The

Volume 5 Number 2 Volume 5, Spring 1959, Number 2 Article 7

Jerome Frank and the Natural

Brendan F. Brown

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BRENDAN F. BROWN*

T HE DISCUSSION of any aspect of the notable career of Judge Jerome N.Frank seems timely. His departure from this life has occasioned appraisals of his far-reaching contributions to legal science by throughout the world. Already some of these appraisals have been published in leading legal periodicals.' Jerome Frank had a remarkably diversified career as lawyer, federal administrator, professor at the , and finally as a mem- ber of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.2 He was a member of that court from his appointment in May, 1941, until the of his death. Despite the many exacting duties of a tremendously active life, he found time to write and publish seven books,3 and numerous articles and reviews on and .

*A.B. (1921), LL.B. (1924), Creighton University; LL.M. (1925), J.U.B. and J.U.L. (1926), J.U.D. (1927), Catholic University of America; D.Phil. in Law (1932), Oxford University. Professor of Law, Loyola University, New Orleans, Louisiana. ' See the eulogies of Judge Frank in 10 J. LEGAL ED. 1 (1957); 2 NATURAL L.F. 1 (1957); 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (1957); 66 YALE L. J. 817 (1957). 2 See Douglas, Jerome N. Frank, 10 J. LEGAL ED. 1-4 (1957). 3 NOT GUILTY (1957) (with Barbara Frank), describing instances where innocent persons were unjustly convicted. COURTS ON TRIAL (1949), myth and in American , a criticism of the trial system. FACT FINDING (1946), a consideration of the problem of fact - scepticism. FATE AND FREEDOM (1945), a philosophy for free Americans, explaining his philosophy and theory of history. IF MEN WERE (1942), a discussion of the problems of government. SAVE AMERICA FIRST (1938), a defense of isolationism. LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930), advocating pragmatism and emphasizing the uncertainty in law. A bibliography of the non-judicial writings of Judge Frank appears in 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 706-08 (1957). 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1959

As a result of his first book, the provoc- tual honesty and by the unusual vigor of ative Law and the Modern Mind, which he his mind, gifted in its endowments and published in 1930 at the age of forty-one, driven forward relentlessly in the search he came to be regarded by a considerable of answers to the vital questions of the number of jurists as one of the founders ages by an unquenchable and insatiable in- of the Realist tellectual curiosity. Our juridical congeni- School of Juris- ality was evident from the unforgettable . This discussion which I had with him in New School emerged in York City, shortly after his judicial appoint- the early thirties ment. It is also manifest from the favorable during the great references which he made to me, as a depression in re- scholastic , in his book, Fate and 4 sponse to the ap- Freedom, which was published in 1945, plication of the and again in his work, Courts on Trial,5 thinking of such which appeared in 1949. It is appropriate, scholars as therefore, that this paper take the form of Holmes, Freud, an In Memorium, a eulogy of the part BRENDAN F. BROWN James and Dewey which he played in making the of to the American scene. This book made objective natural law better understood, him a controversial figure in the legal world, after his discovery that it was a powerful due in part to his intellectual exuberance instrument for the administration of justice which at carried him into excessive in a democratic . His response to and unqualified generalization. Law and that doctrine was one of the dominant the Modern Mind touched off a deluge of elements in his thinking. juridical attacks upon him by members of all of the other Schools of Jurisprudence. Jerome Frank Profoundly Admired St. It is with a deep sense of personal Thomas Aquinas and His Doctrine of responsibility that I undertake to explain and evaluate Judge Frank's views on the the Natural Law natural law. I do so with the full realization At first, as in the case of Jhering, the that he not be able to answer or refute great sociological jurist, Judge Frank was me. If he were alive, it is certain that he not aware of the immense cultural wealth would comment on this article because he available in the writings of St. Thomas was very particular that jurists should cor- Aquinas, the great Dominican jurist of the rectly understand his views. thirteenth century. In Law and the Modern I write, however, not as a complete out- Mind, his only reference to Aquinas was a sider with regard to the life and writings of citation to , who referred to Jerome Frank. Indeed, in some respects Aquinas as the chief exponent of one of there was between us an underlying con- "the twelve principal of the geniality toward law, although we belonged

