid reason why he does it or omits it; nor can he, who is the height of reason, will or do anything which runs against what reason demands. Certainly no one can reasonably will or do what disagrees with reason. It appears, then, from the above reasoning and citations, that God can only do what he sometimes does do. And yet if we claim that God can only do what he does do, we seem to face opposition from both arguments and authorities. … [They say] God can do what he in no way is going to do, and what we just now concluded is evidently completely false, namely that God can only do what at sometime he does do. Otherwise, thanks would not at all be owing to him for what he does since what he cannot omit he does more out of a necessary compulsion arising from his own nature than by having been drawn freely by a will for doing these things. 2 So far as I judge this, then, since God can only do what it is fitting for him to do and what he omits doing is not anything fitting for him to do, I truly think that he is only able to do what sometimes he does do, even though few people or none agree with this opinion of ours and it seems to disagree with the pronouncements of a number of saints and a little bit with reason as well. They say that this judgment detracts greatly from the divine excellence in that it says that he can only do what sometimes he does do and omit that which he does omit, since even we ourselves, who are far less powerful, can do or omit many things which we do not at all do or omit. To them I reply that we ought not on account of this be judged more powerful or better, i.e. because we can do some things which he cannot do, like eat, walk, or even sin, things which are totally removed from the power of divinity and completely foreign to his dignity. In short, does it pertain to God to be able to do those things which he would never do or which are not in the least fitting for him to do? That we can do some things which we ought not to do is to be assigned more to our weakness than to our dignity; we would be totally better if we could do only those things which we ought to do and nothing shameful could be done by us. There is a reason why God has allowed us this power for doing wrong or sinning, namely that he, who is not at all able to sin, may appear more glorious by comparison to out weakness. And when we stop sinning, we attribute this not to our nature but to the assisting grace of him who arranges to his own glory not just good things but bad things as well. There are those, too, who think God can do even those things which he does not do because it is certain that nothing can stop him if he were to want to do those things which he does not do. So it is said: “Who might stop his will?” So also the blessed Augustine says: “He is not called omnipotent because he can do all things but because whatever he wants to do he can do, nor can any effect of his will be obstructed.” Thus whatever he wills necessarily he does when he wills it, because his will cannot in any way be deprived of its effect. But clearly by this reasoning of theirs we could say that under some sort of state of his will he could even sin or do something shameful, since it is in fact certain that nothing could stop his doing this if he willed to do that which he ought not. Besides, when they say here that he is called omnipotent because he can do whatever he wills, obviously they so associate his power and will that where his will is lacking his power is lacking too. … From what has been said, I think, it is easy to refute what seems a possible objection to God’s providence or his will in respect of creatures, so that, although he would not be able to be without those items which he has had in himself from all eternity, because that would not be fitting, still let us not propose that the things which have been foreseen, or which he has willed are, therefore, not able not to be, i.e.