Ibn Al 'Arabī, Hick and Religious Pluralism
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Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2): 145-157, 2008 Ibn al ‘Arabī, Hick and Religious Pluralism Mehmet Sait Reçber* Abstract In this paper, I analyze and give a critical examination of some basic issues of religious pluralism by reference to the mystical philosophy of Muhyi al-Din Ibn al ‘Arabī, who thought that various religious beliefs are to be considered as an outcome of different forms of the divine manifestation. In so doing, in order to show the relevance of Ibn al ‘Arabī’s thought to the contemporary debate of religious pluralism—in the philosophy of religion in particular—I fi rst give a brief description of John Hick’s religious plural- ism. Then I examine Ibn al ‘Arabī’s thinking on the issue and attempt to display the philosophical as well as theological problems it raises. I conclude that Ibn al ‘Arabī’s approach fails to address the problems facing religious pluralism inasmuch as it falls into the trap of a relativism which trivializes philosophical and religious truths-claims and also the ontological commitment of the traditional religious beliefs. Although the diversity of religious beliefs has always been a subject of philosophical and religious concern, it will be no exaggeration to say that it is only in the recent couple of decades that the issue has been so lively debated. The diversity of religions is a fact, but this needs to be carefully distinguished from that the idea of religious pluralism which is advanced as a theoretical explanation for such a phenomenon. The question of the diversity of religious beliefs should be evident: each religion puts forward a different set of religious truth-claims ranging from the nature of God to the human salvation. There is, to start with, a signifi cant difference between the theistic religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam and the non-theistic religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism. The most common feature of the theistic religions is their agreement on the personal nature of God, a conviction which is not shared by the non-theistic religions. However, there are further differences within the theistic as well as non-theistic religions themselves. Thus, for instance, the doctrines of the divine trinity and incarnation, which are essential to the Christian faith, are in sharp contrast to Islamic concept of deity, which forcefully underlines the absolute unity (oneness) and transcendence of God. * Associate Professor of Philosophy of Religion at Ankara University Accepted April 17, 2007 145 Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2) Now, it may seem as a natural disposition to wonder how all these religions can equally be true or justifi ed in their truth-claims. Is there a shared ground behind this diversity? In other words, to what extent is the contention that “all religions refer to the same Being or God” justifi ed? Apart from the naturalistic and, arguably, reductionist explanations for the diversity of religious beliefs, there have been different religious approaches at this point. These attitudes are often characterized as exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Religious exclusivism argues for the truth of just one religion to the exclusion of the others; only the religion can gain warrant or truth and the rest of religions therefore are unwarranted or simply false. The salvation can thus be attained only through the faith and practice of one particular religion. Religious inclusivism, on the other hand, stands for the idea that although the religious truth is ultimately restricted to one religion, the followers of the other religious traditions can somewhat be included in the salvation. And fi nally, religious pluralism holds that all religious traditions are somewhat equally warranted inasmuch as each of them refl ects at least a partial truth with regard to the ultimate religious Reality or Truth. Hence they all can justifi ably lead to salvation [Quinn and Meeker 2000: 3]. Given that faith involves propositional truth-claims one might rightly think that an exclusivist attitude is somewhat inevitable. The truth of any religious belief that p will make any proposition that contradicts with p false. As Ward points out, “To believe a proposition is to think that it is true. To think that it is true is to affi rm that reality is as it is described by that proposition. … Thus an affi rmation by its nature excludes some possible state of affairs; namely, one which would render the proposition false. If an assertion excludes nothing, it affi rms nothing” [1990: 110]. A realist concept of truth thus seems to be essential to the traditional understanding of religious belief.1) Truth therefore matters for one’s faith. The exclusivist standpoint has often been criticized, by the pluralists in particular, to be an ar- rogant attitude refl ecting a self-appreciated superiority to other faiths. John Hick, who is