to two different Schools of Jurisprudence. I 4 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 218, 295 (1945). have always been impressed by his intellec- 5 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 364 (1949). JEROME FRANK of law" 6 as expressed by man throughout , often, as in the case of St. the ages, namely, that law is "a reflection Thomas Aquinas, in a distinguished man- of the divine governing the uni- ner. Moreover, they achieved skills in the techniques of analytic thinking for which verse." Indeed, in that work Judge Frank we modems are still much in their debt. devoted a whole chapter to "Verbalism and And, through them and otherwise, the medi- s " in which he attacked the eval fostered the of social scholastics because they worshipped solidarity and a "sense of the community" and inferred from names. The - values which were subsequently too much neglected. 10 scholastics were the custodians of the doc- trine of objective natural law. The vague prejudice which he had only fifteen years previously was now yielding In 1938, Judge Frank wrote Save Amer- to admiration. This was a tribute to the ica First, a work defending an isolationist openness of his mind and his sincere search position, and challenging the economics of for , wherever he might find it. Marxism. He later receded from isolation- ism in view of the grim results of subse- Once having discovered Aquinas, Jerome quent world developments. In 1942, he Frank's scholarly mind led him to a com- published If Men Were Angels, a treatise plete exposition of the objective natural law on government in a , which he doctrine. In Fate and Freedom, he wrote wrote while still a member of the Securi- that: ties and Exchange Commission. But it was [Aquinas] depicted natural law as a not until 1945, when he published Fate reflection of Divine Reason, knowable to and Freedom, a philosophy for free Ameri- man through his own "natural reason." Wise cans, that he first gave the world his re- and, for his day, tolerant, St. Thomas taught that there are but a few, and highly sponse to objective natural law, while general, immutable of natural formally attacking "fate in history and law. Men should do and avoid , in philosophy."9 good what is good for man in the light of his "natural" inclinations; thus By 1945, Jerome Frank had reversed his men should seek their self-preservation and earlier unfavorable opinion of scholasticism should live, in society, as perfectly as pos- by writing as follows in Fate and Freedom: sible the kind of life suitable to human na- ture. There are also, he said, a few secon- The word "Scholasticism" is sometimes dary principles of natural law .... 11 used to indicate a patronizing attitude towards the aridity of the subjects to which In Fate and Freedom, Judge Frank refers the Scholastics devoted themselves. The to Aquinas as "a genius. '12 He quotes charge of aridity is not too well founded, Charles Beard, the great historian, as prais- for many of these scholars busied them- ing Thomas Aquinas and his followers be- selves with matters of government and cause " 'ethical considerations occupied a 6 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 290 central position in their thought,' because (1930). they took ' as their 7 Ibid. 8 Id. ch. VII. 10 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 99 (1945). 9 See Davies, Jerome Frank- Portraitof a Per- 11 Id. at 123. sonality, 24 U. CH. L. REV. 627, 630-31 (1957). 121d. at 178. 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1959 ideal,' and 'offered a vision of earnestly attempt to apply it.' 17 It may be with justice and mercy prevailing on mentioned that Judge Jerome Frank was earth as in heaven.' ,1" evidently using the word "Catholic" in Jerome Frank in this same work pleads this context in a rough sense to describe for a new phrase to express the basic ideas the fact that the Thomistic version of the in the words "natural law."114 He was keenly natural law is more consonant with the aware of the multiple erroneous contents Catholic of law than any which writers had placed in that phrase, other type of legal philosophy in so far as which had thus become ambiguous. He be- both the natural law and the supernatural lieved that false content in that expression law are objective expressions of the Per- had obscured the pragmatic character of sonal Divine Lawgiver of the Universe. The the thinking of St. Thomas Aquinas in the former is communicated to man indirectly sense that part of the natural law is dynamic through his reason and the latter directly and is developed by , trial and through . But acceptance of the error, and a measure of utility.1 supernatural law, which is dependent on grace, is not a condition precedent for the By 1949, when the important work, adoption of the doctrine of objective nat- Courts on Trial, appeared, Judge Frank ural law, which was perceived in its rudi- bestowed still more commendation on St. mentary form by such pre-Christian pagans Thomas Aquinas and his concept of the as . natural law. In that book, aimed at a pene- trating appraisal of the jury system, he wrote that: The Thomistic Concept of Rule and Some Natural Law adherents have main- Fact Uncertainty Resembled in Many tained that from the Natural Law princi- ples men can logically deduce a detailed Ways the Frankian Thesis of Law and code of legal rules valid forever and every- Fact Scepticism where. That last is rejected in the Roman Catholic conception of Natural Law. That The doctrine of law and fact scepticism conception merits high respect from non- was the core of Jerome Frank's jurispru- Catholics. Formulated in the by St. Thomas Aquinas, it is often called dence. It resembled in many respects Thom- the Scholastit or Thomistic version of istic conclusions with regard to the appli- Natural Law. 16 cation of the in the judicial 18 He goes on to that, "The enlightened process. Aquinas was a sceptic in the Catholic will not expect uniformity in sense that his writings reflected the spirit of judicial formulations of the legal rules even constructive doubt and open inquiry, a con- by judges who believe in Natural Law and 17 Id. at 364. 13 Id. at 219, citing BEARD, THE OPEN DOOR AT 18 AQUINAS, THEOLOGICA, IL-IL, qq. 67-71 HOME ch. 1 (1934). (Amer. Ed., Fathers of English Dominican Prov- 14 Id. at 294. ince Transl. 1947). In these questions, St. Thomas was concerned with committed against justice 15 Id. at 294-95. on the part of the plaintiff, the defendant, the 1 6 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 362-63 (1949). witness, the lawyer and the judge. JEROME FRANK stant search for truth, and the considering ciples of the natural law. 21 Positive law in of problems from many points of view. The turn is then applied to the facts of litigation, distinctive literary format of his Summa used in the judicial or administrative proc- Theologica, namely, a presentation of the esses. 22 Just as some incertitude may exist arguments or objections against his posi- in the changeable sub-principles of the nat- tion, followed by a general reply, and then ural law and in the resulting positive law, a detailed answer point by point with so also uncertainty is enhanced when posi- reference to the objections, emphasizes his tive law is applied to the facts in a law critical approach. suit.2 3 These are the specific facts which affect the of the parties in their peti- Aquinas taught that part of the natural tions for justice from politically organized law was immutable but that another por- society. The uncertainty as to whether jus- tion was dynamic and changing. The con- tice has been adequately administered by tent of this second part was made by the a decision for A against B may be greater application of the few immutable princi- than the incertitude as to whether the posi- ples to ever changing social, political, cul- tive law has implemented justly the natural 19 tural and psychological facts. Since these law. facts may not always have been accurately Aquinas went so far ascertained, and the factual conclusions as to discuss the role of the witness, therefrom correctly drawn, there may be the of his credibility, room for constructive doubt, leading at and the problems of uncertainty created by on the part of a witness.2 4 times to a suspension of judgment among contradictions moralists as to whether a particular syllo- He distinguished between contradictions as gistically-derived remote conclusion is actu- to what a witness had seen or heard, and ally true.20 Thus it may have been doubt- those of opinion and report. The former ful at one time whether the loaning of would impeach his evidence, but not the money at had ceased to be against latter. He concluded that discrepancies as the natural law. This is so not because of to irrelevant or minor details should enhance any defect in the five senses of man, or in the credibility of the witness, because if his rational faculty, but rather because he his story is too "pat," there is a presump- the witness was coached. 25 is finite, and hence in some cases incapable tion that of obtaining a definite answer to every Now all this sounds similar to Judge problem. Error and consequent uncertainty Frank's doctrine of law and fact scepticism, to some extent .always lurk in the fact-find- first formulated in Law and the Modern ing process and in determining the rele- Mind26 and fully elaborated in Courts on vance of the facts themselves. 21 Id. I-I, qq. 95, 96, 97. According to Thomas Aquinas, the posi- 22 1d. II-Il, q. 70, . 2. tive law should implement the immutable 23 Ibid. principles as well as the mutable sub-prin- 2 4 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 19 Id. 1-I, q. 94, art. 5. 26 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 170-85, 20 Ibid. 264-84 (1930). 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1959