the leading defender of religious pluralism in the contemporary philosophy of religion, thinks that an exclusivist view of religious belief is unjustifi ed and therefore he instead proposes an improvement through a revision or transformation in all major religious traditions [1989: 2]. It is however a question whether a pluralistic view can do justice to the nature of religious belief, apart from the philosophical and theological questions which it seems to have generated. In the greater part of this paper, I shall conduct a critical examination of the credentials of the religious pluralism by a particular reference to the mystical thought of Muhyi al-Din Ibn al ‘Arabī (1164-1240). Before this, however, in order 1) A pluralist such as Hick [1993: 3] too seems to have agreed to this fact. 146 REÇBER: Ibn al ‘Arabī, Hick and Religious Pluralism to see the relevance of Ibn al ‘Arabī’s thought to the contemporary debate, I shall provide a brief account of Hick’s religious pluralism. Hick’s religious pluralism seems to have an epistemological motivation to the extent that he propounds the pluralistic hypothesis as an explanatory answer to various forms of religious experi- ence. Considering varieties of religious experience as instantiated in different religious traditions, the pluralistic hypothesis is meant to provide an explanation by postulating a common reference for them. Each type of religious experience is considered to be a response to the Real. However, the Real in itself, as the Ultimate Reality, is beyond all experiential categories. In developing his pluralistic hypothesis, Hick starts with the observation that the world is religiously ambiguous and this, in his view, makes a naturalistic as well as a religious interpretation of religious experience equally possible. Following a middle route between a naturalistic and a religious interpretation of religious experience, Hick argues for “the third possibility that the great post-axial faiths constitute different ways of experiencing, conceiving and living in relation to the ultimate divine Reality which transcends all our varied visions of it” [1989: 235-236]. What makes the post-axial religious tradi- tions (such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism) particularly distinctive, on this account, is the fact that they all aim at a radical transformation of the human reality from being self- centered to the Reality or Divine-centered. In all these traditions, in Hick’s view, there is an attempt to free the human life from a self-centered state by associating it to a further fact, called it God, Reality or Truth [Hick 1988: 2]. What seems to have led Hick to think that all these diverse religious experiences should be considered in the same boat is his meta-epistemological intuition that all human experience is actively processed by the epistemic make-up of their subjects. At this point, Hick makes a reference to the Muslim Sufi thinker Junaid’s idea that “the colour of the water is the same as that of its container” and also to the similar observation of St Thomas Aquinas that “things known are in the knower according to the mode of the knower” [1989: 240-241]. From this, Hick concludes that all the forms of religious experience are inevitably shaped by the noetic structure of the subjects who are in turn infl uenced by the “religio-cultural systems [in which] … the Real is thought and experienced…”[1989: 241]. At the bedrock of Hick’s thought is the Kantian meta-epistemological intuition that the human mind, through its categories and concepts, regulates our sensory experience or perception. This, along with the Kantian lines, leads Hick to make a distinction of noumena and phenomena in grounding religious experience: the Real in itself is postulated as the noumenal ground of the religious experiential phenomena. Unlike the Kantian categories that are ‘universal and invariable,’ the categories of religious experience, Hick argues, are ‘culture-relative.’ Even so, various phenomenal experiences of the Real are considered to be 147 Asian and African Area Studies, 7 (2) empirically genuine or the authentic manifestations of the Real [1989: 241-244].2) Thus Hick maintains: …our human religious experience, variously shaped as it is by our sets of religious concepts, is a cognitive response to the universal presence of the ultimate divine Reality that, in itself, exceeds human conceptuality. This Reality is however manifested to us in ways formed by a variety of human concepts, as the range of the divine personae and metaphysical impersonae witnessed to in the history of religions. Each major tradition, built around its own distinctive way of thinking- and-experiencing the Real, has developed its own answers to the perennial questions of our origin and destiny, constituting more or less comprehensive and coherent cosmologies and eschatologies. These are human creations which have, by their association with living streams of religious experi- ence, become invested with a sacred authority.