Trial. His two chief juridical preoccupa- Aquinas. In the forties, he was aware of tions were always with legal and factual the Thomistic concept of natural law, par- uncertainty as they affected the administra- ticularly in reference to the notion of rule tion of justice. But as time passed, he be- and fact uncertainty. came more and more of a fact-sceptic and Freedom, 1945, Judge Frank less and less of a law-sceptic. This may In Fate and have been due in part to his work as an approves the rule-uncertainty of Aquinas appellate court judge. His continuing in these words: judicial duties probably caused him to take The applications of these principles [i.e., a more authoritarian attitude toward law, of the natural law] to meet particular human problems, wrote St. Thomas, vary with and to admit that legal rules and principles time, place, and circumstances. had more meaningfulness and reality than Aquinas's humaneness and sagacity made he was able to concede when he wrote his conception of natural law exceedingly Law and the Modern Mind from the point flexible and relatively undogmatic - attri- of view of the legal practitioner. 27 But it is butes neglected by some of his disciples. Thanks in considerable measure to his also significant that this shift in emphasis writings, most subsequent social theoriz- from rule-scepticism to fact-scepticism, a ing was cast in the form of "natural law."'29 phrase which he apparently coined, was in Again in Courts on Trial, 1949, Jerome line with the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Frank quoted Aquinas with further ap- As he became less sceptical about the law proval as a law-sceptic, as follows: and more doubtful about the ability of the judge to know the facts, he approached The practical reason is concerned with the position of Aquinas. practical matters, which are singular and contingent. . . , wherefore human cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to of science ... Jerome Frank Discovered and Praised demonstrated conclusions Consequently, although there is necessity the Thomistic Concept of Rule and in the general principles, the more we de- Fact Uncertainty scend to matters of detail, the more fre- 30 quently we encounter defects. Judge Frank eventually found in the Judge Frank also discovered that works of Aquinas, written about seven Aquinas had discussed at length the prob- hundred years previously, a recognition of lems of the trial judge, and actually antici- the psychological, biological, realistic and pated Frankian fact-scepticism. With re- subjective aspects of the administration of gard to the fact-facet of the judicial process, 28 justice. These were the aspects emphasized Frank, in Courts on Trial, refers to Aquinas in Law and the Modern Mind, 1930, but as follows: at that time, apparently, he was without benefit of the learning and of To be sure, he [Aquinas] did say "A judge's sentence is like a particular law re- 27 See Derham, Judge Jerome Frank: An Austral- garding some particular fact," and he did ian Note of Appreciation, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. briefly discuss the task of the trial judge

643, 646 (1957). 2 9 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 124 (1945). 28 See Sharp, Realism and Natural Law, 24 U. COURTS ON TRIAL 366 (1949). CHI. L. REV. 648, 652 (1957). 30 FRANK, JEROME FRANK

when dealing with conflicting testimony. In in the mind with the fact, physical or meta- some situations, he said when the witnesses physical, outside the mind. disagree, the judge must use his "prudent 3 1 discernment," his "discretion. Aquinas, unlike Frank, was pragmatic Jerome Frank also cited in full Question only in regard to that area of human be- fall within the inhi- 70, Article 2, of Part I of the Summa havior which did not Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. There bitions of the ethically controlling moral Aquinas discussed the problems of , norms. According to Aquinas, in this re- evidence, and the credibility of witnesses, stricted area, experience or so-called prac- which a trial judge faced in endeavoring to tical results cannot override divine au- thority, knowable and known by natural reconstruct prior events. Frank then con- 3 4 cludes by writing: "Aquinas here, unlike reason. Cardozo, clearly recognized 'fact discre- Aquinas, like Frank, acknowledged the tion.' ",32Judge Frank was of the opinion sphere of the subjective and the intersub- that Cardozo's legal were too jective, i.e., the common denominator of restricted to the activities of an appellate a number of subjectively made principles court lawyer and judge to enable him to or ideals, which in turn is used as a quasi- arrive at a sufficient understanding of "fact- objective criterion for at least limited '33 discretion. purposes. But Aquinas, unlike Frank, went beyond the intersubjective and accepted the truly objective, which was something more The Area of Dissimilarity Between than the product of the human mind. Aquinas and Frank Should Be Viewed in the Light of the Fact That the Latter It may be noted that Judge Frank made Was Not a Formally Trained a supreme effort to discover an area be- Philosopher tween the intersubjective and the abso- lutely objective. The possibility of ever In some respects, there was a funda- finding such an intermediate zone was one mental difference between the jurisprudence of the principal subjects of our discussion of Aquinas and that of Frank. Aquinas, when I visited Judge Frank in the early my own scepticism as to unlike Frank, was not sceptical as to the forties. I expressed find a substitute for ac- existence of the few principles of the nat- his power ever to objective. It seems ural law which he regarded as unchange- ceptance of the eternally able. He had no doubts as to the accuracy eternally untrue to assert the existence of of man's five senses, apart from such acci- the absolutely relative or the relatively ab- dental outside factors as would, for ex- solute. ample, result in an optical illusion. He Jerome Frank was not satisfied with an did not doubt the capacity of man's reason intersubjective , but he was not to know truth, i.e., conformity of the idea ready to embrace an immutable and objec- tive moral order. He was retreating from 31 Ibid., citing AQUINAS, I-II, q. 67, art. 1, q. 70, art. 2. the merely subjective or intersubjective be- 32 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 366-67 n.26 (1949). 34 AQUINAS, SUMMA T.HEOLQGICA I-II, q. 94, art. 3Id. at 57-58. 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1959 cause ideals had taken on a new of Jerome Frank to draw the line between for him with the of World War II. true and false pragmatism, and true and He saw men giving their lives for ideals false scepticism, and to commend that part such as justice and freedom, which they of his scepticism and pragmatism which evidently regarded as more important than was true instead of attacking them in their life itself - the greatest physical good for totality. Frank himself used an analogous man, upon which all other corporeal good technique when he distinguished between depends. Hence, he reasoned that such wise and unwise Greek sceptics.3 6 ideals must be beyond the subjective, and also the intersubjective, which is merely an Though Judge Frank Did Not Fully extension of the subjective. Accept the Thomistic Concept of Nat- In Fate and Freedom, Judge Frank ural Law, Nevertheless It Exerted a sought to refute the existence of objective Significant Influence on His Thinking truth by an appeal to the authority of cer- tain physical scientists.35 These authorities In Courts on Trial, Judge Frank appar- endeavor to shake the truth of such prop- ently gave the express reason why he did ositions as the whole is greater than any of not cross the line which separated the its parts. But it would appear that no objective from the merely subjective. He authority was cited to prove that a physical assigned as the reason his sense of falli- thing may be and not be at the same time, bility and finite human limitation. These in the same way, and in the same place. prevented him from wholly accepting the Indeed, the opposite is a truth relating to full scope of the Thomistic doctrine of physical matter, self-evident and indemon- natural law. He -expressed this thought in strable, as Aristotle and Aquinas have Courts on Trial by writing: explained. By way of , the duty to Some non-Catholics balk at calling the do moral good and avoid moral evil is also Catholic Natural Law principles and pre- an immutable objective truth. cepts "eternal" or divine in origin. Indeed, to such persons.- mindful of man's finite- But since Jerome Frank was not a pro- ness, his limited capacity for comprehend- fessional philosopher, as he has more than ing, intellectually or emotionally, all that goes on once pointed out in his books, perhaps the in the vast stretches of the universe beyond his ken - it seems presumptuous strictly metaphysical implications of his to assert that man should know what' is conclusions may be minimized. In ultimate eternal, or what constitutes order or regu- analysis, he was a jurist and lawyer who larity, or future, except within his 37 desired to use law for the betterment of own small span of experience. society. The technically professional impli- But in Fate and Freedom, he adopted cations of his scepticism and pragmatism the of the immutable in these *appeared for the most part proximately words: "The only absolute on irrelevant for this limited, practical purpose. which we can count is the knowledge that If this be so, then it is possible for a scho- human knowledge will never be absolute,

lastic jurist in evaluating the Jurisprudence 3 6 Id. at 332.

35 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 316-18 (1945). 37 FRANK, COURTS ON TRuIAL 364 (1949). JEROME FRANK will always be relative and limited. '3 adopt the total concept of Thomistic natu- Judge Frank is correct when he con- ral law because of his great aversion to cludes that even Aquinas was unable to dogma. But dogma in some sense is inescap- find the formula of absolute truth in the able. The human mind must rely on some judicial process. He accurately evaluated fixed and unqualified principle or starting the limitations of Aquinas when he stated: point, for example, in the case of Judge Frank, that all is mutable or, if not, cannot But Aquinas did not explain how the be surely known to be immutable. This exercise of this discretion was to be made "objective": A particular trial judge who absolute starting point necessarily becomes happens to be sitting in a particular case dogma. Hence the issue is not between employs his discretion so that he decides dogma and no-dogma, but between good for the defendant. Suppose another judge or reasonable dogma and bad or unreason- had happened to sit and had heard the able dogma. same witnesses. What means exist for guar- anteeing even approximate uniformity (ob- Is it not more reasonable to conclude jectivity) in such matters? Aquinas does 3 9 that finite human reason and will must have answer that question. not come from a Cause which has infinite Of course he did not, although Aquinas intellect and will, since an effect may not would surely have found some merit in proceed from a cause which does not Frank's proposed solution of the problem, include as much as, if not more than, the namely, the voluntary submission of every effect, and because the finite has no sig- judge to a psychoanalyst for the purpose of nificance if there is no infinite? Judge Frank revealing to himself and the whole legal pro- feared dogmatism, and yet Felix Frank- fession his subconscious prejudices, - furter in a eulogy to him in the Summer, tinctive thought processes, and peculiar 1957, issue of the University of mental strengths and weaknesses. 40 But just Law Review wrote: "While he somehow because the finiteness of Aquinas' mind pre- managed to envelop himself in an atmos- vented him from "objectivizing" the work phere of dogmatism, he was singularly free of a judge, it does not follow that "Natural of bias or imprisoning doctrine. '42 In view Law, in the great majority of lawsuits, of this estimate, therefore, was Jerome 4 1 encounters insurmountable subjectivity." Frank's fear of being known as a dogmatist Nor does it follow that because Aquinas' an adequate , if such were the finite reason could not objectivize the legal case (of course I do not know), for his process, it was incapable of perceiving the not becoming a scholastic jurist? principles of the immutable part of the Again, it may be that Jerome Frank did natural law. not fully sense the significance of the his- It may be that Judge Frank did not torical fact that, in the culture of the West- em World, the fundamental and immutable 3 8 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM 337 (1945). part of the objective natural law is unknow- 39 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 366-67 (1949). ingly accepted as a postulate. It is a residue 40 Frank, Some Reflections on Judge Learned

Hand, 24 U. CH. L. REV. 666, 678 (1957). 42 Frankfurter, Jerome N. Frank. 24 U. CHI. L. 41 FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 367 (1949). REV. 625 (1957). 5 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1959 from the days when the Thomistic doctrine diametrically opposed, but asserted by was a dominant influence in. thought and Marxists as objective and immutable. It action. 'It is because of this postulate and seems that there is no sufficient, final author- conformity thereto for the most part that ity behind the ethical controls of non-scho- scholastic jurists, judges and do not lastic jurists, however true their ideals may find it necessary to refer constantly to the be, and that there is no truth behind the divine origin of the natural law, and its characteristic values of Communists, though changeless area. But this does not mean they, like scholastics, believe in absolutes. that in practice it is unimportant whether some ethical principles are immutable. In closing this eulogy of Judge Jerome It is vital that rationally perceived divine N. Frank, may I say that he left an edifying authority be consciously admitted as the example of a mind sincerely and genuinely basis of the Frankian ideals, even on a sympathetic with objective natural law. His strictly pragmatic basis. If these ideals favorable estimate of it came only after he were ever seriously challenged in this coun- had comprehensively compared it with the try, and it would be naive to assert that juridical ideas of the mightiest intellects this could not happen, then the relativity of the past. He found that Thomistic natu- of all intersubjectiveness would be swept ral law afforded a very satisfying solution aside. The effective would then be of many of the absorbing problems which narrowed to the moral ideals of an immu- were created by lack of certainty in law and table natural law, or to those which are particularly in the finding of facts.

SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE does not bring men nearer to Him, Who is (Continued) the model of our manhood. Men are not profession, radiate the influence of . just united by a common bond of nature Everything in the temporal order such as but in the brotherhood of Christ. It is their wealth, genius, scientific achievement and personal relationship to Him that deter- so forth is only of secondary importance in mines their relationship to one another and relation to Christ; progress is wasted if it imparts a new life and spirit to law.